

**NGOs and Humanitarian Reform:**

# **Mapping Study**

## **Sudan Report**

**By:**

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**Commissioned by NGOs and Humanitarian Reform Project**

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*This mapping study is one of a series of five reports commissioned by the NGOs and Humanitarian Reform Project. It is written by an independent consultant and does not necessarily represent the individual views of the project consortium member.*

*NGOs and Humanitarian Reform is a three year consortium project funded by DfID. Member agencies are ActionAid, CAFOD, CARE, International Council of Voluntary Agencies, International Rescue Committee, Oxfam and Save the Children. The consortium was formed to set up and run the project. This project was established to support the effective engagement of international, national and local humanitarian non-governmental agencies (NGOs) in reform efforts. It promotes an integrated approach across policy-relevant research and operational learning to explore what works and does not work in reform informed by the operational experience of NGOs on the ground. The project aims to strengthen the NGO voice in policy debates and field processes related humanitarian reform.*

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## Executive Summary

This report is a mapping study of the engagement of NGOs with the humanitarian reform process in Sudan. It is one of a series of five country studies<sup>1</sup> conducted as part of the NGOs and Humanitarian Reform project. This three year project was developed and managed by an NGO consortium. The consortium members are ActionAid, the Catholic Fund for Overseas Development (CAFOD), Care International UK, the International Council for Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), the International Rescue Committee, Oxfam, and Save the Children. The project was funded by the UK's Department for International Development (DfID).

The project is intended to develop practical guidance and identify best practice for participation by NGOs in reformed humanitarian financing and co-ordination mechanisms at global and country levels. This report focuses on the engagement of NGOs in Sudan with the reform process there. Field-work for the report was carried out in February 2009. Shortly after the field work was completed the Sudanese Government expelled 12 international NGOs (INGOs) and one aid contractor, and closed three national NGOs (NNGOs).

Sudan is the setting for the largest humanitarian operation in the world and it also has the largest Common Appeals Process (CAP) appeal, and has accounted for between one quarter and one third of all common appeals since 2005. The appeal in Sudan is called the *United Nations and Partners Work Plan for Sudan*.

Sudan is at the heart of the whole humanitarian reform process. It was perceptions of poor performance by the humanitarian community here that drove the Humanitarian Reform initiative. Sudan was the first country to have a large Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF). This report examines NGO engagement with the three pillars of the humanitarian reform: funding; coordination; and leadership; as well as the overall enabler of partnership.

Sudan has a range of pooled funding mechanisms, of which the CHF at about US\$150million a year is by far the largest humanitarian fund. Sudan also benefits from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) to a relatively small extent (down to 1.1% in 2008). While the big three UN agencies (the World Food Programme, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and UNICEF) account for the bulk of CHF allocations, NGOs and the Red Cross Movement have enjoyed a larger share of allocations every year. The UN's share of allocations in 2008 was less than two thirds of the total.

The number of NGOs accessing CHF funds has also grown every year and when combined with stagnant or declining funding for the CHF, this has led to smaller and smaller average allocations each year. This has been accompanied by increased transaction costs as requirements for accessing funds have become more complex (in an effort to be fairer) with each year.

The CHF is not used strategically in Northern Sudan. While the allocation to geographic regions is driven by strategy, the allocation within each region to the sectors, and with each sector to the projects is driven more by a "cake-sharing" ethos than a strategic one.

The CHF only accounted for 11% of all Humanitarian Funding in Sudan in 2008. Against a background in 2008 of rising official humanitarian aid both globally and in the Sudan, funding for the CHF declined both in real and percentage terms, suggesting that donors have not been convinced by the mechanism or the lack of

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<sup>1</sup> The five countries are Sudan, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

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strategy. The size of the CHF fund is expected to be significantly less in 2009, largely due to unfavourable exchange-rates for the main donors to the CHF.

In theory the cluster coordination approach was introduced in Sudan in December 2008. In reality it was not, as the agencies had only agreed to introduce it on the understanding that it was a name-change only.

Although the sectors are now called clusters they lack many of the key elements of the cluster system including:

- Collaborative strategy setting
- Co-leadership from NGOs or the Red Cross
- Separation of coordination from agency operational management

NGO interviewees and others repeatedly raised the issue of the perceptions that some cluster coordinators were unduly favouring their own agencies in cluster meetings. It was clear that cluster members did not feel that all clusters were led in a consensual fashion.

The UN has appointed, for the largest humanitarian operation in the world, a Humanitarian Coordinator from a development rather than a humanitarian background. While the HC is well respected, and has deputies with very strong humanitarian experience, she has little humanitarian experience. One of the key elements of the reform is meant to be improved humanitarian leadership. Strong humanitarian leadership is needed to make strategic use of pooled funding, to make the cluster system work properly, and to promote partnership.

Partnership is the glue that holds the whole humanitarian reform process together. Partnership in Sudan is variable depending on the aspect. Partnership is strong in the development of the annual Work Plan, but is weaker in other areas. There is NGO representation on the Humanitarian Country Team but none on the main UN Country Team. National NGOs are not represented on either.

Despite the approval of Saving Lives Together by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in 2006, NGOs have no seat on the Sudan country-wide Security Management Team (SMT) and have only one seat on the Darfur SMT. NGOs in Sudan have been affected by poor decisions on security by the UN.

It is not yet possible to clearly identify what impact, positive or negative, the humanitarian reforms are having on the level of service to the affected populations in Sudan. It remains to be shown that the UN has the capacity to implement the reforms in such a way as to improve humanitarian performance.

Local NGOs face very serious problems in Sudan, with a government that is very suspicious of the sector. While the local NGO sector has been growing in a very difficult environment, it is very limited in size and capacity. This is only likely to change very slowly without a deliberate action to expand the sector.

In Sudan, NGO engagement with the humanitarian reforms has been mainly limited by the lack of reform. Key elements of the humanitarian reform have not been implemented: pooled funds have not been used as a strategic tool; the cluster coordination approach is clusterised in name only; NGOs are not treated as equal partners; and the Humanitarian Coordinator does not have a humanitarian background. All of these issues are linked. Particularly critical is the lack of strong humanitarian leadership.

The humanitarian reforms can only succeed when all elements of the reform are in place. This is not happening in Sudan.

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## Recommendations

The following recommendations are made in the text. The recommendations are hyperlinked to their appearance in the text.

<b>Primary Recommendations</b>	<b>Page</b>
The HC should indicate which sectors are to be the priority sectors within each region.	27
The HC needs to ensure that sectors leads set clear priorities for their sectors in each planning region prior to the development of Work Plan proposals.	28
The CHF should allocate grants for a period from 1 January of the years in question to the first anniversary of the date of disbursement.	28
The CHF should allocate a proportion (say 2% initially) of funding for granting to smaller national NGOs and increase this proportion on an annual basis to match the development of the national NGO sector. This should be supported by providing support services for such NGOs possibly through a strong national NGO or through an international NGO.	28
Lead agencies for the sectors or clusters should not appoint anyone to a cluster leadership role who also has an operational management role within the agency.	32
Donors need to use their financial leverage to push the UN to implement all three pillars of the humanitarian reform, specifically the appointment of qualified Humanitarian Coordinators.	35
The United Nations should only appoint humanitarian coordinators who meet the minimum criteria set out in the 2003 HC terms of reference and the Humanitarian Response Review.	35
NGOs should continue to advocate for, and Donors press for, full access of the UN Security Management Teams in the Sudan in line with the spirit of "Saving Lives Together".	40
Donors should use their financial muscle to insist that decisions on security by the UN are fully considered and are appropriate.	40
The NGO and Humanitarian Reform consortium should make supporting local NGOs in their efforts to get access to the reform processes an explicit part of the job description for any project staff appointed to Sudan.	43
WFP should reconsider its discriminatory policy on the payment of national NGOs. WFP has an interest in developing the capacity of national NGOs to eventually reduce the costs of food distribution.	43
The NGO and Humanitarian Reform Consortium should use the measure developed here to track changes attitudes towards the humanitarian reform process over time.	47

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

<b><i>Term</i></b>	<b><i>Meaning</i></b>
ACF	Action Contre La Faim
BIF	Basic Infrastructure Fund
BSF	Basic Services Fund
CAFOD	Catholic Fund for Overseas Development
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund (from 9 March 2006). Previously the Central Emergency Revolving Fund
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund (it can also refer to the Cooperative Housing Foundation, but not in this report)
DCPSF	Darfur Community Peace Support Fund
DFID	The UK's Department for International Development
DO	Designated Official (the senior UN official in each country who is given responsibility for overseeing the UN's security policy)
DPKO	The UN's Department for Peace Keeping Operations
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
EC	European Commission
ECHA	Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
ECHO	The Humanitarian Office of the European Commission
ERC	Emergency Relief Coordinator (the head of OCHA)
EU	European Union
FTS	Financial Tracking Service
HAC	Humanitarian Aid Commission
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HRSU	Humanitarian Reform Support Unit
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICVA	International Council for Voluntary Agencies
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration (and inter-governmental body that is affiliated to the UN but not part of it)
IRC	International Rescue Committee
LNGO	Local Non-Governmental Organisation
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MOSS	Minimum Operating Standards for Security
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières France
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NNGO	National Non-Governmental Organisation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ORCHC	Office of the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator
RC	Resident Coordinator
RC/HC	Double hatted Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator
RCSO	Resident Coordinator's Support Office



<b><i>Term</i></b>	<b><i>Meaning</i></b>
SMT	Security Management Team
SRF	Sudan Reconstruction Fund
SUDO	Sudan Development Organisation
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDSS	United Nations Department for Safety and Security
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNJLC	United Nations Joint Logistics Centre
UNOCHA	See OCHA
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme

# Map




Figure 1: Map of Sudan showing the UN Planning regions and the 2009 Work Plan totals. Note the figures quote in the report differ slightly as they are based on analysis of the project database.

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# 1 Methodology

## 1.1 Acknowledgements

The consultant would like to acknowledge the assistance of the project manager, Annie Street, who made a preliminary visit to Sudan and set up some of the logistics. Thanks are also due to Michael Irwin for setting up some of the initial appointments, and to Laura Hotchkiss for support in Sudan.

The consultant is also grateful to CAFOD who provided accommodation during the visit.

Special thanks go to all of those who took to time to complete the questionnaire and answer the consultant's questions during what were in some cases, very long interviews. The consultant is grateful also to those who provided documents and other resources.

## 1.2 Constraints

The main constraint was that the research was limited to Khartoum. Originally a visit to Darfur had been planned, but this was cancelled in the context of increasing security concerns around the possible issuing of indictments by the International Criminal Court (ICC). It might also have been useful to visit Southern Sudan where there is a different context for NGO engagement than in the north.

## 1.3 Document Research

The initial research consisted of reviewing a set of documents already in the consultant's library and some additional documents collected by Ralf Otto of Channel Research. Additional documents were collected in the field and as the result of web searches on particular topics. Documents were indexed using dtSearch and the index was searched during the report writing to locate references to topics of interest.

All documents accessed were added to an Endnote bibliographic database.

## 1.4 Questionnaire

After attending the Humanitarian Country Team meeting on arrival, it became clear the some individuals held strong views about the humanitarian reform process and its implementation in Sudan. The consultant therefore developed a survey instrument (questionnaire) to test perceptions of the humanitarian reform.

The survey instrument contained 9 pairs of questions about the humanitarian reform process, with one positive statement and one negative statement each of nine aspects. Respondents were then asked to indicate their agreement with each statement on a five-point Lickert item from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree". These were combined (with the scoring of negative statements reversed) to give an overall score for perceptions of the humanitarian reform process.

Interviewees were asked to fill in the survey instrument at the start of each interview to avoid the risk of the direction of questions biasing the answers. 38 responses were collected during interviews with another 7 responses on a web version of the survey instrument.

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A reliability analysis of the instrument showed that dropping 4 questions gave more reliable results. The survey instrument is presented in Appendix 2 at the end of the report.

## *1.5 Interviews*

The main source of information was the key informant interviews conducted by the consultant. Some individuals were interviewed several times, and also responded to queries by email. The interviews were generally conducted on a semi-structured basis on the basis of non-attribution of what was said to the interviewee.

The interviewer took notes as well as an audio recording (with the permission of the interviewee). The topic list for the interviews can be found in Appendix 4 and the summary of persons met in Appendix 5 . A full list of persons met has not been included because of concerns expressed by some interviewees in the Sudan.

On the advice of the Consortium members in Sudan, the plan to travel to Darfur was abandoned. This took place against a background of increasing concern about the imminent release of the ICC decision on arrest warrants and the possible reactions to any warrants.

## *1.6 Data analysis*

The summary project data was downloaded from the databases at <http://www.unsudanig.org>. This site has been blocked to users in Sudan since last November due to US sanctions, and the site had to be accessed via a proxy website that hid the origin of the HTTP requests from Sudan from the server in the United States.

The project data was then analysed in terms of agency name and agency type to develop an understanding of the level of engagement of NGOs with the Work Plan process and of their success in accessing CHF funding. All amounts given are in US dollars unless otherwise specified.

## *1.7 Triangulation*

The main sources of triangulation were:

- Triangulation between the different key informant interviewees.
- Triangulation between key informant interviewees and analyses of the Work Plan and CHF databases.

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## 2 Context

The research described in this document took place before March 4th when the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against Sudanese president Omar al-Beshir. In the two days following, the Sudanese government expelled twelve international NGOs, expelled one international consulting firm, and dissolved three national NGOs.

The Sudanese Government said that this action was not related to the arrest warrant, but the UN's Emergency Response Coordinator said "*I think its reasonably clear this was a political response to a decision that has nothing to do with the U.N. or any of the NGOs*" (Reuters, 2009).

The international NGOs ordered to leave Sudan were:

- Action Contre La Faim (ACF)
- Solidarités
- Save the Children UK (SC-UK)
- Save the Children US (SC-US)
- Médecins Sans Frontières Holland (MSF-H)
- Médecins Sans Frontières France (MSF-F)
- CARE International (CARE)
- Oxfam GB
- Mercy Corps (MC)
- International Rescue Committee (IRC)
- Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)
- Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF)

The international development consulting firm that was expelled is a USAID contractor and managed part of the USAID portfolio. The consulting firm was:

- Planning and Development Collaborative International (PADCO)

The three national NGOs that were terminated were:

- Sudan Development Organisation (SUDO)
- AMAL Centre for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence
- The Khartoum Centre for Human Rights Development and Environment

References to the impact of these expulsions on the humanitarian environment in Sudan will be made in text-boxes like this throughout the report. Source: (UNOCHA, 2009).

### 2.1 The context of the Sudan

Sudan is the largest country in Africa. Straddling the Nile, it is an enormously diverse country ranging from desert in the north to rain forests in the South. Formerly part of the Ottoman Empire, Sudan was effectively a British colony (though nominally under joint Egyptian-British administration) from 1899 to 1955.

Independence in 1956 soon led to the first military government after a coup in 1958, setting a pattern for the future. In 1962 a ten-year civil war began in the South. This was eventually settled in 1972 by the Addis Ababa peace agreement that made the South a self-governing region of Sudan.

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Oil was discovered in Southern Sudan in 1978, although the logistical difficulties and the conflict mean it is another 21 years before Sudan becomes an oil exporter.

In 1983, a new civil war began in the South and the Sudanese Government introduced Sharia law. The Civil war raged for two decades until a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in January 2005. This was preceded by six agreements on specific aspects signed by the parties from 2002 to 2004. During this war, more than two million died, four million were displaced, and over half a million took refuge in neighbouring countries. The South was left with almost no infrastructure.

However, a range of factors, including concerns that the West of the country was being marginalised, and growing resource conflict between settled populations and herders brought a new conflict in Darfur in 2003. The central government was accused of arming the herders and setting them loose on the settled population. More than two million people are displaced and the death toll is estimated at over 200,000. The US government has described the killing in Darfur as genocide.

Apart from the South and Darfur, other parts of Sudan present problems arising from chronic poverty and under-development.

Thus Sudan encompasses a huge humanitarian crisis in Darfur, humanitarian issues in other parts of the North, and huge reconstruction needs in the South as people return to their home areas.

## 2.2 Humanitarian planning in the Sudan

The main tool for planning the response in Sudan is the *Work Plan of the United Nations and Partners*. This is the name of the Common Appeal Process (CAP) in Sudan. Although the Work Plan is not always seen as a formal part of the humanitarian reform process it is a vital element of it. It is linked to the Common Humanitarian Fund in the Sudan.

While previous Work Plans have included Recovery and Development budget items, the Work Plan for 2009 only included Humanitarian and Early Recovery items. While the Work Plan did include Recovery and Development budget items in earlier years, these were not included as part of the CAP appeal tracking data published by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service. The Sudan Work Plan has proved reasonable as a resource mobilisation tool (Figure 2).

## Funding for the Sudan Work Plan

Note: 2009 pledges are still being made. Source: OCHA FTS




Figure 2: Funding for the Sudan Work Plan 2003-2009 (Data for 2009 up to February only)

It is the largest Common Appeal in the world and has accounted for between one quarter and one third of all common appeals since 2005. However, the Sudan Work Plan has not enjoyed any great advantage in comparison to other CAP appeals. Some years it has been better funded than the average (2004 and 2007), in other years it is worse funded. However, it does seem to be attracting more funding at the start of the year in comparison to other appeals (Figure 3).

### Funding for CAP appeals as proportion of the appeal amount

Note: 2009 pledges are still being made. Source: OCHA FTS (15 Jan 2009)




Figure 3: Average funding for the CAP appeals as of 15 January 2009.

## 2.3 The context of the humanitarian reforms

Sudan is the original home of the UN Humanitarian Reform process. It was poor performance in Darfur that provided the final push for the Humanitarian Reform process. The then UK Secretary of State for International Development specifically referred to the need to strengthen the humanitarian system because "*vulnerable people deserve much better of us than we have given them in Darfur*" (Benn, 2004).

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In the same speech Hilary Benn called for six elements of reform which he summarised two months later (Benn, 2005) as:

- the need for more, and more flexible, funding to be available right from the moment crisis strikes;
- better and stronger Humanitarian Coordinators, with the power and the funds to act;
- greater clarity about who does what in a crisis;
- the development of benchmarks to measure how we perform;
- addressing unequal allocation of resources between crises; and
- more investment in reducing the risk of future disasters.

The Humanitarian Response review (Adinolfi et al., 2005), commissioned by Jan Egeland, then the UN's Emergency Response Coordinator, was published in August 2009. The review focused on the UN system only and the authors noted that while the review provided "*a fairly good picture of the UN family*" it did not provide such a picture of "*the NGO community and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement*" (ibid p. 8).

The Humanitarian Response review made 36 recommendations, and was used as the basis for the Humanitarian Reform project that was managed by the new OCHA Humanitarian Reform Support Unit in Geneva.

These 36 recommendations were translated into the three pillars of the UN's Humanitarian Reform (Loupforest, 2006), that is:

- the cluster coordination approach;
- strengthened humanitarian coordinators; and
- pooled humanitarian funding.

Partnership is sometimes added as a fourth pillar (OCHA, 2007b) or is sometimes described as an overall enabler for the other reforms.

What is key in the reform process is the interlinking of the pillars. Pooled humanitarian funding increases the role of both the clusters and of the humanitarian coordinator. Stronger coordination is needed to manage the clusters and ensure equitable distribution of funding. The clusters system is needed to ensure effective distribution of pooled funds and to reinforce the humanitarian coordinator.

Of course the UN's Humanitarian Reform project is just one part of a whole raft of initiatives to improve the quality of humanitarian action<sup>2</sup>. However it is probably one of the most important ones as it seeks to change the way in which the humanitarian sector as a whole goes about its business.

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<sup>2</sup> These include Red Cross and NGO Code of Conduct, the Sphere Project, the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Partnership in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), the Quality Compass, the People in Aid Code of Good Practice, the Humanitarian Accountability Project-International, the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative, the Humanitarian Performance Index, the Humanitarian Performance Project and others. Wheeler et al. list 7 major UN linked reform initiatives (2005, pp. 2-3). John Borton lists no less than 34 different benchmarking initiatives in the humanitarian sector (Borton, 2008, pp. 2-3).



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## 3 Funding

### 3.1 *The status of the reform*

Sudan is one of the two countries with a large Common Humanitarian Fund - the other is the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Sudan CHF attracts about US\$150 million in funding a year. There are a number of other pooled funds with variable access for NGOs.

Sudan also benefits from the main pooled fund established under the humanitarian reform, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). In March 2006 the CERF replaced the previous Central Emergency Revolving Fund of US\$50million with a grant fund of \$450million per year and a revolving fund of \$50million.

### 3.2 *Lots of pooled funds*

Sudan has many pooled fund arrangements:

- The Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF). Approx US\$150million per year. Managed by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
- The Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund (DCPSF). Approx US\$28.4million since the fund was established in October 2007. Managed by UNDP (DCPSF Technical Secretariat, 2009).
- The Sudan Recovery Fund for Southern Sudan (SRFSS). Approx US\$84.6million since the fund was established in 2008. Managed by UNDP (UNDP, 2009).
- The Basic Services Fund (BSF). Began as a single donor fund with £17million that was due to end in December 2008, but has now attracted funding from other donors. Managed by BMB Mott MacDonald (DIFD, 2007).
- The Multi-Donor Trust Funds, National and South Sudan. The National MDTF had received a total of US\$356million from donors and the South Sudan one US\$199million. Managed by the World Bank (World Bank, 2008).
- The EU's Post-Conflict Community Based Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme (RRP). Total funding of €50million. Managed by UNDP (EU Delegation to the Sudan, 2007).

In addition there are other consortia-based pooled funds from donors such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) that are managed by the consortium lead. Some of the above pooled funds have subsidiary pools that are sub-granted such as the Emergency Response Fund under the CHF.

### 3.3 *Sudan and the CERF*

Since it was established, the CERF has provided funding equivalent to between 1.1% and 3.4% of the total funding<sup>3</sup> for the Work Plan. Note that projects funded under the CERF may be emergency projects that are added to the Work Plan during the year, rather than projects in the original Work Plan.

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<sup>3</sup> Data sources for the CERF funding for Sudan were: (CERF Secretariat, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009).

Table 1: CERF Funding for Sudan. All funds were disbursed under the rapid response window except for US\$6million granted through the underfunded emergency window in 2007.

Year	CERF grants (US\$ million.)	As % of Work Plan funding
2006	35.5	3.4%
2007	25.5	2.3%
2008	16.0	1.1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>77.0</b>	

CERF funds can only be directly accessed by United Nations agencies and IOM. The lack of direct NGO access to CERF funds is a continuing issue for NGOs.

Table 2: Agencies receiving CERF grants in Sudan (Source: CERF website).

<b>Agency</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>Agency total</b>	<b>Agency % of total</b>
<i>WFP</i>	20.9	3.5	9.3	33.7	43.7%
<i>UNICEF</i>	9.9	11.1	4.4	25.4	32.9%
<i>UNHCR</i>	1.5	4.7	1.0	7.2	9.4%
<i>WHO</i>	2.2	3.1	1.0	6.3	8.2%
<i>FAO</i>	1.0	1.3	-	2.3	2.9%
<i>UNDP</i>	-	1.6	-	1.6	2.0%
<i>IOM</i>	-	-	0.4	0.4	0.5%
<i>UNFPA</i>	-	0.2	-	0.2	0.3%
<b>Yearly total</b>	<b>35.5</b>	<b>25.5</b>	<b>16.0</b>	<b>77.0</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

The “Big Three” UN agencies, WFP, UNICEF, and UNHCR, accounted for 86% of CERF funding grants to the Sudan. This contrasts with the CHF, where these three agencies only attracted 56.4% of the funding for UN agencies.




Figure 4: Funding shares for the big three UN agencies compared, (Sources CERF website and [www.unsudanig.org](http://www.unsudanig.org)).

### 3.4 The Common Humanitarian Fund

The CHF owes its origin to Hilary Benn who offered £40 million of DfID humanitarian funding to the Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan in early 2005 for the HC to deploy where the HC judged it was most needed (Benn, 2005, p. 5).

Sudan was the first country to have a Common Humanitarian Fund, a second pilot was later conducted in DRC. The fund ran at about US\$150million for the first three years, but is expected to be at least 20% less for 2009 (due to the fall in the value of the currencies of the contribution nations in dollar terms)<sup>4</sup>.

### 3.4.1 DONORS TO THE CHF<sup>5</sup>

DfID has remained the backbone donor to the CHF, typically providing half the total funding each year. The CHF has also attracted other major donors. Neither USAID nor The Humanitarian Office of the European Commission (ECHO) contribute to the CHF.

Table 3: Contributors to the CHF. Source: [www.unsudanig.org](http://www.unsudanig.org). Note: current status of outstanding pledges is unknown.

<b>Contributors</b>	<b>Millions of US\$</b>		
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>
<i>Denmark</i>	-	-	0.4
<i>Ireland</i>	2.5	3.9	6.3
<i>Netherlands</i>	51.3	37.0	21.6
<i>Norway</i>	10.6	14.0	17.0
<i>Spain</i>	-	9.5	-
<i>Sweden</i>	15.5	17.2	16.7
<i>United Kingdom</i>	88.0	78.7	79.5
<i>Total Contributions</i>	167.9	160.2	141.6
<i>Carry over</i>		4.1	13.0
<i>Other income (interest)</i>		1.0	
<i>Total paid</i>	167.9	165.3	154.6
<i>Danish Pledge</i>		0.4	
<i>Norwegian Pledge</i>		3.1	
<i>Swedish Pledge</i>		2.4	
<i>Spain Pledge</i>			10.6
<i>Total outstanding? pledges</i>		5.8	10.6
<i>Total</i>	167.9	171.2	165.2
<i>Total less carryover</i>	167.9	167.0	152.2

Contributions to the CHF have fallen as a proportion of the total work plan request from 9.1% of the Work Plan in 2006 to 6.6% in 2008. The CHF has also declined as a source of funding.

Table 4: The importance of the CHF as a funding source. (Sources [www.unsudanig.org](http://www.unsudanig.org) and the OCHA FTS)

<b>The CHF as a funding source</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>
<i>CHF as % of Work Plan request</i>	9.1%	8.0%	6.6%
<i>CHF as % of Work Plan funding</i>	16%	14%	11%

<sup>4</sup> DFID's contribution of £40million in 2008 was worth US\$79million. The DFID contribution of £35million for 2009 is worth only US\$50million now. The Norwegian Kroner is now worth only 74% of what it was worth in dollar terms a year ago in dollar terms, the Swedish Kroner 68%, and the Euro 83%. Currently factors alone will reduce the CHF fund by US\$35million.

<sup>5</sup> Note: all information on CHF funding is derived from analysis of data from the CHF database from [www.unsudanig.org](http://www.unsudanig.org).

### 3.4.2 CHF FUND FLOW

The flow of funds through the CHF depends on whether they are funding UN or NGO projects<sup>6</sup>. Allocations to UN agencies are paid directly to them on allocation, whereas payments to NGOs are channelled through UNDP and are released as stage payments against actual expenditures throughout the life of the project. The logic of this discrimination is that the UN agencies get the funds directly, whereas NGOs get funding via UNDP in line with normal UNDP project rules<sup>7</sup>.




Figure 5: Funding flows for the CHF in 2008. Note that due to "no cost extensions" and the fact that the management fee on NGO funding is collected in arrears, some of these flows will only occur in 2009.

The Sankey Diagram (Figure 5) does not show in-country overhead costs for the UN or NGOs. Neither does it show headquarter overhead costs for NGOs. While UN agencies have to pay a standard 7% of project costs as support for headquarters, NGOs practice varies. Some NGOs do not have to pay any contribution to headquarters cost from funding arranged locally; others do, and one large NGO has to pay a fee of 9% to headquarters for locally arranged funding.

<sup>6</sup> For brevity, Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement projects are included in the figures for NGOs

<sup>7</sup> It should be noted that the same difference can be seen in the way that donors fund UN agencies (the whole grant at the start) and NGOs (staged payments against expenditure). UN agencies argue that staged payments bring increased transaction costs and add no advantage.

### 3.4.3 MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS FOR THE FUND

UNDP levies an administrative fee of 1% on all contributions to the fund. It also levies a management fee on funds channelled to NGOs. UNDP's fee income has been rising both because the fee level has increased every year, and because the proportion of CHF funding channelled to NGOs has increased every year. Approximately 40% of the fee income on the fund is paid to UNDP in New York with the remainder for in-country use.

Table 5: Management and administrative costs of the CHF

<b>CHF Fees in US\$millions</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>
<i>Management Fee level</i>	3.5%	5.0%	7.0%
<i>Management Fee</i>	0.9	1.8	3.6
<i>Administration fee</i>	1.7	1.6	1.4
<i>Total UNDP Fees</i>	2.6	3.4	5.0
<i>Fees as % of the contributions</i>	1.5%	2.1%	3.6%

Whereas funds for UN agencies are paid out on allocation, funds for NGOs are paid out in line with a projected cash flow (for the first payment) and actual expenditures (for subsequent payments). This increased the balance of CHF funds in the UNDP bank accounts. The interest earned is credited to the CHF account.

The management fee for funds channelled to NGOs is only charged on completion of the NGO project and submission of the audit report. The publically available reporting on the fund only shows donor contributions and interest. None of the public report located showed:

- The actual amounts charged as management fees.
- The amounts returned from allocations.
- The end-of-year balances of the fund.

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It should be noted that the UNDP administrative and management fee of 3.6% overall is modest in comparison with some of the other funds. The administrative and management fees for the Darfur Community Peace Support Fund (DCPSF) in 2008 totalled 5.5% of disbursements with another 8.4% to cover the technical secretariat direct costs (13.9% of total disbursements, or 16.2% of project disbursements).

The direct costs of the CHF are not shown as such. The CHF makes grants for the support of OCHA, the Office of the Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator (ORCHC), and the Resident Coordinator's Support Office (RCSO). Grants to OCHA, ORCHC, and the RCSO totalled 5.3% of all CHF funding in 2008. However most of this probably supported general coordination processes such as the Works Plan rather than the CHF specifically.

### 3.4.4 WINNERS AND LOSERS

The field work took place just at the end of the allocation process, and many interviewees expressed strong feelings about the CHF. Some were completely opposed, a tiny few were fully in favour, and the majority regarded it as something that had a good potential but needed fixing.

Interviewees generally took an instrumental view of the CHF, and their perceptions of it were often coloured by their success in accessing CHF funding. They viewed it as primarily as a funding mechanism rather than as an incentive for coordination. The reasons for this are complex, but are linked to the failure of the United Nations to implement the Humanitarian Reform in a coherent way. Thus each component appears as a separate facet rather than a consolidated effort to reform the system.

However the original reason for establishing the CHF was not to have a more efficient funding mechanism but because DFID saw the need for "*improved leadership and coordination in countries*" and allocated funds for the CHF to achieve this (Benn, 2005, p. 5).

Typically, NGOs complained the UN agencies were getting an unfair share of the CHF funds. Staff from large UN agencies complained that the CHF had led to a fall in their overall level of support from the CHF donors.

Table 6: The impact of the advent of the CHF on UNHCR's funding for the Sudan.

<b>Contributions to UNHCR Sudan</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>
<i>From Denmark</i>	4.1	2.2	2.8	2.7
<i>From Ireland</i>			0.4	1.0
<i>From the Netherlands</i>		4.4		0.0
<i>From Norway</i>	2.3	9.8	1.5	1.8
<i>From Spain</i>	0.6	2.8	4.0	0.9
<i>From Sweden</i>	3.4	1.5	2.3	1.5
<i>From the United Kingdom</i>		5.8		
<i>Total bilaterally from the CHF Donors</i>	10.5	26.5	11.0	8.0
<i>From the CHF</i>	8.7		16.8	10.1
<i>From the CHF and CHF donors</i>	19.1	26.5	27.8	18.1
<i>Total UNHCR requirements</i>	129.8	122.1	99.8	92.2
<i>Total contributions</i>	105.1	73.1	92.1	70.3
<i>% Funded</i>	81%	60%	92%	76%
<b>CHF and CHF donors as % of funding</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>30%</b>	<b>26%</b>

WFP, UNHCR, and to a lesser extent, UNICEF, all argue that the CHF has diverted funds from them to other agencies. The three agencies are presently conducting a study (with Norwegian Government funding) of the transaction costs involved in pooled funds like the CHF.

Some NGOs bitterly complain that the CHF process favours the UN agencies and that the channelling of donor funds through the CHF robs them of the opportunity to have longer-term bilateral funding from the CHF donors<sup>8</sup>. Not all humanitarian actors access CHF funding. Both the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) family of agencies do not participate in the Work Plan process, a pre-requisite for CHF funding.

However, NGOs (INGOs and NNGOs) have seen their share of CHF allocations increase from 15.2% to 33.9% (including 1.5% for NNGOs) of CHF funds from 2006 to 2008.

<sup>8</sup> DFID is still providing some bilateral funding for NGOs in Sudan. Other donors to the pooled funding mechanism (such as Ireland and Norway) also provide bilateral funding to NGOs through multi-annual programme funding arrangements. However, NGOs point out that the CHF donors are very highly regarded as bilateral donors because they are quite flexible. Data from the UNOCHA Financial Tracking System shows that CHF funding represents less than 10% of all humanitarian funding in the Sudan.

## Share of CHF funds by year




Figure 6: Share of CHF funds by year.

Not only has the proportion of CHF funding been increasing each year from 2006 to 2008, but the NGOs also get a larger part of their funding for Work Plan projects from the CHF than UN agencies do.

Table 7: CHF funding as a proportion of the amounts requested in the Work Plan by agency type.

<b>CHF as % of Work Plan request</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>
<i>UN</i>	8.6%	7.3%	5.6%
<i>INGO (and foreign Red Cross)</i>	12.8%	11.4%	10.3%
<i>NNGO (and Sudanese Red Crescent)</i>		3.2%	7.7%

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However, the CHF has seen more and more requests each year. This has led to increasing numbers of grants. Thus, on one level, there is very high INGO and increasing NNGO engagement with the CHF.

Table 8: The number of CHF grants per year by agency type

<b>Number of CHF grants</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>
<i>UN</i>	13	262	282
<i>INGO (and foreign Red Cross)</i>	39	200	247
<i>NNGO (and Sudanese Red Crescent)</i>		3	21
<i>Total</i>	52	465	550

### 3.4.5 THE CHF ALLOCATION PROCESS

The CHF grant allocation process is complex. There is an advisory board and the CHF secretariat prepares a policy paper to aid allocation decisions. The first decision on allocation is taken around the allocation of CHF funds to country level budgets and then to the regions.

The UN has established eight planning regions in Darfur. One of these is national (the National Programme) and seven are geographic. The allocation by planning region is strategic. While Darfur accounts for about half of all the Work Plan funding (48% in 2009) it accounts for less CHF funding than Southern Sudan. This in part reflects a deliberate choice to prioritise the South as agencies regard it as easier to get bilateral funding for Darfur.

Table 9: Allocations of CHF Funds by planning region for 2007 and 2008

<b>CHF allocation by region</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>
<i>Southern Sudan</i>	38.3%	35.3%
<i>Darfur</i>	26.2%	30.5%
<i>National Programme</i>	17.0%	10.2%
<i>Southern Kordofan</i>	7.0%	7.7%
<i>Eastern States</i>	2.3%	6.2%
<i>Blue Nile</i>	4.7%	4.0%
<i>Khartoum and other Northern States</i>	2.7%	3.4%
<i>Abeyei</i>	1.8%	2.8%

However, the allocations process generally stops being strategic at the planning region level. In each planning region, except for Southern Sudan<sup>9</sup>, the available funds are then allocated to sectors, and the sectors then allocated them to individual projects.

Interviewees used a variety of terms to describe these two parts of the allocation process including: *horse-trading; cake-sharing, a market; a souk; a bazaar; animals at a trough pushing each other aside*. Decisions on the allocation are made in a semi-democratic way by the parties who hope to benefit from the allocation. The discussion at the allocation meetings is not about strategy or priorities but about percentages and amounts. Several interviewees pointed out that this competition for funding, and the perception that some sector leads are abusing their position to give priority to funding their own programmes, are promoting discord rather than coordination in some sectors.

There are two sides to the size of CHF allocation.

- The fixed costs involved in participating in the process, such as the staff time involved in the proposals, mean that larger CHF allocations make more sense as the fixed costs are a smaller proportion of the whole grant.
- Smaller grants are more appropriate for Local and some national NGOs that have a relatively limited capacity.

However medium and large INGOs find that the costs of participating in the process are very high if the grant size is only US\$200,000. Several interviewees made the point that at this level, CHF funding was only top-up funding as no significant project could be based on so narrow a financial base. When it comes to the meeting, everyone is looking at the cake and few are willing to give up their chance at a slice. Nevertheless, the number of players has increased each year.

Table 10: The number of agencies accessing CHF funding by year

<b>Agency type</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>
<i>UN</i>	13	16	19
<i>INGO</i>	39	44	63
<i>NNGO</i>		1	13
<i>Total</i>	52	61	95

The popularity of the CHF has led to increasing numbers of grants from a pot that is not growing, and the inevitable result is that the grant size has fallen (Table 11).

<sup>9</sup> The Deputy Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator in Southern Sudan uses a different approach where allocations within the region are on a priority rather than a "cake-sharing" basis.



Table 11: Average CHF grant size by agency type (all amounts in US\$)

<b>Agency type</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>
<i>UN</i>	10,812,856	431,453	359,120
<i>INGO</i>	645,837	180,851	200,591
<i>NNGO</i>		32,667	108,670
<i>Average per grant</i>	3,187,592	321,094	278,364

Smaller grants have led to increasing frustration with the CHF, as almost the same amount of work is needed for a small grant application as for a large one. Worse, in an effort to make the allocation process fairer, the transaction costs of accessing CHF funding and meeting the project requirements have increased each year.

The frustration for those accessing the fund is that, despite the small grant size, it still represents a significant financial resource (Table 6).

Table 6: Average agency funding from the CHF by agency type (amounts in US\$).

<b>Agency type</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>
<i>UN</i>	10,812,856	7,065,038	5,330,102
<i>INGO</i>	645,837	822,048	786,444
<i>NNGO</i>		98,000	175,544
<i>Average per agency</i>	3,187,592	2,447,684	1,611,579

Small grants, the exclusion of some types of support costs, the lack of transparency in the allocation process, and the sectoral nature of the fund<sup>10</sup>, mean that CHF funding is top-up funding for many agencies in Northern Sudan rather than strategic funding.

Between them, the expelled INGOs accounted for 23% of all CHF grants to INGOs in 2008. The terminated NNGO accounted for 27% of all CHF grants in 2008.

However, these figures understate the importance of these NGOs as they were some of the main implementing partners for UN agencies. Three of the expelled NGOs did not participate in the Work Plan or CHF process, but were still active in humanitarian programmes.

The main operational UN agencies said that the "*suspended NGOs account for more than half of the capacity for the aid operation in Darfur*" (UNICEF et al., 2009).

CHF grants are made on an annual basis. In 2006 the grants for that year were allocated and disbursed in the autumn, nine or ten months after the notional start of the funded projects. CHF grant allocation and disbursement has improved every year, with allocations in February in 2009 and disbursements expected in March. However, even delays of a few months are a problem for agencies working in the South as the wet season means that construction is not possible in the middle of the year.

When asked to rate CHF funding against other donors, agencies varied in their rating. Some rated it very low because of the transaction costs, others rated it relatively high because it was more flexible than some other funding sources.

<sup>10</sup> Multi-sectoral programmes and projects are the norm for many UN agencies and NGOs.

However, it should be remembered that the CHF was founded not to be an effective funding source, but to increase the authority of Humanitarian Coordinators. This was the rationale behind the founding of the CHF.

*We also need improved leadership and coordination in countries. In the worst crises, the Secretary General should be able to authorise his Humanitarian Coordinators to direct the different UN agencies, on the basis of one assessment of need, using one common plan and drawing on one source of funding. I have now offered £40 million of DfID humanitarian funding for the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan, for him to deploy it where he judges it is most urgently needed. (Benn, 2005, p. 5).*

The extent to which the CHF has enabled this is discussed in the section on leadership.

### 3.5 The Future

The CHF will be significantly smaller in 2009 due to contributions from the main donors being in currencies which have declined in values against the US dollar since a year earlier. However, even in 2008, contributions to the CHF were lower than in the previous two years (Table 3) and accounted for a lower proportion of funding within Sudan (Table 4). This was against a background where 2008 saw the highest levels ever of official humanitarian aid, both in real terms and as a proportion of all Official Development Assistance (Figure 7)<sup>11</sup>.

#### Official Humanitarian Aid: All Donors

Source: OECD DAC Table 1, 22 April 2009. 2008 numbers are provisional.




Figure 7: Official Humanitarian Aid: 1990-2008 (provisional)

This contrast between increased global funding and increased funding for Sudan against declining funding for the CHF mechanism suggests that donors overall have not found the CHF to be a very convincing mechanism in Sudan. This may be due to the failure to manage the CHF resources in a more strategic way.

<sup>11</sup> This is not just an exchange rate artefact, as Figure 7 also shows that official humanitarian aid from the EU also increased significantly from 2007 to 2008 and was the second highest value on record, being exceeded only by 2006.

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The trend shown in 2008, coupled with lower contributions and the exchange-rate driven decreases in 2009, suggest the vigorous action is needed if the CHF is to survive.

### 3.6 Conclusions

The CHF has attracted reasonable donor support, but donor support has not grown as fast as agency interest in the fund. This has led to decreasing grant sizes from the fund. The value of the CHF is expected to fall substantially in 2009 due to the fall in donor currencies against the US dollar.

The CHF is an important source of funding for NGOs in Sudan, and is increasingly supporting national NGOs. Although their share is rapidly growing, national NGOs received only for 1.5% of all CHF funding in 2008. While the bulk of CHF funds go to UN agencies, their share has fallen from 84.8% in 2006 to 66.1% in 2008. However, some of the funding for the UN will also be passed on to NGOs as implementing partners for UN agencies. However, UN financial reports are not sufficiently transparent to establish what proportion of their funding has been passed onto NGO partners.

However, the CHF as presently used in Sudan is not a good funding source for agencies. The lack of a clear strategy, the small grant size, the high transaction costs, an allocation process dominated by sector leads who also need the funding, and the lack of predictability all limit the usefulness of CHF as a funding source.

The lack of strategy also means that the opportunities for the HC to gain the maximum benefit from the fund, through shaping the programmes of UN agencies and NGOs, is being missed to some extent. The CHF is treated as a funding source rather than a policy instrument.

Applying for CHF funds is complex and places a huge administrative demand on national NGOs. Creating a vibrant national NGO sector is an implied priority of the humanitarian reform because they can enable more efficient, appropriate and timely humanitarian response. Specifically, national NGOs generally offer:

- A lower cost base. There is very clear in the Sudan where WFP pays a lower rate to national NGOs for handling food than to international NGOs<sup>12</sup>.
- Better links with the community and a deeper understanding of their context. This is critical because such an understanding allows the design of appropriate humanitarian response in advance of detailed needs assessment.
- More timely interventions after disasters. Beneficiary surveys generally demonstrate the initial help in major disasters comes from local sources rather than international ones

These factors suggest that it may be appropriate to allocate a fixed proportion of CHF funding exclusively to this group of actors.

### 3.7 Recommendations

The current allocation process is not strategic beyond the allocation to planning regions. A more strategic allocation process is needed.

Recommendation 1     ***The HC should indicate which sectors are to be the priority sectors within each region.***

The current allocation process is not very transparent.

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<sup>12</sup> This is unfair, especially as national NGOs often do not have much in the way of private donations to cross subsidise work for the UN.

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Recommendation 2

***The HC needs to ensure that sectors leads set clear priorities for their sectors in each planning region prior to the development of Work Plan proposals.***

Grants are made on a calendar year basis, but the first disbursement occurs several months into the year.

Recommendation 3

***The CHF should allocate grants for a period from 1 January of the years in question to the first anniversary of the date of disbursement.***

Developing the national NGO sector should be a humanitarian priority because of the advantage that they offer in terms of reaching the affected population. However, at present, it is difficult for national NGOs to meet all the administrative hurdles involved in accessing CHF funds.

Recommendation 4

***The CHF should allocate a proportion (say 2% initially) of funding for granting to smaller national NGOs and increase this proportion on an annual basis to match the development of the national NGO sector. This should be supported by providing support services for such NGOs possibly through a strong national NGO or through an international NGO.***

Large national NGOs could continue to compete with INGOs for the rest of the CHF funding.

## 4 Coordination

### 4.1 Overall

NGOs are very strongly engaged in coordination mechanisms in Sudan. This is due in part to the need to be engaged to have access to CHF funding, and to the security context in Sudan.

#### **Disappearing Benchmarks**

One of the aims of the humanitarian reform was to the establishment of benchmarks for humanitarian response. Hilary Benn called for these in the Keeping our Promises speech (Benn, 2005). Three of the first four recommendations of the Humanitarian Response Review were about establishing benchmarks (Adinolfi et al., 2005, p. 16). There benchmarks referred to broader processes such as preparedness, coverage and access.

However, benchmarks in practice have been relegated to relatively narrow technical criteria within the different clusters.

There is no benchmark, for example, on how quickly an OCHA team should be on the ground after a disaster or on how long it should take to make the first CERF application or Flash Appeal. Neither are there benchmarks on partnership.

### 4.2 Clusters or sectors?

The first pillar of the humanitarian reform is the cluster coordination system. The Humanitarian Country Team opted to introduce the cluster system in December 2008. However, this decision was taken on the understanding that this was a semantic change and that the adopting of the cluster system would not make any difference whatsoever to the existing coordination arrangements.

There are no formal benchmarks for whether a particular coordination arrangement is a cluster or a sector. This is one of the reasons why there is so much variability across countries in the application of the cluster coordination system.

Although the sectors are now called clusters they lack many of the key elements of the cluster system including:

- Collaborative strategy setting
- Co-leadership from NGOs or the Red Cross
- Separation of coordination from agency operational management

It is often represented that the obligation of the cluster leads to be the provider of the last resort is a key element, but this is a red herring. Acting as provider of last resort is subject to both the availability of resources and to security. If there is secure access, and there are resources available, there is normally no need for the cluster lead to act as the provider of last resort. It is only when these are missing that the problem arises, but then there is no obligation to act as the provider of last resort.

### 4.3 Cluster interest or agency interest?

Interviewees made complaints that some of the sector leads put their agency responsibility ahead of their cluster responsibility. This perception is

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shared widely, not only by NGOs but also by donors and some UN staff. Interviewees gave examples of where sector leads had made decisions favouring their own agencies.

This is a critical issue that threatens the whole functioning of the cluster system. The suspicion that cluster leads are abusing their position is corrosive of the kind of collaborative relationship built on trust that is needed to make the clusters work. The lack of strong humanitarian leadership means that the individual cluster leads are not challenged by the HC on such issues, but are left to organise their cluster themselves.

The CHF allocation process brought such issues to a head and led to much criticism of the dual role of sector leads, with responsibility not only for sector coordination but also for operational management within their own agencies.

#### 4.4 A study in coordination - the soap question

It is useful to look at a concrete example to illustrate the issues around coordination in Sudan. Soap is a standard distribution item. It plays a role in controlling diarrhoeal disease (Curtis and Cairncross, 2003). This is important as outbreaks of diseases such as cholera are always a source of concern when dealing with displaced populations in the tropics.

UNICEF has adopted the Sphere standards. Non-food items standard 2: personal hygiene states that:

*Each disaster-affected household has access to sufficient soap and other items to ensure personal hygiene, health, dignity and well-being.*

The Sphere Handbook then goes on to give the following key indicators:

- *Each person has access to 250g of bathing soap per month*
- *Each person has access to 200g of laundry soap per month (Sphere Project, 2004, p. 232)*

In Sudan, UNICEF took over responsibility for the soap procurement and main distribution system in 2006 from the non-food item (NFI) common pipeline (managed by the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre ). The soap distributions standard (for all purposes) was two and a half pieces per person per month in Darfur and two pieces per person per month in other areas (weight given by interviewees as 100g per piece).

In 2008 the Darfur soap ration was reduced to two pieces per person per month. In that year 1,750 tonnes of soap were distributed, against the requirement of 3,500 tonnes. The shortfall was due to a lack of funding. However in 2009 it looked as if funding was going to be a severe constraint and UNICEF expected to have no more than 870 tonnes for distribution.

The UNICEF Sector Lead circulated a concept paper in November 2008 setting out three options: first, hope for funding for the full requirement; second, plan for the same level of funding as for 2008; or third, plan for the apparent 2009 funding and half the amount of soap. The concept paper favoured the second option.

NGOs were not happy that in previous years UNICEF had signed Project Cooperation Agreements where UNICEF had undertaken to supply particular quantities of soap and had not done so. They complained even with a stated ration of 200g per person per month in 2008, the average was only 100g per person per month.

UNICEF maintains that the soap issue was fully discussed and that there was a consensus on introducing a new lower standard. Some of the main NGOs involved in soap distribution dispute this.

UNICEF also suggested that the previous soap ration was too generous and that soap was ending up in the market. Distributed items end up in the market because the recipient populations have needs that are not met by relief agencies and relief items to meet those needs. Items are sold in terms of their relative attractiveness to the market and one can even find well appreciated items being sold<sup>13</sup>.

Second, there is a question of how much soap is needed to control diarrhoeal disease. The Sphere Standard appears to be based on best practice drawn on documents like the 1981 UNHCR manual rather than on any particular study<sup>14</sup>. While there is a large literature on the impact of handwashing and of soap on diarrhoeal disease, the only study discussing the impact of distribution amounts that the author could locate was a 1998 paper that found that where 200g of soap was distributed per person per month:

- Soap was found in the house 38% of the time.
- The presence of soap was associated with 27% fewer episodes of diarrhoea (Peterson et al., 1998, p. 520).

Prima facie, this study suggests the 200g of soap per person per month may not be adequate given the low availability of soap in the household; however, it is not known if the missing soap had been used or sold.

The minutes of the WASH meeting of 21 January record that the issue was discussed and that the reduced ration was agreed. UNICEF also announced that this decision would also be binding on other sector members even if they accessed soap from other sources.

Now, under the cluster system, if there had been full discussion of the issue a collective decision would effectively be binding on all the members<sup>15</sup>. However, NGO interviewees stated that there had not been a full discussion on this issue. Some were outraged at the suggestion that this decision would then be binding on all.

The evaluator is not in a position to judge where the truth lies among the contested facts here. The cluster approach can only work where decisions are taken on a consensual basis, and where there is a perception that a consensus was reached. It is very clear that no consensus was reached in the cluster on this issue.

The issue here is that strong humanitarian leadership is needed to keep the cluster leads on track and provide a ready appeal for NGOs unhappy with the decisions of cluster leads. Strong humanitarian leadership would address questions like the soap issue and resolve it one way or the other, rather than leave it hanging as an irritant in the relationship.

## 4.5 Conclusions

NGOs are strongly engaged in the sector coordination mechanism in Sudan. However, despite the decision to adopt the cluster system in Sudan, the clusters are still working as if they were sectors.

The non-separation of sector leadership from agency operational responsibility lends itself to the perception that sector leads sometimes take advantage of their position. As noted earlier, this is a particular problem with the allocation of CHF funds. This perception reduces the moral authority of the sector lead and may damage

<sup>13</sup> Previously in Sudan, the author has seen food deficient families selling part of their favourite items in the food basket to get cash because these commanded the best price in the market.

<sup>14</sup> This is a general problem with the Sphere Standards, in that only some of them are research based.

<sup>15</sup> The OCHA training material for cluster leads set out the consensual nature of cluster leadership very clearly (OCHA, 2007a).

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coordination. None of the sectors have NGO co-leads at present. NGOs complain that sector policies are not set in a clear and transparent way in all sectors.

## 4.6 Recommendations

Many problems in coordination stem from the lack of segregation of agency management roles from sector coordination roles.

Recommendation 5    ***Lead agencies for the sectors or clusters should not appoint anyone to a cluster leadership role who also has an operational management role within the agency.***



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## 5 Leadership

### 5.1 *A pillar of the reform*

Leadership of the humanitarian sector is one of the three pillars of the reform. Strong humanitarian leadership is needed to:

- Ensure the successful working of the cluster system and to protect cluster leads from agency agendas.
- Ensure that any pooled financial resources are used to meet strategic needs in the humanitarian sector.

This supporting role is not one way - the cluster coordination system is intended in turn to support the central role of the Humanitarian Coordinator, as is the pooled funding system<sup>16</sup>.

Without strong humanitarian leadership, humanitarian reform is like a three-legged stool with only two legs.

### 5.2 *The problems with the previous system*

The Resident Coordinator (RC) is the UN's representative in country, whose primary responsibility is advocacy for the United Nations System including supporting the advance of the UN system objectives and mandates and following up on UN global conferences (United Nations, 1999, pp. 1-2). Clearly this role can only be implemented through prioritising good relations with the government.

Prior to the humanitarian reform, the norm was for RCs to be appointed as Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs) also: the so-called 'double-hatted' RC/HC. The Humanitarian Response Review noted that many actors across the humanitarian sector did not approve of the double-hatted RC/HC position. Common objections were that RC/HCs were usually from a development background and had little knowledge of the humanitarian system, and that RC/HCs were reluctant to confront the government on humanitarian issues because of fear of damaging the good relations so necessary for their RC role.

The review concluded that in order to meet their role, the following skills were essential for a Humanitarian Coordinator

- independence from any agency, including his/her mother entity
- a neutral position vis-à-vis the host government
- strong humanitarian experience and a mix of operational diplomatic and negotiation skills

The review also noted that the responsibility for such a function does not allow wearing more than two 'hats' at any one time (Adinolfi et al., 2005, pp. 48-49). At the same time the OCHA/DPKO report<sup>17</sup> on integrated missions recommended that where there was an integrated mission the HC be double-hatted as a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG).

It should be clear that RC and HC have different roles, responsibilities and constituencies. They also have different reporting lines, with the HC reporting to the

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<sup>16</sup> As noted earlier, this was explicitly stated by Hilary Benn as the reason for creating the pooled fund.

<sup>17</sup> E. Barth Eide et al., (2005) Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations. New York: United Nations/ECHA.

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ERC in New York and the RC reporting to the Head of UNDP. The primary constituency for the RC is the UN system and the Government. An RC can end their career by angering either of these. The primary constituency for the HC is the operational humanitarian agencies, be they UN, Red Cross Movement, nor NGOs.

INGOs are really a bit of a nuisance for an RC who has other, broader concerns to think about. The RC has to deal with the UN agencies, the government, and the diplomatic community. In comparison to these three, NGOs are far more numerous and less important in terms of the RC's role.

By contrast, NGOs are a critical resource for the HC. NGOs, with the Red Cross Movement, are the leading edge of humanitarian intervention. Even the UN humanitarian agencies typically implement their operations through NGOs, and parts of the Red Cross Movement.

This lack of importance of NGOs to the RC's role explains why the CHF was not really welcome when first offered to Sudan. The then RC/HC saw it as a nuisance. A contrast to this is the Deputy RC/HC in Southern Sudan who has a very strong humanitarian background. This year she has effectively seized control of the allocations in Southern Sudan as a tool for pushing strategic policy<sup>18</sup>. This was what the CHF was intended for in the first place. Clearly the lesson here is that strong humanitarian leadership is a prerequisite for an effective pooled funding mechanism.

### 5.3 Leadership under the humanitarian reform

In February 2005 Hilary Benn said on leadership *"I would like to see OCHA open up the recruitment process for Humanitarian Coordinators beyond the UN family, to include experienced people from NGOs."* The UN took up this challenge and eventually created a pool for trained HCs which invited applications from individuals outside the UN. OCHA continues to advertise for applications for this pool.

However, all the existing members of the RC pool were added to the HC pool without any assessment of their skills. This had led to the ludicrous situation where one of the aims of the HC pool development is to *"increase the share of individuals with humanitarian experience"*, acknowledging that many potential Humanitarian Coordinators have no humanitarian experience whatsoever (OCHA Humanitarian Reform Support Unit, 2008). This conflicts with the requirement even in the 2003 Terms of Reference that *"The Humanitarian Coordinator is expected to possess specific knowledge and experience of the humanitarian environment and to have demonstrated leadership in complex emergencies"* (United Nations, 2003, p. 1).

Only one Humanitarian Coordinator from a non-UN background has been appointed. However the Ugandan Government did not recognise her appointment<sup>19</sup> and no further appointment of anyone from a non-UN background has been made.

Nor is the UN appointing stand-alone HCs even from a UN background. As of 25 August of 2008 (the last date for which data could be found) there were 26 HCs appointed, but only one of these (in Myanmar) was a stand-alone HC.

Clearly it would be extremely difficult if not impossible for a candidate from a non-UN background to fill the RC role. Thus, adopting the double hatted RC/HC as the norm means that only those with a UN background can take the HC role.

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<sup>18</sup> The Deputy RC/HC in Darfur also have a strong humanitarian background, but is more constrained by the context in Darfur.

<sup>19</sup> The reasons are complex and various explanations are offered, including that the whole appointment process was very badly handled, and that the Ugandan Government objected to the appointment of a stand-alone Humanitarian Coordinator as Uganda is not a failed state, one of the conditions where stand-alone HCs have been appointed in the past.

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However this is what the IASC has done. The IASC has decided to abandon the idea of having separate HCs, and that double-hatted RC/HCs will once again be the norm<sup>20</sup>. However, in what can only be described as a cruel confidence trick, OCHA continues to advertise for non-UN applicants for the HC pool with the current applications closing on 16 March 2009 (OCHA HRSU, 2008).

The commitment of the United Nations to the whole humanitarian reform process must be questioned when it can be seen that the terms of reference for humanitarian coordinators (United Nations, 2003) have not been changed since the last revision in 2003<sup>21</sup>.

## 5.4 Leadership in Sudan

In Sudan, the RC/HC is also the nominal head of UNDP and the DSRSG. It is clearly impossible for one individual to fulfil all these different and sometimes conflicting roles, especially in such a large and complex situation as the Sudan.

Whatever her personal qualities<sup>22</sup>, it is not appropriate that the largest humanitarian operation in the world be led by a development specialist rather than a humanitarian specialist.

This is not an abstract academic issue. Interviewees gave instances of where they felt that humanitarian issues had been sidelined because they were subsumed by RC issues. The next section will deal with instances where partnership is weaker than it might be under a separate HC.

## 5.5 Conclusions

Since the reform process began the IASC has abandoned one of the three pillars, that of trained humanitarian coordinators. Instead the IASC has adopted the double-hatted HC/RC model as the norm. This threatens the whole humanitarian reform process, as one of the three legs of the humanitarian reform is missing.

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## 5.6 Recommendations

The humanitarian reform cannot achieve its aims unless all three pillars are in place. Common funding and the clusters coordination system both need strong humanitarian leadership to be effective.

Recommendation 6 ***Donors need to use their financial leverage to push the UN to implement all three pillars of the humanitarian reform, specifically the appointment of qualified Humanitarian Coordinators.***

Humanitarian Coordinators must, at a minimum, meet the requirement in the terms of reference for HC and the criteria suggested by the Humanitarian Response Review.

Recommendation 7 ***The United Nations should only appoint humanitarian coordinators who meet the minimum criteria set out in the 2003 HC terms of reference and the Humanitarian Response Review.***

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<sup>20</sup> Statement by OCHA representative at the Global WASH meeting in January 2009.

<sup>21</sup> There is a revised version circulating in the IASC at present, but the reform process began nearly four years ago in 2005. However this revised version makes no reference to the need for the HC to have any humanitarian experience whatsoever (IASC, 2009).

<sup>22</sup> And interviewees made clear that the RC/HC has many excellent qualities and is very able.

## 6 Partnership

Partnership is the glue that holds the whole process together. Sometimes it is even added as the fourth pillar of the reform (OCHA, 2007b). However, it might be more correct to think of the humanitarian reform as a chariot wheel, where the spokes of the reform are kept in place by the steel band of partnership around the wheel (Figure 8).

The chariot wheel is probably a more accurate representation of the reform than that given by showing the reform as pillars holding up a roof. The whole reform revolves around donor support, but without partnership, and the willing involvement of non-UN humanitarian actors, the reform will not go anywhere. The spokes also make clear the interdependence of the different elements of the reform.

The chariot wheel of humanitarian reform




Figure 8: The chariot wheel of humanitarian reform

## 6.1 Partnership in the Sudan

Partnership in the Sudan is variable depending on the aspect. Some areas of partnership are weak, and others are strong. One of the areas where strong partnership is evident is in the annual work plan of the UN and partners.

There is an INGO presence on the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). Interviewees said that the INGOs' voice is heard on the HCT, and that the amount of influence it has varies on the topic. There is no national NGO representation on the HCT. Neither is there any NGO presence, national or international on the UN Country Team. Some interviewees made the point that national NGO representation on the HCT would be difficult in a context where the "official" national NGO coordination structure is seen as being a creature of the government.

Although it is not a formal element of the humanitarian reform as such, the Common Appeals Process (known as the "Work Plan of the UN and Partners" in Sudan) is a key reform process. It promotes a joint definition of needs in Sudan and helps to mobilise resources.

Each year has seen an increase in the number of NGOs submitting projects to the Work Plan (Table 7). A number of NGOs do not participate in the Work Plan process, most notably the MSF family, because of concerns about such participation compromising humanitarian principles.

Table 7: Numbers of organisations participating in the Work Plan of the UN and Partners: (Source: the Work Plan data base on [www.unsudanig.org](http://www.unsudanig.org).)

Type	2006	2007	2008	2009
UN	19	23	21	21
INGO	70	78	98	98
NNGO	20	14	43	45
Total	109	115	162	164

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Over time, there has been an upward trend in the share of NGO projects in the total Work Plan budget (Table 14:).

Table 14: Percentage of the total value of Work Plan requests by organisational type. (Source: the Work Plan data base on [www.unsudanig.org](http://www.unsudanig.org).)

Type	2006	2007	2008	2009
UN	89.2%	82.8%	78.0%	78.9%
INGO	10.7%	17.0%	20.7%	19.7%
NNGO	0.1%	0.2%	1.3%	1.4%

However, from several interviewees it was quite clear that for some NGOs participation in the Work Plan was instrumental. Although the CHF is independent of the Work Plan process, projects can only be considered for regular CHF funding if they are included in the Work Plan. In addition, some donors are unwilling to fund projects that are not included in the Work Plan<sup>23</sup>.

In theory the Work Plan should be a strategic statement of the needs in Sudan. Interviewees made clear that the Work Plan is not strategic, but a collage of projects. Interviewees noted that they would be doing the same projects in any case, and just submit their plans to the Work Plan process.

<sup>23</sup> If donors fund projects outside the Work Plan then that reduced that donor's share of contributions to the Work Plan in Sudan.

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There is no coherent strategy underlying the work plan as a whole. Some agencies develop their projects through their own individual strategic processes but there is no overall strategy for the Work Plan as a whole. It is simply the sum of the individual project proposals.

A strategy cannot even be implied from the project proposals. Some of the Work Plan submissions are not even serious statements of agency intent. Some are simply agencies putting a "toe in the water" to see if funding would be available for the activity.

The expulsions and the Work plan.

Ten of the expelled INGOs account between them for 25% of the INGO value of INGO Work Plan projects for 2009. CARE and IRC are the two INGOs with the largest Work Plan portfolio and NRC is the forth largest.

The terminated NNGO accounts for 17% of NNGO Work Plan projects for 2009. SUDO has the largest Work Plan portfolio of any of the NNGOS. These figures understate the importance of the agencies concerned as they do not include the work that they do as implementing partners for the United Nations agencies.

Participation in the Work Plan process is more difficult for local and national NGOs, especially those in the North with no Khartoum representation. All of the Work Plan process is in English, although there is some training in Arabic.

## 6.2 Partnership and security

Security is a serious issue for NGOs and other humanitarian actors in Sudan. Violence and the threat of violence are a constant problem in some parts of the country. In 2006 the United Nations published *"Saving Lives Together"*, with the hope that it *"would further increase the collaboration between the UN system and its humanitarian partners to improve the operational security environment for all organizations involved in humanitarian response"* (United Nations, 2006).

However, despite the seriousness of the security situation in Sudan, some of this hope has gone unfulfilled. Although *"Saving Lives Together"* states that *"INGOs and NGOs may participate in relevant meetings of the UN Security Management Team"* (United Nations, 2006, p. 1), NGOs have had no access to the Sudan-wide Security Management Team meetings, but only to the Darfur Security Management team meetings.

NGOs raised this issue with both the SRSG and the ERC, but it was clear that the opposition to UN membership of the Sudan-wide Security Management Team meetings came from the RC/HC. Thus it would seem that the humanitarian partnership is being damaged by the double-hatting of the RC/HC.

This is not the only place where partnership is lacking in security. There are two Designated Officials (DO) for security in Sudan: one in Darfur, and the other covering the rest of Sudan. The DO plays an important role in setting the UN security phase, either deciding on the lower phases, or advising the UN's Department of Staff Safety in New York on introduction of the higher phases (4 and 5).

The five UN security phases (UNHCR, 1992) are:

- Phase 1: Precautionary
- Phase 2: Restricted movement
- Phase 3: Relocation
- Phase 4: Programme suspension

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- Phase 5: Evacuation

Under the UN's Minimum Operating Standards for Security (MOSS) different levels of precautions are needed under different levels of security. Typically, personal body armour would be required for UN staff working in Phase 4 areas.

There are also implications for staff payments and benefits with different allowances being paid between Phase 2 and Phase 3 for example. Phase 3 requires that family members be relocated<sup>24</sup>. Normally, only urgent life-saving activity is permitted under Phase 4. If Phase 4 is declared on a country-wide basis, all World Bank funding is suspended.

Despite the provision in *Saving Lives Together* that "where appropriate, the DO should coordinate security decisions with non-UN humanitarian actors" (United Nations, 2006, p. 1). The Designated Official (DO) in Darfur recommended raising the UN security phase to Phase 4 in August 2008 as a reaction to the announcement by the ICC prosecutor that he was seeking an indictment for the Sudanese President, without any consultation with non-UN humanitarian actors.

Normally raising the security level to Phase 4 would have led to a severe reduction in UN staff - typically the number of non-locally employed staff at any one location under phase 4 would be limited to the number that could be evacuated with the largest single aircraft in the UN fleet. However, this did not happen. Interviewees made clear that despite the declaration of Phase 4 it was "business as usual" in Darfur, and most, while acknowledging that there are parts of Darfur which are properly Phase 4, characterised the declaration of Phase 4 for the whole of Darfur as inappropriate.

The declaration of Phase 4 is not academic. It brings practical problems in its wake. For the 2009 Work Plan, agencies were initially told that projects classed either as early recovery or as humanitarian in the Work Plan could be funded from the CHF. Agencies submitted their plans accordingly, some resisting pressure from sector leads to change the designation of projects from humanitarian to early recovery. After the Work Plan was finalised, it was then announced that, due to the expected shortfall of funds, only projects classed as humanitarian would be funded by the CHF in Darfur.

This change did not apply to the rest of the country (as it should have if it were driven purely by the shortfall). It seems clear that this restriction was introduced because UN security rules forbid development work under phase 4 security conditions.

Another issue for NGOs is that the UN continues to use hijack-prone vehicles in Darfur. Certain types of vehicles are favoured by the rebels for conversion into war platforms and NGOs reacted to this threat by switching to vehicles types, such as mini-buses, which have no potential for such conversion. However the UN continues to use hijack prone vehicles and continues to suffer hijackings<sup>25</sup>.

### 6.3 Conclusions

There is good NGO engagement in the planning process, but other aspects of partnership are very weak and partnership between the UN and NGOs is still not strongly enough developed. INGOS are denied seating on the UN Country Team (where recovery issues are discussed) and the national UN Security Team.

INGOs have to suffer from poor decisions by the UN (Phase 4 in Darfur or the adoption of Phase 3 in Khartoum) without having an adequate voice at the table. The

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<sup>24</sup> The UN DO for Sudan decided in 2008 to declare that Khartoum was security phase 3, meaning that Khartoum was no longer a family duty station for the UN. This appears somewhat nonsensical given that Khartoum is a far safer city than some in the region which are only phase 2 (such as Nairobi, which has severe security issues).

<sup>25</sup> The NGO policy was driven both by considerations of staff safety and by concerns about fuelling the conflict.

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costs of the additional unnecessary security measures for the UN reduce the amount of assistance that reaches the affected population.

## 6.4 Recommendations

Staff security is essential to operating in dangerous environments. However, security issues affect all humanitarian actors and should be addressed jointly.

Recommendation 8 ***NGOs should continue to advocate for, and Donors press for, full access of the UN Security Management Teams in the Sudan in line with the spirit of "Saving Lives Together".***

Poor decisions on security have a major impact on programme costs.

Recommendation 9 ***Donors should use their financial muscle to insist that decisions on security by the UN are fully considered and are appropriate.***



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## 7 Accountability and impact

### 7.1 Impact of the reforms

Many interviewees made the point that it was not possible to say whether the humanitarian reforms were having any impact on service to beneficiaries. They questioned the link between internal process in the aid system and the provision of services to beneficiaries.

Some suggested that some aspects of the reforms increased agency operating costs without delivering any benefit to the affected population. Examples of increased costs due to the reforms included:

- The transaction costs associated with pooled funding<sup>26</sup>.
- The increased staff time needed for consultative cluster coordination processes.
- The costs of dedicated cluster leadership or co-leadership.

In theory the reforms will lead to better coordinated and more focused responses. While such a tight focus can bring benefits, there are also risks involved. Some interviewees pointed out that better intra-sectoral coordination might lead to weaker inter-sectoral coordination, especially given the time demands of cluster coordination. Also, given that needs assessment is often rudimentary, there is a risk that a more focused response may be more tightly focused on the wrong needs (Figure 9).




Figure 9: Service provision in sector (left) and cluster coordination (centre: on-target and right: off-target)

This risk is a feature of the reforms as currently implemented. They seem to be focused on the reliability (predictability) of the humanitarian response rather than on its accuracy. This can be seen in the way in which benchmarks, which figured prominently in the Humanitarian Response Review, seem to have been relegated to a minor role in the actual implementation of the reform.

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<sup>26</sup> This is currently the object of a study funded by Norway and being conducted by WFP, UNICEF, and UNHCR.

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## 7.2 National and local NGOs

Difficult as the environment is for international NGOs in Sudan, the environment for Government legislation is a severe constraint for local and national NGOs. The legislation covering national NGOs allows the administrative seizure of their assets without due process.

The legal position of national NGOs is so severe that many NGO-like organisations have not registered as NGOs, but as businesses or other forms of organisation.

The local and national NGO sector in the North is relatively new, whereas there is a longer history of local NGOs in the South, but many of these had a previous existence providing services for Sudanese refugees in Kenya or elsewhere. There are many proto-NGOs in the north. These are organisations supporting a single institution like a school or clinic that have the possibility to become broader-based organisations. However, national NGOs are still relatively few, and apart from a few exceptions, have

### The reaction to the ICC warrants and NGOs

The three national NGOs terminated by the Government in the wake of the issuance of the ICC warrant are in a worse position than the INGOs. The INGOs were expelled, but the national NGOs were terminated.

What is especially disappointing is that SUDO was already serving as a nucleus for developing the national NGO sector.

very limited capacity as yet.

National NGOs feel that they are caught in the *Catch 22* situation where they cannot develop their capacity without resources, but their lack of capacity is used as a reason for not channelling resources to them. They also feel that they are discriminated against. As noted earlier WFP pays a lower rate for handling food to national NGOs than to international ones.

There is no independent forum for national NGOs in the North and recent attempts to form one were blocked. This is a major problem for the development of the local NGO sector.

Language issues and the need for a presence in Khartoum all present obstacles to greater engagement by local and national NGOs in the various humanitarian reform processes. The UN is providing some training in Arabic for local and national NGOs to participate in the WF and CHF processes.

It should be noted that even INGOs, with their larger resources, find the Work Plan and CHF processes a challenge. These processes present even bigger challenges to national and local NGOs.

## 7.3 A growing national NGO sector

However, despite all the problems, there is a growing national NGO sector. Many of these new local and national NGOs will need support to enable them to reach the level of bureaucratic competence necessary to navigate these complex processes.

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UN agencies are planning a programme of training local NGO service organisations to work as their partners. However, such training often concentrates on compliance-building<sup>27</sup> rather than capacity building as such.

## 7.4 Conclusions

It is not yet possible to clearly identify what impact, positive or negative, the humanitarian reforms are having on the level of service to the affected populations in Sudan.

While the local NGO sector is growing in a very difficult environment, it is very limited in size and capacity. This is only likely to change very slowly without a deliberate course of action to expand the sector.

## 7.5 Recommendations

Local and national NGOs need more support in Sudan if they are to thrive in a very difficult environment.

Recommendation 10 ***The NGO and Humanitarian Reform consortium should make supporting local NGOs in their efforts to get access to the reform processes an explicit part of the job description for any project staff appointed to Sudan.***

WFPs practice of paying a lower rate to national NGOs is discriminatory.

Recommendation 11 ***WFP should reconsider its discriminatory policy on the payment of national NGOs. WFP has an interest in developing the capacity of national NGOs to eventually reduce the costs of food distribution.***

National NGOs are being left out of coordination processes. One approach to this would be to make the active participation of national NGOs working in any sector one of the benchmarks for that cluster.

Recommendation 12 ***The IASC should change the cluster guidelines to make the active participation of relevant national NGOs a benchmark for the cluster.***

This may include a need to make translation available at cluster meetings, or to circulate cluster documents in multiple languages.


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<sup>27</sup> i.e. developing the capacity of partners to meet financial and administrative conditions of grants

## 8 Attitudes to the reform

A survey was administered as part of the fieldwork (see Appendix 2 for the survey instrument and technical details). A total of 38 responses were collected directly during the interviews, and a further 7 were collected via a web survey.

### Perceptions of the Humanitarian Reform Process in Sudan



One of the web survey responses was in respect of the DRC rather than the Sudan, so this was excluded from the analysis, giving 44 responses in total. The survey data was tested in several ways.

First, the initial 30 responses to the survey instrument were tested for internal consistence and duplication (as described in Appendix 2 below). These tests showed that fourteen of the eighteen questions served as a coherent measure of attitude to the humanitarian reform. It should be noted that the questions were assumed to be uni-dimensional as there were too few responses for a reliable factor analysis.

These were then used to calculate a score of the attitude towards the humanitarian reform. A score of 100% indicates a very favourable attitude towards the current humanitarian reform and a score of 0% indicates a very negative attitude towards the current humanitarian reform. The score varied by respondent type with UN respondents being slightly more optimistic about the humanitarian reforms. The most optimistic individual score for the humanitarian reform came from a UN respondent and the most pessimistic from an NGO respondent.

Table shows that NGOs in Sudan were marginally negative about humanitarian reform, whereas others were slightly positive about humanitarian reform.

Table 15: Perceptions of the humanitarian reform as a rating from 0% (very negative) to 100% (very positive). 50% equates to neither positive nor negative.

<b>Group</b>	<b>Average Score</b>	<b>Min Score</b>	<b>Max Score</b>
<i>All NGOs</i>	48%	25%	66%
<i>Non-NGOs</i>	59%	29%	80%
<i>UN only</i>	60%	29%	80%
<i>Non-UN</i>	59%	29%	80%
<i>INGOs only</i>	48%	25%	64%

The individual answers to all 18 questions were analysed to see if the differences between NGO staff and non-NGO were statistically significant by using a series of chi-square tests. Only one question has a statistically significant difference (at the 0.05 level) between the NGO and non-NGO answers. NGOs disagreed (and non-NGOs agreed) with the statement that:

- Common Humanitarian Funds and the CERF enable all parts of the humanitarian sector to better serve the affected population ( $p=0.015$ ).

NGO interviewees commented that not all parts of the humanitarian sector have access to Common Humanitarian Funds and the CERF, and that it was an open question as to whether these mechanisms did lead to better service for the affected population.

Two other statements (7 and 11) yielded apparently significant chi-square values but these were rejected because they failed to meet the Cochran rule<sup>28</sup>.

<sup>28</sup> This is a rule to ensure that small values in some cells do not lead to erroneous assessments of statistical significance. Cochran's rule (Cochran, 1952) states that all expected frequencies should be greater than 1 and that no more than 20% of expected values be less than five.

<b>Numbers of respondents agreeing with statements by type of respondent (NGO staff or others).</b>  <b>Note: Questions in italics are questions which were not used for generating the perception score for the humanitarian reform.</b>  <b>Question text</b>							
	NGO Agree	NGO Neutral	NGO Disagree	Others Agree	Others Neutral	Others Disagree	Probability X <sup>2</sup>
1 Cluster coordination is here to stay. It is the way in which we now do business in humanitarian assistance.	12	7	4	17	3	1	-
2 The efforts to improve Humanitarian Coordination are primarily intended to guarantee that the UN plays the leading role in humanitarian response rather than just to improve response.	10	6	7	5	4	12	0.19
3 <i>Cluster coordination is just a new name for what we already do in sector coordination. There is no real change.</i>	9	6	8	11	4	6	0.67
4 The Humanitarian Reform project has significantly changed the way we do business in this country.	3	13	7	5	5	11	-
5 The humanitarian community in Sudan are making good progress in implementing the humanitarian reform process (leadership, funding, co-ordination).	9	6	8	10	6	5	0.72
6 The Humanitarian Reform process is probably the most important effort to improve the quality of overall humanitarian response in the last decade.	8	10	5	10	6	5	0.57
7 Common Humanitarian Funds and the CERF effectively divert resources from NGOs to UN agencies or from relief agencies to development ones.	12	2	9	3	4	14	-
8 The Humanitarian Reform is a UN project that principally benefits the UN agencies.	7	8	8	2	7	12	-
9 Cluster coordination is just another fashion in humanitarian response. It will soon be replaced by some new initiative.	10	10	3	6	6	9	0.09
10 The whole Humanitarian Reform process is a bureaucratisation of existing processes that adds administrative and transaction costs without adding any value.	9	6	8	4	6	11	0.31
11 There is a big gap in Sudan between the rhetoric of humanitarian reform and what is happening on the ground.	16	5	2	7	4	10	-
12 <i>Improved Humanitarian Coordination is a key aspect of the Humanitarian Reform that allows all actors to better meet the needs of the affected population.</i>	20	2	1	15	2	4	-
13 <i>The humanitarian reform is just window-dressing; it has made no real difference to how we work in this country.</i>	5	12	6	3	10	8	-
14 <i>Cluster coordination represents a radical change in how the humanitarian agencies go about their business.</i>	3	12	8	5	8	8	-
15 We are engaged with the cluster coordination system as it enables us to better meet the needs of the affected population.	9	7	7	10	9	2	-
16 The Humanitarian Reform project (improved leadership, cluster coordination, and common funding pools) has the potential to enable us to better meet the needs of the affected population.	20	2	1	16	2	3	-
17 The cluster coordination system adds cost (e.g. through extra meetings or dedicated coordinators) without adding value.	10	5	8	5	7	9	0.37
<b>18 Common Humanitarian Funds and the CERF enable all parts of the humanitarian sector to better serve the affected population</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0.02</b>

Table 16: Question text and the number of respondents agreeing or disagreeing with the question by type (NGO staff or others).

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The main advantage offered by the survey is that the fourteen questions can be used elsewhere to give a reliable measure of attitudes toward the humanitarian reform, and the questions can also be used to track changes in attitude to the humanitarian reform over time. The final version of the survey can be found at:

*<http://tinyurl.com/humrefsurvey>*

## 8.1 Recommendations

Recommendation 13 ***The NGO and Humanitarian Reform Consortium should use the measure developed here to track changes attitudes towards the humanitarian reform process over time.***

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# Appendix 1 Terms of Reference

*Note: The evaluator had no input into the Terms of Reference for this evaluation.*

## **Mapping Study on NGOs and Humanitarian Reform Sudan**

### **January/February 2009**

#### **6 week Consultancy**

*Location:* Sudan

*Estimated Start Date:* Middle January 2009

*Duration:* 30 days

*Contractor:* NGOs and Humanitarian Reform Project 7-agency NGO Consortium (led by ActionAid)

*Project Title:* 'NGOs and Humanitarian Reform'

#### **Introduction:**

The consultancy is part of a series of mapping studies which map the situation in relation to humanitarian coordination and financing. Studies in Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Zimbabwe and DRC are taking place in December 2008 and January/February 2009.

This work is the 2<sup>nd</sup> phase of a 3-year inter-agency DfID-funded project, entitled '*NGOs and Humanitarian Reform*'. The project consortium consists of 7 agencies: ActionAid International (lead), CAFOD, CARE, ICVA, International Rescue Committee, Oxfam and Save the Children.

#### **Background:**

NGOs implement the majority of humanitarian programmes at field level, yet their engagement in co-ordination and financing reforms has faced multiple challenges and obstacles. National and local NGOs are absent in most reform fora and even international NGOs often lack capacity to engage in UN processes in a sustained manner.

The *NGOs and Humanitarian Reform* project aims to develop practical guidance and best practice for NGO participation in reformed humanitarian financing and co-ordination mechanisms at global and country levels. The research will particularly focus on the project's three cross-cutting issues: partnership (NGO-NGO, NGO-UN, NGO-donor), accountability (both peer accountability between humanitarian agencies and downwards accountability to beneficiaries), and impact of reform on beneficiaries and NGOs.

Following the mapping studies, Humanitarian Reform Officers will be hired in each of the five focus countries to work with consortium members, local partners, beneficiary groups and external stakeholders to address the main issues identified by the studies. The project is overseen by an International Project Manager, Anne Street

[annie.street@actionaid.org](mailto:annie.street@actionaid.org)

#### **Objectives:**

- Produce an evidence-base to engage stakeholders around the project's activities at global and field levels
- Provide baseline indicators for monitoring the success of the 3-year project
- Inform the design of activities for the next phase of the project in-country and the job description of the Humanitarian Reform Officer position, who will be responsible for promoting and coordinating NGO engagement for the remainder of the project

#### **Outputs:**

- Meetings at the beginning and end of the in-country research with consortium members, to gain insights into their experiences and perspectives initially and then to feedback and check findings at the end of the research period.



- 
- A 20-30 page (5,000-7,500 word) report comprising an analysis of:
    1. Coordination mechanisms and processes (UN-NGO, NGO-NGO etc), including analysis of the relevance of global clusters to field realities and particularly focusing on the experiences of national and local NGOs
    2. Reformed humanitarian financing mechanisms and sources, including analysis of the interaction between different funding channels, also particularly focusing on the experiences of national and local NGOs
    3. Examples of best practice for NGOs (including national and local NGOs) engaging in humanitarian coordination and financing
    4. Key challenges facing NGOs (including national and local NGOs) engaging in humanitarian coordination and financing
    5. A short overview of how the project's 3 cross-cutting themes of partnership, accountability and impact inter-relate with coordination and financing

*The final report should be produced in a format that enables the mapping and policy analysis to be published and circulated to external stakeholders (including UN, NGO partners, donors and national governments). The International Project Manager will also disseminate a synthesised version of all five reports, which will be the primary analysis report used for policy advocacy.*
  - Baseline data on the following:
    - The number of national and international NGOs represented in clusters, IASC/Humanitarian Partnership Country Teams
    - The existence and effectiveness of national NGO humanitarian coordination structures
    - The number of “co-facilitator” positions for NGOs in clusters
    - The number of international and national or local NGOs participating in elaborating humanitarian funding applications submitted to sectoral clusters or other reformed humanitarian financing mechanisms
    - The number of national or local NGOs that obtained humanitarian funding from global sources in the last year
    - The perceived level of transparency of coordination and funding processes (measured as a score out of 5)
    - The average time taken to receive funding for humanitarian interventions from reformed financing mechanisms
    - The transaction costs involved in accessing humanitarian funding from reformed financing mechanisms
    - The number of NGOs and beneficiaries that have used shared needs assessment tools and identification of when and in which sectors

As a confidential annex, the report should also include:

- Draft proposals for appropriate in-country activities for the next phase of the 3-year project, based on consultation with the consortium members and partner agencies
- A short, confidential risk analysis, with suggestions on how to mitigate those risks, for the consortium steering group to inform project roll-out at country level
- Pointers for the job description for the post of Humanitarian Reform Officer to coordinate NGO engagement with the project in-country

#### **Methodology:**

Desk-based research and interviews and face-to-face interviews with key stakeholders in country. These will include national government officials, humanitarian donors, UN agencies and other multilaterals, NGOs (local, national and international) and beneficiary groups. The in-country lead consortium agency will assist the consultant in identifying priority stakeholders to interview, organising meetings and arranging logistics.

The consultant will focus the research on 2 humanitarian centres within Sudan: Khartoum and Dafur. The in-country research will include time spent in both locations.

#### **Person Specification:**

##### *Essential*

- 
- At least 3 years humanitarian experience
  - Strong knowledge of UN and NGO humanitarian policy issues, including humanitarian reform
  - Excellent written English
  - Proven strength in primary and secondary research, including conducting research interviews
  - Strong analytical skill

Knowledge of humanitarian issues in Sudan

**Timeframe:**

This consultancy will be completed in a six-week period beginning 14<sup>th</sup> January 2009. The consultant will be paid for 30 working days

The consultant will spend 5 days undertaking desk research, discussing with consortium members operational in Sudan and conducting interviews (either by telephone or face-to-face where possible e.g. with relevant DfID staff in the Sudan Unit, and other humanitarian donors). 3-4 weeks will be spent in-country (researching the operational context, consulting with field teams, and interviewing field contacts and other key informants). 5-8 days will be spent writing up the research and presenting it (either virtually or face-to-face), to the project Steering Group. The task must be completed no later than six weeks after the start of the consultancy

**Management of the Project:**

This consultant will report to the International Project Manager, and liaise closely with Tasneem Mowjee of Development Initiatives who is the lead consultant on this project and responsible for writing the synthesis report on the basis of the 5 country mapping studies.

**Total fee payable:**

Negotiable, 30 days within a 6-week period. This will be payable half at the beginning of the consultancy and half upon presentation of the final report. Any additional days worked should be cleared with the International Project Manager in advance.

**Tax Liability:**

Settlement of any tax liability arising from this agreement will remain the responsibility of the consultant.

**Amendment / Discontinuation of the Agreement:**

Any revision to this agreement including implementation plan, deliverables and timeframe will have to be agreed by Anne Street (AAI). AAI has the right to discontinue this agreement in the event of failure to implement the task or to deliver the agreed outputs or to meet the timeframe, as specified under this agreement. If such discontinuation happens, AAI will have the right not to pay fees.

December 23<sup>rd</sup> 2008

## Appendix 2 Baseline data and indicators

The following is an analysis of the potential baseline indicators. This has been updated to take in account the situation after the early March expulsions and terminations. As elsewhere in the report foreign Red Cross Movement organisations are included in the figures for INGOs and the Sudanese Red Crescent is included in the figures for local NGOs.

<i><b>Suggested indicator</b></i>	<i><b>Commentary and baseline levels</b></i>
<i>The number of national and international NGOs represented in clusters, IASC/Humanitarian Partnership Country Teams</i>	<p>The information is available in a patch form.</p> <p>The following indicators and levels are suggested (based on the 2009 Work Plan):</p> <p><b>No. of INGOs engaging in the Work Plan: 98 (post expulsions: 88).</b></p> <p><b>No. of NNGO engaging in the Work Plan: 45 (post expulsions 44).</b></p> <p>Non-UN access to the UN Country Team (UNCT, UN Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and on the UN Security Management Teams (SMTs) are important indicators of partnership.</p> <p><b>No of non-UN humanitarian seats on the HCT: 3</b></p> <p><b>No of non-UN seats on the UNCT: Nil</b></p> <p><b>No of non-UN humanitarian seats on the Darfur SMT: 1</b></p> <p><b>No of non-UN humanitarian seats on the national level SMT: Nil</b></p>
<i>The existence and effectiveness of national NGO humanitarian coordination structures</i>	<p>There is currently no effective national NGO humanitarian coordination structure apart from a government-sponsored structure which is view with suspicion by independent Sudanese NGOs.</p> <p><b>Current indicator level: Nil.</b></p>
<i>The number of "co-facilitator" positions for NGOs in clusters</i>	<p>There is some discussion about appointing an NGO co-lead in the NFI sector. However the candidate NGO has since been expelled from Sudan.</p> <p><b>Current indicator level: Nil.</b></p>

<b><i>Suggested indicator</i></b>	<b><i>Commentary and baseline levels</i></b>
<i>The number of international and national or local NGOs participating in elaborating humanitarian funding applications submitted to sectoral clusters or other reformed humanitarian financing mechanisms</i>	<p>Participation in the Work Plan is effectively participating in a joint funding application so that these figures can be used. The CHF management unit does not track the number of projects overall, as they only track the project that are approved for funding.</p> <p>The first two indicators here are the number of INGOs and NGOs submitting Work Plan projects (given above) Two further indicators of participation are the proportion of the Work Plan budget that is composed of NGO and INGO projects. (Percentages post-expulsion are calculated on the basis of removing the projects from the Work Plan).</p> <p><b>Proportion of the Work Plan budget composed of INGO projects: 19.7% (15.6% after expulsions)</b></p> <p><b>Proportion of the Work Plan budget composed of NNGO projects 1.4% (1.2% after expulsions)</b></p> <p><b>NNGO's Work Plan budget as a proportion of all non-UN budgets 6.7% (7.1% after expulsions)</b></p>
<i>The number of national or local NGOs that obtained humanitarian funding from global sources in the last year</i>	<p>The best indicator for this is the number of INGOS and NNGOS getting CHF Funding in 2008.</p> <p><b>Number of INGOs with CHF funding: 63 (55 post expulsions).</b></p> <p><b>Number of NNGOs with CHF funding: 13 (12 post expulsions).</b></p>
<i>The perceived level of transparency of coordination and funding processes (measured as a score out of 5)</i>	<p>A more grounded indicator here is probably the share of CHF funds that INGOs and NNGOs attract. (Percentages post-expulsion are calculated on the basis that the total CHF granting was reduced.)</p> <p><b>Proportion of CHF funding to INGOS: 32.4% (26.6% after removing expelled agencies from calculation)</b></p> <p><b>Proportion of CHF funding to NNGOs: 1.5% (1.1% after removing expelled agencies from calculation)</b></p> <p><b>Proportion of non-UN CHF funding to NNGOs: 4.4% (4.3% after expulsions)</b></p>
<i>The average time taken to receive funding for humanitarian interventions from reformed financing mechanisms</i>	<p>The key indicator here is the data of allocation and of disbursement from the CHF. For 2009 it appeared that the following were going to be the dates:</p> <p><b>First allocations from the CHF: Late February.</b></p> <p><b>First disbursements from the CHF: Early April.</b></p>

<i><b>Suggested indicator</b></i>	<i><b>Commentary and baseline levels</b></i>
<i>The transaction costs involved in accessing humanitarian funding from reformed financing mechanisms</i>	These were not possible to quantify. There is currently a Norwegian funded study examining this issue (at least for UN organisations). However it should be noted that these transactions costs were so high that some NGOs were considering not submitting projects for the CHF process. Therefore, engagement with the CHF can be used as a proxy measure here.
<i>The number of NGOs and beneficiaries that have used shared needs assessment tools and identification of when and in which sectors</i>	This information was not available in any coherent way. There is a good sharing of needs assessment and good participation in the joint nutritional assessment.
<i>Additional indicator: Perceptions of the humanitarian reform</i>	The indicator here is the score from the survey instrument developed as part of the research. <b>The average score for NGO personnel is 48.4%.</b> <b>The average score for other than NGO personnel is 59.2%</b>
<i>Additional indicator: HC with a humanitarian background</i>	<b>Current status: Not present</b>
<i>Additional indicator: Importance of CHF as a funding source</i>	The indication proposed here is the level of CHF funding (in 2008) as a proportion of the total Work Plan request for 2008 <sup>29</sup> . This is because it is not possible to quantify overall funding within a set time frame for any organisation type otherwise. <b>CHF funding for INGOs in proportion to their Work Plan requests: 10.3% (10.1% after expulsions)</b> <b>CHF funding for NNGOs in proportion to their Work Plan requests: 7.7% (6.9% after expulsions)</b>

<sup>29</sup> It should be noted that some of the CHF funding (for emergencies) falls outside the Work Plan, so this figure is not a simple proportion/

## Appendix 3 Survey Instrument

<b>No.</b>	<b>Statement</b>	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>
1	Cluster coordination is here to stay. It is the way in which we now do business in humanitarian assistance.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	The efforts to improve Humanitarian Coordination are primarily intended to guarantee that the UN plays the leading role in humanitarian response rather than just to improve response.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	Cluster coordination is just a new name for what we already do in sector coordination. There is no real change.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	The Humanitarian Reform project has significantly changed the way we do business in this country.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	The humanitarian community in Sudan are making good progress in implementing the humanitarian reform process (leadership, funding, co-ordination).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	The Humanitarian Reform process is probably the most important effort to improve the quality of overall humanitarian response in the last decade.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	Common Humanitarian Funds and the CERF effectively divert resources from NGOs to UN agencies or from relief agencies to development ones.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	The Humanitarian Reform is a UN project that principally benefits the UN agencies.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	Cluster coordination is just another fashion in humanitarian response. It will soon be replaced by some new initiative.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	The whole Humanitarian Reform process is a bureaucratisation of existing processes that adds administrative and transaction costs without adding any value.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11	There is a big gap in Sudan between the rhetoric of humanitarian reform and what is happening on the ground.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12	Improved Humanitarian Coordination is a key aspect of the Humanitarian Reform that allows all actors to better meet the needs of the affected population.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13	The humanitarian reform is just window-dressing; it has made no real difference to how we work in this country.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14	Cluster coordination represents a radical change in how the humanitarian agencies go about their business.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15	We are engaged with the cluster coordination system as it enables us to better meet the needs of the affected population.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16	The Humanitarian Reform project (improved leadership, cluster coordination, and common funding pools) has the potential to enable us to better meet the needs of the affected population.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17	The cluster coordination system adds cost (e.g. through extra meetings or dedicated coordinators) without adding value.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18	Common Humanitarian Funds and the CERF enable all parts of the humanitarian sector to better serve the affected population	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

<b>Please indicate your work experience.</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>&lt;3</b>	<b>4-9</b>	<b>10-19</b>	<b>&gt;20</b>
Years of experience in the humanitarian sector	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Years of experience in the development sector	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

<b>What agency types have you worked for</b>	<b>NNGO</b>	<b>INGO</b>	<b>UN</b>	<b>RC/RC</b>	<b>Govt</b>
Currently	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Previously	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Gender was coded manually for written answers for each respondent. The web version added fields for gender and country and substituted "this country" for "Sudan".

The 44 valid responses were analysed to look at questions that reduced Cronbach's Alpha for the scale. Cronbach's Alpha is a measure of the internal reliability of a scale, the extent to which items in a scale measure the same thing<sup>30</sup>.

Table 17: Segment of SPSS analysis of 44 valid responses showing low question 3 as a primary candidate for removal

	<b>Corrected Item- Total Correlation</b>	<b>Squared Multiple Correlation</b>	<b>Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted</b>
Qst1	0.30	0.52	0.810
Qst2	0.32	0.75	0.810
Qst3	- 0.06	0.52	0.834
Qst4	0.31	0.49	0.809
Qst5	0.48	0.55	0.800
Qst6	0.57	0.64	0.795
Qst7	0.39	0.45	0.806
Qst8	0.53	0.59	0.796
Qst9	0.41	0.58	0.804
Qst10	0.63	0.76	0.791
Qst11	0.49	0.72	0.799
Qst12	0.13	0.56	0.819
Qst13	0.48	0.69	0.801
Qst14	0.23	0.61	0.813
Qst15	0.41	0.62	0.804
Qst16	0.48	0.69	0.801
Qst17	0.61	0.72	0.792
Qst18	0.56	0.54	0.794

On the basis of Table 17, question three was dropped as it offered the best improvement in Cronbach's Alpha and had the lowest correlation with other items.

Table 18: SPSS output showing that after removing question 3, removing question 12 would improve Cronbach's Alpha and remove an item with a low correlation.

	<b>Corrected Item- Total Correlation</b>	<b>Squared Multiple Correlation</b>	<b>Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted</b>
Qst1	0.33	0.41	0.830
Qst2	0.33	0.75	0.832
Qst4	0.36	0.45	0.829
Qst5	0.50	0.55	0.821
Qst6	0.59	0.64	0.816

<sup>30</sup> See (Garson, 2009) for a discussion of reliability measures.

	<b>Corrected Item- Total Correlation</b>	<b>Squared Multiple Correlation</b>	<b>Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted</b>
Qst7	0.38	0.45	0.830
Qst8	0.50	0.59	0.821
Qst9	0.41	0.56	0.826
Qst10	0.60	0.76	0.815
Qst11	0.52	0.71	0.820
Qst12	0.15	0.49	0.839
Qst13	0.50	0.68	0.822
Qst14	0.22	0.60	0.835
Qst15	0.40	0.61	0.827
Qst16	0.46	0.62	0.824
Qst17	0.62	0.72	0.814
Qst18	0.53	0.46	0.819

Table 18 shows that dropping question 12 would be an improvement.

Table 19: SPSS output showing that removing question 14 would further remove Cronbach's Alpha

	<b>Corrected Item- Total Correlation</b>	<b>Squared Multiple Correlation</b>	<b>Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted</b>
Qst1	0.32	0.40	0.837
Qst2	0.35	0.70	0.837
Qst4	0.35	0.45	0.835
Qst5	0.53	0.49	0.826
Qst6	0.57	0.62	0.823
Qst7	0.39	0.43	0.835
Qst8	0.52	0.55	0.826
Qst9	0.42	0.56	0.832
Qst10	0.59	0.75	0.822
Qst11	0.55	0.70	0.824
Qst13	0.52	0.66	0.827
Qst14	0.21	0.58	0.842
Qst15	0.39	0.59	0.833
Qst16	0.42	0.55	0.832
Qst18	0.60	0.70	0.821



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7			
Qst1	0.53	0.42	0.825
8			

Table 19 shows that question 14 has a low correlation (0.21) with the other items and that removing it would also improve Cronbach's Alpha.

Table 20: SPSS output showing that any further removal would decrease Cronbach's Alpha.

	<b>Corrected Item- Total Correlation</b>	<b>Squared Multiple Correlation</b>	<b>Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted</b>
Qst1	0.32	0.39	0.840
Qst2	0.40	0.58	0.837
Qst4	0.33	0.38	0.839
Qst5	0.53	0.48	0.828
Qst6	0.56	0.53	0.827
Qst7	0.39	0.41	0.838
Qst8	0.51	0.55	0.829
Qst9	0.44	0.47	0.833
Qst10	0.59	0.71	0.825
Qst11	0.55	0.64	0.827
Qst13	0.54	0.64	0.829
Qst15	0.36	0.59	0.838
Qst16	0.40	0.54	0.836
Qst17	0.60	0.69	0.824
Qst18	0.53	0.42	0.828

Table 20 shows that the total correlation for all questions is now over 0.3 and that removing any question would reduce Cronbach's Alpha. Next the inter-item correlations were examined to see if any of the questions effectively duplicated each other. Such duplication artificially inflates Cronbach's Alpha.

Table 21: SPSS output showing a high correlation between question 11 and 13

<i>Inter Question Correlation Matrix</i>															
<i>Q</i>	1	2	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	13	15	16	17	18
<i>1</i>	<b>1.00</b>	0.00	0.24	0.31	0.19	0.23	0.11	0.04	0.22	0.04	-0.06	0.37	0.40	0.17	0.31
<i>2</i>	0.00	<b>1.00</b>	0.07	0.20	0.32	0.42	0.13	0.26	0.31	0.49	0.43	-0.22	0.02	0.27	0.30
<i>4</i>	0.24	0.07	<b>1.00</b>	0.37	0.44	0.05	0.06	0.22	0.01	0.23	0.30	0.18	0.32	0.23	0.08
<i>5</i>	0.31	0.20	0.37	<b>1.00</b>	0.44	0.23	0.28	0.18	0.23	0.37	0.34	0.17	0.14	0.45	0.43
<i>6</i>	0.19	0.32	0.44	0.44	<b>1.00</b>	0.12	0.15	0.32	0.20	0.39	0.40	0.23	0.33	0.53	0.35
<i>7</i>	0.23	0.42	0.05	0.23	0.12	<b>1.00</b>	0.28	0.17	0.33	0.27	0.22	0.15	0.16	0.07	0.37
<i>8</i>	0.11	0.13	0.06	0.28	0.15	0.28	<b>1.00</b>	0.41	<b>0.63</b>	0.34	0.24	0.37	0.19	0.46	0.36
<i>9</i>	0.04	0.26	0.22	0.18	0.32	0.17	0.41	<b>1.00</b>	0.40	0.46	0.48	0.02	0.04	0.36	0.11
<i>10</i>	0.22	0.31	0.01	0.23	0.20	0.33	<b>0.63</b>	0.40	<b>1.00</b>	0.25	0.34	0.31	0.42	0.60	0.32
<i>11</i>	0.04	0.49	0.23	0.37	0.39	0.27	0.34	0.46	0.25	<b>1.00</b>	<b>0.70</b>	0.11	0.06	0.27	0.30
<i>13</i>	-0.06	0.43	0.30	0.34	0.40	0.22	0.24	0.48	0.34	<b>0.70</b>	<b>1.00</b>	0.02	0.21	0.27	0.28
<i>15</i>	0.37	-0.22	0.18	0.17	0.23	0.15	0.37	0.02	0.31	0.11	0.02	<b>1.00</b>	0.48	0.42	0.31
<i>16</i>	0.40	0.02	0.32	0.14	0.33	0.16	0.19	0.04	0.42	0.06	0.21	0.48	<b>1.00</b>	0.27	0.21
<i>17</i>	0.17	0.27	0.23	0.45	0.53	0.07	0.46	0.36	0.60	0.27	0.27	0.42	0.27	<b>1.00</b>	0.35
<i>18</i>	0.31	0.30	0.08	0.43	0.35	0.37	0.36	0.11	0.32	0.30	0.28	0.31	0.21	0.35	<b>1.00</b>

Table 21 shows that question pair 11 and 13 had the highest correlation suggesting that they might be asking the same thing. This type of correlation can falsely inflate Cronbach's Alfa. After examining the wording it was decided to drop question 13. This reduced the Cronbach's Alfa from 0.842 to 0.829 leaving fourteen questions in the measure.<sup>31</sup>

After dropping questions 3, 12, 13, and 14, the answers to the fourteen remaining questions were then used to calculate the score for each respondent.

<sup>31</sup> Cronbach's alpha increases with the number of questions, and duplicate questions can lead to a false increase. See (Garson, 2009)

No	Question Text	Weighting
1	Cluster coordination is here to stay. It is the way in which we now do business in humanitarian assistance.	Positive
2	The efforts to improve Humanitarian Coordination are primarily intended to guarantee that the UN plays the leading role in humanitarian response rather than just to improve response.	Negative
3	<i>Cluster coordination is just a new name for what we already do in sector coordination. There is no real change.</i>	Ignored
4	The Humanitarian Reform project has significantly changed the way we do business in this country.	Positive
5	The humanitarian community in this country <sup>32</sup> are making good progress in implementing the humanitarian reform process (leadership, funding, co-ordination).	Positive
6	The Humanitarian Reform process is probably the most important effort to improve the quality of overall humanitarian response in the last decade.	Positive
7	Common Humanitarian Funds and the CERF effectively divert resources from NGOs to UN agencies or from relief agencies to development ones.	Negative
8	The Humanitarian Reform is a UN project that principally benefits the UN agencies.	Negative
9	Cluster coordination is just another fashion in humanitarian response. It will soon be replaced by some new initiative.	Negative
10	The whole Humanitarian Reform process is a bureaucratisation of existing processes that adds administrative and transaction costs without adding any value.	Negative
11	There is a big gap in this country <sup>32</sup> between the rhetoric of humanitarian reform and what is happening on the ground.	Negative
12	<i>Improved Humanitarian Coordination is a key aspect of the Humanitarian Reform that allows all actors to better meet the needs of the affected population.</i>	Ignored
13	<i>The humanitarian reform is just window-dressing; it has made no real difference to how we work in this country.</i>	Ignored
14	<i>Cluster coordination represents a radical change in how the humanitarian agencies go about their business.</i>	Ignored
15	We are engaged with the cluster coordination system as it enables us to better meet the needs of the affected population.	Positive
16	The Humanitarian Reform project (improved leadership, cluster coordination, and common funding pools) has the potential to enable us to better meet the needs of the affected population.	Positive
17	The cluster coordination system adds cost (e.g. through extra meetings or dedicated coordinators) without adding value.	Negative
18	Common Humanitarian Funds and the CERF enable all parts of the humanitarian sector to better serve the affected population	Positive

<sup>32</sup> Text given as "in Sudan" in paper version.

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The score was calculated for each individual based on the scoring table below.

<b><i>Level of agreement with statement</i></b>	<b><i>Positive Statement</i></b>	<b><i>Negative Statement</i></b>
<i>Strongly Agree</i>	2	-2
<i>Agree</i>	1	-1
<i>Neither</i>	0	0
<i>Disagree</i>	-1	1
<i>Strongly Disagree</i>	-2	2

The maximum possible score was 28 (if a respondent strongly agreed with all the positive statements and strongly disagreed with all the negative ones) and the minimum score was minus 28. This was then mathematically manipulated to translate the numerical score into a percentage score ranging from 0% (for minus 28) to 100% (for plus 28).

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## Appendix 4 Key informant interview guide

The following was used as the topic list for the key informant interviews.

Coordination mechanisms and processes (UN-NGO, NGO-NGO etc), including analysis of the relevance of global clusters to field realities and particularly focusing on the experiences of national and local NGOs

- Which NGOs are on the HCT? How are they selected? Is this a positive or negative development?
- What relevance does the HCT have to what is happening on the ground?
- Who takes the decisions, is it the HCT or the UNCT?
- Does your organisation have any influence on the decisions taken by the HCT?
- What are the main NGO coordination mechanisms in Sudan (INGO, NNGO)?
- Which coordination forum is most likely to resolve difficult issues? Why?
- How do you view the cluster system? Why?
- Are there any NGO/RC co-leads in Sudan?

Reformed humanitarian financing mechanisms and sources, including analysis of the interaction between different funding channels, also particularly focusing on the experiences of national and local NGOs

- How important is the CHF to your funding? Why?
- How important is the CERF to your funding? Why?
- How much did you get from these sources in 2008?
- Are these mechanisms transparent? Who is involved in making requests?
- What is the biggest problem with these funds?
- How easy is it for you to access them? What costs are there for you?
- Are they timely (average times)?

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Examples of best practice for NGOs (including national and local NGOs) engaging in humanitarian coordination and financing

- Are there any examples of how you do things in Sudan that are an improvement on elsewhere?
- Given your experience here, what would you do differently if in a similar situation elsewhere?

Key challenges facing NGOs (including national and local NGOs) engaging in humanitarian coordination and financing

- What are the biggest obstacles to NGO involvement in coordination mechanisms (INGO, NNGO, LNGO)?
- What are the biggest obstacles to NGO access to common funding mechanisms like the CHF or the CERF (INGO, NNGO, LNGO)?
- How could NGO participation in coord and financing be improved.

A short overview of how the project's 3 cross-cutting themes of partnership, accountability and impact inter-relate with coordination and financing

- What impact do you think that the humanitarian reform project is having on the affected population in reality? What potential does it have to make an impact?

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## Appendix 5 Persons Met

Because of the situation in the Sudan, and the concern of some interviewees not to be identified, the author presents only a summary of interviews rather than a full list of persons met.

### A5.1 Summary

<i>Summary of Interviews by category of person</i>				
<i>Category of person interviewed</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>as %</i>	<i>of which ♀</i>	<i>♀ as %</i>
<i>INGO Staff</i>	21	51%	8	38%
<i>UN Staff</i>	14	34%	2	14%
<i>NNGO Staff</i>	2	5%	0	
<i>Donors</i>	4	10%	1	25%
<i>Total</i>	41	100%	11	27%

<i>Summary of Interview Methods</i>				
<i>Type of interview method</i>		<i>as %</i>	<i>of which ♀</i>	<i>♀ as %</i>
<i>General meeting</i>	2	5%	2	100%
<i>Semi structured Interview (Individual interviewee)</i>	1	2%	0	
<i>Semi structured Interview (Group - two or more interviewees)</i>	1	2%	1	100%
<i>Semi structured Interview (Individual interviewee) plus questionnaire</i>	26	63%	3	12%
<i>Semi structured Interview (Group - two or more interviewees) plus questionnaire</i>	9	22%	3	33%
<i>Detailed discussion</i>	2	5%	2	100%
<i>Total</i>	41	100%	11	27%

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## Appendix 6 Bibliography

The following documents are cited in the text.

- Adinolfi, C., Bassiouni, D. S., Lauritzsen, H. F., & Williams, H. R. (2005). *Humanitarian Response Review: An independent report commissioned by the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator & Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)*. New York: United Nations. Last viewed on 8<sup>th</sup> June 2008. URL: <http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/content/documents/other/Humanitarian%20Response%20Review%202005.pdf>  
Notes: *This review is an independent assessment of the humanitarian system in which the experts identify reasons why the aid community sometimes falls short of its goals. The report seeks to demonstrate what the humanitarian system's current capabilities are and shows where the shortfalls lie. Already, it has prompted the discussion of how the entire humanitarian system can ensure faster and better responses to the needs of people in distress. Some of the Review's recommendations have been addressed in the 2005 ECOSOC discussions; others will form part the 2005 General Assembly debate on reform of the United Nations, including the larger humanitarian system.*
- Benn, H. (2004). Reform of the International Humanitarian System, ODI: Speech by Hilary Benn, UK Secretary of State for International Development: 15<sup>th</sup> December 2004. Retrieved 28<sup>th</sup> February, 2009, from <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/Speeches/bennaidssystemreform.asp>  
Notes: *Hilary Benn proposed six reforms for the Humanitarian system including: 1) the need for more, and more flexible, funding to be available right from the moment crisis strikes; 2) secondly, ensuring that we have better and stronger Humanitarian Coordinators, with the power and the funds to act; 3) thirdly, greater clarity about who does what in a crisis - including for Internally Displaced People; 4) fourthly, the development of benchmarks to measure how we perform; 5) fifthly, doing something about the unequal allocation of resources between crises; 6) greater investment in reducing the risk of future disasters. Benn said that the UK would contributed £100 million to a common fund of US\$1 billion.*
- Benn, H. (2005). *Keeping our Promises: 2005 and Beyond: Speech by Mr Hilary Benn MP: UK Secretary of State for International Development*. London: DFID. Last viewed on 28<sup>th</sup> Feb 2009. URL: <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/speeches/un-benn-160205.pdf>  
Notes: *Speech form Hilary Benn in which he mentions that DFID has provided £40 million for the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan. He also discusses elements of Humanitarian Reform including the need for OCHA to OCHA open up the recruitment process for Humanitarian Coordinators beyond the UN family, to include experienced people from NGOs.*
- Borton, J. (2008). *Summary of the Emerging Results from the ALNAP Humanitarian Performance Project: Exploratory Phase* London: ALNAP. Last viewed on 28<sup>th</sup> February 2009. URL: [http://www.alnap.org/meetings/pdfs/23\\_jborton.pdf](http://www.alnap.org/meetings/pdfs/23_jborton.pdf)  
Notes: *Summary report on the progress to mid-2008 on the Humanitarian Performance Project.*
- CERF Secretariat. (2006, 2007). CERF in Sudan 2006. Retrieved 2<sup>nd</sup> February 2009, 2009, from <http://ochaonline.un.org/CERFaroundtheWorld/Sudan2008/Sudan2007/Sudan2006/tabid/1727/language/en-US/Default.aspx>  
Notes: *The CERF provided US\$35,519,099 in grants for Sudan in 2006. Almost all of this went on emergency grants for operations in Darfur with (US\$34.5 million) with a small amount for Southern Sudan.*

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CERF Secretariat. (2007). *The Full 2006 CERF Report for Sudan*. New York: Central Emergency Response Fund, OCHA. Last viewed on 2<sup>nd</sup> February 2009. URL: <http://ochaonline2.un.org/LinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docid=1065317>

Notes: *UN agencies and partners requested a total of US\$1.6 billion for humanitarian interventions through the 2006 UN and Partners Work Plan for Sudan. With roughly US\$270 million received or pledged as of late March, only 17 percent of the total funding needed had been pledged or committed. Because of the deteriorating situation in Darfur and given the increasing costs and constraints to humanitarian access, there were four applications for rapid response grants from the CERF. As per the requests, all four grants were quickly approved from the Rapid Response mechanism of the CERF. The first grant of US\$20 million was provided in May 2006 to respond to the new displacement of approximately 200,000 IDPs and influx of 14,000 Chadian refugees in Darfur. The second grant of US\$1 million was provided also in May 2006 to respond to cholera outbreak in Southern Sudan. The third grant of US\$4.5 million was provided in October 2006 to expand the Humanitarian Air Services. The fourth grant of US\$10 million was provided in December 2006 to respond to the growing crisis in Darfur.*

CERF Secretariat. (2008, 2007). CERF around the world - Sudan 2007 - Facts and Figures. Retrieved 2<sup>nd</sup> February 2009, 2009, from <http://ochaonline.un.org/cerf/CERFaroundtheWorld/Sudan2008/Sudan2007/tabid/1726/language/en-US/Default.aspx>

Notes: *CERF Funding in 2007 totalled US\$25,475,033 in grants. Four million people remain displaced due to the North - South conflict, which ended in January 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In Darfur, over two million Sudanese have been displaced over the past four years. More than six million people currently displaced due to violent conflict in the Sudan - this equates to just under 20 percent of the country's overall population. Overall, the humanitarian situation in southern Sudan has stabilized, leading to increased need for sustained recovery and developments efforts. The situation in the north, specifically in Darfur, has deteriorated at a higher pace since the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on 5<sup>th</sup> May 2006.*

CERF Secretariat. (24<sup>th</sup> November 2008). CERF around the world - Sudan 2008 - Facts and Figures. Retrieved 2<sup>nd</sup> February 2009, from <http://ochaonline.un.org/cerf/CERFaroundtheWorld/Sudan2008/tabid/4507/language/en-US/Default.aspx>

Notes: *CERF Funding in 2008 totalled US\$16,025,254 in grants. 4 million people remain displaced due to the North - South conflict, which ended in January 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In Darfur, over 2 million Sudanese have been displaced over the past four years. More than 6 million people currently displaced due to violent conflict in the Sudan - this equates to just under 20 percent of the country's overall population. Overall, the humanitarian situation in southern Sudan has stabilized, leading to increased need for sustained recovery and developments efforts. The situation in the north, specifically in Darfur, has deteriorated at a higher pace since the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on 5<sup>th</sup> May 2006.*

Cochran, W. (1952). The  $\chi^2$  test of goodness of fit. *Annals of Mathematical Statistics*, 23, 315-345

Notes: *Cochran's rule (Cochran, 1952) offered a fair balance between practicality and precision. This rule states that all expected frequencies should be greater than 1 and the no more than 20% be less than five.*

Curtis, V., & Cairncross, S. (2003). Effect of washing hands with soap on diarrhoea risk in the community: a systematic review *The Lancet Infectious Diseases*, 3, 275-281. Last viewed on 15<sup>th</sup> February 2009. URL: <http://www.globalhandwashing.org/Publications/Attachments/CurtisHandwashing.pdf>

Notes: *We set out to determine the impact of washing hands with soap on the risk of diarrhoeal diseases in the community with a systematic review with*



*random effects metaanalysis. Our data sources were studies linking handwashing with diarrhoeal diseases. Seven intervention studies, six case-control, two cross-sectional, and two cohort studies were located from electronic databases, hand searching, and the authors' collections. The pooled relative risk of diarrhoeal disease associated with not washing hands from the intervention trials was 1.88 (95% CI 1.31-2.68), implying that handwashing could reduce diarrhoea risk by 47%. When all studies, when only those of high quality, and when only those studies specifically mentioning soap were pooled, risk reduction ranged from 42-44%. The risks of severe intestinal infections and of shigellosis were associated with reductions of 48% and 59%, respectively. In the absence of adequate mortality studies, we extrapolate the potential number of diarrhoea deaths that could be averted by handwashing at about a million (1.1 million, lower estimate 0.5 million, upper estimate 1.4 million). Results may be affected by the poor quality of many of the studies and may be inflated by publication bias. On current evidence, washing hands with soap can reduce the risk of diarrhoeal diseases by 42-47% and interventions to promote handwashing might save a million lives. More and better-designed trials are needed to measure the impact of washing hands on diarrhoea and acute respiratory infections in developing countries.*

- DCPSF Technical Secretariat. (2009). *Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund* (2009: Update 1). Khartoum: UNDP Fund Management Unit. Last viewed on 1<sup>st</sup> March 2009. URL: <http://www.sd.undp.org/doc/Fund%20Management/DCPSF/2009/updates/DCPSF%20Update%20No%201%20%20January-February%202009.pdf>  
 Notes: *The technical secretariat completed a draft workplan for 2009, which was submitted for consideration at the SC meeting on 15th January. The workplan defines the goal of the DCPSF and lists six key objectives for 2009. Processes such as the small grants scheme, and the evidence and capacity mapping phase, which were introduced at the end of 2008 are situated within the workplan, as are the M&E and communications strategies. Recognising the need to strengthen its presence in Darfur, the secretariat intends to deploy an enhanced team to bases in El Fasher and Nyala, retaining a representational presence in Khartoum.*
- DIFD. (2007, 9<sup>th</sup> January). New UK support to schools and health care in south Sudan. Retrieved 1<sup>st</sup> March 2009, from <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/sudancrisis/sudan-health.asp>  
 Notes: *On today's second anniversary of peace in South Sudan, the Department for International Development confirmed eight new projects for the region, which will mean that over 13,000 children will be able to go to school for the first time, a further 65,000 will continue in education, over 580 teachers will be trained, and seven primary schools will be built. In the health sector, 19,000 mosquito nets will be distributed, and over a million people will be given access to primary health care while over 250,000 people will be given access to safe water, sanitation and bore holes.*
- EU Delegation to the Sudan. (2007). *Sudan Post-Conflict Community Based Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme (RRP)*. Khartoum: Delegation of the European Commission to the Sudan. Last viewed on 1<sup>st</sup> March 2009. URL: [http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/delsdn/en/eu\\_and\\_sudan/7.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/delsdn/en/eu_and_sudan/7.pdf)  
 Notes: *Describes the Sudan Post-Conflict Community Based Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme (RRP). The objective of this intervention is to reduce the prevalence and severity of poverty and increase food security amongst conflict affected rural households across Sudan by achieving tangible improvements at the community and local authority level. The Programme is realised through NGO/NSA consortia receiving funds for post-conflict recovery and rehabilitation projects at county/locality level, over a four year period.*
- Garson, G. D. (2009, 28<sup>th</sup> January). Reliability Analysis. Retrieved 17<sup>th</sup> February 2009, from <http://faculty.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/PA765/reliab.htm>

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Notes: *Researchers must demonstrate instruments are reliable since without reliability, research results using the instrument are not replicable, and replicability is fundamental to the scientific method. Reliability is the correlation of an item, scale, or instrument with a hypothetical one which truly measures what it is supposed to. The page discusses Cronback's alpha and other measures of reliability.*

- IASC. (2009). *Draft Terms of Reference for the Humanitarian Coordinator: 26 February 2009*. Geneva: Inter-Agency Standing Committee. Last viewed on 22<sup>nd</sup> April 2009. URL: <http://www.undg.org/docs/9832/Revised-HC-TOR,-26-Feb-09.doc>

Notes: *These are the new draft terms of reference for the HC as of February 2009. Unlike the previous 2002 version, there is now no requirement for the HC to have any humanitarian experience whatsoever.*

- Loupforest, C. (2006, July). The Three Pillars of Humanitarian Reform. *The UN-Business Focal Point*. Retrieved 23<sup>rd</sup> September, 2007, from [http://www.enebuilder.net/focalpoint/e\\_article000614343.cfm?x=b11,0,w](http://www.enebuilder.net/focalpoint/e_article000614343.cfm?x=b11,0,w)

Notes: *Describes the three original pillars of the Humanitarian Reform (Clusters, Humanitarian Coordinator training, and the CERF). Relates how, to improve the consistency and quality of services that they provide as a group, the key humanitarian actors (UN agencies, IFRC and NGOs) active in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), have embarked on humanitarian reform aimed at building up the overall humanitarian capacity, strengthening the humanitarian coordination system and making funding more reliable. This article describes these efforts and how the private sector can help the IASC implement this three-pronged reform agenda.*

- OCHA. (2007a). *Collaborative Leadership* (Tips and Resources: IAS Cluster/Sector Leadership Training). Geneva: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Last viewed on 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2009. URL: <http://ocha.unog.ch/humanitarianreform/Portals/1/cluster%20approach%20page/training/CSLT%20July%2007/Day1/InfoSheet%20Collaborative%20Leadership.ppt>

Notes: *Successful application of the cluster approach will depend on all humanitarian actors working as equal partners in all aspects of the humanitarian response. To be successful, therefore, sectoral groups must function in ways that respect the roles, responsibilities and mandates of different humanitarian organizations. While the cluster approach encourages strong partnerships and joint planning amongst humanitarian actors, it is up to individual agencies to determine levels of participation in the work of the different sectoral groups. The cluster approach itself does not require that humanitarian actors be held accountable to sector leads. Likewise, it does not demand accountability of non-UN actors to UN agencies. It is essential that sectoral groups find non-bureaucratic ways of involving all humanitarian actors in a collaborative and inclusive process focused on areas of common interest.*

- OCHA. (2007b). *The Four Pillars of Humanitarian Reform*. New York: OCHA 23 September 2007). Last viewed on 8<sup>th</sup> June, 2008. URL: [http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/srilanka/docs/hum\\_re/The\\_humanitarian\\_reform-Four\\_Pillars.pdf](http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/srilanka/docs/hum_re/The_humanitarian_reform-Four_Pillars.pdf)

Notes: *This description of the humanitarian reform process includes building partnerships as the fourth pillar of the reform. To improve the consistency and quality of services they provide as a group, the key humanitarian organisations, (United Nations agencies, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and the non-governmental community) active in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee have embarked on a process of humanitarian reform. These efforts stem from a review of the response system, commissioned by the Emergency Relief Coordinator in 2005 as a response to the lack of a timely and effective response as seen with Sudan in 2004. Humanitarian reform seeks to make funding more reliable and predictable to combat 'forgotten*

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emergencies,' to strengthen country level coordination for the effective use of limited resources, and finally, to strengthen partnerships with NGOs, civil society, and other actors such as private sector and countries providing military assets who contribute to humanitarian response.

OCHA HRSU. (2008). Coordinators: HC Pool Development. *Humanitarian Reform* Retrieved 20<sup>th</sup> February 2009, from

<http://www.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform/Default.aspx?tabid=509>

Notes: *The objectives of this HC pool development are to expand the pool of potential HCs and RC/HCs available for deployment by the ERC in crises. Particular focus will be to increase the share of individuals with humanitarian experience, women, individuals from developing countries, and individuals from outside the UN (NGOs, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, IOM). In addition, the aim is to improve the inclusiveness, transparency and ownership of IASC agencies in the choice of HCs as well as in the performance appraisal of HCs and RC/HCs. To this end, an HC Pool will be established, which will serve as the IASC pre-approval chamber for candidates for RC/HC and stand-alone HC positions. The most recent application procedure closed on 16<sup>th</sup> March 2009.*

Peterson, F. A., Roberts, L., Toole, M. J., & Peterson, D. E. (1998). The effect of soap distribution on diarrhoea: Nyamithuthu Refugee Camp. *Int. J. Epidemiol.*, 27(3), 520-524. Last viewed on 15<sup>th</sup> February 2009. URL:

<http://ije.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/27/3/520>

Notes: *In January 1993, Nyamithuthu Camp in Malawi housed 64 000 Mozambican refugees. Communicable diseases, primarily diarrhoea, pneumonia, malaria and measles, contribute to substantially higher mortality rates in refugee populations compared to similar non-displaced populations. A systematic sample of 402 households in one portion of the camp were surveyed for diarrhoeal risk factors, and then interviewed twice weekly for four months regarding new diarrhoea episodes and the presence of soap in the household. 200 grams of soap per person was distributed monthly. Households had soap on average only 38% of the interview days. Soap was used primarily for bathing and washing clothes (86%). Although 81% of mothers reported washing their children's hands, only 28% of those mothers used soap for that purpose. The presence of soap in a household showed a significant protective effect: there were 27% fewer episodes of diarrhoea in households when soap was present compared to when no soap was present (RR = 0.73, 95% CI: 0.54 < RR < 0.98). Potential confounding factors were assessed and did not appear to be responsible for the association between the presence of soap and reductions in diarrhoea incidence. In summary, our findings suggest that the provision of regular and adequate soap rations, even in the absence of a behaviour modification or education programme, can play an important role in reducing diarrhoea in refugee populations. If subsequent study confirms the soap as a cheap and effective measure to reduce diarrhoea, its provision in adequate amounts should be a high priority in refugee settings.*

Reuters. (2009). Sudan can't fill gaps from expelled aid groups-UN Retrieved 14<sup>th</sup> March 2009, from

<http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N09503326.htm>

Notes: *The Sudanese government lacks sufficient capacity to do the work of the aid groups it has ordered out of the country's war-ravaged Darfur region, the top U.N. humanitarian affairs official said on Monday. Sudan has targeted 13 foreign and three local aid groups saying they collaborated with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, which last week issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir on charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur. Sudan's U.N. Ambassador Abdalmahmoud Abdalhaleem on Friday told reporters that the Sudanese government would have no problem filling in any gaps in aid distribution*

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*created by the expulsion of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs). But U.N. humanitarian affairs chief John Holmes told reporters on Monday that this was not the case.*

Sphere Project. (2004). *Humanitarian charter and minimum standards in disaster response* (2004 ed.). Geneva: Sphere Project. Last viewed on 8<sup>th</sup> June, 2008. URL:

[http://www.sphereproject.org/component/option,com\\_docman/task,doc\\_download/gid,12/Itemid,26/lang,English/](http://www.sphereproject.org/component/option,com_docman/task,doc_download/gid,12/Itemid,26/lang,English/)

Notes: *The Sphere Project was launched in 1997 by a group of humanitarian NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement. The Sphere handbook is a key tool developed by the project. This was developed through a robust and widespread process of engagement among practitioners in each sector for each of the five chapters and the cross cutting issues. However many of the indicators attached to the standards are base on perceptions of what constituted best current practice rather than being research based. The handbook is currently being revised and the next edition of the Handbook is expected to be published late 2010.*

UNDP. (2009). Sudan Recovery Fund South Sudan. Retrieved 1<sup>st</sup> March 2009, from <http://www.sd.undp.org/SRF-SS.htm>

Notes: *The SRF-SS aims to facilitate a transition from humanitarian to recovery assistance through wide ranging support that offers quick recovery impacts and demonstrates peace dividends. In doing so, the SRF-SS seeks to bolster the capacity of the GoSS and partners, and actively encourage the participation and empowerment of communities affected by conflict and poverty.*

UNHCR. (1992). *Guidelines on Staff Security, 2nd Edition*. Geneva: UNHCR

UNICEF, UNHCR, UNJLC, WFP, WHO, & OCHA. (2009, 6<sup>th</sup> March 2009). Joint statement on the humanitarian situation in Sudan by UN agencies. Retrieved 13<sup>th</sup> March 2009, from <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MYAI-7PW4NE?OpenDocument>

Notes: *The UN Agencies operating in Sudan [UNICEF, UNHCR, UNJLC, WFP, WHO] and OCHA, are deeply concerned by this situation. The suspended NGOs account for more than half of the capacity for the aid operation in Darfur. If the life-saving assistance these agencies were providing is not restored shortly, it will have immediate, lasting and profound impacts on the well-being of millions of Sudanese citizens. It is not possible, in any reasonable time frame, to replace the capacity and expertise these agencies have provided over an extended period of time.*

United Nations. (1999). Job Description: Resident Coordinator for Operational Activities for Development of the United Nations System. Last viewed on 14<sup>th</sup> February 2009. URL:

[http://www.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform/Portals/1/Resources%20&%20tools/RC\\_Job\\_Description.pdf](http://www.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform/Portals/1/Resources%20&%20tools/RC_Job_Description.pdf)

Notes: *Job description for UN Resident Coordinators. As the designated representative of the Secretary-General and team leader of United Nations system organizations, the Resident Coordinator assumes, on behalf of the United Nations system and in consultation with the other representatives of the United Nations system, overall responsibility for, and coordination of, the operational activities for development of the United Nations system carried out at the country level, in conformity with the objectives and priorities of the Government and mandates and objectives of United Nations system organizations.*

United Nations. (2003). *Revised Terms of Reference for the Humanitarian Coordinator* New York: United Nations. Last viewed on 22<sup>nd</sup> April 2009. URL:

<http://www.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform/Portals/1/Resources%20&%20tools/Revised%20HC%20TOR%5B2%5D.doc>

Notes: *Job Description for the Humanitarian Coordinator. In a given country, upon the occurrence of a complex emergency or when an already existing*



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*humanitarian situation worsens in degree and/or complexity, the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator, on behalf of the Secretary-General and after consultation with the IASC, will designate a Humanitarian Coordinator for that country. Paragraph 3 states that: The Humanitarian Coordinator is expected to possess specific knowledge and experience of the humanitarian environment and to have demonstrated leadership in complex emergencies. This version was endorsed on 11<sup>th</sup> December 2003.*

United Nations. (2006). *Saving Lives Together: A Framework for improving Security Arrangements among IGOs, NGOs and the UN in the Field*. New York: United Nations. Last viewed on 19<sup>th</sup> February 2009. URL: <http://www.reliefweb.int/telecoms/intro/wgetminutes/Saving%20Lives%20Together.pdf>

Notes: *Saving Lives Together serves as a framework of best practices on security collaboration which may be implemented without imposing upon our respective mandates or compromising the neutrality of humanitarian efforts. The Framework has been well received by all concerned and was welcomed by Member States in an informal meeting at the UN in New York on 6 October 2006. This initiative has been approved by the High Level Committee on Management (HLCM) as the framework for enhancing security collaboration between the UN system and non-governmental organizations.*

UNOCHA. (2009, 5<sup>th</sup> March). Sudan: Expulsion of aid agencies. Retrieved 13<sup>th</sup> March, 2009, from <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/SHIG-7PUDRB?OpenDocument>

Notes: *Since the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against President Omar al-Bashir on 4<sup>th</sup> March, the Sudanese government has ordered the suspension of 16 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in Sudan, as of 6<sup>th</sup> March. The 13 international NGOs that were expelled are: Action Contre La Faim (ACF), Solidarités, Save the Children UK and Save the Children US; Médecins Sans Frontières Holland (MSF-H) and Médecins Sans Frontières France (MSF-F); CARE International; Oxfam GB; Mercy Corps; International Rescue Committee (IRC); Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC); Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF); and PADCO. The national agencies whose activities have been terminated are: SUDO; AMAL Centre for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence, and the Khartoum Centre for Human Rights Development and Environment. The documents linked from this page include early statements by some of the agencies concerned.*

Wheeler, V., Harmer, A., & Darcy, J. (2005). *The currency of humanitarian reform* (HPG Briefing Note). London: Humanitarian Policy Group at ODI. Last viewed on 28<sup>th</sup> February 2009. URL: [http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/papers/Humanitarian\\_reform.pdf](http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/papers/Humanitarian_reform.pdf)

Notes: *The international humanitarian community faces an evergrowing range of complex crises and changing threats, from the challenges of protracted conflict and pandemics both old (HIV/AIDS) and potentially new (avian flu) to sudden and devastating natural disasters. For all its efforts, the international humanitarian system is still struggling to keep pace with the challenges it confronts. This paper examines the various strands of the 2005 humanitarian reform agenda and the relationship between them. It assesses the prospects for substantial change in the international system, and for better humanitarian outcomes as a result.*

World Bank. (2008). *Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Funds: Third Progress Report: Reporting Period: January 1—December 31, 2007: (Second Printing with Revisions)*. Washington: World Bank. Last viewed on 1<sup>st</sup> March 2009. URL: [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRMDTF/Resources/MDTFs\\_3rd\\_ProgRpt.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRMDTF/Resources/MDTFs_3rd_ProgRpt.pdf)

Notes: *As Administrator of the Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) for Sudan, the World Bank provides Donors with an annual report on the progress of activities financed by their contributions. This Third Progress Report covers implementation of the National and Southern Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Funds*

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*during calendar year 1<sup>st</sup> January to 31<sup>st</sup> December, 2007. The two trust funds were established under the authority of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and became effective on 24<sup>th</sup> August, 2005.*