Unsafe Migration towards Europe and USA; Status of Knowledge, May 2010

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Introduction and definitions

Defining unsafe migration

The increasing world economic and demographic inequalities, greater flexibility in the labour markets as well as more globalized mass media pushed international migration for the last twenty years.

More than three quarters of the international migrants move to richer countries for improving the quality of their lives, as well as that of their families at home. Migrants’ remittances account for sizable part of some countries national economy, and these have been growing steadily in the last decade.

Such increased movement of people has caused the need for more migration control and the raise of barriers to human mobility, in terms of greater enforcement at customs and more requirements to migrate.

Figure 1 Customs personnel in the USA

Source: CRS Presentation of CBP Data

About 50 Millions migrants live today in the host countries in a status of irregularity. Irregular migrant are vulnerable to any sort of victimization, as they are reluctant to seek for authorities’ protection. They often refer to criminals to assist them in the irregular migration with the result of putting their lives at risk.

1 UNDP – Human Development Report 2009
It is estimated that more than 1,000 African migrants disappear or die every year while attempting to reach Europe. In the last few years, about 300 to 500 dead migrants have been recorded at the US border annually. Much more are probably those unrecorded. Most of them die of starvation or thirst trying to cross the desert or drown while crossing the sea. Most of them undertake the trip by paying and relying on smuggling groups promising the passage across the border. If they survive the journey, many of these migrants risk to be victimized at destination. Every year, about 5,000 West African women and girls, once in Europe, are exploited in prostitution, and young men maybe exploited in other forms of forced labour. This is why these criminals may sometimes actively recruit these migrant-to-be leveraging their poor economic conditions.

Stranded migrants and victims of human trafficking, although suffering different forms of violence, are both conducting migratory experiences vulnerable to victimization which could be prevented if they had relied on safer migration paths.

The international law defines smuggling of migrants as “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident”\(^2\). The definition does not imply victimization, and smuggling of migrants is a victimless crime. As discussed above, many smuggled migrants are victimized during their journeys, as they may suffer violence by the smugglers or because they cross dangerous routes.

Smuggling of migrants may occur by land, air and sea. The methods and the vectors used change according to the prices migrants can afford to pay. In the context of migration operated by hand of smuggling groups, the safer and the easier the travel, the more expensive the service will be. Migrants with little funds are often guided over short distances and dangerous routes. Those with more funds may be able to buy a total package and travel in a more secure way\(^3\).

The passages via sea are often extremely dangerous and require some sort of organization, to begin with a vessel able to cover medium or long range sea crossings. For geographical circumstances, the sea crossing is the major form of migrants’ movement to the Arabic Peninsula from Africa, to Australia from Asia and from Africa to Europe.

Conversely, passages via air rarely put the life of the migrants at risk, and are normally used by those who can afford paying more. In a study on East Africa, Harwood explains that the large majority of migrants leaving Somalia and Ethiopia would choose to travel


\(^3\) Ilse van Liempt and Jeroen Doomernik “Migrant’s Agency in the Smuggling Process: The Perspectives of Smuggled Migrants in the Netherlands” International Migration Vol. 44 (4) 2006
overland or by sea in extremely precarious situations because of their poor economic conditions. Only 3-5% of them would afford flying directly to South Africa, usually with forged documents\(^4\). The reason for higher prices for this smuggling method stands because it implies to have an (irregular) travel document which is normally expensive. Even more expensive it is to organize a false marriage to get into a country illegally, or corrupting diplomatic personnel abroad in order to issue legal VISAs on illegal procedures. These practices have been detected in many countries around the world.

However, these forms of assisted migration do not exclude the possibility these migrants are shielded from being victimized as a consequence of their migratory experience. Sometimes, on the basis of the debt cumulated to afford the services of the smugglers, migrants maybe exploited to repay it with their work. Under various forms of debt bondage, they are vulnerable to labour and sexual exploitation, which is typical of trafficking in persons.

The United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children,\(^5\) defines trafficking in persons as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation”. By definition, trafficking victims may not necessarily be foreign migrants, by including forms of trafficking occurring within the national borders.

The concept of Unsafe Migration, as intended in this paper, includes those migrants who, in many ways, are victimized as result of migratory experience, including victims of human trafficking and smuggled migrants victims of their smugglers.

**UNODC, the Convention on Transnational Organized Crime and supplementing Protocols**

The Trafficking in Persons and the Migrants’ Smuggling protocols are both supplementing the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC). The Convention establishes general measures against transnational organized crime, and each Protocol must be read and applied in conjunction with the Convention.

In creating and signing the Convention and the Protocols, the States Parties committed to cooperate in the global struggle against human trafficking, smuggling of migrants and organized crime. This cooperation requires information sharing on patterns and trends in

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\(^5\) The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, was adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25. It entered into force on 25 December 2003. It is the first global legally binding instrument with an agreed definition on trafficking in persons.
transnational organized crime, as stated on Article 28 and Article 32 of the UNTOC. Engaging in multilateral collaboration to ensure more intensive gathering and analysis of primary data is an important step in full implementation of the Protocol.

Today, the Member States still lack the ability to say with any precision how many victims of human trafficking or how many smuggled migrants cross their borders, even harder to record where they come from or where they are going to. The various estimates that have been made are highly controversial. As a consequence, changes cannot be tracked over time, and interventions cannot be evaluated for their impact. Understanding, thus tackling these forms of unsafe migration requires ongoing exchange of data. The States Parties recognized this need when they agreed upon language on Article 28 of the UNTOC, which states:

> States Parties shall consider developing and sharing analytical expertise concerning organized criminal activities with each other and through international and regional organizations. For that purpose, common definitions, standards and methodologies should be developed and applied as appropriate.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is the custodian of the Convention and its Protocols. In this role, UNODC has the duty to monitor their implementation and the mandate for “facilitating the exchange of information among State Parties on Patterns and Trends in transnational organized Crime and on successful practice for combating it” (Article 32 –b of the UNTOC)

The UNODC mechanism monitoring the patterns and trends of these forms of unsafe migration is based on two pillars. The first pillar consists of the official statistics UNODC collects from the national authorities. The second pillar consists in a structure of studies targeting the economic dynamics, migrants’ behaviours and hidden population. This implies adopting more sophisticated methods of research, such as surveys.

**Data used, structure and goals of the paper**

This paper is based on the two types of data describe above; official statistics and surveys.

Official statistics on migrants smuggling destined to the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA) will be presented to provide an update status of knowledge on the trends, flows and patterns of unsafe migration in these two regions.

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These records do have the limits of being affected by a list of factors not necessarily related with the severity or the change in patterns of the phenomenon under investigation.

Official national statistics represent just a part of the phenomenon, the part detected by the criminal justice system. Changes in the legislation or in the repressive action of the governments do affect scope and shape of these statistics. However, the value of this information lies on regularity on which they are collected and on the validation conducted by the national authorities. Keeping in mind all the caveats and the limits, this information can help understanding trends of unsafe migration, and to propose some first considerations on if and how the economic downturn has had an impact on these migratory flows. In addition it allows an understanding of the hot spots of unsafe migration destined to USA and the EU.

The analysis will focus on these two flows as they are the most relevant documented. However, a global overview will be provided as migratory flows tend to be displaced overtime and space.

The second part of this paper will analyze in details how the economic downturn has impacted on these migration flows. While statistics concerning smuggling of migrant will help understating the key areas of the world vulnerable to unsafe migration, an analysis of the trends of macro-economic variables in these areas will serve as basis for the hypothesis of this study. A particular insight will be given to Economic dynamics of the interested countries during the period of the recession and the recent recovery.

The last chapter will provide a way forward to better understand how to monitor population at risk of unsafe migration, and address migrants and would-be-migrant to safer migratory paths.
Unsafe migration patterns and trends; 10 years of vulnerability

A global picture of migration at risk

About 5 Millions of migrants move every year from developing world to developed world\(^7\). Not all irregular migration is assisted, not all assisted migration conducts to victimization, and many assisted irregular migrants do experience a successful migration.

The flows of unsafe migration discussed here are just a portion of the overall international migration, still most of these flows remain undocumented. Information is missing on migrant smuggling and human trafficking across Latin American countries, within the Sub-Sahara Africa, to the Middle East and within large parts of the Asian continent.

Among the irregular migration flows more documented, the one arriving to the USA across the Mexican border, and the one arriving to the EU via sea are the most relevant and will be discussed further in this study. These are also the migratory flows where more prominent appears the role of the organized smugglers.

Figure 2 Main Irregular Migration flows - Intercepted irregular migrant, by border of interception (2006, 2007 and 2008).

The number of migrants’ arrivals to Yemen from the Horn of Africa is massive, similar in scope to the flow from North Africa to Europe (50,000 people in 2008). Somalis depart from Bosasso in Somalia (the area of Puntland) and cross the Arab Sea, whereas Ethiopians undertake the crossing from Obock (Djibouti), cross the Red Sea, to land on the Yemenite coasts\(^8\). The trip would require three days to cover about 350 km.

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\(^7\) UNDP – Human Development Report 2009

\(^8\) Mixed Migration Task Force Update Somalia, No 8: August 2009
While nearly all Somalis will be registered upon arrival in Yemen, Ethiopians would attempt to escape local authorities for fears of being deported. According to international organizations, about 1-2% of migrants leaving the coasts of East Africa die while crossing the sea on the way to Yemen.

Many deaths are caused by the smugglers forcing the migrants to jump on the open water to minimize the risks of being intercepted by the coast guards. As for other sea routes, also here it is unclear the existence of organized groups behind this flow. According to some 2007 press accounts, the sea passage from Bosasso would cost around 90$ and the vessels used are fishing boats.

In the last few years, this flow registered a constant increase overtime mainly pushed by the greater number of Ethiopians leaving from Djibouti, while the numbers concerning migrants leaving from Somalia remained stable. The most recent 2010 statistics show a relevant decrease in these numbers, as 9,400 people reached the shores of Yemen in the first three months of the year. This compares to nearly 17,000 between January and March 2009. To the African flows to Europe and to the Gulf Countries, it has to be added the large intra-African migrants’ smuggling flows, among which the one directed to South Africa seems more prominent and involving extremely dangerous travel conditions.

Figure 3 Arrivals in Yemen from the Horn of Africa

Source: UNHCHR

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9 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6189473.stm
10 According to UNHCHR, the numbers of reported arrivals from Somalia remain comparable to last year, while arrivals from Ethiopia have doubled. - Mixed Migration Task Force Update Somalia- No 8: August 2009
In Australia, the coasts are the natural entry for irregular migrants originating from Asia, including Afghanistan, Pakistan and China. Migrants would be transiting through Indonesia, where they would prepare their landing to the Christmas Island or Ashmore Island few kilometres away from Java, or to other islands in the north of Australia.\footnote{\url{http://jonjayray.wordpress.com/2009/10/01/unrest-over-illegal-immigrants-to-australia/}}

**Figure 4** people in ‘immigration detention’ at 30 June 2009 by arrival type, Australia.

Source: Dep. Of immigration and multicultural Affairs - Australia

**Figure 5** people taken into ‘immigration detention’ during 2008–09, Australia.

Source: Dep. Of immigration and multicultural Affairs - Australia
The number of irregular migrants detected in Australia has been steadily decreasing in the last few years. Here, the total arrivals by sea are very low compared to the European numbers. Also the number of overstayers overall decreased since the beginning of this decade.\(^\text{12}\)

Figure 6 Trends in immigration detention by arrival type and/or reason for detention, Australia.

Central Asia is another area of the world heavily affected by this phenomenon. This irregular migration flow is greatly under-documented, as probably large part of irregular migration here goes unreported. However, the migratory flow in this region appears to be less ‘at risk’ for the security of the migrants. The land passage across Central Asia is commonly used by Asians to migrate illegally to the Russian Federation, and from here onto Turkey and Europe. When travel starts in South or East Asia, they would fly from their origin countries to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan and from here by land across Kazakhstan to Russia. The Kyrgyz-Kazakh border may occur by foot in some stages, and ‘taxis’ would be waiting on the other side of the border to take them up to Moscow for 1,000USD.\(^\text{13}\) Smuggling routes in this region changes often according to the degree of enforcement at customs, which is likely a characteristic of the land border crossing. Authorities report that along the Kazakh-Russian border there are about 800 uncontrolled smuggling routes.\(^\text{14}\)

\(^\text{12}\) IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN AUSTRALIA: A NEW BEGINNING
\(^\text{13}\) GEMBICKA Katarina, “Baseline research on smuggling of migrants in from, through Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan)," *opus cit.*, p. 19.
\(^\text{14}\) J. A. Zaionchkovskaya, Yu. F. Florinskaya Legal and illegal migration across Russia-Kazakhstan border
It is probable that others migration flows are as risky as those described above, although being not recorded by the competent authorities, they remain unknown. As most of the regular migration in the world is occurring within the same region, it is likely that unsafe migration follow the same stream, thus particularly severe it is probably the intra-developing countries flows. However, the lack of adequate registration system does not allow for an understating of the importance of these flows.

**Migrants and criminals on the way to Europe and the United States**

Irregular migratory flows into Europe and USA are particularly interesting, not only for the scope of the flows, but also for the role the transnational organized crime plays in assisting the migrants to cross the border.

Specialized and organized groups exploit the vulnerabilities of these migrants, and makes profit out of the ‘service’ to facilitate irregular migration. The status of ‘clandestine’ pushes migrants to rely on these subjects, who could easily turn from smugglers to slave drivers. Migrants may be robbed, sexually assaulted, abandoned along the routes or to be exploited at destination, as the case for victims of human trafficking.

Not all smugglers are organized criminals or professionals. The main literature refers to the dichotomy ‘professionalism’ versus ‘amateurism’, and ‘individual smugglers’ against ‘organized smuggling rings’. There are also conflicting views in terms of the type of structures the smuggling rings (hierarchical or flexible). In reality, there is not reason to think that the presence of one type of migration necessarily exclude the other. Migrants’ smuggling is likely conducted by individuals and by groups, working on regular and/or part-time basis and with different level of risks to be taken by migrants.

Where illegal border crossing is relatively easy, there is no need for a smuggler or for organized groups to secure the passage. In situation when the border crossing is more difficult, for geographical reasons or for more controls, then smuggling organization may find some reasons to operate.

It appears clear that assistance is needed to cross the Sahara desert from West or East Africa to the coasts of the continent. Similarly, the strengthened migration controls on the US-Mexican border have increased the need to professional smugglers in this area.

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15 UNDP – Human Development Report 2009
16 NESKE Matthias, “Human smuggling to and through Germany”, *opus cit.* p. 123.
17 VAN LIEPMT Ilse, *opus cit.* p. 34-35.
20 Please see the Chapter on Smuggling of Migrants from Africa into the Europe in this Report.
Even if the scope of irregular migration originating destined to North America is much greater, in terms of risks, the one originating from Africa is probably the most relevant.

*To Europe by Sea*

Irregular migration from Africa to Europe by sea proceeds along a number of specific routes and methods, and all of these put the life of the migrants in danger. They all purchase services and passages along the route at the many well-known ‘smuggling hubs’ along the way. The journey from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe may take from few months to some years, and migrants may stop for longer periods along the way to collect resources for the journey onward.  

Gao in Mali, and Agadez in Niger, are two significant hubs on the routes to Europe for West African migrants. From here, they are collected in trucks departing to Algeria and Libya. The city of Tamanrasset in the southern Algeria, Dirkou in Niger, Maghnia in the north of Algeria, or Oujda in Morocco, are some of the known centres where sub-Saharan migrants may reside in order to finance the rest of the journey.

On the other side of the continent, East-African migrants gather in Addis Ababa, in Ethiopia and in Khartoum, in Sudan. Other important migration hubs on this part of the continent are Kassala, on the Sudan-Eritrean border and Al Kufra in Libya.

Once migrants have reached the African coast, they attempt to reach Europe by sea. All sea crossings to enter the EU are extremely dangerous and in the hand of criminal groups. The possible routes can be summarized into three main passages; To Spain, either by crossing the Atlantic to the Canary Islands, or the Alborean Sea to the mainland; To Italy and Malta, across the Channel of Sicily from Libya and Algeria; To Greece by sea or land from Turkey.

Most migrants passing to Europe via the Canaries are North-Africans (Moroccan, Algerian) and West-Africans (Senegalese, Gambian and Guinean). Departure points are between Laayoune and Tarfaya on the western African coasts, with most migrants embarked in small wooden boats or inflatable rubber boats. The passage is extremely dangerous due to the rough sea, the long distance and the fragile boats used by migrants. The role of organized smuggling groups in this route is well documented.

Routes directed to southern Spain are similarly dangerous. Small boats are used from the coast between Tangier and Rabat in Morocco to reach Cádiz in Spain, trough the Atlantic side of the straight of Gibraltar. On the other side of the straight, across the Alborean Sea, boats leave Morocco close to Melilla, to land in Grenada and Almería (Spain). Here, the passage is even more dangerous as smugglers would normally drop the migrants off.

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21 Carling 2007 – *Unauthorized Migration from Africa to Spain, 2007*
22 Carling 2007 – *Unauthorized Migration from Africa to Spain, 2007*
23 La guardian de los ‘negreros’ del Sahara. El País – Barbulos 2004
24 Carling 2007 – *Unauthorized Migration from Africa to Spain, 2007*
100 meters from the shores to minimize the risk of interception. Moroccan organized groups have the monopoly on the passage in these routes, with connections to the Spanish mainland.25

In 2008, a pick of 37,000 migrants arrived in Italy by sea. They were nationals from a variety of African origins, mainly North Africans, from the Horn of Africa and from West Africa. The sea crossing starts mainly from the Libyan western coasts (Zliten) to reach the island of Lampedusa (Italy). Here, a dangerous practice is that of leaving the migrants alone in the boats with no or inexperience d sailors. As in the case for the Canaries, the fragile boats and the weather conditions result in the death of many of these migrants.26 As in other cases, organized smuggling rings are located in the main Libyan departing points. These groups are connected with other smuggling rings operating along routes from West and East Africa.

For most part of the decade, migrants passing through the Greece-Turkey route were mainly Asians. African irregular migration has been increasingly making use of these routes as well and since 2007, they were among the migrants most apprehended at the Greek sea border. Migrants depart from Turkey to land on the Greek islands of Samos, Chios and Lesbos, just 1.5 kilometres from the Turkish coast. Alternatively they may be transported across the land border across the Evros River. This passage is even more dangerous for the presence of mine fields, that for years killed migrants trying to clandestinely cross the border. Also on the Turkish coasts, as in Libya, Morocco and on the West African coasts, smuggler networks are also structured organizations,27 based at departure points and in contact with intermediaries at transit stations.

To the United States of America from the Southern Border

The great majority (97%) of the illegal migrants who enter the USA clandestinely do so over the Mexico-USA border28, and Mexico plays a major role in terms of origin, as in 2008 about 90% of the total 792,000 migrants apprehended were Mexican nationals. The remainder were mostly other Latin Americans.29 Border control pushed the migrant flows into increasingly harsh terrains, such as the Sonora desert in Arizona, which may be the reason behind a growing number of detected migrant deaths.30

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30 GAO, Border-Crossing Deaths Have Doubled Since 1995; Border Patrol’s Efforts to Prevent Deaths Have Not Been Fully Evaluated
Another element of concern for the life of the migrants is the level of violence used by the criminal groups organizing the smuggling. Smugglers group migrants along the border in houses for days to several weeks, for the purpose of receiving payment for the smuggling services. Here migrants are vulnerable to any sort of victimization, either before the crossing or once inside the USA. This practice often transforms the migrants into hostages, the collateral on which the transaction is secured. As a matter of fact, a quarter of the defenders arrested in the USA for migrants’ smuggling are also charged of kidnapping, and 15% of the smuggled aliens had been held against their will in attempts to extort additional payments.

Applying, non-Mexican migrants are more vulnerable to such practices, as these nationals are often relying on organized groups connected or integrated with the drug’s cartels. 80% of Central American (non Mexicans) irregular migrants in 2005 passed through the Texas sectors, in territories in the hand of the so called Gulf Cartel. They have operations and allies down the east coast of Mexico to the Central American border, and may have links with Central American organized crime groups.

**Historical trends and current concerns**

During the last 10 years, illegal border crossing from Mexico to United States has overall decreased. The number of apprehensions at the south-west border registered a pick in the year 2000, followed by a drop until the year 2003, to rise again until 2005. Since then,

32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Border Security: Apprehensions of “Other Than Mexican” Aliens; .CRS Report for Congress, 2005
apprehensions have steadily decreased. In relative terms, the relevance of the Arizona sectors increased drastically in the 90s, and nowadays more illegal migrants are apprehended here. The Texas sectors are used less and less, and mainly by non Mexicans migrants.

**Figure 8 Trends in apprehensions at the US south-west border (number of apprehension per sectors)**

![Graph showing trends in apprehensions at the US south-west border](image)

*Source: CRS Presentation of CIR and CBP Data*

**Figure 9 Trends in the shares of apprehensions at the US south-west border (percentage of apprehension per sectors)**

![Graph showing trends in the shares of apprehensions at the US south-west border](image)

*Source: CRS Presentation of CIR and CBP Data*
The number of apprehensions of non Mexican irregular migrants grew from 4% of the total migrants apprehended in 2002, to 15% in 2009. Such increased share is mainly due to a steady decrease of the Mexican component.

**Figure 10 Share of apprehended irregular migrants at US borders, by country of nationality, FYs 2002 and 2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mexicans</th>
<th>Other than Mexicans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: US- department of homeland security

**Figure 11 Apprehended irregular migrants at US borders, by Nationality**

Source: US- department of homeland security
As discussed above, not all irregular migrants make use of smugglers to cross the border, but the majority of them do, and this practice has become more used over time. The percentage of Mexicans referring to a smuggler has increased in the last 20 years to reach lately the almost totality. At the same time, the increased share of non Mexican migrants indicates a relative more importance of the larger smuggling networks that, as discussed above, are majorly involved in the smuggling of these nationals into the USA. Beside Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador are the main countries of origin for migrants smuggled into the USA.

Source: Mexican Migration Project
As migrant apprehended is just a part or those smuggled into the United States, it is needed some calculation for a credible estimate of the dimension of the phenomenon. The US- Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) estimated the number of likely irregular migrants in the USA overtime. These estimates are based on surveyed foreign born population, with some specific indicators, such as age, origin and level of education.

Figure 14 CIS - Estimated irregular migrants at US borders, by Nationality (in Millions)

Source: Center for Immigration Studies

The PEW Hispanic Centre estimated that of all irregular immigrants in the USA, about 75-60% entered the country clandestinely and most of them across the Mexican border. As is explained above, over 90% of illegal Mexican migrants are assisted by professional smugglers. As a consequence, according to these numbers, it can be estimated that about 6 Millions smuggled migrants are residing in the United States of America (stock figure).

As far as flow-figures are concerned, the Mexican Migration Project estimated that the probability of being apprehended at the border is about 20% for Mexicans. This probability has changed overtime, as a consequence can not always be used as a definite key for estimating the migrants’ flow over this border.

Some 661,000 Mexicans were apprehended at the border in 2008. It is possible that some of these may be the same people caught multiple times\(^{37}\), however it can be estimated that about 3 millions Mexicans cross the border clandestinely every year. Considering also the other nationals and the turnover of the migrants residing in the United States, this flow-figure would match in great number with the stock estimates.

As far as the other nationals crossing clandestinely the border are concerned, 65,000-100,000 entries of non-Mexican migrants occur each year. As a matter of fact, they have less to fear from being apprehended, and being taken into custody may actually facilitate their migration. As a consequence, detection statistics in this case may reflect the real scope of the irregular migration into the USA.

As far as the situation in Europe is concerned, as reported above the number of migrants departing by the African coasts or from Turkey are much less than those crossing the Mexican border with the United States of America. However the risks connected with this migration flows are much higher. Every year, about 1,000 African migrants are estimated to die or disappear during the travel, which is about the double to the triple of migrants dying in Mexico in a much larger migratory flow. It can be roughly estimated that a migrant attempting the clandestine passage from Africa to Europe faces a probability to die 20 to 30 times higher than the one crossing the southern border of the USA.

**Figure 15** Apprehended irregular migrants at European coasts, by country of apprehension (2000-2009)

![Graph showing apprehended irregular migrants at European coasts](image)

Source: official statistics from multiple national authorities

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37 The Mexican Migration Project Surveys are conducted among Mexican migrants who are back in Mexico to celebrate Christmas with their families. It is likely that these migrants cross the border more than once in a year.
Arrivals in Spain by sea are mainly concentrated in the Canary Islands, the Strait of Gibraltar and the Alboran Sea. When migrants arrive on the Canary Islands, almost all are apprehended since they rely on the lack of repatriation facilities to be released on the Spanish mainland. When migrants arrive on the Spanish mainland, some prefer to escape rather than face processing. Apprehensions at sea border in Spain peaked in 2006 with about 40,000 detected migrants, mostly in the Canaries. In 2009, about 7,000 apprehensions were recorded at Spanish sea borders.

**Figure 16 Points of interception for migrants apprehended in Spain at sea border**

Border apprehensions along the Italian coasts peaked in 2008 with about 36,000 migrants intercepted, mostly in Lampedusa and Sicily. In 2009, because of the enforcement agreements with the Libyan authorities, apprehensions were less than 10,000 and all concentrated in the first six months of the year, before these agreements.
In addition, arrivals on the coasts of Malta totalled about 1,200 in 2007, 2,500 in 2008 and 1,300 in 2009. Arrivals to Malta follow the same trends and patterns of those to Sicily. Experts tend to represent smuggling of migrants into Malta as an ‘appendix’ to that destined to Italy.

The trend of migrants arriving to the Greek shores have been constantly increasing since 2003, and in 2009 Greece has registered the largest number of migrants apprehended at sea border in the European Union (about 25,000).

The total number of migrants apprehended at sea borders of the European Union in 2009 was about 45,000, and over the last five years, trend appears to be fluctuating between 40,000 and 70,000 migrants per year.

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38 Most of the sea apprehensions registered in the Rest of Italy in the nineties and early 2000s referred to South East Europeans (Albanians) directed to the south east coast of Italy. This flow totally extinguished nowadays.
Figure 18 Aggregated migrants apprehended at the sea border in Greece, Italy, Malta and Spain

Source: UNODC elaboration on official statistics from multiple national authorities

As far as the nationalities of the migrants are concerned, the situation in Greece is slightly different compared to the other European countries of arrivals. Most of the migrants arrived by sea and by land are Asians (mainly Afghani, Middle Eastern and South Asians). However African migration has increased overtime, probably because of a displacement of the Italian and Spanish routes.

Figure 19 Migrants apprehended in the EU at the sea borders

Greece – 2009

Source: Coastguard, Greece
The origin of irregular migrants smuggled to Spain by sea has changed over the past decade. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, it was mostly Moroccans who were hidden in vans and lorries arriving in ferries from Morocco. The years 2005 and 2006 marked the beginning of a sharp increase in arrivals of West Africans compared to North Africans in Spain. Between 2004 and 2008, South Asian and South East Asian irregular migrants were also intercepted when trying to cross to Spain either from Morocco, through Ceuta and Melilla or on boats to the Canary Islands. In 2009, the vast majority of migrants arriving in Spain by sea were again North African.

There are no definite official statistics on the nationality of the migrants arrived by sea in Spain. A 2008 study of the NGO ACCEM, conducted on a random sample of West African migrants who arrived between April and August 2008, depict the following picture; 12.6 per cent were from Côte d’Ivoire; 11.4 per cent from Guinea; 11.1 per cent from Mauritania; 9 per cent from Mali; 9 per cent from Burkina Faso; 7.3 per cent from Ghana; 6.8 per cent from Gambia; 4.8 per cent from Nigeria and 3.6 per cent from Senegal.39

Somalia, Eritrea, Tunisia, Nigeria and Egypt are the main origins of migrants detected in Italy, Malta and Greece at sea border. Palestinians and Afghani represents a large share of the arrivals in Greece, and Moroccans are registered frequently in Spain, as well as Italy and Malta. Also Algerians play a relevant role in the arrivals in Spain and Italy.

At the same time, it appears clear that the drivers behind the migration originating from Somalia, Afghanistan and the Middle East may not always be of economic nature. Most of Somali, as well as Eritreans, Palestinians and Afghani leave because of the long standing conflicts in their countries of origin, which have deteriorated over the last few years.

Conversely, North African and West African unsafe migration have been fluctuating over the years, but constantly present and always relevant. Economic motivations are likely the major drivers for these migrants, as it is the case for Latin Americans directed to the United States of America.

The next chapter will analyze the possible relation between the Economic dynamics and the trends related to migration at risks. In particular, being most of them labour migrants, a particular focus will be given on the relation between unemployment rates at destination and origin and these migration flows.
Economic downturn and migration; hope and disillusion

The crisis on labour markets in Europe and USA

At the beginning of the year 2010, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stated that the global economy was in a status of severe recession inflicted by a massive financial crisis and acute loss of confidence. IMF predicted that the contraction of the global economy would have moderated from the second quarter of 2010 onward.\(^4\)

Many economies around the world have been seriously affected by the financial crisis and slump in activity. It has been estimated that more than 60 countries entered in a recession as a consequence of this economic downturn initiated by this financial crisis. To many observers, this is the worst economic recession after the Great Depression of 1929.

The global downturn touched first the major world economies on 2007, and it has fully impacted on their outputs the two following years. The advanced economies experienced

a reduction of 7.5% decline in real GDP during the fourth quarter of 2008, and output have continued to fall almost as fast during the first quarter of the following year\textsuperscript{41}. At the end of 2009, the world output registered a 0.5% contraction compared to 2008. According to IMF, in 2010 the world output is expected to rise by about 4.5%, thus the recovery has started to move the world economy upward\textsuperscript{42}.

**Figure 22 OECD Composite Leading Indicators (CLI)\textsuperscript{43}**

![Graph showing OECD Composite Leading Indicators](image)

Source: OECD

The crisis moved from a purely financial dimension into the real economy, as the banking sector have reduced the opportunity for credit to enterprises and increased the interest rates. This has caused lack of liquidity to the private sector as well as public companies, including some States (Iceland and Greece are the best examples of State insolvencies because of a lack of liquidity).

Eventually, this financial crunch led to the contraction of the Gross Domestic Products in the USA, Europe and other countries for a period longer than two quarters, which is the defining condition for an economic recession. In the United States, the downturn started in the third quarter of 2007, and the recession followed one year later until the third quarter of 2009.

\textsuperscript{41}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{43}The CLI is a times series, formed by aggregating a variety of component indicators which show a reasonably consistent relationship with a reference series (e.g. industrial production IIP) at turning points. The main message of CLI movements over time is the increase or decrease, rather than the amplitude of the changes.
The reduced production has eventually impacted on the unemployment rates of the countries under economic stress. In relative terms, the advanced economies are those majorly affected by the employment crisis.

**Figure 23** US Gross Domestic Product Growth, Percent change from preceding period

![Graph showing US GDP percent change from preceding period](image)

Source: US - Bureau of Economic Statistics

**Figure 24** Unemployment rates for selected countries

![Graph showing unemployment rates for selected countries](image)

Source: UNODC elaboration on OECD data
Unemployment rates in the United States rose immediately after the first signs of the financial crisis in the year 2007, and after four years of a constant decline. Two years after the beginning of the financial crisis, the United States of America recorded a +80% increase of the unemployment rates compared to rates recorded in 2006, for a total of about 11 millions people unemployed. Initial predictions for the year 2010 indicated American unemployment rate will continue increasing; however the first official data released during the year indicate an opposite trend.

Source: Bureau of Labour Statistics
European economies are characterized by less flexible, and more protected labour markets than USA. This causes, on one hand, a general higher unemployment rates in Europe compared to USA, and on the other hand, a delayed and more limited impact of this financial crisis into unemployment rates.

As a matter of fact, in the richest countries of the European Union (EU-15) the unemployment rates raised one year later (2008) and less drastically compared to the USA. However, unemployment rates in the European Union remain substantially higher than in the USA.

Within the European Union, the economic impact of the crisis differs among its member states. A closer look to the major European economies shows that, according the OECD forecasts, the United Kingdom and Spain will still register a sharp increase in the unemployment rates at the end of 2010. The United Kingdom will pass from the 5% recorded in 2007, to 8.5% in 2010, when Spain will register a pick of about 15%. Germany, France, Greece, Sweden and Italy seemed to have suffered less compared to the other EU member states. They will register a more moderate, but still relevant increase in the unemployment rates to be recorded at the end of the 2010.

Unemployment rates in Spain and Italy seem to have been affected by the recession before the other EU countries, as these were somewhat increasing already in 2007, while in other major European countries, unemployment rates started rising in 2008.

**Figure 27 Unemployment rates in selected EU countries**

Source: OECD
The crisis on vulnerable population

Currently, the economic downturn has had a minor impact on the least developed countries. Although very poor in absolute terms, the African continent registered a minor reduction in the national GDP growths compared to the previous years.

Similar considerations can be made for other parts of the world normally characterized for being origin of migration at risk. China, South East Asia, South Asia and large part of the South American continent did register a slower, but still positive economic development in the year 2008. In the year 2009, it was registered GDPs reduction in some parts of Africa and in large parts of Latin America, however limited compared to the advanced economies. The IMF forecasts for 2010 indicate a broad recovery in the developing countries.

Figure 28 World maps showing GDP real growth rates for the years of the crisis
As opposed to areas of the world described above, other developing and emerging economies (Eastern Europe, Central America and Mexico) seem to have been more affected and did register heavy slowdown also in the year 2009.

As far as the main origins for unsafe migration to the United States are concerned, in March 2010, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) summarized this situation stating that, even at the peak of the crisis, most part of Latin America performed surprisingly well, resulting in a substantially improved outlook for the region\textsuperscript{44}. Four Latin American countries were identified in the previous chapter; El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Mexico. Although geographically close, these four countries differ in terms of absolute richness. Mexico is the richest of these four, with a GDP per capita of about 9,500 USD recorded in 2005. In the same year, El Salvador recorded a GDP per capita of 5,130 USD, Guatemala of 4,400 USD, and Honduras of 2,820 USD.

In relative terms, the crisis has hit these four countries proportionally to their absolute richness. Mexico registered a deeper and longer recession, reaching a negative pick of \(-7\%\) in the annual GDP growth rate in 2009. El Salvador and Honduras were also heavily affected by the crisis with negative growth recorded in 2009. Guatemala registered a slowdown, but still some growth was recorded even in the worst moment of the crisis.

\textsuperscript{44} A. Izquierdo; E. Talvi; "The Aftermath of the Crisis; Policy Lessons and Challenges Ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean", IADB, March 2010
In terms of unemployment, these countries have definitely suffered much less than the advanced economies. According to the official statistics, just Mexico has registered an increased unemployment during the years of the global economic downturn. Moreover this moderate increasing trend seems to have simply followed the decade trend, rather than being affected by the crisis. El Salvador and Guatemala did not record any substantial change in the unemployment rates of the last few years, while Honduras seems to be recovering from the high rates registered during this decade.
Overall, information on the most recent trends on the GDPs and unemployment for these four countries confirm that, still in 2010, the economic downturn did not affect the main origins of unsafe migration as much as the destinations.

In terms of the impact of the economic downturn, the situation does not look too bad for those African countries at the origin of unsafe migration to Europe. Especially for those migratory flows that could be considered as mostly economically driven. Migratory flows that appear to be more politically driven (Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia and the Middle East) have been excluded from the analysis.

Also in this case, the main origins for unsafe migration to Europe own different level of economic development. According to 2005 data, Tunisia is the richest among the North African countries (7,500USD per capita), Algeria records a GDP per capita of about 6,500USD, Egypt of about 5,000USD, Morocco of about 3,500USD. Nigeria (2,200USD per capita) and Eritrea (800USD per capita) are by far much poorer of North African countries.

Figure 31 GDP annual percent change for the main origins of unsafe migration to EU (just labour migrants)
The North African countries here considered; Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria did not experience any recession at all, as their GDPs continued to rise, even if at a reduced rates during the years of the global downturn. Algeria and Tunisia recorded accordingly a +2% and +3% GDP growth in 2009, from a +3% and +6% in 2007. Egypt passed from a+7% recorded in 2007, to +5% in 2009. Morocco recorded very mixed trends in its GDP growth, however always positive and increasing.

The Nigerian economy seems not to have been touched at all from the crisis. The GDP continued to grow at the same pace recorded since 2005 (+5% per year). Conversely, the Eritrean GDP followed somehow that of the global economical trends, with a reduction of the country’s GDP in 2008 equal to about -10%, compared to 2007.

Source: International Monetary Fund
The unemployment rates in Nigeria are by far lower than North Africa, around 5% of the country’s workforce. Egypt registers a lower unemployment rates compared to the two countries of the Maghreb, and decreasing since 2007. Tunisia registers a quite high unemployment rate, which is in line with the long term trend, and Algeria decreased overtime, with a slight trend change during the global economic downturn. Unfortunately unemployment rates in Morocco and Eritrea are incomplete or not available.

As for the case of the Latin American countries, also in the case of the African countries, it is fair to say that the relative impact of the economic crisis has been, so far, less drastic than the advanced economies. Only exception is Eritrea that, according to the data available did experience a relevant contraction of the national production.

In February 2010, the African Development Bank (AfDB)\(^{45}\) showed how the continent, at aggregated level, did not enter into a recession, but in an economic slowdown. The African aggregated GDP growth rate fell from about +6% in 2005–08 to +2% in 2009. The following chart presents the ‘usual’ trend, with a drastic drop for the year 2009. Nevertheless, differently than in Europe and the USA, in the case of Africa the numbers are still positive.

\(^{45}\) African Development Bank Group “CONTAINING THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL CRISIS AND PAVING THE WAY TO RECOVERY IN AFRICA” Meeting of the Committee of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Cape Town, 21 February 2010
The crisis clearly originated in the developed world and was transmitted to Africa and Latin America mostly through real channels such as declining exports and reduced FDIs. As a consequence, countries more open to trade and capital flows suffered the sharpest growth falls in 2009\textsuperscript{46}.

An important channel of transmission of the crisis from the advanced economies to the countries origins of migration is the reduced inflows of migrants’ remittances.\textsuperscript{47}

**Safe and unsafe migration during the crisis**

According the World Bank’s Outlook for Remittances 2010, the latest data show that remittance flows to developing and emerging countries has dropped of about 6% because of the crisis. Global remittances inflows to these countries reached $316 billion in 2009, from $336 billion in 2008. The World Bank estimates these capital flows will increase again of about 6.2 % in 2010\textsuperscript{48}.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} Dilip Ratha, Sanket Mohapatra, and Ani Silwal \textit{Outlook for Remittance Flows 2010-11; Remittance flows to developing countries remained resilient in 2009, expected to recover during 2010-11; Migration and Remittances Team, Development Prospects Group, World; April 23, 2010}
Most of this reduced inflows hit the upper-middle income countries, with an annual drop of about 15% in 2009. Low income countries did not register any reduction of remittances, mainly due to the modest dimension of these capital inflows.

Source: World Bank
As regards to the origin countries for unsafe migration, Mexican remittances dropped of about 20% during the years of the economic downturn, passing from about 27,000M USD in 2007, to a bit more than 20,000M USD in 2009. Small reductions in the inflows of remittances were recorded also in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras in 2009.

As far as the main origins for Europe are concerned, remittances inflows to Nigeria, Egypt and Morocco did increase drastically during the entire decade, while Algeria and Tunisia registered a more moderate growth. These two countries’ remittances were not affected by the economic downturn, as the inflows in 2009 remained stable compared to the previous years. Conversely, in 2009 Nigerian remittances reduced of about 5-7%, Egyptian of about 18%, and Moroccan of about 15%.

**Figure 36 Remittances inflows (US$ millions) to main origins of unsafe migration to EU**

Source: World Bank

Data on the outflows of the remittances are not available as yet for the year 2009. However, the 2008 data indicate a flexion of the production of migrants’ wealth in United States, Spain, German and United Kingdom already during the early stage of the crisis.
It can be concluded that remittances inflows to the main origins on migration at risk, reduced as a consequence of the contracted economy in the destination countries.

Migrants’ remittances could be considered an indicator of the economic motivations to start a potential migratory experience. It is clear that labour migrants are attracted by the employment opportunities at destination, and a raise of the unemployment rates is translated into fewer opportunities for migrants. The unemployed migrant will not be able to send capital back home, thus a reduction of the remittances, which goes together with a lack of motivation to migrate.

This is particularly true for those who would risk their lives attempting to reach the final destination. The combination of the high risks starting an unsafe migratory path, with the reduced working opportunities, may impact on the motivation of the possible migrant to leave. This is particularly true if, as it appears evident from the Economical data, the crisis has affected the destination countries more than the origin countries. While there are fewer reasons to migrate, as labour opportunities have reduced at destinations, the motivations to stay home are greater, as origin countries did register some sort of economic growth, and irregular migration got more difficult and expensive for the increased border controls.

The data at the base of this study confirms this hypothesis. In particular the following chart shows that, during the years when the American economy flourished (2002-2005), more migrants were apprehended at border, as they were trying to enter irregularly into the country. The positive correlation\(^49\) between the two series of data is confirmed also during the years of slowdown, as fewer migrants were apprehended in 2007 and 2008.

\(^{49}\) Statistical correlation is strong and positive (r: 0.8, sig: 0.05)
Figure 38 Relation between migrants apprehended at border in the USA and US-GDP growth

Source: UNODC elaboration on multiple official sources

Figure 39 Relation between estimated irregular migrants in the USA and US-unemployment

Source: UNODC elaboration on multiple official sources
This is confirmed when using other indicators, such as the Center for Immigration Studies monthly estimates of residing irregular migrants in USA and unemployment. Also in this case, it appears evident a correlation between the reduced irregular migration and the economic crisis.\(^{50}\) The above chart shows the implied illegal population has drastically reduced in the second quarter of 2007, when the US-Unemployment started to raise as a consequence of the economic crisis. This trend has been confirmed also in 2008 and 2009.

The two charts above clearly provide evidence to the hypothesis that the economic crisis did actually resulted in a reduction of the migratory flows into the USA, including those more at risk for the life of the migrant.

Same analysis cannot easily be conducted in the EU, because migratory flows at risk are landing in southern Europe, but are directed to other countries. The multiplicity of possible destinations in the EU makes it difficult to assess how the dynamics at destination may affect the migration flows discussed here. Moreover, many migrants arriving here are not labour migrants, but asylum seekers (Somali, Sudanese, Afghani and Palestinians). However some statistical evidence confirms the hypothesis also in this case. The number of arrivals in Lampedusa and the EU unemployment rates are negatively correlated.\(^{51}\)

Figure 40 Relation between number of migrants apprehended in Sicily and unempl. rates in EU-15

Source: UNODC elaboration on multiple official sources

\(^{50}\) Statistical correlation is strong and negative (r: -0.8, sig:000)

\(^{51}\) Statistical correlation is moderate and negative (r: -0.55, sig:005)
This is confirmed by more qualitative type of studies. The first results of the surveys conducted by UNODC in Africa do confirm this hypothesis. More of these surveys have to be conducted in the future, to assess the economic motivations of the migrants and the level of awareness of the risks connected with irregular migration.
Conclusions; a theoretical frame for monitoring unsafe migration

If it is true that the global economic crisis has reduced the economic drivers for unsafe migration, it is also likely that the forthcoming economic recovery will lead to more and riskier migratory flows. Global economy will manage to recover, but overall the world will be poorer, and in the long run global inequalities will likely increase, as the impact of the reduced remittances will impact on the national GDPs of the countries of origin.

However, the current status of knowledge does not allow having sufficient elements to predict coherently future global dynamics concerning the forms of migration considered in this paper. As a consequence, in the near future destination and origin countries will be unprepared to steer this phenomenon into safer migratory paths.

It is imaginable that more migrants will be in need of leaving, as remittances will provide some benefit to their countries’ GDPs, and that, at the same time, destination countries will raise their national barriers to new migration flows. This tension will result into an increasing demand for smuggling services of organized criminals, more risks for migrants and eventually more victims of smugglers and traffickers.

There is a need for international community to assess and predict these forms of migration, in order to protect migrants in transit and at destination, and provide proper information about the risks and the benefits at origin.

According to UNODC, this is possible by a system surveys able to assess the motivation and the likelihood of targeted population to migrate. This system of surveys would result on a periodical barometer able to assess what are the expectations of the would-be-migrants, what are their economic motivations, the level of migrants’ awareness of the risks connected with the migration at risk, as well as the knowledge of possible safer migratory paths.

Surveys conducted in the main areas of origins can be able to estimate the dimension of the population that would be ready to undertake dangerous migration, and how the economic changes may impact on this choice.

This would facilitate improved understanding of the population vulnerable to improper migration, including a forecast of the supply dimension of human trafficking and the demand for high-risk migration services.

As a consequence, through this barometer, national authorities should be able to steer would-be-migrants to proper migration paths, thus reducing the demand for organized criminals and their smuggling services, and sustaining the economies of these origin countries.
This can happen, for instance, by identifying and addressing specific information gaps of the population at risk of unsafe migration, and through bilateral agreements with the possible destination countries.

Similarly, countries at destination or on the routes will be able to assess the dimension of the migratory flow to be expected. This should allow these governments to adequately assist and protect migrants at risk of victimization. Eventually, countries at destination and at origin will be able to prevent the deaths of thousands of migrants.

Currently, these surveys are conducted by UNODC in different African countries, under the frame of IMPACT research activities. These surveys on migrants vulnerable to violence, exploitation or other forms of victimization aim at understating the motivations, the main vulnerabilities, migrants’ awareness of the risks at departure, the involvement of organized crime and other relevant information. These surveys are conducted by UNODC in Africa (Algeria, Mali, Niger and Nigeria) and in Europe (Greece, Italy, Malta and Spain) on hundreds of irregular migrants arrived at destination or in transit, as well as among would-be-migrants. Furthermore interviews are conducted among practitioners, such as magistrates, investigators and NGO personnel, who have direct experience with the phenomenon considered.

This monitoring activity will be, through the contribution of GIVAS, expanded to the region of Central America, and eventually a series of surveys will target the area of South Asia, South East Asia and the Pacific. Overall this would allow building up an information gathering system that, if sustained over time, will empower the international community to prevent migration at risk.