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The Role of Ethnic Identity and Economic Issues in the 2007 Kenyan Elections*

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Abstract

This paper investigates the factors that shaped Kenyan's voting intentions in the 2007 presidential election. Using data from a public opinion survey conducted two weeks before the election we are able to evaluate the relative importance of what shaped voting behavior comprehensively, taking into account factors such as ethnicity, access to public services, incidence of poverty and wealth differences across ethnic groups and across generations. We find strong evidence that ethnic identity was the main factor determining voting intentions and to a lesser extent grievances, economic well-being, and access to public and private goods. However, the relative importance of these factors depends on whether Kenyan voters identify themselves first and foremost in terms of their ethnicity, occupation or nationality. Those who identify themselves in terms of their ethnicity were influenced the most by access to public services. This evidence supports theories that suggest ethnic identity is a proxy used by voters to assess which candidate will give them greater access to public goods.

Keywords: Voting behavior, ethnic identity, Kenya

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Introduction

Ethnic identity in many African countries influences political and social behavior. Ethnic identity influences who one trusts, does business with, gets married to and whom to vote for. The reasons why ethnic identities play such a strong role in African's lives is still debated. Some argue that ethnicity is hard-wired within the socio-economic system, it is the way people have learned to live and there are no incentives to change. Others argue that the salience of ethnic identities is a political construct. Some countries with high ethnic diversity such as Tanzania have used the education system and redistribution of resources to develop a sense of national as opposed to ethnic identity. However, in other ethnically diverse countries, like Kenya, political parties have used ethnic identity to mobilize voters and to establish political alliances, leading in some cases to violent ethnic conflicts. An example of this is the recent disputed Kenyan presidential election. Although the election appeared to be one of the most competitive in the history of the country, it was marked by unprecedented levels of violence -much of it ethnically motivated- resulting in the loss of 1,200 lives, the displacement of over a quarter of a million people and the widespread destruction of property.

Although it is argued that open elections can help mediate disputes among groups by installing broadly legitimate and accountable governments (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Carothers, 2007; Soudriette and Pilon, 2007), when citizens vote primarily on the basis of identity (ethnicity, religion, class, etc) other issues such as performance and accountability are put aside diminishing the value of democracy. Hence in ethnically divided societies competitive electoral processes risk widening existing divisions across groups (Snyder, 2000; Wilkinson, 2004; Snyder and Mansfield, 2005) and keeping governments in office not necessarily on the basis of their merit, but on the basis of who has the biggest ethnic alliance. The unprecedented levels of violence that Kenya experienced is just one of the many examples that raise questions about what factors determine voting behavior in maturing African democracies and whether ethnic identity

still remains a salient factor in voting choices compared to economic well-being and a politician's performance.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the voting behavior of Kenyans with the aim of identifying the factors that influenced voting intentions and the issues that divided Kenyans. To do so, we use a nationally representative public opinion survey, which we conducted two weeks before the 27 December 2007 general elections. We find strong evidence that ethnic identity was one of the main factors determining voting intentions. There is a striking correlation between respondents' ethnicity and their chosen candidate, despite the fact that less than one percent of respondents claimed that ethnicity was the main factor in deciding whom to vote for. Even when we control for other factors, such as respondents' characteristics and economic indicators, ethnic identity remains a strong factor influencing voting intentions. Nonetheless, we find that factors like grievances, economic well-being, and access to public and private goods also influenced voters' choice albeit to a lesser extent than ethnic identity. Specifically these factors are access to public services (school, health clinics, and police stations), whether the respondent suffered any shortage of food or medicines, whether the respondent lives in an area with higher incidence of poverty than the national average and whether the respondent's ethnic group has a wealth level below the national average.

Our work has a number of methodological advantages over earlier analyses of voting behavior. Previous studies that have relied on anecdotal evidence or highly aggregated data miss out on important information such as respondents' poverty levels that could influence voting intentions. Studies using public opinion surveys can benefit from information not available in aggregated data sets. However, using exclusively public opinion surveys to analyze voting behavior could lead to biased results, as self-reported information could be inaccurate and respondents' perceptions might be biased by previously taken dispositions, thereby becoming endogenous (e.g. dispositions such as I'm not a Kikuyu hence I disapprove whatever the President does).

To overcome the shortcomings of such approaches, in this work we triangulated our survey with other data sources. Specifically, we used data from the Kenyan Bureau of Statistics on the incidence of poverty at constituency level before the contending incumbent president took office and a year before the latest election. In addition, we used data collected systematically by our fieldwork-team on the public services available nearby the respondent's home. By using these economic indicators in our analysis, rather than just perceptions or self-reported wealth levels, we are able minimize problems of bias and endogeneity in our econometric models and rule out competing explanations for our findings. Hence, this work evaluates the relative importance of what shaped voting behavior comprehensively, taking into account factors such as ethnicity, access to public services, incidence of poverty and wealth differences across ethnic groups and across generations.

Of particular interest is the finding that voting behavior depends on how Kenyans identify themselves first and foremost— in terms of their ethnicity, occupation or nationality. Among those who identify themselves first and foremost as Kenyans ethnic identity is still a salient factor influencing voting intentions. This contrasts with the Weberian and Gellnerian theories that argue national identity displaces sub-national identities. Not surprisingly among those who identify first and foremost in terms of their ethnicity, voting intentions are influenced by their ethnic identity. However, for this group access to public services is a key factor influencing voting intentions. This evidence supports Horowitz's (1985) hypothesis which states that ethnic identity is used as a proxy by voters to assess which candidate will give them greater access to public goods, in an environment where politicians use ethnicity as a political tool to mobilize voters.

The article proceeds as follows: In the next section, we provide a brief general discussion of voting behavior in Kenya. Section 3 provides a descriptive analysis of voter intentions, based on the public opinion survey. Sections 4 and 5 present and test the hypotheses on the factors that drove voting intentions. Section 6 concludes.

2. Ethnic Identity and Voting in Kenya

Until recently Kenya had been touted as beacon of peace, a success story in an otherwise troubled continent. Unlike many of her neighbors, Kenya has never experienced extensive civil strife or a military coup and the country has been under civilian rule since attaining independence in 1963. This state of relative stability was achieved primarily under a single-party rule (the Kenya African National Unity party) and under a constitutional arrangement that endowed the presidency with immense powers. Before 1991, the country appeared politically united and elections were held on regular basis without major problems although the president had a lot to say about which candidates were cleared by the party to compete in the elections.

This apparent peace, stability and unity unraveled after the introduction of competitive politics in 1991. Ethnicity moved to playing a central role in Kenyan politics as evidenced by patterns of political mobilization, resource allocation, and public service appointments, notably to the Cabinet (Kimenyi, 1997; Apollos, 2001; Orvis, 2001). Analysis of voting behavior based on aggregate data suggests that, since the introduction of multiparty democracy, opposition parties quickly splintered according to ethnic groupings, and ethnicity became a dominant factor in explaining voting patterns and violent clashes (Muigai, 1995; Kimenyi, 1997; Oyugi, 1997; Orvis, 2001). For instance, Oyugi (1997) using aggregate data shows that ethnicity was the most defining factor in the 1992 elections. Not only were political parties formed along ethnic lines, but also voting was primarily in ethnic blocks. This pattern was repeated in the 1997 general elections. In both general elections, widespread ethnic violence occurred especially so during campaigning (Kimenyi and Ndung'u 2005).

There are a number of factors determining why politicians found so easy to play with ethnic identities. These factors become clear if we compare the policies pursued by Tanzania and Kenya (neighboring countries, both highly ethnic diverse) after their independence from Great Britain in early 1960s. In Tanzania right after independence, President Nyerere emphasized the sense of a national identity over sub-national identities. He was very careful on how the education

system was run. The public school curriculum was designed to stress common Tanzanian history, culture, and values and inculcate a strong sense of national identity (Court 1984). Nyerere also employed Kiswahili as a nation-building tool by establishing it as the national language, and used in government administration and in all spheres of public life (Polome 1980). But perhaps the Tanzanian's keystone to build a sense of national unity has been the focus on an equitable regional distribution of public investment in education, health, and infrastructure (Court and Kinyanjui 1980). The Kenyan experience could not be more different to the Tanzanian approach of self-conscious nation-building. Kenya has not used the school curriculum to promote a coherent national identity. For instance, the school curriculum does not study Kenya as a nation until grade 5. The Kenyan focus on provincial geography and history in grades 1–4 and as a result this might deepen ethnic divisions, especially among the many who drop out of primary school before grade 5 (Miguel 2004). Although Kiswahili has long been widely spoken in Kenya as a lingua franca, it competes with other languages such as English and local languages in political forums and schools. On top of that, the regional distribution of central government resources has favored some ethnic groups depending on who in charge in the office greatly politicizing ethnicity and creating grievances across the perceived discriminated ethnic groups (Court and Kinyanjui 1980).

Land disputes is a particular factor that have also fuelled ethnic sensitivities and violent clashes in Kenya, especially so in the Rift Valley. According to Anderson and Lochery (2008) as Kenya moved toward independence a number of land settlement schemes were devised. By 1975 there were more 250 of these land settlement schemes, the great majority in the Rift Valley or along its borders. The purpose of these land settlement schemes were not land distribution but to give back to Kenyans fertile land. As such land was sold at market prices which meant some of the natives of the Rift Valley were unable to buy it, so wealthy people from other regions acquired land in the region legally. About one million acres of land in the Rift Valley were redistributed in this way, with more than a quarter of million people from other regions moving

in. These land schemes produced ethnically diverse communities. These communities lived together peacefully for thirty years, but violence then flared up with the introduction of multiparty politics. Then politicians started to exploit ethnicity to create a sense of difference and for short term political ends. As the fertile land in the region has tended to shrink ethnic sensitivities have been strengthened motivated by a combination of political and economic factors.

In 2002 the view that Kenya's elections was becoming merely an ethnic consensus changed. Then Mwai Kibaki got the support from a broad coalition of several ethnic groups which got together to end the failing economic policies of the KANU party. Kibaki's first Presidential election success in 2002 —declared free and fair by international observers— was hailed at the time as a step forward for Kenyan democracy. His victory, aided by the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) represented the end of KANU's one-party dominance since Independence. Kibaki came to power promising to turn the economy around, to introduce free primary education, to deliver a new constitution to end with corruption and tribalism. President Kibaki's administration delivered Kenya a booming tourism industry, economic growth placed at more than 6% annually and the introduction of free primary school education. Less progress was achieved however in tackling corruption, reducing widespread poverty and inter-ethnic inequalities and in delivering a reformed constitution. Kibaki's defeat in the 2005 Referendum on a revised constitution failed to reach a consensus on how Kenya should be run. Kimenyi and Shughart (2008) using a constituency-level dataset find that voting decision in the Referendum were primarily influenced by ethnic identity as groups disagreed in how resources and power should be shared. The failed Referendum also ended the NARC coalition and split the Cabinet. Roads Minister Raila Odinga and Environment Minister Kalonzo Musyoka, who led the group against the approval of the referendum, formed a new opposition political party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM).

In September 2007 the seventy-five year old President Kibaki declared that he would stand again in the presidential elections, backed by a new political alliance - the Party of National

Unity (PNU). Among Kibaki's supporters were once his political rivals, former president Daniel arap Moi and Uhuru Kenyatta, leader of the former ruling party KANU. The ODM was left with major chances of contesting the elections. But, with just four months ahead of elections the ODM split into two fractions as they failed to select the party's presidential candidate. So Kibaki faced a weakened opposition led by Raila Odinga backed by the ODM and Kalonzo Musyoka backed by the new fraction ODM-Kenya.

The fact that political parties re-arranged according to ethnic alliances was an eminent threat of having an u-turn toward having the electorate divided along ethnic lines as in the elections of the 1990s. Although throughout campaigning, the rival groups focused on the politicians' track record and promised policies all parties appealed to ethnic sensitivities and loyalties. As the Daily nation put it in one of its editorials: the only thing that seems to matter is the ethnicity of the three candidates [Mwai Kibaki a Kikuyu, Raila Odinga a Luo and Kalonzo Musyoka a Kamba], one reason why Kenyans keep voting for the wrong people.

3. Analysis of Voter Intentions

To assess the factors that influenced voting intentions of Kenyans we use data from a nationally representative survey of people aged 18 and over conducted just two weeks ahead of the General Elections held on 27 December 2007 hence providing a good picture of voting intentions and economic/political perceptions. To ensure that respondents fully understand the survey questions, whenever possible interviews were conducted in the respondents' mother tongue.¹ In total, interviews were conducted in 10 of the most widely spoken languages in Kenya. The sample includes 1,207 Kenyans from all the eight provinces, covering all 71 districts and in 76 out of 210 electoral constituencies with a margin of sampling error of +/-3% at a 95% confidence level. The sample captures the rural/urban split consistent with the most recent Kenyan census that shows

¹ In piloting and fieldwork we found that the vast majority of Kenyans were welcoming and eager to talk freely about their voting intentions. The survey reached a response rate of 80%, a high rate for studies of this kind in Kenya.

that 65% of respondents live in rural areas and the remainder in urban areas. The incidence of poverty in our sampled areas is also consistent with patterns of poverty as reported by the Kenyan Statistics Bureau. Also quite important for our analysis is the fact the ethnic distribution of the sample respondents matches to that of the national population.

At the time of our survey, most respondents (93%) were registered voters and willing to vote in the Presidential election. The responses to the question *“if elections were held tomorrow, which party’s candidate would you vote for as national President?”* showed that the leading candidates -Kibaki and Odinga- were in a virtual statistical tie (with 40.1% of intended vote for Kibaki and 46.6% for Odinga) so any one of them could have won depending on voter turnout. The surveyed voting intentions for the presidential candidates coincide with similar opinion surveys conducted in Kenya as well as with a major exit poll conducted by the University of California, San Diego. The Electoral Commission of Kenya found Mwai Kibaki the winner of the presidential election with 51.3% of the votes to 48.7% for Odinga and with a 69% of voter turnout. The opposition claimed fraud and international electoral observers reported a number of irregularities in the tallying and counting of ballots. The outcome of the elections, and primarily because of the belief that the election was rigged, culminated in unprecedented level of violence. While our research does not dwell on issue of irregularities, we are able to infer from the survey that the electorate was highly polarized between two candidates, Odinga and the incumbent president Kibaki.

But what were the factors splitting the Kenyan electorate so clearly? A way to start unravelling this complex issue is to uncover the most important factors that motivated Kenyans to support their preferred candidates. With this purpose we asked respondents. *“among these qualifications, which is the most important to you when you decide who to vote for a candidate in the presidential elections, or is there something else that you consider?”* There were eight qualifications listed and an open-end option in case respondents mentioned any other issue. The responses were as shown in Figure 1:

[Figure 1]

As the results show, over 90% of the respondents stated that they would select a candidate based on the candidate's track record in terms of honesty, experience in handling funds and care for the community. Perhaps, most surprisingly, only less than one per cent of survey respondents (0.80%) stated that the ethnicity/tribe of the candidate was the most important factor in shaping their voting intentions. However a different picture emerges when depicting these motivations to chose a presidential candidate and respondent's ethnicity.

Classifying voter preferences for a presidential candidate and voters' ethnic group shows that there is unison in voting patterns among most ethnic groups. The three main presidential candidates, Kibaki (of Kikuyu ethnicity), Odinga (of Luo ethnicity) and Kalonzo (of Kamba ethnicity) were overwhelmingly supported by the people from their own ethnic groups (as shown in Figure 2). Other ethnic groups that did not have a major presidential candidates contending in the election seem to have voted for one of the candidates in a block: The Luhyas and Kalenjins primarily supported Odinga, while the Merus and Embus supported Kibaki.

[Figure 2]

The contrasting evidence in our survey between voting intentions by ethnicity and the self-described voting motivations is of interest. One could argue that respondents simply gave us a polite answer to their voting motivations, or that are in fact in denial on what is really influencing their vote.

One however should be cautious in drawing bold conclusions from the strong correlation between ethnicity and voting intentions. Correlations do not reveal causalities. Ethnicity could be masking other factors. Furthermore, identity goes beyond one's ethnic group as socio-economic aspects come into play. Kenyans have enjoyed rapid economic and social transformation over recent years resulting in expansion of the middle class, urbanization and growing expectations about what democracy can deliver. All these factors undoubtedly contribute to re-shaping

Kenyan identity. It is then important to understand how Kenyans see themselves. To analyze this issue, the following question was asked:

“We have spoken to many Kenyans and they have all described themselves in different ways. Some people describe themselves in terms of their language, ethnic group, race, religion or gender and others describe themselves in economic terms, such as working class, middle class or a farmer. Besides being Kenyan, which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?”

When asked to depict their group identity in this way, few respondents (20%) identify in terms of their ethnicity, 37% of respondents insisted on identifying themselves first and foremost in nationalistic terms, that is as Kenyans. The rest of respondents, that is 43%, identify themselves on non-ethnic or nationalistic basis, notably those based on occupation (18%), social class (7%), gender (4%) and on religion (3%).

We find no correlation between how Kenyans intended to vote and how they primarily identify themselves. As Figure 3 reveals the Kenyan electorate was divided between Kibaki and Odinga, regardless of which category they identify themselves with. In other words, it appears that support for leading candidates was not based on these other axes of identification.

[Figure 3]

Economic issues and potential grievances could have instead driven voting intentions. Kibaki irrefutably improved the economic outlook of Kenya since 2002 with the economy achieving impressive growth rates. However, our survey shows that Kibaki’s performance ratings give a mixed picture. To the question *“do you approve or disapprove the way President Mwai Kibaki has performed his job over the year”* the great majority of respondents (70%) answered that they approved Kibaki’s performance. Yet, among those who claimed approving him, only 53% had the intention to vote for him (Figure 4).

[Figure 4]

We obtain a similar picture when referring to past performance. To the question *“looking back, how do you compare President Kibaki’s performance with President Moi’s performance with regard to the following matters?”* we find that although 60% of respondents perceived the economic conditions of the country to be better during Kibaki’s rule the majority of respondents (71%) did not see an improvement in their living conditions. Kenyans perceptions could suggest that the economic benefits gained during Kibaki’s rule were concentrated to only a few people. So it is not surprising that the majority of people who did not consider their living conditions to have improved intended to vote for opposition candidates. Specifically, 81% of those who perceived their living conditions as worse during Kibaki’s rule intended to vote for Odinga. In contrast, the majority (63%) of those who perceived their living conditions as better or much better during Kibaki’s rule intended to re-elect him.

The perceptions on both Kibaki’s performance and respondent’s economic well-being are useful information in helping us gauge public opinion and voting intentions. However this information needs to be taken with a pinch of salt in explaining voting behavior as perceptions might be magnified or biased by previously taken dispositions or by other factors such as ethnic identity (e.g. dispositions such as I’m not a Kikuyu hence I disapprove whatever the President does). Therefore in order to understand what exactly is driving Kenyan’s voting behavior, if it is indeed a grievance because living conditions are not improving, information is needed on actual economic indicators (such as access to private and public goods) and not just exclusively on how respondents perceive their living conditions or the economy. As mentioned earlier our survey gathered a wide-range of economic indicators on the respondent’s, respondent’s father and other information such as access to services in respondent’s nearby areas. To guide our econometric analysis on explaining our respondent’s voting intentions we next review a few theories in the literature on voting behavior.

4. Hypotheses on Voting Behavior in Kenya

There are a wide number of theories that seek to explain voting behavior in the developed and developing world (Berelson et al., 1954; Downs, 1957; Campbell et al., 1960; Riker, 1968; Riker and Ordeshook, 1970; Calvert, 1985, 1986; Sigleman, 1991; Sigleman et al., 1992; Blais, 2000; Norris and Mattes, 2003). In general the current comparative literature on mass electoral behavior can be viewed as a debate on the relative importance of social identities and economic interests (Lichbach and Zuckerman, 1997). For advanced democracies, elections tend to take the form of a referendum on the economy, with voters rewarding or punishing incumbent political parties at the ballot box depending on their past policy performance (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000, Geys, 2006). Evidence of this sort of retrospective, interest-based economic voting has been found in Latin America and other parts of the developing world (Remmer, 1991; Pacek and Radcliff, 1995). More commonly, however, voters in new democracies and deeply ethnically diverse societies alike the African ones voter's behavior seems to be predominantly influenced by voter's identity (such as ethnicity, family linkage, religion) and clientelism (Hyden and Leys, 1972, Barkan, 1979; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997; Scarrit and Mozzafar, 1999; Mozzafar et al., 1995, 2003; Van de Walle, 2003; Erdmann, 2004, 2007; Ferree, 2004, 2008; Bratton et al., 2005; Posner, 2005; Lindberg et al., 2008).

The conventional wisdom suggests that ethnicity is the main factor explaining voter outcomes in several African countries, Kenya included (Berman et al., 2004; Erdmann, 2007; Eifer et al., 2007). According to Horowitz (1985) the reasons why ethnic identity underpins the voting decision is that in societies characterized by low information such as the African ones group identity is a useful heuristic for voters. Such ethnic voting implies that voting is not the outcome of a careful evaluation of policy positions or the performance of leaders. Ethnicity serves as a proxy that voters use to 'control damage' or to assess the expected benefits of voting for a particular candidate. Most recently the idea that ethnicity is so salient among voters has been challenged. Lindeberg and Morrison (2008) argue that there is no strong empirical evidence for

concluding ethnicity is the most influential factor and that previously found evidence supporting the conventional wisdom might be misleading as it was based on inferences from aggregated data not suitable for evaluating whether ethnicity or other factor drive voters' choices.

With the new waves of democratization in the continent more public opinion surveys have been conducted systematically, the Afrobarometer being a clear example. Using individual datasets recent studies suggest that, while ethnicity is an important factor influencing voting behavior in a number of African countries -such as in Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, Kenya and Zambia- it is not the only factor. For instance, Fridy (2007) concludes that ethnicity is an extremely significant factor in the Ghanaian elections although not a deciding factor. In particular, Posner and Simon (2002) and Youde (2005) find that in Zambia and Ghana voters are concerned about issues such as their incomes and other indicators of economic well-being like employment, living standards and access to public goods. When one controls for these indicators the importance of ethnic identity is weakened. Lewis (2007) observes that while identity is important in Nigerian politics, ethnicity is not the only axes of identification. Identity in Nigeria takes many dimensions (such as ethnicity, economic status, religion) and it varies by region and over time. In other words, identity is rather fluid. Nevertheless, Lewis finds that ethnic feelings are the strongest, particularly where people feel discriminated against and exploited such as in the Niger Delta region. Similarly Ndegwa (1997) attributes the observed ethnic voting patterns to the fact that Africans possess "dual citizenship." Africans are members of two types of political communities in the same temporal and spatial world. On the one hand, they are members of their civic-republican community, which is often their ethnic or community group and to which they owe some obligations. On the other hand, they are members of the modern national state. Ndegwa suggests that the membership in the national state is guided by conception of status and rights rather than duties. This dual citizenship undermines the democratization process as Africans continue to show allegiance to their civic republican community.

Ethnic identity in Kenya is likely to have played an important role in influencing voting intentions, but based on the above and the voting behavior found in other African countries we also wish to know whether social identity, economic interest, grievances – or some combination of the three – is the driving force behind the voting intentions in Kenya's December 2007 presidential election. As such we will be testing three main hypotheses. First, our central hypothesis is to test whether ethnic identity (or any other identity) influenced voting intentions.

The second hypothesis we will test is whether economic issues influenced voting intentions and whether as in the analysis of Posner and Simon and Youde the importance of ethnic identity is weakened once we control for economic indicators. Among the indicators of well-being we will test is whether the respondent was unemployed before the election, whether the respondent suffered a shortage of essential goods such as foods and medicines and to proxy overall well-being we will use indices of respondents' wealth and access to public services. Since these indicators are actually self-reported, and we do not know the extent of their accuracy, we will add to our survey information on the poverty incidence at the constituency level where our respondents were living in 1996 and 2006. In this way we can assess whether the respondents reward Mwai Kibaki in areas where the incidence of poverty were reduced.

The third hypothesis we will test is whether respondents punish the incumbent political party at the ballot box on the basis of past policy performance and grievances as a few authors have found. Self-reported views on whether the respondent agrees with the performance of Mwai Kibaki might be biased through the eyes of their ethnic identity, so instead of using perceptions of performance we use other indicators collected in our survey and other databases. We asked respondents whether their household and their father's household owned a number of listed items that give an indication of their general wealth across generations. The questions were carefully phrased such that they could give an indication of generational mobility and also an indication of whether Mwai Kibaki's administration had improved the well being of Kenyans across generations and across ethnic groups. Within this third hypothesis we want to test whether, as

Lewis found in Nigeria, ethnic identity is stronger among those who feel discriminated and exploited, thereby influencing voting behavior to a larger extent.

Of special interest is to test whether the above mentioned three hypotheses hold on average for the voting population and when voters are analyzed separately according to how they identify first and foremost. If indeed Kenyans have a dual citizenship (as Ndegwa argues that is the case in some African countries) then those who identify firstly as Kenyans might be influenced to a different extent by ethnic identity and economic interest compared to those who identify first and foremost in terms of their ethnicity. Perhaps as Weberian and Gellnerian theories suggest national identity will displace the sub-national identities focusing voter attention more on economic issues.

5. Empirical Model of Voting Behavior in Kenya

Here, we turn to test the three main hypotheses of voter behavior on whether respondent's voting intentions depend on ethnic identity, economic indicators or grievances or a combination of the three. To do so, we express respondents' voting behavior as in the following probit equation (1). Specifically, we use as a dependent variable whether the survey respondent said would vote for Kibaki in the 2007 Presidential election or not. We test for a number of individual characteristics, represented by vector X_{ic} at the constituency c in which individual i lives.

$$\Pr(\text{voting for Kibaki}_{ic}=1) = \Phi(\alpha + X_{ic}\beta + u_{ic}), \quad (1)$$

where $\Phi(\cdot)$ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution and α is a constant. The β coefficients measure the effects of the factors x_{ic} (e.g. ethnicity, economic indicators and grievances) on the probability of voting for Kibaki and u_{ic} represents the error term. The analysis is focused on the survey respondents that claimed they were registered to vote

and were planning to vote in the 2007 elections. This group consists of 1,121 people, 93% of the survey's original sample.

Table 4 presents the results of five regressions on the probability of intending to vote for Kibaki using our main independent variables: ethnic identity, the respondent's constituency average public good index and the dummy variables on whether the respondent lives in a constituency with higher incidence of poverty than the national average, whether the respondent suffered any shortage of food or medicines a year ahead of the elections and whether the respondent's ethnic group has wealth-asset index lower than the average in the sample. The coefficients reported are marginal effects on the probability of intending to vote for Kibaki.

Ethnic Identity

To start with, we analyze the extent to which ethnic identity, without controlling for any other factors, affects the probability of intending to vote for Kibaki. We define a respondent's ethnic identity based on the information obtained from the question: "*what is your tribe?*", a question commonly asked among Kenyans referring to what in academic terms is understood as ethnicity. All survey respondents answered this question, mentioning in total twenty three ethnic groups. In the probit regression we introduce the information on a respondent's ethnicity as a categorical variable, so the marginal effects of each reported ethnic group are relative to the base ethnic group used, the Kikuyu. The results of this first model are shown in Table 4 under column "Model 1".

Relative to the base ethnic group, Kikuyu, we find that with the exception of those of Embu/Meru origin, being a member of the other analyzed ethnic groups reduces the probability of intending to vote for Kibaki. This finding suggests that a large percentage of respondents' voting intentions were influenced by their ethnicity. However, before drawing any sound conclusions, we need to control for other factors that could affect voting intention as we have done in the other models presented in Table 4. In models 2-4 we show the results of using different specifications

to test our three main hypotheses. In Model 5 we report the main results of our econometric analysis once we remove the independent variables that turn out not to be statistically significant. The descriptive summary of all the variables used in our econometric models as well as the correlations among the main independent variables are shown in Tables 2 and 3.

Other Socio-Economic Identities

In addition to one's ethnic group, there are many other axes of identification. Age, religion, region, occupation, etc. could be used as a basis of identity. In our regressions we find no evidence that respondents' occupation, religion, whether living in an urban/rural area or being unemployed played a statistically significant role in influencing voting intentions (results not shown in Table 4). Only age turns out to be statistically significant. Specifically, we found that the probability of voting for Kibaki was reduced by approximately 12% among those aged 18-39 compared to those aged 40 or older. The reason why age might be statistically significant is that young Kenyans might feel less nostalgia for the era of former president Daniel Moi than the older generations. Also, younger Kenyans have enjoyed the benefits from democracy and have been encouraged to be part of the generational change.

Economic indicators: Well-being, Access to Public and Private Goods

To test our second hypothesis on whether economic indicators influenced respondents' voting intentions we use a number of different variables. We start by examining whether indicators of well-being in the recent past, specifically a year before the elections affect respondents' voting intentions. In that year, Kenya achieved an economic growth of 6%, the highest rate of growth that Kenya has achieved in decades. Nonetheless, in that year Kenya also experienced serious droughts. This produced severe shortages of water, and a fall in agricultural production in a country that is still mainly rural. Hence, differences in the fortunes of Kenyans might have increased. We test whether deprivation of basic necessities during the year before the election

affected voting behavior. We focus on whether respondents' experienced any shortages across each of six goods: food, water, medicines, cash to pay for school expenses, fuel to cook and cash income. We obtained this information by asking "*over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without?*" The answers were recorded using the following scale: never, just once or twice, several times, many times, always and don't know. We find statistically significant evidence that having experienced a shortage (just once or more) of food or medicines ahead of the elections reduced the probability of intending to vote for Kibaki in about 13%.²

To assess the importance of access to services we use the data collected during our fieldwork on whether there were main services provided nearby the respondent's home. The enumerators in conjunction with the field supervisor had to answer the following question "*where the following services present in the primary sampling unit?*" The list included 11 services and the enumerator had the option to answer either yes, no or can't determine.³ From the list of services that respondents have nearby we focus on schools, health clinics and police stations, as a proxy to whether the availability of these services, could have increased the probability of voting for Kibaki. Using a normalized index ranging from 0 (no services nearby) to 1 (all three services nearby). Access to these services did not affect the probability of voting for Kibaki. However when, the average of this index is used at constituency level we find that the larger the index the probability of intending to vote for Kibaki is increased by 16%. Even though we do not have information on whether the schools or health clinics were public or private, both services are

² We also construct an "economic shortage-index" which considers whether people experienced a shortage of any of these six goods. We did not find a statistically significant effect of this economic shortage-index on voting intentions.

³ On average the sample includes 10 respondents per primary sampling unit and 15 per constituency. The services that enumerators were asked to look for are: post-office, school, police station, electricity grid that most houses could access, piped water system that most houses could access, sewage system that most houses could access, health clinic, recreation facilities, any churches, mosques, temples or other places of worship, any town halls or community buildings that can be used for meetings and market stalls.

overwhelmingly provided by the Kenyan state.⁴ Hence, the provision of public goods, appears to increase the probability of voting for Kibaki.

We also assess economic indicators of Kibaki's performance in the more distant past. For many Kenyans Kibaki's presidential victory in 2002 represented hope for a change from KANU's rule. To assess whether the economic changes introduced by Kibaki's administration influenced voting intentions we assess whether a reduction in the incidence of poverty where our respondent lives affected the respondent's voting intentions. For this purpose we gathered information on the incidence of poverty at constituency level in 1999 (before Kibaki's administration) and 2006 (a year ahead of the elections). Using this information we constructed a dummy variable on whether between 1999 and 2006 poverty declined in the constituency where the respondent was living in 2007. This variable did not turn out to be statistically significant, perhaps because our respondent was not living in the same constituency in the two years compared. To discard this hypothesis we interacted the reduction in poverty by whether the respondent was living in the same constituency over the period analyzed (information obtained by asking our respondents in which constituencies they had lived in the previous general elections). This dummy variable did not turn out to be statistically significant different from zero.

A second proxy to assess whether Kibaki's performance affected respondent's preferences we used an indicator of wealth-mobility across generations. We assessed our respondent's wealth level and that of the respondent's father by constructing an wealth-asset index based on the responses to "*which of these things does your household own?*" and "*which of these things did your father's household own, when your father was your age or when he died if before this age (or about the mother if the father is not known)?*" The list of things includes 15 possible durable assets in the case of the respondent's household and 13 assets in the case of the

⁴ For instance only 8% of our respondents have their children enrolled in a private school.

father's household.⁵ Using these assets we constructed two normalized wealth-asset indices for the respondent and the respondent's father ranging from 0 (no assets at all) to 1 (owning all mentioned assets). In our regression we added a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent's normalized wealth-asset index is below the normalized parent's index, indicating a deterioration of wealth across generations. The effect of this dummy variable turn out not to be statistically significant. We also estimated whether changes in land ownership or land size across generations (respondent's and respondent's father) as self-reported in our survey influenced voting intentions. We find that the effect of these variables is not statistically significant different from zero (results not shown in Table 4).

Grievances

We now focus on assessing the importance of grievances that might have induced Kenyans to (not) vote for Kibaki. Kibaki's administration has irrefutably delivered economic progress. However, such progress could be discounted if Kenyans hold grievances against his leadership. Specifically, we test for the effects of two sources of grievances on voting intentions: individual- and group-grievance.

We test the importance of individual-grievance by putting into perspective the respondent's well-being conditions versus that of others. To assess the impact on voting preferences we used two proxy variables. First we created a dummy variable on whether the respondent's wealth-asset index is below the average wealth-asset index in the sample. We find that this dummy variable is not statistically different from zero (Model 3). Secondly we used a dummy variable on whether the respondent is living in a constituency where the incidence of poverty (as measured by the Statistics Bureau in 2006) is above the national average. We find

⁵ Both questions includes: book, radio, television, bicycle, motor vehicle, house, oven, fridge, washing machine, land telephone, land, cattle, and in the question referring to respondent's wealth computer and mobile phones were added. The answers were recorded as either no, yes, or don't know.

that the probability of intending to vote for Kibaki was reduced by 7% if the respondent lived in a constituency where the incidence of poverty is above the national level.

Moving now to “group-grievance”, we use this term to refer to the situation where a respondent’s ethnic group has an average wealth-asset level below the average in the sample. When we include this generalized-grievance in our regression we find that it affects voter intentions significantly. As shown in Model 4 (Table 4) the probability of intending to vote for Kibaki is reduced by approximately 36% if the respondent’s ethnic group has a wealth-asset index below the average. Interestingly, we find that the relative level of wealth between different ethnic groups has not changed across generations, when we look at the wealth level the respondent and the respondent’s father (see Table 1). Therefore this group-grievance might suggest not only that there are wealth differences across ethnic groups today, but that these differences originate from the past and have not yet been addressed.

In sum the evidence presented suggests that economic well-being, access to public and private goods as well as grievances influenced respondents’ voting intentions, albeit to a lesser extent than ethnic identity. The magnitude of our main independent variables are nearly identical across the five specifications used. However, in the case of ethnic identity, once we control for these other main factors, the importance of ethnicity is weakened for all groups with the exception of the Embu/Merus but it remains at relative high level. Moreover the marginal effect of ethnicity is almost halved for the Kissi, Mijikenda and other minor ethnic groups included in the regression (comparing Model 1 to 5). The reason why the salience of ethnicity might get weaker is that none of these ethnic groups had a candidate of their ethnic identity competing in the elections, so as in Horowitz’s hypothesis ethnicity may well be a proxy for other factors (such as reliability, trustworthiness, delivery of goods, etc.) in situations of low information. The inclusion of our control variables has managed to unpick to some extent these proxies. In contrast, for ethnic groups that had a candidate contending in the elections (Luos, Kambas,

Kikuyus) ethnic identity remains particularly important, perhaps because their ethnic identity might reflect the expected gains that their candidate might bring.

Group self-interest

So far we have analyzed how on average various factors shaped the voting intentions of Kenyans. Although this analysis allows us to make broad generalizations, it might ignore that voting behavior might have differed in some groups. Voter heterogeneity, for instance with respect to how Kenyans identify themselves, can cause a systematic bias in voting behavior, aggregate economic valuations and perceptions on grievances. To control for the impact of voter heterogeneity, we analyze the voting behavior of a number of sub-groups. We analyze separately voting behavior based on how Kenyans identify themselves—either on the basis of their ethnicity, occupation or on nationalistic terms. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 5.

Ethnicity as Main Identity

We now turn attention to investigating voting behavior based on how Kenyans identify themselves. For this analysis, we split the survey sample according to the self-expressed main identity of respondents. We first examine the voting behavior of those who identify themselves first and foremost on the basis of their ethnic origin. For this group of people age, access to public services and indicators of individual- and group-grievances are the factors influencing their voting behavior, other than ethnic identity.

Unlike the “average Kenyan” (and the other two groups identified in terms of nationality and occupation) analyzed we find that our proxy for a reduction in wealth across generations (individual-grievance) is statistically significant among those who identify first and foremost as ethnic. Specifically, within this group the probability of intending to vote for Kibaki is reduced by 21% if the respondent’s wealth-asset is below the father’s wealth-asset index. Another difference

compared to the “average Kenyan” and the other two groups analyzed is the salience of the marginal effects on the availability of services (school, health clinic and police station). The higher this service index is the probability of intending for Kibaki is increased by 54%, a marginal effect larger than the effect found for the ethnic identities.

Similar to the evidence for the “average Kenyan”, once we control for other factors the salience of ethnic identity is weakened. We could infer from these results that ethnic identity for this group is a proxy for expressing grievances (going back a long time as our individual-grievance might suggest) and also a proxy for which candidate is reliable enough to deliver public goods.

Occupation as Main Identity

We turn to examine the voting behavior of those who identify themselves first and foremost in terms of their occupation, which represent 18% of the sample. The reason why people might identify on occupation terms could be because they have found channels, other than their own ethnic group, to exercise and express their political and economic interests. However, within this group ethnic identity still affects voting intentions along with group-grievances and whether the respondent suffered a shortage of food or medicines.

The reason why ethnic attachments remain strong among those who identify in terms of their occupation might be found in recent modernization theories. According to Eifert et al. (2007) there are two contrasting theories that predict which sector -the modern or the traditional one- should have the strongest ethnic attachments and occupation/class identification. On the one hand, according to early modernization theorists such as Marx, Weber, Durkheim and Parsons people in the traditional sector of the economy would have a strong ethnic identification (and weak class/occupational identification) since they have been least exposed to modern currents

that is they have been less “detrribalized.” On the other hand, newer modernization theorists (Young, 1965, 1976; Melson and Wolpe, 1970; Bates, 1983) predict to find the strongest ethnic attachments among people located in the modern sector of the economy, since the processes of urbanization and industrialization deepen ethnic identities as individuals use their ethnic affiliation as a tool for advancement.

We find that although there is roughly an identical split among those who identify in terms of their occupation in urban/rural areas, only 30% are based in what can be called “the traditional sector” (subsistence farmers, peasants and commercial farmers). The strength of ethnic attachment does not change if we split those who identify in terms of occupation by whether they are based in the traditional/modern sector, nor by whether they are living in a urban/rural area. So the evidence suggests that ethnic identity affects voting intentions of those who identify in terms of their occupation, perhaps because these respondents use ethnic identity as a political tool for advancement.

Nationalism: An Illusion of Unity?

We turn our attention to examining the voting behavior of those who identified first and foremost in nationalistic terms –that is, those who referred themselves as Kenyans. This group’s voting intentions are influenced by age, public and private goods, individual and group- grievances – similar to the “average Kenyans” albeit with larger marginal coefficients for all these factors. Perhaps more surprising is the significant role that ethnic identities have in influencing voting intentions within this group.

The crucial importance of building a national identity, Amartya Sen argues, lies in its constructive political and civil role. A national identity can combat the divisions created by having groups identified with one key trait -such as ethnicity- and embracing a broader, richer and more complex understanding of ourselves (Sen 2006). If this is to hold true, then perhaps ethnic identity among those who identify as Kenyans will not be relevant in influencing their

voting intentions. Surprisingly our results reveal a different picture. The salience of ethnic identity remains as strong for this group as for the average Kenyan and the other groups analyzed (even when controlling or not for other factors). This result begs the question of what exactly people mean when they identify themselves as Kenyans and why their national identity has not displaced their ethnic identity as suggested by Weberian and Gellnerian theories. It seems again that as in the other sub-groups analyzed ethnic identity serves as a proxy for grievances, reliability, trustworthiness, delivery of goods, etc.

Overall, the analysis presented here reveals that there are some differences in behavior in the sub-groups analyzed. The observed asymmetries in reactions to economic indicators across voters appear to be motivated by how Kenyans identify themselves first and foremost and not so much by their socio-economic characteristics. As Table 2 shows, Kenyans that identify on tribal, nationalistic or occupation terms have in general similar characteristics (e.g. age, occupation, wealth-asset index, etc.). However the salience of ethnic identity remains strong in influencing voting behavior across all sub-groups analyzed, even after controlling for other factors.

6. Conclusions

This paper has analyzed in detail the key factors that influenced voter preferences during the 2007 Kenyan elections. Using a rich, comprehensive and, for these reasons, rather unique pre-election survey we found that ethnic identity had a strong influence on voting intentions. The importance of ethnic identity is remarkable and robust to the inclusion of every other control among those who had a presidential candidate in the race but also among many of the groups who did not. Although we found evidence that other economic factors such as grievances, access to public and private goods also matter (and weaken the salience of ethnic identity), their relative impact is small compared to the high predicting power of ethnic identity in our econometric analysis.

Of particular interest is that the relative importance of grievances, economic well-being, and access to public and private goods depends on whether Kenyan voters identify themselves

first and foremost in terms of their ethnicity, occupation or nationality. Specifically, those who identify themselves in terms of their ethnicity were influenced the most by access to public services, which supports the hypothesis that ethnicity is used by voters as a proxy for expected gains such as access to public services. The evidence also reveals that ethnic identity impacts voting intentions equally, regardless of how voters identify themselves. The strong relationship between ethnic identity and voting choices calls for a rethinking of how competitive politics in Kenya and many other African countries can create a system in which politicians are elected on the basis of their merit, and accountability and not merely on the basis of their ethnicity. Yes, ethnicity is being used by voters as a proxy for expected gains, but political parties are exploiting ethnicity to create a sense of difference for short term political ends.

The post-electoral violence that reached unprecedented levels in Kenya highlights the need to find other ways through which ethnic grievances can be settled and power shared across ethnic groups within a democratic context. The ethno-politics prevalent in Kenya might induce a vicious circle, where both voters and political parties are unable to escape without suffering long-term consequences. Recent field work by Collier et al. (2010) in Kenya (after the elections) found a substantial drop in trust among Kenyans and especially across ethnic groups, with one out of five Kenyans saying they would prefer to find means other than elections to choose candidates. If Kenya chooses to live with ethno-politics then perhaps Switzerland (an ethnically diverse country) can offer some clues on how ethno-politics can achieve peace and prosperity by adjusting the structure of the public sector to achieve ethnic equity, so the allocation of resources or public jobs does not favor a particular ethnic group. If Kenyans prefer instead to develop a sense of national unity and policies for national prosperity, they could look across the border and learn from the educational and institutional reforms that Tanzania implemented to address ethnic inequalities and embrace a national identity. No matter which approach is adopted (the Swiss, Tanzanian or other), what is clear is the need to achieve ethnic equity and deal with old and new

grievances. One opportunity to perhaps address these ethnic imbalances is through the awaited constitutional reform.

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Appendix

Figure 1. Self-Described Voting Motivations




Figure 2. Voting Intentions by People's Tribe of Origin




Figure 3. Voting Intentions by Kenyan's Main Identify




Figure 4. Voting Intentions Kibaki's Approval Rating




Table 1. Wealth-Asset Index

	Mean Respondent's		Mean Parent's	
	Asset Index	Std. Dev.	Asset Index	Std. Dev.
Kikuyu	0.45	0.14	0.42	0.17
Luo	0.43	0.14	0.40	0.17
Luhya	0.44	0.14	0.41	0.15
Kamba	0.40	0.14	0.35	0.18
Embu/Meru	0.41	0.15	0.40	0.15
Kissi	0.42	0.12	0.34	0.18
Kalenjin	0.46	0.15	0.39	0.15
Mijikenda	0.34	0.15	0.30	0.14
Somali	0.30	0.16	0.19	0.12
Others	0.39	0.14	0.26	0.18
Average	0.42	0.14	0.37	0.17

Table 2. Summary Statistics

		Only those that First and Foremost Identity as:			
		All	Tribe	Class	Kenyan
Ethnicity	Kikuyu	0.20	0.12	0.29	0.17
	Luo	0.12	0.15	0.12	0.10
	Luhya	0.15	0.10	0.13	0.20
	Kamba	0.10	0.15	0.06	0.09
	Embu/Meru	0.10	0.12	0.05	0.11
	Kissi	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07
	Kalenjin	0.08	0.04	0.11	0.09
	Mijikenda	0.06	0.07	0.04	0.07
	Somali	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.01
	Others	0.09	0.11	0.08	0.09
Age	40+	0.27	0.29	0.27	0.26
	less than 39	0.73	0.71	0.73	0.74
Intended to vote for Kibaki		0.41	0.39	0.43	0.40
Respondent living in a constituency with higher incidence of poverty than national average		0.51	0.65	0.37	0.54
Last year respondent suffered shortage of food or medicines		0.45	0.47	0.47	0.42
Respondent's constituency had a reduction in poverty incidence between 1999-2006		0.42	0.45	0.47	0.36
Respondent's constituency had a reduction in poverty incidence between 1999-2006 and lived in constituency during that period		0.34	0.37	0.38	0.30
Respondent's asset index is lower parent's asset index		0.64	0.63	0.66	0.63
Respondent's household is wealthier than father's household		0.25	0.26	0.29	0.22
Respondent's constituency average public good index:					
Presence of school, hospital and police station		0.57	0.60	0.59	0.56
Respondent's asset index is lower than average asset index		0.49	0.54	0.48	0.47
Respondent's asset index and father's are lower than average asset index		0.24	0.29	0.22	0.24
Respondent's average ethnic asset is lower than average asset index		0.45	0.59	0.36	0.43
Respondent's average ethnic asset index and father's ethnic asset index are lower than average asset index		0.45	0.59	0.36	0.43
Observations (Likely Voters)		1124	217	279	423

Table 3. Correlation Matrix

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
(1) Age	1										
(2) Respondent living in a constituency with higher incidence of poverty than national average	0.01	1									
(3) Last year respondent suffered shortage of food or medicines	-0.01	0.12*	1								
(4) Respondent's constituency had a reduction in poverty incidence between 1999-2006 and lived in constituency during that period	-0.05	-0.17*	0.00	1							
(5) Respondent's asset index is lower parent's asset index	-0.08	-0.05	-0.03	0.05	1						
(6) Respondent's household is wealthier than father's household	0.02	-0.05	-0.12*	0.00	0.14*	1					
(7) Respondent's constituency average public good index	-0.02	-0.29*	-0.13*	0.12*	0.04	0.01	1				
(8) Respondent's asset index is lower than average asset index	0.01	0.13*	0.12*	0.02	-0.37*	-0.14*	0.01	1			
(9) Respondent's asset index and father's are lower than average asset index	-0.04	0.16*	0.10*	0.02	0.20*	-0.05	0.07	0.58*	1		
(10) Respondent's average ethnic asset is lower than average asset index	0.01	0.30*	0.06	0.12*	0.04	-0.05	0.20*	0.17*	0.24*	1	
(11) Respondent's average ethnic asset index and father's ethnic asset index are lower than average asset index	0.01	0.31*	0.06	0.12*	0.035	-0.05	0.20*	0.17*	0.24*	1	1

Table 4. Probability of Voting for Kibaki

Dependent Variable: Respondent would vote for Kibaki
 Probit Marginal Effects

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	
Ethnicity (Kikuyu reference group)	Luo	-0.533*** (0.021)	-0.521*** (0.021)	-0.522*** (0.021)	-0.522*** (0.021)	-0.522*** (0.021)
	Luhya	-0.484*** (0.025)	-0.452*** (0.029)	-0.451*** (0.029)	-0.450*** (0.029)	-0.451*** (0.029)
	Kamba	-0.455*** (0.022)	-0.440*** (0.024)	-0.440*** (0.024)	-0.315*** (0.054)	-0.312*** (0.055)
	Embu/Meru	-0.039 (0.074)	-0.024 (0.076)	-0.058 (0.073)	0.328** (0.105)	0.336** (0.103)
	Kissi	-0.428*** (0.023)	-0.402*** (0.027)	-0.405*** (0.026)	-0.236*** (0.071)	-0.233** (0.071)
	Kalenjin	-0.459*** (0.022)	-0.452*** (0.022)	-0.453*** (0.022)	-0.453*** (0.022)	-0.453*** (0.022)
	Mijikenda	-0.418*** (0.022)	-0.397*** (0.025)	-0.401*** (0.025)	-0.254*** (0.071)	-0.250*** (0.072)
	Somali	-0.313*** (0.042)	-0.291*** (0.052)	-0.297*** (0.051)		
	Others	-0.426*** (0.024)	-0.397*** (0.027)	-0.406*** (0.026)	-0.226** (0.076)	-0.226** (0.075)
	Age 18-39 (40+ reference group)		-0.123** (0.041)	-0.119** (0.040)	-0.120** (0.040)	-0.118** (0.041)
Respondent living in a constituency with higher incidence of poverty than national average			-0.085** (0.043)	-0.081* (0.043)	-0.077* (0.043)	
Last year respondent suffered shortage of food or medicines			-0.134*** (0.036)	-0.138*** (0.036)	-0.134*** (0.036)	
Respondent's asset index is lower parent's asset index			-0.020 (0.038)	-0.002 (0.041)	-0.023 (0.038)	
Respondent's constituency had a reduction in poverty incidence between 1999-2006 and lived in constituency during that period			-0.061 (0.041)			
Respondent's asset index is lower than average asset index				0.052 (0.039)		
Respondent's average ethnic asset is lower than average asset index					-0.356*** (0.092)	
Respondent's constituency average public good index: Presence of school, hospital and police station				0.168* (0.097)	0.163* (0.096)	
Pseudo R-squared	0.363	0.385	0.385	0.384	0.384	
N (Likely to vote)	1121	1121	1121	1121	1121	

*Coefficients as marginal effects. dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
 Significance Level, *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001. Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.*

Table 5. Probability of Voting for Kibaki by Identity

Dependent Variable: Respondent would vote for Kibaki Probit Marginal Effects		Only those that First and Foremost Identity as:					
		Tribe		Occupation/Class		Kenyan	
Ethnicity (Kikuyu reference group)	Luo			-0.525***	-0.527***	-0.595***	-0.587***
				(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.048)	(0.051)
	Luhya	-0.528***	-0.481***	-0.477***	-0.505***	-0.668***	-0.633***
		(0.074)	(0.102)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.061)	(0.070)
	Kamba	-0.557***	-0.374**	-0.456***	-0.057	-0.556***	-0.451***
		(0.079)	(0.153)	(0.041)	(0.236)	(0.050)	(0.095)
	Embu/Meru	0.226	0.479***	-0.171	0.503***	-0.292**	0.090
		(0.198)	(0.133)	(0.128)	(0.130)	(0.137)	(0.313)
	Kissi	-0.537***	-0.393**	-0.454***	0.037	-0.519***	-0.385**
		(0.066)	(0.141)	(0.045)	(0.237)	(0.048)	(0.133)
Kalenjin	-0.495***	-0.494***	-0.492***	-0.495***	-0.563***	-0.557***	
	(0.068)	(0.076)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.048)	(0.051)	
Mijikenda	-0.520***	-0.333*	-0.428***		-0.512***	-0.384**	
	(0.068)	(0.178)	(0.044)		(0.048)	(0.133)	
Somali	-0.371**		-0.276**	0.439**	-0.416***		
	(0.126)		(0.109)	(0.173)	(0.071)		
Others	-0.555***	-0.354**	-0.419***	0.149	-0.533***	-0.395**	
	(0.067)	(0.162)	(0.052)	(0.222)	(0.051)	(0.137)	
Age 18-39 (40+ reference group)							
Respondent living in a constituency with higher incidence of poverty than national average							
Last year respondent suffered shortage of food or medicines							
Respondent's average ethnic asset is lower than average asset index							
Respondent's asset index is lower parent's asset index							
Respondent's constituency average public good index:							
Presence of school, hospital and police station							
Pseudo R-squared	0.304	0.352	0.319	0.344	0.462	0.520	
N (Likely to vote)	184	184	277	277	423	423	

Coefficients as marginal effects. dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Significance Level, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$. Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.