

<b>Main title</b>	<b>What is the evidence on the effectiveness and efficiency of different social transfer targeting methodologies?</b>
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
# 1 Background and conceptual framework

## 1.1 Aims and rationale for review

Targeting is any mechanism for identifying eligible individuals and screening out the ineligible, for purposes of transferring resources. Targeting can originate either from political and ethical notions of 'fairness', or from economic considerations of cost-effectiveness. In the first case societies judge existing levels of poverty and inequality as unacceptable, while in the second case societies aim to maximise welfare under existing budget constraints.

In both cases the existence of a measure of social 'welfare' is assumed. In many cases this measure is per capita income or consumption but it does not need to be; for example, it could be membership of a demographic category regarded as particularly vulnerable. In cases of poverty targeting, indicator variables are used to predict welfare levels of individuals or households, which inevitably results in inclusion and exclusion errors (Cornia and Stewart 1993). Inclusion errors occur when programmes reach unintended beneficiaries, while exclusion errors occur when programmes do not reach intended beneficiaries (see Figure 1).

**Figure 1. The 2 errors of targeting**




Source: OPM 2009

Figure 2 illustrates these two errors, predicted from the application of a proxy means test (PMT) targeting methodology in Rwanda and Bangladesh. In both cases, everyone below the horizontal lines should be targeted, but everyone to the left of the vertical line is targeted. Errors of exclusion are seen in the bottom right quadrant, errors of inclusion are in the top left quadrant.

The process of targeting often requires a large amount of information to be collected – though this varies by targeting mechanism – in order to identify the eligible and screen out the ineligible. This can absorb a significant portion of the programme budget, particularly for large-scale social transfer programmes. While targeting is often perceived as a costly activity, any assessment of targeting cost effectiveness must

weigh up this expenditure against the accuracy of the beneficiary identification process in relation to the programme objectives.

**Figure 2. Errors of exclusion and inclusion in Rwanda and Bangladesh**



Source: Stephen Kidd, *pers. comm.*

Targeting can also produce unintended consequences, some of which are negative, like distortion of incentives, the social stigma attached to people targeted by an intervention, and politicisation (manipulation of targeting for political gain). Errors, costs and unintended consequences have led some to propose universal targeting against poverty targeting (van de Walle 1998). On the other hand, targeting may yield unintended or secondary benefits, such as highlighting and sensitising local populations to the disadvantage of particular groups, or involving communities in decision making processes on projects intended to benefit them (if community-based targeting is used).

The aim of the present review is to shed light on the errors, costs and unintended consequences (both positive and negative) of targeting in actual programmes in a comparative way across different targeting mechanisms. It is hoped that the knowledge summarised by this review will inform the future selection, design and implementation of targeting mechanisms for social transfer programmes.

## **1.2 Definitional and conceptual issues**

### **1.2.1 The interventions**

The purpose of the present review is the systematisation of evidence regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of targeting mechanisms employed by social transfer programmes in developing countries. The focus of the review is not on a particular intervention, but on the range of mechanisms used by a subset of development interventions to identify programme beneficiaries or participants.

Any targeting methodology is based on a criterion that screens the eligible from the population. The criterion used, the designers of the criterion and the user of the criterion for screening may vary considerably. Common targeting methodologies are the following:

- *Means testing*: based on an assessment of income or wealth of applicants (including unverified means-testing)
- *Proxy indicators*: based on characteristics like location (geographic targeting) or age that are believed to be highly correlated with wellbeing or deprivation
- *Proxy means testing*: based on a weighted combination of characteristics that are believed to be highly correlated with wellbeing or deprivation
- *Categorical targeting*: based on characteristics of particular interest to policy-makers, which might or might not be correlated with wellbeing or deprivation
- *Self-targeting*: based on voluntary participation in the programme
- *Community-based*: based on an eligibility assessment performed by the community where a programme is implemented
- *Universal targeting*: whereby everyone – or everyone within a particular category – is eligible.

Very often, programmes use combinations of targeting mechanisms. Only targeting mechanisms used in social transfer programmes will be included in the review.

Social transfers can be defined as regular non-contributory payments, in cash or in kind, provided by government or non-governmental organisations to individuals or households, with the objective of decreasing chronic or shock-induced poverty, addressing social risk and/or reducing economic vulnerability (adapted from Samson *et al.* 2006: 2). Social transfer programmes include non-contributory grants (e.g. social pensions, disability grant, child support grant and family allowances), conditional transfers (e.g. conditional cash transfer programmes where benefits are conditional on compliance with household participation in education and health services, or public works programmes where benefits are conditional on work), and in-kind transfers (e.g. school feeding programmes, food stamps, voucher schemes). Since our definition of social transfer programmes specifies ‘regular’ payments, short-term programmes or once-off transfers (as in emergency relief interventions) are excluded from consideration in this review. (For the full list of included and excluded programmes, see Table A.1 in Appendix 3.2.)

Only targeting mechanisms employed by programmes implemented in developing countries will be considered. Our definition of ‘developing country’ includes all countries that do not fall in the high-income classification adopted by the World Bank. There are 66 countries in this classification (see section 3.2 of the Appendix for a full list). Our justification for including upper-middle income countries like

Brazil is that a large proportion of the population in such countries live in condition of extreme poverty.

### **1.2.2 Targeting pathways: including the eligible, screening out the ineligible**

Policy-makers designing social transfer programmes have several objectives, one of which is to ensure that the resources they are transferring reach the intended beneficiaries. They do this by selecting a targeting mechanism that maximises effectiveness (it reaches the intended individuals or households) and efficiency (it does so at a reasonable cost). However, there is often a trade-off between these two considerations. Targeting mechanisms that are often believed to be most accurate (e.g. means testing – requiring individual assessment of every applicant) are among the most expensive to administer. Conversely, low-cost targeting mechanisms (e.g. geographic targeting – blanket coverage of an area) can be inaccurate as they invariably (by design) have high inclusion and exclusion errors. Striking an optimal balance between accuracy and cost (assessed across the full spectrum of costs – administrative, private, social, political, other economic such as perverse incentives, psychological) is the essence of the targeting dilemma.

The range of targeting mechanisms that are used in practice reflects differences in decisions taken at various stages of the targeting process, from selecting eligibility criteria to monitoring programme outcomes. Specifically, targeting social transfers involves the following series of steps:

1. **What is the aim of the targeting process?**  
(e.g. to reach the poor (poverty targeting), or alternatively to direct benefits for other reasons, for example, an old age entitlement)
2. **Who decides on eligibility criteria?**  
(e.g. programme administrators, politicians, communities)
3. **What are the eligibility criteria?**  
(e.g. poverty, age, disability, unemployment, citizenship)
4. **When does identification of beneficiaries occur?**  
(before delivery of social transfers, or on collection of social transfers)
5. **Who identifies programme beneficiaries?**  
(e.g. technocrats, communities, or beneficiaries themselves)
6. **Are social transfers actually delivered to people identified as eligible?**  
(how large is the inclusion error? how large is the exclusion error?)
7. **What are the financial costs of the targeting process?**  
(how much programme budget was spent on identifying beneficiaries?)
8. **What are the unintended consequences of the targeting process?**  
(e.g. did the exclusion of community members cause any social tensions?)

The first five of these eight steps relate to how targeting is done; the final three steps relate to how targeting is assessed. Targeting mechanisms can be classified in terms of the decisions taken under steps 1-5 above. For instance, if communities identify beneficiaries this is a community-based targeting mechanism, while if beneficiaries identify themselves this is a self-targeting approach. For purposes of learning and retargeting – because circumstances change, regular recertification of beneficiaries might be needed in long-running programmes – implementation decisions and assessment should both be part of an integrated targeting process.

The expectation informing the selection of a targeting mechanism is that decisions taken under steps 1-4 will produce good targeting outcomes in terms of steps 5-7: reasonably accurate, acceptable cost, with few negative unintended consequences. From a programming perspective, these outcomes are sometimes defined by predetermined parameters; e.g. inclusion error should not exceed xx%, targeting costs should not absorb more than xx% of programme budget. From a research perspective, our interest is in comparing outcomes across alternative targeting mechanisms. Our research hypothesis is that different targeting mechanisms are associated with systematic differences in terms of inclusion and exclusion errors, financial costs and unintended consequences.

First, as discussed above, by design and during implementation targeting systems will typically result in both inclusion and exclusion errors. Inclusion errors increase programme costs and undermine efficiency in terms of achieving the programme's objectives. Exclusion errors deprive eligible households of a source of social investment and can in the worst cases perpetuate poverty traps for generations. Some social policy analysts (notably Cornia and Stewart, 1993) have suggested weighting exclusion errors several times that of inclusion errors.

Second, targeting involves administrative and other costs. Relatively little is known about these costs and there has been little effort to document differences in costs between alternative targeting mechanisms. It has been hypothesised that costs of targeting mechanisms increase more than proportionally with accuracy of targeting (Besley and Kanbur 1990), and evidence for this 'trade-off' will be investigated in this systematic review.

Third, targeting may have a number of unintended effects on both the targeted and untargeted populations. Some unintended effects can be positive, as for example when social transfers made to one vulnerable category (older persons) also benefit another vulnerable category (children) (Case and Deaton 1998). Less investigated are the unintended negative effects of targeting. Sen (1995), for example, mentions information distortions (people acting as poor in order to obtain benefits); incentive distortions (beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries lose motivation to work); and stigma (beneficiaries are stigmatised and lose respect). These unintended negative effects will also be investigated, to the extent that data exist.

### **1.2.3 The outcome indicators**

Following the targeting pathways developed in the previous section, we describe here the final and intermediate indicators of the success of targeting mechanisms. The review will aggregate and systematise evidence on four indicators, which will be analysed comparatively across different targeting methodologies described in section 1.21. The four indicators are:

1. Errors (inclusion and exclusion) in implementation: the ability of the targeting mechanism to identify the eligible population
2. Targeting costs
3. Unintended negative social consequences of targeting
4. Positive outcomes across targeting mechanisms

Targeting costs are expressed as a proportion of the programme budget. Normally only administrative costs are reported by the studies, which is a limitation. Where data are available, full targeting costs will be assessed. These include: administrative costs, private costs (opportunity costs, travel costs), indirect costs (e.g. behavioural change to meet eligibility criteria), social costs (stigma, erosion of community cohesion) and political costs (loss of political support).

Unintended effects and other intangible costs often are not measured numerically. They can nevertheless be categorised, and their observed prevalence can be summarised and analysed comparatively across different targeting mechanisms.

### **1.2.4 Heterogeneity of impact and generalisability**

The main objective of this review is to analyse and systematically compare targeting errors, costs, and unintended consequences across different targeting mechanisms employed in social transfer programmes. The extent of generalisability of the results obtained will depend on the size of the sample of studies selected, the extent to which relevant information about targeting processes and outcomes is documented, and on their representativeness of different contexts.

Contextual factors may affect the efficacy of targeting mechanisms. Efficacy will be analysed across some key descriptive variables such as: geographic area of intervention, programme type, implementing agency. Data on contextual factors will be extracted and the possibility of a metaregression analysis will be explored. At a minimum, a bivariate tabulation of indicators (targeting errors and costs) across the contextual characteristics outlined above will be presented.



### **1.3 Policy and practice background**

The conclusions reached by the present reviews will be relevant to both academic and development audiences. Academics will improve their understanding of the causes and remedies of poverty and vulnerability. Policy-makers, donors and NGOs will benefit from lessons on the design and implementation of sound targeting mechanisms.

### **1.4 Research background**

The only large-scale review of targeting mechanisms covering several countries available is Coady et al. (2004) which covers 122 programmes employing different targeting methodologies. Other reviews have a much narrower focus. For example, Sharp (2001) reviews targeting mechanisms in Ethiopia, Pritchett et al. (2002) review targeting of social transfer programmes in Indonesia, Rose (2008) analyses different targeted approaches in Zambia, while Kidd and Wylde (forthcoming) review the proxy means test methodology.

No review has been produced since the work of Coady et al. (2004), which provided a comprehensive overview of social transfer programmes implemented during the period 1985-2000. The present review will cover programmes implemented mainly since 2000. However, since our search criterion is publication date, some studies published in the 2000s will refer to programmes ongoing in the 1990s or earlier. In addition, we adopt a different focus from the Coady et al. work, by looking at a broader range of costs and effects of targeting. Finally, by looking at more recent programmes we aim to learn from experiences with the array of new social transfer interventions that have proliferated since the concept of 'social protection' was devised in the late 1990s.

### **1.5 Objectives**

This systematic review pursues the following objectives:

- Summarising existing evidence on inclusion and exclusion errors of targeted programmes at design and implementation stage
- Summarising existing evidence on the administrative costs of targeting methodologies
- Summarising existing evidence on negative unintended consequences produced by targeting mechanisms
- Identifying the most efficient and effective targeting mechanisms, bearing in mind the objectives of programmes
- Providing lessons for better design and implementation of targeting mechanisms

## **2 Methods used in the review**

### **2.1 User involvement**

#### **2.1.1 Approach and rationale**

This review is primarily directed to an audience of policy-makers and practitioners in the social protection area and to development studies academics. The review has two main policy objectives:

- Informing development practitioners on ways to improve the design and the implementation of targeting mechanisms
- Informing the academic community on existing gaps in terms of both theoretical knowledge and evidence in the study areas

Two policy advisors from DFID will be involved in the definition of the objectives of the review and will peer review its main outputs. Other policy-makers and practitioners will be reached via personal contacts in social protection policy networks and through participation in training courses, seminars and conferences.

The findings will be disseminated in full report form as well as in shorter, more accessible forms, such as in policy briefings. These will highlight the key findings, conclusions and recommendations to policy-makers. We also intend to contribute to academic debates by preparing a paper for publication in a peer reviewed article.

### **2.2 Identifying and describing studies**

#### **2.2.1 Defining relevant studies: inclusion and exclusion criteria**

These are the criteria for inclusion/exclusion of studies (a more detailed description can be found in section 3.2 of the Appendix):

- Only social transfer interventions (as defined in 1.2.1 and listed in Table A.1 in Appendix 3.2) are included.
- Interventions in high-income countries are excluded.
- Studies produced before 2000 are excluded.
- Studies that meet the quality requirements discussed in Section 2.3.1 (see also the quality assessment form of Section 3.4). Note that this review is not summarising welfare outcomes observed in impact evaluation studies.
- Studies not published in English (other languages, Spanish in particular, were ruled out in order to accelerate the review process within the set deadlines).


## 2.2.2 Identification of potential studies: Search strategy

Potential studies will be searched using databases of published and unpublished material. More details on the databases and the keywords initially used on the research can be found in section 3.3 of the Appendix. Given the difficulty of identifying a varied range of programmes with the use of single key-words, we will also use hand-search and bibliographic back-referencing in order to identify additional papers.

## 2.2.3 Screening studies: applying inclusion and exclusion criteria

In order to screen studies to be included in the review a 2-stage process will be followed (see Figure 2). First, titles and abstracts of retrieved studies will be screened based on a set of exclusion criteria. Studies will then be divided into two categories: those reporting information on targeting errors and cost of interventions, and those reporting on unintended consequences of targeting mechanisms. The second category of studies is likely to be composed of qualitative rather than quantitative studies. The criteria for the first stage selection process are those already described in section 2.2.1.

**Figure 2 Screening process of studies**



Reports of studies screened at the first stage will be uploaded to a database and subjected to further screening. Studies that do not report targeting errors or cost accurately or credibly will be excluded. The unintended consequences considered are effects resulting from:

- Affecting the incentive system
- Affecting community and social cohesion

- Stigmatisation
- Other positive or negative effects that may emerge

The coding of studies will be piloted together with the qualitative assessment form. An Excel form will be created to summarise the main characteristics of the studies as described in Section 2.2.4 below. Among the characteristics included will be a number of contextual factors that will be extracted in view of the analysis of heterogeneity. A final list of the contextual factors to include will be formulated during the piloting phase.

### **Applying the inclusion and exclusion criteria**

The selection of titles and abstracts for review will be conducted by one researcher. However, by having two researchers assess each title list during the pilot test of the search strategy, the research team will ensure that the approach to selecting titles for inclusion is uniform.

Full texts selected for inclusion will be reviewed by two researchers independently and then discussed. The two researchers would combine substantive and methodological expertise to ensure that both topic relevance and methodological considerations are taken into account effectively for each study reviewed. Where disagreements emerge about individual studies, a third researcher will be consulted.

### **External Quality Assurance**

For this review we will take part in peer review organised by 3ie. This includes internal review by 3ie and DFID staff of deliverables within 1 week for protocols and 2 weeks for draft reviews, and organisation of external peer review by 3ie.

## **2.2.4 Characterising included studies**

Studies screened for final inclusion in the review will be organised in a table containing information on a range of relevant variables, including those listed in Table 3 below.

**Table 3 Characteristics of included studies**

Authors of the studies
Year of publication/production
Journal or place from which was obtained
Title of the study
Country and geographic area of intervention
Social transfer type
Implementing agency
Programme objective
Target group
Targeting mechanism
Study methodology (quantitative or qualitative)

Reporting inclusion and exclusion errors
Reporting targeting costs
Reporting unintended consequences
Other relevant contextual factors

### **2.2.5 Identifying and describing studies: quality assurance process**

Studies will be screened at stages 1 and 2 with the help of the check lists reported in Appendix 3.4. The first screening will be performed by a research assistant. The second screening, based on the quality of the information available in the studies screened, will be performed by the team reviewers and by the lead reviewer. A narrative summary of the qualitative studies included based on the criteria of table A.7 in the Appendix will also be presented.

## **2.3 Methods for synthesis**

### **2.3.1 Assessing quality of studies**

The quality of the studies will be assessed in the course of the screening process and using the checklist forms reported in Appendix 3.4. This review is not setting rigid study requirements in terms of the study methodology, because we are mainly concerned with the extraction of cost and targeting error data. Study quality mainly consists of the credibility of the data on targeting errors and costs.

A minimum set of quality requirement is nevertheless established and will be employed in the second stage selection process. Data on targeting errors should be obtained from household surveys. Surveys should consist of random samples representative of the beneficiary population. The samples should be of sufficient size to allow for a confidence in the estimate of, say, 5 per cent above and below the observed ratio. Data on costs should be obtained from reliable sources, like project documents and monitoring forms. The tables in Appendix 3.4 show an example of the qualitative assessment performed. The method will be piloted using test Excel spreadsheet on a limited number of studies and then properly revised. In the case of qualitative studies a more rigorous screening is conducted (see Table A.7).

### **2.3.2 Overall approach to and process of synthesis**

The review is interested in three main outcomes of targeting interventions which will be analysed in different ways.

Average inclusion and exclusion errors found will be reported in a table which tabulates the results by targeting mechanism. If the number of studies is sufficiently large we will consider analysing the variability of targeting errors across studies using meta-regression (Stanley 2001). Variability in the results can be the outcome

of different targeting typology, different social transfer programmes, different characteristics of implementation or other contextual factors. Targeting typology and type of social transfer programme will be collected by the review. Implementation data may be extracted from the studies and might include: implementing agency (eg whether the programme is implemented by government or NGO); administrative targeting cost; or level of community involvement. Contextual factors might include geographic characteristics of the area where the programme is implemented: broad geographic area (like Africa or India); whether urban or rural; or size of the intervention.

Average targeting cost data will also be reported in a table format by targeting mechanism. If the number of studies found is sufficiently large we will plot costs against accuracy of targeting in order to test the linearity of the relationship. The hypothesis is that costs increase more than proportionally with accuracy.

Findings on unintended consequences will be reported in categorical order. Narratives will report summaries of findings for each type of unintended consequence found together with the number of studies found.

### 2.3.3 Selection of outcome data for synthesis

The review is looking at three outcome indicators (see Table 4). Targeting errors are normally reported as percentages. Similarly, targeting costs are often expressed as fractions of the total programme cost. Unintended consequences are more likely to be reported in a narrative way.

**Table 4 Outcomes and suggested metrics for the analysis**

<b>Outcome</b>	<b>Indicator</b>
Targeting errors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % of excluded eligible over the eligible</li> <li>• % of included ineligible over the beneficiaries</li> </ul>
Administrative costs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Administrative targeting cost as a proportion of total programme cost</li> <li>• Administrative targeting cost as a proportion of total administrative cost</li> <li>• Actual targeting cost, expressed as cost in US\$ per person</li> </ul>
Other costs and benefits	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Narrative reports</li> </ul>

## 2.4 Deriving conclusions and implications

The conclusions of the review will be presented in the following ways:

- A table reporting average targeting errors by targeting methodology

- A review of the reasons for targeting errors
- A table reporting average targeting costs by targeting methodology
- A scatter plot of administrative cost over accuracy of targeting (providing a reliable and comparable measure can be found)
- A bivariate tabulation of targeting errors and costs by targeting mechanism and other variables like geographic area of intervention, implementing agency and programme type. Metaregression results if this type of analysis is performed.
- Summaries of findings regarding each identified category of negative unintended consequence of targeting and benefits

The final report will also discuss implications of the study for policy-makers and future research. In particular, policy-makers and academics will be advised regarding:

- The generalisability of the results observed: to what extent the aggregate programme outcomes found are truly representative
- Evidence gaps: an assessment of the size and the quality of the evidence available
- Theoretical gaps: an assessment of knowledge gaps in our understanding of the operation of targeting mechanisms in developing countries
- Conceptual gaps: building a framework for selecting, costing and evaluating targeting mechanisms.

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### 3 Appendices

#### 3.1 Authorship of this report

**Review Team:**

Stephen Devereux – Lead reviewer  
 Edoardo Masset – Reviewer  
 Rachel Sabates-Wheeler – Reviewer  
 Michael Samson – Reviewer  
 Stephen Kidd – Technical advisor

#### 3.2 Inclusion and exclusion criteria

These are the criteria for inclusion/exclusion of studies:

1. Type of intervention
2. Year of publication of the study
3. High income economies
4. Outcome reporting

1. Social transfer programmes included and excluded by the review are:

**Table A.1 List of included and excluded social transfer programmes**

Included	Excluded
Regular non-contributory cash grants <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social pensions</li> <li>• Disability grants</li> <li>• Child support grants</li> <li>• Family allowances</li> </ul>	Contributory social security schemes  Short-term or once-off social transfers (e.g. asset transfer programmes)  Emergency relief interventions
Regular conditional transfers <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conditional cash transfers</li> <li>• Public works programmes</li> <li>• Employment guarantee schemes</li> <li>• School feeding programmes</li> </ul>	Microfinance programmes  Social funds  Agricultural input subsidies
Regular in-kind transfers <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Food stamps</li> <li>• Voucher schemes</li> </ul>	Education or health fee waivers

2. Studies published or produced before the year 2000 are excluded.

- Interventions in high-income economy areas at the time the data were collected will be excluded. Following the World Bank classification there are 66 high-income economies:

Andorra, France, Netherlands, Antilles Antigua and Barbuda, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Aruba, Germany, New Zealand, Australia, Greece, Northern Mariana Islands, Austria, Greenland, Norway, Bahamas, The Guam, Oman, Bahrain, Hong Kong, Portugal, Barbados, Hungary, Puerto Rico, Belgium, Iceland, Qatar, Bermuda, Ireland, San Marino, Brunei, Darussalam, Isle of Man, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Israel, Singapore, Cayman Islands, Italy, Slovak Republic, Channel Islands, Japan, Slovenia, Croatia, Korea, Rep. Spain, Cyprus, Kuwait, Sweden, Czech Republic, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Denmark, Luxembourg, Trinidad and Tobago, Estonia, Macao, United Arab Emirates, Equatorial Guinea, Malta, United Kingdom, Faeroe Islands, Monaco, United States, Finland, Netherlands, Virgin Islands (U.S.)

- The review will only include studies reporting any of the following outcomes:

**Table A.2 Study outcomes included in the review**

Inclusion and exclusion errors
Analysis of the reasons for targeting errors
Administrative costs
Other costs and benefits

### 3.3 Search strategy for electronic databases

The search will consider a limited number of electronic databases that are reported in Table A.3. However, it is quite possible that a large number of studies produced by African and Asian researcher are not indexed by the research engines selected. Hand search, backward referencing and forward citation tracking from second stage selection of studies will also be employed. Experts in the field and other researchers will be contacted by email in order to obtain more recent unpublished studies.

**Table A.3 Databases used in the searching process**

Published work	Unpublished work
Agris	BLDS
Econlit	ELDIS
IBSS	Google Scholar
JSTOR	IDEAS
PubMed	JOLIS
SocIndex	International initiative for impact evaluation

<p>Web of Science</p> <p>A range of individual journals including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• World Development</li> <li>• Journal of Development Studies</li> <li>• World Bank Economic Review</li> </ul>	<p>Dissertations Abstracts Database (includes U.S., Canadian, British and some European dissertations)</p> <p>Key institutional websites, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Asian Development Bank</li> <li>• DFID</li> <li>• IADB</li> <li>• IDS</li> <li>• IFPRI</li> <li>• World Bank e-library</li> <li>• World Food Programme</li> </ul>
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We will also conduct a separate search of dissertations and conference abstracts using Index to theses, the Proquest dissertation database and the conference proceeding database of Web of Science.

Search will be initially performed using OR and AND combinations of the set of words in the two columns of Table A.4. Table A.4 contains a pilot list. Different key searches will be tested through an iterative process in order to define a final list of keywords. In doing so, the reviewers will be supported by the EPPI team. During the pilot, studies that are surely included will be used to search for synonymous keywords using the built-in thesaurus search of the EPPI software.

**Table A.4 List of words initially used in searching the databases**

<p>Social transfers</p> <p>Social grants</p> <p>Cash transfers</p> <p>In-kind transfers</p> <p>Non-contributory</p> <p>Conditional cash transfers</p> <p>Unconditional cash transfers</p> <p>Social pension</p> <p>Disability grant</p> <p>Child support grant</p> <p>Family allowance</p> <p>Public works programmes</p> <p>Employment guarantee schemes</p> <p>School feeding programmes</p> <p>Food stamps</p> <p>Voucher schemes</p>	<p>AND</p>	<p>Targeting</p> <p>Errors</p> <p>Costs</p> <p>Inclusion</p> <p>Exclusion</p> <p>Efficiency</p> <p>Effectiveness</p> <p>Categorical</p> <p>Means test</p> <p>Proxy indicator</p> <p>Self-targeting</p> <p>Self-selection</p> <p>Community-based</p> <p>Community selection</p> <p>Geographic</p> <p>Blanket coverage</p> <p>Incentives</p> <p>Disincentives</p> <p>Social cohesion</p> <p>Stigma</p> <p>Politicisation</p> <p>Negative impact</p>
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### 3.4 Check lists for first and second stage screening

**Table A.5 Check list for first stage screening of titles and abstracts**

Entry	Judgement (yes/no/DK)
<p><i>Programme type</i></p> <p>Conditional or unconditional cash transfer? High income country? Study published/produced after 2000?</p> <p><i>Outcome indicators</i></p> <p>Reporting inclusion and exclusion errors? Reporting targeting costs? Reporting unintended consequences?</p>	

**Table A.6 Check list for second stage screening of reports: quantitative studies**

Entry	Judgement (yes/no)
<p>Are inclusion and exclusion error reported? Are errors and costs in numbers or percentages? What is the source of the data? What is the sampling methodology of the study? What is the sample size and standard error of estimates? What is the source of data on costs? What is the methodology adopted to calculate costs? Are reported inclusion and exclusion error credible? Are reported administrative costs accurate? Are reported administrative costs credible?</p>	

**Table A.7 Check list for second stage screening of qualitative studies**

Entry	Judgement (yes/no)
<p>Is there a clear statement of the aims of the research? Is the study based on a research methodology that is reliable? Are the conclusions of the study based on actual data? Is the sample representative of the process to be explained? Are the findings explicit and easy to understand? Are the conclusions obtained supported by the evidence offered?</p>	