CSAE WPS/2010-09

Decentralization, Accountability and the 2007 MPs Elections in Kenya[*]

Roxana Gutiérrez-Romero[1]

University of Oxford

Department of International Development

Abstract

The Kenyan Constituency Development Fund (CDF) aims to alleviate poverty by allocating resources to constituencies which MPs and residents decide how to spend. In this paper we assess whether MPs' re-election chances were affected by their management of the CDF. For this purpose we analyse the type of projects implemented by the CDF and residents' opinion about their MP and the CDF. We find that MPs' re-election chances were influenced by MPs' ethnicity and by the way MPs allocated the CDF. MPs who run the most projects on education and the least on other projects such as health or water were less likely to be re-elected.

Keywords: Decentralization, Accountability, Elections, Africa, Kenya

Introduction

Kenya has pursued economic development through central planning since independence in 1964. The centralization of authority and management of resources has led to the inadequate distribution of resources across regions, resulting in a growing inequality in services, infrastructure and development across the country (Court and Kinyanjui 1980; Mapesa and Kibua 2006). To overcome the distortion in the allocation of public expenditure a number of decentralization programs were put into place during the 1960s and 1970s, but without much success as these programs became politicised and the misallocation of resources persisted (Court and Kinyanjui 1980). Over the last decade Kenya has had a renewed interest in decentralization programs as a way to reverse inequality and tackle poverty. But to prevent the failure of previous decentralization efforts the government has contemplated this time empowering the grassroots through devolved decision making, participatory budgeting and the monitoring of these programs. One of the main examples of these new decentralization efforts is the Constituency Development Fund (CDF). The CDF was established in 2003 with the goal of fighting poverty at the grassroots level. For this purpose the CDF allocates 2.5% of the Government annual ordinary revenue across all the 210 constituencies -taking into account their poverty levels-. The sitting MPs are then asked to form a local committee to consult residents on how to spend the fund. Although the CDF is designed to consider local needs and preferences a number of concerns have been raised about the weak institutional framework supporting the CDF, its lack of transparency, and ultimately that it does not address sufficiently the political imperfections that distorted political incentives to serve equally all the poor.

The lack of transparency in the use of the fund has been confirmed by the Kenyan Deputy Auditor General, John Kagondu as he found that several constituencies have failed to prepare and maintain proper records and books for accounts and to support CDF expenditure (Kagondu 2008). Several studies in Kenya have found that residents are not participating or being consulted in

CDF activities (IEA 2006; KIPPRA 2006; Mapesa and Kibua 2006). These studies have also pointed out that the fact that MPs are the legislators, implementers and auditors of the CDF activities imposes a major constraint on the transparency and accountability of the fund. Of course residents could vote out MPs in general elections that have mismanaged the fund, but this would require that voters are informed in the first place about the quality of locally provided public goods and that they ultimately weight in their voting decisions for MPs how the CDF was managed. There is not much evidence in Kenya that the performance of politicians affects greatly the observed voting behaviour. Since the introduction of competitive multiparty politics in 1992 political parties have mobilised voters on ethnic basis and since then ethnicity has been one of the most influential aspects shaping the voting intensions of Kenyans. When citizens vote primarily on the basis of identity (such as ethnicity, religion, class), other issues such as performance and accountability become secondary, diminishing the value of democracy and accountability of politicians. As the last 2007 disputed general elections showed, violence and general lawlessness escalated to unprecedented levels much due to ethnic clashes which resulted in the loss of hundreds of lives, the displacement of over a quarter of a million people and widespread destruction of property. The disputed election and the unprecedented levels of ethnic violence experienced in Kenya raise the question about what factors influenced voting behaviour, and whether decentralization efforts like the CDF can make MPs accountable through elections in a country that is so tribal.

The objective of this article is to assess what factors shaped Kenyan's voting intentions for MPs and ultimately whether the way MPs managed the Constituency Development Fund affected their re-election chances in the last 2007 general elections. A great advantage of this analysis is that until the election day only one cohort of MPs have managed the CDF, that is the MPs that served over the period 2002-07. Hence the opinions and evaluations regarding the CDF will be attributable entirely to the outgoing MPs and not to earlier ones. The variability in

political outcomes across constituencies is particularly appealing since the official electoral results show that the great majority of outgoing MPs were contending to be re-elected in the elections (183 out of 210) but only 40% of them managed to be re-elected. It is worth noting that these electoral results were not questioned by international observers nor by Kenyan political parties. This contrasts with the presidential election that was deemed to have suffered from a number of irregularities such as tallying and counting of ballots.

To explore our research question two surveys were undertaken, one just two weeks before the 2007 general elections and one in the summer of 2008. The pre-election survey asked about voter intentions, perceptions on how the CDF has been spent, political parties vote-buying or intimidation activities, and respondent's socio-economic characteristics among other themes. The data are based on a nationally and regionally representative survey of 1,210 Kenyans aged 18 and over who were interviewed in 76 out of the 210 constituencies. The post-election survey revisited previous respondents to investigate about their experiences in the aftermath of the election, and also to find out in more detail their opinions about how their past MPs managed the CDF, and whether their views had changed regarding democracy, the decentralization of funds, and their trust in institutions among other issues.

As the surveys were conducted right before the elections and some time after the elections they provide a good picture of voting intentions and how economic/political perceptions changed in the aftermath of the elections. Further databases were collected in order to obtain further information on the curriculum vitae of the MPs who had served over the period 2002-07, how the CDF had been spent over 2003-07, what the political outcomes had been in all MP elections since 1992 at constituency level, as well as the prevailing poverty levels ahead of the elections and earlier. We expect that triangulating all these databases will provide a good picture of the extent to which the way that MPs managed the CDF actually influenced the outcome of the MP elections and whether any other factors were also important in the elections.

We find that although the evaluations on how MPs performed over the term 2002-07 and how the constituency development fund was managed influenced voting in the MP elections, the respondent's ethnic attachment to political parties also played an important role. The majority of our survey respondents think that the CDF helped to reduce poverty and improve services in their constituency however they also believe that the CDF has been misused for political purposes. Our results suggest this mismanagement reduced the likelihood of many MPs getting re-elected, but undoubtedly more efforts need to be made for the CDF to become the hoped panacea for tackling poverty.

The article proceeds as follows: In the next section, we describe how the CDF works and provide statistics on how the CDF has been used in constituencies. Section three presents some highlights of the survey data, focusing on voter intentions and their perception of the use of the CDF. Section four discusses different hypotheses about the factors that drove voting intentions for MPs in Kenya. Section five presents the results of the empirical model and the robustness. The conclusions and discussion of the results are presented in section six.

2. CDF: How does it work?

President Mwai Kibaki first became President in 2002 aided by the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) bringing to an end KANU's one-party dominance since Independence in 1963. The NARC government promised to devolve power away from the centre and to share political power among Kenya's diverse groups. With this hopes the CDF was established in 2003 through an Act of the Parliament with the goal of "fighting poverty at the grassroots level through the implementation of community based projects which have long terms effects on improving the people's economic well being…(and to)…relieve members of parliament from the heavy demands of fund-raising for projects which ought to be financed through the consolidated fund." To achieve this goal the CDF ensures that constituencies receive 2.5% of the Government annual

ordinary revenue, besides monies to be received from other sources by the National Management Committee of the fund.

In total, the government allocated 19 USD million to the CDF fund for the financial year 2003/4 followed by 83 USD million in 2004/5, 107 USD million in 2005/6, 148 USD million on the year previous to election that is 2006/7 and 149 USD million to the newly elected parliament in the 2007/8 financial year. The increase in the value of the CDF allocation reflects the economic recovery of Kenya. In 2002, when Kibaki took over as president the Kenyan economy was stagnant and in the year ahead of the election Kenya was growing at 6%.

Figure 1: CDF Allocations 2003-08

The CDF fund was first distributed equally among the 210 constituencies but since 2004 the central government has committed to use an allocation formula to distribute the development funds to the 210 constituencies such that the government may not renege its obligation as happened in previous decentralization programmes. This formula also aims to provide a fairly

uniform fund to each constituency, but some allowance is made for poverty levels, such that the poorest constituencies receive slightly more resources. According to the CDF Act this formula estimates that 75% of the net available fund is distributed equally among all 210 constituencies, whilst 25% of the net available fund is distributed according to a weighted value of the constituency's contribution to national poverty. The weighting factor applied to the constituency contribution to poverty is the ratio of urban-rural poor population derived from the 1999 population and housing census. This weight favours rural areas by a weight factor of 0.23 to urban areas. The net available CDF fund is the total CDF allocation after netting out 3% for an administrative budget and 5% for a so called constituency emergency budget.

$$\text{CDF Allocated} = [\frac{0.75 * \text{CDF}}{210} + (0.25 * \text{CDF} * \text{weighted contribution poverty})] \quad \text{eq.(1)}$$

The reason why the CDF Board decided to bias allocations against urban areas was the fact that the majority of the poor population live and derive their livelihoods from rural areas. According to the 1999 census the share of urban poor to rural poor population was 19 and 81% respectively. So improving the rural socio-economic outlook is perceived as a priority. Another aspect considered to bias the CDF allocation against urban areas was to deter migration from rural to urban areas. The CDF Board considered that the concentration of people in slum settlements in urban areas could be an indication that the living conditions and economic opportunities in settlers' respective rural areas of origin were probably worse. So the logic of the CDF Board was that if rural areas are better developed and more capable of absorbing a growing population, then fewer people might be attracted to migrate into urban slums.

Whether or not allocations biased against urban areas will actually deter migration toward urban areas is out of the scope of this study. Nonetheless it is clear that the given weighted allocations have resulted in allocations biased towards major towns. For instance the next figure plots the number of poor people constituencies had in 2006 and the CDF allocations given over

the period 2003-07. As the figure shows some constituencies such as Nakuru Town, Nyeri Town, Kisumu Town (West and East), Langata (the constituency of Raila Odinga), and Embakasi have received considerably smaller CDF allocations than constituencies where the poor are more concentrated in rural areas. It is worth mentioning that all these constituencies with smaller CDF allocations experienced high levels of post-electoral violence. Of course we are not making here a cause-effect analysis of the electoral violence but the fact that these constituencies received smaller allocations than other constituencies could have added to the already existing grievances in these areas.

Figure 2: CDF Allocation and Poverty Allocations at Constituency level

Once the CDF funds have been allocated the sitting MPs to make use of the funds they first need to form a local committee which will invite proposals from members of the constituency to make expenditure choices in line with local needs and preferences. The committee headed by the MP needed to be formed within the first trimester of 2003 and be composed by at most 15 non-paid local people with four reserved seats (for a woman, a religious leader, a representative of an NGO and a young person) to ensure a broad representation.

The local committees prioritise projects suggested by residents and recommend projects that could tackle poverty in the constituency. A list of projects with top priority is then sent to a District CDF committee which reviews whether the projects are in line with the CDF regulations. If that is the case the projects are then sent to the national CDF board which has to approve the disbursement of funds to the local committee.

Local committees have the freedom to run any sort of development projects provided they are not used to support political parties or religious bodies. Development projects may include the acquisition of land, vehicles, machinery or equipment. The number of projects that each constituency can get approved per financial year are a minimum of five and a maximum of twenty five. Figure 3 shows the total number of projects run by all the 210 constituencies over the period 2003-07.[2] In 2003 a total of 1,970 CDF projects were run and by 2006-07 this number increased to 20,361 projects. The number of CDF projects increased as the CDF total allocations did. However, in the elections year of 2006-07 there was a particularly notable increase in activity. For instance, the number of CDF projects increased by 119% compared to the previous year whilst the CDF allocations increased by just 38%.

---

[2] Information on the type of projects run over the period 2007-08 was no publically available for its inclusion in this paper.

Figure 3: Number of CDF Projects 2003-07

We observe that the average number of CDF projects increased over time as the allocations did for all type of MPs (whether they won or not in the 2007 elections), but a sharper increase was experienced in the year ahead of the election 2006-07. As figure 4 shows, the MPs who lost in the 2007 election were on average running more CDF projects in every single year over the period 2003-07 than those MPs who actually won in the 2007 elections or those who were not contending. Even in 2003 when every constituency got the same amount of CDF allocation the MPs who then lost the election in 2007 run more projects than the rest of MPs.

Figure 4: Average Number of CDF Projects by status of MP in 2007 elections

As figure 5 shows, over the period 2003-07 the MPs that lost in the 2007 elections run on average the most number of CDF projects (176 projects), followed by those MPs that actually got re-elected (167 projects) and by those MPs who were not contending in the election (159 projects). A potential reason for the difference in the average number of CDF projects run is the allocations that constituencies received. Table A.1 in the appendix shows that the MPs that lost in the 2007 elections got on average the highest CDF allocations 758,294 USD, as these constituencies had on average a larger number of poor people than the constituencies of the MPs that won or that did not contest in the 2007 elections. In contrast the constituencies of the MPs who got re-elected received on average less CDF allocations (739,336 USD) than those MPs that lost in the elections and than those who did not contest in elections. The MPs who did not contest in the elections run on average less projects than those MPs who were contending in the elections despite the fact that they received larger allocations than those who won the elections and a similar amount to those who lost the elections.

11

Figure 5: Average number of CDF Projects 2003-07

The number of projects run gives an indication of the effort put by MPs into using the CDF and potentially how MPs used the funds to win elections. Another indicator is the actual CDF expenditure of MPs. The CDF act establishes that MPs do not have to spend all their given CDF allocations as they have the discretion of saving unspent allocations and roll over this amount to subsequent fiscal years. Unfortunately the CDF dataset has scant information on the actual CDF expenditure per CDF project. In the majority of projects (80%) no information is given on how much the constituency has spent on that given project. This lack of information is more evident for some years such as 2004-05 and 2005-06. Bearing in mind this limitation, Table A.1 shows the reported expenditure by election outcome. The MPs that have the highest reported expenditure are those who lost the election with an average of   296,209   USD spent per constituency, followed by those who did not contest in the election with an average reported expenditure of 257,346 USD and by those who actually won the election with an average reported

expenditure of 242,654 USD. The differences in these reported expenditure could well be due to differences in actual expenditures or allocations given, but also due to differences in the quality of accounting across constituencies.

Since reported expenditure is not a reliable basis for analysing difference in behaviour across constituencies, we focus next on what sort of projects were run by MPs. Over the period 2003-07 the majority of projects (55%) were dedicated to education, followed by water (11%), health (10%) and various other projects such as roads, infrastructure and sports. Constituencies have provided scant information about the exact nature of the projects as most information merely refers for instance to dispensary, school building improvement, road in town, etc.

Figure 6: Type of CDF Projects 2003-07

In general MPs run the majority of their CDF funded projects in the education sector since the creation of the CDF up until the election year of 2007. A similar picture in type of project run emerges when we analyse this information by whether the MPs were contending in the elections and whether they won or not the election. Nonetheless the share of CDF education projects out of the total CDF projects was 5 percentage points lower for MPs who were re-elected compared to other MPs. The share of CDF funded water projects was 2 percentage points higher among re-elected MPs than the rest of MPs. These differences in type of projects run and the

election outcome could suggest that voters' preferences and needs played a role when casting their votes for their MPs.

Figure 7: Type of CDF Projects 2003-07 by status of MP in 2007 elections

Although the CDF in principle takes into account the grassroots, local knowledge, needs and preferences several academics and the media have suggested that the CDF is at risk of failing just like previous government attempts at decentralization. Specifically, three think tanks in Kenya –Institute of Policy Analysis and Research (IPAR), Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA) and the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA)- have raised several concerns with regard to the accountability of the fund, citizen participation and financial management putting into doubt the effectiveness of the CDF. For instance, a survey conducted by KIPPRA (2006) on the CDF in 35 constituencies in 2006 found that half of the survey respondents believe that the CDF monies have been widely mismanaged. In fact, according to KIPPRA's survey the CDF is viewed as the worst managed fund among all the ongoing government funds (Rural Electrification Programme Levy, Local Authority Transfer Fund, Roads

Maintenance Funds, Secondary School Education Bursary Fund, HIV/AIDS Fund and the Free Primary Education). KIPPRA respondents mentioned that the main reason for the CDF mismanagement is the power given to the local MPs to appoint and replace members of the CDF committee. Other main reasons mentioned were that political loyalties have led to the unfair sharing of the resources across the constituencies and wards. In addition, it was reported a lack of transparency and accountability due to the blending of supervisory and implementing roles.

A study conducted by IPAR in five constituencies (Limuru, Kajiabo, Mackakos, Kangundo and Makadara) also highlights other problems of the CDF (Mapesa and Kibua, 2006). Using both primary and secondary data sources the study finds that the CDF lacks of direction, transparency and has flawed legal foundations[3]. Although on average in the constituencies examined people are aware that there are resources for the constituency, people do not have enough knowledge on how exactly the CDF operates. The majority of people interviewed disagree in the way in which the CDF committees were selected and a very small percentage (less than 2%) of the respondents participated in the selection of the committees. IPAR's study finds overwhelming evidence and acceptance that the CDF has been used to advance the political agenda of the MPs. Evidence was found of a "tug-of-war" between MPs and councillors that believe there are enough loopholes that can be exploited for individual financial-political advantage. This is aided by the fact that in four out of five of the constituencies analysed, the appointments of the members of the CDF committees are composed by MP's supporters and friends not elected by the local population. With a few exceptions, the members of the CDF committees were found to be technically incompetent, lacked an understanding of how the CDF operates, and had a limited capacity in project identification, planning, monitoring and evaluation.

---

[3] District development officers, provincial administrators, councillors, district accountants and officials of the respective CDCs were interviewed either individually or in focus groups. Data were also collected through *barazas* held in the five constituencies and from opinion leaders and individual members of the public.

Committees do not have their own offices and use the premises of the MP's political party, and lack a proper mechanism for tracking the funds released to the approved projects. Perhaps these potential sources of mismanagement could be prevented or penalised if there was a proper auditing system of the fund. However the IPAR study finds that although the Controller General is expected to audit constituencies' expenditures, there is no provision for the committees at constituency level to answer any queries on resources spent.

A third study on CDF was conducted by the IEA. The IEA conducted a survey in 25 constituencies in 2005 interviewing 1,231 citizens and 577 members of CDF management committees. The study found extremely low participation among residents in CDF activities, and weak mechanisms in place for the grassroots to have a say in the projects to be implemented. IEA's survey respondents claimed that the biggest challenge facing the CDF was how to be well managed.

Other studies and media have suggested that the framework of the CDF puts it at risk of failing like previous government attempts at decentralization.[4] Specifically, the Hanns Seidel Foundation (2006) argues that the current Kenyan decentralization policy is characterised by an umbrella of funds with overlaps of areas and responsibilities[5]. For instance, education funds are given under the LAFT, Education Funds and CDF creating overlaps. In addition to this lack of coordination among funds there is lack clarity on the total amount of resources being allocated to each Local Authority and constituency.

---

[4] Since 1963 Kenya has attempted numerous programs aimed at decentralising resources with limited success. Examples of such programs are the past *majimbo* system (1963); the District Development Grant Program (1966); the Special Rural Development Program (1969/70); the Rural Development Fund; the District Development Planning (1971) and the District Focus for Rural Development (1983/44).

[5] Ongoing funds are the Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF) (1989/99); Poverty Alleviation Fund (2000/01); the Roads Maintenance Fuel Levy Fund (RMLF) (2000/1); Constituency HIV/AIDS Fund (2001/2); Free Primary Education Fund (2003) and Secondary School Bursaries Fund (2003).

The CDF has also come under particular scrutiny in the media. Major newspapers in Kenya have suggested that some MPs have been nepotistic by appointing members of their families to the CDF local committees. Media reports have also suggested that some MPs were funding no-poverty oriented activities such as golf facilities, clubs and even brothels. Ahead of the 2007 election reporting on the CDF intensified. The reports suggested that some of the MPs contending for re-election were using CDF money to buy votes and political loyalties were guiding funding within constituencies. Some of the MPs who were not contending were accused of leaving substantial CDF resources unspent reflecting their lack of interest in their constituency.

The concerns raised with regard to the management and accountability of the fund require greater scrutiny from citizens, and what a better opportunity to observe how MPs were evaluated than the last general elections of 2007. In these elections citizens had the opportunity to assess the performance of their MPs who ruled over 2002-2007 and vote out those MPs who abused their position. In order to find out whether the management of the CDF had an impact on voting intentions we conducted a nationally representative panel-survey before and after the 2007 elections which asked about resident's views on their MP and the CDF. The findings of the panel-survey are described next.

3. Candidate selection: Survey data

We use data from a nationally representative survey of Kenyans aged 18 and over conducted just two weeks ahead of the General Election of 27 December 2007, thereby getting a good picture of voting intentions and economic/political perceptions. The sample includes 1,210 Kenyans from all the eight provinces, covering 76 out of 210 electoral constituencies. The sample captures the rural/urban split consistent with the most recent Kenyan census that shows that 65% of respondents live in rural areas and the remainder in urban areas. Kenya has over a dozen different ethnic groups, none of them being the majority of the population. The ethnic distribution of the

sample respondents also matches to that of the national population as shown in Table A.4.[6] In the summer of 2008 we revisited our respondents to explore in more detail their opinions about the past MP and how the CDF was managed as well as their experiences in the aftermath of the election. We managed to re-interview 60% of our previous respondents. In order for our post-electoral survey to be comparable to our previous survey we replaced respondents that could not be found for new ones that had the same gender, education (defined as completed primary or less, or more than completed primary) and living in the same constituency as the respondent replaced. In addition if the respondent that could not be tracked back was a Meru, Kikuyu, Luo or Luhya the respondent was replaced with a person of the same ethnicity, gender, education who lived in the same constituency.[7]

At the time of our pre-election survey, most respondents –98% planned to participate in the general elections. Our survey showed that the leading candidates—Kibaki and Odinga- were in a virtual statistical tie (with 40.2% of intended vote for Kibaki and 46.7 for Odinga) so any one of them could have won depending on voter turnout. Our surveyed voting intentions for the presidential candidates coincide with similar opinion surveys conducted in Kenya as well as with a major exit poll conducted by the University of California, San Diego. The Election Commission of Kenya however found that Kibaki had won the presidential election with 51.3% of the votes to 48.7% for Odinga. The opposition claimed fraud and international electoral observers reported a number of irregularities in the tallying and counting of ballots in the presidential election. The

---

[6] In piloting and fieldwork we found that the vast majority of Kenyans were welcoming and eager to talk freely about their voting intentions. The survey reached a response rate of 80 per cent, a high rate for studies of this kind in Kenya.

[7] We replaced respondents in this way, as our pilot study in the worst areas affected by violence (Rift Valley, Nyanza and Nairobi) suggested that the great majority of displaced people moved within the same constituency to areas where there were more clusters of people from their ethnicity. We also found that respondents of Meru, Kikuyu, Luo or Luhya were the ethnic groups worst affected by violence and above all by displacement.

outcome of the elections, and primarily because of the belief that the presidential election was rigged, culminated in unprecedented levels of violence. While our research does not dwell on the issue of irregularities, we are able to infer from the survey that the electorate was highly polarized between two parties, the ODM led by Raila Odinga and PNU led by the incumbent president Mwai Kibaki. This polarization was also evident in the elections for MPs. As the next table shows, the pre-election survey gives a very good approximation of the actual election results for the MPs election according to the results released by the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK). The vote was primarily divided between the ODM and PNU parties.

Table 1: Voting intention in 2007 MPs elections

	Percent of intended vote according to pre-election survey	Percent of total elected MPs according to ECK	Number of MPs elected by party according to ECK
ODM	41.9	47.8	99
PNU	33.1	21.3	44
ODM-K	6.2	7.7	16
KANU	1.1	6.8	14
NARC	1.1	1.5	3
NARC-K	0.7	1.9	4
Sisi Kwa Sisi	0.7	1.0	2
Kenda	0.6	0.5	1
Safina	0.4	2.4	5
Mazingira Greens	0.4	0.5	1
FORD-K	0.4	0.5	1
DP	0.4	1.0	2
FORD-P	0.2	1.5	3
N LP	0.2	0.5	1
New Ford-Kenya	0.2	1.0	2
KADDU	0.2	0.5	1
KADU-A	0.1	0.5	1
PDP	0.1	0.5	1
Other parties	2.1	2.9	6
Respondents that mentioned would vote in the MPs election	90.0		
Don't know for which MP would vote	8.6		
Would not vote	1.4		

Classifying voter preferences for a presidential candidate and voters' ethnic group shows that there is unison in voting patterns among most ethnic groups. The three main presidential candidates, Kibaki (of Kikiyu ethnicity), Odinga (of Luo ethnicity) and Kalonzo (of Kamba ethnicity) were overwhelmingly supported by the people from their own ethnic groups (as shown in Figure A.1). Other ethnic groups that did not have a major presidential candidates contending in the election seem to have voted for one of the candidates in a block: The Luhyas and Kalenjins primarily supported Odinga, while the Merus and Embus supported Kibaki. The same picture emerges in voting intentions for the MPs. As Figure 9 shows the majority of Kikuyus and Merus intended to vote for MPs from the PNU party, the majority of Luos, Luhyas and Kalenjin intended to vote for MPs from the ODM party. Not shown in the figure is the preference of 80% of Kambas for the ODM-K party. This unison between of ethnic groups and voting intentions suggests that about 40% of the surveyed population had an apparent intention to vote based on ethnic grounds. But of course these are mere correlations and other factors could well be considered when voting for MPs.

Figure 8: Voting intentions for MP and Respondents' Ethnicity

As shown in table A.3 our pre-election survey shows that the majority of respondents (60%) disapprove of the performance of their MP over the previous 12 months (2006-07) and also the majority of respondents (62%) thought that their MP was not honest. With these poor perceptions it is perhaps not surprising to find that only 31% of respondents claimed that they would vote to re-elect their outgoing MP and 8.64% were still thinking for which MP to vote just two weeks before the elections.

With MPs being the closest authority to which citizens could have contact with it is perhaps surprising to find that roughly half of respondents think that their MP does not care about their community, is not qualified to manage public funds, to serve the community or to have more responsibilities within the MP's party. The management of the CDF might test many of the managerial qualities of the MPs but also their ability to communicate and show how they care for the constituency. According to our pre-electoral survey, 88% of respondents answered negatively to "has your community been involved in the CDF, that is in the design of projects or meetings", and 56% of respondents answered that "the CDF was not being used for the purpose intended in their communities". Despite these perceptions, 60% answered positively to "do you believe the CDF has helped to reduce poverty in your community?" and 77% answered positively to "do you believe that the CDF has improved services such as education and health in your community?".

Although the majority of respondents think that the CDF helped to reduce poverty, also roughly half of the respondents answered positively to "Has the CDF benefited mainly people of a specific political party in the community?" and that "Has your MP used the CDF to fund his/her political campaign or to buy votes?". These perceptions suggest that there are mixed evaluations on how the CDF has been used.

In the survey conducted in the summer of 2008 we asked our respondents whether the reason they voted to re-elect their MP was because of how well he/she used the CDF, that is

provided that the respondent claimed they had voted for their MP. Thirty seven percent of respondents that claimed voted for their outgoing MP answered positively to our question "I re-elected my past MP because how well he/she used the CDF?".

4. Hypotheses on voting behaviour and datasets used

Despite that about half of the Kenyan population lives on less than a dollar a day Kenya's MP's are among the best-paid MPs in the world. In 2006, just before the elections MPs earned a minimum of 7,000 USD a month, but with allowances they could take more than 10,000 USD a moth.[8] The high stakes at risk will undoubtedly provide incentives for MPs to try securing their re-election.

Several authors have found evidence that voting behavior in Africa is predominantly influenced by some form of identity factor such as ethnicity, family lineages, religion, etc. (Barkan 1979; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Ferree, 2004, 2008; Lindberg et al. 2008). Ethnic voting in Africa gives credence to Horowitz's (1985) expressive voting hypothesis whereby ethnic voters use their votes to register their identity as members of groups. Such voting implies that voting is not the outcome of a careful evaluation of policy positions or the performance of leaders. Instead, it is identity that matters the most. The introduction of competitive party politics in Kenya has generally been associated with increased ethnic polarization (Kimenyi 1997; Muigai 1995; Orvis 2001 Oyugi 1997). Ethnicity has played a central role in Kenyan politics as evidenced by patterns of political mobilization, resource allocation, and public service appointments, notably to the Cabinet (Apollos 2001; Kimenyi 1997; Muigai 1995; Orvis 2001).

---

[8] Information taken from the Gardian Newspaper available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/apr/26/kenya.mainsection

Ethnic identity is likely to have played an important role in influencing voting intentions for MPs, however other factors might have also affected the last 2007 elections. In next section we will assess whether social identity, economic interest, or MPs ability – or some combination of the three – is the driving force behind the voting intentions in Kenya's December 2007 MPs election. As such we will be testing three main hypotheses. The central hypothesis to test is to what extent ethnicity influenced voting intentions for MPs in the last 2007 elections, but only as one among several relevant determinants of partisanship. It is of particular importance to test whether the voting intentions for MPs were influenced by wealth.

In order to disentangle the reason why voters might re-elect their MP the second hypothesis will test whether respondents' responses on how the MP managed the CDF and benefited the community influenced voting intentions. As these responses are only perceptions, the actual use of the CDF will be tested. The CDF expenditure could be a proxy for whether the effort of MPs influenced voting intentions. However, as mentioned earlier the data on expenditure are scant and hence not accurate on how the CDF was managed. Instead the number of CDF projects launched and the type of projects –education, health, water and other sectors- will be tested. The hypothesis is that those MPs that had a higher number of CDF projects running could have increased their chances of re-election. It is worth noting that the number of CDF projects running is a noisy measure of MPs effort as MPs could well have fewer CDF projects running but better managed. To account for this possibility we will test whether the share of CDF projects that MPs had on education, health, water and other sectors influences their chances to be re-elected. Focusing on the total share of CDF projects run for instance on education might also reflect more accurately whether the type of CDF projects run reflected preferences hence affecting voting intentions.

As a part of the third hypothesis to test is whether the perceived ability of the MP to defend the socio-economic interest of voters, affects voting intentions. Specifically we will test

whether for instance the characteristics of outgoing MPs (e.g. in terms of education, whether they have served as MP previously) might have influenced the chances of re-election. Also as a proxy for outgoing MPs ability is the performance evaluation over the full term served 2002-07. Presumably MPs with higher evaluated performance will have higher chances of re-election.

One alternative measure for MPs ability to defend socio-economic interest is whether the MPs are contending in party strongholds, where because citizens consider the MP's party desirable the MP gets a high number of votes for reasons such as party's policy stance or affinity to main political force. Given the political context of Kenya, it is not possible to test directly for party strongholds. In 2002 the majority of outgoing MPs (60%) were elected as part of the NARC coalition. As this coalition broke down in 2005 MPs had to re-attach to the new political factions although the majority attaching to PNU and ODM. (as shown in Table A.2). As outgoing MPs contended for mostly newly formed political parties it impossible to test for party strongholds. Instead as a noisy measure of MPs strongholds we will test whether the outgoing MP has served in the constituency for more than one term and how successful the MP was when first elected in 2002, that is in terms of percentage of votes obtained and the margin of victory in 2002, that is the difference between percentage of votes obtained between the elected MP and the candidate that got the second highest percentage of votes. The hypothesis is that these three measures (whether MP served more than one term, percentage of votes obtained and margin of victory) increased the popularity of MPs in past elections and possibly in the one of 2007, and therefore the likelihood of their re-election.

A special thing to bear in mind when testing the above hypothesis is that the elections for MPs of 2007 were the most competitive in Kenya. For the first time every single constituency had more than two candidates running for MPs and the number of candidates running for MPs doubled since the last election in 2002. This degree of competitive elections could have affected the chances of re-election for MPs, hence weakening potential MPs strongholds. In order to take

account for this possibility it will be tested whether the number of candidates running for MPs per constituency lowered the chances of outgoing MPs being re-elected.

In sum the hypothesis to test will be whether a voter's preference over outgoing MPs depends on the voter's characteristics, especially wealth and ethnicity and on the MP's efforts in providing the constituency with public goods through the CDF, the MP's ability and on whether the MP is running in strong holds. We use the five datasets listed below to test our hypotheses.

1. CDF Data 2003-2007

    - Allocations and Spending

    - Number of CDF projects running

    - Type of projects running (education, health, water, other)

2. Pre- and post-election survey (conducted in December 2007 and summer 2008)

3. Poverty levels at constituency level in 1999 and 2006

4. MPs Elections data 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007

5. Curriculum Vitae of outgoing MPs 2002-2007:

    - Age

    - Education

    - Work Experience

    - Party Affiliation

    - Terms served since 1964

The CDF dataset is available from the relevant board overseeing its implementation. The data on poverty at constituency level are available from the Statistics Bureau of Kenya and the outcome on political elections was obtained from the Electoral Commission. The data on outgoing MPs characteristics were obtained from the MPs' curriculum vitae listed on the Kenyan parliament website.

5. Results

This section focuses on the testing of our three main hypotheses of political behavior. For this purpose we estimate the following probit regression to assess which factors influenced Kenyans' voting intentions. Specifically, we use as a dependent variable whether the survey respondent said would vote to re-elect their MP in the 2007 General election or not. We test the respondent's characteristics and perceptions of both their MP and how the CDF has been managed, represented by vector X_{ic}, MP's characteristics MP_{ic}, how the CDF has been spent CDF_{ic} and the political characteristics at constituency level POL_{ic} at the constituency c in which individual i lives.

$$\text{Pr (re-electing MP }_{ic} =1) =\Phi(X_{ic}\beta+MP_{ic}\eta+ CDF_{ic}\gamma+POL_{ic}\delta), \qquad (2)$$

where $\Phi(.)$ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.

The analysis is focused on those survey respondents that claimed were planning to vote in the 2007 MP elections and whose outgoing MPs were contending to be re-elected. This group consists of 1,026 people, that is 85% of the survey's original sample.

The overall results of the vote choice analysis are presented in Table (A.5) by means of a series of probit regression models. The coefficients reported are marginal effects on the probability of intending to vote for the incumbent MP. To identify the best predictors of this probability, we gradually and sequentially introduce various combinations of the independent variables representing either the MP's characteristics, or respondents perceptions of their MP and the CDF. If any of these factors prove to have explanatory power, they are retained in subsequent models; if they do not, they are trimmed out.

Model (1) tests our hypothesis that the MP elections were influenced by a combination of citizens' characteristics their perceptions of their MP and CDF and MP's characteristics. We estimate the impact of ethnicity on the probability of intending to vote for an MP using two interaction coefficients. The first one interacts whether the MP is contending for the ODM party

26

and whether the respondent is a Luo, Luhya or Kalenjin. The second interaction is whether the MP is contending for the PNU party and whether the respondent is a Kikiyu, Meru or Embu. Both interactions are statistically significant and of magnitude of .389 and .243 respectively. That is the chances of an MP being re-elected increase if he or she is contending for the party that the respondent's ethnic block is supporting. We obtained information about the respondent's ethnicity by asking "Which is your tribe".

In this first model it is also introduced the change in the incidence of poverty at constituency level between 1999 and 2006 and an index of ethnic fragmentation. To measure ethnic diversity the following index using data from the pre-election survey was used:

$$\text{Ethnic Diversity} = 1 - \sum_{j=1}^{J} \left(\frac{n_{ij}}{N_i} \right)^2 \qquad \text{eq. (3)}$$

where $\dfrac{n_{ij}}{N_i}$ is the proportion of people belonging to ethnic group j in district j. This index of ethnic diversity takes the value of zero if all the population in the district belongs to the same ethnic group and increases in value the more ethnically diverse the population is in the district.

The impact of changes in poverty and ethnic diversity is statistically significant. Specifically, the probability of voting for the incumbent MP as lower in constituencies which experienced an increase in poverty between 1999 and 2006. Similarly MPs ruling in areas with higher levels of ethnic diversity had a lower chance of being re-elected. This is compatible Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) who argue that more fragmented populations might have a higher variability in needs and preferences that MPs might find more difficult to fulfill thereby decreasing their chances of being re-elected.

Model (1) also tests the impact of the vote lead that the MP had when elected in 2002. This variable is found to have a small but statistically significant effect. A one percent increase in the vote lead increased the probability of being re-elected by just .002. A potential explanation

why the previous vote lead did not have a large impact on the probability of re-election is the fact that the 2007 election proved to be the most competitive at all levels. For the first time all constituencies had more than two candidates contending for MPs and the total number of MPs contending increased from 965 in 2002 to 2,547 in the 2007 election. As shown in Table A.5, MPs in constituencies with a greater number of contending candidates had lower chances of being re-elected.

Model (1) also tests the impact of respondents' perceptions of how the MP managed the CDF. Among those respondents who answered positively to our post-electoral survey question "I re-elected my MP because of how well he/she used the CDF", the probability of intending to vote for their MP is increased by .101.

More specifically regarding the use of the CDF we estimate the impact of the number of projects directly related to education, which cover more than 60% of all the CDF expenditure. For this we use the number of education projects as a share of the total number of CDF projects over 2003-07. This share has a statistically significant effect, with a one percentage point increase reducing the probability of the MP being re-elected by .584. Figure (A.2) illustrates the extent to which the probability of re-election falls as the share of education projects ran increses. This figure plots the predicted probability of voting for the incumbent MP and the share of education projects according to the margin win the MP got in 2002. The figure shows that the probability of re-election drops the higher the share of education projects the MPs ran regardless of their margin win in 2002. This evidence could potentially be explained by voter's perceptions of whether improvements in education helped to reduce poverty or improve services. To test this hypothesis an interaction between perceptions that the CDF did not improve poverty or services and the share of CDF education projects ran was included in the econometric analysis. The interaction (not shown in Table A.5) was not statistically significant (marginal effect of -1.19, standard error .444).

The impact of perceptions on the misuse of the CDF is also explored. The probability of voting for the incumbent MP was .110 lower for those respondents who answered positively to "Do you believe your MP used the CDF to fund his/her political campaigns?"

5.1 Robustness of the estimates to alternative measures and omitted variables

The basic model (1) is insensitive to the use of alternative variables and to the omission of respondent's perceptions. For instance, model (2) removes the respondent's perception of both their MP and the misused of the CDF. The probability of re-electing the incumbent MP is still affected by the share of CDF education projects. That is, MPs who ran more education projects had a lower probability of being re-elected, regardless of the citizen's views on their MP and the misuse of the CDF. This finding might be due to the fact residents do not consider education as a priority in their constituency. To test this hypothesis model (3) includes an interaction between the share of CDF projects on education and a dummy variable on whether respondents have children of schooling age and answered positively to the question "the biggest problem in the provision of education in your child's school is lack of funding, teachers, education materials, buildings in good state". This interaction is not statistically significant.

In model (4) we test whether the probability of being re-elected was affected by whether the MP had served a previous term (before 2002) and by their popularity, that is by the exact percentage of votes obtained when elected in 2002. Since the percentage of votes obtained is correlated with the margin win the MP got the latter variable was removed. The coefficients in model (4) show that having served as MP previously to 2002 does not affect the chances of being re-elected. In contrast, the MPs percentage of votes obtained in 2002 turns out to be statistically significant and of similar size to the margin win shown in the basic model (1).

Model (5) further explores the effect of the respondent's perception on the mismanagement of the CDF. No evidence is found that intention of voters to re-elect their

incumbent MP was affected by perceptions that the CDF was misused "in terms of benefiting only those who belong to a political party".

Model (6) replaces the share of CDF education projects by the actual number of CDF projects run on education, health, water and other categories. Since the number of CDF projects launched might depend on the allocations given to constituencies we divide the number of projects by the number of poor people that the constituency has. The results show that number of CDF projects on education per poor individual reduces the probability of the incumbent MP being re-elected, while the number of CDF projects on health and wealth per poor individual increase the probability of the incumbent MP being re-elected. These results are then consistent with the results reported in model (1).

In model (7) we use instead the actual CDF expenditure over the period 2002-07. Since expenditure might depend on the allocations give to constituency, we divide the actual expenditure by the number of poor people in the constituency. We find that this term is not statistically significant, but it is worth noting that the reported CDF expenditure is not a reliable source of MP's effort as most constituencies have scant information on the actual CDF expenditure.

The 2007 presidential elections in Kenya were characterised by a number of irregularities in terms of vote-buying, politicians instigating citizens to be violent and making threats in order to regain power. We tested whether the probability of the incumbent MP being re-elected was influenced by non-competitive practices used by the MP's party or by other parties. Model (8) shows that no statistically significant evidence is found that party threats or offers (whether they come from the incumbent MP's party or another one) influenced voting intentions for their incumbent MP. To obtain information on party threats or offers we asked respondents in the post-electoral survey "During the 2007 political campaign did members of a specific party offer you something in exchange for your vote or threaten you to vote in certain way?"

Other variables of interest (not shown in Table A.5) were also tested but turned out not to be statistically significant. These variables were the respondent's age, education attainment, wealth level[9], whether he/she lives in a rural setting, the MP's age and education attainment.

6. Conclusions and discussion of results

The objective of this article was to assess what factors shaped Kenyan's voting intentions for MPs and ultimately whether the way MPs managed the Constituency Development Fund affected their re-election chances in the 2007 general elections. The findings of this research are important for several reasons.

First, in order for decentralization efforts to have a positive impact on poverty and to be accountable voters need to use information about the quality of locally provided public goods in making their voting decisions in local elections. The evidence suggests that citizens based their decision to re-elect their MP on a number of factors, including how the contending MPs managed the CDF. Specifically among the survey respondents who had an intention to re-elect their MP, 56% claimed that it was because of how well their MP used the CDF. When controlling for other factors (characteristics of respondents, perceptions of MPs and how the CDF had actually been spent) we found that respondents' opinions of how well the MP had used the CDF increased the probability of the MP being re-elected by .101. This is of course just a perception of how the MP used the CDF.

Second, we found that the amount of funds spent on the constituency did not actually increase the probability of the MP being re-elected. However, the probability of the MP being re-elected was affected by how the CDF was spent. Those MPs who ran the most projects on

---

[9] The respondent's wealth level was estimated with an asset index based on the respondent's answer to "Does your household own the following items?". The items asked were: book, radio, television, motorcycle, motor vehicle, house, oven, bicycle, fridge, telephone, washing machine, computer, mobile phone, land and cattle.

education reduced of being re-elected. In contrast MPs who ran the most projects on health or water increased their re-election chances. The reasons as to why voters preferred MPs who ran less projects on education are unclear. One potential reason could be that voters assigned greater importance to health and water projects. An alternative explanation, and perhaps more likely, is that because of the overlapping government funds supporting the education sector, voters are unable to gauge whether improvements in their children's schools came from the CDF or from another fund.

Overall the evidence indicates that although the evaluations of the CDF influenced the chances of MPs being re-elected, the respondent's ethnic attachment to political parties also played an important role. This is perhaps not surprising given that political parties have since 1992 used ethnicity as a way to mobilise voters, including and especially in the 2007 election. If citizens vote for a party because of their ethnic attachment regardless of any other factors this undermines the accountability of the CDF and ultimately the value of democracy.

To strengthen the effectiveness of the CDF institutional reforms would also need to take place given that the current institutional arrangement of the CDF and political context are particularly prone to abuses. Not only because people use ethnicity perhaps as a way to express grievances or economic interests, but also due to the fact that MPs are the legislators, implementers and watchdogs of the CDF activities, which imposes a major constraint on the effectiveness and transparency of the fund. A good start would be to have an independent watchdog with the authority to punish those MPs who mismanage the CDF. In this way, MPs regardless of the support they may have from the constituency could be evaluated in an independent manner. In addition, if the ultimate goal of the CDF is to tackle poverty, then better guidance and scrutiny are needed on the type of projects that the CDF should fund.

References

Apollos, Machira. (2001) "Ethnicity, Violence and Democracy" *Africa Development*, Vol. XXVI.

Banerjee, A., and Somanathan, R. (2007) The political economy of public goods: some evidence from India. Journal of Development Economics. 82:2.

Barkan, Joe D. (1979), "Legislators, Elections, and Political Linkage" in Barkan Joe D. and John J. Okumu (Eds), *Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania*, New York: Praeger, pp. 64-92.

Bratton, Michael and van de Walle, Nicolas (1997). *Democratic Experiments in Africa. Regime Transitions in Comparative perspective*, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Court, D., and Kinyanjui, K. (1980) "Development Policy and Educational Opportunity: The Experience of Kenya and Tanzania" IDS Occasional Paper, no. 33 Nairobi: University of Nairobi.

Ferree, Karen E. (2004) . "The Micro-Foundations of Ethnic Voting: Evidence From South Africa" *Afrobarometer* Working Paper, no. 40, (June).

Ferree, Karen E. (2008). *The Political Origins of South Africa's Racial Census.* New York, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.

Horowitz, Donald L. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) "Kenyans' Verdict: A Citizens Report Card on the Constituencies Development Fund (CDF)" IEA, 2006. Available at: http://www.ieakenya.or.ke/viewdocument.asp?ID=106

Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF), "Decentralised Funds in Kenya" HSF working paper 2006. Available at: http://www.hss.or.ke/pdf/DecentralisedFundsInKenya_complete.pdf

Kagondu, J. "Workshop for Members of Parliament on Constituencies Development Fund" 24-25 January 2006. Available at http://www.cdf.go.ke/images/docs/nationalauditofficepresentation.pdf.

Kimenyi, Mwangi S. *Ethnic Diversity, Liberty and the State: The African Dilemma*, Cheltenham, Eng: Edward Elgar: 1997.

Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research & Analysis (KIPPRA) "Decentralised Funds" KIPPRA, 2006. Available at: http://www.kippra.org/DGSP-Booklet.doc

Mapesa, B. & Kibua, T. (2006) "An Assessment of the Management and. Utilisation of the Constituency Development Fund in Kenya." Discussion Paper IPAR (2006) Available at: http://www.ipar.or.ke/publications_discussionpapers.html

Lichbach, Mark and Alan Zuckerman, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

Lindberg, Staffan I. and Morrison, Minion K.C., "Are African Voters Really Ethnic or Clientelistic? Survey Evidence from Ghana" *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 123 (2008): 95-122.

Muigai, Githu. "Ethnicity and the Renewal of Competitive Politics in Kenya" in Harvey Glickman, ed. *Ethnic Conflict and Democratization*, Atlanta, GA: The African Studies Association Press, 1995, 161-96.

Orvis, Stephen. "Moral Ethnicity and Political Tribalism in Kenya's 'Virtual Democracy" *African Issues*, 29, No. 1/2 (2001): 8-13.

Oyugi, Walter O. "Ethnicity in the Electoral Process: The 1992 General Elections in Kenya" *African Journal of Political Science* 2, no 1 (1997): 41-69.

Appendix

Table A.1: Characteristics of MPs and constituencies

Variable	All MPs		Got reelected in 2007		Did not get reelected in 2007		Did not contend in 2007	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Incidence of Poverty in 1999	52.6%	13.1	52.8%	12.3	51.8%	13.7	55.2%	12.9
Incidence of Poverty in 2006	53.0%	13.4	52.9%	13.0	52.3%	13.9	55.4%	12.9
MP's Constituency contribution to national poverty in 2006	48%	0.2	43%	0.2	50%	0.2	50%	0.2
Number of Poor at MP's constituency in 2006	68,503	32391	62,178	30892	72,414	34057	70,756	28248
MP's Gender (Male)	96%	0.2	93%	0.3	100%	0.0	90%	0.3
MP's age	56	9.9	54	10.3	57	9.2	57	11.1
MP's educational level (highschool or less)	34%	0.5	31%	0.5	37%	0.5	35%	0.5
Served as MP before 2002	47%	0.5	43%	0.5	53%	0.5	40%	0.5
Number of Terms MP has served before	1.9	1.3	1.9	1.4	2.0	1.3	1.6	0.8
Percentage votes MP obtained in 2002	62%	16.6	64%	17.7	59%	16.1	69%	13.2
Vote lead MP got when elected in 2002 (percentage point difference)	37.0	25.8	39.2	28.0	33.2	24.2	47.9	22.6
Number of contending MP candidates in 2002 election	4.9	2.1	4.7	1.9	5.2	2.2	4.6	1.5
Number of contending MP candidates in 2007 election	12.1	6.3	10.4	5.5	13.9	6.4	9.8	5.8
Number CDF Projects in Education 2003-07	92	65.1	82	54.5	98	72.8	96	59.2
Number CDF Projects in Health 2003-07	17	12.5	15	9.9	18	14.3	17	10.2
Number CDF Projects in Water 2003-07	19	16.3	19	18.1	18	16.0	17	12.1
Number CDF Projects in Other kind 2003-07	38	30.4	37	26.3	40	35.1	34	21.2
Total Number Projects in 2003-07	166	94.3	154	85.3	175	103	164	83.5
Education as share of total CDF project number 2003-07	53%	0.1	50%	0.1	55%	0.1	56%	0.1
Health as share of total CDF project number 2003-07	11%	0.1	10%	0.1	11%	0.1	12%	0.1
Water as share of total CDF project number 2003-07	12%	0.1	13%	0.1	11%	0.1	11%	0.1
Other kind of CDF projects as share of total CDF project number 2003-07	25%	0.1	26%	0.1	24%	0.1	21%	0.1
Total Allocation to CDF Projects 2003-07 (USD)	748,815	87204	739,336	84834	758,294	90995	753,555	77725
Total Reported Expenditure in CDF Projects 2003-07 (USD)	271,564	287678	242,654	59716	296,209	400474	257,346	48815
Allocation to CDF Projects 2003-07 per number of poor (USD)	14.1	9.1	16.3	12.2	13.1	6.8	12.1	4.1
Reported Expenditure in CDF Projects 2003-07 per number of poor (USD)	4.9	4.2	5.5	4.6	4.7	4.4	4.1	1.6
Observations	210		77		106		24	

Table A.2: Party of Re-elected MPs

Political Party	Number of outgoing MPs contending in 2007 election	Number of outgoing MPs who whon in 2007 election	Re-election rate (%)
PNU	54	23	43
ODM	31	27	87
KANU	22	7	32
ODM-K	18	9	50
NARC-K	13	4	31
FORD-P	9	2	22
NARC	5	1	20
Safina	4		0
Chama Cha Mwananchi	2		0
Democratic party of Kenya	2		0
Ford-A	2		0
Forum for Republican Party	2		0
New Ford-Kenya	2	2	100
Sisi Kwa Sisi Party of Kenya	2		0
Social Democratic Party of Kenya	2		0
DP	1	1	100
FORD-K	1		0
Independent party	1		0
Kenda	1	1	100
Kenya National Democratic Alliance	1		0
Labour Party of Kenya	1		0
Mazingira Greens Party of Kenya	1		0
Mazingira Greens	1		0
NARC Kenya	1		0
New Democrats	1		0
New Kanu Alliance Party of Kenya	1		0
Peoples Patriotic Party of Kenya	1		0
Shirikisho Party of Kenya	1		0
SPK	1		0
The Independent Party	1		0
Workers Congress Party of Kenya	1		0
Total	186	77	41

Table A.3: Characteristics of survey respondents

Variable	All Sample		Respondents whose outgoing MP is contending in elections	
	Obs	Percentage	Obs	Percentage
Respondent intended to vote for outgoing MP in 2007 elections	1210	0.26	1026	0.31
Respondent's age (18-39)	1210	0.73	1026	0.72
Respondent's educational level (secundary and higher)	1210	0.71	1026	0.71
Respondent's gender (female)	1210	0.48	1026	0.47
Respondent living in urban area	1210	0.35	1026	0.35
Respondent's assets index	1210	0.42	1026	0.42
Respondent disaprove perfomance of outgoing MP during 2006-07 period	1186	0.40	1005	0.42
Respondent is a Luo, Luhya or Kikuyu X Outgoing MP is contending for ODM	1210	0.08	1026	0.10
Respondent is a Kikuyu, Embu or Meru X Outgoing MP is contending for PNU	1210	0.13	1026	0.15
Respondent believes community was not involved in CDF	1104	0.88	933	0.88
Respondent believes CDF was not used for purpuse intended in community	1210	0.56	1026	0.57
Respondent believes outgoing MP is not honest	1160	0.62	992	0.61
Respondent believes MP's obligation is making sure that local government do its job	1210	0.40	1026	0.40
Respondent believes MP's obligation is making sure that the President does his job	1210	0.26	1026	0.26
Respondent believes child's primary school main problem is lack of funding, education materials or building in bad state	1210	0.14	1026	0.15
Respondent received an offer or a threat from a party to vote in certain way in 2007	1210	0.50	1026	0.49
Party for which MP is contending made the offer	1210	0.08	1026	0.09
Party for which MP is contending made the threat	1210	0.01	1026	0.01
Respondent claims polititians were instigating violence in community ahead 2007 elections	1210	0.30	1026	0.30
	1178	0.50	1001	0.49
Respondent believes MP does not care about the community				
Respondent believes MP is not qualified to serve community	1177	0.55	1001	0.53
Respondent believes MP does not have enough experience in managing public service programs	1167	0.55	994	0.54
Respondent believes MP is not qualified to have a position in political party	1127	0.42	955	0.42
Respondent believes CDF has helped to reduce poverty in community	1210	0.60	1026	0.60
	1210	0.77	1026	0.76
Respondent believes CDF has improved services in community				
Respondent believes CDF has used to fund political campaigns	1210	0.50	1026	0.49
Respondent believes CDF has benefited mainly people of specific political party in his/her community	1210	0.52	1026	0.53
Respondent claim the reason why reelected MP was because of how well he/she used the CDF	1210	0.36	1026	0.37

Table A.4: Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Sample and Population

Ethnic Group	Sample (%)	National Population Share (%)
Kikuyu	18.7	20.78
Luhya	15.7	14.38
Luo	12.3	12.38
Kalejin	8.5	11.46
Kamba	9.3	11.42
Kisii	8.0	6.15
Meru	8.2	5.07
Mijikenda	6.2	4.70
Maasai	2.2	1.76
Turkana	2.1	1.32
Embu	1.1	1.20
Taita	1.9	0.95
Teso	0.2	0.83
Kuria	0.1	0.52
Basuba	0.1	0.50
Samburu	0.1	0.50
Arab	0.2	0.16
Somali	3.1	0.21
Swahili	0.5	0.37
Pokot	1.0	0.37
Bajun	0.20	0.26
Nubi	0.2	
Borana	0.1	0.31

Data are based on the 1989 Kenya Population Census (Nairobi, Central Bureau of Census).

Figure A.1. Voting Intentions for President by respondent's ethnicity

Table A.5: Probability of Voting for outgoing MP in 2007 elections

Dependent Variable: Whether Respondent voted for outgoing MP in 2007 elections

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Respondent is a Luo, Luhya or Kalenjin X Outgoing MP is contending for ODM	0.389***	0.393***	0.389***	0.367***	0.387***	0.363***	0.402***	0.402***
	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.055)
Respondent is a Kikuyu, Embu or Meru X Outgoing MP is contending for PNU	0.243***	0.237***	0.243***	0.248***	0.242***	0.200***	0.309***	0.314***
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.045)
Changes in constituency's poverty incidence 1999-2006	-0.016**	-0.016**	-0.016**	-0.016**	-0.017**	-0.015	-0.018**	-0.018**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
District Ethnic Fragmentation	-0.215***	-0.223***	-0.215***	-0.204**	-0.217***	-0.169**	-0.169**	-0.174**
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.062)	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.056)
Margin win MP got when elected in 2002	0.002**	0.002**	0.002**		0.002**	0.002***	0.002**	0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Number of contending MP candidates in 2007 election	-0.016***	-0.016***	-0.016***	-0.014***	-0.016***	-0.015***	-0.013***	-0.013***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education as share of total CDF project number 2003-07	-0.584***	-0.631***	-0.585***	-0.585***	-0.588***			
	(0.124)	(0.121)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.124)			
Respondent claim the reason why reelected MP was because of how well he/she used the CDF	0.101**		0.101**	0.093**	0.103**	0.084**	0.117***	0.118***
	(0.032)		(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Respondent believes CDF has used to fund political campaigns	-0.110***		-0.110***	-0.111***	-0.102**	-0.103**	-0.112***	-0.112***
	(0.029)		(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Education as share of total CDF project X Respondent believes school main problem is lack of funding, teachers, education materials or buildings in good state			0.004					
			(0.079)					
Served as MP before 2002				-0.013				
				(0.037)				
Percentage votes MP obtained in 2002				0.004**				
				(0.001)				
Respondent believes CDF has benefited mainly people of specific political party in his/her community					-0.019			
					(0.034)			
Log (Number CDF Projects in Education 2003-07 per number of poor)						-0.119**		
						(0.038)		
Log (Number CDF Projects in Health 2003-07 per number of poor)						0.080**		
						(0.028)		
Log (Number CDF Projects in Water 2003-07 per number of poor)						0.099***		
						(0.024)		
Log (Numberof other CDF Projects 2003-07 per number of poor)						0.050		
						(0.036)		
Log (Reported expenditure in CDF Projects 2003-07 per number of poor)							0.009	
							(0.027)	
Respondent received an offer or a threat from a party to vote in certain way in 2007								0.006
								(0.030)
Pseudo R-squared	0.162	0.143	0.162	0.169	0.162	0.191	0.145	0.145
Number of observations	1029	1029	1029	914	1029	1029	1029	1029

*Coefficients as marginal effects. dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Significance Level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses*

Figure A.2: Probability of re-electing outgoing MP by share education CDF projects running