Review of Impact and Effectiveness of Transparency and Accountability Initiatives:

Abstracts of the Relevant Literature

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The Impact and Effectiveness of Transparency and Accountability Initiatives: Abstracts of the Relevant Literature

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1 We have done our best to provide standardised abstracts of key readings in each sector reviewed for this project. This collection of 67 abstracts was produced by a team of accountability generalists and specialists. Because they are produced by several people, and because of variations in the literature, some abstracts are organised slightly differently than others.
1. General Literature on the Impact and Effectiveness of Transparency and Accountability (IETA) initiatives


General Description
The author identifies the present period as being a new era for civic engagement, particularly those forms of engagement that bring citizens into formal governance processes to ensure ex-ante accountability (i.e., accountability mechanisms that ensure accountability throughout the governance process rather than as an ex-post judgment in the form of elections). The paper distinguishes between different forms of pro-accountability reforms and key design features of various social accountability initiatives.

Country and level of analysis
The paper does not contain any original empirical analysis, although there are several ‘break-out’ boxes in abbreviated case-study format.

Sector
Budget processes and service delivery are referenced very generally.

Key actors
Government, civil society, international donors

Kind of accountability
Social accountability

Tools used
Citizen report cards, community scorecards, state-society round-tables, access to information and community monitoring are among those tools referenced generally.

Broad intention
To increase state accountability to citizens using mechanisms that rely on genuinely synergistic state-society relations.

Seeks to influence
State accountability to its citizens, as well as citizen participation in formal governance mechanisms.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
In general, social accountability initiatives are likely to be more substantive and sustainable than other pro-accountability reforms (such as Weberian public sector reform; marketisation; the creation of ombudsmen).
The author highlights six key features of social accountability initiatives, suggesting that each of these components must be discussed and incorporated into any design in relation to the context:

- Punishment vs. reward based
- Rule following vs. performance based
- Level of institutionalisation
- Depth of [societal] involvement
- Inclusiveness of participation
- Branches of government involved

**Evidence**

As the title suggests, this is a conceptual discussion. As such, no original empirical work was done. However, the author does offer some abbreviated case studies in the form of break-out boxes in several social accountability mechanisms.

**Methods**

Conceptual discussion -- no original empirical work was done.

**Factors contributing to impact**

- Entry points – which are used to introduce social accountability initiatives?
- State-society synergy – how balanced is this interaction?
- Mixing mechanisms – how can the right mix (because a mix is usually required) of mechanisms be determined?
- Capacity-building – how can we ensure that state and societal actors will actually participate?


**General Description**

The author argues that the active participation of civil society in governance processes and the strengthening of the state are not mutually exclusive nor are they contradictory. Rather, he proposes increased ‘co-governance’ as the best solution for ensuring state accountability to its citizens by outlining five case studies that have shown successful results.

**Country and level of analysis**

Country case studies include Brazil, Mexico (two separate case studies), the US and India. The levels of analysis vary by case study, from local- to national-level initiatives.

**Sector**

Sectors include municipal budgeting, election monitoring, service-delivery monitoring and public oversight of local infrastructure projects.

**Key actors**

The key actors vary by case study but generally include the general citizenry, civil society organisations, state reformers and public bureaucrats (including those in horizontal accountability bodies).
Kind of accountability
The author focuses on ‘societal’ forms of vertical accountability, although he argues that ‘societal accountability’ too often connotes the selective participation of ‘well-behaved’ societal actors at the expense of allowing more antagonistic and/or grassroots-oriented actors to participate.

Tools used
The tools used vary by case study:
- Brazil – Participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre
- Mexico – Citizen oversight of electoral processes
- US – Community participation in public education and policing in Chicago
- Mexico – Community oversight of public infrastructure projects in Oaxaca
- India – Grassroots initiatives targeting corruption in public services and infrastructure projects

Broad intention
The author attempts to demonstrate successful examples of ‘co-governance’ issues that draw state and societal institutions together in meaningful ways to enhance accountability.

Seeks to influence
The initiatives profiled seek to influence budget processes, electoral processes and wider service delivery to ensure states are accountable and responsive to the needs of citizens, particularly its poor citizens.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
In comparison to ‘exit’ options – which tend to emphasise market solutions to citizens’ dissatisfaction with public services – and ‘voice’ – which tends to be associated with relatively flimsy conceptions of citizen participation – co-governance brings citizens into the actual decision-making structures and processes of the state. The embeddedness of societal actors within these processes facilitates a more approach to state accountability to its citizens.

Evidence
The evidence presented on the impact of co-governance initiatives is generally positive, although for each initiative there is some variation depending on where the programme was implemented, what the political and social contexts in those areas were, etc.

Methods
The author selects purposively five successful ‘case studies’ of co-governance based on the assertion that most development professionals learn from failed governance reforms, rather than those that succeed. Each case study is based on the compilation and secondary analysis of other, mostly qualitative studies related to these initiatives.

Factors contributing to impact
- The earlier societal actors are involved in the design process of co-governance initiatives, the more effective they tend to be.
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- Government must go beyond the provision of information – ‘transparency is not enough’ (p. 459) – and stimulate the participation of society, particularly participation of the poor.
- The best way to assure the sustainability of a co-governance initiative is through its full institutionalisation, either through (a) building co-governance into the strategic plans of government agencies; (b) creating new agencies that assure societal participation; and/or (c) inscribing co-governance mechanisms in law.
- Co-governance in decentralised contexts works best when there is a central mechanism for supervision and coordination of activities.


**General description**

This paper is concerned primarily with the prominence of democratic local governance (DLG) among donor discourses and, in particular, the centrality of participation and accountability within DLG programming. In general, Blair is most concerned with political accountability and the processes through which this occurs in contexts of DLG reforms. Transparency is a concept used only in relation to elections.

**Country and level of analysis**

Six countries – Bolivia, Honduras, India, Mali, the Philippines, and Ukraine – are discussed in this paper. Most of the discussion is in relation to a purposive, small sample of local sites within these countries in which DLG processes were running. For India, local sites were restricted to the state of Karnataka.

**Sector**

The paper refers to accountability quite generally. However, (i) budget processes, and (ii) service delivery are mentioned. (iii) ‘Other’ – decision-making and monitoring of infrastructure processes – is also mentioned.

**Key actors**

Overall, these are state-led initiatives meant to increase accountability to citizens. Citizens are mentioned frequently in the course of this paper. For example, in Mali – where DLG processes were being implemented during the course of analysis – citizens were involved closely with the very design of DLG statutes (eg, decisions regarding districting), which in turn lay the foundation for more citizen-led accountability measures at the local level relative to other countries studied.

In terms of donors, this paper was commissioned by USAID. Five of the six countries (all but India) received USAID funding for DLG programmes in the decade prior to this evaluation.

**Kind of accountability**

Political accountability is the focus here. Bureaucratic accountability is discussed, but only in relation to the accountability of bureaucrats to elected officials.
In general, responsiveness appears to be the main focus of most of the sites studied. However, answerability is an important dimension sought in sites with ‘formal grievance procedures’ (eg, the ‘vigilance councils’ in Bolivia) and standard-setting is an important dimension of citizen engagement with the design of Mali’s national roll-out of DLG programmes.

Tools used
Blair refers to a number of accountability mechanisms. Because of his focus on political accountability, (i) elections; (ii) political parties; (iii) civil society; and (iv) the media are included, as are (v) public meetings; (vi) ‘formal grievance procedures’ (including civil-society led oversight committees); and (viii) opinion surveys.

Sites studied covered a range of these initiatives. There was no site, however, in which all mechanisms were employed.

Broad intention
A basic model for DLG that Blair tests in his analysis here is as follows: (i) increased citizen participation increases the representation of marginalised population groups; (ii) their inclusion in political processes increases empowerment of these groups; (iii) newly empowered groups will be allocated public services and goods more effectively and fairly; and (iv) as a result, poverty will be reduced. Still, he acknowledges the processes of participation and accountability both as ends in themselves and as means to further ends.

Seeks to influence
DLG reforms are intended to make a more enabling environment for citizens – particularly those from historically marginalised groups – to make demands of elected representatives, who can then (according to this paper’s approach) pressure bureaucrats to respond accordingly. In this sense, these initiatives target formal institutions. However, Blair states that for donors, the ultimate ‘output’ with which they are most concerned is poverty reduction (see model outlined under the section ‘Broad intention’).

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
See model outlined in ‘Broad intention’.

But also: ‘On the process side, through participation DLG promises to increase popular input into what local government does and through accountability it bids to increase popular control over what local government has done or left undone. On the output side, DLG finds its justification largely in the ideas that it can improve local service delivery and that for a good number of donors it can contribute significantly to poverty reduction as well’ (22).

Evidence
Blair classifies ex-post the mechanisms studied – see list in ‘Tools used’ – as either (i) ‘mechanisms that appeared effective in ensuring accountability’, and (ii) ‘mechanisms with some promise... but not enough track record yet to be considered viable’ (27). Though the outcomes for each of these vary depending on the country, he isolates civil society and political parties as the ‘most active’ mechanisms for producing accountability. He claims that sites that employed several mechanisms simultaneously were more likely to see increased accountability than those that only used one or two of them.
He also finds some evidence suggesting that initiatives that promote more universalistic local development activities that benefit a wide swath of the population might be more effective than those that target specific population groups. This is because, as Blair argues, even where participation at the local level might improve the quality of representation, it does not necessarily then produce empowerment, enhanced state responsiveness and poverty reduction. This is because DLG tends to benefit initially local elites.

Methods
This paper is a shortened journal article based on a synthesis report completed for USAID. The original USAID synthesis report was based on six country-specific case studies – one of which was led by Blair – that employed a mix of mostly qualitative methods – site visits, key informant interviews, observation, document review. The sample of original case studies had been purposively selected to show examples of ‘good’ DLG practice.

First, Blair says clearly that his evaluation is ‘impressionistic’ and claims that it was impossible to set strict standards for ‘effectiveness’ for such a study. Second, he proposes a linear, process-oriented model of accountability in DLG in which two circles are placed next to each other at the end of the model – he labels one of these ‘What Local People Get’ and the other ‘What Local People Need and Want’. The greater the overlap between these two circles, the more effective the DLG programme has been, according to Blair.


General Description
This edited volume collects a number of case studies of social accountability strategies across Africa. This is particularly important because much of the work on social accountability to date, particularly social accountability initiatives that have been bottom-up in nature, have not focused on African contexts. The editors have included specifically contributions from practitioners from both civil society and government involved in implementing social accountability strategies. The case studies are divided into three sections – ‘civil society-led’; ‘government-led’; and ‘working in partnership’, which functions as a section on hybrid, or diagonal, forms of accountability (note: the first and third sections were analysed for this abstract).

Country and level of analysis
The regional focus is Africa, with case studies including: South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, Madagascar and multiple-country cases.

Sector
The case studies cover budget processes and service delivery most specifically, although the right to information is also mentioned.

Key actors
The key actors vary by case study, and by section – in the case studies focusing on civil society-led initiatives, the strategies of civil society organisations are highlighted with some discussion of their interactions with state actors, international actors and local media. In the section on hybrid initiatives, both state and civil society actors feature.
Kind of accountability
Social accountability is the focus, with some discussion of the limitations of traditional vertical accountability mechanisms and the importance of hybrid accountability (generally referred to in this volume as ‘partnerships’ for accountability).

Tools used
The tools vary by case study but include planning and resource allocation tools, expenditure management tools, performance management tools, public integrity tools, community scorecards, budget analysis and in some cases, litigation.

Broad intention
The broad intention is (a) to empower citizens and civil society organisations in diverse African contexts to view themselves as actors capable of demanding accountability from state institutions, and (b) to increase state accountability to demands articulated by citizens and civil society organisations.

Seeks to influence
The initiatives profiled seek to influence budget processes, electoral processes and wider service delivery to ensure states are accountable and responsive to the needs of its citizens, particularly its poor citizens.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
Although this varies depending on the case studies, the review of Afrobarometer data in the introduction suggests that many citizens from the countries studied do not see themselves as ‘account-holders’ in the context of a vertical-accountability relationship between citizens and states. ‘Initiatives that increase popular contact with, or awareness of, elected representatives and representative institutions should also work to increase public demand for accountability’, (p. 20).

Evidence
- In a number of cases, civil society organisations demanded and received greater access to government information.
- In some cases, new legislation was introduced or amended to take into account the demands of citizens and civil society organisations.
- Tools that lacked ‘teeth’, or genuine sanctioning capabilities, tended to have less impact, although some authors remained committed to these tools in contexts with little opportunity for citizen mobilisation and voice.

Methods
This volume is based on a series of case studies of various social accountability initiatives, written from the perspective of a key stakeholder involved. As such, the case study authors generally employ a descriptive approach to outlining the context in which the accountability deficit was occurring and the accountability strategy used to address it.

Factors contributing to impact
Civil society organisations with good communication strategies and proactive engagement with local media tended to be more successful in their efforts.

Many civil society organisations relied on robust research to back up their arguments for pro-accountability reforms.

Civil society organisations that had the capacity and resources to integrate pro-accountability reform work into their mandates were more likely to be successful than those that struggled without these resources.

Coordinated action in the form of partnerships – whether partnerships between civil society organisations and/or partnerships between civil society organisations and state actors – were key to many initiatives’ success.

Where pro-accountability reform did occur there tended to be political will within the state institution concerned.

In various phases of the pro-accountability reform campaign, the importance of independent facilitation / mediation amongst and between civil society and state actors was an important factor for success in some of the cases.

Where state and civil society actors interacted in participatory spaces concerning an accountability deficit, it was important for the process to be treated as a developmental strategy rather than a ‘customer service channel’.


General Description
The authors trace the shift in development research from macro- to micro-policy questions. In particular, they look at the advantages and disadvantages of randomised control trials (RCTs) – or, randomised evaluations (REs) – as the dominant methodology within this research stream. They ask whether there is a trade-off between the scope of the questions that researchers ask and the quality of the evidence that they generate.

The authors are concerned with methodology here and, as a result, do not discuss accountability or specific initiatives in a way that conforms to this abstract. There is no original empirical work in this paper. See ‘Expected impact and underlying assumptions’

Sector
The authors refer to service delivery generally, as most randomised control trials/evaluations tend to focus on this sector.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
Supporters of randomised controlled trials/evaluations make the following general claim about their chosen method:

- Although difficult to do well, RCT/REs are promising for evidence-based policy because they are based on a simple comparison of means between treatment and control groups, which persuasively illustrates the impact of a certain kinds of interventions.

More specifically, RCT/REs purportedly:

- Solve the identification problem by removing selection bias via randomisation
However, the effects on the control group still vary and the most common manner of describing overall effects for treatment groups is presenting the average effect.

- Present research design in a transparent, easily usable fashion that allows an evaluated programme to be replicated in other settings
  - But, can a programme that worked well in one country be as effective when transferred to another?
- Pinpoint whether or not a programme works or doesn’t
  - However, they do not estimate parameters in a theoretical model of human behaviour, potentially making the leap from evidence to policy recommendation too easily, too quickly.
  - Some would argue that the lack of qualitative data in most RCT/REs misses the opportunity for generating explanations on why programmes work or don’t.
- Prevent data mining as a result of the research design, since there is only one regression – of the outcome on the treatment variable – which is specified in advance
  - However, the incentives for a result are still strong and it could be difficult for researchers to resist tinkering with the margins in order to produce a statistically significant finding.
- Point agencies implementing certain programmes in the right direction by testing what works (or doesn’t)
  - But, since many RCT/REs are done on programmes already underway, implementing agencies (often local NGOs) might feel threatened by a negative result (or incentivised to manipulate results to show positive effects).
- Establish which programmes work so that international agencies can be more confident about the effectiveness of aid, whilst recipient governments can more clearly pursue effective development strategies
  - Some point to the fact that some RCT/REs showing positive results simply have not been adopted as official policy.
  - More generally, policy environments are more complex than the streamlined simplicity in which many RCT/REs are designed and run; quoting Paul Romer in a chapter from this volume, ‘policymakers are constrained, but rarely ignorant’ (127).


General Description
This is a conceptual discussion of the framework developed for the Overseas Development Institute’s evaluation of voice and accountability (V&A) programmes funded by European bilateral aid agencies. The authors outline the design of the evaluation framework used for assessing the type and impact of donor-funded V&A programmes under analysis. It should be read with reference to O’Neil et al (2007) and Rocha Menocal et al (2008).

Sector
This paper refers broadly to voice and accountability (V&A) initiatives, with no reference to sector-specific programmes.
Kind of accountability
The authors identify the three main forms of accountability identified in much of the literature – vertical, horizontal and hybrid – as areas of interest, although their equally critical focus on citizen voice makes vertical and hybrid forms of accountability more relevant for their evaluation.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
The authors accept that broader development outcomes (e.g., poverty reduction) are not likely direct results of V&A initiatives. Rather, they argue that it is more useful to think of the short-term outcomes – often capacity-building or knowledge generation – as part of a ‘pathway of change’ towards long-range outcomes.

The authors also argue that assumptions made by those designing interventions or by those evaluating them can be tested as follows:
- What are the assumptions behind the development of the initiative?
- What activities are implemented and which channels are used as part of the initiative?
- What are the outputs from the implementation of activities?
- What outcomes – here, defined as changes in policy and/or practice – were generated as the result of these outputs?
   Once these have been answered, gaps in the original theory of change might be identified.

Evidence
N/A – However, this evaluation framework was piloted in two countries being studied for the larger evaluation.

Methods
Theory-based evaluation

Factors contributing to impact
Context analysis is identified as a critical component of any impact evaluation of a V&A initiative. This should include the following:
- Political and institutional framework (and actual operation)
  - Legal rights to information, participation and accountability
  - Public oversight mechanisms in place across government
  - Distribution of powers across government
  - Economic structures and institutions
- Key features of main actors
  - Mapping the principal state and non-state actors
  - Mapping the ‘architecture’ of aid at the national and local levels
- Social and political landscape
  - Analysis of the political alliances, networks and sources of power
  - Analysis of informal power structures and institutions
- Understanding of recent events that shape opportunity and risk for V&A initiatives

General Description
The author argues that the study of democratic transitions has become narrowly focused on electoral reform and has not taken into proper consideration wider transitions in the various accountability relationships necessary for substantive democratic governance. How can diverse actors that favour accountability break out from a relatively static ‘low-power equilibrium’ in which they lack leverage?

To answer this question, the author analyses various rural civil-society organisations and social movements in terms of their effects on increasing state accountability. He finds that changes in the balance of power between society and the state were driven by long-term cycles of reciprocal interaction between scaled-up grassroots organisations and pro-reform state figures.

Country and level of analysis
Mexico is the focus of this volume, and while much of the discussion is framed by changes in the national political regime during the 1990s, the author analyses sub-national accountability politics by looking primarily at a handful of predominantly rural states. The author is very focused on accountability between levels of government and state institutions (particularly in federal systems).

Sector
Sectors include regional monitoring of natural resource management, watershed management, investment in agriculture and infrastructure and food distribution.

Key actors
The actors vary depending on the specific case being discussed, but generally include Mexico’s political regime, its state institutions, rural civil society and external actors such as multilateral organisations like the World Bank.

Kind of accountability
The author is most concerned with moving his analysis beyond political accountability to social accountability. He argues for re-envisioning the directionality of accountability – i.e., vertical versus horizontal – to take into consideration the multiple, sometimes contradictory accountability relationships that exist in practice.

Tools used
Among others, the author highlights state-created, ‘invited’ spaces of participation for civil society as well as more autonomous forms of social mobilisation.

Broad intention
To increase state accountability to rural citizens in Mexico, which the author argues has been relatively static given the wider democratic consolidation occurring at the national level.

Seeks to influence
Both national and sub-national state institutions, particularly in their relation to the poor, rural population

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
The author is sceptical about electoral participation exacting substantive accountability from the state to its citizens, particularly those in poor, rural areas where more authoritarian or patron-oriented relationships might be resistant to change. In terms of accountability channels, contemporary innovations with participatory power-sharing and ‘old-fashioned protest’ matter more – particularly in these contexts – than do elections.

At the same time, these latter forms of demand-making will not necessarily have immediate impact, particularly in those spaces where civil society is ‘invited’ to participate with little opportunity to sanction non-compliance. Instead, most accountability reforms are driven by longer term processes of state-society interactions, and in particular, interactions between state reformers and local social movements.

Evidence
Using the method described below, the author traces patterns of state-society synergy in a handful of rural states to assess the impact on enhanced state accountability. The results vary by and within context. Those states with greater autonomy from the national political regime often had histories of greater downward accountability to local residents in regard to the sectors identified above, although this sometimes occurred under conditions of relatively authoritarian control. The creation of ‘invited’ spaces for participation was rarely the key explanatory factor that generated an enabling environment for citizen voice.

Methods
This volume is a collection of essays brought together under the theme of accountability politics in Mexico. Several conceptual chapters book-end more empirical work based on case-studies of civil society-state interaction in a handful of rural states. The methods used include:

- Sub-national comparative method
- Institutional ethnography
- Analysis of collective identity formation
- Aggregation of qualitative indicators of institutional behaviour

The author does not develop a framework from these for the analysis of accountability politics, because he claims that attributing causality to the effects of civil society influence on state institutions will be necessarily dependent on context.

In terms of indicators, most of which the author claims can be assessed qualitatively, he outlines the following:

- General accountability
  - Attempts to enforce accountability
  - Outcomes of enforcement efforts
- Institutional change
  - Scope – To what degree is the pro-accountability reform implemented within and across state agencies?
  - Depth – To what degree is the pro-accountability reform a ‘lite’ reform versus a reform which gives citizens greater leverage?
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- Citizen participation in accountability processes
  - Depth
  - Enabling factors
- Transparency of information
  - Quality
  - Reliability
  - Quantity
  - Practical accessibility
  - Social relevance

Factors contributing to impact
- Presence of reformist state agents who open opportunities for civil society actors to mobilise and pressure states
- Presence of accumulated ‘social energy’ constructed from prior mobilisations
- Ability of local organisations to scale up their activities


General Description
The author questions the widely held assumption that transparency generates accountability. Because those who hold power might not be easily shamed, the more important question – according to the author – is what kinds of transparency lead to what kinds of accountability, and under what conditions? In order to answer this question, the author makes a couple of conceptual distinctions – the need to differentiate between (i) ‘clear’ and ‘opaque’ transparency, and (ii) ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ accountability.

Kind of accountability
The author makes a distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ forms of accountability, the former translating as accountability based on answerability with the latter referring to accountability based on the ability to sanction.

Tools used
Freedom of information

Broad intention
State institutions’ provision of reliable, substantive information

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
The author refers to the under-explored common wisdom that greater transparency will lead to increased accountability. While this may be an intuitive line of thinking, he suggests that it is more of a normative assumption than one based on analysis of empirical evidence (which is lacking, according to the author). What tends to happen is that pro-accountability reformers call for accountability, and powerful elites respond with some measure of transparency.
The author produces several tables which attempt to visualise the relationship between his two types of transparency and accountability. Conceptually, he sees ‘institutional answerability’ as a potential overlap between (clear) transparency and (soft) accountability.

Factors contributing to impact

- Who is being targeted – institutions or individuals?
- What is the quality of official information accessible to the public?
- Opaque vs. clear transparency, or does the information made available reveal reliable information about institutional behaviour and performance (clear) or is it transparent only nominally (opaque)?
- Soft vs. hard accountability, or does the accountability reform offer the opportunity for sanctions, compensation or remediation (hard) or is it limited to dissemination and minimal answerability (soft)?


General Description

The authors discuss the possibilities for combining qualitative and quantitative methods in impact evaluations. Because of the growing interest in doing impact evaluations in development research – particularly randomised impact evaluations – it is increasingly necessary for researchers to strategise research designs that facilitate the use of qualitative data and the comparative advantages they bring to understanding non-material, non-monetary research topics such as governance quality, empowerment, social capital and social exclusion.

Kind of accountability

Although accountability is not the focus of this paper, the authors do express concern over the lack of in-country ‘ownership’ of many impact evaluations and propose that those evaluations that incorporate qualitative data might better address this gap. Generally speaking, most impact evaluations are undertaken by donor agencies and are not driven by in-country demand. Without this, there is some question as to the utility of the results of the impact evaluation as a potential feedback tool (representing citizen voice) into the policy process. The authors refer to this as the ‘political economy’ of impact evaluations.

Tools used

Related to T&A initiatives, citizen report cards and community score cards are discussed as possible tools for mixed-method impact evaluations.

Evidence

Integrating qualitative data into impact evaluations facilitates a greater level of attribution between intervention and impact in programmes focused on measuring complex change. For example, a quantitative impact evaluation on the impact of an immunisation campaign on tuberculosis might make sense, but less so if directed towards the evaluation of a reform in a governance process.
Methods
There are three main approaches to a mixed qualitative-quantitative methodology presented in this paper. All of them, the authors make clear, require an elaboration of a ‘theory of change’ at the research-design stage.

- Integrating the methods
- Sequencing the use of methods
- Merging the methods

If qualitative methods were not incorporated into the original research design – which often rely on aggregated quantitative survey data in many (non-randomised) impact evaluations – the authors suggest the addition of a qualitative module to the original survey instrument. This can be done using focus groups, community scorecards or citizen report cards.


Description
The authors argue that impatience with biased, ineffective and outright corrupt institutions has led people to seek new forms of engagement with existing accountability systems and to invent new mechanisms where necessary. The authors describe this worldwide phenomenon as being part of a broad ‘New Accountability Agenda’.

This new agenda has arisen because traditional notions of accountability have been concerned with technical, financial and legal accountability at the expense of human development and social justice. The role of ordinary citizens and their associations has also been under-appreciated. At the same time, changes in methods for extracting accountability and in jurisdictions have propelled this new agenda forward. The defining features of the new agenda emerge from the answers to five key questions:

- Who is seeking accountability?
- From whom (or what) is it sought?
- Where (in which forums and over what extent of geographic coverage) is it being sought?
- How (through what means) are the powerful being held to account?
- For what (which actions against which norms) is accountability being sought?

Country and level of analysis
The authors weave dozens of country-specific examples from the global south into their analysis.

Sector
The authors cover numerous sectors in their analysis.

Key actors
For the authors, main actors continue to be the ‘state’ and ‘society’, though they are critical of how these actors are conceived monolithically and, in particular, turn their focus to the lack of focus on accountability within society (outside the realm of ‘high politics’). They are also much more explicit than other accountability researchers about the roles that other states,
international organisations and multinational corporations play in the new accountability agenda.

**Kind of accountability**
The authors are interested mostly in vertical accountability but not in isolation from horizontal accountability – they claim that the former is important in its own right but is also required for proper functioning of the latter. However, as the authors have made clear elsewhere – regarding their concept of ‘hybrid’ accountability – these directional flows are not quite as static in the ‘new accountability agenda’, which includes new principal-agent relations and shifting jurisdictions.

**Tools used**
The authors cover – usually in a very brief format – a wide range of ‘new’ accountability ‘experiments’, but not in a systematic way. Their interest lies more in how numerous experiments are united by several broad principles than in outlining the key technical components to the new accountability tools.

**Seeks to influence**
The authors are interested in both the ‘high politics’ and the ‘deep politics’ of accountability. The former refers to the target of traditional accountability mechanisms – the decisions of public officials; the performance of state institutions. The latter, however, is under-conceptualised in most accountability initiatives – the ‘deep politics’ of social norms as filtered through family, gender, ethnicity, religion. If ongoing injustices in the realm of ‘deep politics’ are not addressed, the authors are sceptical of the sustainability of initiatives focused on ‘high politics’.

**Expected impact and underlying assumptions**
The authors’ core assumptions and arguments:
- The new accountability agenda is manifest in the variety of experiments taking place that offer disadvantaged people opportunities to operationalise rights and to shift the terrain of government from technical solutions to concerns regarding human development and social justice.
- The role of globalisation is misunderstood and needs greater clarity – it has both complicated accountability claims whilst also making possible many new channels of accountability.
- Accountability failures are often written off as instances of ‘elite capture’. What receives less attention is the flip-side to this equation – the fact that public and social institutions are systematically biased against marginalised social groups.
- ‘Answerability’ and ‘enforcement’ are not the only two possible components of accountability initiatives. As part of the new agenda, accountability initiatives allow for the shaping of shared values through deliberation (e.g., communities collectively agreeing to standards against which the actions of power-holders are to be judged).
- Amongst advocates for pro-accountability reform, there continues to be an under-recognised conflict between those in favour of soft accountability and those who favour hard accountability. ‘Soft’ advocates tend to see accountability gaps as technical glitches needing to be fixed. ‘Hard’ advocates see accountability as a longer term political and social project.
The new accountability agenda has the potential to create (and in some cases, has already created) a backlash – (i) Some fear that the design of new initiatives tends to depoliticise the activism of the poor; (ii) Others argue that new accountability experiments stunt the growth of formal democratic institutions; and (iii) Many suspect that new accountability initiatives further erode trust in public officials.

Evidence
The authors weave dozens of country-specific examples into their analysis, but more as a way of demonstrating the existence of a new accountability agenda rather than showing whether or not these new initiatives are effective and, if so, how.

Methods
This volume is predominantly a conceptual and theoretical piece, with a few chapters covering myriad brief, case-study examples from the authors’ review of previous research. The case-study examples are used as proof that the roles, methods, jurisdictions and standards within new accountability experiments have shifted.

Factors contributing to impact
The authors are more concerned with describing the new agenda than they are with assessing the impact of new initiatives.


General Description
Traditionally, efforts to rectify the failures of horizontal and vertical modes of accountability have proceeded independently of one another; the focus has been on strengthening the performance of each axis, rather than strategising on ways they might proactively reinforce one another. In this paper, the authors attempt to merge these two axes by presenting two case studies that demonstrate ‘hybrid’ or ‘diagonal’ accountability. These initiatives – rare, but with a great deal of potential for increasing accountability – bring citizens (vertical) directly into the auditing and decision-making functions of public oversight agencies (horizontal).

Country and level of analysis
India – the level of analysis is at the local level in two of the country’s largest cities

Sector
Food rations and public expenditure

Key actors
Civil society organisations, public oversight agencies, bureaucracy, local and state government

Kind of accountability
‘Hybrid’ or ‘diagonal’ accountability, which the pair describe as being the insertion of vertical-accountability actors (i.e., citizens) into horizontal accountability channels (such as state auditing agencies).
Tools used
The tools used for insertion into horizontal spaces varied but relied on civil society mobilisation and, at times, quite risky modes of demand-making. The authors mention in passing a number of official participatory spaces – for example, the ‘vigilance councils’ meant to monitor food distribution – which they say were held hostage by elite interests in maintaining control of food distribution.

Broad intention
The broad intention is to increase state accountability to citizens by allowing for vertical accountability actors – organised citizens, civil society actors – to participate in the horizontal accountability mechanisms of the state.

Seeks to influence
The effectiveness of horizontal accountability mechanisms

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
- There are many potential risks involved for those going beyond the better known forms of citizen engagement that ‘often amount to little more than “barking dog” advocacy at the margins’.
- The state often tries to neutralise diagonal accountability efforts by offering anodyne opportunities for citizen consultation.
- The poor continue to demonstrate – without the question being retired – that they have both the capacity and long-term vision to participate in somewhat technical intrastate oversight processes.

Evidence
Two cases were presented, both of which resulted in civil society observers being inserted into horizontal accountability mechanisms.

Methods
The paper draws from the analysis and comparison of two case studies which could be classified as institutional ethnography.

Factors contributing to impact
Though the authors state that neither of their cases included the full, ideal range of factors ensuring success, the five key elements are:
- Legal standing for non-governmental observers within institutions of public-sector oversight
- A continuous presence for these observers throughout the process of the agency’s work
- Well-defined procedures for the conduct of encounters between citizens and public-sector actors in meetings
- Structured access to the flow of official documentary information
- The right of observers to issue dissenting reports directly to legislative bodies

The authors were very careful to point out that attempts to initiate these diagonal accountability channels carried many potential risks for citizens in the form of economic, physical, social reprisals. To avoid risks, the authors suggest that vertically induced efforts to create diagonal accountability relationships should be created in collaboration with pro-
accountability reformers within the state and not as alternative, independent substation for the state.


General Description
The impetus for this paper is the limited evidence of the impact of citizen voice and accountability (V&A) initiatives on development outcomes. This is particularly problematic because of the renewed interest on citizen voice as a potential salve for deficits in state accountability. The authors attempt to guide the reader through the challenges of measuring the impact of citizen V&A programmes by suggesting parameters for indicators, frameworks and methods.

Kind of accountability
Both horizontal and vertical accountability are discussed

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
- One of the primary challenges to measuring changes through V&A interventions is that outcomes tend to be reflected in intangible changes in power relationships, which are difficult to measure.
- In many cases, V&A interventions are designed to specifically strengthen V&A; concerns about the impact on development outcomes are secondary, often either assumed or simply ignored.
- Qualitative tools can be particularly useful for assessing the impact of V&A interventions. Particularly if we look at behavioural change indicators, qualitative methods allow us to collect data on (i) observable changes, and (ii) perception scores of the quality of change, which can in turn be triangulated with (iii) more quantifiable measures of change, where they exist.
- V&A interventions, in particular, are context-based and, as a result, require indicators and mechanism that reflect local social and political factors.
- In order to delineate the various resources going into and results coming out of V&A interventions, the authors propose a ‘results chain’ model which should be organised sequentially as follows:
  - Inputs
  - Process
  - Outputs
  - Outcomes
  - Impact

Methods
Qualitative methods are particularly important for measuring changes that result from V&A initiatives, although indicators selected must be standardised and be organised according to a logical protocol.

General Description
The authors provide an overview of social accountability as a concept and describe the logic behind the World Bank’s support of related initiatives. For their purposes, social accountability refers broadly to an approach to building accountability through civic engagement. Supporting social accountability initiatives – particularly those that are demand-driven – has become an increasingly important component of the World Bank’s work because of their ability to support efforts at poverty reduction and sustainable development.

Key actors
Civil society, media, state institutions

Kind of accountability
Social accountability, although other more top-down approaches to accountability are discussed

Tools used
- Participatory policy and budget formulation
- Participatory policy and budget analysis
- Participatory public expenditure/input tracking
- Participatory performance monitoring and evaluation

Broad intention
To improve the quality of governance and development effectiveness and to increase the empowerment of the poor.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
Social accountability can:
- Improve the quality of governance
- Increase development effectiveness, by
  - Improving service delivery
  - Facilitating more informed policy design
- Increase empowerment, particularly of the poor

Factors contributing to impact
- Political context and culture
- Access to information
- Role of the media
- Civil society capacity
- State capacity
- State-civil society synergy
- Level of institutionalisation of the social accountability mechanism

General Description
The editors collect seven case studies of citizen-led social accountability initiatives from Africa in this volume. The case studies are written by practitioners from either civil society or government and, as such, are particularly useful for practitioners or for donors and development partners interested in supporting social accountability initiatives.

Country and level of analysis
Case studies from seven countries are included – Senegal, Ghana, Benin, Nigeria, Tanzania, Malawi and Zimbabwe. The level of analysis varies from local- to national-level, depending on the case study.

Sector
The case studies focus on a mix of sectors – budget processes, service delivery, natural resource management and aid transparency.

Key actors
The key actors highlighted in these case studies are civil society organisations, though state institutions, international actors and transnational networks and the media are also mentioned frequently.

Kind of accountability
Social accountability

Tools used
Tools include budget analysis, civil society and community monitoring, public revenue and taxation analysis, public expenditure monitoring, participatory planning, participatory budgeting and participatory evaluation of local service delivery.

Broad intention
The broad intention of this wide range of initiatives is to empower ordinary citizens to exercise their inherent rights to hold governments accountable for the use of public funds and how they exercise their authority.

Seeks to influence
State institutions

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
- Social accountability can improve governance by (a) strengthening democracy; (b) enhancing accountability; (c) reducing corruption; (d) enhancing government legitimacy; (e) improving citizen-state relations and (f) providing political stability and peace.
- Social accountability can enhance development by (a) ensuring better-designed policies, budgets and plans are used as part of the national development strategy; (b) increasing government resources from international donors and from tax revenues; (c) making public spending and services more equitable and (d) using development resources more efficiently.
• Social accountability can increase citizen empowerment by (a) raising citizens’ awareness of their rights; (b) making information more freely available; (c) providing more opportunities for ‘citizen voice’ and (d) enhancing agency.

• Although supply-side accountability mechanisms are necessary for good governance, states are often ineffective at holding themselves accountable. Citizens must also demand it.

• The opportunities for social accountability exist in all aspects of government. Those social accountability initiatives that directly involve ordinary citizens in the allocation, disbursement, monitoring and evaluation of public resources will prove effective because these are the resource flows that translate public policy into action.

Evidence
Evidence varied by case study. In some instances (eg, Senegal, Tanzania, Zimbabwe), social accountability initiatives were scaled up and/or had more palpable policy impacts (eg, budget consultations between government and civil society) than elsewhere. However, some of the outcomes common to most of the case studies included:

- Enhanced capacity of civil society to demand social accountability
- Improved credibility of civil society in the eyes of state actors
- Increased citizen awareness and interest in the accountability deficit at issue
- Increased government willingness to engage with civil society, even if this remained more cosmetic than substantive

Methods
The seven case studies selected for this volume were identified in the course of two stocktaking exercises commissioned by the World Bank Institute. They were chosen from a larger sample of 60 case studies for the purposes of representing a range of contexts and social accountability strategies.

Factors contributing to impact
First, the volume editors – looking across the seven case studies – find that social accountability is strongly influenced by a range of environmental factors, which can be said to either be ‘enabling’ or ‘disabling’. Evaluating the context along these lines can help practitioners plan for and design social accountability strategies. In some country contexts, actions aimed at creating more enabling environments might be critical before achieving effective social accountability outcomes. The aspects of enabling and disabling environments are as follows:

1. Political context and culture
   a. Availability of democratic space
   b. Respect for citizens’ rights
   c. Level of decentralisation

2. Legal and policy framework
   a. Access to information
   b. Level of citizen participation

3. Sociocultural and economic factors
   a. The social norms, power relations and deference to authority in local contexts
   b. Lack of citizen empowerment and participation
   c. Degree of gender inequities
   d. Levels of poverty and illiteracy
Second, the editors identify key factors that made certain initiatives more likely to be successful. These include the following:

1. Effective use of the media
2. Combination of technical skills (within civil society) and popular mobilisation – one without the other tended to be less potent as an approach
3. Previous experience of social accountability practices by civil society actors created a stronger enabling environment for initiatives
4. Sustained commitment of both civil society and government
5. A solution-based approach that integrated constructive criticism and problem-solving into the initiative design
6. Coalition-building
7. Drawing on international support


General Description
The author begins by acknowledging the deficiency of elections as a vertical accountability mechanism and instead focuses on the importance of horizontal accountability, particularly in newly formed democracies where it tends to be weak. One major point he makes is that effective horizontal accountability requires networks of public agencies that are legally empowered and willing and able to take action against misconduct or poor performance. However, with the increased density of networks necessary for horizontal accountability to occur, the opportunities for the violation of horizontal accountability expand – through (i) encroachment, or the trespassing of one state agency onto the lawful authority of another, and through (ii) potential corruption.

Country and level of analysis
Generally focused on new democracies (at the time of writing), particularly those in Latin America

Key actors
Elected officials, bureaucracy, citizens (as voters or as members of ‘watchdog’ groups)

Kind of accountability
Horizontal accountability

Seeks to influence
The quality of governance, and in particular, the relationship between democracy, liberalism and republicanism

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
The author presents a fairly cynical assessment of the possibilities for horizontal accountability, particularly since – as he argues – the incentives for public officials to enable these mechanisms are weak. Furthermore, although he does see citizen ‘watchdog groups’ as important actors in accountability struggles, he sees their potential success as being limited without the support of a horizontal accountability mechanism (or without the assistance of the media).
Evidence
This paper does not include original empirical work.

Methods
This paper does not include original empirical work. The author describes many of his claims as being ‘impressionistic’.


General Description
It is widely acknowledged that elections alone are too weak to guarantee ‘decent’ governance. In his contribution to this volume, the author attempts to demystify the concept of accountability and its growing importance in the wake of many democratic transitions in recent decades. As currently used – and with particular reference to political accountability – he defines accountability based on the two basic connotations it carries – (i) answerability, and (ii) enforcement. Answerability refers to the need for public officials to inform citizens of their behaviour and to justify, or explain it. Enforcement refers to the capacity of accountability agents to impose sanctions on power-holders who have violated their public duty.

Key actors
Public officials, civil society, bureaucracy, international actors (mostly with reference to international organisations)

Kind of accountability
Political accountability broadly with some reference to all that this might entail (e.g., bureaucratic accountability, judicial accountability)


General description
One of the MDGs – ‘Eradicating Extreme Poverty and Hunger’ – aims at reducing the proportion of people whose income is less than $1 by half by 2015. India’s 11 Five-Year Plan, reiterating the country’s commitment to the MDGs, has set socio-economic targets for inclusive growth and development. These include reducing the headcount ratio of poor by 10 percent, raising the real wage rate of unskilled workers by 20 percent and creating 70 million new work opportunities. The NREGS (National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme), formulated under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), 2005, is an important government initiative for poverty reduction in India.

However, in the initial phase (2006 and 2007) of the implementation of NREGA, it was seen that workers were not attracted towards this scheme as the actual wage payment was relatively below the prescribed minimum wages. This was because in most of the states the Schedule of Rates for calculation of minimum wages was quite old and had been adapted from the government works which utilised machines. In NREGS, machines are banned; all jobs have to be accomplished through manual labour and wages are calculated on the basis of quantity of work done. So the quantity of works done by machines was used as the parameter for paying works that was done by manual labour.

The state governments were not following NREGS guidelines in fixing Schedule of Rates, which stated that the productivity norms should be fixed by the state governments after undertaking comprehensive work, time and motion studies. Instead of framing new Schedule of Rates based on comprehensive study, the state government simply adopted the old rates. State governments were violating the provisions of the NREGA, the Central Operational Guidelines and the circular of the Ministry of Rural Development of Government of India. Since this scheme is demand-driven and not allocation-based, the lower demand for employment mainly due to low wages offered by the scheme was defeating the very purpose of the Scheme.

Civil society organisations, which included research organisations, NGOs, community based organisations etc. joined hands to launch advocacy campaigns for fresh Time and Motion Study and revision of the Schedule of Rates. Though the campaign was launched nationally we shall analyse the campaign in the states of Bihar and Gujarat.

Country and level of analysis

Two states of India - Gujarat and Jharkhand

Sector

Employment Guarantee Scheme for poverty alleviation

Key actors

The wage workers working under NREGS were not given minimum prescribed wages as they could not fulfil the productivity norms. It triggered civil society action nationally.

In Gujarat, studies were conducted by different civil society organisations and research institutes to show that workers were not been paid properly due to poorly designed parameters. Unnati (an NGO in Gujarat) in its status report on the implementation of NREGS
pointed out that the system of calculation of wages was difficult to understand for an ordinary person as numerous parameters like the proportion of work, geographical conditions of the district and pro-rata basis keeping in view the total person days and measurement of work were taken into consideration. Unnati recommended that the system should be simplified and then widely publicised for transparency and accountability. It shared the findings of its report with senior government officials and other stakeholders.

Janpath and Sabar Ekta Manch (both are networks of civil society organisations) also prepared a status report on the implementation of NREGS in Gujarat and demanded that the government should issue immediate circular informing at all levels that wages under NREGS cannot be less than agricultural minimum wages of Rs.50 and appropriate action should be taken for the contravention of Payment of Minimum Wages Act. This report was widely disseminated to the media and civil society organisations.

Sabar Ekta Manch and Mashurben Makwana of Balisana Village of Prantij Taluka, Sabarkantha also filed litigations seeking court intervention on the issue. They filed a petition in the High Court of Gujarat against the Government of Gujarat regarding the non payment of proper wages under NREGS. The High Court issued a notice to the Gujarat Government and passed an order directing the Department of Rural Development (DRDA office), District Programme Coordinator of Sabarkantha District to inquire whether those persons who were working under the scheme under the NREGA, 2005 were getting proper wages as per the notification or not, and also to find out how many such persons were working in Sabarkantha District and to produce a statement showing actual wages being paid by the concerned authority to the concerned persons. The High Court also directed the respondents to file detailed affidavits in reply as to why the scheme under NREGS had not been properly implemented or looked after by the respondent authorities.

In Jharkhand, civic action started with a seminar organized by NREGA Watch (performance monitoring group formed by CSOs) on February 2, 2007. In the seminar, a detailed report on the ground realities of the implementation of NREGA was presented where non-payment of minimum wages was the major issue. Another status report on NREGS by PRIA recommended that District Schedule of Rates (DSR) should be finalised immediately to ensure proper wage payments without any anomalies. The issue of underpayment and unjustified productivity norms was also raised jointly by well known activists and intellectuals like Prof. Jean Dreze, Ms. Aruna Roy and Ms. Annie Raja and members of the Central Employment Guarantee Council.

In both the states, multiple actors were involved in the campaign for removing anomalies in wages. In Gujarat, Janpath, Sabar Ekta Manch, Unnati, Disha, and Centre for Development Alternatives were prominent actors who conducted research studies and advocated the revision of wages after redesigning Schedule of Rates. Similarly, in Jharkhand, NREGA Watch, PRIA, Centre for Science and Environment and some individual activists such as Dr. Jean Dreze raised the issue, briefed media and engaged with the government.

**Tools used**

Research institutions, huge networks of civil society organisations collected evidence of lower-than-minimum wages under NREGA and advocated for a revision of the Schedule of Rates and
daily wages by conducting a fresh time and motion study. They advocated this need through the media, multi-stakeholder dialogue, petitions and court cases to the state governments and central government.

Broad intention

Revision of the Schedule of Rates for determining wages under NREGS.

Seeks to influence

To Influence the state governments to revise Schedule of Rates for determining wages, fixing of minimum wages and ensure payment of minimum wages to the workers working in NREGS.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions

Accountability initiatives (research, communication through media, active engagement with government, synergy between CSOs) lead to good response from the government leading to rationale productivity norms and increase in minimum wages.

Evidence

The Government of Jharkhand requested The Birla Institute of Technology (BIT), Mesra to conduct a time and motion study for determining productivity norms. On the basis of these recommendations, the Government issued a Government Order on 22 October 2008 revising the Schedule of Rates for NREGS, so that an unskilled worker working for eight hours is able to get the minimum agricultural wage applicable in the state.

Government of Gujarat was also pressed into action by CSOs. It requested Centre for Environmental Planning and Technology to conduct a time and motion study for assessing field productivity of rural unskilled workers and to develop practical work rates to be adopted for the Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) of the state. The CEPT team conducted a time and motion study and recommended the wage of Rs 90.30 per day and productivity norms. All this led to the notification of a new Schedule of Rates based on the time and motion study resulting in an increase of Rs. 40 per day in 2008.

The revision of the Schedule of Rates (productivity norms) has led to an increase in actual wages paid to workers under NREGA in both the states covered by this case study.

Methods

Order of state governments and studies of central government on NREGS.

Factors contributing to impact

In both the states, multiple actors were involved in the process. While some of these players such as CSE and CDA acted individually, others came together and worked as policy networks. They used both invited and created spaces to raise the demands. The research and communication strategies were different for different organisations. These research findings were communicated through print media, seminar, multi-stakeholders dialogue and
consultations. Circulation of electronic copies of research reports through e-mails and creation of e-groups facilitated information sharing and mobilising action. The network based organisations like DISHA organised rally / protests against the violations of NREGA and minimum wages payments. The involvement of activists and intellectuals like Jean Dreze, a member of the Central Employment Guarantee Council (CEGC), Aruna Roy (One of the architects of Social Audit and RTI Campaigns in India) in the studies and advocacy campaigns also played important part in influencing the executive on the need for revision in wages.

Majority of research studies conducted by network of civil society organisations was data collection exercise about status of NREGS in the states, which lacked robust methodology, however this barrier was overcome because of their credibility of working at the grassroots. The government took these reports seriously and instituted studies for determining wages and productivity norms. Right to Information (RTI) Act proved to be an enabling factor as it helped in accessing information related to existing productivity norms and minimum wages, which the state government was reluctant to provide. These information quoted directly from government records strengthened the case for revision of wages.

Janpath and Sabar Ekta Manch in Gujarat filed litigations in Gujarat High Court, which spurred the government in action. The role of independent judiciary in forcing the executive to follow constitutional and statutory norms was quite critical in Gujarat. Active engagement with the government by NREGA Watch, PRIA, Unnati and other CSOs also resulted in creating a critical mass in the executive for change in policies. These organisations systematically held dialogues with the Department of Rural Development (Jharkhand), the Planning Commission of India, Members of Parliament, the Ministry of Rural Development and the Central Employment Guarantee Council in order to influence them.

Overwhelmed by number of studies from civil society organisations, the Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India decided to do status check of NREGS in India. The state government of Jharkhand also ordered its officials to undertake field visits and report to the government. The reports of the government substantiated the findings of CSOs and regular field visits improved the implementation of NREGS.


General Description
The authors object to findings from research on accountability in Latin America which portray countries in the region as having weak accountability mechanisms. They argue that that might be the case if the focus is on traditional accountability mechanisms only – vertical accountability via voting; horizontal accountability mechanisms within the state. However, they claim that an under-explored area of research on accountability in this region is ‘societal’ accountability, which they define broadly as alternative forms of political control that rely on citizen mobilisation and action. By overlooking societal accountability processes, earlier researchers missed the role citizen action played in initiating the recent wave of democratisation in Latin America and risk overlooking the role they can play in strengthening state horizontal accountability mechanisms.

Country and level of analysis
Argentina – the level of analysis traces local-level action that eventually impacted – to varying degrees – national-level state institutions and processes

**Sector**
Citizen security and policing

**Key actors**
Civil society, media, judicial branch

**Kind of accountability**
‘Societal’ accountability, which for the authors translates as actions carried out by actors with differing degrees of organisation that recognise themselves as legitimate claimants of rights. These actions tend to give visibility to and articulate the demands of citizens that are often left out of the representative political arena.

**Tools used**
Social mobilisation, media and legal mechanisms

**Broad intention**
Societal accountability can impact the functioning of horizontal accountability mechanisms to ensure downward accountability from states to citizens. When these actions arise from the social mobilisation of marginalised citizens, the process potentially gives voice to new accountability concerns that might be ignored in traditional horizontal and vertical accountability relations.

**Seeks to influence**
State institutions

**Expected impact and underlying assumptions**
- Societal mechanisms impose symbolic sanctions on public officials or institutions by exposing, denouncing or using some combination of the two. Exposure serves as a form of signalling, drawing attention to a failure in state accountability to its citizens. Denunciation can follow the initial signalling by pushing the initial exposure into a more formal complaint process, thereby activating (in theory) horizontal accountability mechanisms. This process is described – in the Latin American context – as follows:
  - Social mobilisation organises around a particular demand
  - The social mobilisation links to media actors, who give coverage to actions and claims of the movement
  - Individuals or associations, bolstered by their claim becoming a public issue, activate local judicial proceedings or public oversight agencies

**Evidence**
The authors provide evidence for their claims about effective societal accountability measures by working through two case studies in Argentina.

**Methods**
The authors provide two case studies of societal accountability processes in Argentina. Both involved under-investigated homicides – the perpetrators in one case were state law
enforcement officials – and citizens’ efforts to activate horizontal accountability mechanisms for social justice.

The assumptions about how societal accountability works ideally are demonstrated in each of their cases. In this sense, their selection of case studies was purposive.

Factors contributing to impact
As described in ‘Assumptions’ and ‘Methods’, the greatest impact is achieved when citizens pursue (i) mobilisational, (ii) mediatic, and (iii) legal mechanisms for activating horizontal accountability.
2. Service Delivery


General description
This study reports on an experimental design to evaluate the impact of three different kinds of interventions to encourage beneficiary participation in primary education: providing information, training community members in a new education testing tool and organizing volunteers to hold remedial reading camps for illiterate children in Uttar Pradesh, India.

Country and level of analysis
Village communities in the Jaunpur district of Uttar Pradesh, India were the targets of the intervention.

Sector
Primary Education

Key actors
A prominent educational NGO – Pratham – Village Education Committees (VECs), community members, teachers, village administration.

Kind of accountability
Social accountability through information dissemination and expected mobilization

Tools used
The intervention disseminated information about school performance, trained villagers in a testing tool to ascertain literacy and enrolment of children, presented neighbourhood report cards on literacy and enrolment, and trained volunteers to provide out of school remedial classes for children.

Broad intention
Increasing public awareness of the poor performance of village schools and stimulating community participation in primary education.

Seeks to influence
The intervention targeted teacher performance through increasing awareness and mobilization of communities.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
The expected impact was that communities who were made aware of the poor performance of schools would mobilize and engage with public schools and demand better outcomes. The testing tool would help community members ascertain whether there were improvements in literacy levels. The out of school volunteer-led remedial classes were a ‘direct-control small group’ to see whether alternatives to formal schooling had any impact.
Evidence
The study found no impact on community involvement in public schools, nor impact on teacher effort or learning outcomes in all of the schools under study. However, training of volunteers had significant impact on increased literacy as well as upsurge of volunteerism.

Methods
The study was based on a randomized control trial involving three different intervention groups.
   a) Community awareness of service delivery and of the role and activities of the Village Education Committees through village level meetings attended by community members, local administration, teachers and NGO representatives who facilitated the meetings and later distribution of pamphlets about the same.
   b) The above intervention, plus the training of community members to administer a reading test for children, and the creation of report cards by neighbourhood about learning and enrolment which were then presented at village meetings.
   c) A ‘direct-control small group’ was added to the above two in which the NGO recruited one or more volunteers and trained them to improve reading skills after which they held reading camps of two to three months in the selected villages outside of school.

Factors contributing to impact
In explaining the results, the authors suggest that the awareness raising and resulting mobilization was not enough to get VECs energized or parents engaged with local schools because their expectations of the efficacy of such large group participation mechanisms. The authors hypothesize that the evidence suggests that participation in large group mechanisms of social accountability (direct or indirect) are likely to be low. In addition, comparing the results with similar experiments in Uganda, the authors suggest that the importance of the facility and the monitoring body (in this case the schools and the VEC) can influence whether communities participate. Finally they also point out that the NGO that facilitated the intervention felt that its direct involvement (e.g. through selecting VEC members or participants) could not be scalable, which might explain, in part, the lack of participation. However, in small group participation, the results were strong. As shown, there was much interest in improving the reading of the children as demonstrated by the popularity and effectiveness of the reading camps.


General Description
The intervention consisted of a ‘citizen report card’, ie, a form of community monitoring of service quality and quantity to ensure improved standards and accountability from local health staff. Part of this experiment actually incorporated participatory methods into its design by encouraging communities to devise their own monitoring arrangements. One year later, the researchers find that the community monitoring project increased the quality and quantity of primary health care provision in treatment communities relative to the control group (specifically, an increase in infant weight and decreased child mortality in treatment communities, higher utilization of services; perception of service quality). It also increased levels of engagement and responsiveness with local health officials relative to the control group.
Country and level of analysis
Uganda – local level

Sector
Service delivery – health

Key actors
Local community-based organisations (CBOs), rural communities, local health care workers

Kind of accountability
Social accountability

Tools used
Community monitoring; report cards

Broad intention
The broad intention of this intervention was to increase the responsiveness of health care workers to local community health needs as well as to improve overall health outcomes on a range of indicators (e.g., infant birth weight).

Seeks to influence
Health care service delivery

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
The authors hypothesized that a lack of relevant information on the status of health service delivery and the community’s entitlements, and failure to agree on what is reasonable to demand from the health care provider, were holding back initiatives to pressure and monitor the provider. While individual community members have private information, for example they know whether their own child died or not, and whether the health workers did anything to help them, they typically do not have any information on aggregate outcomes, such as how many children in their community did not survive beyond the age of 5 or where citizens, on average, seek care, or what the community can expect in terms of quality and quantity of service provision. Partly as a response to this information problem, and partly because monitoring a public facility is a public good which may be subject to serious free-rider problems, few people actively participate in monitoring their service providers. Relieving these two constraints was therefore the main objective of the intervention. The key behavioural change induced by more extensive community-based monitoring was expected to be increased effort by the health unit staff to serve the community.

Evidence
The community-based monitoring project increased the quality and quantity of primary health care provision. A year after the first round of meetings, the authors observed a significant difference in the weight of infants and a markedly lower number of deaths among children under five – a 33 per cent reduction – in the treatment communities. Utilization for general outpatient services was 20 percent higher in the treatment facilities compared to the control facilities. Treatment practices, including immunization of children, waiting time, examination procedures, and absenteeism, improved significantly in the treatment communities, thus
suggesting that the changes in quality and quantity of health care provision are due to behavioural changes of the health care workers. There is additional evidence that the treatment communities became more engaged and began to monitor the health unit more extensively.

Methods
This paper is based on an experimental design that randomly assigned communities to a basic intervention involving community-based monitoring and report card-scoring of local health services, and others to communities without such an intervention. The experiment involved 50 public health dispensaries and health care users in the corresponding catchment areas in nine districts across four rural regions in Uganda, affecting approximately 55,000 households. The authors also implemented a household survey in the participating communities.

Factors contributing to impact
The authors do outline a number of the more detailed outcomes that related to the bigger impact of the community monitoring interventions, but they do not discuss much the factors which contributed to the success of the initiatives in detail.


General Description
In response to the World Bank’s 2004 World Development Report *Making Services Work for Poor People*, the authors apply the Report’s framework to a number of pro-accountability reform case studies in Latin America. The authors find that political and technical challenges, in particular, continue to challenge the implementation of pro-accountability reforms. In general, their analysis demonstrates that the impact of accountability initiatives are generally more positive in less poor communities and that stronger central-state oversight is probably necessary to push such reforms.

Country and level of analysis
Brazil, Chile and Colombia are all featured in this study. National-level decentralization policies are the focus of each country-specific case study included.

Sector
Service delivery – education

Key actors
Local communities, local education providers, school councils, educational authorities at various levels (local, state and federal)

Kind of accountability
Although the pro-accountability reforms did involve the participation of local communities in each case, the accountability between an autonomous school or newly empowered local school council and higher-level education authorities is more of the focus here.

Tools used
Decentralisation; some community participation
Broad intention
The broad intention is to improve accessibility to and performance of public schools in the countries being studied.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
The authors question the underlying assumptions about decentralisation improving efficiency and equity given the various challenges created by local contexts that might not be able to take advantage of such reforms, either because of administrative histories and/or capacity constraints.

Evidence
The authors find that the success of accountability-related reforms depends to a large degree on how local actors accept and adjust to the change in roles and the political and historical context in which the reforms are implemented. The central state can work to address inconsistencies and inequities, but this requires access to good information to identify problems, and the will and capacity to address them.

Methods
The authors purposively select three case studies of educational reform in Latin America and then apply a World Bank accountability framework to them to assess the assumptions and design of the Bank’s framework.


General description
Dholka is a small town located in Ahmedabad district, Gujarat, India inhabited by 61,569 people (2001 census) with an annual population growth rate of 7.96 percent. Dholka has large number of power looms and cotton processing units and is a major trade centre for the neighbouring villages. Manufacturing, service, processing and trade are the main occupation of people. Despite being an important trading centre, the water supply and sanitation services are very poorly managed. The municipality responsible for these services is inefficient and unresponsive to the needs of the people. The grim status of municipal services is reflected in the dissatisfaction levels among citizens especially when it comes to water supply and sanitation. Citizens complain that they not only face acute shortage of water but water supplied to them is of very poor quality. In addition, poorly maintained pumps and power failure added to their woes.

Country and level of analysis
Dholka is a small town in water scarce state of Gujarat, India.

Sector
Access to clean and timely supply of water.

Key actors

Unnati, a civil society organisation in Gujarat conducted a widespread mobilisation drive in Dholka town for making the citizens aware of their rights and their strength in making governance system transparent and accountable. It also identified and trained citizen leaders, so that demands of the citizens could be articulated locally. In order for enabling citizens to take up their rights related to water, Unnati facilitated in preparation of Citizens Report Card (CRC) in all the localities of the town especially in the slums. These CRC prepared by citizen leaders involving exhaustive data gathering on regular basis was used to exert pressure on the municipality for improving access to water. The elected representatives like ward councillors who were also trained by Unnati on the municipal governance, role of municipality etc. provided support to the demands of the citizens. The officials of the municipality tried to promote citizens participation in governance by establishing Citizen Support Cell in the premises of the Dholka municipality. Citizen Support Cell acted as the platform for participation, engagement and negotiation of the citizens with the government machinery.

Kind of accountability

Citizens went beyond the complaint mechanism of the government institutions to solve the problems related to water supply. They created platforms where citizens could interact regularly with the officials and these platforms served as the mechanism for not only making officials aware of the problems faced by them but also negotiating and suggesting corrective measures. The case study shows that complaint systems in the government set up does not offer any space to citizens for offering solutions to the problems faced by them resulting in unilateral imposition of solutions by the government machinery. Creation of citizens platforms / citizens forums having the provision of regular interface with the government officials can overcome the limitations of complaint system (institutional accountability) in the country.

Tools used

Civil society organisation along with the citizens of the town used Citizen Report Card, Community Monitoring, Citizen Support Cell, capacity building of citizen leaders and creation of platforms for citizens’ engagement with the government for putting up their demands. Citizens actively engaged with different levels of governance structures viz. elected representatives and officials in order to convince them that better management of water services can improve citizens’ access to water supply.

Broad intention

Making the municipality accountable for improving the access to water supply.

Seeks to influence

The objective of citizen’s action was to influence municipality for taking correction measures for improving water supply in the Dholka town.
Expected impact and underlying assumptions

Active engagement with the government makes it accountable and improves access to water supply.

Evidence

The establishment of the Citizen Support Cell by the Dholka municipality acted as a non-institutional forum for regular meetings and discussions of the citizens with the officials. Such interactions helped in finding effective, cheap and specific solutions to the water supply problems. The solutions, which were jointly offered, by the citizens and officials were:

- For improving the distribution of water the municipality has come up with a fixed time of water supply in the different areas which was fixed in consultations with the citizens.
- The municipality prepared a schedule for water supply for five bore wells. This schedule was given to the bore well operators and the community. The bore well operators were given registers to record the time at which water was being distributed to different areas. The time of release was compared to the schedule and any difference had to be explained to the municipality. This helped in checking unscheduled pumping in the economically better off clusters and also to keep track of breakdown in pumps. The operators were also given the responsibility to check that water is accessible to each and every household of the area. Action was taken against operators who did not keep up to the schedule. This helped in better distribution and improved access to water in the areas inhabited by low income people. It led to better transparency in water distribution and the complaint that rich areas have more access to water was resolved.
- To solve the problem on poor quality of water, a chlorination kit was installed in each of the five bore wells, so that the water gets chlorinated while it is being pumped. This was a cost effective way of treating water as the setting up of water treatment plant is very expensive and takes time. Citizens could have access to good quality of water.
- The slums of Ward No. 7 used to receive water supply after midnight, which was highly inconvenient for the poor people as they had to leave early for daily labour. For solving their problems, the municipality changed the timings of water supply to around 9:00 pm, which enabled families to collect water easily. In one of the slum clusters, that was not receiving water for the last 2 years (due to blockage in the pipeline) water supply was resumed after the blockage was cleared and the broken pipes were replaced.
- In ward 5 and 6 many public stand posts did not have taps and water tend to be wasted. The constant efforts of the citizens led to the installation of the required taps, which were also being monitored regularly. Illegal water connection was another problem in these wards. Around 80 households were identified that did not have a legal connection. The municipal officials along with the citizen leaders had a discussion with these households about the problem and all of them had taken legal connection. Given this positive response citizen leaders identified around 2000 illegal connections in the town and provided the details to the municipality. The municipality took concrete steps and warned them that water supply to their households would be stopped if they did not legalise their connections. Following this, around 1200 households paid the connection fees and got legal connection whereas water supply was stopped for the remaining households.
- New pipelines were laid which solved the problems of low pressure of water in the town.
Factors contributing to impact

Civil Society Organisation, Unnati, citizen leader, citizens and elected representatives through various mechanisms like citizens' report cards and regular community / individual representation created pressure on the government system to have interactions with them for solving the problem of access to water in the town. It led to creation of a platform called Citizen Support Cell where citizens and officials could discuss and negotiate leading to better understanding of the citizens’ perspective by the government. This active engagement of the citizens with the government system improved the access of common persons to water in the town.


General Description
This case study summarises the experiences from a successful pilot project in Maharashtra, western India, which applied the community score card methodology to assess the performance of 14 gram panchayats across service delivery in water and sanitation, health and education.

Country and level of analysis
District-, village- and block-level of local self-government institutions in western India

Sector
Service delivery – education, health and water / sanitation

Key actors
Communities, service delivery staff, and local-government institutions including zilla parashads, panchayat samiti and gram panchayat (as well as their various sub-committees on education, health, etc).

Kind of accountability
Social accountability

Tools used
Community score card

Broad intention
The broad intention of the community score card and related activities as part of this pilot programme was to measure user satisfaction with local service delivery and to address gaps and problems in service delivery as needed.

Seeks to influence
Local self-government institutions

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
By using community score cards, the project implementers attempted to exact social and public accountability and responsiveness from local service providers. By linking service providers to
communities, citizens are empowered to provide immediate feedback to service provider, which measures user (dis)satisfaction and points to possibilities for improvements in service delivery.

**Evidence**
- The process allowed community members to convene and identify and agree upon priority issues within each service sector.
- When comparing the score cards of users and providers, one surprising finding was that many of the judgments were fairly similar, suggesting a degree of consensus about what works and what doesn’t. However, when scoring for transparency and behavioural issues (of service providers), the differences between user scores and provider scores were vast.
- The process allows community members to propose collective solutions to community problems. In many instances within this pilot programme, communities developed innovative plans for addressing various priority issues.
- The process appears to have increased many community members’ sense of empowerment, given that many of them were for the first time voicing their concerns about public services and offering solutions for the improvement of service delivery.

**Methods**
The methodology adopted for this pilot project consisted of six stages of project activities undertaken in three phases. Phase I consisted of preparatory activities and building capacity for undertaking the implementation of the pilot project with community participation. The key activities undertaken in this phase involved identifying villages, selecting facilitators, designing the training program, conducting the training workshop, and operational planning for the pilot exercise. Phase II saw the actual implementation of the pilot through trained facilitators. All key activities involved in the score card process, such as input tracking, community assessment, self-evaluation by service providers, consolidation of score cards, and the interface meeting, were undertaken during this phase. Finally, during phase III, post-implementation activities were conducted. This involved analysis, documentation, and dissemination through a workshop involving all key stakeholders.


**General description**
The study looks at the impact of community based information campaigns in three states on educational performance through a random controlled trial. Overall, the impacts observed were positive, the highest for teacher effort and more modest for pupil learning. The study concludes that for decentralized policies to work, information can play an important role in improving people’s knowledge about entitlements and the oversight role expected of them, subsequently leading to improved school performance.

**Country and level of analysis**
The analysis of the impact of information on school performance at the school level – 610 schools across three states in India
Sector
Education

Key actors
Civil society groups, government

Kind of accountability
Social Accountability

Tools used
Information was disseminated about rights and entitlements to parents regarding school committees and their responsibilities.

Broad intention
Increasing citizen oversight over school performance.

Seeks to influence
Teacher and school administration performance

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
Improving performance of teachers in terms of effort, reducing absenteeism, ensuring entitlements are provided (e.g. mid day meals and school uniforms); improving knowledge of parents about their rights and responsibilities in monitoring performance; and improving student learning. The assumption is that participation in school committees, engagement with school officials and monitoring will make a difference.

Evidence
Positive impacts were observed on the engagement of parents in the school committees, on teacher efforts (not being absent and teaching while present) and entitlements (mid day meals, uniforms etc.). Impacts on learning by students (as gauged by tests) were modest.

Methods
Randomized controlled trial in 610 Gram Panchayat (i.e., lowest level of elected government) schools in three states. Baselines were conducted and post treatment surveys administered five months later.

Factors contributing to impact
Causal relationships were explored through focus groups. The study suggests that changes occurred because there were increased discussions among villagers and because villagers were more forthcoming in raising issues with teachers and with the school committee. Factors contributing to impact relate to differences between the three states – their different baselines, differences in entitlements, etc.


General Description
This volume demonstrates that compared with other regions, social accountability initiatives across South and Southeast Asia have a much greater element of community participation and involvement. Often, the collaboration between civil society groups and governments in these initiatives is quite high, standing out in contrast to other regions. This collection of numerous, brief case studies of social accountability initiatives offers valuable practical lessons on program design and operation, establishment of partnerships and networks, and project management.

**Country and level of analysis**
South and Southeast Asian countries including Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Japan, Nepal, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, and the Philippines. The levels of analysis vary but are generally initiatives based on national-level reforms.

**Sector**
Budget processes and service delivery; to a lesser extent, freedom of information

**Key actors**
Varies by case but considering the focus on social accountability, citizens and civil society organisations are key. Those from the public sector with whom they interface – which varies by case – are also key actors.

**Kind of accountability**
Social accountability

**Tools used**
Budget analysis; citizens’ charters; citizen report cards; community mobilisation; expenditure monitoring; social audits

**Broad intention**
The broad intention of this volume is to identify and promote a variety of approaches towards building accountability that rely on civic engagement. Because most members of society in many countries studied herein are marginalised in some way, the enhancement of civic engagement in accountability initiatives is thought to lead to better, more responsive governance by state institutions.

**Seeks to influence**
State institutions

**Expected impact and underlying assumptions**
Social accountability initiatives can (a) improve the quality of governance; (b) improve public policies and services, making them more responsive to the poor and contributing to reductions in poverty; and (c) enhance citizen empowerment.

**Evidence**
See individual case studies for various forms of case-specific outcomes, many of which were successful. However, the authors do point to several important considerations that cut across most cases:
- Civil society spaces – particularly those that challenge and contest the state – are often fragile. The essence of civil society lies in its autonomy from the state, yet to influence
public policy, civil society institutions need to relate to the state; this creates conundrums in many of these case studies.

- Most initiatives discussed in this volume are based in urban centres. The main challenge is building the capacities within rural populations to employ social accountability tools.
- Context is important; global good practices will be irrelevant if they do not address local priorities.
- There is very weak networking amongst civil society organisations working on social accountability across the region. This is surprising given the level of success some of these initiatives have achieved.

Methods
The World Bank commissioned 54 case studies as a form of stocktaking of social accountability initiatives in Asia. A number of those 54 were discussed in an earlier publication, but this document includes a tighter focus on 13 of those cases. The 13 cases herein were selected, in large part, because they were deemed the most successful cases relative to others from the region.

Factors contributing to impact
- Some of the cases demonstrated the effectiveness of combining state responsiveness with voices of the community. Instead of adversarial interactions, a number of these case studies show cooperation based more on strategic partnerships, many of which began as pilot projects that empowered participants and eventually survived beyond the original lifespan of the project.
- Most of the cases demonstrate the empowering potential of information.
- The presence of local ownership for drive social accountability initiatives is crucial for generating support and participation. Local ownership that is nonpartisan and credible is particularly important here.
- Some of the cases highlight the critical need for political buy-in, which – in the context of these cases – is not always easy given that many innovations are driven by charismatic individuals or institutional entrepreneurs.
- Many of the tools discussed in these cases require certain types of skills. As a result, local networks of pro-accountability reformers should aim to build local capacities in order to own and sustain social accountability initiatives.


General description
The paper reports on an independent assessment of the contribution of the first two Citizen Report Cards in Bangalore (1994 and 1999).

Country and level of analysis
Examination of the impact of two rounds of Citizen Report Cards (CRCs) on citizen awareness, voice and quality of services in Bangalore, India
Sector
Urban public services

Key actors
Civil society groups, government

Kind of accountability
Social accountability

Tools used
Two rounds of Citizen Report Cards (surveys of citizen satisfaction with public services and the dissemination of the results through public media)

Broad intention
Increasing public awareness of the quality of urban services and triggering improvements through ‘naming and shaming’.

Seeks to influence
Public agency performance

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
Public agencies were expected to reform themselves to improve their rankings in the report cards. An additional expected impact was the increased awareness among the public of the differences in performance of the various agencies and the mobilization to demand better services. The underlying assumptions were that if levels of citizen satisfaction were publicized, public officials would be ashamed and respond. It is also assumed that the problems in delivery were due to the behaviour of public officials rather than lack of resources or capacities. Another assumption was that citizen satisfaction accurately reflected the quality of services being delivered, and improving satisfaction was a goal in itself.

Evidence
The study found that CRCs had a positive impact on public awareness and on citizen mobilization to demand better services. Public officials’ awareness of citizen perceptions about quality also improved. Several public sector reforms were triggered including property taxation reform, the creation of a Bangalore Agenda Task Force and the streamlining of agencies’ internal systems and procedures. An overall increase in transparency and responsiveness was found.

Methods
The study was based on individual interviews with a sample of agency heads and senior staff (total 19) of the services covered in the report cards; interviews with senior government officials familiar with the CRCs and their influence in government (5); interviews with citizen groups (7); and interviews with media groups (4). These interviews were analysed for their assessment of impact, based on which an overall judgement of impacts was made.

Factors contributing to impact
The study identified three factors that seem to contribute to impact. First was the role of the media in publicising the poor performance of public agencies. Second, impacts were supported by an active civil society that pressed for reforms within agencies and demanded better
performance. Third, the leadership of particular agencies contributed significantly to their performance; leaders who were concerned about their reputation and citizen satisfaction were much more likely to act in response to the CRCs.


**General description**
The article describes an unusual policy experiment in which a newspaper campaign aimed at reducing capture of public funds by providing schools and parents with information to monitor local officials’ handling of a large education grant programme in Uganda.

**Country and level of analysis**
School districts in Uganda

**Sector**
Primary education

**Key actors**
Media, government, local communities

**Kind of accountability**
Social accountability through information dissemination, resulting in monitoring and accountability demands.

**Tools used**
The intervention disseminated information about school performance, trained villagers in a testing tool to ascertain literacy and enrolment of children, presented neighbourhood report cards on literacy and enrolment and trained volunteers to provide out of school remedial classes for children.

**Broad intention**
Increasing public awareness of the poor performance of village schools and stimulating community participation in primary education.

**Seeks to influence**
Behaviour of public officials by increasing monitoring by communities and deterring capture of education grant funds.

**Expected impact and underlying assumptions**
By disseminating information through the newspapers about how much money was supposed to reach schools a) public officials would hesitate in diverting funds meant for education and b) schools and parents would demand the funds to which they were entitled. The assumptions were that increased awareness would lead to changed behaviour without any additional auditing or monitoring.
Evidence
The paper shows that the newspaper campaign was highly successful in reducing the capture of the education grant by intermediate public officials. Further, increased awareness about the availability of resources increased enrolment significantly in schools which were close to newspaper outlets. Additionally, test scores of schools in areas with higher newspaper penetration also increased significantly.

Methods
The paper relies on econometric analysis using two complementary approaches to estimating the effects of improved access to information: a) differential access to newspapers across schools and b) testing head teachers’ knowledge of the grant programme and relating that to the distance to the nearest newspaper outlet. Reduction in capture is measured by the share of funding reaching schools and relies on Bjorkman’s 2004 study examining the impact of information on test scores.

Factors contributing to impact
The authors conclude that the newspaper campaign was successful, but there is limited discussion of factors contributing to impact. They do not present evidence of communities actually demanding accountability, nor teachers mobilizing communities to increase enrolment. While the links between the information campaign, reduced corruption, increased enrolment and improved test scores are established, there is no discussion of the enabling factors.


General description
The paper examines the effectiveness of social audits as tools for enhancing accountability. The authors use qualitative and quantitative methods to analyse social audits in the National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme in Andhra Pradesh. The impacts analysed are the size of programme and payment processes, overall quality of implementation and the scaling up of social audits.

Country and level of analysis
Social audits at the sub-district level in the state of Andhra Pradesh, India

Sector
Employment programmes

Key actors
Government officials, NGOs, local communities.

Kind of accountability
Social accountability through social audits.

Tools used
Social audits, which operate by first gathering information about the budgets and expenditure in public programmes and then presenting and verifying these in a public gathering in which all
relevant stakeholders – public officials, elected leaders, private contractors and workers – are present.

**Broad intention**
By discussing the performance of employment programmes in a public forum involving all the relevant stakeholders, deficiencies in the programme and/or corruption would be highlighted, triggering formal accountability mechanisms.

**Seeks to influence**
Social audits seek to influence the behaviour of public officials who are implementing programmes and to mobilize citizens about their entitlements.

**Expected impact and underlying assumptions**
Social audits are expected to prevent abuse of public funds and to improve performance through the exposure (or threat of exposure) of malfeasance. The assumptions behind social audits are that corruption and poor implementation are the key reasons for poor performance. By airing public expenditures and information on implementation in a public manner, public officials will be deterred from corruption and will improve their performance.

**Evidence**
The analysis finds that the social audits have contributed to increasing the number of person-days of work offered in the treated sub-districts. Compared with the neighbouring state of Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh has done exceptionally well in increasing employment. However, the social audits do not seem to have an impact on the process of payment for labour. When the authors compare the performance of sub-districts based on the quantitative and qualitative data, they find that there are some discrepancies. Overall, they conclude that social audits surface additional critical information that is key to reforms.

**Methods**
The paper uses an ex-post control trial methodology and related econometric analysis of data of implementation, employment generation, and payment of workers in 55 sub-districts in Andhra Pradesh. A difference of difference estimator is used in the analysis to account for the fact that the cases were not randomly selected. In addition qualitative data was collected on the social audits themselves in the treated sub-districts based on beneficiaries’ perceptions of the programme – perceptions of financial irregularities, maintenance of muster rolls and the performance of key programme functionaries. Finally, in order to compare the process of scaling up in Andhra Pradesh with the neighbouring state of Karnataka, qualitative interviews were undertaken with relevant staff in Karnataka.

**Factors contributing to impact**
The authors conclude that social audits have improved the performance of the programme in terms of employment generated. This success was a factor in the second finding: that payment processes did not improve. The sudden increase in labour and related wage payments put a strain on the existing structures which were unable to cope with the increased demand. Other factors that were seen as critical to success were a) overcoming resistance from frontline workers b) management of information about the programme c) adequate funding for the programme and d) political support. Political support for the programme in Andhra Pradesh, which was missing in Karnataka was the main reason cited for the lack of programme
performance and scaling up in Karnataka.
3. Budget Processes


General description
Bosworth conducts a preliminary mapping of DFID’s efforts to strengthen domestic accountability on public expenditure, with a particular focus on countries where aid is provided as budget support through government systems.

Country and level of analysis
The report covers 87 initiatives, the majority (45) of which are in Africa; others are located in Asia, Latin America, Europe and the Middle East. DFID supports more work at a national level than at sub-national levels, particularly on transparency; a small number of initiatives address accountability on public expenditure in sector programmes.

Sector
Budget processes

Key actors
The key actors discussed are: DFID, governments, and civil society and research organizations (CSOs) receiving DFID support.

Kind of accountability
The initiatives profiled aim to enhance both vertical and social accountability.

Tools used
The initiatives profiled employ a variety of tools, and focus on:

- Transparency/opening up space (supporting or encouraging the publication of public expenditure information, developing capacity for commentary on and analysis of public expenditure, and work on the legal framework for availability of public expenditure information)
- Enhancing participation in public expenditure processes at various stages of the budget, and strengthening the capacity of civil society to participate in/monitor public expenditure

Broad intention
DFID aims to support processes of budget transparency and participation to enhance voice and accountability.

Seeks to influence
The initiatives profiled seek to make governments more accountable, make service delivery agencies more effective/efficient and enhance the capacity of CSOs.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
The majority of interventions express one or more of the following objectives:
• Accountable, transparent government and public expenditure management.
• Responsive and accountable service delivery agencies and local government.
• Building capacity of civil society, particularly the poor, to voice demands and hold government at all levels to account.

Evidence
A small number of reviews suggest changes have occurred in the incidence of corruption and in financial management as a result of DFID interventions. More frequently intermediate changes are mentioned, for example the generation of methodologies and experiences to inform national debate, improvements in the quality of participation, the availability of information, or levels of awareness.

Methods
Bosworth conducts a review of DFID internal documentation for 87 interventions. Where possible, on the basis of Project reviews, she identified lessons learned. Direct contact with country offices was minimal, although some country office staff provided additional information.

Factors contributing to impact
• Interventions to enhance accountability at sector level, such as in education or health, have often encountered problems due to inability of local bodies to respond in the absence of decentralisation of authority and financial devolution.
• Methodologies and approaches need to be clearly understood by citizens and officials to reduce adversarial perceptions, develop concepts of ‘downward accountability’ and reinforce a collaborative approach with the aim of improving the quality of implementation
• Political will and sincere government engagement can be important factors contributing to the success of attempts to enhance accountability
• Uncertainty and lack of clarity about what is meant by participation can limit the scope for meaningful participation. In some cases participation has been interpreted as merely notional consultation, an approach that can limit the development of real accountability.


General description
This paper synthesises the key findings from case studies in five countries, each of which examined how public expenditure management has been linked to poverty reduction policy goals. The goal of this research was to identify the factors influencing the importance attached to poverty reduction within the budget process in the country in question, and the effectiveness with which policies are translated into spending patterns and ultimately into outcomes.

Country and level of analysis
Foster et al. examine national level budget processes in Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda.
Sector
Budget Processes

Key actors
The authors focus primarily on governments (often acting with donor encouragement); they also highlight the role of civil society engagement.

Kind of accountability
The authors are primarily concerned with vertical accountability.

Tools used
Foster et al. examine various aspects of public expenditure management. These include Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEF), Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PSRP), and other institutionalized processes for sharing budget information and facilitating consultation.

Broad intention
Foster et al. focus on strategies for improving public expenditure management for poverty reduction.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
In order for public expenditure to reduce poverty, political will is necessary but insufficient. It needs to be allied to more effective public expenditure management. This in turn must be coupled with reforms that bring the incentives facing those required to implement expenditure programmes more into line with the objectives of policy. The authors hypothesise that transparent flows of information will be important in keeping Government honest, and that wider publicity on the nature and extent of the problems faced by the poor will help to secure increased focus on improving their lot. Involvement the poor, and advocates on their behalf, in policy dialogue, can reinforce poverty focus, the effect being strongest where the poor are given greatest influence over expenditures intended to benefit them.

Evidence
The authors find some interesting examples where the sharing of information and a pro-active approach to participation have helped to improve the effectiveness of poverty policies. However, these initiatives for the most part come from sympathetic governments (though with donor encouragement), rather than being the result of countervailing pressures from civil society. The habit of consultation and sharing of information still has shallow roots, and access could easily be removed or (more likely) decline if government leadership gives it less emphasis. Civil society engagement in activities aimed at influencing government remains weak, both in terms of the quality of analysis, and the extent to which governments have felt required to respond.

Methods
Each country case study was researched over a two to three month period in 2001. This research examined the national experience with regard a set of common hypotheses, based on a review of written material and structured interviews with participants in the policy process.
Factors contributing to impact
Evidence that information and analysis are more influential when undertaken as part of a national process receives some support. The participatory poverty analysis in Uganda, and the study of health inequalities in Ghana, had greater influence on poverty because, in the former case, the Ministry of Finance was fully involved and, in the latter case, because the work was commissioned by the Government-donor health partners, and taken forward within the discussions of the sector programme.

Capacity constraints may limit the impact of civil society participation in budget processes: it is easier to extend rights in principle than to help an illiterate population exercise them in opposition to officials and politicians who have far greater resources of skills, status, wealth and power.


General description
This academic paper examines two citizen-initiated efforts in India to engage with public sector oversight functions. Only the second initiative (MKSS social audit) is relevant to budget processes.

Country and level of analysis
Discussion is focused around the local government level in India.

Sector
Budget Processes

Key actors
The paper profiles the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS), a 1,000-member ‘non-party political movement.’

Kind of accountability
Goetz and Jenkins advance the concept of a “hybrid” of vertical and horizontal accountability

Tools used
MKSS has pioneered the social audit, a participatory processes through which citizens could monitor the implementation of government programs in their communities. The social audit process culminates in dramatic but infrequent public hearings.

Broad intention
MKSS’ social audits aim to increase access to information, mobilize citizens to investigate and expose corruption, and improve accountability for public funds.

Seeks to influence
The social audits seek to influence local and state government officials.
**Expected impact and underlying assumptions**
MKSS seeks immediate responses to instances of corruption exposed by the social audits, as well as institutional and legal changes that can help reduce the scope for future corruption.

**Evidence**
The social audit process has led to enhanced public participation and pledges by local government officials to return stolen monies. In addition, MKSS’ sustained pressure led to the passage of a Right to Information Act at the state level. MKSS also successfully campaigned for amendments to the state’s local government law to create mandatory legal procedures for the investigation of corruption and to institutionalize the public-hearing audit method at the village assembly level.

**Methods**
The authors have conducted extensive fieldwork on the MKSS’ activities in India.

**Factors contributing to impact**
Authors suggest five necessary conditions for effective state–citizen co-operation for improved accountability: legal standing for non-government participants, regular presence of these outsiders, clear procedures for meetings, the right to information and the right for outsiders to issue a dissenting report to legislative bodies. MKSS initiative satisfies first four conditions.


**General description**
Goldfrank provides a detailed review of recent participatory budgeting (PB) initiatives in Latin America. He also includes information on PB’s origins and discussion of normative and analytical approaches to PB.

**Country and level of analysis**
Goldfrank provides an overview of PB experiences in Latin America (with understandable focus on Brazil) as well as more detailed case studies of PB in Bolivia, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Peru. PB tends to be a local process, but the review also highlights efforts by national governments to enhance public participation in budget processes.

**Sector**
Budget Processes

**Key actors**
Citizens participating in PB; local and national governments

**Kind of accountability**
PB initiatives can enhance vertical, horizontal, and social accountability.

**Tools used**
PB initiatives take somewhat different forms in different countries but may generally be described as a process by which citizens, either as individuals or through civic associations, may
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voluntarily and regularly contribute to decision-making over at least part of a public budget through an annual series of scheduled meetings with government authorities.

**Broad intention**
PB initiatives seek various outcomes, depending on normative approach (see discussion below in section on impact/assumptions), ranging from making state more participatory to improving effectiveness of public spending generally aim to enhance public participation in the budget process, thereby improving the impact and effectiveness of government spending.

**Seeks to influence**
PB initiatives seek to influence local, state, and national government officials, as well as the citizenry at large, to encourage their participation.

**Expected impact and underlying assumptions**
This depends on the normative approach, of which Goldfrank identifies four distinct types: (i) radical democratic (also called ‘deepening democracy,’ e.g. the Workers’ Party in Brazil), (II) orthodox left, (iii) liberal (e.g. international development agencies), and (iv) conservative. The radical democracy and liberal approaches are the most prominent. Radical democracy in general calls for a more participatory state, whereas from the liberal perspective, PB exists alongside and in support of other public sector reforms like privatization and streamlining state employment.

**Evidence**
Goldfrank cites evidence by other scholars, in terms of PB’s success in redirecting public resources towards poor neighbourhoods (Marquetti 2002; Serageldin, et al. 2003), extending service provision (Navarro 2004; Sousa Santos 1998), democratizing existing and spurring the creation of new civic associations (Abers 2000; Baierle 1998; Baiocchi 2001a, 2001b; Wampler and Avritzer 2004), and increasing transparency and accountability (Ackerman 2004; Fedozzi 1997; Wampler 2004), while reducing clientelism (Abers 2000) and enhancing democratic representation for the formerly excluded (Nylen 2003; Souza 2001). These studies also show that these outcomes are by no means guaranteed by PB, and that even well-regarded cases show some contradictory results (Baierle 2003; Nylen 2003; Souza 2001; Wampler 2004).

**Methods**
Goldfrank conducts a desk-based study that is a broad overview of recent trends and case studies.

**Factors contributing to impact**
Goldfrank notes that successful PB has occurred under variety of circumstances, but lists the following pre-conditions that tend to account for success: political will, social capital, bureaucratic competence, small size, sufficient resources, legal foundation, political decentralization.

He notes that there is less consensus with respect to institutional design, but mentions the following features: immediate needs focus vs. long-term planning, informal vs. formal structures for participation, deliberation (participants should engage in face-to-face discussion and debate and be given at least some decision-making power over at least some part of the budgetary process, usually the establishment of investment priorities, centralized supervision (the mayor’s
office should be directly involved in coordinating the PB process), and accessible rules and information.


General description
The authors construct a transparency index for 194 countries based on over 20 independent sources. They examine variation in their index’s subcomponents as well as correlations that suggest the potential benefits of greater transparency. The introduction provides detailed account of theoretical framework and empirical evidence of transparency’s role in facilitating accountability and improving governance.

Country and level of analysis
Global with brief country case study on Chile; national level

Sector
Budget Processes (In fact, the discussion is more general and could be applied to a number of sectors.)

Key actors
The authors highlight the role of various public institutions in enhancing transparency, as well as the role of the media and citizens.

Kind of accountability
The authors identify ways in which transparency can enhance vertical and horizontal transparency.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
The authors examine various definitions of transparency and find that underlying these definitions transparency is always closely related to accountability. The purpose for demanding transparency is to allow citizens, markets or governments to hold institutions accountable for their policies and performance. The authors also cite a large body of existing research, which shows that countries with more transparent policy environments tend to perform better in international financial markets, transparency is correlated with better governance, and that transparency can facilitate participation in political processes.

They also highlight the importance of budget transparency: “Another important area to hold governments accountable is to monitor how they take decisions regarding the budget and how they spend revenues. As the primary economic policy document, transparency and participation in the budget are particularly important to assess whether governments are financially accountable” (p. 22). However, they note that for budget transparency and other economic/institutional components of transparency to have an impact on accountability, they must be coupled with the capacity and resources, political and financial, to exercise the right to hold government to account.
Evidence
Mindful of the challenges in inferring causality, authors find that transparency is associated with better socio-economic and human development indicators, as well as with higher competitiveness and lower corruption.

Methods
The authors’ transparency index for 194 countries is based on over 20 independent sources. They decompose transparency into two main components more amenable to policy intervention – (i) economic and institutional transparency, and (ii) political transparency. The first component refers to the degree of accessibility and usefulness of information provided by public institutions. This includes economic transparency, e-government, Freedom of Information laws, transparency in the budget process, transparency of policy, and transparency of the public sector. The second component captures more functional component of transparency – that is, the capacity and resources to exercise right to hold institutions to account. This includes transparency of political funding, openness of political system, and press freedom. Components are weighted by the reliability of sources.


General description
This academic paper presents the impact of a randomized field experiment on reducing corruption in over 600 Indonesian village road projects.

Country and level of analysis
Olken’s analysis focuses on the village level in Indonesia.

Sector
Budget Processes

Key actors
Key actors include the central government audit agency, participants in village-level “accountability meetings,” village officials.

Olken’s project was supported by a grant from the Department for International Development–World Bank Strategic Poverty Partnership Trust Fund.

Kind of accountability
Olken’s experiment focuses on mechanisms to enhance vertical (democratic) accountability.

Tools used
Olken’s experiment examines the impact of external audits and “accountability meetings” (village-level meetings in which project officials account for how they spent project funds. In one experiment, hundreds of invitations to these meetings were distributed throughout the village, to encourage direct participation in the monitoring process and to reduce elite dominance of the process. In the second experiment, an anonymous comment form was distributed along with the invitations, providing villagers an opportunity to relay information about the project without fear of retaliation.)
**Broad intention**  
The initiative aims to reduce corruption in village construction projects

**Seeks to influence**  
Village project officials, citizens (encourage participation in monitoring)

**Expected impact and underlying assumptions**  
Increasing monitoring has the potential to reduce corruption. In practice, however, the very individuals tasked with monitoring and enforcing punishments may themselves be corruptible.

An alternative approach to reducing corruption, which has gained prominence in recent years, is to increase grassroots participation by community members in local-level monitoring. Of course, this approach has potential drawbacks as well; for example, monitoring public projects is a public good, so there may be a serious free-rider problem. Grassroots monitoring may also be prone to capture by local elites.

**Evidence**  
Increasing government audits from 4 percent of projects to 100 percent reduced missing expenditures by eight percentage points. By contrast, increasing grassroots participation in monitoring had little average impact, reducing missing expenditures only in situations with limited free-rider problems and limited elite capture.

Grassroots monitoring treatments led to higher attendance and active involvement at meetings. The invitations treatment substantially reduced missing labour expenditures but had no effect on missing materials expenditures. Olken has two possible hypotheses for this discrepancy: (1) information: easier to observe actual wage payments than quantity of materials delivered – makes corruption in labour technologically easier to monitor; (2) incentives: focus on labour because more workers attending meetings and more focused on private interest (getting paid) than on public good – Olken finds more evidence for this latter hypothesis.

Olken’s experiment also demonstrates evidence of elite capture: when given the opportunity, neighbourhood heads channelled comment forms to villagers predisposed to be favourable to project.

**Methods**  
Olken conducts a randomized field experiment in over 600 Indonesian village road projects. He examines the effects of two different ‘treatments’ (invitations to attend “accountability meetings and anonymous comment forms) that sought to increase grassroots monitoring as well as increasing probability of audit. Notably, he employs an objective measure of corruption, constructing independent estimates of the amount each project actually cost to build and then comparing this estimate with what the village reported it spent on the project on a line-item by line-item basis.

**Factors contributing to impact**  
Olken suggests that the following factors play a role in determining the impact of increased monitoring on reducing corruption: a credible threat of punishment, citizens’ access to information and incentives to report corruption, and reducing elite capture.

General description

Citizen participation in planning and budgeting is relatively new in Indonesia. Suharto’s highly centralised ‘New Order’ regime was un-responsive to the individual priorities and problems of varied local communities (Dixon and Hakim 2009 p.120). This sort of regime was detested by citizens, who reacted with violence leading to fall of Suharto. It was argued that the centralised policy-making process, which excluded people over three decades was the cause of the violence hence there was a requirement of community participation in local planning process.

With the stepping down of Suharto in 1998, the process of democratisation and decentralisation was set in motion which led to fundamental reshaping of local planning, budgeting and other aspects of public finance management. This process has been studied in Surakarta, also known as Solo, one of an important city in Indonesia.

Modern Surakarta is situated in the province of Central Java and is a middle-sized city having population slightly over 750,000 at night, which rises to 1 million during the day (Pratikno, 2005: p. 62). A vast majority of population are Javanese with minority ethnic groups being Chinese, Arab and Indian. Economic inequality, feudalistic attitude is part of Solonese society. Minority Chinese ethnic group dominates the textile, batik painting industries and the most important business activities in Solo. The majority of indigenous Javanese are poor. Therefore, relations between the Javanese majority and Chinese minority have been problematic throughout the history of Surakarta. Chinese minority and senior bureaucrats are perceived as responsible for poverty problem in Surakarta leading to society’s distrust of the government. Javanese majority feel aggrieved, as, they have been deprived of economic rights by the Chinese minority and political rights by centralised political system.

Country and level of analysis
Solo municipality, Indonesia

Sector
Participatory Planning and Budgeting

Key actors
Surakarta is divided into 5 sub-districts (kecamatan): Banjarsari, Jebres, Laweyan, Pasar Kliwon, and Serengan. Below the municipal government, there are two layers of government that are known as:
1. Kecamatan (sub-district or sub-municipal) government
2. Kelurahan (village) government.

\(^2\) ‘New Order’ is the term coined by former Indonesian President Suharto to characterise his regime as he came to power in 1966. Suharto used this term to contrast his rule with that of his predecessor, Sukarno (dubbed the “Old Order,” or Orde Lama). The term “New Order” in more recent times has become synonymous with the Suharto years (1965–1998).

\(^3\) The violence surrounding the downfall of the Suharto regime in 1998 resulted in loss of US$ 58,823,529 and loss of jobs of 10,000.
Before political reform in 1999, representative body called LKMD (Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa) appointed by village heads without any inclusion of the citizens. The planning and budgeting process was top down. However, with the political reform in 1999, name of the former LKMD was changed to LPMK (Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat) and various village institutions were involved in the planning process. The LKMD and the Kelurahan planning processes now function only as facilitators, and the funding of Kelurahan Development Meeting came from the Municipal Annual Budget (APBD) (Sugiartoto 2003, p.100). Despite these institutional mechanisms in place, planning and budgeting process did not change significantly as erstwhile members did not include participation of citizens.

Indonesian Partnership for Local Governance Initiatives (IPGI), a tripartite partnership involving local governments, the academia and NGOs suggested to the city government for establishing facilitating mechanisms for making planning process inclusive. Heeding to their advice, city government introduced a mechanism, Participatory Development Planning for direct community involvement. Under Solo’s Mayoral circular letter in 2001, this mechanism was to be activated at village, sub municipality and municipality levels. However, the process was still being dominated by local elites; Mayoral orders (2002) further tried to push the process by starting the planning process at neighbourhood associations and inclusion of CSOs, social and business leaders.

Local Governance Initiatives (IPGI) Solo intervened in the process by training 255 facilitators for 51 villages for providing aid in the exercise. Further, local NGOs educated and mobilised people and motivated them to come prepared in the meetings for planning. For example, PATTIRO⁴ organised women and poor and facilitated formation of women collective Forum of Coordination of Posyandu Activists (FKKP) and also Association of Pedicab⁵ Drivers in order to facilitate participation.

Newly elected Mayor Joko Widodo (Jokowi) further pushed the democratic process by introducing new mechanisms (e.g. Focused Group Discussion in sectoral committees) to accommodate marginalised sections in the process and hence improving the quality of participation in the planning. The participation can be categorised into two: (1) sectoral and (2) territorial. Sector based discussion is held first within different groups such as group of artisans, educationist. Later different groups discuss together and finally sector based discussion is held at the city level. Participation in territorial planning starts from smallest neighbourhood unit and then moves upwards.

The current Mayor further promoted participation by adopting Multi Stakeholders Dialogue (MSD) based approach. He felt that planning is a formal agenda every year but other emergency issues may also occur and hence MSD process complements regular planning process. For example flooding due to excessive rain and overflowing river was the focus of MSDs at different levels of the city. Citizens suggested conservation of river bank area by reclaiming the encroached land and planting trees; creation of park and playground on the banks of river. In another instance, the relocation of street vendors from the main park in the city to a different place was possible through as many as 50 meetings with representatives of vendors.

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⁴ Pusat Telaah dan Informasi Regional (PATTIRO) is an NGO established on April 17, 1999, promotes good governance and public participation in Indonesia, particularly at local level. PATTIRO has a office in Solo.

⁵ Cycle rickshaw

⁶ In 2005, direct election of the Mayor was introduced under new local democratic system.
Kind of accountability
- Weakening the hold of political and social elites over the planning and budgeting process with the help of new policies and rules.
- Making the government accountable for deepening democracy, so that decision-making powers are transferred to citizens.

Tools used
- Enhancing participation in lowest level especially neighbourhood associations and village level.
- Multi Stakeholders Dialogue (MSD)

Seeks to influence
To influence the city government to establish policies, rules and facilitating mechanisms of participation to make planning and budgeting process inclusive.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
Facilitating mechanisms for participation (beyond policies and rules) results in substantive participation leading citizens’ centric plans and budgets.

Evidence
- Citizen and CSOs monitor the implementation of approved city budget along with the government agencies.
- Pedicab (cycle rickshaw) drivers the most poor segment of the society who are mainly migrants from villages and largely homeless were organised into association named Forum Kerukunan Keluarga Becak (FKKB) by PATTIRO and other CSOs. Representatives of FKKB are invited for consultation during planning process. City government has issued license to these Pedicab drivers, provided them space for parking and also painted their Pedicabs in attractive colours so that they are more appealing to tourists, trained them in English language and also provided them uniform. It is the evidence of integration of poor of the Solo city in the planning process.
- Increased participation of women in planning and budgeting process. In 2010, 30 per cent of the participants in general meetings for planning are women and in many cases women are leading these discussions. These women are also involved in monitoring of implementation of budget at Kelurahan level.
- Participation has changed the power relations between citizens and city government. Prior to 1999, city government took all the decisions without consultations with the people but now citizens not only participate but also monitor the planning and budget process. Regular monitoring has resulted in prosecution of large number of members of legislative council in 1999 to 2004 in the corruption cases.
- Reclaiming river banks: Several slums had come up on the banks of a river, which flows in the middle of the city. River was getting increasingly polluted due to disposal of wastes by slum dwellers. City government discussed this problem with representatives of slum dwellers, CSOs and other citizen groups. Slum dwellers were resettled in a different location and given one-two room accommodation with all necessary facilities. NGOs were given reclaimed land for maintaining it for public use. Now river bank has football and volleyball grounds, dance academy, playground for small children etc. and there is a pathway all along.
It has become hub of health and recreation activities in the morning and evening for those living in the neighbourhood.

- Removing encroachment from the public park: A centrally located and historically important public park was encroached by street vendors and had become a dangerous place where criminal activities like prostitution, drug peddling etc. used to take place. People in the neighbourhood feared visiting this park after sunset. City government had several rounds of meetings with vendors who had occupied the park, citizens living in the neighbourhoods and CSOs. These vendors were given shops at an alternative place, were provided with a registration number. Later, park was cleaned and decorated, lamp posts were installed. Now this park is frequented by many people and is centre of social activities.

Factors contributing to impact
The downfall of Suharto ended in the political and bureaucratic centralisation and started the process of decentralisation in Indonesia. However, all the institutional spaces for participation were blocked by political and social elites thereby making the democratic centralisation redundant. It required the synergy of efforts of reformist political leaders, CSOs, NGOs and citizens to break the grip of elites over the political processes in Indonesia. Political leaders showed innovation in thinking by going much beyond policies and rules to deepen democracy; they created facilitating mechanisms for promoting participation. CSOs and NGOs stepped in by preparing citizens for engaging in planning and budgeting process.


General description
Robinson examines the impact and significance of independent budget analysis and advocacy initiatives that are designed to improve budget transparency and the poverty focus of government expenditure priorities. He draws on case study research of six budget groups, which include non-governmental organisations, research institutions and social movements.

Country and level of analysis
Robinson analyzes groups in Brazil, Croatia, India, Mexico, South Africa, and Uganda. Most work centres on national and state-level budgets, though several organizations are engaged in tracking expenditure allocations at the local level.

Sector
Budget Processes

Key actors
Range of civil society actors: NGOs, networks and social movements, research organizations

Kind of accountability
The groups that Robinson profiles are engaged in initiatives that promote both vertical and horizontal accountability.
Tools used
The profiled groups’ activities employ various efforts aimed at enhancing budget literacy, transparency and participation in budget processes, and advancing specific budget advocacy goals (greater allocations for particular priorities, e.g.)

Broad intention
The profiled groups’ activities have various aims, related to enhancing accountability, transparency, participation, and responsiveness.

Seeks to influence
The profiled groups seek to influence various actors in local and national governments, as well as the citizenry at large.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
All groups engage in capacity building to promote awareness and understanding of public budgets among legislators, NGOs, journalists and civic leaders. Several also conduct advocacy work designed to influence budget policies, their quality of implementation, and the utilisation of expenditures.

Robinson notes that it may be unrealistic to expect major changes in budget priorities on account of structural and procedural limitations built into the budget process in many countries

Evidence
The impacts fall into two principal categories: changes in budget policies and changes in the budget process. Changes in budget policy are reflected in increases in expenditure allocations, the quality of implementation or execution (i.e. the efficiency and effectiveness of expenditures), and expenditure outcomes in terms of physical outputs. Overall, the research found that the most significant impacts achieved by independent budget groups lie in improving budget transparency and budget awareness on the one hand, and enhancing budgetary resources for existing programmes and improvements in the efficiency of expenditure utilisation on the other.

Methods
The report represents a synthesis of six case studies. Various methods are used to assess impact (analysis of data provided by CSOs on budget outturns and physical verification of investments, qualitative interviews and focus group discussions; field visits).

Factors contributing to impact
The key explanatory factors that shape the positive impact of independent budget groups appear to be as follows: the legitimacy acquired from quality analysis and timely and effective dissemination; the strength and flexibility of broader alliances in civil society; the quality of relationships established with government and the legislature; the depth and extent of legislative engagement in budget deliberation and review; and the openness and flexibility of the budget process. The first three factors represent various dimensions of organisational strategy while the latter two relate to the nature and structure of the budget process.

General description
This paper begins by analyzing how the Brazilian Workers’ Party translated its success with participatory budgeting (PB) from the city level to the state. The authors then assess the impact of PB on fiscal and planning outcomes.

Country and level of analysis
Brazil, state and local level

Sector
Budget Processes

Key actors
State and local governments; citizens participating in PB

Kind of accountability
PB initiatives have the potential to enhance vertical, horizontal, and social accountability.

Tools used
Participatory budgeting process

Broad intention
PB advances a political project that includes a popular vision of democracy and a redistributive approach to development

Seeks to influence
State/local government; citizens

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
PB is expected to weaken partisan competition, enhance participation in the budget process, advance the class interests of the poor and working class through redistributive development, and legitimate popular visions of democracy and redistributive visions of development.

Authors also document challenges inherent to scaling up, as well as fierce opposition and scarce resources for investments, which could serve to limit impact.

Evidence
The authors document successful scaling up of PB initiative from municipal to state level. They show that the PB process did not hurt efficiency of public spending, and may have even improved it. They also find evidence that PB contributes to effective planning, enhanced participation and redistribution.

Methods
The authors conduct interviews and statistical analysis, exploiting variation across municipalities in the state of Rio Grande do Sul.
Factors contributing to impact
Authors account for success in scaling up as a result of institutional knowledge/experience stemming from previous success in Porto Alegre. The existence of powerful social movement allies at the state level also played a role.

In addition, using statistical analysis, they find participation is inversely related to the size of the municipal population, but positively correlated with the percentage of the electorate registered with the Workers’ Party. This supports their hypothesis that participation depends on the support of the group seeking to implement an alternative vision of participatory democracy.

To assess the impact of PB, they examine invested amounts per capita in each municipality and find that the PB process generated expenditures that were likely to encourage supporters, incorporate potential opponents and promote redistribution. That is, municipalities with a greater percentage of Workers’ Party members received more investment money, though demonstrated electoral support for the party reduced investment. As evidence of redistribution, municipalities registering a lower score in terms of various social indicators also received more investment funds.


General description
In this U4 Issue, Sundet reviews government-led Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) and civil society expenditure tracking initiatives. The report concludes with strategic recommendations for governments, civil society organizations and donors.

Country and level of analysis
While primary discussion focuses on Uganda and Tanzania, the report also mentions expenditure tracking initiatives India, the Philippines, Mexico, South Africa and Malawi. The initiatives discussed cover both the national and local level.

Sector
Budget Processes

Key actors
The report spans initiatives led by governments and civil society organizations. The CSOs profiled include the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) right to information movement in Rajasthan, India, and the social audits of Concerned Citizens for Good Governance (CCAGG), in Abra, Philippines, both of which grew out of local movements. Other examples of CSOs monitoring public funds include Fundar in Mexico and Public Service Accountability Monitor (PSAM) in South Africa. These are compared with more recent experiences of expenditure tracking conducted by CSOs from Tanzania and Malawi.

Kind of accountability
Government-led PETS mainly promote vertical accountability, whereas CSO-led initiatives promote both horizontal and social accountability.
Tools used
The report profiles both PETS (surveys that measure the amount of funds received at each link of the public service delivery chain from a nation’s treasury down to the service delivery unit, where it is supposed to be spent) as well as social audits (participatory processes through which citizens could monitor the implementation of government programs in their communities. The social audit process typically culminates in public hearings.)

Broad intention
The initiatives profiled aim to enhance transparency in the flow of funds from central government to the level of service provision (e.g. school level) and accountability in terms of how funds are spent.

Seeks to influence
The initiatives profiled seek to influence government actors with power to follow up on findings and reduce capture (e.g. by increasing transparency or reforming system of transfers; some groups also sought legal/institutional change)

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
PETS can: (i) test how well a system of financial transfers work; (ii) by identifying weaknesses, can provide valuable policy recommendations; and (iii) can also provide launching pad for a policy dialogue.

However, PETS do not typically provide a process or strategy by which the technical recommendations that are provided can be implemented. Furthermore, government-led PETS do not typically trigger a public debate. Beyond the Ugandan experience, there is little evidence of PETS capturing the public imagination or leading to concerted pressure for reform.

CSO-led efforts better suited to deal with political challenges than are government-led processes. Sundet also notes that PETS is not a good description for many of the ongoing tracking initiatives that have been attributed to this label.

Evidence
The Uganda PETS has by far the most documented evidence of impact. Once the initial survey findings became known, the Ugandan government conducted a public information campaign and a follow-up survey showed that leakages had been dramatically reduced from 74% to less than 20%. However, Sundet cites a more recent review of the Uganda PETS (Hubbard 2005), which suggests that a number of other elements (concurrent reforms, etc.) played a greater role than the PETS in accounting for the reduction in leakages. The impact of Tanzania’s PETS has been much more limited. PETS conducted in 1999, 2001 and 2004 succeeded in revealing significant leakages and unnecessary complexities in the system of financial transfers. However, the government did not accept the findings and follow up.

Sundet also highlights the following documented successes of CSO-led initiatives. These include the discovery of specific missing funds leading to recovery of funds and/or disciplinary action against officials found to be diverting funds, formal co-operation between national audit authorities and citizens in audit processes, and legislative reform.
Methods
The report is a critical literature review that also draws on Sundet’s experience working with CSOs to conduct PETS in Tanzania. The key sources Sundet draws from are:

- Ablo and Reinikka (1998), Reinikka and Svensson (2003), and Hubbard (2008), which review the Uganda PETS
- Mushi et al. (2005), Sundet (2004) and Sundet (2007) review PETS in Tanzania

Factors contributing to impact
Sundet highlights the importance of political will to follow up on findings/recommendations of government-led PETS. He suggests PETS are more likely to succeed when there is a strategy in place to act on the findings of the PETS, before the actual PETS are conducted. The Uganda PETS also revealed the critical role of access to information: leakage was reduced significantly more in schools that were closer to the nearest newspaper vendor.

Factors accounting for successful CSO-led efforts include the involvement of local officials, to secure access to official data and facilitate direct communication between communities and authorities. In addition, successes in translating tracking into action seem more likely where tracking is case-specific, where specific cases are documented and followed up, rather than broader statistical analysis.


General description
Wampler’s book analyzes participatory budgeting (PB) in eight Brazilian municipalities with the goal of developing generalizable theoretical explanation of how citizens and governments use PB to extend accountability and establish citizenship rights.

Country and level of analysis
Brazil, local government

Sector
Budget Processes

Key actors
Citizens participating in PB; local government officials

Kind of accountability
PB initiatives have the potential to enhance vertical, horizontal, and social accountability.

Tools used
Participatory Budgeting Processes
**Broad intention**  
Increase accountability/extend citizenship rights/deepen democracy

**Seeks to influence**  
Local governments; create new mechanism to enhance citizen voice

**Expected impact and underlying assumptions**  
Participatory institutions have the potential to enhance accountability along various dimensions:

- **Horizontal**: Act as check on prerogatives/actions of mayoral administrations
- **Vertical**: allow citizens to vote for representatives and specific policies
- **Societal**: Rely on mobilization of citizens into a political process that may legitimatize a new policy-making process, while adding additional checks on government action by interested and engaged citizens

**Evidence**  
Wampler first reviews existing evidence of PB’s impact, noting that its effect on civil society receives the “lion’s share” of attention. For instance, Abers (1998, 2000) finds that PB builds social capital and that its impact depends on political will. However, Abers does not address the factors that affect political will. Baiocchi (2005) finds that education and gender differences do not “pose insurmountable barriers to effective participation” and that PB fosters deliberative public space.

Wampler further notes that researchers have found it very difficult to measure the redistributive impact of PB for methodological/data reasons. He cites Marquetti (2007) as the most successful attempt to illustrate a connection between PB and social spending. Marquetti demonstrates that lower income neighbourhoods in Porto Alegre received greater share of investment spending than middle- or upper-income neighbourhoods. This represents the strongest evidence to date that a PB program has had a redistributive effect. Finally, Wampler and Avritzer (2004) present evidence that PB reduced clientelism.

In terms of the evidence of impact from the cases Wampler analyzes in this book, he finds:

- **Impact on citizenship (deepening democracy)** only in case of PB programs that delegate authority to citizens (Porto Alegre and Ipatinga)
- **Mixed results** in terms of the impact on accountability. Under some circumstances, PB can extend accountability but depends on type of localized process and interactions among government officials and citizens. The impact on horizontal accountability demonstrates the weakest results because PB depends on a concentration of authority in mayor’s office, and often circumvents the municipal legislature.

**Methods**  
Wampler conducts a systematic comparison of eight cases to generate explanations for PB’s origins, internal processes, and outcomes. He selects cases so as to allow for variation in political history, economic development and civil society. Wampler employs surveys of PB participants, interviews with government officials and PB participants, budget analysis, focus groups, legal analysis and participant observation in more than 100 meetings over a 10-year period.
Factors contributing to impact

Wampler claims that to produce a strong PB program, it is necessary to have high levels of mayoral support, civil society that can engage in both cooperation and contestation, and rules that delegate specific types of direct authority to citizens. He further notes that mayoral administrations’ incentives to choose to delegate authority depend on whether they perceive it is in their electoral, party, government, and ideological interests. In addition, mayoral-legislative relations and available investment spending are necessary but not sufficient to produce positive PB outcomes. While these factors often help limit PB’s impact, and PB can be undermined if enough legislators oppose it, these conditions are insufficient to produce positive outcome
4. Freedom of Information (FoI)

4.1 Overview of FoI in Various Countries


Abstract

The 2006 14 country study conducted by the Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI) is, to date, the most comprehensive study of its kind reflecting on the impact of FoI laws around the world. In each of the countries surveyed in the study, OSJI relied upon civil society organisation partners, committed to freedom of information, to conduct the research. The study therefore highlights the leading role played by civil society in promoting and enforcing the right of ATI. Of the 14 countries surveyed, Armenia, Bulgaria, France, Mexico, Peru, Romania and South Africa had dedicated FoI laws at the time of the study. Argentina, Chile and Spain had partial legal recognition of the right, and the remaining 4 countries – Ghana, Kenya, Macedonia and Nigeria – had no ATI laws at the time of the study. Mozambique and Senegal also formed part of the survey, but data capture problems prevented their results from being included in the report.

The basis of the study was nearly 2 000 requests for information in the 14 countries surveyed, consisting of a set of 70 questions, each submitted twice, to 18 public institutions. The requestors were a combination of NGOs, journalists, businesspeople, and representatives of identifiable vulnerable minority groups. The study therefore reflects on how public institutions in different countries respond based on their perception of the standing of the person or body making the request. The requests made were, as far as possible, for the kind of information that one would expect public bodies to hold, and the objective was therefore not to measure the competence of these bodies in providing information, but rather their willingness to do so.

As an exercise in monitoring the impact of FoI worldwide the study stands out as a unique example and a rich source of information. The report lists 9 main findings. Firstly, the study found that, on the whole, having ATI laws increased responsiveness on the part of public officials, and the rapid increase in these laws in the past 15 years is therefore a development to be welcomed. However, the second general finding was that “mute refusals” (a failure to respond either verbally or in writing) remained a problem, even in countries with ATI laws. Interestingly, the third main finding was that transitional democracies tended to be more responsive and provided more information than mature democracies, but, fourthly, that there were significant differences and variations in response between the regions surveyed.

The fifth finding is of great significance, as it shows that the involvement of civil society has a remarkable impact on the success of ATI requests and laws. The sixth finding is that discrimination affects response rates - where requestors are journalists or NGO representatives, the response tends to be more forthcoming than when the requestor is perceived as marginalised or powerless, and the report contains numerous examples to support this finding.

Macedonia has since adopted full FoI legislation, and Ghana has draft legislation in place.
Finding seven was that even in the most responsive countries, results were inconsistent even when the requests made were identical. Furthermore, finding eight was the non-compliance was variable, in the sense that the manner in which government bodies responded negatively to requests were variable (verbal, written or “mute”). The final, ninth, finding was that refusals in writing were a rare exception ranging between 2% and 5% of responses, and most of these were based on legitimate grounds for refusal. Clearly government officials, whether there are ATI laws in place or not, are reluctant to put their refusals to provide information on record, but rather rely on the device of the “mute refusal” to frustrate requestors’ attempts to get information.

The findings of this study therefore provide a useful baseline from which to assess the state of access to information in the countries surveyed, as well as to offer some quantitative means to assess the impact of ATI laws in the countries in the study. It also highlights the point that FOI remains a “professionalized” environment, quite heavily reliant on expert civil society intervention and activism in order for it to be realised.

4.2 Theorising FOI


Abstract

Australian academic and Peter Sebina of the University of Botswana offer a theoretical reflection on the rationale for the rights of access to information. A right to freedom of information has a fairly long history, but its contemporary incarnation – as a leverage right with relevance to both civil and political freedoms and social and economic rights, is an emerging conception. Furthermore, interest in and support for FOI legislation has accelerated remarkably in the last 2 decades. In 1990, just 12 countries had ATI laws, while today there are nearly 80 such pieces of legislation. Interest in FOI and ATI as a right is therefore growing, but there is considerable debate about what constitutes this right and indeed what purpose it serves. As Snell and Sebina describe it:

The problems of access to information are not new nor are they uncatologued. Yet our tools in identifying the problems, understanding their causes and devising solutions whether short term or long term seem deficient. With a few exceptions, we have approached access regimes – their performance, evaluation and reform – with a heavy concentration on the legislative architecture and have often accepted that the failures or problems are isolated instances or exceptions to the norm. We need to find a theoretical framework that accepts that the access to information process is a complex system, one that necessitates a mixture of approaches by administrators and users (p. 62).

They go on to explain that the understanding of FOI as a right stems from the understanding that citizens own the information that the state gathers and hold on their behalf. FOI is traditionally understood therefore as a civil and political right, although it has great implications for the enforcement of social and economic rights, as is illustrated below. Furthermore, as the discourse on FOI evolves, it “becomes a problematic minefield of competing and often contradictory expectations” (Snell and Sebina, 2007: 63). And this then highlights the source of

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8 The Swedish Freedom of the Press Act is the oldest of its kind, passed in 1766.
the confusion about what kind of right ATI is, as it is understood to have different rationales. Most elaborately, FOI is credited with the teleological expectation that it is a source of good governance, and thereby combats corruption and enhances the investment climate in any given country. It is these rather lofty expectations that underlie the multistakeholder voluntary disclosure regimes that have begun to emerge, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).

The other outcome that Snell and Sebina credit FOI with resulting in is more deliberative and participatory democracy, as information allows citizens to engage more meaningfully and fully with their government and hold them to account. FOI as a right matters because of the potential it has to invert the power relationship between state and citizen. Snell and Sebina describe this as the problem of “information asymmetry in the public sector” (crediting the term information asymmetry to Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz). The problem he is referring to is “where there is an information disparity between those that govern and the governed, leading to flawed agency relationships” (p. 64). Snell and Sebina’s article provides a description of the theoretical landscape underlying the right to FOI, and illustrate the nature of the right as a power.

4.3 India: Country Examples (Assessing Impact and the Role of Civil Society)


Abstract
In order to illustrate the impact and effectiveness of ATI regimes, in particular in developing countries, and also to outline the importance of the role of civil society as a champion of FOI, the case study of MKSS in India, with its track record of fighting grassroots corruption, stands out. Jenkins and Goetz trace the first phase of the emergence of this rural, civil society movement - the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS - Association for the Empowerment of Workers and Farmers) - whose strategy has been to focus on access to information held by public officials in order to highlight, and ultimately combat, corruption in the use of public funds for service delivery. MKSS is not a formal or professional NGO. It consists of a mix of local residents of Rajsamand district in Rajasthan in India, and activists from other parts of the country. Its work on the right of access to information began in the late 1980s, but it was from about 1995 onwards that its work began to gain impetus. Shehkar Singh points out that it was under his leadership, and that of activists Aruna Roy and Nikhil Dey that the movement was formally founded in 1990, and that its initial strategy was to organise hunger strikes to demand the statutory minimum wages. It was this first campaign that led the group to realise the significance of the right to information, and incorporate this into their strategy.

Thus MKSS’s focus was on the failure of the enforcement of minimum wage laws, and the failure of the state Public Distribution System (PDS) to make available subsidised food and other essential commodities. And it was this focus on wages and prices that led MKSS to begin to look at corruption of public officials as its central concern. Jenkins and Goetz give a description of how the information that MKSS was able unearth on public accounts was able to expose the corrupt practises of local authorities in both the payment of minimum wages on public work project, as well as in the PDS; but it was these initial activities that led MKSS “to the conclusion that such malfeasance could not be traced without access to official documentation” (p. 605).
However, at this early stage of the campaign, India did not have ATI laws in place to facilitate this access, and campaigning for this legislation became another prong in MKSS’s strategy.

MKSS devised an innovative participatory method in the form of the *jan sunwais* (public meetings) where available information from official expenditure records is read out to villagers, and local people are then invited to give testimony relating to discrepancies in this official information and actual payments received. “Through this direct form of ‘social audit’, many people discovered that they had been listed as beneficiaries of anti-poverty schemes, though they had never received payment. Others were astonished to learn of large payments to local building contractors for works that were never performed” (p. 606).

There are two remarkable features of this method. The first is that it allows direct participation on the part of members of communities, to whom sometimes relatively small sums of money can be enormously significant. And this direct process of accounting has the result of putting the power to hold public officials and beneficiaries of public funds into the hands of those who have been deprived of their entitlements, in a way that more formal means of restitution, such as court action, would deny them. In communities where most people are known to one another, a “name and shame” exercise such as this can have a powerful social impact.

And this points to the second feature, which is the cumulative effect of this method. As noted, the sums involved in each case may be small, but over time and when all the cases are added up, “the cumulative diversion of resources intended specifically for the poor, or for local public goods more generally, is enormous” (p. 607). In assessing the impact of India’s ATI activism, it is clear that this has acted as a deterrent to corrupt officials. For example, in 2004, most of the 6 000 million rupees allocated for drought relief in Rajasthan were in fact spent for this purpose.

However, owing to the lack of ATI legislation, from the late 1990s, MKSS encountered increasing resistance when trying to access government-held information. MKSS’s lobbying in this area led to the passing of a state-level Right to Information Act in Rajasthan in 2000. The successful campaign for ATI legislation (in Rajasthan at least) is a measurable impact of MKSS’s activism for FOI. This gave activists the official power to access information, but they did continue to encounter levels of bureaucratic resistance, which made this an ongoing struggle.


Abstract
From 2001 onwards, Jenkins identifies a “second wave of anticorruption activism” in India, in contrast to the 1995-2000 period. This second wave he describes as “brid[ing] divisions within the anticorruption movement itself, gaps that hampered its effectiveness.” In particular, there are four such “divides” the bridging of which he outlines. Firstly, the relationship between the poor and middle class, was, according to Jenkins, being bridged during this second wave of activism, in contrast with the first wave where the middle class were often accused of being complicit in this corruption to their own benefit. However, post-2001, alliances between poor and middle class citizens began to emerge, which he argues have the effect of consolidating the gains of the earlier period.
The second bridge that developed during the second period of activism was between the more formal NGO sector and people’s movements. This is significant in the Indian context, where NGOs and their employees are seen as beneficiaries of foreign funding, and therefore agents of foreign “imperialism.” So the 1990s grassroots movements sought to distance themselves from the NGO sector in order to bolster their credibility. These distinctions began to dissolve in the post-2001 era, with the strengths and elements of both types of organisation being drawn on to form new hybrid organisations: “The gradual evolution of several anti-corruption groups whose movement credentials are beyond reproach has made the bridging of the NGO-movement gap possible.

Thirdly, this second wave of activism began to bridge was that between the state and civil society. The introduction of ATI laws of course makes the state, officially at least, a partner in the FOI movement, but Jenkins notes the emergence of greater levels of state-civic engagement in India during this period. While not entirely successful, this is a relationship that is in the process of being forged.

The fourth and final gap, which has also not been entirely eliminated, is that between what Jenkins labels “the activist and partisan domains of anti-corruption politics.” The anti-corruption civil society movement spearheaded by MKSS had originally cast itself as free of party political affiliation, but as this movement matured, it became clear that opposition party politicians in particular could usefully be deployed to provide expertise and ask questions in the relevant official fora. While this is a problem which has not been resolved, it is clear that the realms of formal politics and anti-corruption activism are in some instances drawing closer together and finding ways to collaborate.

Over and above these grassroots successes, it is important to note that as the campaign for ATI in India gains momentum, its impact has spilled over into the environment movement, where a number of successful cases have been prosecuted. At the political level, development projects, electoral procedures, and urban municipal government have all been affected by the movement for greater transparency and FOI. The culmination of this was a national Right to Information Act in 2002, which was amended and made more effective in 2005. What sets India apart in terms of its ATI law and implementation is that it is overseen by an Information Commissioner, rather than enforcement being a matter for the courts. There are some doubts expressed about the impartiality of these Commissioners however, as most of them are serving or retired civil servants.


General description

Bihar is an extremely poor region (in terms of Human Development Index) in India. Advocating and bringing policy level changes in this state is a daunting task as governance institutions are caught in web of procedures and they simply are not concerned about the needs of people. The initial years of implementation of RTI Act, 2005 in India showed that it had hit a roadblock and
bureaucracy had created several bottlenecks for proper implementation of the Act. It made civil society organizations get together and design strategies for policy level changes. The start was made in the form of community-based research in selected locations in India. Social Activists, NGOs, community based organisations got to together with the community and collected data about implementation of RTI Act in their regions.

An all-India study with a focus on twelve provinces was conducted by Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA) between April to September 2006 in order to gauge people’s opinion on accessing information under RTI. The respondents of the qualitative study were 40 NGOs, community-based organisations, activists, media persons etc. who had been educating people on RTI for one year. They were posed questions on the difficulties in accessing information, behaviour of government officers, role of Information Commissions and the government’s role in educating people. The findings of the study demonstrated that a large majority was facing several difficulties in accessing information from government offices. Most of the government officers supposed to provide information at the state and district levels were not cooperative and they sometimes threatened applicants to withdraw applications. In Bihar, there were several instances of Public Information Officers (PIOs) refusing to accept applications. Government officers were frequently absent from office and nobody accepted the application in his absence. Most of the time, information provided under RTI was partial or half-baked.

Country and level of analysis

Bihar, a province in the eastern region of India.

Sector

Access to Information under RTI Act, 2005

Key actors

In Bihar, civil society organisations advocating policy level changes focused on influencing pro-change actors in bureaucracy and elected representatives. The pro-reform political atmosphere in Bihar also created the right environment for policy changes.

Research had already highlighted that people were facing tremendous difficulty in accessing information. Sharing the research findings with the media brought these problems to the attention of policy-makers, but they did not take any action. In fact, they did not know what needed be done to correct the situation. It provided the activists and civil society organisations an opportunity to influence the provincial government in making citizen-centric policies.

RTI activists (Parveen Amanullah and others) from Bihar and Arvind Kejriwal and Manish Sisodia from Delhi came together and decided to suggest a systemic change for the province’s bureaucracy. They advocated that the innovative use of information technology (an RTI call centre) could provide a way out of these problems. Any suggestion for pilot- testing of an e-governance model would have drawn derisive remarks, as the province was extremely poor. Yet, they had the courage and enthusiasm to take the idea to policy-makers. This idea was appreciated by the activists, who felt that it should be discussed with the Chief Minister of Bihar, Mr. Nitish Kumar.
Arvind presented the plan in December 2006, and it was accepted by the Bihar Government. Therefore, some activists were able to influence the officials and ministers for bringing about innovative mechanisms for facilitating access to information.

**Broad intention**

To establish innovative mechanisms (Right to Information call centre) for facilitating access to information under RTI.

**Seeks to influence**

To influence ministers and officials to establish the innovative mechanisms

**Expected impact and underlying assumptions**

Activists armed with grassroots research can bring institutional changes in governance.

**Evidence**

The Chief Minister said that the RTI call centre would be inaugurated on 29 January 2007; this announcement forced the bureaucracy to put all their efforts in to starting the RTI call centre. The task of training the personnel of the call centre and guiding them for two months was given to Parivartan (Citizens’ Group in Delhi). After all these preparations, the RTI call centre was finally inaugurated on January 29, 2007.

The RTI call centre was an innovative model adopted by a poorly-governed state desperately trying to make governance accessible to all. It tried to tackle the primary problems faced by common citizens in filing applications, namely difficulties in locating the offices where RTI applications can be filed, unavailability of convenient modes of payment and apathetic government officers who refused to take applications. The RTI call centre supported by information technology tried to resolve all these problems, as applications were accepted on the telephone and RTI fees were deducted from the caller’s bill. It also resolved a reduction in the appeal fees, which was one of the main issues raised by various actors.

Bihar is the first state in India to accept RTI applications on the phone with the objective of ensuring transparency in the functioning of public institutions and that of expanding the reach of RTI to the villages.

The RTI call centre had a slow start, but it has gradually picked up. The analysis of data of two years (2007–2009) of the RTI call centre’s working shows that it has facilitated in the filing of applications and appeals in a big way. A comparison of the data of 2007 and 2009 on details of calls received at the call centre shows that the number of applications filed has jumped nearly three times from 2007 to 2009. The number of First Appeals and Second Appeals has seen a huge increase over these two years. Nearly forty percent of RTI applications are being filed in Bihar through RTI call centre. Further, the analysis of call details shows that the maximum number of RTI applications was filed in the Personal and Administrative Reforms Department and Rural Development Department. Interaction with community and civil society organisations in Bihar brought out the reasons for RTI usage in these two departments; community members said malpractices in huge recruitment drives for primary school teachers and in rural
employment drives under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme were the reason they wanted to find out whether entitlements were granted in a fair manner.

One important facet of this call centre is that it is able to answer different citizen queries on RTI. The three to four fold increase in the number of queries over these two years substantiates the conclusion that the call centre has been able to educate and guide a number of citizens. Though the number of 12,628 (2009) seems to be quite small compared to the huge population of Bihar, this method of responding to RTI applications, appeals and queries assumes importance, as no such method exists in other states. It could possibly provide a solution for making information accessible to all and dealing with huge pending RTI applications and appeals in government departments. Information technology then, if used innovatively, can provide solutions for poor grievance redressal, poor transparency and non-accountability of government institutions.

These must be seen as small operational bottlenecks – telephones may not be accessible in remote areas, though this could be easily sorted out if the call centre is expanded. This model has won the appreciation of several quarters. Ms. Sonia Gandhi, United Progressive Alliance Chairperson had urged Congress-led state governments to adopt this model. It has also won the National Award for E-governance 2008-09 for the project and this award is to be granted by the Department of Administrative Reforms under the Ministry of Personnel, New Delhi.

Factors contributing to impact

Another important finding of the study is that evidence based advocacy should be taken up together by the research organisations, activists and community based organisations. The collaboration helps in combining grass roots data collection exercise with robust methodology and policy briefs. It ultimately results in credible research, which is trusted by the government agencies. It should also be understood that evidence based research alone cannot bring policy changes in South Asia; it must be combined with community mobilisation, communication strategies, advocacy strategies and partnership with key stakeholders for being successful.

In addition, political context is an important factor in any policy level changes. In this case, the Chief Minister formed the government on the promise of providing ‘good governance’ to the people of the province. His tenure was preceded by years of poor governance, so the people of Bihar had voted for him expecting institutional transformation. The pro-reform attitude of political leaders enlarged the stakeholders who were pro-reform. Some bureaucrats and elected representatives who were fence-sitters also joined the pro-reform group. It made the task of community-based organisations, activists, and media easier as the number of stakeholders who were pro-reform in the province had become quite large.

It can be said that to some extent the political context determines the communication strategies of the policy-influencers. They usually use dialogue, consultations, lobbying, campaigns, on line methods like petitions, voting, blogs, and press releases to approach policy-makers. In Bihar, the activists used the print media to build pressure on the government for creating mechanisms for facilitating access to information. The various stories of problems faced by people in accessing information, which had been highlighted in research, were regularly published in the print media. Sometimes, selected leaks to the media about the performance of different departments on RTI also made headlines. In India, political leaders are very concerned about what is being
written in the media as it affects the people’s perception about governance. So, press releases on RTI created pressure on Bihar’s ‘image-conscious’ government to create facilitating mechanisms on RTI.

Good media communication, interested actors such as officials and the political context led to the establishment of innovative mechanisms (RTI call center), which provided easy access to information to the common person in Bihar.

4.3d Sisodia, M. (n.d.) ‘Using Right to Information to Improve the Public Distribution System and Basic Infrastructure in Delhi.’ Contributory article in study conducted by PRIA on Citizen Leadership and Democratic Accountability in India, South Africa and Brazil.

General description

Despite impressive growth in last two decades, the majority of Indians, i.e. 836 million, live on less than Rs. 20 per day.\(^9\) India is placed at 132 in the latest UN Human Development Index (HDI) and Transparency International relegates India to 85\(^{th}\) place in the list of least corrupt countries in the world. The number of people living in slums in India has more than doubled in the past two decades and now exceeds the entire population of Britain. Such conditions exist in spite of the fact that there has been a fifteen-fold increase in the Central Government Budget spending on anti-poverty programmes.\(^10\) Yet this huge money does not seem to make any impact, which clearly leads to the conclusion that inefficiency and corruption in the government welfare schemes continue to be huge. The corruption in the Public Distribution System (provides subsidised food grains to the poor) is astonishing. The government spends billions of dollars on food subsidies every year to procure food grains for distribution to the poor and economically weaker sections of society. As per citizens’ perceptions, more than 90 percent of the funds allocated for PDS are misappropriated.

Civil society organisations along with citizens have tried out various experiments like social audits, right to information and public hearings to demand transparency and accountability of the government departments and this case study of Delhi being taken up for discussion is one such case. This case study shows how citizens along with a ‘people-based organisation’ were able to ensure transparency in the functioning of Public Distribution System resulting in better access of food to the poor.

Country and level of analysis

This case study is located in poor locality of Delhi, Sundar Nagari having the population of 120,000 mostly poor. The Public distribution of Shops in the area witnessed tremendous diversion of food grains depriving the poor of subsidised food grains affecting their food security. (Department of Food and Supplies provides subsidised food grains to poor under Public Distribution System.)

Sector

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The case study intends to test the assumption that use of legal instruments like Right to Information leads to transparency and accountability in the Public Distribution System.

Key actors

The people based organisation, Parivartan in Delhi felt that the movement for transparency and accountability in governance should be started with the PDS in Delhi. The organisation believed that hunger is an issue, which touches the lives of the poor and deprived the most, and any effort for stopping the large scale leakage in the PDS system in Delhi would be appropriate at that time. The activists of Parivartan started mobilising people in Sundar Nagari Colony on the RTI. They conducted house to house campaigns, meetings at public places and provided handholding support in filing RTI applications. Encouraged by the campaign, people filed RTI applications in large numbers asking for information related to the PDS, scholarships for poor students etc. The mobilisation by Parivartan engaged citizens in the transparency and accountability campaign in Delhi. The media, especially print media, carried out a number of stories about the malfunctioning of the PDS system thereby building tremendous pressure on the Department of Food and Supplies to take action against those who were involved in the siphoning off food grains meant for the poor.

Kind of accountability

Traditional channels of accountability like complaint in Food and Supplies departments had failed to work, so citizens used legal instruments like Right to Information to access information related to allocation of food grains for their locality and non-institutional mechanisms like Social Audit, Surveys and Public Hearings to expose corruption in the Food and Civil Supplies department.

Tools used

Citizens along with people based organisation, Parivartan used RTI, Social Audit, Surveys, Open confrontation with the government (processions), litigations in the courts and expose in the media for disclosing details of corruption and pressurising the government to improve public distribution system.

Broad intention

To check corruption in the PDS system and timely delivery of food grains to the poor by Food and Civil Supplies department.

Seeks to influence

Transparency and accountability in the functioning of Food and Civil Supplies department of Delhi.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions

RTI would expose corruption and make the Food and Civil Supplies department accountable to improve delivery of food to the poor.
Evidence

The Department of Food and Supply, Delhi, implemented section 4 of RTI Act. It brought about all the information of the department in the public domain. This initiative exposed discrepancies in the issue of PDS cards. Several fake PDS cards were found. For instance, 901 cards were issued in the name of one woman in Badarpur Colony, who did not exist. This reveals the modus operandi of PDS shopkeepers who registered fake names for siphoning off food grains and demonstrates the scale of corruption in PDS in Delhi, which could be checked by building transparency and accountability into the system.

The Delhi Government decided to take significant steps to make the PDS more transparent and accountable to the beneficiaries. Instructions were issued to the Department of Food and Supplies to make all the PDS records public. Orders were also passed that any PDS card holder could inspect his/her records on every Saturday at the District Food and Supply Office. Complaints could be made directly to the senior officials in the department. The officers were directed to take immediate action on the complaints and in case the charges against the PDS shopkeepers were proved, their licence was to be suspended immediately. Facilities for inspection of the files and setting up of complaint mechanisms were some of the crucial steps for reforming the department of food in Delhi. It resulted in improving the delivery of food grains to the poor.

Several case studies of poor being provided food grains on regular basis on filing RTI exist in Sundar Nagari.

Factors contributing to impact

Mobilisation by Parivartan led to huge participation of the citizens who owned the movement right from the beginning. They filed RTI applications in large numbers, thereby creating panic among the PDS shopkeepers and government officials who feared that their misdemeanours would be exposed due to peoples’ pressure. In addition, non-institutional mechanisms like social audit, public hearings and surveys kept the people engaged when the movement was at the low ebb. These mechanisms also brought out credible evidence against corruption in the PDS of the Delhi government, which was covered extensively by print media. These three factors – namely people, civil society organisation and media – were critical reforming food system in Delhi.

South Africa: Country Examples (Assessing Impact and the Role of Civil Society; including ‘grey literature)


Abstract

South Africa’s Open Democracy Advice Centre (ODAC), stands out as a civil society body as it specifically established to pursue research, training and litigation on access to information in terms of the Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000 (PAIA) and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act of 2000. In addition ODAC focuses on the Protected Disclosure Act (PDA) relating to the protection of “whistleblowers” which clearly supplements the general
thrust of ODAC’s “Right to Know, Right to Live” programme. Secondly, ODAC has come to occupy something of a niche in pursuing access to information cases that relate to socio-economic rights cases, and so the work of ODAC, more than any other actor in this area, is of most relevance to this sector. A further reason why the work of ODAC commends itself to use as an example of civil society’s work in this area is that ODAC has undergone periodic reviews during the past decade, all of which have been documented, and which point to an evolving methodology for access to information and its importance for socio-economic rights.

ODAC’s founding in 2000 coincided with the passing of the three pieces of legislation upon which its work is focused (noted above). It grew out of the Open Democracy Campaign Group, a coalition of a number of CSOs in the late 1990s who were campaigning for enabling legislation to give effect to the right of access to information included in the Constitution. As ODAC’s 2006 report, *Evaluation of ODAC’s Right to Know, Right to Live Outreach Strategy – 2001 to 2005* summarises this process:

> Even before the trilogy of Bills became laws, [ODAC] was conceptualised as a mechanism to make conceptual and practical links between these Bills. Focusing on the two pieces of “transparency legislation” (PDA and PAIA), ODAC was designed to play an active role in fostering a culture of accountability and transparency. It aimed to do this by assisting citizens and institutions (public and private) to understand and use the laws to leverage a menu of rights available to them ODAC.

The report notes further that ODAC was originally designed as a collaborative project of IDASA, the Black Sash and the Department of Public Law at UCT.

ODAC has a decade of experience in campaigning for the right to know, and its experience, and self-reflection on its tactics therefore make it a valuable case study in understanding the relationship between access to information and the enforcement of socio-economic rights in South Africa.

There are roughly two periods covered by ODAC’s review processes – the period from 2000-2005, when ODAC undertook a 5-year review, and the period since then to date. The first 2 years inevitably involved the setting up of “appropriate operational and governance structures” and “[d]uring this period ODAC assumed that training paralegals and NGOs on how to use these ATI laws would automatically translate into them using the laws to assist disadvantaged groups and communities to identify problems and make specific requests.” However, by 2003 it became apparent that this assumption would need to be questioned, as a five country study showed that despite its suite of openness laws, South Africa had one of the worst ATI compliance rates of the countries surveyed.\(^\text{11}\) Furthermore, the study found that South Africa’s scores in terms of political will and compliance were the lowest, pointing to the difficulty with implementing ATI laws, however impressive they may be. Furthermore, ODAC was concerned with the low number of ATI requests that were being received, and so it was apparent that both on the “supply” side, as well as the “demand” side, the flow of information was poor. The following section of this chapter returns to this question of the difficulty of implementation, and some new developments which may assist in cracking open the information environment, but this

\(^\text{11}\) The 2003 pilot of 5 countries was conducted by the Open Society Justice Institute (OSJI) and was followed in 2004 by the 14 country study.
realisation on the part of ODAC lead to a rethink of their strategies and tactics from 2003 onwards.

The major change that took place was that rather than playing the role of information provider, with supportive training to NGOs, ODAC would now have more interaction with the communities themselves who were to be on the receiving end of the information requests. As the 2006 report describes this shift in methodology,

As opposed to teaching people in a formalistic way about the ATI law, [they] would spend more time on facilitating a community-based meeting at which local people [would] identify the issues they want to take action around; clarify how the access to information can take them closer to their development goals; and, having done that, ODAC sends off requests for information on behalf of the community. This part of the process involved filling in the necessary forms, taking responsibility for follow up communication, and supporting advocacy processes arising out of the request.

This change of approach rapidly yielded results, with the number of PAIA requests increasing remarkably during 2003 and 2004, and steadily continuing to rise in 2005. In looking at the requests that developed from the communities where ODAC did its work (9 in 2004 and 12 in 2005), the requests related to socio-economic rights to healthcare, water, housing, and electricity. A range of other related issues were also included in these access to information requests, but it is salient to note that the communities in question prioritised development and access to resources, as well as information about how local government funds were being spent. At this local level then, ATI requests are most pressingly concerned with these “bread and butter” issues, rather than the security or procedural questions that form the subject of some of the more high profile ATI cases.

The other important point about the community-based ATI requests processed by ODAC during this period is that most of them did not reach the point of litigation – of the 12 community-linked requests in progress in 2005, 5 had a satisfactory result by mid-year, and just 3 had potential court action looming. Once ODAC had made their initial intervention, even when these yielded only partial results, the communities felt empowered to take over the process, as the footing on which they dealt with the government had shifted. The other important constituency that ODAC continued to work with during this time was specialised and grassroots NGOs, with the majority of ATI requests emanating from these partnerships – 159 in 2004 alone.

However these successes need to be seen against the backdrop of an overall challenge with accessing information in South Africa. In 2004, the 2003 OSI 5 country pilot study to monitor FOI legislation and compliance was extended to a 14 country study, and once again South Africa’s results were disappointing. In this study, ODAC took a leading role, making 100 out of a total of 140 requests on behalf of NGOs, the media and individuals “to elicit and test the use and supply of ATI legislation.” These requests were made to all 3 tiers of government, and of the requests to 18 public bodies, 63% were met with “mute refusal” (i.e. they were ignored) and just 13% were responded to within 30 days. The upshot of the study was that South Africa’s compliance with ATI requests had actually declined from 2003 to 2004.
4.3f ODAC (2010) *The Right to Know, the Right to Live: Turning the Right to Information into a Living Reality*. Cape Town: ODAC.

Abstract
In its most recent report ODAC notes some important new developments. The first of these is the rise in service delivery protests, which ODAC directly attributes to an inability to hold local government to account, and they go on to point out that while these protests are ostensibly as a result of poor service delivery, “initial studies around service delivery protests indicate that the lack of information about service delivery, rather than service delivery itself, is a key component in causing the protests” This view is echoed by the Public Service Commission (PSC), who remark: “Some citizens have found alternative ways to draw attention to the need for public participation through service delivery protests and rising activism. This development should come as a signal to government that effective communication and public participation must remain a fundamental priority” [emphasis added] PSC (2008), cited by ODAC.

A second important development in ODAC’s current work is that of the 11 new ATI requests lodged by them in 2009, 8 of them have a housing component to them, and all of them relate to socio-economic rights in some respect (the other issues arising being healthcare, water and food parcels from the Department of Social Development). Furthermore, of these 11 cases, 6 have been referred to ODAC’s litigation unit – “as officials tend to give requests the necessary level of attention only when they receive an official letter of demand from our attorneys” as the report wryly notes!

ODAC is also at pains to point out in its 2010 report that what may appear to be “a decline in our ability to secure disclosure of information on behalf of our clients” is in fact a result of a shift in emphasis. ODAC has previously assisted poor communities in urban areas “in seeking information from well-resourced metropolitan municipalities” but its current suite of project mainly focus on “assisting the rural poor who wanted to access information held by smaller rural and less endowed local or district municipalities.” And this is in keeping with the conclusion of its 2006 report, as it points to strategic qualitative choice on ODAC’s part in terms of its community outreach interventions. It also links up with the theoretical point that ATI is intended to confer powers on citizens, but that citizens in rural areas may be most constrained in exercising these. Referring to the Peddie Women’s Support Centre’s request to the Ngqushwa Local Municipality, ODAC notes: “The power imbalance between the officials and the community was quite evident in our interventions there. We saw a pervasive attitude on the part of the officials wherein they regarded service delivery as a favour that they do for the citizens.” This once again underlines the precise nature of the right of access to information understood as a power, and therefore one which is intended to change the footing on which citizens approach the state.

ODAC also lists 11 institutions which have consistently scored a zero (0%) in their “Golden Key Index” which measures their ATI compliance. Disturbingly, of the 11, 4 are the Office of the Premier of one of South Africa’s 9 provinces\(^\text{12}\) while the remaining 8 are district municipalities.\(^\text{13}\)

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\(^{12}\) Western Cape, North West, Northern Cape and Mpumalanga

\(^{13}\) The 11 institutions were all eligible for ODAC’s “Rusty Padlock Award” with the Bophirima District Municipality eventually being drawn for this dubious distinction.
ODAC’s findings then raise two important points about the implementation of ATI as a right. The first is the need for some kind of commissioner or information regulator to provide a cost effective and accessible means for ordinary citizens to press the levers which enforce their rights of access to information. In the face of many government bodies’ “mute refusal” to comply with ATI regulations, such a regulatory body could meaningfully give teeth to the power that PAIA confers on citizens. The second point is the extension of jurisdiction over PAIA to magistrate’s courts in South Africa. While even these courts are likely to remain beyond the reach of most ordinary citizens, this opens a space for a wider range of civil society bodies to articulate communities’ ATI claims through these courts, without having to have recourse to either the intervention of bodies like ODAC, or the lengthy and costly court battles of previous cases.


Abstract
The majority of ATI cases involving social and economic rights do not result in litigation. A few selected cases offer some illustration of how the right of ATI understood as a power can create a space for citizens to hold government to account, by exposing an unfair practice or lapse in policy. And this exposure creates a situation where citizens can demand what they are entitled to as a result of the information that they receive.

One example comes from ODAC, reported by Mukelani Dimba, (ODAC’s Deputy Executive Director) as one of its successful interventions. It “demonstrates how socio-economic rights can be realised through the use freedom of information and public pressure rather than through litigation” [emphasis added]. This case clearly arose through ODAC’s strategy of community engagement as noted in their 2006 report.

Access to water in rural areas in South Africa is not a resource that can be taken for granted. Nor is this an issue without gendered implications. The rural areas of South Africa reflect a population demographic that is skewed in favour of older women, and the young. Access to clean water is therefore not only an issue of basic health and safety, but is very much a women’s issue in many areas. In many rural areas, in the absence of the infrastructure for piped water, local government delivers water in tankers, and deposits it into large communal drums for the community’s use.\(^{14}\)

Dimba describes how, in 2004, ODAC took up cudgels on behalf of the residents of Emkhandlwini in rural KwaZulu-Natal. It was reported that the municipal tanker was delivering water to other villages in the area, but that for some reason, Emkhandlwini was excluded. The villagers were forced to rely on a stream, which their livestock also used, for water. The local

\(^{14}\) While nearly 75% of South African households now have access to piped water, according to Statistics South Africa’s 2007 Community Survey, there is a marked discrepancy between urban and rural areas. The three provinces with the lowest percentages of households with access to piped water are Limpopo (56.3%), the Eastern Cape (54.1%) and KwaZulu-Natal (63%), which are also provinces with large rural populations, and the sites of former so-called black “homelands.” Access to piped water is calculated as a water source within 200 metres of the dwelling. See: http://www.southafrica.info/about/social/communitysurvey-housing.htm
government councillor for the area had been appealed to about this problem, but these appeals had proven fruitless. ODAC assisted the residents to use PAIA to request the minutes of the local government council meetings where the water provision programme had been decided. At the same time, they requested the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and budget.\footnote{Both the Constitution, and domestic law of South Africa (in the form of the \textit{Municipal Systems Act} 32 of 2000, and the \textit{Municipal Structures Act} 113 of 1998) require all municipalities to have a 5 year IDP, reviewed annually, to give effect to the developmental and transformative goals of the Constitution.}

For 6 months the community was kept waiting, and when the information was finally provided, it showed that there were indeed plans to provide water in the area, but that these had not been communicated to the residents. The pressure that this information allowed the residents to put on the municipality to account for their exclusion, along with the attention of the media to the case, finally yielded the result of the provision of fixed water tanks (drums) that are regularly replenished, along with a commitment to lay pipes for a permanent water supply.

This case is a neat demonstration of the theoretical construction of the right of access to information as a power. By requiring the municipality to make public its plans to provide water, they were required to justify their decisions to the community in question, and to make good on their commitments. As Dimba remarks:

> Public pressure to influence resource allocation can only be effectively applied if there is sufficient transparency in the process of resource allocation. Freedom of information creates the conditions in which decisions about the allocation of resources can be challenged.

4.4 Multi-stakeholder International Transparency Regimes: EITI


Abstract

Against the general backdrop of FOI initiatives around the world, note needs to be taken of the emergence of multistakeholder initiatives, the (thus far) most firmly established of which is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The overt mission of the EITI is quite simple – to make available information about payments that emanate from extractive industries in resource-rich countries. The purpose of this is “to improve transparency and accountability” (which is frequently lacking on the part of both industry and governments in developing countries rich in oil, gas and minerals). The further aim or mission of EITI is therefore based on the assumption that this information will demonstrate a government’s commitment to good governance, allow for scrutiny of revenue collection, and improve the investment climate. Thus what appears to be a somewhat modest tool – availability of information – is thought to have the potential to result in better governance, as well as have spinoffs for further economic development in resource-rich countries. The EITI was launched at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 with the 53 natural resource-rich countries of the developing world as its target.

To date, there are just two countries – Azerbaijan and Liberia – that have been approved as EITI compliant. There are more than 30 “candidate” countries (countries who are in the process of
preparing for validation to become compliant), of which one, Guinea, has been suspended, and two – Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe, have had their requests to have their validation period extended denied by the board. Participation in EITI is voluntary, but as adherence to it increases, it’s credibility increases and tangible benefits become more visible, which has the result that EITI has come to be seen as a “must have” for resource-rich developing countries.

As EITI was launched in 2002, it must be noted that assessments of its performance are as yet preliminary. Indeed most EITI candidate countries only began the process after 2005. However the overall momentum is forward, with some 32 countries at various stages of the EITI process. According to Rainbow Insight’s assessment, “EITI is seen as a success simply by the fact that it exists, with its infrastructure, processes, policies and procedures having now been established.” Furthermore, quite tangible benefits are discernable for those countries that have cleared the validation hurdle. For example, Azerbaijan has recently had its investment rating upgraded by Fitch ratings, the international credit rating agency. Rainbow Insight is an international consultancy which was requested by the EITI Secretariat “to perform an evaluation of the initiative’s impact, both as a tool of public policy and as a mechanism for promoting multi-stakeholder engagement on natural resource revenues, with the objective of presenting the evaluation’s findings at the EITI’s International Conference in Doha in February 2009” and that report forms the basis of one of the most recent assessments of EITI.

According to the report, the process of keeping up the momentum of EITI while still allowing for the autonomy and ownership of local EITI bodies requires a fine balance. There is a danger that if too few countries pass through the validation phase, or pass through it once and then fail to repeat it, that “the EITI’s future will prove grim.”

So “validation is the central issue” for EITI. As Rainbow Insight’s report describes it:

EITI validation needs to become a “club good” with a sharp distinction between those who are “members” and those who are not. This raises the issue of whether additional incentives can be provided to candidates to get validated; one concern expressed by many stakeholders is that the long-term incentives for EITI validation (e.g. “greater transparency,” “sustainable development,” “poverty reduction”) are somewhat vague, and that it is difficult to create a causal connection between EITI and these outcomes.

It is clear that EITI as a multistakeholder transparency initiative cannot be regarded as having short terms results or impacts. The countries that have committed to EITI are in many cases only beginning the process of reconciliation, and the validation process has proven a stumbling block for many. The strengths of EITI may well yet be seen, and its weaknesses are becoming apparent as the process unfolds.

One obvious strength of EITI is its growing momentum. As the benefits of compliance become more apparent, and as support for EITI grows, the number of countries at some stage of EITI compliance has multiplied. And this compliance brings with it an atmosphere of cooperation and openness that can usefully be deployed politically and economically to promote growth and development.

Another strength of EITI is its ostensible purpose, which is on the surface quite modest. The disclosure of payment information on both sides of the equation – industry and government –
could be understood to be a fairly minimal requirement, at least at its inception phase. However, as the process escalates, this can become a weakness, as the compliance regime has been shown to be arduous and costly, which can place something of a strain on developing countries, however resource-rich they may be. It is noted that EITI’s secretariat is stretched to full capacity. One suggestion made by Rainbow Insight is that “there is an undoubted opportunity to develop an inward, rolling secondment programme for high-flying representatives of the NGO, Government and corporate sectors.” The secretariat itself therefore provides an ideal “nursery” for growing EITI capacity from the centre, and then deploying this capacity back to local EITI structures, filling that lacuna too, as noted above.


Abstract

In 2010, EITI published its own assessment of the impact of EITI in Africa. Liberia is just one of 2 countries that have achieved EITI validation to date (the other being Azerbaijan). Liberia’s reports – both their Annual Reconciliation Reports (the second of which completed in February 2010) and the reports validating the reconciliation reports – are instructive examples of the kind of information that successful EITI compliance can yield over time. The Liberian EITI (LEITI) covers 4 sectors: Mining, oil, forestry and (for the first time in 2010) agriculture. Nearly 70 companies’ revenues and payments; and 5 government agencies, including the National Oil Company; are listed in the 2010 report. As compliance with LEITI is also legally mandated under Liberian Law, companies that do not comply are fined, or face the threat of banning form their areas of operation. Note also that the reports contain some discrepancies (0.02% and 0.04% of the total in 2009 and 2010 respectively) but that these are resolved and explained in the report, in keeping with the overall EITI goal of accountability.

The report also credits EITI with helping to address the roots of Liberia’s protracted civil war, which had their genesis in competition over Liberia’s resources. LEITI organises meetings in local communities with government and company representatives, where people are able to interrogate them about the contents of LEITI’s reconciliation reports. As Negbalee Warner, LEITI’s (former) National Coordinator and International EITI Board Member remarks:

Communities are also using this opportunity to raise questions about how the money is being allocated and used, and whether the communities are receiving a fair return for their resources. Prior to the existence of LEITI, there was no real forum where these kinds of discussions could take place. However now, through this process, suspicion and distrust are being reduced, helping to diffuse the tensions that led to conflict in the past.

The report also refers to Nigeria’s NEITI, which is claims has been instrumental in empowering civil society to hold government to account in recovering revenue that is owing to it from oil revenues. Indeed NEITI’s 2005 reconciliation report identified an estimated USD4.7 billion owed by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) for payments of domestic crude oil. “NEITI Reports serve an invaluable function in helping all stakeholders, NEITI, the oil companies, the regulatory agencies, the National Assembly, and civil society, to develop strategies to address problems in the oil and gas sector.”
5. Natural Resource Governance


General description
This report is an assessment of how the IMF and World Bank implemented extractive industry (EI) transparency in their operations in 57 resource-rich countries since the World Bank endorsed the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in June 2003, until April 2008. The assessment reviews 3 elements of EI transparency: 1) public disclosure of revenues paid to governments by the extractive industries; 2) public disclosure of EI contracts; and 3) civil society participation in the implementation and monitoring of the transparency process.

Country and level of analysis
The report covers 57 resource-rich countries around the world. The EITI is primarily a national-level initiative.

Sector
Natural Resource Management

Key actors
IMF, World Bank, civil society (broadly conceived)

Kind of accountability
The transparency measures supported by the World Bank and the IMF incorporate elements of both horizontal and vertical transparency.

Tools used
The assessment covers IMF and World Bank support for various transparency measures in the extractive industries, including the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a voluntary program involving the public reporting of revenues from the extractive industries. The two institutions support many activities aimed at transparency including workshops, country dialogue, and capacity building grants. The report also highlights the role of using revenue transparency as a program benchmark or progress indicator, and the promotion of contract disclosure.

Broad intention
The various initiatives examined all aim to promote transparency in the extractive industries.

Seeks to influence
Governments, but also private sector and civil society actors.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
The report highlights the role of transparency to reduce corruption and poverty in resource-rich countries: “Increasing transparency opens up the decision making process to public debate and moves the process towards more prudent and equitable management of extractive industry resources.” However, “as shown by the recent failure of Bank efforts to increase transparency in the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project,” promises of transparency do not necessarily translate
into poverty reduction or responsible government spending, nor do IFI-induced transparency measures alone justify IFI involvement in the extractive industries” (p. 5).

Regarding IMF operations, the report notes that: “A lack of transparency in the extractive industry in many of these countries seriously undermines the IMF’s ability to promote fiscal management and macro-economic stability. By contrast, transparent governance of natural resources reduces the potential for corruption and mismanagement through improved public oversight and increased government accountability. By promoting reliable systems for gathering and publishing information on the EI sectors in resource-rich countries, the IMF improves its own ability to develop successful interventions and policy advice” (p. 9)

Evidence
Overall, the assessment found that while both the IMF and the Bank raise the concern of transparency at some level in many resource-rich countries, the approach is neither consistent across countries nor comprehensive. Furthermore, the institutions are mainly focusing on the disclosure of revenues, including support for the EITI, and are largely not promoting contract transparency or ensuring meaningful civil society participation. Specific findings include:

- Transparency is raised in a majority of resource-rich countries
- Revenue transparency as a benchmark is frequent for IMF and infrequent for World Bank.
- Contract disclosure is largely not promoted.
- The importance of civil society engagement is often absent.
- EI transparency is applied inconsistently across country operations
- EI transparency is applied inconsistently in HIPC programs
- IFC projects require revenue disclosure, but reporting varies greatly

Methods
This assessment represents measures described in publicly available IMF and World Bank documents. The assessment evaluated all IMF and World Bank project investments, program loans, technical assistance, and non-lending operations (e.g., grants, country strategies, and surveillance operations). For World Bank and IFC lending programs, only extractive industry-related projects were considered. It is important to recognize that this assessment considered only information publicly disclosed in IMF and World Bank documents. In addition, a draft of the country findings was provided to the IMF and World Bank for their review.

It is not an evaluation of extractive industry transparency in resource-rich countries and the ratings do not reflect the level of transparency that may already be practiced in individual countries. Rather, the study aims to shed light on whether the IMF and World Bank are using their full leverage in promoting EI transparency measures across all resource-rich countries. The study also includes brief case studies of the Republic of Congo and Peru.

Factors contributing to impact
The centrality of structural transparency measures in IMF and World Bank interventions has led to greater transparency in revenue management in the Republic of Congo. In particular, the kind of reforms of oil sector governance and the support for civil society oversight included in IMF and World Bank interventions deserves wider attention and should be replicated in other resource-rich countries. However, systemic change and real accountability has been hampered
not just by government resistance to reform but by a lack of sustained and strong support by the IMF and World Bank management and Board members, which can be seen, for instance, in the lack of incentives and support for staff implementation of programs.

Despite the importance of the extractive industries in Peru and the IMF’s previous significant involvement in the extractives sector, the IMF’s recent engagements have not prioritized public disclosure of revenues and contracts or multi-stakeholder engagement or even general transparency in the sector overall. Furthermore, there are no specific measures or performance benchmarks on the public disclosure of EI revenues and contracts.


**General description**
The report is intended to help strengthen the capacity of legislatures – which the authors claim is an under-studied research area – to design and implement more accountable and transparent mechanism for monitoring extractive industries generally, as well as the collection and use of extractive industry revenues.

**Country and level of analysis**
Nine countries are studied herein and are analysed on the basis of the activities of their national legislatures – Angola, Botswana, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, the DRC, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and South Africa

**Sector**
Natural resource management

**Key actors**
National legislatures, with some attention paid to international organisations, ‘advocacy groups’ and private-sector entities

**Kind of accountability**
‘Public’ (vertical) accountability, broadly looking at the linkage between elected legislatures and citizens

**Tools used**
The focus of this report is on national legislation and the creation of legislative bodies to design and manage natural resources. Many of the mechanisms that enable these tools to be used are normative in approach and international in scope, such as the EITI and the PWYP schemes, or other pan-African peer review mechanisms.

**Broad intention**
The broad intention of the various recommendations generated by this report is for increased legislative involvement in the promotion and management of transparency and accountability in domestic natural resource management. As a result of improved legislative oversight of this sector, a country’s wealth can be better and more equitably managed and redistributed.
Seeks to influence
Elected legislators and legislative bodies

Expected impact and underlying assumptions

- Legislatures are well placed to help mitigate the various risks that management of oil and other resources may pose because they can help shape the design of sound management systems for the country’s wealth.
- Successful management of natural resources significantly improves when democratic institutions are in place prior to the exploitation of mineral wealth. However most of these institutions and process often take longer to develop than the time needed to exploit mineral wealth.
- Political and institutional constraints are the principal stumbling blocks to improved management and oversight of the extractive industries.

Evidence

- As a result of initiatives like EITI and PWYP, a number of African countries – including Nigeria, Angola and Congo-Brazzaville – now publish financial and other information in the press and online on government websites, including audit results and other assessments that highlight management weaknesses.
- The legislatures of Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe and South Africa have passed legislation intended to ensure the sustainable and accountable management of their countries’ national resources. Legislatures in Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa regularly request access to information in order to conduct oversight and investigatory activities and are increasingly holding public hearings on proposed legislation.
- The legislatures in a number of countries are improving their research and analysis capacities. South Africa’s National Assembly Research Unit produces reports for use in reviewing executive branch budget proposals. Nigeria’s National Assembly is establishing a budget and research office to improve its ability to engage the executive more substantively on budget issues.

Methods

The report relies on a mix of country-level case studies that draw on NDI survey data, expert interviews and a review of national legislation and government documents.

Factors contributing to impact

- International organisations, advocacy groups and multinational companies have been key actors in increasing the access to information and awareness of the importance of government oversight. Where national legislatures link to and commit to the principles outlined by these initiatives, the authors find increased instances of improved accountability reforms.
- It is important that legislatures pay sufficient attention within the budget cycle to ensure that they have the resources necessary for developing the capacities necessary for the oversight and management of natural resources.
- Many legislatures have found Parliamentary Service Commissions (PSC) effective in building cross-party consensus on issues relating to legislative budgeting for natural resource management.
• Pro-accountability reform legislators that link to local advocacy groups and work with broad-based citizen support are more likely to be effective in winning gains in their struggle to increase legislative oversight and management of natural resources.


**General description**
This short report produced by the EITI Secretariat presents examples from stakeholders on the ground, which illustrate how the EITI process has generated positive changes in the extractive sectors relating to trust building, governance, economic management, civil society engagement and improved business environment.

**Country and level of analysis**
Noting that 20 out of the 32 EITI-implementing countries are in sub-Saharan Africa, the report highlights the experiences of Liberia, Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon, and Ghana. The report focuses on experiences at the national level.

**Sector**
Natural Resource Management

**Key actors**
The report highlights the experiences of a number of EITI stakeholders, including governments, civil society organizations (such as those involved in the Gabon Publish What You Pay Coalition) and companies that have signed up to the EITI.

**Kind of accountability**
The EITI incorporates elements of both horizontal and vertical accountability.

**Tools used**
This is beyond the scope of this report, which primarily brings together anecdotal evidence of impact through reports by EITI stakeholders in the various countries under review.

**Broad intention**
The EITI aims to increase transparency and accountability in the extractives sector, in order to reduce corruption, improve governance, and improve the business climate in resource-rich countries.

**Seeks to influence**
The EITI seeks to influence governments and companies operating in resource-rich countries to adopt transparency standards.

**Expected impact and underlying assumptions**
The expected impact of the EITI includes: building trust and dialogue (among citizens, governments, and companies), improving governance (by providing detailed reporting and inviting public participation), helping governments to manage and enhance growth and development, empowering civil society and communities, and attracting business and improving the business climate.
Evidence
The report’s evidence of the EITI’s impact in Africa is primarily presented in terms of increasing transparency. In Nigeria, the NEITI Chairman explains how the NEITI report has led to reforms at the Department of Petroleum Resources and the Federal Inland Revenue Service. A Senior Program Officer from the World Bank in Cameroon explains how the EITI process has helped improve the monitoring and management capacity of relevant government agency. The Africa Regional Publish What You Pay Coordinator notes how EITI process empowered civil society in Cameroon to gain access to relevant information, and help it engage with a previously sensitive subject in a credible and legitimate manner. Oil industry executives operating in Ghana and Liberia explain how the EITI has reduced government suspicion and increased the cooperation of local communities.

Methods
The report provides evidence primarily in the form of anecdotes by EITI stakeholders based in the countries under review. These anecdotes are collated and summarized in order to reach some broad, suggestive conclusions.

Factors contributing to impact
This is beyond the scope of the report.


General description
The first brief attempts to shed light on how public sector institutions governing the Nigerian oil sector permit the existence of corruption. The second brief examines a variety of reforms that aim to advance anti-corruption reform in Nigeria’s oil sector.

Country and level of analysis
The briefs focus on national-level experience in Nigeria.

Sector
Natural Resource Management

Key actors
Gillies highlights the role of four government institutions that run Nigeria’s oil industry affairs (the national oil company, Ministry of Petroleum, the President and his top advisors, and the Department of Petroleum Resources, the industry regulator). She also discusses the Oil and Gas Implementation Committee, constituted by former President Obasanjo to devise a strategy for streamlining sector operations, the NEITI, foreign aid donors, and international institutions such as the International Corrupt Practices Commission.

Kind of accountability
Gillies is primarily concerned with vertical accountability, though the NEITI includes elements of horizontal and social accountability.

Tools used
The state of current reforms is evaluated based on the authors’ own experience, interviews, and published evidence.

**Broad intention**
The paper seeks to establish the way in which a variety of introduced reforms can effectively reduce public sector corruption in the administration of Nigeria’s oil sector.

**Seeks to influence**
The reforms under discussion primarily seek to influence the various government institutions to increase transparency in the governance of the oil sector in Nigeria.

**Expected impact and underlying assumptions**
The author contends that oil wealth fuels the instability, corruption, and patronage-driven politics which characterise governance in Nigeria. In particular, she highlights different corruption risks associated with: the awarding of licenses; the awarding of contracts; bottlenecks and inefficiencies; bunkering; the exportation of crude; and importing refined products. She then suggests the following avenues for anti-corruption reform in Nigeria’s oil sector: the legal and regulatory framework; open and competitive award procedures; process and revenue transparency; investigation and prosecution of corruption; and oversight and accountability measures.

**Evidence**
In general, the author does not provide much evidence of the impact of natural resource governance reforms in Nigeria. However, in a second briefing, she presents useful information on the limited impact of some key reforms, which may serve to inform the design and implementation of future reforms. She also notes the accomplishments of the Nigerian EITI (NEITI): “the establishment of a high-powered multi-stakeholder working group with civil society, corporate and government members, the conduct and disclosure of a wide-ranging audit, and the drafting and passage of the 2007 NEITI Act. The audit, in particular, exceeded the international EITI standards: it required fully disaggregated payment data from companies, investigated physical, process and financial issues, covered a five year period of 1999-2004, and included criticism of how the Nigerian government manages its oil assets and revenues. [However] since the release in 2006 of the first audit covering the period 1999-2004, progress at NEITI has slowed” (p. 3).

**Methods**
The author combines country expert interviews with knowledge of specialized literature and her own experience living and working in Nigeria.

**Factors contributing to impact**
Gillies primarily highlights factors that limit the potential impact of reforms to natural resource governance. For instance, she notes that capacity constraints, a lack of clout, infighting and political capture have hampered Nigeria’s accountability institutions. She also notes the challenge of limited access to the oil sector’s governance process. For instance, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company escapes the budgetary scrutiny applied to most governance agencies.

General description
This report was commissioned by Global Witness as a ‘stocktaking’ exercise of three years of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (which creates an international framework for establishing and maintaining import/export controls on diamonds in order to avoid trade in diamonds that fund conflict and human rights abuses). It was negotiated by governments, trade groups and civil society organisations and currently has 70 member countries signed on. In assessing the implementation of this scheme to date, the author proposes a framework for organising future work and ideas for enhancing effectiveness.

Country and level of analysis
Global

Sector
Natural Resource Management – diamond trade, specifically

Key actors
Governments, the diamond industry, trade groups, civil society organisations

Kind of accountability
Primarily horizontal in that the participants are concentrated in government, many high-level industry actors and relatively large civil society organisations (all of whom participate on a generally equal basis, as claimed in this report)

Tools used
An international certification scheme

Broad intention
The broad intention of the Kimberley process is to reduce the illicit international trade in diamonds, which has been linked to a number of conflicts and human rights abuses in developing countries.

Seeks to influence
The Kimberley process seeks to influence government oversight of the diamond industry in order to move illicit trade into legitimate, documented trade.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
• Legally mandated transparency in the international trade of diamonds will decrease the amount of resources used for funding conflict and human rights abuses.

Evidence
• The vast majority of licit international diamond trade and production is now done via the Kimberley process (based on the global spread of membership).
• All 70 state members have passed national laws to enhance their diamond import and export control regimes.
• There has been a fairly dramatic increase in licit, documented diamond imports during the initial three years of the process, which might be one measurement of the impact of the regime.
• However – and in relation to above – the author acknowledges that efforts to quantify the impact are an ongoing challenge, although recommendations for statistical data collection within and across countries might be one way of addressing this.

Methods
For the purposes of this report, the author relied on previous reports and statistical data produced by the network of actors involved in the Kimberley process. She also interviewed key actors in the network for qualitative insights into the scheme.

The Kimberley process itself employs an ad hoc, voluntary process of peer review – the 70 member states and additional actors from civil society and the private sector monitor implementation of Kimberley principles in member countries. A key component of this peer review mechanism is the review visit, in which a delegation of Kimberley members visit and review diamond trade and import / export procedures in member states. There is also an ongoing data component to this scheme – based on international trade figures – but this side of the monitoring process has made less progress than the peer review mechanism.

Factors contributing to impact
• The ad hoc dimension of the Kimberley process is credited with facilitating such widespread participation. In some ways, the voluntary nature of the scheme has its drawbacks, but it also allows for greater inclusiveness.
• The scheme operates on a cooperative, rather than a punitive basis. After three years of initial work, this was posing some difficulty for participants in terms of how the sanctioning of non-compliers could be done without betraying the nature of cooperation and support for in-country monitoring capacities. However, this non-punitive characteristic is viewed as one of the scheme’s strengths.
• Although the scheme has been largely non-punitive, it is founded on the principle of member expulsion should non-compliance occur. While this has not yet happened, even when significant implementation lapses have been observed, it is seen as one of the key factors contributing to the success of the Kimberley process.
• The substantive participation of a wide range of stakeholders – including government, the private sector and civil society – is viewed as a feature of this programme that has impacted its success. In particular, civil society organisations are given – claims the author – equal voice within the scheme as government and private-sector actors.

General description
This survey follows up on a 2008 assessment of World Bank support for extractive industry (EI) transparency initiatives. The assessment found that the World Bank does not appear to be evaluating the adequacy of civil society engagement in government or private sector projects that benefit from World Bank assistance. To shed more light and attention to this issue, in 2009 the Bank Information Center (BIC) conducted a survey of civil society participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The survey questions were intended to address multiple aspects of CSO participation: inclusiveness, transparency, independence, and accountability.

Country and level of analysis
The survey focused on EITI candidate countries, and received 27 respondents representing 19 countries (4 Europe and Central Asia, 2 Latin America and Caribbean, 3 Asia, 1 Middle East - North Africa, 8 Africa, and 1 international).

Sector
Natural Resource Management

Key actors
The organizations represented include: 7 EITI Multi-stakeholder Group (MSG) CSOs, 12 non-MSG CSOs, 1 government agency, 2 consultants, 1 company, and 5 CSOs that did not indicate MSG status.

Kind of accountability
The EITI includes elements of vertical and horizontal accountability

Tools used
The survey covers CSO participation in the EITI, broadly conceived, and thus does not focus on specific tools. One particular mechanism that the survey highlights is the Multi-Stakeholder Group (MSG). (All EITI-implementing countries have established multi-stakeholder steering groups, which typically have 10 to 20 members comprised of representatives from government, private companies, and civil society).

Broad intention
An important part of the EITI process is its support and requirement of civil society participation throughout the process of EI revenue disclosure. The assessment seeks to verify effective inclusion of CSOs in the EITI process.

Seeks to influence
It seeks to influence governments, private sector and CSO itself to become more inclusive. Enhancing civil society participation in the EITI represents a new mechanism for enhancing citizen voice.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
It is expected that CSO would play a larger role in the design, implementation and monitoring of revenue transparency and other EITI initiatives.
Evidence
Survey respondents expressed general agreement that the EITI process has resulted in enhanced CSO engagement in the EI sector, especially related to increased availability of information and government recognition that CSOs are an important part of the process. Furthermore, in more countries than not, CSO engagement in the EITI process tended to be in the early stages, i.e. allowing for CSO input into the design of important EITI mechanisms, selection processes, and decisions. However, there are still many concerns surrounding MSG selection process and in half the countries it was felt that the roles and responsibilities of CSOs within the EITI process remained either unclear or inadequate.

WB assistance is reported to have influenced two areas: enhancing CSO knowledge of the Extractives sector and convincing government of the importance of CSO participation in EITI. Although the Bank has been instrumental in providing more EITI-related information to CSOs, it appears that the Bank itself was not forthcoming with providing information on its own EI-related activities in a country.

It appears that CSO engagement with the EITI process would significantly improve if there was reliable and meaningful reported local level EI revenue data, especially for the use of the extractive industry-affected communities. To address this concern, the report suggested that more effort needs to be invested on: engaging with and inviting input from non-MSG groups, building the capacity of and creating the opportunity for local/community-based CSOs to act upon disclosed revenue data, increasing public awareness, and expanding the disclosure of information to include project-level revenue data, social expenditures (especially at the community-level), and contracts.

Methods
The survey was distributed in English, Russian, French, Spanish, and Arabic through the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) network mainly to PWYP members, but also to a few groups and individuals outside of the coalition. A copy of the original survey questions is attached at the end of the report.

Factors contributing to impact
Beyond the scope of this report.


General description
The RWI’s Parliamentary pilot program seeks to strengthen the oversight, transparency and fair distribution of revenues from the extraction of natural resources (oil, minerals and gas) in two resource rich countries: Ghana and Tanzania. The overview report contains three main sections: a critical revision of RWI’s proposed model of change, a comparative evaluation of the baseline findings in two countries, and a thorough discussion of policy and methodological recommendations for improved program implementation and final evaluation. The comparative evaluation is preceded by a comprehensive discussion of measuring challenges during the adaptation process and baseline evaluation.
Country and level of analysis

Sector
Natural Resource Management

Key actors
Members of Parliament, Parliamentary staffers, media, and civil society organizations.

Kind of accountability
Some components of vertical and horizontal accountability.

Tools used
Experts interviews, stakeholders survey.

Broad intention
The RWI’s Parliamentary pilot program seeks to strengthen the oversight, transparency and fair distribution of revenues from the extraction of natural resources (oil, minerals and gas) in two resource rich countries: Ghana and Tanzania.

Seeks to influence
The pilot program seeks to influence the knowledge of stakeholders to promote a more transparent and fairer process for extracting, distributing and allocating natural resource revenues, and improve their ability to effectively influence and oversee the transparent management of the extractives sector.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
RWI acknowledges that the effort to strengthen parliaments and other key stakeholders can be associated (albeit not directly) with visible improvements in poverty reduction, public service delivery, reduction of corruption indicators and promotion of greater democratic governance. The Institute’s proposed model of change builds on two premises: a) there is an accepted idea of the factors and interactions that produce “positive and poverty oriented changes”, and b) those changes can be observed and assessed with valid and reliable indicators over time. RWI hopes to “directly attribute” policy advocacy and technical assistance efforts made by Members of Parliament, media and civil society organizations, to “positive and poverty oriented changes” in extractive revenue and expenditure related policies and allocations. The proposed model of change empowers key stakeholders to become directly involved throughout all the stages of the extractive process, from licensing and contracting, to regulation, management and effective allocation of natural resource wealth.

Evidence
The initiative under review is a baseline evaluation, so findings are preliminary but nevertheless significant to signal the direction of expected impact.

- A first relevant finding is that the involved stakeholders (MPs, media, CSOs) have different “absorbing” capacities to benefit from increased training and knowledge. In both countries, CSO’s tend to be better informed than MP’s and both are better informed than Media organizations. In both countries, stakeholders tend to be better informed of domestic issues on the EI agenda rather than issues that are perceived to be
of an external nature (such as EITI). From this evidence, the report infers that media organizations can benefit most from training and awareness initiatives on issues such as EITI for example.

- In the same manner, the evaluation illustrates which actors have greater “influencing” capacities: in both countries, media organizations are reported to be much more capable of effectively influencing policy debates to promote more transparent contracting, fairer distribution and improved allocation of natural resource revenues than other stakeholders like CSOs or MPs. Paradoxically, independent media organizations in Tanzania have greater “influencing ability” than MPs or CSOs because they are not bound by legal and political constrains that limit their actions.

- Finally, comparative findings suggest there is a considerable knowledge-influencing gap between what stakeholders know about the EI sector and what stakeholders do to make it more transparent, equitable and efficient. In both countries MP’s tend to know more about EI issues than what they actually do with such knowledge (media organizations feature the reverse problem: they have an influencing potential far greater than their own knowledge of EI issues). This important gap validates the critical relevance of these parliamentary pilots to enhance the influencing ability of stakeholders in general, and MPs in particular.

**Methods**

The baseline evaluation was conducted in two stages: one adaptation stage to test and adjust the criteria proposed by the model of change by carrying out expert interviews on the ground in both countries. A second stage included carrying out stakeholder surveys with a representative sample of MPs, staffers, media and CSOs in both countries. The qualitative and survey quantitative evidence was assembled and discussed alongside archival evidence from projects on the ground as well as anecdotal evidence.

**Factors contributing to impact**

In addition to the proposed project interventions of training and capacity development, there are other factors associated with greater or more effective impact, including:

- the individual and often conflicting motivations of policy actors, especially MPs, to develop a proactive engagement with the EI governance agenda
- the parliament-specific constrains, including political and legal constrains, which may undermine the individuals’ ability –and willingness- to work towards EI governance
- the institutional-structural constraints such as the policy making predominance of the executive in the policy process and the weak oversight capability of specialized agencies, will reduce the stakeholders’ ability to produce meaningful policy changes.


**General description**

Rainbow Insight was commissioned by the EITI Secretariat in November 2008 to perform an evaluation of the initiative’s impact, both as a tool of public policy and as a mechanism for promoting multi-stakeholder engagement on natural resource revenues. The evaluation’s findings were presented at the EITI’s International Conference in Doha in February 2009.
Country and level of analysis
The report finds that the EITI is making a number of direct and indirect contributions to “good governance” with respect to natural resource revenues. First, it is establishing an emerging standard for the reporting of natural resource revenues by both corporations and governments. Second, within candidate countries it is providing a model of multi-stakeholder dialogue on a critical issue of public policy. Third, at the international level it is similarly forging a network composed of civil servants, corporate executives, and representatives of global civil society who share a commitment to revenue transparency in the hope of promoting economic development and poverty reduction.

Sector
Natural Resource Management

Key actors
Multiple stakeholders, including government officials, private sector companies, and civil society representatives.

Kind of accountability
Vertical and horizontal.

Tools used
Review of secondary literature and available country reports.

Broad intention
The report seeks to inform the EITI secretariat of progresses made in the adoption and validation of EITI initiatives and stakeholder engagement.

Seeks to influence
The report seeks to influence the EITI board on best practices for the adoption and validation of EITI initiatives and stakeholder engagement.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
The evaluation understands the term “impact” as not only the extent to which the EITI has emerged as a “global standard” for natural resource revenue transparency, but also the initiative’s role in promoting multi-stakeholder dialogue on a critical issue for public policy.

The report presents EITI as a means of helping countries avoid the “resource curse.” In their words, “the aim of the EITI is to ensure that citizens can reconcile what comes into their economy (the revenue side) with government accounts (the expenditure side), so that both industry and the state become more accountable to those who should ultimately benefit from the nation’s resource endowment.”

Evidence
The EITI has been effective in raising awareness of the importance of transparency and its links to sustained development. The existence of EITI as a multi-stakeholder organisation, in which transparency can now be discussed openly, is itself a success story. Indeed, in many countries natural resource revenues were previously classified as “state secrets” and were placed “off-
budget,” and so the introduction of EITI has made a major impact on the capacity of the public to analyze fiscal policy.

However, at the time of the report’s publication, not a single country had been validated. Further, an overwhelming majority of the stakeholders interviewed do not believe that validation will be rapid in coming years.

**Methods**

This evaluation is largely qualitative and has been based on: a review of published material; a written questionnaire and series of interviews with many EITI stakeholders (including Board members, industry executives, public officials, and members of global civil society); and an on-site visit to an EITI Candidate Country (Cameroon).

The researchers were unable to perform any statistical or econometric testing of the EITI’s independent impact on budget transparency owing to the paucity of empirical data or “observations” (no countries have yet been validated as EITI compliant). They also note that statistical or econometric testing of the EITI “residual” would likely prove challenging in the face of other, complementary initiatives which have supporting objectives (e.g. the IMF’s ongoing efforts to promote Resource Revenue Transparency), and would likely require more time and resources than were available for the present report.

Researchers also suggest that the EITI Board and Secretariat put into place a formal set of benchmarks or Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) in order to assess the EITI’s performance. They state that they are not convinced that the current KPIs are really useful for purposes of critical self-evaluation. KPIs should cover both organizational and marketing aspects of the EITI, the former referring to the Initiative’s operations (such measures could include gender and country balance among staff-members; training hours, and so forth) and the latter referring to its success in implementation (which should also include attrition meaning countries that leave the EITI). Further, the KPIs need not be purely quantitative but could include longer-range “directional” indicators as well. The EITI will also need to give some thought to indicators that focus on public engagement with the initiative, beyond website visits and newspaper reports.

**Factors contributing to impact**

To the extent that the EITI has been a success, much of that is due to the actions of its Board and its Secretariat. The Board has brought together three key constituencies: governments, firms, and civil society. The achievement of maintaining commitment among these stakeholders is hugely significant. It is a credit to the Board that it has set high standards in overseeing the development of infrastructure, processes and materials. The Board has also recognized the difficulties inherent in placing too much pressure on candidate countries, while trying to maintain the initiative’s momentum: this is a difficult balancing act. *At the same time, some stakeholders have suggested that candidate countries are under-represented on the Board,* and that Board discussions are dominated by debates between civil society and corporate representatives. Further, working relations between the Board and the World Bank—which does not have a formal seat on the Board—could be improved in the interest of greater coherence and efficiency, particularly since the Bank plays an important role in the management of technical assistance funds.
One challenge facing all those who seek greater transparency in Cameroon’s reporting of its natural resource—and in particular, its oil—revenues is the complexity of the country’s Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs).


General description
This report presents the results of the Revenue Watch Index, which assesses the transparency of government revenues from the extractive sector (oil, natural gas and minerals)

Country and level of analysis
The Revenue Watch Index assesses 39 resource-rich countries around the world. The Index focuses primarily on national-level transparency, though includes some questions about sub-national transfers.

Sector
Natural Resource Management

Key actors
Revenue Watch Institute and associated researchers; governments and state-owned companies in assessed countries

Kind of accountability
The Revenue Watch Index is primarily concerned with vertical accountability, which is seen as a consequence of greater transparency in this context.

Tools used
The Revenue Watch Index is based on a detailed questionnaire, filled in by researchers and reviewed by country experts. (More details below in Methods section.)

Broad intention
The Index aims to address the fact that there has been no specific assessment to date of revenue transparency in resource-dependent countries.

Seeks to influence
The report concludes with policy recommendations addressed to various actors, including governments, civil society, parliamentarians and companies. In particular, the report targets the International Accounting Standards Board, the United States and other G20 governments, international financial institutions, and makes recommendations for improving implementation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
The report highlights the anticipated benefits of boosting transparency around revenues from natural resources: “The underlying assumption of this index is that transparent and accountable management of natural resource revenues is essential to the development and stability of all oil, gas and mineral producing countries. Recent studies find that countries with greater public access to information have higher governance scores and higher economic growth. Moreover,
research shows that more transparent countries have better credit ratings, better fiscal discipline and less corruption. Further evidence has emerged that countries with less transparency have lower per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), lower Foreign Direct Investment and higher capital costs than more transparent countries” (p. 8).

The report further notes: “The goal of the Index is to contribute to the good governance debate by providing a concrete and specific definition of what extractive sector transparency means. It creates a comparative analytic framework to begin assessing individual countries performances against best practice, as well as against their peers. The index provides civil society and parliaments with robust empirical data that can be used to critique their country’s performance and demand higher standards of transparency and accountability in the extractive sector” (p. 8).

Evidence
The Revenue Watch Index shows that levels of transparency in natural resource governance tend to be rather limited across the world, with the majority of the countries (30 out of 41) ranking in the two lowest categories of the Index. The report finds that governments are more likely to disclose operational rather than financial information. In addition, the report highlights the divide between de facto and de jure transparency. For instance, many countries that score poorly on the overall Index manage to do well in terms of Institutional Setting and EITI categories. Finally, among the countries surveyed, contract transparency is rare, with Colombia, Liberia, Peru, Timor-Leste and the United States being the only governments that publish their valid contracts (or leases) in full. In numerous countries that perform poorly on the index overall, governments do not even disclose contracts to their legislatures.

Methods
The questionnaire assesses information that governments publish about the oil, gas and mining sector in a comprehensive manner. First, the questionnaire identifies a set of key documents published by governmental agencies that deal with extractive resources. Second, the questionnaire identifies publicly available information and institutional practices on a series of issues highlighted by international guidelines, experts and international campaigns on transparency. The Index covers seven categories that represent key areas of natural resource governance:

1. Access to resources
2. Generation of revenue
3. Institutional setting
4. State-owned companies: the availability of information regarding the governance structures of state-owned entities and the reporting practices related to their activities.
5. Natural resource funds: the rules governing the operation of funds and the availability of information regarding their functioning.
6. Sub-national transfers
7. EITI

The questionnaire has two types of questions: transparency and legal and regulatory framework. The Revenue Watch Index is constructed as a simple average of the transparency-related questions.
Factors contributing to impact
This is outside of the scope of this study.


General description
The report discusses the origins and structure of PWYP, assesses the effectiveness of PWYP’s advocacy and policy endeavours and examines how the Coalition has operated internationally. In this sense, the report is not only a narrative of PWYP’s history, but a practical tool to shine a light on how PWYP has been able to achieve its success and overcome its challenges between the years 2002 and 2007. Furthermore, the report looks at various issues that the PWYP coalition must confront in order to continue to deliver results in the future.

Country and level of analysis
This report looks at a London-based initiative but with a global NGO and community-based partnerships in a wide range of countries.

Sector
Natural resource management

Key actors
PWYP is a global network of NGOs, advocacy organisations, community-based organisations and faith-based communities. Other key actors involved include government and the extractive industries.

Kind of accountability
Vertical (government vs. citizens) and horizontal (intra government) types.

Tools used
PWYP is a transnational coalition that advocates for and advises on resource revenue transparency. This includes a host of recommendations on public- and private-sector accounting sectors, the publication of payments and receipts in resource-related transactions, etc.

Broad intention
To require full transparency in the payment, receipt and management of natural resource revenues; to promote public disclosure of extractive contracts; and encourage civil society participation in the monitoring of revenue expenditures.

Seeks to influence
The transparency of financial deals between government and the extractive industries.
Expected impact and underlying assumptions

- The lack of transparency in the payment and receipt of natural resource revenues has fostered corruption and mismanagement by officials in countries where oil, gas and mining industries are an important source of income.
- If citizens know how much their government gets paid for the extraction of the country’s natural resources, it becomes much easier to monitor how the revenue is spent.
- Revenue monitoring can then serve as a basis for organising revenues towards mobilising revenues for poverty reduction, economic growth and development.

Evidence

- The mobilisation of civil society organisations to campaign collectively at the international, national and local levels for greater transparency in the extractive industries. This has occurred within a relatively short period of time, against a backdrop in which – only a few years prior – many affiliated NGOs were unable to talk openly about the issue of revenue transparency in their countries.
- Revenue transparency has become an accepted norm of corporate behaviour. Even if companies are not operating with full transparency, they no longer have a choice as to whether to engage in the debate or not.
- International financial institutions and donor agencies have incorporated revenue transparency programmes and requirements into their donor strategies.
- The creation of the EITI, which draws many of the implementation guidelines and operating procedures from PWYP and enshrines the participation of civil society groups.
- The companies Statoil Hydro, Talisman Energy and Newmont Mining voluntarily agreed to disclose payments to governments on a country-by-country basis.
- The assembling of institutional investors and pension fund managers, now representing some US$13 trillion in funds, to support calls for greater transparency of payments and revenues in the extractive industry.
- The agenda has progressed beyond resource revenue transparency to look at how concessions are awarded, how contracts are negotiated and how money from oil, gas and mining is spent. Thus, transparency of the entire extractive industry ‘value chain’ is now being tackled.

Methods

This report draws on historical research methods in its presentation of PWYP’s work. It traces the activities and accomplishments of PWYP drawing from organisational documentation as well as other historical references published by donor agencies, legislative bodies, etc.

Factors contributing to impact

- PWYP’s underlying message is simple and powerful: the citizens of countries that are rich in natural resources should not be poor. Because its objectives are clear and streamlined, PWYP has succeeded in getting revenue transparency on international political and business agendas.
- PWYP’s organisational structure allows it to deliver concrete results and to generate broad ownership among its members. It leverages the various strengths of each of its members to support its goals and acknowledges openly weaknesses, as they arise.
• PWYP operates with minimum bureaucracy and is largely ad hoc. There is no centralised budget covering all of PWYP’s activities; rather, partners are encouraged to use their own resources – both human and financial – to contribute to overall advocacy efforts.

• Individuals involved with PWYP take risks: In some cases, they were prepared to collaborate with others despite different policy perspectives because their objective on this issue was aligned. In other cases, individuals had to push hard against local forms of resistance to their campaign for reform.

• PWYP has a powerful core objective, based in the political capital of a rich country, which complements existing local priorities of civil society activists promoting good governance and corporate responsibility in the south.
6. Aid Transparency


General description
The book explores whether and how countries benefiting from debt relief have used the proceeds to improve social service delivery to their citizens. It analyses whether the scaling-up of external assistance (in particular using debt relief) has allowed poor countries to accelerate their progress towards the Millennium Development Goals.

Country and level of analysis
Four country cases are studied in depth - Ghana, Malawi, Senegal and Uganda. These cases are discussed in the context of wider characteristics and tendencies across African highly indebted poor countries as a whole (which in 2007 numbered 33).

Sector
Aid (the book is not specifically about aid transparency and accountability but has findings relevant to these).

Key actors
African governments, donors to Africa, African Development Bank, international financial institutions as those responsible for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.

Kind of accountability
Transparency over aid resources – ie downward aid transparency/accountability from bilateral and multilateral donors to aid-dependent governments; and aid-recipient governments’ domestic downward transparency/accountability to civil society organisations and poor citizens, whom HIPC debt relief initiative was meant to benefit.

Tools used
The book reports on the use of a case study approach to study effects of debt relief and related development assistance on service delivery in Africa, relating these to progress towards the MDGs.

Broad intention
The book is ‘inspired by the need to deepen the AfDB’s knowledge of whether and how countries benefiting from debt relief have used the proceeds to improve social service delivery to their citizens. [...] has scaling up external assistance (in particular using debt relief) allowed these countries to accelerate progress towards the Millennium Development Goals [...]?’ (v).

Seeks to influence
Donors to Africa; African countries benefiting from debt relief.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
The expected impact of this study was better targeted, more efficient spending on poverty reduction and delivery of social services, as debt relief and aid flows to Africa increased in wake of Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative (1996), enhanced HIPC initiative (1999) and
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (2005). HIPC incorporated a strong focus on public finance management, including the introduction of Accountability Action Plans (AAPs) for tracking all stages of budget processes relating to HIPC. These sought to enhance powers and staffing for internal audit in-country; legal powers and independence of Supreme Audit Institutions; powers of parliamentary committees and plenary sessions to debate public expenditures; investigative powers of anti-corruption agencies; efficiency of procurement regulations; accountability of finance ministries, line ministries and decentralised agencies to civil society, through community monitoring of expenditures or even community execution of expenditures (53-4).

The study relates to aid transparency and accountability insofar as ‘debt relief has become equivalent to good quality budget support (that is, flexible and predictable) [and] all four countries kept separate records on HIPC-funded spending, making it possible for this to be tracked’ (16).

Evidence
The case studies’ main message, confirmed by wider analysis of other African HIPCs, is that ‘debt relief has a major positive impact on the MDGs if it is accompanied by stable or rising high-quality aid and high accountability and capacity in NDG spending. However, debt relief can be undermined by volatile or low-quality aid, less effective spending, and failure to execute or be accountable for the effectiveness of MDG spending’ (59-60).

The study demonstrates how the lack of good data on donor disbursements obliges African governments to rely on aid pledges in preparing their national budgets and Medium term Expenditure Frameworks, and shows how this lead to consistently over-optimistic aid disbursement projections, and consequently shortfalls in aid and difficulties in rationalising budget management and social spending (21).

A core finding is that:

“The most effective means of accountability seems to have been accountability to local beneficiary agencies, communities, and poor citizens. This can occur through official provision of information and through monitoring and reporting channels for the poor (as in the response to PETS). However, it can also be promoted by involving civil society representatives in the design of poverty reduction strategies and annual budgets, allowing them to gain greater understanding of intended results from the beginning [and] the widespread diffusion in the media of details of expected results of spending at the most disaggregated level possible, supported by training of the media in how to interpret and check the results of such spending. Yet these methods were not widely used by governments or even sponsored by donors” (55).

Four conclusions of the book are of key interest:
- Much more effort is needed from donors to reinforce the ability of African civil society and other branches of government to hold executives to account for spending and MDG results. Major support and funding for capacity-strengthening is needed, (i) of African officials to design and implement aid strategies and manage donors, including over aid transparency and predictability (ii) of Supreme Audit Institutions and Parliaments to assess results, and (iii) of civil society and community actors to hold governments accountable.
• Particularly large improvements are needed in monitoring spending and tracking results from the perspective of the most vulnerable (61).
• Donors should set up ways for African governments and civil societies to hold donors themselves accountable for their performance, as a group and individually, in relation to each African aid-recipient country; and to themselves hold aid recipients accountable for aid and spending results (61).
• More broadly (p 62), donors need to integrate into their country analytical work the kind of process and impact analysis used in this study, so as to improve their identification of process needs including where capacity-building is required for increasing African governments’ accountability and effectiveness.

Methods
Country case studies were used as a more appropriate methodology for understanding explanatory factors than the statistical multivariate analysis that was used in a prior AfDB study (5). Case studies permit analysis of links between debt relief and social spending by (p6):
• Obtaining more up-to-date information on debt relief, expenditure, and the outcomes of public service delivery;
• Measuring debt relief using the amount of annual debt service saved for potential MDG spending instead of present value savings;
• Assessing the impact of wider budget financing beyond external debt relief, thus taking account of aid and domestic debt trends;
• Most importantly (rather than using multi-country indices) allowing a much more detailed qualitative analysis of the institutions countries put in place to channel debt relief to social services, how these institutions functioned at each stage of the financing and spending process, and under what circumstances these improved delivery’ (6).

Four cases were selected to capture heterogeneity along several axes including governance quality (deemed high, medium or low), so that the sample could be considered broadly representative of other African countries’ potential experiences. The studies were implemented by teams of senior national officials who have been responsible for managing debt relief, aid, and anti-poverty spending in their countries. They conducted retrospective surveys, public finance analysis and interviews, and consulted national documents and data.’ Findings are contextualised by broad reference to the experience of other African countries and in particular with reference to a complementary fifteen-country data analysis and literature review, ‘to present a more comprehensive picture of cross-country comparative results and policy lessons for African countries’ (7).

Factors contributing to impact
One factor increasing the likelihood that aid transparency and accountability will increase aid’s impact on social spending and poverty reduction is the establishment of conditions relating the integration of aid and debt relief resources into normal budgetary processes, to the release of aid and debt relief funds (18). A key factor affecting this study’s findings is that ‘[t]he HIPC focus on budgetary processes and reforms has renewed emphasis on public expenditure management, in particular, the integration and tracking of poverty-related spending in the budget process’ – closely related to aid transparency and accountability (18). The kind of donor aid monitoring and statistical treatment of projections that is available to a country like Uganda with relatively high public finance management capacity, has proved key to ensuring that lack of transparency does not have major negative impacts on budget processes - but such capacity is
not available to all affected countries by any means (21). A negative factor is that ‘[a]s long as donors keep their aid off-budget, even if the aid is used for MDG-related goals, it is not possible to track any increases in MDG spending’ (20). i.e. donors can and do undermine their own aid transparency efforts by simultaneously continuing non-transparent aid delivery practices.

Gaps
The methods that proved most effective in generating accountability for debt relief and social spending on poverty reduction (accountability to local beneficiaries and poor citizens, through info provision and monitoring and reporting by the poor, media diffusion and training of the media in interpretation and spending-checks) are not widely used by governments or sponsored by donors, and could be more so (55).


General description
Prepared for a conference by the aid transparency initiative AidData in March 2010, this paper reports on statistical modelling designed to test the hypothesis that more aid transparency will reduce corruption in recipient countries by reducing the scope for capture by recipient governments or their contractors.

Country and level of analysis
Data covering ninety-five countries between 1999 and 2004 for a total of 1300 country-years were used. The time-span was dictated by current data limitations on key explanatory variables. Variables were established using a range of indices and rankings: corruption at national level using a three-year rolling average of countries’ scores on the International Country Risk Guide’s 6-point scale; donor transparency proxied (simply but admittedly imperfectly) by project-level data from the AidData/PLAID 1.91 database; a variable capturing aid transparency per recipient-year, derived from number of projects received in a given year and the respective projects’ transparency; and a five-year moving average of that median, to allow for the fact that multi-year aid transparency trends might be more important in determining corruption that year-on-year variations. The question that can be answered about relative aid transparency is therefore a ‘recipient-level’ question rather than a ‘donor-level’ question, comparing not the transparency of one donor’s aid with that of another, but the transparency of the aid received by one recipient to the aid received by another.

Sector
Aid transparency; access to information

Key actors
The authors are academic researchers. Acting as data intermediaries they use data provided by AidData, on the official development aid given by official donor agencies, to explore the effects of aid transparency.
Kind of accountability
The paper is about transparency rather than accountability per se. Among several propositions in favour of aid transparency that it sets out is one which directly relates aid transparency to the accountability of aid, as follows: ‘greater information about aid permits citizens, the media, and watchdog groups to hold governments and their contractors accountable for how the aid is used’ (p. 1). At the core of this research, this proposition is about aid transparency - seen as an element of bureaucratic accountability - facilitating social accountability in aid-recipient countries.

Tools used
The paper demonstrates the potential afforded by open-access aid data for intermediaries to use the data to further accountability and transparency ends. The tool used by the authors/researchers was statistical (regression) analysis, made possible by AidData’s open-access provision of the necessary aid statistics.

Broad intention
The intention was to test the hypothesis that more aid transparency will reduce corruption in recipient countries, in a statistically rigorous way that controlled for selection bias.

Seeks to influence
This research explicitly seeks to influence official donor agencies concerned about corruption in aid-recipient governments. It has implications too for all givers of aid, whether official development assistance, NGO aid or private donations.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
The assumption the paper explicitly sets out to test is the proposition that greater aid transparency will reduce corruption in aid-recipient countries. A background assumption relates high aid dependency to high levels of corruption in recipient countries. Specifically, the researchers hypothesise that:

‘[...] more transparent aid causes corruption to decline. As the share of aid that a given recipient collects from more transparent donors increases, more is known about the details of specific development projects implemented within that recipient country. The greater degree of information enables interested parties – be they non-governmental watchdog groups, journalists, or ordinary citizens – to track the projects and verify that the money was spent for its intended purpose. When discrepancies between planned development activities and those actually implemented are identified, activists can trigger ‘fire alarms’ that requires politicians in the donor government – and perhaps even in the recipient government – to account for the project in question’ (6).

Evidence
From regression analysis conducted on a time-series cross-national dataset a strong statistical relationship was found between greater donor transparency and lower recipient corruption. The authors spell out the limitations in their proxies and the gaps in the raw data which may affect their findings. They qualify their findings by stating that if their estimates, assumptions and statistical techniques have successfully accounted for the factors that influence aid allocation, then their results can be interpreted causally, as showing the effects of aid transparency on recipient corruption and revealing that these effects are substantial.
The authors conclude that this paper has made a ‘strong first move’ in the direction of demonstrating with robust statistical evidence that failure to transparently report aid leads to increased corruption among recipients, noting that the results, while confirming their hypothesis, surprised even them with the potential magnitude of the causal effects (31). The evidence thus strongly suggests that donors can dampen corruption among aid recipients by making their own aid more transparent.

**Methods**

Key methodological difficulties that the research design had to overcome are selection bias and endogeneity or ‘confounding’. The fact that ‘donors that value transparency might make more information available about their aid [but at the same time transparent donors may also specifically target less corrupt countries as recipients of their aid [thus extending] the ethos of transparency to the selection of their beneficiaries’ (p 2). Also donors’ fear of aid capture in certain corrupt environments may lead them to be extra-transparent in how they give it.

Propensity score matching\(^{16}\), via two different procedures, was used to account for selection effects. Using data available at AidData from nearly one million projects totalling $4.2 trillion, the researchers partitioned the sample into seven segments ranked according to recipients’ likelihood of receiving aid from the more transparent donors; performed regression analysis on each of the seven subclasses assessing the effects of aid transparency on corruption levels; and combined the results to generate an overall estimate of effects of aid transparency on corruption (p 2-3). They also performed robustness checks, by matching ‘treatment’ observations to ‘control’ counterparts and performing regression analysis on the matched sample. A range of techniques is also used to control for endogeneity effects.

**Factors contributing to impact**

The researchers posit, broadly, that variance in donor transparency generates different incentives for politicians and bureaucrats working under the different transparency regimes.

Specifically, they argue that knowing their aid is being scrutinised motivates politicians and bureaucrats in transparent donor countries to monitor the processes and outputs of their aid projects more closely (8). This might entail, for example, developing procurement and contracting procedures that make it harder to siphon off aid to ‘phony shell corporations’; more specific aid targeting; earmarking of a proportion of aid for projects designed to improve governance and reduce corruption in recipient governments (8).

From the perspective of a recipient-country politician tasked with allocating foreign aid, ‘if the aid portfolio is transparent, with projects thoroughly described and categorized according to international standards, the politician can anticipate that others in the aid community, including NGOs or newspaper reporters, can track the aid, identify problems, and raise concerns publicly (8-9).

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\(^{16}\) ‘a methodology attempting to provide unbiased estimation of treatment effects [...] for cases of causal interference and simple selection bias in non-experimental settings’ – Wikipedia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propensity_score_matching
Secondary evidence from activism on World Bank environmental reform is cited to illustrate how the prominence attained in the media and in public opinion by scandals over foreign aid has prompted far-reaching reforms in aid agencies (9).

In respect of what makes a donor more or less transparent, the authors report from other research into the Development Assistance Committee’s aid data that in the more transparent countries reporting requirements have been driven upwards by concerned voters extracting more information from their politicians. ‘Greater breath of aid information [...] generally results from more stringent reporting requirements placed by the principals on the aid organizations, be they bilateral or multilateral’ (12).

By way of possible explanation for the surprising magnitude of the effect of donor transparency on recipient corruption, the authors speculate that aid transparency ‘gives watchdog actors a leg up when trying to police governments to deliver promised aid in its intended form’ and that each increment in donor transparency, however small, provides activists with additional leverage for fighting aid project corruption (25). An alternative speculative explanation is that donors prioritising anti-corruption, while reporting more information about their own projects, also reduce their recipients’ corruption by other more direct means such as conditionality or anti-corruption training, in which case data coverage is a proxy for rather than a measure of donor transparency.

Gaps
In concluding reflections the researchers announce that they will work further to develop proxies for aid transparency, including weighting different AidData fields according to their importance; will impute the missing data to guard further against sample bias; and will test causal assumptions in individual cases by means of qualitative and historical tracing.


General description
This is a collection of case studies of claims made to the World Bank Inspection Panel (WBIP) against World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and International Development Association) projects. A ‘citizen-driven public accountability process’, the WBIP was introduced in response to pressure from civil society organisations and is utilised by civil society organisations in North and South acting with or on behalf of citizens in countries where the WB operates, who expect to be negatively affected by Bank operations. The introduction spells out key terms as follows:

- ‘Transparency refers here to public access to information about institutions and their actions, while accountability is widely understood as referring to those institutions’ public answerability for their actions. Transparency is necessary but not sufficient for accountability’ (footnote 2, p xxiii).
- ‘Accountability politics [is] the effort to hold powerful actors to their previously stated policies or principles [...], the process of holding actors responsible for their actions. This involves answerability – usually formal processes in which actions are held up to standards of behaviour or performance [...O]thers prefer more rigorous criteria, which include sanctions for violations of standards’ (xii).
Country and level of analysis:
The WBIP’s remit covers IBRD and IDA. Its scope extends to all World Bank borrower countries. The case studies presented and analysed in this book are of nine claims out of a total of twenty-eight made to the WBIP, on projects in Nepal, Brazil (2), Argentina(2)/Paraguay, Bangladesh, Chile, India and China.

Sector
Aid accountability and transparency

Key actors
The actor under scrutiny is the World Bank Inspection Panel, instigated as a transparency and accountability mechanism for prevention and redress of harm against people in borrower countries negatively affected by WB-funded projects. Actors who have brought the claims are campaigners on human rights, environment and social justice, working with and on behalf of affected parties in borrower countries, helped by northern-based campaigners on the International Financial Institutions such as the Bank Information Centre, and environmental NGOs.

Kind of accountability
The WBIP was conceived explicitly as a horizontal accountability mechanism – one part of the WB exacting accountability from others. While the WBIP itself is a horizontal public accountability mechanism, its working depends on demand and support from social actors outside the Bank – ie, on social accountability – and its aim is to deliver some downwards accountability to affected people (p xv).

Tools used
The WBIP ‘allows local people [or in most cases the CSOs representing them] who are affected by a WB-funded project to file a complaint and request an independent investigation into whether the bank complied with its own environmental and social policies’ (xii). It is a form of ‘thinking locally and acting globally’ (p xv), in that it enables recourse to an international instrument when local-level attempts to advance grassroots causes have been blocked. It operates within the limits of the WB’s own ‘safeguard’ policies (environmental, social, etc), and is circumscribed to the WB (ie it excludes borrowing governments, except insofar as their actions lead to WB non-compliance with its own policies).

The WBIP was created, and access to Bank information greatly increased, in an effort ‘designed to use the power of “sunshine”’(p xiv). They were obtained in response to a ‘fix it or nix it’ bargaining strategy (footnote 9, p xiii), in which campaigners threatened to push for cuts in US congressional appropriations unless the World Bank systemically addressed accountability and transparency weaknesses.

This book is not about simple ‘aid information’-type transparency, but (horizontal) aid accountability to policies and (downwards) aid accountability to affected parties. The Inspection Panel is a transparency measure - a way of making information accessible -, as well as a vehicle of institutional answerability and a way to obtain sanctions and remediation, to use terms borrowed from Fox (2007: 668). By providing clear transparency as opposed to opaque transparency, it seeks to make the World Bank answerable and sanctionable.
Broad intention
The WBIP intends to make a dominant international institution transparent and hold it accountable to its own rules, using the power of “sunshine” to ‘discourage the most egregious abuses and empower pro-reform forces both inside and outside the institution’ (p xiv). More broadly, it aims to contribute to reform of multilateral institution. The book, published ten years into the WBIP’s life, aims to explore ‘how the process has affected projects on the ground’, and ‘whether the panel’s case history has changed the way the Bank does business’ (247).

Seeks to influence
The main influencing target is the World Bank, via obtaining compliance with policies, securing changes in policies, strengthening reformers within, and empowering pro-reform actors outside. Implicitly its lessons also target the other international financial institutions and other international aid agencies.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
‘The board created the WBIP in 1993 to encourage improved bank compliance with its own policies. Some board members implicitly accepted the crosscutting political principle that multilateral organizations should also be accountable to the people they directly affect’ (xiv).


Evidence
These are case studies of key claims made to Inspection Panel, based on extensive independent field research including presentation of views of direct participants in the claim process in question. The actual impact attained varies with claim/case:
- Some significant direct impacts eg policy reforms, including some with important precedents with applications beyond the range of the WBIP itself
- Some withdrawals of WB funding for projects with potentially devastating effects
- Minimal mitigation or no impact
- Responses which had divisive effect on social actor claimants, inadvertently or otherwise
- Backlashes against claimants from their governments and even HRs violations
- WBIP’s working has changed whose voices count and who listens, in these nine cases.

The existence of WBIP is seen to have had a positive impact on the Bank as an institution:
- adoption of policies and improvement of internal structures for compliance – eg IFC (International Financial Corporation) and MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency) established a Compliance Advisor 1998 and Ombudsman’s Office 1999, whereas formerly these arms of the WB Group that loan to the private sector had no accountability mechanisms
- Perception among WB staff that the WBIP has contributed to better policy compliance, partly due to turmoil and embarrassment caused by claims and recognition of costs (including reputational costs) of non-compliance.
- Measures put in place to strengthen WB’s capacity to make its safeguards work (eg staff training, advisory desk, screening procedures etc)
• Transparency attained on WB website about safeguard policies which apply to each project the WB finances

However, improvements in compliance do not amount to the policies' objectives being met, and improved systems do not equal improved accountability. Also, these improvements happened against a backdrop of other tendencies that led to reduced accountability, via attacks on the WB's safeguard policies by management and some borrowers.

One possibly negative and unintended consequence of WBIP's successes is that WB staff are becoming risk-averse, ‘avoiding certain types of projects’ (271) – but there are diverse views on whether this increased risk aversion is a good or bad thing. Another is that the Bank sought to move the policy goalposts – it became careful to set policy that it would implement it in practice, weakening its safeguard policies, as well as shifting compliance responsibility to borrowers, who are beyond WBIP’s purview (272). The study shows that ‘project and policy improvements do not always guarantee the substantive project-level outcomes that claimants seek’ (274).

On the other hand, the WBIP experience has provided important lessons in process and concepts of accountability, with other regional development banks now coming under greater scrutiny or introducing accountability mechanisms. On balance, the WBIP process has had contradictory effects on WB’s safeguards policy framework (273-4).

**Methods**
The book’s chapters consist of independent analysis of case studies of key claims made since the WBIP was established, including perspectives from directly involved claimants and giving an assessment of strengths and weaknesses of the panel process as evinced by these cases.

**Factors contributing to impact**
The WBIP has taken effect partly by altering the conception of governance within the WB to embrace a more political dimension: ‘that the institution must be accountable to the people affected by its lending’ (247). The testing of commitments with reference to practice rather than to policy statements has been a key factor in attaining impact. An unfortunate reality is that impact of claims is correlated with severe risk or proof of harm to claimants – and the sector of the project or loan is a determining factor, with most claims and most impacts being associated with infrastructure projects.

Some factors that have generated impact by affecting staff: (fear of) public exposure, the ‘scandal factor’, turmoil and embarrassment among responsible staff; but also risk aversion arising from the above, which while potentially reducing abuses and harm to people, is not necessarily a positive factor contributing to the WBIP’s impact in a positive sense.

The work of transnational coalition behind and around the claimants has been critical important, from raising initial awareness of the WBIP as a recourse, to providing the necessary technical knowhow to claimants, to tracking the process through the machinery, to providing critique on the mechanism itself. The persistence of civil society advocates, through what have proved to be slow processes of incremental change, has been a key factor. No doubt largely resulting from transnational civil society actors’ efforts, the visibility and legitimacy of the WBIP has enhanced
its chances of impact. The requirement of direct involvement of southern affected people and their close allies has given authenticity and focus and made it a very citizen-led initiative.

The way the tool (the WBIP) itself is designed gives rise to two kinds of limitation: the WB and borrower governments tend to blame each other for failings; and, the WBIP’s mandate is constantly under contestation including by borrower governments who are on the WB’s Board.

Actual participation of claimants has been limited to filing claims, with no right to appeal – which means that they lose control of the process early on. Design limitations – in the jurisdiction, mandate and workings of the WBIP – have limited its effectiveness, not least by enabling the agent (the Board) to abdicate responsibility with no effective sanction ensuing.

Defensive, antagonistic attitudes by Bank officials and borrower governments have limited the WBIPs’ effectiveness as well as causing a need to constantly withstand and address backsliding tendencies.

**Gaps**

The study being focused on one transparency initiative and on in-depth case studies, its findings have little applicability to other initiatives, although its methodology could be usefully replicated for assessing and understanding the impact of other such mechanisms elsewhere.


**General description**

The paper attempts to quantify the financial costs and benefits, and highlight some of the non-financial costs and benefits, of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), a major donor-led effort introduced in 2008 to enhance the transparency of aid.

**Country and level of analysis**

Its scope is potentially global as it refers to an international initiative that any donor of official or other forms of aid (eg, private aid flows, NGO aid) can join. It is based on visits to the headquarters of four donor agencies and a survey that elicited responses from seven donors (GTZ, DfID, DANIDA, Swiss Cooperation, World Bank, Asian Development Bank and UNDP) in fourteen countries (Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Malawi, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda and Zambia).

**Sector**

Aid transparency

**Key actors**

The key actors discussed in this report and also targeted by it are official bilateral and multilateral donors actually and potentially belonging to IATI, and non-governmental donors, which may become involved in IATI.
Kind of accountability
IATI is a transparency mechanism, introduced partly in response to pressure from civil society aid transparency campaigners. It currently operates as a form of publicly-funded self-regulation by official donors, with CSO participation in its steering committee, but has the scope to extend to the operations of all actors that give aid, including private and NGO sources. Thus, it is not a social accountability initiative but incorporates elements of both social and public sector accountability.

This report, coming from one civil society actor (aidinfo, which is part of Development Initiatives for Poverty Reduction) that was instrumental in the establishment of IATI, aims to make a – mainly financial - case for IATI and its extension to aid-giving actors beyond its current membership.

Tools used
IATI uses as its tools common standards as to the information provided on international aid, and an online registry that records the location of information about all aid given by participating donors.

Broad intention
The intention of IATI is to make information about aid spending easier to access, use and understand (IATI no date, ‘Supporting Aid transparency’, briefing paper). The intention of this report is to set out the costs and benefits of greater aid transparency as pursued in the form of IATI.

Seeks to influence
At the proximate level, IATI seeks to benefit aid recipients, at this stage mainly recipient country governments, and aid-giving peers. Ultimately, it seeks to benefit people in aid-recipient countries by rendering aid to them more transparent and hence more effective and efficient. This report seeks to influence current IATI signatories plus other aid-givers that are not currently signatories.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
IATI’s own statement of its expected impact is to ‘[make] information about aid spending easier to access, use and understand’ (IATI no date, ‘Supporting Aid Transparency’, briefing paper).

Since aidinfo’s cost-benefit analysis report was produced just a year after IATI was launched, it cannot report any actual impact of IATI in terms of increased aid effectiveness or efficiency. Its focus in any case is to set out the benefits expected from IATI in relation to the costs, rather than assess its impact. It estimates that ‘increases in effectiveness from increased aid transparency by IATI signatories might lead to improvements in aid effectiveness which are approximately equivalent to a permanent increase in global aid of 1.3%. If the IATI standard were implemented by all DAC donors we estimate that this would enable improvements equivalent to a permanent increase of 2.3% in global aid, or $2.8 billion a year. These increases in aid effectiveness would produce benefits in less than a single day that exceed the estimated costs of implementing IATI’ (p 2).
Without attempting to quantify them, the report speculates (p 4) about ‘other, less tangible possible benefits, such as improved aid allocation, more and better research [on aid] and greater willingness to give aid’.

The postulated benefits or positive impacts of IATI are stated in terms of:

- Reduced administrative costs of reporting aid information and time spent responding to information requests
- Savings for organisations that collect data (including think tanks, researchers and international organisations and NGOs that advocate about and analyse aid)
- Reduced diversion of aid resources to non-legitimate uses
- Macroeconomic benefits of greater aid predictability
- Avoiding aid coordination failures
- Improving aid allocations between donors, thereby attaining bigger poverty impact
- Improved quality of research into development programmes
- Greater willingness to give aid

Many assumptions underlie these expectations (detailed in an accompanying technical note by Barder, Owen 2009, ‘The Costs and Benefits of Aid Transparency: A Draft Analytical Framework - Appendix 1: Information, Accountability and Preventing Capture’). A absolutely crucial one is that the financial savings incurred by aid bureaucracies from a system of standardised, pooled aid information will be reassigned to development activities in developing countries and that these activities themselves will be developmentally effective.

Evidence
There is no evidence to date, not least because IATI had only been launched a year before this report was published and was still being set up. The report does manage to assemble quantitative estimates of the administrative costs of providing aid transparency via the IATI mechanism, and the costs of existing provision of aid transparency by individual aid-givers (ie before IATI was operational).

Methods
Fact-finding visits were made to the headquarters of four donor agencies to interview. ‘These visits appraised the way that donors currently gather information and began to assess the likely costs and immediate benefits of complying with IATI’ (p 14). A survey was conducted that elicited responses from seven donors (GTZ, DfID, DANIDA, Swiss Cooperation, World Bank, Asian Development Bank and UNDP) in fourteen countries (Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Malawi, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda and Zambia).

Factors contributing to impact
On the basis of these estimates it can be stated that cost-effectiveness (which is not impact, but is all this report is able to cover) will be increased the more aid-givers participate in IATI.

Gaps
The report is looking at the costs and benefits of IATI in prospect and via grounded and substantiated estimates, not offering a retrospective analysis based on actual costs and actual benefits. No impact judgements are possible since no data is yet available on IATI’s impact.
Relationships for Aid. London: Earthscan.

General description
This is a critically reflective, situated, retrospective account of ALPS as an attempt to change organizational practice so as to facilitate ‘good development practice’ and involve poor people and their organisations centrally in initiating, monitoring and evaluating their own development processes.

Country and level of analysis
It focuses on the organizational and systemic level, ActionAid being an international organization with headquarters in South Africa and programmes and partners all over the world.

Sector
Aid accountability

Key actors
ActionAid, its partners in the global south and the poor people whom ActionAid exists to support.

Kind of accountability
Downwards accountability; accountability to partners. Upwards accountability to funders is also discussed in the context of the tensions produced by simultaneous multi-directional and differently conceived accountabilities.

Tools used
Reform of the organisation’s internal accountability, planning and reporting systems

Broad intention
This radical overhaul of internal systems was undertaken so as to resolve the disjuncture between the organisation’s vision and the management systems that were supposed to facilitate organisational performance, but in fact conflicted with the vision embodied by a new (1999) organisational strategy. ‘On the face of it, ALPs simply tied to support the adherence to often–repeated international NGO principles [of] involving stakeholders in its work’(138).

Seeks to influence
ActionAid itself (headquarters and country programme staff) as it continues to ‘learn, rethink and react’ to the introduction of ALPS (147); and other major stakeholders.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
Value-based to the core, ALPS sought to make ActionAid more accountable to the people the organisation exists to support – poor people in southern countries. It was premised partly on the assumption that the wider and lasting impacts and changes occurring in the lives of poor people as a result of ActionAid’s activities were not well-captured by existing systems, and could be better understood via a system that was built to make the organisation transparent and accountable to partners and poor people. It was expected to upset existing power relations
within the organisation, and overturn conventions that associate greater accountability with more voluminous and centripetal reporting to headquarters and donors. The system embraces a vision of social change as complex and non-linear, and prioritises process and the principles of ‘transparency, participation, learning, awareness of gender and power, and accountability to primary stakeholders: poor people’ (137).

Evidence

Unapologetically and deliberately and critically reflexive, the chapter draws on the authors’ own (situated and not impartial) experience as architects of ALPS, on views of ActionAid country programme staff and partners, and on an external evaluation conducted by an independent expert on organizational learning and social change, which drew on interviews with the same actors. It is

Three areas of progress attributable to ALPS are identified:

(i) a strong internalisation of ALPS and what it stands for, particularly the principles, attitudes and behaviours underpinning it;
(ii) recognition and sharing of power within the organisation and all its relationships, especially between it and partners (to which it is a donor) and communities;
(iii) provision of space within ActionAid country programmes for learning and working with others to improve the quality of development work.

It is recognised that ActionAid still has a long way to go to foster ‘a true relationship with its partners where partners can openly and clearly articulate criticism and share vulnerabilities regarding the difficulties of promoting social change’ (148). The long road ahead is explained in terms of the intrinsically slow, painstaking and complex nature of organisational change processes.

Methods

An in-depth assessment of one organisational change initiative, using methods of self-critical reflection from a stance that is explicitly not independent or impartial but values the authors’ personal experience as a critical ingredient for learning. This is complemented by the perspective of an external evaluator who, while independent, approaches ALPS from the same epistemological perspective.

Factors contributing to impact

The account highlights as many factors detracting from or undermining potential impact, as contributing to it. Impact is constrained by:

- The daunting implications of trying to achieve this in country contexts where ActionAid ran large service delivery programmes wherein there was no concept of accountability to poor people.
- ‘The reactionary forces to change are very strong [...] It takes a long time to create change on a large scale’ (148)
- Entrenched organisational and professional expectations as to detailed guidance rather than creative improvisation with systems and processes.
- The challenges of honest peer review as an approach, in a Northern environment marked by competition for funding and profile
- Competition for attention between ALPS and other concurrent processes of organisational change
- Failure to articulate what ALPS meant for the less ‘typical’ parts of the organisation
• High staff turnover which weakened resolve and commitment to the long-term change process, and a lack of proper induction for incoming staff in the essence of ALPS
• Perceptions of contradictions between ALPS and other essential but more standard M&E requirements, and lack of clarity as to expectations, due to particular instances of poor process management
• Strong pressures from key donors for ‘business as usual’ in M&E, reporting and impact assessment. It can be deduced from the ALPS experience that donors genuinely concerned with accountability and transparency to primary stakeholders and development partners need to alter their requirements and incentives systems if approaches such as ALPS are to succeed.
• Breakdown in trust between parties at crucial points
The attainment of desired impact, patchy and partial if not universal, was favoured by:
• Placing values at the core and accepting the need for far-reaching organisational change to resolve the disjunctures identified
• Reducing onerous and unpopular upwards reporting
• Narrowing two deep-rooted divides, common in big INGOs, (i) between ‘finance and programme disciplines’ so that financial information could be shared with partners and communities in ways meaningful to lay people, including semi- and illiterate people, and (ii) between marketing and programme staff so that the former could ‘sell’ ALPS to donors and supporters effectively.
• ALPS giving county staff permission to ‘push the boundaries’ and extend participation and accountability rhetoric into everyday internal practice


General description
The article reports on a research project intended to develop systematic ways of delivering and managing downward accountability in international NGOs. It gives a useful synthetic overview of the state of NGO accountability discourse and practice, then describes the Listen First process and illustrates it by reference to one of the six cases. It ends with lessons and implications, including several specific further research needs.

Country and level of analysis
It has general applicability to the whole development INGO sector and programmes anywhere, but the application of the Listen First framework to Concern’s programme in Angola is described in detail.

Sector
NGO downwards accountability

Key actors
International NGOs; their funders; their local civil society partners; and the communities where these work, as the ultimate raison d’etre of the INGOs.
Kind of accountability
The framework allows the establishment and tracking of performance standards for NGOs relating to provision of information (transparency) about their activities to people in communities, their involvement in decision-making (participation), listening, and NGO field staff’s attitudes and behaviours.

Tools used
The authors do not report in detail on the application of specific T&A tools by NGOs seeking to improve their accountability, but do give an overview of what has been tried and what was still found wanting, which prompted the development of the Listen First framework. They note that their attempt to identify case studies of INGO downward accountability mechanisms were hindered by the paucity of systematised, detailed and publicly available case-study material, despite hundreds of examples existing.

Broad intention
To develop, based on existing experience and dissatisfaction with current practice, systematic ways of managing downward accountability in an international NGO setting.

Seeks to influence
INGO managers and field staff, and indirectly, donor staff whose accountability requirements these actors have to comply with at the same time as discharging their downwards accountability to their stakeholders. Also, applied researchers working in the field.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
The programme on which the article reports emerged from a conviction that new frameworks were needed if INGOs were to fulfil their downward accountabilities in ways that ‘align the incentives created up upward accountability with good practice in downward accountability’ (801). The framework developed was based on a review of existing methods and approaches, unsatisfactory because so few are written up and available, but thorough enough to identify good practice elements to draw on, confirm the sense that new approaches were needed, and address current approaches’ weaknesses in the design of Listen First.

Evidence
As indicated, the programme’s review of existing aid accountability and transparency initiatives practised by INGOs revealed that a tiny minority of them are publicly available and written up in enough detail to permit analysis of their component parts, let alone of their impact. In respect of its own Listen First framework, while it reports insightful findings from the pilot exercise, no longer-term impact can be detected as such an early stage. However, among the lessons identified are several impacts in terms of changes in field staff’s attitudes and behaviours and improvements introduced into the design or process facilitation of the framework.

Methods
Listen First itself is a participatory framework for downwards NGO accountability. The tools it uses are participatory self-assessment workshops; community research; and management reports.
Its design is based on a review of a vast number of INGO downward accountability initiatives which use a wide range of methods; from there, twenty-five have been selected as good practice examples of the use of innovative and useful tools.

Factors contributing to impact
Listen First was considered to have proven useful in its pilot stage, its success being attributed to several factors: High awareness of power dynamics throughout; the creation of non-threatening spaces for reflection; a flexible attitude to standardised approaches and an embracing of contextual differences and complexities; ongoing revision of tools and approaches in iteration with their application; good facilitation skills. Regarding the conversion of some information into quantified summaries of performance, opinions of stakeholders differ: some see this as making the framework attractive to senior management; others as providing incentives for stakeholders to distort information, and hindering reflection and learning.


General description
An updated version of a background document prepared for a DCF meeting held in December 2009 (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2009, also reviewed for this project but not selected for abstracting given lack of relevant content), this paper reports in its Section 3 on a small survey of aid transparency initiatives conducted by the author in May 2010. The United Nations Economic and Social Council 2009 Background study reported that a plethora of new aid transparency initiatives had sprung up since the Accra High-level Forum in September 2008 but that, these being in early stages, their impact could not be assessed at that point, especially because the inception of the more recent ones were provoking re-evaluation and re-design of some of the slightly earlier ones. The survey reported on in the later, revised, version of the background paper therefore attempts to remedy this.

Country and level of analysis
The survey is of eight aid transparency initiatives that exist globally (listed below). All these have actual or potential global scope and all are located in OECD countries.

Sector
Aid transparency.

Key actors
Eight aid transparency initiatives that exist globally (AidData, Accessible Information on Development Activities AIDA, Aid Management Platform AMP, Development Assistance Database DAD, OECD Creditor Reporting System CRS, Project-Level Aid Information Database PLAID, EC Joint Research Centre’s TR-AID, UN-OCHA Financial Tracking System). IATI is not included as it was in too early days to be able to provide the information the survey sought, but it is discussed in the narrative, as is Publish What You Fund (PWYF).
Kind of accountability
These are aid transparency initiatives that lend themselves to and/or expressly seek to facilitate social accountability initiatives and bureaucratic accountability initiatives, although the mechanisms by which they purport to contribute to social accountability are not always made clear.

Tools used
The eight initiatives surveyed are based on the tools of statistical data gathering, systematization and provision with open access. The paper reports on a quick, small, purposeful survey that gathered both qualitative and quantitative information from these initiatives.

Broad intention
The survey was intended to assess the extent to which transparency initiatives are in line with the norms that the background paper suggested should be their key characteristics if they are to help improve aid accountability. These were:

- Responding to the different information needs of different stakeholders, whether the providers, recipient government, civil society or the public – in particular where, when, how, and on what aid is spent;
- Ensuring data are timely, accurate, up to date and easily accessible to all stakeholders;
- Making detailed additional information available such as the conditions attached to aid and the terms of concessional loans;
- Being relevant for economic analysis, budgeting and planning, social and environmental appraisals, and analysing progress of projects and programmes as well as progress towards the IADGS and other national development goals;
- Being a mechanism to trace aid through the system from provider to intended beneficiary;
- Being classified to match local budgets and plans as well as international classifications;
- In a common data format to be integrated electronically easily into local/other systems;
- Coming from all possible providers, including non-DAC, foundations and charities; and
- Being easy to access for all stakeholders, especially those in programme countries” (18).

Seeks to influence
The recommendations appears to be directed at the actors and ‘sponsors’ of the aid transparency initiatives themselves, as they point to ways in which international [aid] transparency can be improved in terms of the data the various aid transparency initiatives provide, the way it is provided and presented, and issues of access and dissemination.

Expected impact and underlying assumptions
The UN Development Cooperation Forum seeks to reinforce mutual accountability, among other things. To that end it has defined what constitutes ‘best practice in international and national mutual accountability and transparency on development cooperation’ (2) and conducted this independent review of progress in this regard. It is particularly concerned to ‘make accountability more mutual by making providers more accountable to programme country governments and other stakeholders, which is one of the major gaps identified’ (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2009: 1). The prominence of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the subsequent Accra Agenda for Action in the document evince a strong preoccupation with improving aid effectiveness thus understood, and an assumption that improved aid transparency is a necessary condition for this.
The ultimate end sought for aid transparency is for it to influence provider agency and programme country government behaviour (23).

Evidence and Methods
The study notes:

- good cooperation among the sponsors of different initiatives, minimizing duplication and overlap, including efforts to match reporting periods and definitions used in different systems so as to make different data sets compatible and more authoritative
- recent expansions of the content published by the initiatives, to include forward spending plans of DAC donors, as specified in the Accra Agenda for Action; and steps towards including data from multilaterals, global funds and non-DAC aid providers
- little coverage of NGOs and foundations, despite small progress
- progress by these initiatives in encouraging programme country governments to increase their transparency on the use of aid, through greater public access to their Aid Information Management Systems, as well as greater transparency of aid-related documentation especially to parliaments, and
- more comprehensive coverage of aid flows in budget documents and data.

It notes, though, little progress in other areas such as:

- collecting data also from programme country stakeholders (including parliamentary, audit office and grassroots impact monitoring) in a participatory way, so as to provide cross-checks on what providers and programme country governments are reporting;
- building on programme country governments’ national monitoring and evaluation frameworks (rather than individual frameworks used by providers) so that the results of aid can be easily compared by stakeholders with the national development goals;
- giving stakeholders legal rights to access data (except in a few provider and programme countries), making it technically more easy to understand (ie with minimum aid jargon) and find (with minimum IT and statistical skills) and widening dissemination to all stakeholders, together with supporting documents explaining how data can be used to promote accountability and guiding users to find information relevant to their needs;
- going beyond data to publish documents on conditionalities, policies and procedures, as well as expected outputs and outcomes, as expected in the AAA (again with exception of a few providers and programme countries).”

It identifies as the main challenge ahead, the need to ensure information is used to analyse the behaviour of provider agencies and country governments, since this analysis is critical to advancing mutual accountability and domestic accountability.

The survey was completed via phone or face-to-face interviews by the ‘sponsors’ (key actors, rather than funders) of the eight aid transparency initiatives in question, as well as some users. The results are not intended to allow ranking or comparison across these different initiatives, but provide an assessment of where progress can be detected and where more effort needs to
be invested. Some survey responses are presented in numerical and graphic form. The findings are contextualised in explanations, often disaggregating to the level of individual initiatives.

Factors contributing to impact
The existence of ‘a strong international civil-society-led campaign in Publish What You Fund, ‘designed to ensure application of [the IATI] principles as well as a universal right to request and receive information about aid’ (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2009: 20) is seen as key to the potential impact of IATI.

Impact will remain limited as long as these initiatives’ coverage remains limited in the following senses:
- looking backwards rather than also covering future disbursements;
- failing to cover dimensions such as gender impact and impact on internationally-agreed development goals;
- generally stopping short of non-DAC government aid providers, CSO providers or private foundations and off-budget flows; and
- failing to see the expected cause-and-effect chain right through to the effectiveness of development cooperation, in terms of meeting the Paris targets, let alone the MDGs or gender equity aims (19).

Improvements in these areas generally depend not on the transparency initiatives themselves but on the disposition and cooperation of the data providers.

Impact is also constrained by:
- the lack of the sort of cross-checks that could be done if in-country participatory data-gathering exercises were taking place involving stakeholders such as parliamentarians, audit offices and grassroots groups.
- The fact that many stakeholders lack legal rights to access the data, and the necessary technical capacity to find and understand it easily
- The absence of complementary information in the form of documents about conditionalities, policies and procedures, expected outputs and outcomes (such information was called for in the Accra Agenda for Action).

Gaps
The main gap is simply that the timing of the survey reported on (early in the life of many of these aid transparency initiatives) means it cannot be expected to comment much on their impact.