Historically, many alternative options have been developed to deal with the management of coercive power within the state, each having different implications for state building. However, the role of armies in the processes of state building is usually neglected in the literature – at least in the sense that it is not analysed in depth even when it is mentioned or highlighted.¹ Such neglect is particularly startling when fragile states are debated; indeed in the policy-related literature the discussion is almost exclusively focused on how to limit and downsize the armed forces. The security-sector reform literature, for example, approaches the role of armies in the context of state building by adopting wholesale the standard Western European model, somewhat idealised to reflect the British and North American experience more than any other. In the words of the OECD handbook (2007: 13):

‘The traditional concept of security is being redefined to include not only state stability and the security of nations but also the safety and wellbeing of their people. The recognition that development and security are inextricably linked is enabling security in partner countries to be viewed as a public policy and governance issue inviting greater public scrutiny of security policy. A democratically run, accountable and efficient security system helps reduce the risk of conflict, thus creating an enabling environment for development.’

In practice attempts to implement this template have rarely been successful, among other reasons because local elites are often not interested in this kind of project. The aim of this paper is to contribute to filling the gap in the literature and to launch a debate on armies and state building from the perspective of political analysis. Our concern is to explain what factors can drive a ruling elite in one direction or the other in their adoption of a particular option in the management of coercive power.

Coercion and state building: taming the violence

We start our discussion of coercion and state building from Tilly’s (1985) statement of the monopoly of violence as the key determinant of state formation.² Our specific concern in this thread of our work is with the fact that once achieved, a monopoly of large scale violence has to be maintained. Changing internal and external conditions mean that a monopoly of large-scale violence can always be subjected to challenges, among other reasons because control over the agents of violence by a ruler might not be completely certain. The management of coercive power in well-established states has substantially different characteristics from the original establishment of the monopoly:

¹ Tilly (1985) and Mann (1986; 1993) incorporate armies in the state-building framework, but do not analyse their functioning or their relationship with political power in detail.
² Max Weber’s (1978) ‘monopoly of legitimate violence’ is instead less useful analytically because of all the problems deriving from the difficulty of defining and measuring legitimacy.
it benefits from the ‘taming of violence’ (Elias 1982; Bates 2001), that is a process to bring the military forces under full control and discipline and ‘civilise’ them;

as the original charismatic leadership, which engaged in the primitive accumulation, inevitably wanes, the ruler is exposed to the risk of disloyalty from his own agents of coercion and has to protect himself against them;

as the state machinery expands and becomes more complex, management problems arise and the ruler is increasingly unable to rely purely on his direct, patrimonial control;

the funding of the machinery of coercion tends to be subject to different rules once a monopoly of large-scale violence has been successfully established; as long term financial accumulation is enabled by the newly formed state, new prospects also emerge for the state to tap into such accumulation in a less predatory and disruptive way (North et al. 2009: 178ff.; Bates 2001);

the interests of the elite at the centre might not coincide with the interests of the peripheral elites, or subordinated actors within the state; taming the violence might make sense in the capital, but much less so in the provinces, where junior members of the ruling power block might feel the need, for example, to increase their leverage and contractual power vis-à-vis their senior colleagues. This might explain the seemingly erratic behaviour of some polities with regard to taming the violence: ruling elites and allies in a coalition might be divided with regard to it.

The management of coercive power is therefore fraught with difficulties and contradictions, which can easily derail the state-building process or force it to take a non-developmental path.

While the desire of any ruling elite to protect itself against direct internal and external threats is easy to explain, the factors driving the taming of violence and the problems related to the management of the security apparatus are more complex to untangle. As noted by Janowitz (1977:71),

‘one is struck by the efforts of military regimes and their political leaders to search for and experiment with acceptable forms of civilian involvement.’

The ‘taming’ takes multiple shapes and includes processes such as the establishment of a complex system of procedural justice, a police system, a political intelligence system and a subnational governance system. As far as armies are concerned, taming the violence implies processes of centralisation, institutionalisation and bureaucratisation, which are the focus of this paper. Coercion never disappears as one of the key ingredients of the state, but only becomes more ‘civilised’ and recedes from the public eye. The army loses some of its importance and dedicates itself mainly to protecting the regime against other states, but it remains the ultimate repository of the monopoly and as such represents a threat because of its potential disloyalty. As a whole, these multiple processes of specialisation and taming of violence have at their centre two efforts:

making coercion (hence violence) more carefully targeted and selective, as opposed to the untamed, indiscriminate violence that tends to characterise the initial establishment of the monopoly of violence;

consolidating the control of the ruling elite over the specialists of violence.
A recent book by North et al. (2009) has received much praise for its treatment of the way in which states have dealt in different ways with reducing and controlling violence. North and his co-authors distinguish between ‘natural states’ (or ‘limited access orders’) and ‘open access orders’ – which, in effect, are modern developed liberal democracies. North et al. (2009: 18) explain state building in limited access orders in this way:

‘The natural state reduces the problem of endemic violence through the formation of a dominant coalition whose members possess special privileges. The logic of the natural state follows from how it solves the problem of violence. Elites – members of the dominant coalition – agree to respect each other’s privileges, including property rights and access to resources and activities. By limiting access to these privileges to members of the dominant coalition, elites create credible incentives to cooperate rather than fight among themselves. Because elites know that violence will reduce their own rents, they have incentives not to fight.’

How can a transition from limited access orders towards open access orders occur?

‘In order for elite groups and organizations to concede control of military assets to a single organization, they must believe that they can collectively discipline the military organization.’ (North et al. 2009: 170)

Only the growth and consolidation of formal institutions can allow this: ‘External control of the military involves the co-evolution of perpetually lived organizations in the state and in the private sector’ (North et al. 2009: 171).

The success of North et al. might be due in part to the fact that their work manages to reconcile a recognition of the role of violence in state building with an indication of an historical pattern and a strategy (the western democracies, institutionalisation) that essentially ends up expunging violence from the picture. In part, we adopt their approach, particularly in recognising the role of formal institutions. However, tracing the history of what are today ‘open access orders’ does not necessarily provide a solution to the dilemmas faced by ‘natural states’ in the developing world today, as North and his colleagues also recognised.3

This paper proposes a framework for the study of the role of armies in elite bargaining and state building. The path taken by what are today known as ‘western democracies’ is one of army institutionalisation and subordination of the armed forces to the political elite. The paper accepts that this has been an historically successful path for resolving this dilemma, but also points out that the same path might not be attractive or feasible for ruling elites in every circumstance. In practice, most ruling elites seem to have found such a path unappealing or unworkable. The paper describes a range of alternatives, highlighting the trade-offs implicit in each of them. In particular, it focuses on the incorporation of armies to the elite bargain as the main alternative. The hypothesis which we tested in our series of case studies is that in contexts of state formation and in the early stages of state building, the integration of the army into a country’s elite bargain is a key factor in preventing military interventions.

Over time political leaders develop the expertise and experience to distribute rents and access to resources in such a way that elites would ‘have little incentive to:

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3 According to Mushtaq Khan (London, September 2010), who participated in a workshop with North after the completion of the book.
mobilise or create promises of future rewards to factions of the military to instigate rebellion;
• mobilise and make promises of future rewards to groups within the population to take up arms against the state; or
• to make alliances with neighbouring states or insurgent movements to mount an armed challenge to the state’ (Putzel 2008).

An obvious point of tension in the incorporation of the army into the elite bargain is that the demands of coalition-making may be at odds with the requirements of military effectiveness. Attempting to define military effectiveness, Brooks (2007: 15ff.) identified a number of causes and sources:
• culture;
• social structure (cleavages, etc.);
• political and economic institutions;
• international factors;
• strategic assessment and coordination processes (among top political and military leaders);
• weapons- and equipment-procurement process;
• strategic command and control;
• intelligence and internal monitoring;
• officer selection, rotation and promotion procedures;
• tactical command and control;
• training and military education.

From this superficial listing, it already emerges that some of these sources of military effectiveness (strategic command and control, officer selection, rotation and promotion, intelligence and internal monitoring) tend to be particularly at odds with the demands of elite bargaining. This is true regardless of whether elite bargains are inclusive or not. It is highly significant that when effectiveness appeared unachievable anyway, or was considered to be unnecessary due to favourable security conditions, rulers opted to prioritise political loyalty without hesitation (Finer 1975: 94ff.). Therefore, ruling elites are always faced with a key dilemma when dealing with their armed forces - how to secure their loyalty and at the same time their military effectiveness.

The paper concludes that rather than being just one of many components in the power elites, the army plays a key role in reducing the fluidity of elite bargains and in steering them towards consolidation, provided that certain key conditions are met.
The ‘western’ path: institutionalisation and its limits

The model

The risk of disloyalty among the specialists of violence can be read as part of the wider problem of consolidating an elite bargain and its impact on the long-term viability of the state and its developmental prospects. The more threatening the security environment of a country is, the more likely it is that a regime will be keen to maintain efficient and capable armed forces. This might come at the expense of negotiating an inclusive elite bargain, particularly in the short term. Vice versa, prioritising the formulation of an elite bargain can come at the expense of the military effectiveness of the armed forces. Practices such as nepotism, to mention but one, imply high costs in terms of morale and commitment among the troops, and this is well understood within the military and by and large among politicians too. However, even in the presence of major conflicts, political leaders can be opposed to accepting meritocracy and professionalism as the only criteria for selecting the officer corps.

Regimes that experienced constant military threats over extended periods of time could go as far as shaping society and the political system to meet their security needs, making major concessions to the ruled. Typically, however, this would not take the shape of coalition building, but rather of unilateral decisions taken at the top, even if it usually implied major social concessions by the ruler. Of course, the supreme form of political concession to the ruled are electoral, property and welfare entitlements, but the range of historical solutions is huge. However, the circumstances that have allowed this option to be taken have been rather exceptional. Clearly surrendering entitlements to the ruled has never been the preferred option of rulers. Throughout history, rulers have tried hard to build armies that were not dependent on strong links to society in order to function.

In this next section, we provide a short review of various options for tackling the potential disloyalty of the specialists of violence, indicating how they are positioned in the interaction between the formulation of an elite bargain and concern over the effectiveness of the armed forces. A number of options that achieve control over the military are connected to North et al.’s (2009) hypothesis – the role of ‘perpetually lived organisations’ – but are not the result of elite bargaining, even if they become more viable in the presence of a solid and lasting political settlement:

- **Military professionalism**: the adoption of a code of conduct and of meritocratic criteria in the selection and promotion of personnel.

- **Institutionalisation**: making transition, succession and change more predictable, or in any case more tolerable. This is distinct from mere professionalisation since it includes a component of supervision – although the two processes are related, as enforcing meritocratic criteria requires a strong institutional environment. Therefore, institutionalisation either has to precede professionalisation or proceed in parallel with it.

- **Bureaucratisation**: historically states have developed increasingly sophisticated systems of bureaucratic control and management over their armed forces. Compared to other aspects of the bureaucratisation of the state, armies pose particular problems. Kiser and Baer (2005) list them as follows:
a. it is more difficult to measure their ‘output’, at least until they are tested in battle when it might then be too late;
b. they are more mobile and more distant, often on foreign soil;
c. they have very strong incentives for non-compliance (avoiding death).

As a result:
d. ‘these factors make monitoring very difficult. The key monitoring problem is in the relationship between the high command and the troops in the field. [...] Local monitoring will be essential because central monitoring will be ineffective. Centralized monitoring is not as important a factor in the military as it is in tax administration. Because of the difficulty and importance of monitoring, it is clear that highly motivated agents are even more essential in the military than in tax administration’ (Kiser and Baer 2005: 235-6).

Janowitz’s (1977: 177, 200) identification of ‘heroic leaders’ as a key component of the officer corps of developing armies springs to mind here. Historically, this meant that striking a balance between supervision and centralisation on the one hand and sufficient freedom of initiative on the other was never easy. In the European context, when attempting to develop more highly organised armies, states were only gradually forced to ‘shift to a bureaucratic organization based on hierarchical monitoring and relatively weak incentives’, featuring fixed salaries and dismissal for non-compliance. In this case motivation had to be provided initially to a much greater extent through coercion (such as shooting soldiers who deserted or failed to obey orders), but from the sixteenth century onwards armies also started to develop ‘non-instrumental motivations’ such as the fostering of 

\textit{esprit de corps} through repeated drills and the division of troops into smaller units to stimulate the creation of ‘primary personal ties’.

\begin{itemize}
  \item Development of institutionalised civilian oversight: this differs from patrimonial control because it is regulated by formal rules and is exercised by institutions, not by individuals. A preliminary condition is the establishment of strong civilian institutions in the country; it would not have been compatible with the patrimonial regimes that were characteristic of most of Europe until the twentieth century (Belkin 2005: 28).
  \item Tie the army to society: there are virtuous and not-so-virtuous ways of doing this. The virtuous way is to facilitate interaction between the army and society as a whole, to recruit beyond a narrow group of families with a military tradition, to expose the army to the influence of civilians, and to facilitate army involvement in civilian politics as well as in livelihood and public works.
\end{itemize}

When successfully implemented, the strategies described above have among their effects that of establishing ‘social protection’: that is, protecting the population and avoiding abuses and arbitrary behaviour. Taken as a whole, this is the process of ‘taming the violence’ as discussed in the introduction. As hinted at already, however, it is one thing to observe the process as it unfolds, starting from the point of arrival, and quite another to follow it right from the start as the ruling elites face a series of dilemmas that emerge along the way. Even the processes just described can ‘derail’ or have largely non-developmental effects. For example, regimes that cannot fully trust their own armies, or that lack human resources to adequately staff the officer corps down to the lower levels, are usually inclined to over-centralise and to limit the autonomy of the lower ranks as much as possible. Centralisation,
therefore, can also be manipulated into becoming a tool of control, at the expense of the army’s effectiveness in battle (Giustozzi 2011b).

Even when a civilian ruling elite manages to bring the armed forces under secure political control, it is by no means guaranteed that what will emerge will be a centralised army with a strong chain of command and control. The absence of a strong perceived threat might remove the incentive for at least part of the elite to subscribe to the formation of a centralised force.

**Limitations to the model:**

*Reluctant local elites in Colombia*[^4]

The case of Colombia illustrates this limitation well. Colombia’s history has been characterised by a weak monopoly of large-scale violence at the centre (even by Latin American standards) and at the same time by an extreme loyalty of the military to the civilian leadership (again an exceptional characteristic in the Latin American context). For the latter, the trade-off was one of wide operational autonomy given to the army in exchange for abstaining from direct political interference; in practice the army was free to disregard the political directives of the political leadership, as was the case in the 1990s’ negotiations with the insurgents.

Throughout the twentieth century, the rural and provincial elites sponsored armed groups to protect and further their interests, contributing decisively to a persistently weak control of armed force by the centre and an ongoing threat that tension among the ruling elites could turn into civil war. In this sense Colombia is the perfect example of the risks for the long term viability of the elite bargain of the lack of solid command and control over armed force. Enlightened ‘reformers’ at the centre were aware of the risks, but the process of centralisation of armed power proved very troublesome. These ‘reformers’ (their exact role is still debated) included army generals such as Rojas Pinilla, who took power in 1953.

President Uribe’s leadership partly reassured the economic elites that the state could protect their interests and provide them with security. However, until Uribe – and in part even after his presidency – the economic elite in the provinces largely diverged from the political elite in the capital and never fully trusted the national armed forces. In a sense, this was a problem of collective action: should elites pay higher taxes to fund a larger and better equipped army, or should they spend the money on local paramilitary forces at the direct service of the provincial elites. The lack of faith in the national leadership meant that tax money appeared better spent if kept close to the provincial elites and under their tight control. The national elites were happy to cooperate with the provincial elites (hence with the paramilitaries) even if doubts about the model of counter-insurgency existed at the centre. Until 1995, not a single paramilitary was killed or captured by the state.

Only once the toleration of private violence by the state had become politically (and internationally) unacceptable, did the state move to reassert control, mostly through some form of co-optation of the paramilitaries. The military presence of the state in the remote provinces during the Uribe presidency increased massively. Even then, forms of paramilitary organisation survived in the so-called *Bandas Criminales Emergentes*, albeit with much weaker connections to the security apparatus. Pressure from the US was important in turning the Colombian state against the paramilitaries (because of their involvement in the cocaine trade).

[^4]: This section is based on Gutiérrez Sanín (forthcoming 2011).
trade), but the action of the state in this regard only became effective once Uribe succeeded in better integrating the provincial elites to the elite bargain.

Reversibility in Uganda

Another point worth making is that the developmental path is reversible. In Uganda, President Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) seemed to have adopted a new approach when it came to power in 1986:

‘The National Resistance Army (NRA), by then still transitioning from insurgent to conventional military, assumed centre stage in reconstruction efforts via, first of all, the establishment and maintenance of order and stability in most of the country. A completely novel approach to keeping the army politically engaged consisted of allowing its members to participate actively in the newly-introduced broad-based, non-partisan politics, as members of the legislature [the interim National Resistance Council] and as government ministers. Amidst these innovations, however, efforts to build a new kind of military continued: highly politicised, subordinate to civilian authority; disciplined, people-oriented or people-friendly, all attributes of so-called “people’s” armies. Further, unlike its immediate predecessor, the highly un-disciplined Uganda National Liberation Army, it had a unified chain of command.’ (Golooba-Mutebi 2011)

Nonetheless, in more recent years the strong chain of command and control over the army (now called the Uganda People’s Defence Force) has decayed considerably. This seems to be due to the fact that the army has ‘over time been metamorphosing into a threat to long-term political stability and the legitimacy of the NRM regime’ (Golooba-Mutebi 2011). Financial management was one of the first weak spots to emerge and ghost soldiers are a widespread problem. There are also indications of senior officers rigging and subverting procurement processes. However, problems spread much further than that and the chain of command deteriorated to the point that even directives from President Museveni as Commander-in-Chief could be largely ignored by unit commanders.

The risky path to professionalism in Afghanistan

The transition towards professionalisation from a patrimonial, or in any case non-meritocratic system, can be problematic. Access to education and alternative professional avenues are rarely going to be evenly distributed across the territory of a country and trying to mobilise the educated class into the army can result in regional, sectarian or ethnic imbalances.

During the monarchy, the Afghan army was subordinated to the executive authority through the appointment of aristocrats as generals; since all key positions were controlled by aristocrats, the loyalty of the army should have been ensured. Two factors intervened to disrupt the elite bargain: the lack of inclusiveness, which drove the educated middle class to opposition; and disputes within the royal family over the path to reform. For a while, the monarchy could hold against rising opposition by using manipulative techniques such as selective appointment to the middle ranks of the army or concentrating supposedly loyal units in Kabul. However, once one of the leading figures within the royal family set out to take

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5 This section is based on Golooba-Mutebi (forthcoming 2011).
6 This section is based on Giustozzi (2011c).
power with the help of the army, the monarchy was doomed and the elite bargain, such as it was, fell apart.

The republic established in 1973 attempted to co-opt the middle class, with some initial success, but soon retrenched in a narrow patrimonial system and was never able to produce an inclusive political settlement. As the middle class and the professional officers in the army became increasingly radicalised, it was only a matter of time before the republic was itself overthrown. Afghanistan’s prioritisation of the army for modernisation programmes may have been necessary for the survival of regimes, and possibly of the state itself, but led to much political turmoil and a continually fractured elite bargain.

The Afghan experience demonstrates how detecting and destroying political activity in the armed forces might not be an easy task even for sophisticated security services; the possibility of keeping the armed forces depoliticised and subordinate to the executive authority cannot be ruled out in principle (for example, the case of Jordan) (Tal 2002; Gerber 1997; Jureidini and McLaurin 1984; Robins 2004), but there is no question that the most promising option is to lay in place institutional frameworks that can recognise and contain such politicisation. At the same time, to simply argue that the only solution is to build strong institutions is disingenuous: institutionalisation is a long-term process that depends on the determination and capabilities of the political elites. It is not an automatic process that can be set in motion in any circumstances and produce quick results. Moreover, institutionalisation can be a costly process, particularly if implemented through templates imported from much wealthier countries, and may not be sustainable in the long term.

Rogue professionalism in Pakistan

Professionalisation and institutionalisation do not always produce developmental outcomes. While it could be argued that, in general, highly professional military systems are more effective, they do not always respect civilian rulers. Huntington (1957) and others’ argument that professionalism prevents the involvement of the army in politics is also contradicted by such notorious cases as Pakistan’s and Turkey’s multiple coups: both armies have a reputation of being highly professional. Indeed it has been argued that ‘the promotion of a corporate spirit and professionalism might encourage a sense of self-importance among senior officers that inflates regime vulnerability to a coup’ (Belkin 2005: 22-4). This aspect of professionalism derives from, or is strengthened by, the fact that ‘in the developing world, the military establishment has an enunciated commitment to managed and contrived socio-political change, in contrast with the conservative essence of western military institutions’. Since ‘at the root of military ideology is the acceptance of collective public enterprise as a basis for achieving social, political and economic change’, leftist ideas could often sound attractive. The new professional armies were already attracting ‘the ambitious and the visionary’, who believed that ‘in the long run it would supply the opportunity for liberating and modernising their homeland’ (Janowitz 1977: 14, 136, 140).

A key aspect of how professional armies can end up being a political liability to their rulers is that they behave like any other institutionalised organisations: they are not loyal to an individual or to a group of individuals, but to abstract principles and rules. If they become

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7 In the Philippines, military involvement in politics since the transition to democracy in 1986 has come arguably from the most professional sections of the military (Putzel 1999).
disloyal, they are generally motivated by a perceived betrayal of the ruler. This type of friction usually starts within the army itself, often taking the character of generational conflict, pitting an elite of experienced, but poorly educated, high-rank officers against the emerging new generation of inexperienced, but professionally prepared, junior officers. A deficient system of promotion and career development can also contribute to the frustration of part of the officer corps and to the creation of politicised factions (Fontrier 2005: 353).

The case of Pakistan provides a perfect illustration of the risks that a strongly institutionalised army may pose to civilian elites. Because the army was a genuinely professional and well-disciplined one, with a strong internal chain of command, it enjoyed a great advantage over the politicians and ended up continually playing ‘divide and rule’ with them. The aim of the civilian elites was not to establish civilian control over the army, but to enlist army support for their own factional (authoritarian) ambitions. Both the feudal component of the elites and the liberal middle class tried to use the army for their own purposes, but ended up being used by the army and eventually clashing with it, albeit never successfully. The weakness of the civilian elite, with its limited roots in society and its relative isolation, combined with internal divisions to magnify the role of a solid and united army. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had the biggest opportunity in the mid-1970s to ‘tame the army into a subordinate position’, following the defeat in Eastern Pakistan at the hands of the Indians. Instead, ‘he rebuilt the organization with the intention of using it as a tool to further his regional power interests’ and arguably to shore up his personal power (Siddiqa forthcoming).

The army proved a very tough nut to crack for the civilian elites:

‘Since the military is professionally trained and disciplined, highly hierarchical, fairly homogenous, and rentier in character, it is a far more potent enemy to fight than what is assumed to be the case.’

Pakistan is a very good example of the risk represented to a ruling elite by a professional, unified army with a solid chain of command and control. The never ending tension with India and the series of wars fought with it prevented the civilian elite from splitting the army and weakening it:

‘A professional military proved extremely difficult to fight since it has the structural design and the organizational strength to crowd out all other state institutions. Such an organization, in fact, determines its own corporate interests which it then defends through increasing its political power and engagement with the polity and society.’ (Siddiqa forthcoming)

Tying the army to society may be a successful practice in developed countries, but can only work when regimes themselves have popular support; otherwise exposing armies to society can be very dangerous and have the opposite effect of compromising the loyalty of the army. Subversive ideas can spread very rapidly in coercive environments such as an army, particularly where there is frustration within the ranks. There is also a less virtuous way of going about things, through ethnic recruitment and economic strategies, which is illustrated in the next section. The risk with this strategy is that society is not likely to be the relatively harmonious environment that characterises many developed countries, but a bubbling chaos of separate communities only recently conscripted into a nation-building project. This is why the not-so-virtuous way of linking armies and society is more likely to be the result of any opening up of the army.
In sum, the evidence is that institutionalisation, bureaucratisation, subordination to civilian control and professionalisation, even when effectively implemented (which is a rare occurrence), do not necessarily kick off a virtuous cycle as the Western European and North American experiences would seem to suggest. The factors that determine the outcome of the implementation of these techniques and processes are complex, but have to do with the more general political environment, internal and external. The strength of civil society and the cohesion of the political elites are certainly major factors, as highlighted by the Colombian and Pakistani cases. The aims and ambitions of political leaders are shown by the Afghan and Ugandan cases also to affect outcomes deeply. Given what could be described as a mixed record of institutionalisation, bureaucratisation, subordination to civilian control and professionalisation in practice, the reluctance of ruling elites to follow this path may be easier to understand. Moreover, ruling elites might be actively opposed to such options for their own reasons. In such cases, to insist on advising, or forcing, ruling elites to pursue the ‘western’ path might only lead them to manipulate the implementation of reforms avowedly aimed in that direction, thus emptying them of their meaning.

**Ruling elites might not be interested**

Joel Migdal (2001: 68-72, 83) described well the ‘dilemma of state building’: domestic and international dangers can be met through building agencies of the state, but this holds its own perils for state leaders. Agencies of the state, such as the army, may themselves pose threats to state leaders who still have only limited ability to marshal widespread public support, hence agency manipulation and even recourse to weakening the same state agencies. In particular, leaders of new states in the post-colonial age quickly learnt their lessons and often started viewing the state bureaucracies they were creating as ‘Frankensteins’ that ought to be weakened.

Military professionalism is not suitable to all types of political regimes. Rarely do rulers have embrace military professionalism enthusiastically, and the attempt to limit its impact has often backfired badly. Moreover, professionalism is extremely costly, as it implies the absorption of large numbers of educated and skilled personnel. Even in the absence of full bureaucratisation, professional recruitment requires the development of a sophisticated structure to manage it. Thus, even if they are inclined to favour professionalisation in principle, rulers may not be able to achieve it, at least not in the medium and short term. Indeed, in Finer’s (1975) term the cost of building an armed force could be placed on a par with effectiveness and loyalty as one of the dilemmas of state building. The dilemma is only apparently removed by the presence of abundant external support to fund the development of the army. In the case of Afghanistan, by 2010 the yearly cost of maintaining the army was several times higher than the government’s revenue and was largely paid by the US government. Questions emerged about the long-term sustainability of the army and the political risk of downsizing it in the event of a reduction in external support (World Bank 2010).

The rejection of military professionalism is going to be stronger in contexts where the social composition of the army does not reflect the wider social structure, as was the case in a number of African states following decolonisation, and where external threats are not perceived as strong. In such cases, rulers have an incentive to marginalise and weaken the army (Fontrier 2005: 351-2). The end of colonialism and the subsequent sacking of white officers ‘provided a blank slate for the first African rulers’ (Howe 2004: 39). Indeed there is
evidence that the politicians occasionally played a leading role in the decay of military professionalism, sometimes even facing resistance from the armies (Howe 2004: 46-7).

The consequences of an unsuitable model

As the Afghan example illustrates, the net result of insisting on unwelcome and/or unfeasible reforms is only going to be a slide towards the most manipulative techniques, not least because such manipulations must happen ‘below the surface’ and no ambitious long-term alternative can easily be formulated without upsetting external donors and patrons.

After 2001, Afghanistan was the scene of several efforts to reform the security sector and bring it in line with the ‘western’ model: civilian supervision, subordination of the armed forces, professionalisation, bureaucratisation and institutionalisation, all carried out more or less in parallel. As far as the army is concerned, these efforts began in 2002 with the formation of the Afghan National Army. Early attempts by an as yet unreformed Ministry of Defence to twist the process to suit the interest of key figures in the ruling coalition were beaten back and a range of procedures were set up by the western (mostly American) trainers to vet appointments and to maintain an ethnic balance within the army. These measures had an impact, but key figures within the ministry managed to maintain influence over appointments and establish factional networks within the army. The chain of command and control was severely disrupted and meritocratic considerations only applied up to a certain point in promotions and appointments. The worst aspect of this mix of externally imposed standards and local manipulations was that soon nobody was aware of what the real capabilities of the National Army were, of how institutionalised it was and of how effective civilian supervision would turn out to be in the absence of foreign armies protecting the ruling elite (Giustozzi 2007; 2011c). The result has been a high degree of fluidity in the political environment, which adds to uncertainty and provides incentives to political actors to ‘hedge their bets’ by investing even greater efforts in securing the loyalty of particular factions of the armed forces for their person or group, thus reproducing the fractures of the elite bargain within the army itself.

This short-term expediency can be extremely disruptive of state building in the medium and long term, and accounts for much of the fragility easily observed in late-developing states. It deserves to be looked at in greater detail.

Alternatives: short-term expediency

There are a whole range of options that could allow a ruling elite to secure the loyalty of its armed forces, at least for some time, but that do not fit at all with North et al.’s (2009) model of virtuous institutionalisation, relating instead to what North calls ‘limited access orders’. In these cases, the ruling elite grant privileges strategically, in order to secure political support from the beneficiaries.

Techniques of manipulation: these include purging the officer corps, in order to ‘remove undesirables and demonstrate the regime’s power and authority’ and to deter challenges, which has long been practiced and which has maintained its popularity in the twentieth century and beyond (Brooks 1998: 35). Of course all this has very negative repercussions on the effectiveness of the army, particularly when it has previously achieved a degree of professionalism and skill. Very common practices are:
- the periodical rotation of commanding officers, in order to prevent the formation of opposition factions and the development of personal power bases (Brooks 1998: 41);
- the strategic deployment of military units in such a way that those considered most loyal will be closer to the capital and/or have freedom of movement and relocation;
- the dispersion of units in order to make communication difficult among them (Quinlivan 1999: 157; Horowitz 1985: 533).
- The habit of many regimes of discouraging communication among high ranking officers, which is meant to make plotting more difficult, has obvious negative effects on coordination, unit integration, learning and improving the structures and practices (Byman 2006: 105).

- Divide and rule: keeping the army divided and making sure that at least part of it is effective can be achieved in a number of ways. As already mentioned, the employment of mercenaries from communities that were ferociously warlike or skilled at the use of particular weapons, or from abroad, was a solution widely used in the past and in the colonial era; it has been occasionally used in the contemporary era too. The same can be said of the recruitment of unpopular minorities from within the boundaries of the country, who would then be unable to revolt against the political authorities. Another way of preventing a coup is to appoint commanding officers from among those who are despised or weak.

- Kinship-based recruitment: One of the most widely used divide-and-rule coup-proofing measures is the establishment of networks of personal loyalty among the officer corps. One particular version of this is the reliance on kinship ties. A personal relationship between the ruler and the officers can only work in practice in a small army; when the officers start numbering in the thousands it becomes unviable. In such cases an option can be entrenching a limited number of officers of proven loyalty in positions of power and keeping them there, allowing them to consolidate their power. Usually this required that the officers be personally linked to the ruler(s) and at the same time be members of small and unpopular minorities (Brooks 1998: 42). Examples of this abound in Uganda: Obote brought plenty of Langi tribesmen into the army (Golooba-Mutebi 2008: 15); Amin replaced them with Kakwa and Nubian tribesmen; while under Museveni the Bahima and Banyarwanda predominated (Golooba-Mutebi 2011).

- Ethnic recruitment: While certainly not without some positive impact on the loyalty of the army, ethnic discrimination can be described as a form of inefficiency as ‘it constrains the talent recruitment pool’ (Pascal 1980: 9-10), the more so in societies where skilled human resources are already in limited supply due to lack of education or insufficient mobilisation. A coup-proofing technique described by Horowitz (1985: 532ff.) is mixing officers of different ethnic and communitarian backgrounds so that conspiracies can more easily be detected as they denounce each other, or in any case are wary of cooperating. Although not easy to establish in the first place (it could easily trigger coups if pushed too hard), such practices seem to have worked well in a number of ‘civilian autocracies’ like Guinea (under Sekou Toure), Kenya and Zambia, at least as far as the army was concerned. The tendency in the early post-colonial era was to slide towards greater and greater reliance on ethnically based coup-proofing
techniques, as doubts over the loyalty of army officers grew stronger: it might be taken as an indication of at least some effectiveness.

Techniques also exist that are not in principle aimed at establishing or consolidating ‘limited access orders’, but nonetheless represent an obstacle for processes of institutionalisation and bureaucratisation, because they interfere with the chain of command of the army. We discuss two examples here:

> **Organisational strategies:** An army may be kept under control if the size remains small and it is staffed mostly or exclusively with loyalists. This strategy has the benefit of being inexpensive, but of course is dependent on the absence of a major external threat. If a threat to the ruler then emerges, expanding the army quickly might become necessary, but is fraught with difficulties. Alternatively, an army may be blown up to a very large size, even in the absence of the ability to appropriately equip and train it, in order to prevent plotters from building a network sufficiently large to reach the critical mass needed to stage a successful coup (Brooks 1998: 43). This is a costly option and it is not clear whether preventing coups has ever been a key factor in leading to massive army-expansion programmes. There is also a strong counter-indication that the expansion of the size of an army can compromise its effectiveness (Howe 2004: 57).

> **Manipulating the security architecture:** a solution which might allow combining loyalty and effectiveness to a greater degree is the creation of parallel security forces (‘counter-balancing forces’) (Belkin 2005: 29ff.). In practice this means that the ‘security architecture’ of the armed forces is tampered with, according to a rationale which is not so much military as political. Typically this takes the shape of the creation, or expansion, of a ‘national’ or ‘presidential’ guard, or the strengthening and up-arming of a gendarmerie, or again the creation of fighting units within the security services, the creation of a strong and heavily armed border force or of popular militias (Howe 2004: 50; Migdal 2001: 79-80; Brooks 1998: 37; Al-Marashi and Salama 2008: 125).

It is worth noting that paramilitary force, while not matching the power of armies, can be created quickly and staffed arbitrarily much more easily than an army where some professional requirements will continue to exist even in the most patrimonial of regimes, if for no other reason than that their logistics and administration are more complex (Horowitz 1985: 547).

### Congo: a laboratory of all types of manipulation

Zaire under Mobutu and as DR Congo under the Kabillas has one of the richest histories of manipulation of the security architecture, as well as of a whole range of other manipulative techniques of divide and rule. Mobutu made sure that the armed forces would never be a unified force with a single command structure, as a means of securing his control over it through patronage and preventing the military mobilising against him as a unified force. The fragmentation of the security apparatus was also due to Mobutu’s resort to ‘decentralised

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8 Al-Marashi and Salama (2008: 174-5) believe that the expansion of the Iraqi officer corps during the Iran-Iraq war made it more difficult for the army to oppose Saddam Hussein at the end of the conflict.

9 This section is based on De Goede (forthcoming 2011).
patrimonialism’ when he lost control over the periphery, and tried to prevent the disintegration of the state. In a sense this was Mobutu’s own effort at elite bargaining. At the same time Mobutu was keen on centralising control over the security sector as part of his attempt to reclaim state authority and prevent further disintegration of the state. He also centralised control over both the armed forces and the gendarmerie into his own hands. Mobutu also used nepotism and ethnic appointments in an attempt to guarantee the army’s loyalty and secure his regime.

The armed forces thus served several purposes: a source of patronage for elite bargaining, a force of coercion to co-opt into subordinate positions those not included in the bargain, and providing protection to the ruling elite. Mobutu’s concern with elite bargaining and divide and rule over the security apparatus, however, impacted very negatively on the effectiveness of the armed forces. The disastrous military campaigns of the late 1970s (Shaba I and Shaba II) show that FAZ\textsuperscript{10} was not an army that was capable of large-scale violence, nor was it combat-ready in any way. In 1996-97 it was again easily defeated by the AFDL (Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération) under the command of Laurent Kabila.

\textit{Afghanistan: the relative success of security architecture manipulation}\textsuperscript{11}

The Afghan case indicates that, while in the long term only a stable political settlement can remove incentives to political players to wreck the processes and sabotage the organisations of the state, on the basis of the fear that such organisations might become docile tools in the hands of their political adversaries, in the short term political ownership of state organisations and processes within the security sector is probably necessary in order to make them work effectively. The dilemma, therefore, becomes how to reconcile such ownership with power sharing and political alliances. The example of the Afghan Ministry of Defence in the 1980s seems one not to be imitated, whereas the State Security and the Ministry of the Interior seem more positive examples, once the context is taken into account. The occupation of state organisations by political parties or factions can therefore become the lesser evil, in the absence of strong institutionalised organisations and if it is part of a successful elite bargain.

The Afghan case also shows how institutionalisation in the presence of precarious elite bargains is difficult, because the most powerful actors want to keep their hands free in order to be able to seize any chance of strengthening their position. A well-balanced security architecture can produce some of the effects usually associated with, or attributed to, institutionalisation and organisation building, and/or allow a window of opportunity for institutionalisation itself. However, based on the Afghan case, there are two main problems with the manipulation of the security architecture:

- Cooperation among different services of the armed forces becomes problematic, reducing the overall effectiveness;
- In the long run even the best thought-out security architecture can be subject to decay and crises. Changes in the architecture are likely to be perceived as controversial, particularly when one of the components grows at the expense of others. The more delicate an elite bargain is and the more weakly it is

\textsuperscript{10} When the country was renamed Zaire in 1968, the national army (ANC) was renamed FAZ (Forces Armées Zairoises).

\textsuperscript{11} This section is based on Giustozzi (forthcoming 2011c).
supported by institutionalisation, the more likely it is that changes in the security architecture will be perceived as a threat. In such cases, ‘improvements’ in the architecture might have the unwanted effect of intensifying the opposition against which it is supposed to protect (see, for example, Tanai’s and the Army’s reaction to the National Guard) (Giustozzi 2011c).

From this perspective, the worst aspect of the post-2001 elite bargain in Afghanistan was the fact that a single faction was dominant in all three security establishments. The components of the ruling coalition that were excluded from control of the security sector resorted to a ‘beggar your neighbour’ policy in order to weaken the adversary. President Karzai’s attitude towards the Ministry of the Interior could be interpreted in this way, as he stubbornly resisted the adoption of meritocratic criteria in appointments, while the minister of finance and others adopted a similar attitude towards the Ministry of Defence in 2002-4. The Afghanistan National Army (ANA) was mostly spared because it was under US control, but in its early days there were indications that the people in control of the Ministry of Defence, having realised that they would not have ‘owned’ the ANA, were trying to undermine it by sabotaging recruitment. Eventually they were satisfied with the leverage obtained in appointing field officers, which allowed them to establish a degree of factional influence there too (Giustozzi 2007).

In sum, the development of multiple agencies, each controlling only a modest share of the state’s mobilisational capacity, offers the opportunity to keep centrifugal tendencies in check because any rogue agency could be confronted by several others. The more acute the threat to state leaders, the greater the incentive to prevent the rise of large concentrations of power, particularly when these have their own mobilising capabilities (Migdal 2001: 209-10, 213). We could add that the existence of overlap among agencies in terms of capabilities contributes to make each single agency less indispensable to executive power and therefore easily replaceable. As long as the single agencies do not have exclusive control of portions of territory, but are inter-mixed, they are not likely to easily shift to fighting a civil war against each other. The role of intelligence agencies in controlling them should also be highlighted (Giustozzi 2011b).

The main reason why the creation of parallel security forces is less injurious to military effectiveness than many other coup-proofing techniques is that in principle it allows for each one of the security forces to apply meritocratic criteria for the internal selection of personnel. Nonetheless, this technique has negative repercussions on military effectiveness. To start with, parallel and overlapping security forces lead to increasingly difficult coordination and cooperation. Moreover, the creation of parallel military forces often implied that they were given priority over the regular army in the distribution of new equipment, in order to give them an edge in the event of a coup. Another consideration is that while parallel military forces are compatible with some meritocracy, the latter can still be easily replaced by patronage and ethnicism; in such a case this coup-proofing technique could facilitate state unravelling and civil war.

Finally, the very process of re-balancing the security architecture of a country is fraught with dangers. Changes in the architecture are likely to be perceived as controversial, particularly when one of the components grows at the expense of others. The costs of creating parallel security structures also contributes to explaining why not every ruler indulged in it. To go back to the previous discussion of paramilitary forces and the manipulation of the security
architecture, creating a strong paramilitary force is likely to antagonise the army, the more so if the force is entirely new, has a nationwide organisation and has not been parented by the army in the first place; on the other hand, a weak paramilitary force would not be of much use.\footnote{Horowitz (1985: 547-8, 554-6), who mentions the Philippine army tolerance for Marcos’ packing of the constabulary with fellow Ilocanos as due to the fact that the paramilitary was a long-established force, and Kenyatta’s ‘careful manipulation’ of the military composition of Kenya’s army.}

As the Afghan case illustrates, when the precarious balance enabled by the manipulation of the security architecture faces a crisis, the risk is of a vicious cycle of precarious elite bargains and weak or absent institutionalisation causing a downward spiral, where political actors react to institutional weakness by trying to strengthen their respective positions, further weakening the elite bargain and strengthening distrust among coalition partners, in turn making institutionalisation more difficult or undermining existing state organisations. Therefore, although precarious elite bargains can seem attractive solutions to civil wars and crisis situations, in the medium and long term they can turn out to be a major obstacle to state building.

**Alternatives: long-term strategies**

*Incorporation into the elite bargain*

As shown above, ruling elites often do not see institutionalisation as an attractive path, nor are they forced to take it by a compelling reason, such as those described by North et al. (2009). It is in this kind of (very common) context that the incorporation of the army into the elite bargain in its own right starts to appear as an expedient capable of bearing important fruits, including in the short term. In the orthodox liberal view, armies should not be part of the elite bargain but be completely subjected to civilian control. The problem with institutionalisation and organisation building is that while the example of western democracies suggests a strong potential, the outcome is uncertain and in any case it is a long and expensive path. There are, instead, a number of ways of incorporating the army into the elite bargain, which can be implemented quickly and with guaranteed results, at least in the short term.

*Sharing power with the generals:* appointing them as ministers, governors and other positions, as well as granting the army a share of decisional power in key bodies.

*Economic strategies:* this is about ensuring the loyalty of army officers by granting them the *de facto* right to collect tax. The advantage of this solution is that it can function in the presence of ‘a non-bureaucratic organisation’, but the drawback is the low central control of military activities. The feudalisation of the army was an ancestor to this solution: as Machiavelli (1531) pointed out, centralisation was not always good, because once the central state machinery falls, nothing else is left to oppose resistance. Hence feudalisation and the devolution of taxation rights can sometimes appear to be attractive options because of their intrinsic resilience. A more modern version of this solution is the provision of ‘corporate and private benefits’ such as high budget allocations, high salaries and privileged access to goods and services to army officers (Brooks 1998: 19-26). While offering a higher degree of control to the ruling elite, this version is exposed to the danger of financial overstretching and the consequent need to downsize and cut salaries (Belkin 2005: 25-6). Yet another version of the same solution consists in the permission to become active in the economy of the country, usually with some monopoly privilege and forms of semi-tolerated corruption, but sometimes even with the permission to establish their own economic enterprises, as in Rwanda post-
1994. The outcome of this is likely to be determined by patterns of political organisation within the army (Brooks 1998: 27; Siddiq 2007).

**Techniques of political control**

The record of these strategies is mixed. Arguably they sometimes turned out to be non-developmental if not even anti-developmental. Will the army be satisfied with being granted a share of power? What is the cost to the state budget of economic strategies? How damaging to economic development is the granting of privileges to the army? More ways of ensuring the political loyalty of the army exist which, although rarely discussed in the literature from this perspective, have a proven track record of solidity and reliability, although their developmental character is in some cases doubtful and their implementation is not easy. They consist essentially in techniques of political control:

**Political commissars:** a particular type of bureaucratised command and control, which developed specifically in polities that drew inspiration from the Soviet model. It is based on the imposition of a double chain of command, with commanding officer and political officer reporting separately. In its initial version, it evidently compromised military efficiency, not least because the commissars were *de facto* above the commanders in terms of power. After some fine tuning, which reduces the power of the commissars, the system on the whole appears to have been remarkably successful in combining a degree of effectiveness with extreme political reliability in political systems that were not politically inclusive. Of course, adopting this system was not an option at everybody’s disposal. Without a genuine mass political party geared towards the production of cadres, the system could not exist. Hence the costs (political and otherwise) of establishing such a system were considerable if not huge. 13

The system was adopted wholeheartedly by communist regimes, 14 but few non-communist states managed to effectively imitate it and when they succeeded they had to adopt many of the features of the Soviet-style party state.

**Nationalist indoctrination:** a result of the introduction of mass mobilisation towards the end of the nineteenth century, it has important political implications (Kenstbaum 2005). This process combined with the expansion of urban agglomerations, which:

‘made communication and political organization easy and effective. […] [A]ristocratic retinues’ power was rolled back, serfdom and other traditional forms of bondage were replaced by obligations of tax payment and military service, autonomous city institutions were built up…’ (Gat 2006: 299)

Mass armies also meant mass demobilisation processes after a war, which had important political implication in terms of the attitudes of ruling elites towards the population (Giustozzi 2011a). A linked process was the emergence of nationalist sentiments. Although symbols were widely used to motivate soldiers even before the appearance of nationalism, their impact in increasing their willingness to risk their lives was limited until they started being employed more widely throughout society, particularly in the educational process. Other benefits of nationalist indoctrination included an institutionalising impact: soldiers became as a result

13 For a comparison of the political commissars with other, less fortunate, systems of political supervision of armed forces see Herspring (2001) and Merridale: 138-9).

14 In China, after the beginning of the modernisation of the army in 1955, party cadres in the army lost importance, but their role was already being strengthened again as early as 1958 (Joffe 1965: 57ff, 115ff).
less inclined to follow their commanders regardless. However, indoctrination (nationalist or otherwise) can only be credibly implemented by a regime with strong ideological credentials; moreover it is a long-term strategy with little short-term impact (Belkin 2005: 23).

**Tanzania: strong political control and low-level incorporation into the bargain**

Tanzania is a good example of successful management of government-army relations in the context of what North et al. (2009) would still consider a ‘limited access order’. After the 1964 mutiny of the British-trained army, TANU felt extremely threatened and decided to abolish the old army and develop an entirely new force under tight civilian control. Recruitment policies were from the beginning inclusive in nature. Appointments in the officer corps were made by the president on the basis of individual merit and performance. In order to ensure the army’s professionalism, a national military academy was set up and sources of training diversified (Omari 2002: 94). In this way the professionalism of the army was guaranteed. The army did well in its 1980 invasion of Uganda.

The Tanzanian solution mainly relied on control over the army through the party organisation itself:

‘TANU membership was required as a prerequisite to join the armed forces. From the mid-1960s, political commissars were introduced into the army in order to ensure “a new, correctly politicised military establishment” [Zirker 1992: 112]. Moreover, political education in the army was accorded a very prominent role.’ (Lindemann 2010a: 5-6)

On top of this, the ruling party also gave the military an opportunity to participate in the formulation of party policy. This opportunity was strengthened in 1981 when the military was for the first time granted formal representation at the ruling party’s official meetings (Swai 1991: 100).

‘On the other hand, political authorities have since the early 1970s successfully tried to co-opt military leaders into positions of party and government. In this context, military officers were either directly appointed by the President or allowed to run for political office without having to give up their jobs. In case of election, they were granted an unpaid leave and could return to their original position upon completion of their service.’ (Omari 2002: 101)

Economic strategies of army incorporation into the elite bargain were also used. The defence budget as share of GDP showed a steep increase from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s and remained at a relatively high level thereafter. The army was also:

‘allowed to benefit from “new” sources of patronage, including involvement in gold mining, commercial links with the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe and gun running in the Democratic Republic of Congo.’ (Lindemann 2010a: 8, citing Kelsall 2003: 62)

The difficulty to control the ‘oversized and confident army’ that was the legacy of the war with Uganda, together with the failed 1982/83 coup, explains not only why:

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15 This section is based on Lindemann (2010a).
‘high budget allocations to the military were maintained even in times of the worst economic crisis, but also why more and more army officers were co-opted into party and government throughout the 1980s’ (Lindemann 2010a: 9).

All in all, however, incorporation into the elite bargain played second fiddle to direct political control through the party organisation.

Zambia: high level incorporation into the bargain and modest political control

A somewhat different case of integration of the army in its own right into the elite bargain is represented by Zambia. Until the proclamation of the one-party state, political control through the ruling party remained minimal. This changed however with the introduction of the one-party state in 1973 when the Kaunda government made a deliberate attempt to politicise the army. The degree of civil-military integration never reached the same degree as in Tanzania, but:

‘UNIP organs commonly referred to as “Works Committees” were introduced in the barracks. Appointments to key army positions were generally given to those believed to be loyal to the ruling party. Moreover, all ranks had to participate in political education seminars where party policy was explained and loyalty to the one-party state was promoted.’ (Lindemann 2010a: 14, citing ACR 1975/1976, B384)

A signal of the relative weakness of this party control was the parallel role of the highly centralised Department of Military Intelligence, which operated undercover from the Ministry of Defence and managed to place its agents at all levels of the army (Haantobolo 2008: 175).

A more obvious role of the comparatively weak party organisations in the army is the extent to which all Zambian governments have made:

‘a sustained effort to provide the Zambian army in general, and high-ranking military leaders in particular, with generous access to state patronage. Under Kaunda, this became evident in dramatically increased defence budgets from the late 1960s, [albeit justified by threats from South Africa and Rhodesia.] As this growing military expenditure was no longer made public from 1970 onwards, the army leadership gained considerable discretion in the distribution of financial resources as well as control over personnel policy and defence planning.’ (Lindemann 2010a: 14)

Furthermore, from 1973 onwards Kaunda nominated the three heads of the armed services to parliament and appointed all three of them as ministers of state. This policy continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s, with many current or former army officers being appointed to cabinet, the UNIP Central Committee or as district governors.

Congo: distributing the spoils is not enough for a solid bargain

A very distant example of incorporation of the armed forces into the elite bargain is represented by Congo. Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s regime did not have the civilian backing or
the military superiority required to establish an effective monopoly of large scale violence and ended up in many ways similar in its functioning to Mobutu’s, with divide and rule, nepotism and ethnic appointments all playing a key role in preventing a majority of his fragmented coalition from turning against him. He used appointment into the new Congolese Armed Forces (FAC) to co-opt ex-Mobutists, Banyamulenge, the Katangan Gendarmes and Lumumbist Nationalists, but could never effectively control them despite his efforts to centralise authority in his hands. Kabila also relied for a while on a strong Rwandan presence in the army, which perhaps strengthened his security but at a high political cost in terms of legitimacy. As relations with Rwanda worsened, a new civil war rapidly kicked off.

The new war was launched in August 1998 and rapidly escalated into a multi-actor conflict in which political objectives and economic interests were fought over by, at the height of the war, seven state armies, six rebel movements and numerous local militias. The war ended with the 2002 Global and All-Inclusive Peace Accord, a new political settlement based on a highly unstable and factionalised elite bargain. This time greater attention was paid to the mechanisms that could lead to the formation of a national, restructured and integrated national army. A merger model was adopted in which the armed forces of the ex-belligerents would form a new national army (FARDC, Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo) and positions were divided according to a clear power-sharing formula. However, the president still has much direct control over the armed forces, often sidelining the minister of defence. The difference with Mobutu’s time was that the latter kept the security forces divided in order to rule; J Kabila had divided them up to buy support. The Republican Guard was supposed to be the cornerstone of the security apparatus, directly under the president and better equipped than the rest of the armed forces.

The new regime started off with an army that was a motley collection of militias, without the organisational and logistical capacity, nor the skills, for large-scale violence – i.e. fighting battles. ‘There is no monolithic and unified command as different structures co-exist in parallel. Internal supervision and discipline is poor, leading to impunity and a complete lack of accountability’ (De Goede 2011).

The close link between the elite bargain and distribution of the spoils within the armed forces made the implementation of the plan to build a non-political armed force difficult, a confirmation that the monopoly of large-scale violence and the political settlement are inter-dependent. The strategy was to rely on a technical expedient to achieve a national army: merge the different armed factions – both signatories to the peace accord and other armed groups that volunteered to participate – in FARDC after which they would undergo a process of brassage, or mixing, to break up factions and loyalty ties with the political branches of the former belligerents. The new integrated brigades would then be trained and deployed throughout the country. Although good on paper, the brassage process was hampered from the start by infrastructural and practical obstacles, as well as by political obstruction (Hesselbein 2007: 50). The distrust among the ex-belligerents in the transitional organisations and their concern that the accord might not hold and result in renewed warfare meant that the ex-belligerents were not committed to an army reintegration process that would deprive them of their military capacity. Their military power had been the measure of their political relevance in the peace negotiations. To the extent that units were effectively merged, the effect was to disrupt an already weak chain of command and control, leading to episodes of disintegration of the army.
The comparison of Zambia, Tanzania and Congo illustrates the central role of political organisation in determining whether the integration of the army in its own right into the elite bargain contributes to state consolidation or state unravelling. Techniques of political control can certainly be used to strengthen the hand of the civilian leadership vis-à-vis the generals, and in some cases even lead to a situation of complete subordination of the army to civilian control. This was the case with the Soviet Union, but also of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and several others (Giustozzi 2011b). Within our sample of case studies, Tanzania comes closest to such a scenario, although as we have seen the generals were not completely under the thumb of the politicians. The incorporation of the army as part and parcel of the elite bargain without any such organisational back up might force the civilian leadership to resort to many of the same manipulative techniques discussed above.

**Alternatives: externally imposed orders**

Troubled ruling elites have often identified external support as an effective alternative to having to resolve the dilemma of how to combine effective armed forces with their loyalty. External support can of course take a variety of shapes, which can be summarised into two: direct support in the form of a foreign military presence and indirect support in the shape of supplies, funding and advice. External military support may not always be easy to secure, particularly after the end of the super-power rivalry that characterised the Cold War. However, once secured, it is rather simple to implement, although it comes with strings attached, such as a loss of political legitimacy, a perception of weakness of the ruling elite in the absence of external support (hence dependence from it), demands by foreign powers providing support, which might go against the interests of the ruling elite.

Perhaps the greatest danger is the risk that foreign support will suddenly be withdrawn, leaving the host elite to cater for itself without much time to prepare for the task. A good example of this is Mobutu’s Zaire. After relying on Belgian and Moroccan support in the Shaba crises, Mobutu was suddenly caught by the unexpected end of the Cold War with armed forces unable to defend his regime in the face of internal revolt. External supporters no longer had the motivation to come to his rescue and he was easily overthrown.

**Afghanistan: test ground for external support of all varieties**

18 It is remarkable that for all the supervision, control and plenitude of resources available, the Americans - like the Soviets before them - could not prevent corruption from spreading to the Afghan army. Although a degree of corruption was most likely inevitable, the indications are that in the 1980s and possibly after 2001 corruption was beginning to have serious effects on the functionality of the system (Giustozzi 2007). The example of the reform of Afghanistan’s police has not been examined in detail here, but it is another example of attempted micro-management that ended with extremely disappointing results (Wilder 2007; ICG 2007).

Clearly what was missing in both cases was a responsible and motivated Afghan leadership, the only possible source of effective micro-management. External intervention has had a crowding out effect, removing the need for Afghans to develop the skills required to manage their own security sector. Such ‘motivation’ can be achieved on a large scale only if the leadership is among the beneficiaries of effective management. Not only is micro-

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18 This section is based on Giustozzi (forthcoming 2011c).
management of organisations and processes from external powers very difficult to achieve; if it can ever be achieved, it is probably only through the installation of a real protectorate, which of course politically might not be desirable or acceptable. Micro-management is also problematic because of the apparently irresistible tendency of foreign advisers to develop their ‘friendships’ with local players and become themselves factionalised, therefore losing the ability to work as genuine brokers among client factions, and sometime even ending up unwittingly encouraging factional conflict and personal rivalry. This was the case with Soviet advisers, for example, themselves splitting among supporters of the two factions of the pro-Soviet regime: Khalq and Parcham (Giustozzi and Kalinosky forthcoming; Giustozzi 2011c). At that point, foreign advisers and de facto managers are left with no significant advantage over local players, and with many disadvantages. While these issues have been increasingly acknowledged in the literature under the entry ‘lack of local ownership in security sector reform’, what is usually missing is a serious analysis of what local players really want, which is generally not the implementation of templates imported from abroad.

Conclusion: organisation vs. coercion

The case studies for this overview paper, which will be published in a separate volume, allow us to make a number of points. The first one is that even ‘virtuous’ techniques of civilian control over the military and of institutionalisation of the armed forces can lead to unexpected negative results, particularly if the civilian counterpart is weak and divided. In other words it is inappropriate to see techniques as good or bad per se, since their impact depends on the wider political and social context. Given a context not conducive to the establishment of what North et al. (2009) call ‘open access orders’, these techniques are not necessarily better or more appropriate than any other. Therefore, a wider range of techniques for taming violence has to be explored in order to identify realistic options to secure at least some conditions that are necessary for a developmental take-off: the consolidation of a state monopoly over violence; the reaching of a political settlement; and the establishment of a relatively effective state machinery. Any particular technique or strategy has trade-offs; none work in every circumstance or suit every need.

It is also obvious from our case studies that elite bargaining can come at the expense of the effectiveness of the agencies of coercion. Like other agencies of the state, the armed forces often become the object of the distribution of the spoils during the formulation of the bargain. Alternatively, the army will be formed through the incorporation of separate militias, which were until recently fighting each other and which are linked to the different partners in the bargaining process. This is particularly the case when the ruling elite is not organised around a solid political organisation with a wide social base, either developed as an insurgent organisation or as an expression of sectors of civil society. A solid political party might be able to mediate the formulation of the elite bargain and incorporate factions and individuals in a more regulated, institutionalised way, as arguably was the case in Tanzania.

In the absence of that, a patrimonial distribution of posts is what is likely to occur. A strong and capable leader might be able to manage in the short term, but as leadership wanes or is distracted by other tasks, the agency is likely to suffer rapid decay in the command-and-control structure. This is the case of Uganda’s army under Museveni, of Afghanistan in the 1990s and of DR Congo. Tanzania, and Afghanistan under President Najibullah (1986-1992) were better able to manage the security sector, although in the latter case divisions within the ruling party, expression of a precarious elite bargain, prevented a wholly successful
management of the security sector. The slide towards short-term expediency is almost always associated with instability.

Should the elites reach a consensus on the need for a strong functional army to face off an external threat (the case of Pakistan), a stable and ‘virtuous’ relationship is still far from guaranteed because the civilian elites first need to find a *modus vivendi* among themselves. Once a strong army is part of the political game and the elite bargain is still weak or non-existent – a typical situation arising out of decolonisation – the chances of the civilian elite being able to reach a solid elite bargain are small, because the army is then in a position to manipulate civilian factions and keep them divided. This might go some way to explain why sometimes solid elite bargains of the ‘open access order’ type can emerge only in the wake of catastrophic military defeats (for example in Germany and Japan after the Second World War).

This leads us to one of the other points emerging from the case studies: coalition-making *per se* does not necessarily represent an effective answer to the concerns of rulers over the loyalty of their specialists in coercion. Even when based on a distribution of rents and resources, coalitions have an implicitly temporary character. Historical experience clearly shows that simply relying on political alliances, even within the officer corps, is not sufficient to secure a regime. Coalitions tend to be precarious because the perception of what is a fair deal might change over time, as will the individuals and groups that are partners to the coalition. Divergences over the character of the coalition are bound to periodically resurface, with potentially disrupting and even explosive consequences, particularly so when the armed forces are not under solid command and control by the ruling elite. The case of Colombia is the most obvious within our set of case studies, but examples of this can be drawn from Afghanistan and Congo as well. Political organisations emerge in this context as relatively benign ways to solidify the elite bargain; single party regimes might still be viewed as unappealing ‘limited access orders’, but have a successful record in ensuring political stability and in keeping militaries under control. They might not be very developmental in many cases, but they are less fragile. In a sense, a sophisticated political organisation may represent a particularly effective path to the ‘taming of violence’, reducing the need for sheer coercion in implementing and maintaining the elite bargain.

The Tanzanian case highlights the role of political commissars and strong party organisations in the army. In its own way, this could be described as an institutional path to incorporating the army in the elite bargain. It certainly worked in terms of ensuring the loyalty of the army and political stability. The question which arises is in what way was this substantially different from the virtuous path described in the developmental path above? The answer may not be found in the narrow context of the security sector alone.

A civilian elite faced with a potentially disloyal armed force has, of course, limited choices available, particularly if its political and social base is weak or limited. In the Zambian case the army was included in the elite bargain in a more prominent position than in Tanzania: the ruling party had to share the spoils to a greater extent and was not able to exercise strong political control directly.

The army plays an important role in enforcing the elite bargain itself. This is inevitable but can occur in a number of ways, each having widely varying implications. Because coalition making of a state-building quality cannot be achieved simply through the formulation of alliances based on free will, the existence of a core agent of coercion capable of driving the
elite-bargaining process is essential. Without the NRA having achieved success on the battlefield, Museveni would never have succeeded in co-opting a range of militias into the army in what was essentially coercive coalition building. In DR Congo, it was external support that provided the ‘core’ necessary to co-opt or coerce a range of militias to join the government side in subordinate positions around Kabila. The process of coercive co-optation can often go astray, as in Afghanistan in the 1990s, but it is highly significant that even the UN (MONUC) got involved in it in Congo. Even UN idealism had to bow to the realities of state making. In Colombia, the co-optation of the paramilitary was a political decision, as the armed forces had long had the capability to centralise military power.

It is clear from the sample that outright victory in a civil war simplifies many of the problems linked to elite bargaining. In other words, the greater the ‘coercive core’, the easier and more successful coercive co-optation is going to be, and vice versa. However, the longer-term prospects of an elite bargain depend on other factors. Museveni was in a strongly dominant position in 1986, but because he chose to rely on his personal charisma, rather than on a strongly organised political party or organisation, he proved unable to successfully manage the security sector, particularly once a range of previously hostile militias started being incorporated into it. As a result, it was also subject to rapid decay once Museveni was less involved in the army.

The implication of this acknowledgement is that the formation of a disciplined, politically loyal military core is often at the centre not just of the process of state formation, but also of the consolidation of the elite bargain into a political settlement. The main alternative is the existence of a highly cohesive ‘civil society’, typically in the shape of an inclusive political organisation, which may take over the task of subsuming various components of civil society and elite groups within itself and negotiate an elite bargain internally. The experience of the past is that it is easier to develop a disciplined military than a viable and effective political organisation. In the absence of the latter, therefore, investing in the development of a disciplined and cohesive military makes sense within certain limits: an army too big and powerful will be tempted to dominate the political arena. As hinted above, there are a whole range of problems associated with external assistance to host militaries, but this does not detract from the consideration that an armed force under the effective command and control of a political leader is an essential ingredient to successful elite bargaining and state building. On the other hand, even the technically most successful military-assistance programme will run into serious trouble in the absence of a viable elite bargain.
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