REDISTRIBUTIVE LAND REFORM AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN ZIMBABWE

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1.0 Introduction

Zimbabwe attained political independence in 1980 and embarked upon its land reform programme thereafter. For a period spanning almost 30 years, the country's land reform programme has undergone through changes in terms of its key implementation characteristics, including method of land acquisition and quality of land acquired, scale of land reform, type of resettlement models, settler selection criteria and types of beneficiaries, objectives of land reform and provision of support services, among other issues. In the early stages of resettlement, poverty alleviation and the decongestion of the communal lands were central objectives of land reform. Thus, initially, the criteria for resettlement emphasized, among other categories; the landless or those with too little land to support themselves and their dependents, the unemployed (both spouses), the poor and the returning refugees (Zimbabwe, Government of 1985: 23-24). Gradually, emphasis shifted towards production oriented goals, although this was abandoned in the Fast Track resettlement (post 2000) period. On the overall, changes in the implementation characteristics of land reform had a bearing on the performance of land reform, especially its ability to reduce poverty among beneficiaries and even beyond. What has never changed in almost 30 years of implementing land reform has been the political set-up and governance systems providing policy direction to the programme. Work on the assessment of the performance of the land-reform programme has often overlooked the limitations that arise from the fact that only ZANU PF, a liberation war based political party has been at the helm of governing the country. Since then, any "inherent weakness" in the party in terms of approach to land reform and strategies adopted has undoubtedly influenced programme performance.

Research work on the performance of Zimbabwe's land reforms, more so the extent to which the programme has contributed to poverty reduction is quite limited. The work of

Kinsey and others provides the dominant body of literature on the performance of Zimbabwe's resettlement areas. This paper, in assessing the state of the art evidence on land reform and poverty reduction in Zimbabwe, heavily draws from Kinsey's work. This is further corroborated by literature from undergraduate and post-graduate students who have done research-work on resettlement areas, especially in Masvingo province. The structure of the paper is as follows: the next section provides the historical context of land reform in Zimbabwe. The following section then presents the setting/context for understanding land reform and poverty reduction. This is followed by the section that presents the framework for understanding poverty alleviation in the resettlement areas. A discussion on the outcomes of land reform from a poverty reduction perspective and based on the evidence from Masvingo is presented next. Background data on Fast Track Resettlement in Zimbabwe is then presented, followed by the concluding remarks.

1.1 The Historical Context

At Independence in 1980, whites who constituted 3% of the population controlled 51% of the country's farming land (44% of Zimbabwe's total land area), with about 75% of prime agricultural land under the Large Scale Commercial Farming (LSCF) sector (Weiner et al 1985) and hence inaccessible to the black majority. Farm sizes in the Large Scale Commercial Farming Sector ranged between 500 and 2000 hectares, with most of them located in the better agro-ecological regions I, II and III. The Communal Areas (CAs), which were home to about 4.3 million blacks which constituted 72% of the rural population, had access to only 42% of the land, three quarters of which was in the poor agro-ecological regions IV and V. Poverty was concentrated in the CAs, with Government estimating that more than half of the households had few or no cattle to use as draught power (TNDP 1982). Given this background, land reform became welfarist in its approach, targeting mainly the poor in land allocation. This was supported by strict settler selection criteria which emphasized the landless, the poor and the war displaced and returning refugees. As explained elsewhere in this paper, beneficiaries of land reform and their spouses were not allowed to be in formal employment, giving credence to the use of land resettlement as a tool for fighting poverty. After 1984, experienced master farmers were added onto those targeted for resettlement with the intention of providing a 'demonstration' effect amongst settlers, a move that was seen as critical in raising productivity (Cusworth 1990:15).

At the same time, Government was conscious on the need not to jeorpadize large-scale commercial farming. The Government had succumbed, starting from the Lancaster House constitutional negotiations, to the demands of commercial farmers and their alliances on the need to guarantee agriculture's contribution to the national economy. "The commercial farmers, in alliance with transnational capital, (including foreign experts) argued for some, but not much land redistribution. Their arguments, based on the need to maintain agriculture's role as a source of food, industrial raw materials, employment and foreign exchange, were very persuasive to a state that was all to aware that even if it wanted to, it could not redistribute as much land as the peasants expected," (Mumbengegwi 1988: 158). Given the significance of production arguments in land resettlement, Government responded by coming up with appropriate resettlement models

that catered for the poor and the landless (as represented in the Model A and currently A1 schemes) and those that prioritized increased production (as represented by the Commercial Farm Settlement Scheme and the current A2 models). This resulted in Government endorsing programmes aimed at indigenizing the large-scale commercial farming sector.

Government's thinking and approach to the inherited problems were clearly spelt out in the country's development strategy as explained in the Transitional Development Plan of 1982. Emphasis was placed on redressing the imbalances in development between the modern sector which had served mainly whites (commerce, industry, mining and commercial agriculture) and the peasant sector. The peasant sector was largely subsistence in character and was poorly serviced with essential physical, agricultural and social infrastructure. It was estimated that the communal lands had capacity to support only 46% of the population it was supporting. The Growth with Equity Policy was adopted as the key implementation strategy of the Transitional National Development Plan. Key issues addressed by the policy were: reconstruction, growth, equitable distribution of income and wealth and socialist transformation. "To promote equitable growth and in order to redress the gross imbalances between the modern and rural peasant sectors, the strategy emphasizes rural development and land settlement schemes. The need for efficient and balanced growth and development, and the emphasis on rural development and agricultural production provided a basis for socialist development..;" (TNDP 1982: 24).

The Growth with Equity Policy was wholistic in its approach and as such, it was also targeted at correcting the discrepancies in the urban settlement hierarchy through investment in growth and rural service centres, and hence the implementation of the growth point policy in communal and resettlement areas. Through the establishment of a new urban settlement hierarchy that included Towns, Growth Points, District Services Centres, Rural Health Centres and Business Centres, the intention was to "bring rural population into close contact with services and markets, thus forging linkages with the national economy and stimulating the development of local markets, with regional specialization and a multitude of informal employment opportunities," (ibid:25). The situation where 90% of all the marketed agricultural produce (through the official or formal markets) came from the LSCF; 2 to 3% from Small Scale Commercial Farming Sector, and 5 to 7% from Communal Areas was seen as perpetuating poverty and had to be reversed through positive state policies (see Table 1.1). As a result of concerted efforts by the state, small-holder agricultural production soon picked-up. "During the first two years of independent Zimbabwe, smallholder farmers almost doubled their maize production to one million tones, transforming the subsector into a significant surplus producer of staple food crop maize and other cash crops, especially cotton. The 1981/2 and 1986/7 droughts not withstanding, smallholder maize production grew at 40 percent per year over the 1980s, reaching a record high of 1.6 million tons in 1988" (Mano 2007: 8).

As part of the socialist transformation, it was a priority of the Growth with Equity Policy to promote 'people oriented development and enhancement of self-help and collective self-reliance through cooperatives and community development efforts," (TNDP 1982:

101). It is within this back-ground that the Model B (cooperative) resettlement schemes were established.

Table 1.1: Marketing of Crops and Livestock from CAs and SSCF (1980/81).

Product	Percent Contribution
Maize	12
Cotton	21
Groundnuts Shelled	90
Sorghum	17
Soyabeans	4
Beef	5
Pork	4

Source: TNDP 1982: 64

Starting from the late 1980s and right through to the 1990s, Government priorities in resettlement shifted in favour of production oriented objectives, even though poverty alleviation remained important as well. In fact, there was a more pronounced fusion of welfarist and production based objectives in land reform, and this was evidently reflected in the dual resettlement models that were adopted by government. As early as 1982, the Minister of Lands and Agriculture was quoted as saying, "In resettlement we have given land to 15000 people but most of them do not know how to farm. We want to….give land that will be acquired this year to members of your association (The National Farmers Association which was made up of master farmers)) (Ranger 1985: 313). According to the 1995 Policies and Procedures document, the settlers were expected to be master farmers, have proven agricultural ability and sufficient educational background, in good health and were expected to be in possession of an adequate number of cattle for draught power. However, it was stressed that the settler (or the spouse) was not supposed to be gainfully employed at the initial settlement although this was allowed at a later stage after having made significant land improvements that included constructing a decent homestead and a blair toilet, fencing the homestead and mechanisms were in place to ensure productive use of the land. In addition, settlers were to be supported with safe domestic water (borehole with handpump for each village) and diptanks, with settlers expected to erect ventilated pit latrines with material support from the Ministry of Health.

Different land reform periods emphasized different aspects, with welfare based objectives being dominant in the early 1980s while economic/production aspects gained recognition at a later stage. Even though land policy would attempt a merge of the issues, practical action on the ground meant separate settler selection criteria, distinct categories of beneficiaries, different resettlement models and tenure arrangements, and varying plot sizes as well. Table 1.2 gives a summary of the land reform trajectory in Zimbabwe. Essentially, the Government of Zimbabwe was the major player in the land reform process. The ruling ZANU P.F political party, its key decision making structures in the form of the POLITBRO and the Central Committee have remained the key players responsible for making crucial decisions. Civil servants also yielded a lot of power on the implementation aspects of resettlement, including key aspects of beneficiary selection and scheme administration. The resettlement models used for instance have always been a product of technocrats, with no input from civil society organizations and the settlers at large.

Table 1.2: Linkages between Land Reform and Poverty Alleviation in Zimbabwe.

Foci of Land Reform	Mechanisms	Issues	Examples of Resettlement Models
Welfare	Direct land transfers, with land being used as a safety net and land used as the basis for instance	Increase in production means decreased poverty Targeting of beneficiaries considered key	Model A, Model B
Production	Multipliers and economic linkages from successful commercial production, and trickle down effects (via state redistributive mechanisms)	How linkages work, and whether 'commercial' farming is successful Role of employment factors (e.g. farm-workers) is key	Commercial Farmer Settlement Schemes Model C (Core Estate) A2

Source: Constructed from various sources

A new era emerged under Fast Track. Despite the existence of technical prescriptions for A2 settlers for instance, there has been a mix-up of resettlement models and beneficiaries as well. The A2 model was split into small-scale, medium scale and large scale, with the small-scale and medium-scale versions resembling A1 schemes, especially in terms of size of plots. The actual allocation witnessed a further mix-up, with some of the richer settlers getting land under the A1 model, while other poorer settlers were given land under the A2. Various government reports at the provincial level have even recommended that some A2 settlers needed to be relocated to A1 schemes. The neat technical separations on resettlement models and the accompanying beneficiary selection criteria have largely been blown apart by micro and highly political processes on the ground. It is the implication of this on poverty alleviation that is a subject for further debate and research.

2.0 Emphasizing Poverty Reduction in Land Reform: The Setting

Whilst it is understood that land reforms in general seek to address poverty alleviation, not much has been invested in unpacking poverty at the local level. The debate on this is quite broad, and it brings in issues of plot sizes, incomes and assets, among many other things. Yet, the discussion for instance, on social differentiation among the smallholder farmers has not been applied in the targeting debate in land reform. The work by Jayne et al (2001) in Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique confirmed the existence of a differentiated access to land by households, while land sizes were constantly changing over time. A country like Rwanda had, over a period of 15 years, experienced marked declines in landholding sizes accessed by households. In Zimbabwe, Kinsey's work has shown the increased size of populations in resettlement areas and yet no analysis to date has been done on the imminent declines in plot sizes. The ICES Survey of 1995/96 produced similar results with communal areas having 57% and 43 % of the households ranging in size from 1-5 and above 6 members respectively as compared to 42% and 58 % in the resettlement areas. The mean household size was 5.3 in communal areas as compared with 6.2 for the resettlement areas. The debate by academics and technocrats is till occupied with the official plot sizes (as allocated several

decades ago), with no reference to the additional numbers of households that have been added as a result of natural growth and the resultant changes in plot sizes as the subdivision of land that is common in communal areas replicates itself in resettlement areas. Yet this is an important variable in the poverty alleviation debate for small-holder farmers.

Land reform in Zimbabwe has emphasized poverty alleviation and this has been operationalized through programme objectives that sought to allocate land to the poor. Land allocation in the country has been done through respective resettlement models, with the most popular one and the most relevant to the discussion on poverty alleviation being the Model A, which has since assumed a new name as the A1 resettlement model. Given the focus of the A2 resettlement schemes which emphasizes commercial production, the discussion on poverty alleviation in these situations does not focus on the beneficiaries or settlers per se, but the farm/scheme level effects on farm-workers and other multiplier impacts on the neighbourhood (Jayne et al 2001).

In the initial phase, the main resettlement models used in land allocation were Model A, Model B, Model C and Model D. Each of these models emphasized specific aspects with Model A being the most common one where settlers were allocated individual arable plots and communal grazing. Model B schemes were cooperative schemes that were designed to utilize intact infrastructure on the acquired farms and were deemed suitable for optimizing large-scale economies. Model C was built around the core estate owned by the Agricultural Development Authority (ARDA) which would provide research, training, credit, input supply and marketing services to the settlers. On the other hand, Model D was designed for the drier agro-ecological regions IV and V, providing grazing for use by communal areas. Each of these has the potential to provide exciting lessons on poverty alleviation, though the model B for instance, has largely been disbanded. Currently, the main resettlement models are the A1 and the A2. Essentially, Model A1 is simply a modification of the original Model A while the A2 model is commercial in its approach and targets certain categories of settlers who are expected to be well resourced. As already mentioned, poverty reduction among settlers is relevant in the context of A1 schemes whereas for A2 schemes, the discourse is on the multiplier effects of resettlement.

That Zimbabwe's land reform emphasizes poverty reduction is not new. Even major donors providing financial support to land reforms emphasize programmes that contribute to poverty reduction. However, as Deininger, Hoogeveen and Kinsey (2000) state, "…little empirical evidence exists to indicate whether, and under what conditions, a poverty reducing land reform program would be feasible" (p1). Earlier on, Kinsey and Biswanger (1996: 121-122) had raised very important issues on poverty alleviation in land reforms. "Although we found no consistent evidence to support favouring settlers who have capital, we did find fairly consistent evidence that choosing settlers mainly on the basis of equity leads to problems. It seems to be a fact of life that agricultural settlement schemes, except in specific circumstances, do not make good welfare programmes. While the landless may be able to make good use of the new resources provided by settlement, the elderly, the sick and disabled and those with an inadequate

access to labour, usually cannot. A successful programme, therefore must maintain a balance between a settler's suitability and need."

All the same, the main justification for land reform in Zimbabwe and elsewhere has continued to be premised on poverty alleviation arguments. Despite the limitations of past and present efforts, Zimbabwe has relatively impressive statistics on the progress made in the redistribution of land. By 1997, the government had acquired 3498 444 ha and resettled about 71 000 families. For the period between 1998 and 2000, some 168 264 hectares had been allocated to 4697 families, under what is commonly referred to as the Inception Phase of the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme Phase II (LRRP II) (Govt. of Zimbabwe 2001). Based on the Presidential Land Review Committee (PLRC 2003), about 127 192 A1 settlers had been allocated land under Fast Track Land Reform and Resettlement Programme (FTLRP). When combined, over 200 000 families have been allocated farm land via the smallholder/A1 model since 1980. Thus in terms of the ongoing national discourse at policy level, the first step on poverty alleviation has been accomplished for the over 200 000 small-holder beneficiaries. The simplistic (and often unrealistic) assumption being that those settled were poor and predominantly originated from the congested communal lands. The adherence to poverty alleviation was particularly strict in the first decade and "until around 1992, household heads were not permitted to work off their own farms, nor could they migrate to cities and leave their spouses to work off their plots" (Deininger 2000:3). This policy requirement gradually became relaxed until it became totally irrelevant under Fast Track Land Reform Resettlement Programme (FTLRP). Indeed, various studies on resettlement in the pre-2000 period showed that land allocation went to the intended beneficiaries who were largely the poor. Choga 1999, working in Hoyuyu resettlement in Mashonaland East showed that settlers were mainly the unemployed and had no land. Some of the beneficiaries were former farm-workers as well. Vhutuza 1991, in a study on Mushandike Resettlement in Masvingo, also showed that the beneficiaries were landless and war displaced people. Similar evidence was also produced in a study on Chinyika Resettlement (Kinsey 2004).

Indications are however that under FTLRP, poverty reduction was not the driving agenda in the land occupations driven land reform. For instance, in a recently completed study covering 375 A1 farmers located in Mashonaland West, Mashonaland East, Manicaland, Masvingo and Matebeleland South Province, only about 53.1% of the beneficiaries were unemployed and theoretically fitted to be categorized as the landless and the poor (Table 2.1) (Zimbabwe Independent Institute 2007). The remaining group largely had a steady income from other sources and hence do not qualify to be called the poor nor the landless. In a recent study in Masvingo, Mavedzenge et al (2006:59-60) talk of settlers of diversified socio-economic status, including "..both the very poor with no social assets who joined the land invasions out of desperation as they saw little future in the communal lands, and those who committed to new resettlements with assets from the communal areas, or from town." In the event that land was allocated in some cases, to non-poor A1 farmers (as the little data available seems to suggest) in what context then is poverty alleviation discussed. This is an issue where more thinking is still required. Indications are also that by at large, there has been primitive accumulation (Khan 2004)

under FTLRP involving 'huge injustices and social waste' (ibid). In the end, people or groups of people with power became beneficiaries of primitive accumulation. In-fact Izumi (1999) had argued that control of land has been retained by existing powerful social groups' (ibid: 9), while gender dimensions have been largely ignored.

Table 2.1: Occupation/Economic Activities of A1 settlers in selected Schemes (n = 375)

Category	Number	Percent
Business people	7	1.6
Civil Servants (Agriculture and Lands Ministries)	18	4.8
Civil Servants (Education)	24	6.4
Civil Servants (Others)	15	4.0
Ex-security	20	5.3
Ex-combatants	3	0.8
Ex-farm workers	4	1.1
Informal sector	24	6.4
Gold Panners	5	1.3
Local Councils	3	0.8
Pensioneers	3	0.8
Parastatals	2	0.6
Private Sector (Finance)	3	0.8
Private Sector (Other)	14	3.7
Security Ministries	13	3.5
Unemployed	119	53.1
Others	12	3.2
Total	375	100

Source: Zimbabwe Independent Institute 2007

3.0 Poverty in the National Context

After almost three decades of implementing land reform, and considering that land has been allocated to over 200 000 smallholder farmers, it is quite relevant to evaluate the land reform programme in Zimbabwe in terms of its contribution to poverty reduction. But what do the national data on poverty trends show? Data from the CSO driven Income and Expenditure Surveys, though problematic in its own approach, remains the most useful and representative in explaining the national poverty situation in the country. The most recent national document analyzing poverty trends is the 2003 National Poverty Assessment Report (PASS II). For the period between 1995 and 2003, there was a huge increase in the incidence of poverty. For instance, the PASS II Report indicated that the proportion of households in the very poor category (those below the Food Poverty Line) had increased from about 20 percent in 1995 to about 48% in the year 2003, an increase of about 148% over an 8 year period. The combined categories of very poor (below the Total Consumption Poverty Line) leaped from 42% in 1995 to 63% in the year 2003, an increase of 51%. Whereas previously poverty was understood as a rural phenomenon (Kinsey 1999), the situation in urban areas has deteriorated sharply mainly because of the declining macro-environment, especially hyper-inflation, negative GDP growth and the shrinking formal job opportunities (Govt. of Zimbabwe 2003). "In rural areas a higher percentage (63%) of households was living below the TCPL compared to households in urban areas (53%). However, in urban areas there was a higher percentage increase (65%) than in rural areas (42%);" (ibid: 22). In all the land-use and land tenure categories (communal, resettlement, large-scale commercial and small scale commercial farms),

more than 50% of the households were below the TCPL. Data from the Income, Consumption and Expenditure Survey (ICES), which is more nationally representative, has shown that resettled households were some of the poorest groups in the population. In-fact, national data on the poverty situation in the country does not reveal any significant difference in the incidence of poverty in resettlement areas and communal areas. Thus the Income, Consumption and Expenditure Survey showed that resettled households were almost as poor as communal households, (Government of Zimbabwe 1998). Also, Alwary and Ersado (1999) found poverty incidences at 65.3% among land reform beneficiaries and 66.8% in communal areas.

A major determinant of rural poverty in Zimbabwe is the incidence of drought. Between 1959 and 2002, the country had experienced over 15 droughts, averaging a drought year every 2 to 3 years (see Table 3.1). The frequency of droughts has been intense in the post 2000 period and a combination of this and other factors (e.g. disruptions and distortions associated with FTLRP) has seen food aid emerging as a strong intervention aimed at fighting poverty. At the same time, the loss of cattle during drought years (as was the case in the 1991/92) leads to loss of draught power, creating conditions that deepen further poverty among households. Cattle populations experienced dips at the midst of severe droughts in the years 1982-84 and 1991-92. A combination of droughts and de-stocking by displaced LSCF farmers in the post 2000 period have contributed to declining cattle populations. Thus the impact of droughts and the ongoing economic recession has produced shocks that have undermined livelihoods of households. MASDAR (2006:35), citing the findings of the World Food Programme (WFP) in 2005-06, noted that more 'than half of the surveyed households had sold assets to buy food (in October 2005 and prior to food assistance) and (in March 2006) 12% of the households had sold assets to pay for food and 5% had disposed of assets to pay for health in the previous three months. This clearly indicates that droughts force households to dispose off their assets, further entrenching poverty.

In general, incomes, livelihoods and the poverty situation of households in resettlement and communal areas varies from year to year depending on the weather conditions. Although the country has well developed dams, some of which are located in the communal areas, these have not been exploited to the maximum through the development of smallholder irrigation. Even existing irrigation projects have faced numerous challenges. Table 3.2 summarizes the status of irrigation schemes that have been developed to cater for the needs of small-holder producers in Masvingo province. In some situations, canals had become damaged and needed to be repaired (as was the case with Magudu irrigation in a communal ward in Masvingo district) while in some situations underground pipes had been damaged (as was the case at Longdale resettlement scheme). In other cases, the engines that pump water for irrigation had broken down and were no longer working, the constraining factor being availability of funds to finance repairs. Other schemes required completely new engines as was the case with Chinyamatumura with 124 beneficiaries and located in a communal area. Many of the existing schemes also required new fencing. Given this background, the sustainability of irrigation schemes and their role in fighting poverty becomes questionable. Data from

Fast Track Schemes seems to be showing that many irrigation schemes, especially those allocated to A1 farmers, are no longer operational.

Table 3.1: Drought in Zimbabwe, 1953 – 2003

Rank	Crop Year	Annual Mean Rainfall	Probability of Occurrence	Percent Below 50-Year Average
		Mm	%	%
1	1991-1992	425.1	2.8	-77.4
2	1972-1973	488.0	6.1	-54.6
3	1994-1995	491.6	6.4	-53.4
4	1982-1993	502.3	7.2	-50.1
5	1967-1968	502.9	7.2	-50
6	1986-1987	516.6	8.4	-46
7	1963-1964	544.7	11.2	-38.5
8	1981-1982	573.5	14.7	-31.5
9	1983-1984	577.6	15.3	-30.6
10	1990-1991	586.5	16.5	-28.6
11	1993-1994	615.9	21.1	-22.5
12	1964-1965	616.8	21.2	-22.2
13	**2001-2002**	**616.9**	**21.2**	**-22.2**
14	1959-1960	617.4	21.3	-22.2
15	1978-1979	636.5	24.7	-18.5
	50-Year Average	754.7		

Source: Richardson, C (2005).

Table 3.2: Status of Irrigation Schemes for Small-Holder Producers in Communal and Resettlement Schemes: the example of Masvingo

District	**Existing Projects Requiring Rehabilitation**			**Operational Schemes**	
	Ha.	**No. of Beneficiaries**	**Estimated lost (Jan 2003) (Million)**	**Ha.**	**No. of Beneficiaries.**
Bikita	59	366	145	140	374
Chiredzi	1171	1805	1039	552	752
Chivi	231.5	2089	233.55	192	1547
Gutu	353	363	115.5	50	125
Masvingo	1659	1061	520	859	1155
Mwenezi	145	375	270	83	220
Zaka	242	53.8	53.8	351	452
Grand total	3860.5	6205	2377	2227	4625

Source: Masvingo Provincial Data from the Governor's Office 2004

Over the years, remittances, especially from the urban to rural areas, have been an important source of livelihood, support to agriculture and enhancement of household food security. "Remittance inflows of cash and material goods primarily from family members working in urban areas became an important strategic source for cushioning against seasonal climatic shocks to agricultural incomes and food security of rural based family members," (Mano 2007:13). Studies by Rukuni and Eicher (1984, 1989) and

Mudimu and Bernstern (1989) as quoted by Mano 2007, provide empirical evidence on the link between remittance income and food security. Mano (2007:13) further states that "Remittance income was high during the 1980s because employment in national industries earned a positive real wage net of urban cost of living. Thus, urban –based family members had the positive savings from which they could remit a fraction back to their rural family homes." Remittance capacity for most of the urban based workers has either declined or disappeared following the economic challenges in the country. New dimensions of remittances, especially for those with children in the Diaspora have since emerged. ZIMVAC annual rural assessment reports have observed the increasing significance of remittance income from relatively educated and networked children who are based in the Diaspora.

Households in Zimbabwe, like elsewhere in sub-saharan Africa, have been exposed to the shocks associated with the HIV/AIDS pandemic, introducing new dimensions to the land reform and poverty reduction debate. According to the PASS II results, some households were already not able to utilize all of their land for a variety of reasons (Table 3.3 refers) which included lack of draught power, droughts, illnesses and many others. A key factor that determines the success of resettlement as an economically viable development initiative is the extent to which land purchased for resettlement (arable and grazing) is utilized (Cusworth 1990). According to PASS II, resettlement areas had the highest proportion (26 percent) of the households without draught power compared to 12 percent for the small scale commercial farming areas. On the other hand, communal areas had the highest proportion (26 percent) of the very poor households who cited lack of seed or fertilizer as a major problem compared to 21 percent for the small scale commercial farming areas (see also Table 3.5). Table 3.4 further shows the actual decline in area planted among households as a direct impact of illness in the households. Chronic illnesses were also leading to the withdrawal of children from school, with 18% of the households affected.

Table 3.3: Reasons given by households for not fully utilising land in 2002/2003 agricultural season by poverty category, percent households, Zimbabwe 2003.

	Very Poor	Poor	Non-poor	Total
No draught power	22	14.4	12.1	19.1
No ploughing implements	12	12.6	11.9	12
Labour constraints	6.8	9.9	12.8	8.3
Drought	28.9	32.9	30.8	29.8
No seed and/or fertilizer	25.6	24.8	24.3	25.3
Illness	2.4	2.1	3.1	2.5
Other	1.6	2.5	3.7	2.1
Not Stated	0.8	0.7	1.4	0.9
Total percent	100	100	100	100
Total No	8769	1916	2212	12897

Source: Extracted from PASS II p 749.

Table 3.4: Rural Households that Experienced Reduced Area Planted due to Chronic Illness by Poverty Category, percent, Zimbabwe 2003

Province	Very Poor	Poor	Non Poor	Total
Manicaland	36	42	41	38
Mashonaland Central	42	28	27	37
Mashonaland East	31	28	31	30
Mashonaland West	39	46	34	39
Matabeleland North	38	53	29	38
Matabeleland South	34	51	29	36
Midlands	45	53	41	45
Masvingo	50	47	42	49
Total	40	43	35	39

Source: Extracted from PASS II, p 429.

Table 3.5: Seed Situation in Zimbabwe, 2003

Crop	**Expected Seed Production (MT)**	**Projected Demand (MT)**	**Remarks**
Maize Hybrid	20,000	60,000	40,000 MT Deficit
OPV Maize	3,000	-	-
Soybeans	7,400	6,000	1,400 MT Surplus
Sorghum Hybrid	700	2,000	1,300 MT Deficit
Sorghum OPV	1,600	-	-
Pearl Millet	380	1,500	1,120 MT Deficit
Groundnuts	500	2,500	2,000 MT Deficit
Sugar beans	180	2,700	2,500 MT Deficit
Finger millet	-	1,000	-

Source: FEWSNET Report, as cited in the Joint Donor Review of Food Aid Review in Zimbabwe: Draft Final Report: 22.

The current poverty situation has been shaped by the unstable macro-economic conditions prevailing in the country. The management of the foreign exchange rate has resulted in an over-valued exchange rate. Two foreign exchange rates operate in the country, the official rate and the parallel/black market rate. In the year 2001, 1US$ was equivalent to Z$55. The value of the Zimbabwe dollar depreciated to a rate of 1US$ to Z$1 500 by October 2006, falling further to 1US$ to above Z$20 000 on the parallel market by April 2007. By June 2007, the rate had slided to 1US$ to Z$150 000. Yet the official rate has remained fixed at 1US$ to Z$250 (see annex for more details on foreign exchange rate). Inability to access forex, either for purposes of converting Zimbabwe Dollar incomes into savings or as a direct source of income has meant that rural households have been exposed more to the impoverishing conditions that prevail in the country. Steep levels of inflation have contributed to worsening conditions of living for the poor. Thus for instance, year on year inflation was estimated at around 502% by June 2006 (CSO 2006). By February 2007, inflation had risen to between 1100% and 1300%, a figure that later rose to around 1800% in March while by April 2007 it was estimated

that inflation was over 2 000%. By June 2007, inflation was estimated at over 4 500%. Generally, this situation has forced many to sink into deep poverty, worse still for the newly resettled farmers who are/were expected to be "starting a new life".

Thus whilst land reform is continuing, giving more land to the small-holder farmers (and presumably leading to poverty reduction), the situation on the ground is showing evidence to the contrary. National data from the Poverty Assessment Study Survey of (2003) has indicated, as discussed above, an upsurge in the incidence of poverty across the country. Two significant issues have so far emerged from the land reform/poverty reduction discourse. The first is that there are indications that (although more empirical evidence is required) some of those who received land under the Model A1 schemes do not qualify to be categorized as the poor. It seems this argument is particularly relevant under FTLRP. Secondly, although land reform has been ongoing, the incidence of poverty has even increased at the national level. The explanation as to why this has been the case and the implication of this on the land reform and poverty reduction to date is what is seemingly missing in the body of the existing literature. These issues are addressed in detail in the later sections of this paper.

Given the tremendous challenges that have emerged in the post-2000 period, food aid has played a significant role in complementing household and national food security. This discussion can, arguably, be situated in the poverty debates. Starting from about 2002, food aid assistance by the World Food Programme (WFP), C-SAFE (a consortium of 3 American NGOs-CARE, CRS and WVI) has been instrumental in preventing widespread humanitarian crisis. At the same time, non-food interventions have been equally important in promoting the livelihoods of vulnerable groups. Through the Poverty Reduction Programme (PRP) funded by the Department of International Development (DFID), efforts have been made through 10 NGOS to fight extreme poverty and hunger.

The debate on national food security has become hotly contested between Government and humanitarian agencies and other independent analysts. Motivated by the desire to portray FTLRP as a success and a major contributor to food security, critics of government have argued that government has deliberately been overstating the country's contribution to its food needs. As noted by the Joint Food Aid Review Report (2007: 32), "Between 2001 and 2006, Government estimates of cereal production generally exceeded independent estimates by a factor ranging from 1.07 to 3.11," (see Table 3.6). The height of the crisis was in 2004 when Government estimated a cereal bumper harvest of 2.9 million metric tones, and stopped food aid interventions after declaring that the country was self-sufficient. On the other hand, the ZIMVAC Reports (2002-2007) have shown that the number of people unable to meet their food requirements ranged between 17% (for 2006/07) and 56% of the rural population (in the 2003/04 season). It can be concluded from this discussion that those unable to feed themselves are primarily in the very poor category. In fact, the Joint Donor Review Food Aid Report articulated that "between 29% and 72% of the rural population were at risk of severe food shortages triggered by drought but exacerbated by land reform, sub-optimal economic governance, HIV and AIDS, and worsening poverty, among other factors," (see Table 3.7). The scale of the crises was huge with between 2.3 – 7.1 million people needing assistance and the

capacity of traditional safety nets of government like the drought relief was exceeded. In this regard, there was the Presidential Declaration of a state of disaster in communal areas on 26 April 2002 while Matebeleland South was declared a Disaster Area in January 2003 (ibid).

Table 3.6: Cereal Harvest Estimates

Harvest Year	Government Estimates	FAO Estimates
2006	2 026 000	1 528 300
2005	888 000	600 000
2004	2 958 000	951 414
2003	1 051 726	980 000
2002	705 840	538 868
2001	1 780 000	887 061

Joint Donor Review of Food Aid in Zimbabwe: Draft Final Report: 32

Table 3.7: People Unable to meet their Household Food Requirements based on ZIMVAC Reports

Agricultural Year	People Unable to meet their Household Food Requirements as % of Population	Estimated cumulative deficit per marketing year (April- March of the next year((MT)
2002/03	7 182 000 (52% total population)	345 000
2003/04	4 361 632 (56% rural population)	388 642
2004/05	2 300 000 (29% rural population)	177 681
2005/06	2 900 000(36% rural population)	225 455
2006/07	1 400 000 (17% rural population)	91 000

Source: Joint Donor Review of Food Aid in Zimbabwe: Draft Final Report: 32

Results from the Poverty Assessment Study Survey (PASS) II confirmed the food shortage dilemma. According to PASS II (2003), 48% of the households were not able to meet their basic food needs compared to 20% in 1995. On the overall, the Communal Areas were the worst affected with 51% of the households not able to afford basic food requirements. The Large Scale Commercial Farming areas witnessed an increase in the very poor households from 11% to 38%, a 247% increase, depicting a deteriorating situation in these areas. This could have been the result of the deteriorating situation of farm-workers and the effect of drought. For the resettlement areas, 46% were in the very poor category while 25% were in the poor category, (Government of Zimbabwe 2003: 114).

It has already been stated that in practical terms it is rare if not unreal for land reform to target entirely the poor and become successful. In a study of several countries in Africa, Jayne et al (2001: vii) demonstrates that 'sustained income growth for the poorest strata of the rural population will depend on agricultural growth in most countries and agricultural productivity growth, while most easily generating gains for better off smallholder farmers, is likely to offer the best potential for pulling the poorest and land constrained households out of poverty". This is largely explained through the growth linkages where the "first round beneficiaries of agricultural growth generate important multiplier effects by increasing their expenditure in a range of local off-farm and non-farm activities that create second round benefits for a wide range of other households in the rural economy. Income growth derived from agricultural productivity growth generates demand for non-farm activities that have absorbed the rural poor into more viable non-farm activities. In much of Africa, the consumption growth linkages have

been found to be especially important," (ibid: vii). The extent to which the multiplier linkages are developed is a function of many other factors, including social relations, education, infrastructure, institutional development and levels of incomes generated (Delgrado & Minct 2000). The multiplier effects argument is even more relevant in the context of both communal and resettlement areas, where the nature of settlement patterns is such that relatively 'wealthy communities' in the resettlement areas are surrounded by generally poor communities on the communal areas. Generally, there is not enough data to allow for a detailed analysis of the multiplier effects in the context of land reform and poverty reduction debate in Zimbabwe. Put differently, the combination of welfarist and production oriented foci in Zimbabwe's land reforms is expected to address the issues of poverty directly (by giving land to the poor) and indirectly (through the multiplier effects).

An understanding of local perceptions versus the official view on the land reform and poverty alleviation debate is useful in setting the context for measuring the performance of land reforms vis-à-vis poverty reduction. Local perceptions on the place of land reform in poverty reduction are rather divergent from the official perspective as expressed through policy and programme documents. Kinsey (1999) uses the results of the Poverty Assessment Study Survey (PASS) of 1995 (Government of Zimbabwe, 1997) to illustrate the national perceptions and views on the land reform and poverty alleviation debate. Thus, when asked the question on what were the best solutions to alleviate poverty, provision of land was only cited by 2% of the respondents versus 39% of the respondents who called for increases in wages and employment opportunities. In addition, other respondents tended to emphasize the mechanisms that can be used to allow households to make better use of the land that they already have. In this regard, 23% of the respondents cited the need to have finance and affordable loans, 10% noted accessing irrigation water while 2% cited 'better' infrastructure. Based on their own survey results, Kinsey (1999) also reports similar findings in terms of how the settlers viewed land reform in relation to poverty reduction. Kinsey (1999) goes further to show that settlers' own views about their poverty situation tended to vary in drought and non-drought years. In conclusion, Kinsey (1999:7) argues that "….. neither the national poverty study conducted in 1995 nor the 1997 results of the research survey finds substantial support for the idea that provision of land per se is a key factor in alleviating poverty. Politicians' assertion to the contrary, there simply does not appear to be a loud clamour for land among rural dwellers; land is not perceived as the route out of poverty. Neither is possession of land useful in identifying those who are poor or those who are rich."

In light of the foregoing, the discourse on land reform and poverty reduction is not a simple one. The characteristics of poverty have changed from being predominantly rural to cover most of the urban population. Droughts remain at the centre stage of causing and perpetuating rural poverty. At the same time, small-holder irrigated agriculture has not proved its mettle in poverty alleviation. The declining macro-economic conditions lie at the heart of deepening poverty. The key question then is: what options are there to fight poverty given this particular context.

4.0 The Performance of Resettlement in the Context of Poverty Alleviation

The dominant resettlement model in Zimbabwe, the A1 has historically been biased towards the development of small-holder agriculture. This is backed by a policy framework that stipulate that at least 60% of the land allocated should be given to A1 farmers with the remaining 40% being reserved for the A2 farmers. There is always an economic rationale used to justify this approach to redistributive land reform, and this is premised on the inverse relationship between land productivity and the size of land-holdings (Byres 2004). The efficiency argument has also been used to promote the development of small-holdings in land reforms, with the final objective of bringing about a quick rise in agricultural output (ibid). In addition to being politically expedient, this approach has been shown to be supportive of poverty alleviation (Krishna 1959). Griffin et al (2002) has in effect strongly argued in favour of radical redistributive land reform based on confiscating land from large-scale land owners and distributing it in small-holding with beneficiaries working on the owner-operated, family based farms. In seeking to understand the contribution of land reform to poverty reduction, the debate is primarily about the situation in the A1 schemes. A2 schemes become relevant mainly through the multiplier effects of land reform.

The discourse on the performance of resettlement areas in Zimbabwe, particularly in relation to agricultural production is informed mainly by the work of Kinsey and others. Guided by the social consequence approach which is concerned with the impact of schemes on individuals, families and communities (Hulme 1988), Kinsey and Binswanger (1996) analyzed the performance of resettlement schemes using two broad sets of inter-related variables. The first category, according to the authors, is referred to as the implementation characteristics of resettlement and is broadly concerned with variables that operate mainly at the scheme level. These, among other issues, include issues of scale (e.g. overall scheme size, average land holding size), scheme organization (public, private, spontaneous), settler selection rules; infrastructure and credit, land rights, access to social services and the mode of supply, access to production services, and how the services are supplied, costs and cost recovery, quality of land and the participation of settler groups. The net effect of the implementation variables is reflected in the second group of variables which are referred to as the outcome of resettlement. These include yields and production levels, family income levels, asset accumulation and savings, consumption levels, poverty reduction, diversification of production patterns, environment impacts, stability of resettlement and sustainability of farming systems. This section makes an attempt to review, where data permits, the performance of the resettlement programme in relation to some of these key issues.

Scheme Organization and Administration

Zimbabwe has diversified forms of scheme organization and administration. Thus, there are the formal resettlement schemes where the role of the state is quite central in planning, infrastructure development, land acquisition, settler selection, provision of extension services and the movement of settlers into and out of schemes (Kinsey & Binswanger 1996). On the other hand, there are various versions of spontaneous schemes

as typified by the occupation and settlement of the Zambezi valley and its frontiers (Chimhowu 2003, Dzingirai 1999) and Gokwe (Nyambara 2003, Alexander 2003).

Evidence shows that the strong role of the state has, regrettably, negatively affected the performance of resettlement schemes. Kinsey and Binswanger confirm this and argue that "Paternalism is usually based on good intentions – the wish to see settlers do well and to shield them from excessive hardships in the early stages of the resettlement process. But these good intentions are almost always linked to a profound failure to appreciate that continued control and coddling of settlers in the later stages of the resettlement process is more damaging than inadequate support in the earliest stages" (Kinsey and Binswanger 1996: 117). Commenting further on the adverse outcome of firm government control, the authors state that "Technical staff often fails to understand that they are participating in a new and different system. They fail to recognize that settlers are to be encouraged in their new role as owners or right-holders, and treated as independent decision-makers who must learn to operate within the constraints imposed by nature, their skills, their assets and their access to markets " (ibid: 118). Further, there are also costs associated with the official programmes that are characterisd by a dominant role of the state.

Perhaps the epitome of state control was best evident in the design and implementation of the Model B schemes where the state went as far as to dictate the mode of production, composition of settlers and what to produce. Thus collective cooperative schemes (known popularly as Model B schemes), have largely not been successful (Chipika 1988, Mumbengegwi 1988, Zimbabwe, Government 1991). The lack of group cohesion (Akarabi – Ameyavi 1990) has largely led to the breakdown of the Model B schemes, with a few exceptions where internal modifications forced reorganization (Mumbengegwi 1984). The failure of resettlement at the scheme level also translated into failure at the household level, and poverty reduction became unattainable. Studying on Mushandike Irrigation Scheme in Masvingo province, Dzingirayi (2003) reveals that some settlers simply deserted their plots, undermining the performance of the resettlement scheme at both the scheme and individual level.

Type of Beneficiaries

In the greater part of the 1980s, criteria for resettlement emphasized allocation of land to the landless or those with too little land to support themselves, those not in employment, the poor and the returning refugees (Zimbabwe Government of 1985:23-24). Experienced or master farmers were also to be added on the list with the intention of realizing the 'demonstration effect' among fellow peasants who would be inexperienced in farming. In the mid 1990s, war veterans were added onto the list, with a 20% quota reserved for them. In a study of Chinyika resettlement in Manicaland, Kinsey (2004) showed that there was a general conformity with the selection criteria, with some two thirds of beneficiaries coming from nearby communal areas, thereby contributing to their decongestion. Thus decongestion of the communal areas is one aspect that is seen as contributing to poverty alleviation among rural populations. Data from the original, old resettlement schemes has shown that many of the settlers came from communal areas (ibid). However, a phenomenon that has continued to characterize resettlement is that of

settlers having dual land rights in their original communal areas and resettlement areas. The work by Kinsey (2004) in Chinyika showed that 48.9% of the settlers had continued to cultivate in communal areas in the 1983-84 period. New evidence is still coming up on how FTLRP has performed in targeting the poor. As mentioned elsewhere in this paper, indications are that FTLRP has not done very well in terms of benefiting the poor.

Provision of Extension Services

The provision of extensive services, especially in the early stages of resettlement, proved a major contributing factor to the increased absorption of production technology, culminating in increases in agricultural production (Kinsey 1987). In explaining the success of resettlement in the early period, Kinsey (1999) cites the strength of government intervention in two critical paths, namely the provision of land to the rural poor and extending the state-supported network of institutions to rural areas. However, gradually, providing land to the poor did slow down while the provision of facilities and services to rural areas slowed down at a later stage, reaching minimum (if not zero levels) under FTLRP. Thus for instance, the little amounts of farming inputs and other forms of credit currently provided by the government have been characterized by poor or non-recovery of such credit. A combination of factors, especially droughts, poor organizational capacities by the lending institutions and political interferences have largely been responsible for the poor recovery of credit from farmers. To some extent, urban bias (Lipton 1977, Griffin *et al* 2002) exists in the allocation of farming inputs by government, resulting in less allocations to the poor smallholder farmers on A1 schemes, with the bulk of it being routed to the A2 farmers. The input packages under FTLRP are tilted in favour of A2 farmers at the expense of A1 farmers.

In the early years of resettlement, the then Agricultural Finance Coorporation (AFC) created a special fund meant to increase access to loans by the settlers. This was to be discontinued following general failure to repay loans with Chimedza (1994) showing that some 77% of the resettled farmers who had taken loans were in arrears, resulting in the service being stopped to them. "As is the case of credit, those resettled had preferential access to agricultural extension and veterinary services. The schemes were also provided with depots for seeds and fertilizer, dips for cattle, schools and clinics and, - where possible – villages were supplied with a clean domestic water supply" (Deininger et al 2000:3)

Method of Land Acquisition

The method of land acquisition also has implications for poverty reduction. Evidence on Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme is quite clear on the dispossession of certain sections of the population which was already poor – the farm-workers. The Presidential Land Review Committee Report (PLRC) of 2003, various government and independent reports have confirmed that a significant proportion of the former farm-workers were in distressful situations. The use of land occupations in land acquisition precludes planning. Evidence is showing that disorder is prevalent on the farms, with various types of conflicts developing. Settlers were put on the land without essential support services, a key factor that influenced success in the pre-2000 resettlement. Accordingly, it is difficult

to understand how FTLRP can score similar success when its 'nakedness' is that noticeable.

Quality of Land Acquired

There are contrasting experiences in terms of the quality of land acquired between 1980-1999 and the year 2000 and beyond and its implications on poverty reduction. It is well understood that the quality of land made available for resettlement was poor in the early phase of land reform when the Lancaster House Constitution did not allow for the compulsory acquisition of land (Moyo 1995, Tshuma 1997). Yet ironically, agricultural productivity in the resettlement areas was also better during that same period (Kinsey 1999). All the same, there were limitations in terms of the quality of land availed and Herbst (1990) noted that by that time, some 91% of the land purchased for resettlement was in areas where it was doubtful that surface water would be adequate to agriculture and living needs. "If Zimbabwe could have simply seized well-watered commercial farming land, the water constraint would not have been nearly as important. However, using the Lancaster House settlement, the government was forced to focus much of its resettlement efforts on land that needed a great deal of preparations before it could be farmed." In the post 2000 period, there was no discrimination based on any known technical criteria in the settlement and acquisition of land under FTLRP. Highly mechanized farms, including those involved in specialized land-uses and those with sophisticated irrigation infrastructure were acquired and settled. This, however, did not translate into an automatic increase in output. In fact a key lesson from FTLRP is that the acquisition and settlement of good quality land does not directly lead to high agricultural production. In the absence of other necessary conditions that include having the right beneficiaries on the land, secure tenure arrangements; adequate extension support and unrestricted access to farming inputs, settlement of good quality land on its own does not yield any positive results in agricultural production and poverty reduction. Thus for instance good quality land with irrigation infrastructure was acquired under FTLRP, but as illustrated in Table 4.1 a significant 516 farmers were not using the irrigation production infrastructure that they found on the farms. It is for this reason that FTLRP has been criticized for contributing to the current national food insecurity, thereby directly contributing to worsening livelihood conditions among many Zimbabweans.

Table 4.1: Farmers not Utilizing Production Infrastructure

Province	Type of Infrastructure					
	Centre Pivot	Drip Irrigation	Sprinkler Irrigation	Flood Irrigation	Greenhouses	Total
Mashonaland East	5	8	103	1	14	99
Mashonaland West	23	31	155	-	12	398
Manicaland	2	3	3	-	2	17
Masvingo	-	4	4	6	1	-
Midlands	2	2	9	-	3	2
Matebeleland North	-	-	-	-	-	-
Matebeleland South	-	3	11	1	1	-
Mashonaland Central	2	-	-	-	-	-
Total	32	51	285	8	33	516

Source: Government of Zimbabwe Records 2006.

Agricultural Productivity and Accumulation of Assets

Studies have confirmed the superiority of agricultural production (especially cropping) in resettlement areas. Evidence in this is clearest in relation two main parameters: agricultural productivity and asset accumulation. Deininger, Hoogeveen and Kinsey 2004, building on the earlier work by Gunning, Hoddinott, Kinsey and Owens (2000), concluded that income from cropping was much higher among resettled households. In a comparative study of production and productivity of one resettlement scheme in Gutu South and Ndawi Communal Lands, Chingwenya (2001) has shown that communal areas had lower figures for total production and yields (see Table 4.2). Though acknowledging that "much of that apparent improvement comes simply from cultivating more land with old standards of management," Kinsey (2004:1683) argued that it is evident that "resettlement has enabled substantial numbers of farmers to achieve greater productivity: Yields above 1.5 tonnes per ha were not reported at all in the communal areas" (ibid.:1683). The work by Chikondo (1996) in Masasa Ringa Model A scheme in Mashonaland East also demonstrated that farmers on average exceeded planning expectations in terms of size of land cultivated and aggregate volume of production above target (see also next sections for the findings by Vhutuza 1991 on Mushandike irrigation scheme and annexes). In the study by Chikondo (1996), about 75% of total value of production originated from crop production and the balance from livestock. Similar studies by Harts-Broekhuis and Huisman (2001) in Insiza district in Matebeleland confirmed that resettled households had higher levels of production than other households. However, the variations were explained or attributed to access to more land and labour, as well as possession of more farming equipment and livestock. Ironically, based on their findings, resettlement has not resulted in significant improvements in agricultural productivity per ha.

Table 4.2: Maize Production & Productivity before and after Resettling in a Resettlement Area in Gutu and the adjacent Ndawi communal area.

Tonnage	**Total Production (% of Growers)**		**Yields (Tonnes/ha)**	
	Prior to Resettlement	**After Resettlement**	**Ndawi C.A.**	**Gutu**
Below 0.50	80.4	15.9	69.6	34.1
0.51-1.00	6.1	6.1	17.4	17.1
1.10-1.50	11.0	17.1	13.0	13.4
1.51-2.00	-	-	0.0	17.1
Above 2.00	2.0	61.0	0.0	18.3
Total	99.5	100.1	100	100.00

Source: Chingwenya 2001

Although there is clear evidence of increased productivity in the resettlement areas, there is less clear evidence on the performance of the livestock sector. Tavonezvi (1995), reviewing the performance of the livestock sub-sector in resettlement areas found out that the schemes in the study sample were failing by wide margins to achieve planned target incomes from cattle sales and attributes this situation to unrealistic initial assumptions pertaining to cattle ownership, herd growth and composition, slaughter grades and off-take rates. Whereas the initially resettlement conditions required that those settled in Model A schemes should have at least two draught oxen, evidence on the ground showed otherwise. Kinsey, Burger and Cumming (1998) show that 40% of settlers in the study

area had no cattle at all. Vhutuza (1991), in a study of Mushandike Model A scheme, showed that more than 30% of the settlers had no cattle after resettlement. Generally, resettlement areas still remain under-stocked even though some of the households with cattle have already exceeded the recommended targets.

There is evidence showing increased assets accumulation by farmers in the resettlement areas. These include accumulation of savings, livestock, farming and non-farming equipment. Kinsey (1998) has noted an increase in the use of savings accounts among the households in the study sample with the proportion of those with saving accounts increasing from 6% in 1980 to 52% in 1995. Investment in housing development is also another measure of assets accumulation, even though there is no clear analysis of this in the resettlement areas.

Given the positive results on agricultural production it would seem sensible to argue that resettlement areas are moving in the right direction from a poverty reduction perspective (although national data on poverty is showing otherwise). However, Kinsey (2004) argues that this does not readily translate to improved poverty outcomes. This, according to Kinsey, is caused by that families in resettlement areas have grown large in size and hence the benefits are consumed by the large size of family members. This, according to the authors, made it necessary for analysts to separate between agricultural productivity indicators and welfare indicators. Other studies by Deininger et al 2000 and Harts-Broekhuis and Huisman confirmed the large size nature of resettlement households and further state that these households attract more members because of their success, and act as social safety nets (but the extra members do not make a contribution to agricultural output). In fact, Deininger et al (2000:1) noted "The net impact of land reform on welfare on a household by household basis thus depends crucially on the original size of the beneficiary households and what has happened to household size subsequently." Elsewhere in this report, other data sources have confirmed that resettlement area households are bigger in size than those in communal areas.

Also, the increase in total population has been a major factor that influenced the performance of particular attributes of both communal and resettlement areas. Overtime, cropping land has been expanding at the expense of grazing land. In the context of communal lands, this has been a major case of overstocking.

Evidence has shown that resettled farmers have better market integration than their communal counterparts and the former have a stronger commercial orientation, especially for the tradable crops. Better agricultural productivity in the resettlement areas is connected to easy access to credit and extension services. In fact Deininger et al (2000:7) has shown that "Households in communal areas are much more dependent on remittances and transfers, and to a less degree, business and off-farm income, than land reform beneficiaries. Household income for communal households is approximately half that of resettled households, and resettled households focus almost entirely on agriculture."

5.0 Outcomes of Land Reform from a Poverty Reduction Perspective: Evidence from Masvingo

This section provides evidence on the outcomes of land reform in Masvingo, focusing mainly on issues relating to poverty reduction. It presents evidence from individual case studies dotted around Masvingo province. Data from communal areas is also included to allow for the comparison, where applicable, between communal and resettlement areas. The main evidence produced in this section relates to agricultural productivity and accumulation of assets especially livestock. The data is showing, as already argued in the preceding section, that agricultural productivity is better in the resettlement areas than communal areas, thereby possibly contributing to poverty reduction. There is, less progress in the development of the livestock sector.

Masvingo province has in the past benefited from huge rural development projects making direct contribution to poverty reduction at the local level. One such project was the coordinated Agricultural and Rural Development Project (CARD) which was implemented in Gutu district in the 1980s. The intervention was instrumental in raising agricultural productivity in Gutu's Communal Lands. The CARD programme was quite diversified in terms of its intervention and these were in five main areas namely land-use development, crop development, improvement of grazing schemes and group development, and the Water and Sanitation Project. The multi-faceted Gutu Crop Development Project under CARD was aimed at "securing subsistence production in below average rainfall years by increased yields from a reduced cropping area through the application of improved crop husbandry practices and the availability of all inputs when required" (Government of Zimbabwe 1988: 26). The resultant effect of the intervention was improved crop performance and yields, improved labour situations through direct employment among the project groups and increased ownership of farming equipment that included ploughs, harrows, cultivations, ridges, scotch-carts and wheelbarrows. In connection with crop yields, Chipika (1988) showed that productivity for maize rose from 620kg/ha in the 1984/85 period to 770kg/ha in the 1986/87 period, before rising exponentially to 2835kg/ha in the 1987/88 agricultural season.

Through the Livestock Development Project, CARD was instrumental in improving livestock management among project beneficiaries. However, with respect to the Kupedza Nhomba Rabbit Self-Help Project, where many rabbit groups were formed and received project support (breeding stock, extension services, grants), Van 1988 (as quoted in Government of Zimbabwe 1988: 51) showed that the "target group had not been adequately reached with the majority of group members belonging to the wealthier upper strata families who had less need of protein supplementation than the poorer families." The evaluation of the initiative showed that average productivity of rabbits was a result of high mortality, leadership problems in groups and inadequate farmer training and extension. On the overall, programme deviations were noted in CARD and improved performance was hindered by lack of proper monitoring and evaluation systems. Biases were also confirmed in group formations for the various interventions, with 90% of group members at some point in time being made of master farmers, to the exclusion of the lower strata of peasant farmers. Given this situation, poverty reduction would be

understood in terms of the multiplier effects that filtered through to the poor, non project beneficiaries.

In general, most of the central and southern parts of Masvingo are covered by the moderately shallow grayish brown granite sands that are relatively infertile. As such, this group of soils requires large volumes of inputs especially organic matter and fertilizers to make them productive. Unfortunately, the majority of the small holder producers in both communal and resettlement areas have no adequate financial resources to invest on the improved productive capacity of the land, thereby setting the tone for continued low productivity. The study by Chitombo (2006) on the causes of low agricultural production in Gutu's Mataruse area (Ward 14) demonstrated that physical and economic factors were the main factors responsible for the low level of production. The study confirms a direct relationship between rainfall patterns and levels of agricultural production, especially maize. The data, spanning between 1999 and 2005, indicated that decreases and increases in rainfall patterns were accompanied by similar dips and rises in crop production, especially maize. The study also argued that households in the study area last had surplus that was marketed (to the Grain marketing Board) in 1985 and 1988, and since then output has remained low with no significant amounts for sale since then. In addition to having lowest yields during drought periods, livestock losses also reached their maximum during such periods. Thus, as demonstrated in the study, livestock ownership in the study area was such that 78.8% had no sheep, 62.4% had no goats, 97% had no donkeys while 35.2% had no cattle during the 2000-2001 farming season. After the 2001/2002 drought, the situation got worse to the extent that by the end of that season, 94.5% had no sheep, 92.2% had no goats, 100% had no donkeys and 52.5% had no cattle. Consequently draught power was identified as a key problem delaying planting. The study also showed that the continued fragmentation of farming plots (largely due to population increases), 60% of which ranged from 1.6-3.2 ha, was also contributing to reduced productivity.

More recently, Mavedzenge et al 2006 noted that households owning cattle averaged 49.2% across communal sites and 52.1% across the A1 sites. The study also noted that restocking in the new A1 resettlement schemes was continuing, with more cattle being transferred from communal to resettlement areas. However, the study notes that, as is the situation in communal areas, many herds in the A1 resettlement schemes were still low enough not to allow the putting together of a span of cattle for cultivation. As such, many of the households still depended on, like those without cattle at all, hired draught power.

Based on the study by Chitombo (2006) in Gutu's Mataruse ward, draught power and its access early in the season becomes critical when consideration is made of AREX records for the local area which showed that crops planted after late December, especially maize, *mhunga*, groundnuts and rapoko became a total failure between the period 2000/2001 and 2004/2005. Thus sowing dates became important determinants of yields attained. Hiring draught power was an option not easily available as well. "…. Those who have draught power plough in their fields just after the rains while soil moisture is still available and usually help their neighbours when soil moisture is already gone leading to poor germination and negative yields" (ibid:32). Whilst the use of cattle manure had declined

as a result of decreasing livestock numbers, the application of fertilizers was low for reasons associated with low rainfall patterns (which causes use of fertilizers to increase the chances of crop wilting during droughts) and lack of financial resources. Ironically, the study area had four dams, namely Mataruse, Mushangwe, Maromo and Duti, but no irrigation had been developed in the area. Consequently, low levels of agricultural output had forced many of the people in the study area to rely on food aid. Thus for instance, since 1998, the area has been receiving food aid from the World Food Progamme, Christian Care, Care International, RUDO and the Organization of Collective and Cooperatives in Zimbabwe.

Given the dry nature of Masvingo Province, the importance of water development for irrigation purposes dates back to the colonial era when many dams were constructed primarily for servicing large-scale commercial farms (Ministry of Agriculture 1995). Consequently, large-scale commercial farms continued to enjoy benefits and always managed to minimize the effects of droughts. Whilst the Government of Zimbabwe has invested heavily in the development of dams, not much has been realized as benefits by the small-holder farmers. While dams like Manyuchi, Chinyika and Makuza have been developed in Masvingo province, nothing has really benefited the small-holder producers (Bernestein 2000). Elsewhere in this report it has been observed that smallholder irrigation in facing viability challenges.

All the same, the Government of Zimbabwe has long realized the importance of irrigation development for the small-holder farmers, and Masvingo province has been one of the major beneficiaries of the policy strategy. There are mixed experiences on the extent to which irrigation schemes have improved agricultural production, and hence contributing to poverty alleviation directly and indirectly. A study of Chipiwa Irrigation Scheme, a settler scheme attached to Mkwasine estates by Mushuku (2001) showed that lack of credit facilities was affecting their core farming activity, which is that of sugar cane production. Commercial banks were giving small loans which were largely inadequate while Agribank had settled for a group-lending approach. Lack of collateral was identified as a major constraint as most of plot-holders had not yet finished paying for the plots and hence had no title deeds to use as collateral. Expressing their disapproval of the group lending approach, farmers revealed that "If one farmer defaults and the group fails to recover, Agribank disqualifies the whole group until its loan is repaid… Some sub-groups ..… have been disqualified because of defaulting, which is unfair to farmers who manage to pay their loans in time" (Mashuku 2001:31).

For the farmers in Chipiwa irrigation scheme, agricultural productivity averaged 116 tonnes of sugar cane per hectare in 1991, 100 tonnes in 1991 and zero in 1992 which was a devastating drought year. In the aftermath of the drought and with improvement in water availability, productivity averaged 87 tonnes of cane per ha in 1993, 112 in 1994 before starting another decline to 102 tonnes in 1995 and 48 tonnes in 1996. In the following years, productivity was 90 tonnes in 1998, and 99 tonnes in 1999. Management at the Mwasine Estate confirmed that farmers were still struggling to recover from the effects of the droughts (ibid). Implementation challenges constraining output related to lack of financial capital (for instance 12.2% of the respondents in the

study were not using herbicides for lack of capital), lack of ownership rights, and scheme management problems. Out of the 191 original farmers, 43 had died by 2001 with sons taking over but with little knowledge on farm operations, leading to decreases in production (ibid).

In a study of the Fuve-Panganai Irrigation Schemes in Zaka, Manyanye (1998) reports about marginal profits for the farmers in the study sample. With incomes coming from crop sales, especially green maize, vegetables (tomatoes) and cotton production; costs in the form of farming inputs (fertilizers, hybrid seeds, chemical pesticides) and the cost of irrigation, marketing of the product to the Cargill Depot in Mutare further increased the cost of producing cotton as transport costs were reducing their profit margins.

Vhutuza 1991, quoting a key Government official involved in resettlement in Masvingo noted that "people settled with little knowledge and assets did not in the long term realize any income from their endeavours" (p14). The official also raised the concern that resettlement schemes were planned as self contained units independent from communal areas. This was viewed as not practical as it had created conflict between resettlement and communal areas, leading to poach grazing, boundary fence cutting, indiscriminate felling of trees and game poaching (ibid). Vhutuza also noted that "…. In the early years destitutes were resettled in Mushandike, disregarding the setters' ability to practice economically viable farming which depends mostly on knowledgability of settlers and material possessions like cattle, carts, ploughs etc, which are needed for agricultural production" (Vhutuza 1991:19). However, on the average, interviews with the settlers confirmed that their production performance and livelihoods had changed for the better since joining resettlement (ibid) (see annexes for some production statistics on Mushandike Irrigation scheme in selected years).

Despite the positive effects identified above, Dzingirayi (2002) shows how the dominant role of the state in managing and controlling small-holder irrigation in Mushandike undermined the performance of the scheme. Through a firm grip on production and marketing, the state caused discontent among farmers, forcing them to behave in certain ways that undermined production. For instance, in order to avoid marketing their produce to state parastatals like the Cotton Marketing Board (now Cotton Company of Zimbabwe) and the Grain Marketing Board, farmers by-passed the system, secretly selling their produce elsewhere, including the surrounding communal areas. Labour and effort to work in the irrigation scheme was transferred to plots in the dryland areas where there was less or no state control while some farmers "reversed their settlement in favour of the places in the margins" (ibid 2002:5), including the Zambezi Valley and Gokwe.

In the aftermath of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) and the introduction of the market economy, the state has since withdrawn from Mushandike, with its role being replaced by agri-business firms. This has resulted in the development of contract framing where irrigators were contracted by CANNERS to produce, inter alia, beans and tomatoes. The irrigators received support in the form of seeds, fertilizers and chemicals and a ready market for the produce. Like what the state did before it, the company had also instituted monitoring and surveillance mechanisms to enforce control

on the production and marketing of contracted produce. The major complaint by settlers was that of low prices fetched and losses incurred when the company failed to collect produce on time. According to Dzingirayi, the poverty of settlers caused and constrained relationship with CANNERS as poverty itself "… prevents farmers from being self-reliant in ways that enable them to raise their inputs or source appropriate markets" (p15). As a response to the low prices, farmers always get involved in side-marketing, with CANNERS itself estimating that it was losing as much as 50% of the crop to other marketing channels" (ibid:16). In conclusion, Dzingirayi notes that 'the new agrarian contracts have, as with the state – peasant contracts, not introduced meaningful opportunities for Mushundike small-holders beyond improving access to inputs. The contracts, it seems, have done more to improve CANNERS' contracts of smallholder agricultural production and to market the same production to its own industrial operations. This interlocking of agriculture to industrial operation has inevitably limited opportunities for the smallholder" (ibid:16). Evidence from elsewhere (e.g. the tea growers in the Honde Valley) has also confirmed that contract farming was problematic, especially in the key areas of pricing and grading of the final product (Mtisi 2002). As such, its contribution to poverty reduction remains questionable.

Whilst livestock is a cornerstone of farming activities in both communal and resettlement areas of Masvingo and elsewhere in the country, there are policy guidelines that set the limits of livestock ownership in the A1 resettlement schemes (Table 5.1 refers). A study by Panoira (1990) showed that about 80% of each resettlement scheme's gross land area was made of grazing land. Worth noting is that the limits were set based on some assumptions on minimum draught power and cropping reliability in different agro-ecological regions. A similar argument was also raised by Chiwera (2 000: 35). Thus "resettlement projects are planned and implemented as distinct entities with the allocation and utilization of resources being exclusively for the selected households in communities. Thus in a typical Model A resettlement project no provision is made for the resources of communities in adjacent communal areas. This, as already mentioned, set the scene for the conflict between communal areas and resettlement areas. This is particularly important given that by 2000, Resettlement and Communal areas shared a common boundary of 1200kn (ibid). Also, at the time of the study, resettlement areas had a total of about 3000 illegal settlers (ibid). Studies have shown that poach grazing and fence cutting were the most pertinent problems faced in the management of grazing schemes (Cousins 1989). In Gutu South Resettlement Area, a stock pound had to be constructed as a deterrent measure that allows the impounding of all trespassing stock in the project areas. Thus about 400 cattle had been impounded in 6 villages during the second half of 1997, raising fines that amounted to $5 450 (ibid). The following year (1998), 150 cattle were impounded in one village and since then no new cases had been reported (courtesy of the Stock Trespass Act).

Table 5.1: Maximum No. of Livestock Per Household as Per Policy

Region	Maximum No. of Livestock
I & II	5
III	8
IV	10
V	15-20

Source: Zimbabwe Government of 1985

In the study of grazing schemes in Gutu South Resettlement Scheme which is located in Natural Region III, Chiwera 2000 also noted that it has not been possible practically for resettlement areas to exclude their neighbouring communal areas from accessing grazing. Thus poach grazing was reported by almost all the households located adjacent to communal areas, as compared to almost half of those located from communal areas. Elsewhere, the evaluation of the EEC funded grazing management schemes by Cousins (1987) revealed that boundary conflicts were the major cause of the collapse of most grazing schemes. The study by Chiwera in Gutu South showed that the quality of grazing was poor in resettlement areas close to communal areas. In the study sample, 60% of the households owned a herd of cattle of 10 or less (n = 61). In situations of distress, as in the cases of drought periods, communal area farmers in the neighbourhood were allowed access to grazing as a relief measure. This was the case, for instance, during the 1991/1992 drought. "The relief grazing offered to Communal Areas Livestock during drought periods has the potential of boosting the relationship between resettlement and communal areas in resource utilization" (Chiwera 2001:53). The problem however, is that Communal Area Farmers would want to make the arrangement permanent (ibid).

Mavedzenge et al (2006: 75) make important revelations on the emerging relationships between communal areas and A1 schemes. "One of the major attractions of the new resettlements – even those with barely any agricultural potential such as Mateke Hills- is the availability of grazing lands…cattle in particular were moved quickly to the new resettlement areas for grazing following land invasions. Many communal area dwellers still have their animals there, even if they have not been allocated or taken up plots. Sharing arrangements between communal area dwellers and new settlers (often relatives or friends from the communal areas) are common, with herds being split so that breeding and younger stock gain access to plentiful grazing while a core herd is retained for draught power and milk"

With the establishment of Resettlement Areas, prior arrangements between some communal areas and large scale farmers were lost. This was the case with Gutu South Resettlement where interviews with communal area kraal-heads showed dismay in the manner in which the Land Reform Programme was depriving them of livelihood opportunities they used to enjoy. "… before the farms were acquired for resettlement purposes the previous owner granted them the rights of passage and collection of firewood. Grazing of Livestock on the farm was prohibited but owners of trespassing livestock were merely asked to perform some piece jobs before their stock could be released. Presently they were being asked to pay up to $30 per beast per day for any trespassing stock…. They felt that the white commercial farmer was more cooperative than the fellow blacks that were resettled on the farm" (Chiwera 2000:73).

6.0 Fast Track Land Reform and Resettlement in Masvingo Province and its Implications on Poverty Reduction

This section provides a brief analysis of FTLRP in Masvingo province. Though biased in favour of the A 2 schemes, it provides an analysis that links A2 schemes and its

implications on poverty reduction[1]. By 2003, Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme had distributed about 1321 130 ha in the province (PLRCC 2003). Of this, about 40% was allocated to the A1 smallholder farmers while 60% had gone to A2 (Commercial farmers). About 156 farms with a total hectarage of 199 886.5604 was allocated through the A2 model, creating about 1062 commercial plots. Of these, 840 farmers (79.1%) had taken up their plots by December 2006 as compared to 120 who had not taken up their plots.

There are several arguments that arise in relation to the impact of FTLRP and poverty alleviation. The first relates to the conditions under which land redistribution took place. In contrast to pre-Fast Track land reform, land allocation took place with little or no planning and provision of support infrastructure has been minimal. The potential to use land to generate income and fight poverty by the new beneficiaries is therefore constrained from the beginning. It is in this regard that a Parliament of Zimbabwe Report (2003:27) noted that "In Mashonaland Central, based on a rough planning figure of 4 officers per ward and given that the province has 167 wards, has a gross need of 668 officers for the province. At the moment the province has 140 officers in post leaving a deficit of 428." The operations of the existing staff were also constrained by the lack of field transport. This is a challenge that FTLRP has to face upto.

Secondly, the post-2000 situation has seen the creation of more fundamental changes in the country's agrarian structure than previous resettlement efforts. The issue of viability of the new farm size structure and productivity on the new enterprises, and the kinds of benefits that potentially can flow through the multiplier effects are critical in informing the debate on FTLRP and poverty alleviation. Already, some government reports have started to talk about over-stocked A2 plots and there is evidence that this is happening in Masvingo province. Elsewhere in Manicaland Province, Marongwe et al (2004) has shown that the emerging farm size structures for plots with timber plantations is far below the minimum 500 ha that is required in order to maintain viability of commercial timber production. Similar arguments have been raised in Masvingo, especially in relation to wildlife and cattle ranching forms of land-uses. The key question is: to what extent do the restructured specialized enterprises have the capacity to generate multiplier effects that can make positive contribution to poverty alleviation?

Thirdly, the post 2000 success or failure of land reform is shaped by the wider economic collapse in the country and the impact of the hyper-inflation environment on farming business, flow of investments and remittances etc. It has been argued that new beneficiaries are the worst affected by the declining economic situation. This has been linked to the fact that new beneficiaries were almost starting a new life on their plots and hence their expenditure was naturally expected to be high. When combined with the fact that many of the beneficiaries are civil servants (whose salaries at some point were less than US$10 a month), it largely explains why farming has not picked up as was expected. Recently, state media (The Sunday Mail, 1-8 July 2007) has cited examples of civil servants in Matebeleland South who were letting their farms to Zimbabweans who were based in the Diaspora, particularly in South Africa. Government reports also indicate that

[1] At this stage, data on A1 resettlement schemes is still being collected.

cases of subletting of plots are widespread but hidden. Given this context, is it desirable and practical to talk about poverty alleviation in the current circumstances. Further, is it even worthy it to make a judgment of land reform and poverty reduction based on the experience of FTLRP?

The fourth issue is that debate on the impact of FTLP on food production and food security at household and national levels; livelihoods of vulnerable groups and the state of the environment has tended to be highly politicised. Questions have been raised on the usefulness of redistributing highly productive land with well developed infrastructure although by no means all of large farms settled under Fast Track were 'highly productive.' It is well understood that FTLP was indiscriminate in land acquisition and did not target less productive land. Reports of vandalization of farming infrastructure, including irrigation equipment have been confirmed in government records and independent studies (see also Moyo and Sukume 2004). In the early stages of the land occupations the high mobility of land occupiers as they shuttled between their communal home and the new home in the newly occupied farms meant less time and effort were put to farming. This potentially worsened the food security situation of the households in the face of crippling droughts. The important question to ask is: what is the evidence that links FTLRP and food security at the household and national levels?

A rather misleading assumption that guided land acquisition under Fast Track was that settlement of good quality and well developed land would lead to immediate increases in agricultural production. There were many other issues that were sidelined in the process which in the end resulted in the collapse of production on the formerly highly productive enterprises. Such factors included the quality of beneficiaries, adequacy of extension support, absence of secure tenure arrangements and the shortage of farming inputs. Arguably, FTLP was erroneously based on the assumption that transfer of good quality land from one set of farmers to another can be carried out without compromising production even in the short term. Evidence to date is proving otherwise and is in fact giving weight to the argument that FTLP contributed directly and indirectly to the escalation of poverty. The lack of tenure security for the new farmers has been associated with lack of investment on the land, potentially undermining agricultural production. The lack of tenure security is a disincentive to investment on the land yet beneficiary selection under FTLP was inconsistent and indiscriminate, and to some extent was "free for all" provided one was in the 'correct political camp.' In the end, land was allocated in some situations to farmers of such low individual resource base that it is difficult or even inconceivable for some of them to make any investment on the land. It is in this regard that poverty alleviation via the multiplier effects, especially for the A2 schemes is rather questionable under FTLP.

A fifth argument on the debate on poverty alleviation in the Fast Track period makes reference to the situation of former farm-workers. According to Sachikonye (2003), about 90% of the 160 farms surveyed had experienced a halt or drastic decline in production, resulting in the loss of employment and livelihoods of ex-farm-workers and their families. The exact figures on the numbers of ex-farm-workers displaced remains controversial, although CFU (2003) estimated them at around 200 000 permanent

workers, with an additional number of seasonal workers having lost their working opportunities. Critics of Fast Track have been quick to point out that that some 135 000 households were allocated land by a process that displaced over 200 000 people. In addition to the loss of jobs and incomes, farm workers, who even before the advent of Fast Track were mostly vulnerable as a result of their meager salaries, also lost access to basic social services, subsidized food and shelter in some of the cases (Sachikonye 2003). "With the takeover of the farms, access to housing has become insecure. In some cases, the new farmers or settlers have evicted farm workers from the compound houses. Attempts by workers to keep their homes sometimes ignited disputes with the settlers especially the war veterans." (ibid: 49).

Masvingo province, like any other province in the country, is having problems of former farm-workers who remain on the farms though unemployed by the new settlers. The province is also having problems with "land occupiers", most of whom are described as having settled on the farms at the onset of land occupations in the year 2000. The overall situation in the province is illustrated in Table 6.1. This adds another interesting dimension to poverty reduction which is yet to be properly understood.

Table 6.1: Unemployed former Farm-workers & Land Occupiers in Masvingo

District	**No. of farmers with ex-farm-workers**	**Total No. of Ex Farm-workers**	**No. of Farms with Land Occupiers**	**Total No. of Land Occupiers**
Chiredzi	5	31	16	121
Gutu	0	0	1	10
Masvingo	0	0	4	90
Mwenezi	4	26	15	214
Total	9	57	36	435

Source: Government Records 2006

In addition to the above, there are also specific cases of farms that are still occupied by land occupiers but are not strictly categorized as land occupiers. One such example is the case of about 700 families form Chitsa Communal lands who have been settled in the Gonarezhou Game Park who had their plots pegged and allocated to them by a former Governor of the province, (various press reports). One report has actually stated that "The Chitsa people are not doing any meaningful farming as the soils and rainfall pattern in the Gonarezhou Game Park are not suitable for crop farming. One can only speculate their source of livelihood in the game park with a wide variety of game animals. There is already a cabinet decision for the Chitsa people to move out of Gonarezhou Game Park." Another example is about 200 families who settled at Muzero farm which is owned by a Church institution. The above mentioned report also noted, "The settlers are settled along the Mutirikwi Dam within the prohibited 10 km radius of the Great Zimbabwe and the number keeps increasing. If the setters are allowed to stay, the Great Zimbabwe Monuments will be de-listed from the List of World Heritage sites. No human settlements are allowed within 10km radius from sites with World Heritage Status" (ibid: 60). The problem of land occupiers is therefore larger than what the statistics in Table 5.3 shows. For instance, it is understood that in Masvingo district alone, 6 more farms owned by indigenous farmers were affected by land occupiers. Sundowns Farm had the least number of occupiers with 25 of them, while Magwenzi River Ranch had the highest

with 125 families (ibid: 60). The uncertainty of such settlements and its implications on the livelihoods of the land occupiers can only be speculated upon.

6.1 Specialized Land uses in Masvingo Province

Masvingo province is traditionally home to specialized land-uses that include sugar cane, citrus and wildlife. Many of the farms involved in this category were also acquired and settled under FTLRP. Needless to mention that some of these are facing viability problems, a typical example being that of sugar cane farmers. Available data shows that plot sizes ranged between 15-30 ha, averaging at about 20 ha per plot. Apparently, reports have been made that some beneficiaries have introduced livestock on the sugar cane plots, a move that has created serious conflicts among the farmers themselves.

The high costs of producing sugar cane have been reportedly hampering production by the A2 farmers. The costs of farming inputs (fertilizers, chemicals) and transportation of the harvested cane to the mill were highly prohibitive for the new farmers. In some cases, lack of cordial working relations between A2 farmers and the parent company like Mkwasine estate has also not helped the situation either. The wrangles on the ownership of harvested cane had to be decided in the courts and in the year 2002, no black farmer harvested sugar cane after former farm-owners were allowed to harvest their crop by the courts. By and large, many of the new A2 farmers were not receiving financial assistance from the banks and as a result their farming operations remain constrained. The situation has also been made worse by the government controls on sugar price.

Some of the farms distributed also had citrus plantations. Some A2 farmers were reportedly doing well while others were failing to mantain the production infrastructure. As has been the case nation wide, FTLRP has resulted in the under-utilization, and in some cases vandalization of production infrastructure. Irrigation infrastructure has particularly been affected.

Table 6.2: Vandalization of Farm Equipment in Chiredzi District

Farm	**Description of the Situation**
Lot 3 of Fair Ranch	The former farm-owners destroyed the Water pump that serviced the farm and 120 ha of sugar cane dried up.
Hippo Valley, Holdings Farm 21	Former farm owner vandalized all pumps on the farm and 92 ha of sugar cane dried up.
Lot 8 of Mkwasine Central	The Centre Pivots on the farm were vandalized allegedly by the former owner.
Hippo Valley, Holdings Farm 29	Farm house was vandalized by former farm owner, with equipment like geysers and air conditioners being removed.
Hippo Valley Holdings Farm 48	The former farm owner removed air conditioners and geysers and promised to bring them back.
Hippo Valley Holdings Farm 25	Former farm owner removed the water pump resulting in the drying up of sugar cane.
Hippo Valley Holdings Farm 39	Former farm owner removed air conditioners and geysers

Source: Various Data Sources

It is evident that the problems of transition in the specialized high value operations are a major cause of concern. Possible explanations to this still remain largely hypothetical. At one level, the deteriorating economic situation can be seen as the source of the problem. Lending for farming operations, even for the few with collateral, remain prohibitively expensive. Could it be the reason why specialized high value enterprises have faced operational challenges. Another obvious question relates to the skills possessed by the new farmers. To date, there is no evidence to prove that land allocation took into consideration skills possessed by beneficiaries. Success stories are hard to come by on specialized production systems that include dairy and cane farming to name a few. The rapid transfer of farms with specialized production systems could have been the source of the problem. Makhado (2006), writing about the pre-2000 land reform, talks of huge irrigation schemes that collapsed simply because beneficiaries were the least prepared. Was it the case of history repeating itself under Fast Track. All these issues are relevant in unpacking the consequences of FTLRP on poverty alleviation, and in general more evidence is required before any major conclusions are made.

Evidence from this brief section seems to be showing that the situation on some A2 schemes is not very promising and agricultural production still remains low. There are serious challenges that are yet to be addressed in A2 schemes. In this context, the contribution to poverty reduction by A2 farmers through employment of labour and other multiplier effects is still far from being achieved. The problems associated with former farm-workers and other groups of land occupiers who remain stationed at the A2 farms are a source of concern firstly in terms of the impact of this on farm production and secondly, in terms of their livelihoods. More evidence is however required on the wider picture of the situation of A2 farmers and the implications of this on agricultural production and poverty reduction.

7.0 Concluding Remarks

There is evidence that is showing that agricultural productivity, especially in the old resettlement areas was superior than the situation obtaining in the communal areas. What is however not clear is how sustainable that trend has been and what the current situation is in the old resettlement areas. Existing literature has also shown that there has been improvement by resettlement farmers in terms of assets accumulation. However, the key conditions that existed in the old resettlement areas (increased extension and support services) are missing elements in FTLRP, casting doubt on the ability of the programme to reduce poverty. Even though agricultural productivity and asset accumulation has been confirmed by the existing body of literature on old resettlement areas, this has not translated into net poverty reduction at household level. Why this has been the case, and the disparity in national poverty trends and research results on the performance of resettlement areas are areas where further understanding is required. Also, while the land reform and poverty reduction discussion emphasizes, inter alia, the importance of inputs supply and extension services, it is rather surprising that there is no time frame for such support. For how long should such support be given if the gains already achieved are to be sustained?

The planning of resettlement areas is such that there is no provision for the development of multiplier effects to filter through from resettlement to communal areas. What is happening (e.g. poach grazing) falls outside the policy framework. The question is: is this approach sustainable and to what extent does this promote poverty reduction? An even broader issue is: where does the survival of communal areas come from?

FTLRP is different from previous attempts at land reform even in terms of the beneficiaries of land reform, making interpretations of poverty reduction via the land reform debate rather complicated. The broader vision as pronounced earlier in the Transitional Development Plan and the Growth with Equity Policy has been dropped. Also, the experience of past resettlement schemes does not show significant relationship on poverty reduction via the multiplier effects of land reform. All the same, whilst evidence is there on the improved agricultural performance in old resettlement schemes, it is not clear how sustainable that positive trend has been. Seven years into FTLP, it is important to understand how A1 smallholder farmers are performing in agricultural productivity and asset accumulation. The key question is whether or not their trajectory path is following that of their counterparts in the old resettlement areas.

Whilst land reform is understood to be about wealth creation, there is contradictory evidence coming from some of the FTLRP schemes. The under-utilization of farming infrastructure, and its vandalization in some situations, present clear evidence of the decimation of wealth. Evaluation of FTLRP therefore entails balancing analysis on the wealth creation component and the aspect where wealth has been/is in-fact being destroyed.

Jayne et al (2001) makes a strong case that the hope for economic growth and poverty reduction in the rural contexts of sub-Saharan Africa remains rooted on the land. Almost three decades of land reform in Zimbabwe have not produced clear evidence on land reform and poverty alleviation. This raises fundamental questions from a policy and research point of view. What is going wrong and what needs to be changed? What is the vision on land reform and are the existing mechanisms the correct ones in terms of poverty alleviation? What implementation characteristics need to be changed for positive outcomes on poverty alleviation? Is it about beneficiaries, resettlement models, scale of land reform, tenure arrangements, agricultural development strategies, scheme management, non-creative policies etc? It is evident that more thinking and research is required if land reform in Zimbabwe is to become successful in poverty reduction?

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ZIMVAC Report No. 6, May 2006

ZIMVAC 2005 Report

List of Annexes

Annex 1: Production under Dryland Farming: Average targeted and actual yields on the Mushandike Scheme(Scheme Dryland} {tons per hectare}

Year	Crop	Planned Yield	Actual Yield
1983-84	Maize	0.50	0.45
	Small Grains	0.60	0.11
	Groundnuts	0.20	0.07
	Sunflower	0.80	0.09
1984-85	Maize	0.55	0.39
	Groundnuts	0.20	0.09
	Sunflower	0.70	0.12
	Small grains	0.60	0.13
1985-86	Maize	0.56	0.4
	Groundnuts	0.21	0.1
	Small grains	0.63	0.16
	Sunflower	0.63	0.14
	Beans	Not available	Not available
	Cotton	Not available	0.612
1986-87	Maize	0.72	0.60
	Groundnuts	0.27	012
	Small grains	0.81	0.1
	Sunflower	0.81	0.09
	Beans	0.68	0.12
	Cotton	0.9	0.87
	Tobacco	1.08	No growers
1987-88	Maize	1.96	1.60
	Groundnuts	0.24	0.20
	Small grains	0.90	0.80
	Sunflower	0.70	0.63
	Cotton	0.96	0.70
	Beans	0.4	0.12
	Tobacco	0.5	No growers
1988-89	Maize	1.96	1.59
	Groundnuts	0.24	0.20
	Small grains	0.90	0.70
	Sunflower	0.70	0.68
	Cotton	0.96	0.70
	Beans	0.4	0.10
	Tobacco	0.5	No growers
1989-90	Maize	1.96	1.53
	Groundnuts	0.50	0.30
	Small grains	0.90	0.68
	Sunflower	0.69	0.57
	Cotton	0.94	0.68
	Beans	0.4	0.08
	Tobacco	-	-

Annex 2: Mean performance indicators compared to planning targets, 1993-94 (Masasa-Ringa resettlement in Seke District, Mashonaland East) (Yield is in tones/ha and retention and sales are in tones)

Crop	Area (ha)		Yield		Retention		Sales	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
Maize	1.00	2.65	3.00	3.62	0.70	1.85	2.30	7.46
Groundnuts	0.50	062	0.85	1.42	0.25	0.39	0.15	0.44
Sunflowers	0.90	0.28	1.50	0.70	0.00	0.02	1.85	0.18
Other	0.60	0.11	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	03.00	3.65	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Adapted from Chikondo's study of Msasa- Ringa Resettlement Area (1996).

Annex 3: Problems Faced by A2 Farmers in Masvingo Province

Type of Problem	**Chiredzi**	**Gutu**	**Masvingo**	**Mwenezi**	**Total**
Boundary	41	5	2	9	57
Vandalism	1	3	0	3	7
Plot Ownership	13	3	1	12	29
Farm House	6	1	0	3	10
Theft	3	8	0	12	23
Sharing of Electricity & Water Bills	10	0	0	0	10
Irrigation infrustructure	9	0	1	1	11
Fencing Facilities	2	11	0	18	31
Stray Animals	3	6	0	1	10
Farm Workers	2	0	1	1	4
Dam / Boreholes	5	0	0	0	5
Water Sources	0	1	0	3	4
Cutting Down of Trees	0	13	0	1	14
Roads and Other Access Channells	1	4	0	0	5
Cattle Handling Facilities	0	0	0	1	1
Compound Houses	10	2	0	2	14
Veld Fires	0	5	0	1	6
Land Occupiers	0	2	0	1	3
Poaching	0	0	0	4	4
Grazing Area	0	18	2	16	36
Other	5	3	0	8	16
Total no of	111	85	7	97	300

cases					

Annex 4: Monthly Historical Forex Rates – Zimbabwe

Year	Month	Parallel Rate low	Parallel Rate High	Auction Rate	Inter Bank Rate	Mean Monthly Rates	Mean Monthly Rates
2003	June	2,700	3,200				
	July	2,700	3,200			2950	
	August	3,800	4,600			4200	4,880
	September	4,880	5,500			5190	
	October	5,000	5,500			5250	
	November	5,000	5,700			5350	5,283
	December	5,000	5,500			5250	
2004	January	3,500	4,500	3,518		4000	
	February	4,800	5,400	4,084		5100	5,167
	March	5,000	5,400	4,382		5200	
	April	5,000	5,400	4,619		5200	
	May	5,600	6,200	5,330		5900	6,450
	June	6000	6,500	5,348		6250	
	July	6,800	7,600	5,368		7200	
	August	7,200	7,800	5,610		7500	7,667
	September	7,500	8,000	5,616		7750	
	October	7,500	8,000	5,621		7750	
	November	8000	8,400	5,665		8200	8,567
	December	8500	9,000	5,729		8750	
2005	January	8500	9,000	5,957		8750	
	February	10,500	12,000	6,051		11250	13,250
	March	11,500	13,000	6,082		12250	
	April	14500	18,000	6,113		16250	
	May	19,000	21,000	6,125		20000	24,167
	June	19,000	24,000	9,994		21500	
	July	29,000	33,000	17,701		31000	
	August	38,000	48,000	24,504		43000	73,500
	September	75,000	85,000		26,003	80000	
	October	95,000	100,000		60,781	97500	
	November	85,000	95,000		70,477	90000	107,833
	December	95,000	102,000		83,810	99500	
2006	January	120,000	150,000		99,201	135000	
	February	180,000	205,000		99,201	192500	204,167
	March	200,000	220,000		100,193	210000	
	April	200,000	220,000			210000	
	May	220,000	260, 000			240 000	225,000
	December		2 500				
2007	January						
	March		25 000				
	April		17 000				