Religion, Politics and Governance in India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania: An Overview

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Religions and Development
Research Programme

The Religions and Development Research Programme Consortium is an international research partnership that is exploring the relationships between several major world religions, development in low-income countries and poverty reduction. The programme is comprised of a series of comparative research projects that are addressing the following questions:

- How do religious values and beliefs drive the actions and interactions of individuals and faith-based organisations?
- How do religious values and beliefs and religious organisations influence the relationships between states and societies?
- In what ways do faith communities interact with development actors and what are the outcomes with respect to the achievement of development goals?

The research aims to provide knowledge and tools to enable dialogue between development partners and contribute to the achievement of development goals. We believe that our role as researchers is not to make judgements about the truth or desirability of particular values or beliefs, nor is it to urge a greater or lesser role for religion in achieving development objectives. Instead, our aim is to produce systematic and reliable knowledge and better understanding of the social world.

The research focuses on four countries (India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania), enabling the research team to study most of the major world religions: Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism and African traditional belief systems. The research projects will compare two or more of the focus countries, regions within the countries, different religious traditions and selected development activities and policies.

The consortium consists of six research partner organisations, each of which is working with other researchers in the four focus countries:

- University of Birmingham, UK: International Development Department, Department of Theology and Religion, Centre for West African Studies, Centre for the Study of Global Ethics.
- University of Bath, UK: Centre for Development Studies.
- Indian Institute of Dalit Studies, New Delhi.
- University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
- Lahore University of Management Sciences, Pakistan.

In addition to the research partners, links have been forged with non-academic and non-government bodies, including Islamic Relief.

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List of acronyms
ANPP  All Nigerian People’s Party
ATR  African traditional religion
FBO  Faith based organization
BJP  Bharatiya Janata Party
BAKWATA  Baraza Kuu La Waislamu Tanzania
BARAZA-KUU  Baraza Kuu La Jumuiya Na Taasisi Kiislam Tanzania
CCM  Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CCT  Christian Council of Tanzania
CPI  Communist party of India
CUF  Civic United Front
ELCT  Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania
JDPC  Justice, Development and Peace Commission
INC  Indian National Congress/Congress Party
Izala  Izalatul-Bid’a Wa Iqamat
MMA  Muttahida-Majlise-e-Amal
NWFP  North West Frontier Province
NASFAT  Nasrul-Lahi-Ill-Fathi Society of Nigeria
OIC  Organization of Islamic Conference
PDP  People’s Democratic Party
PPP  Pakistan’s People’s Party
NPC  Nigerian People’s Congress
NCNC  National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons
NDA  National Democratic Alliance
OBCs  Other Backward Classes
RO  Religious organization
RSS  Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
TANU  Tanganyika African National Union
SAD  Shromani Akali Dal
UPA  United Progressive Alliance
VHP  Vishwa Hindu Prishad
UAMSHO  Association for Islamic Propagation in Zanzibar
Summary

This comparative analysis of the relationships between religion, politics and governance in India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania draws on research undertaken as part of a wider research programme on religions and development. The starting point for these studies was the need to examine the implication of the ‘return of religion’ for ‘good governance’, in particular the extent to which religious actors (religious communities, faith based organizations and religious political parties) help or hinder development, especially with respect to pro-poor policy and practice. Each country study provided a historical evaluation of state-religion relationships since independence and detailed case studies of religious actors that assess contemporary patterns of governance and engagement with politics.

The analysis draws on the sociological principle of differentiation between politics and religion, set within the comparative historical context of the post-colonial state. What emerges is the gradual demise of the secular state to a condition today in which there are strong pressures towards conflictual relationships between politics and religion in highly differentiated polities and consensual relationships in integrationist (low differentiated) polities. These pressures, moreover, are reflected in the electoral mobilization of religious identities; state co-option of religious demands; modes of resistance by marginalized groups through ‘religions of revolution’; and, post-9/11, new discourses and policy innovations centred on religious identities. Historically, the ‘crisis of governance’ in these states from the late 1970s onwards played a critical role in undermining the coalition of social and political forces that had underpinned the post-colonial secular state, in the process creating new public spaces for religious actors to occupy.

Case studies of religious actors engaged in contemporary politics in India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania provide some fascinating insights into the changing nature of governance in these states and also the transformations which are occurring within the religious traditions.

- First, democracy, even in religiously homogenous societies such as Pakistan, operates to undercut the power of religion and religious actors, while conversely, lack of democracy (e.g. under military regimes) encourages the use of religion as a means of exercising power, pressures towards a greater integration of religion and the state, and the use of religious actors by the state to increase its legitimacy. It also sets up a vicious cycle of radicalization.

- Second, the interests of poor religious communities are more likely to be articulated if there are specific incentives for political parties (such as increasing their size and electoral support base) and there are programmes intended to benefit these groups (e.g. affirmative action). Engagement with the political
process by such communities can lead to changes in their sense of identity, as it sets up internal debates about the logic of political engagement.

- Third, religious actors sometimes have an ambiguous record on good governance and development. While most criticize underdevelopment, their ideas about the meaning and purpose of development diverge widely. Some are enthusiastic about the normative ‘good governance’ agenda, while others put forward alternative conceptions of development that foreground religious ideals and practices. However, the latter may not see gender discrimination, religious discrimination or exclusion of the poor or marginal religious communities, either by public policy or within the theologies of their own traditions, as a problem.

- Fourth, encounters between state and religion in these countries are dynamic, fluid and changeable. The ‘good governance’ agenda in Africa and Asia has impelled states to be more accommodating of cultural and religious diversity and gender equality, sometimes at the behest of external donors and multilateral development agencies. In the same way, in some cases, religious traditions and theologies have also provided creative responses to traditional dilemmas in the form of inter-faith dialogues that extend beyond mere tolerance and accommodation.

Overall, however, these departures and innovations remain marginal to the main debates about the state and religion in India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania. Their limited impact demonstrates how challenging it is for religious actors in Asia and Africa to be drivers of good governance and developmental changes.

An appropriate role for religion in contemporary governance in the South is more likely to be developed through understanding the nature and outcomes of general policies to improve governance and development than an exclusive focus on the role and performance of religious actors themselves. Recognizing this is the first crucial step towards a better understanding of the implications of the ‘return of religion’ in developing societies.
1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction

In developed and developing societies alike the last thirty years have witnessed the ‘return of religion’ to public life. This process is normally dated from the Iranian Revolution in 1979, and has been distinguished by the mobilization of religiously-based political identities, virulent anti- secularism and vocal claims for a more generous role for religions in the public sphere where, for the most part, the operative norm since 1945 has been the secular state (Casanova, 1994; Habermas, 2006; Haynes, 2007). Radical political movements in the name of militant Islam have created a global security threat: in Afghanistan and Pakistan, militant Islam threatens to capture the state for a global jihad against the West; in Europe the call by some Muslim groups for shari’a law has led to an anti-Islamic backlash; and in large parts of the Middle East and South East Asia, religious terrorism in the name of Islam has mobilized new political formations (Klausen, 2005; Roy, 2004). Fundamentalist Christianity has also been mobilized as never before. The presidency of George W. Bush was notable for its overt efforts to promote Christian values in public and international affairs, as the Christian Right was elevated to prominence that far exceeded its political constituency. In the United Kingdom, too, the leadership of Tony Blair was marked by a public profession of the Prime Minister’s Christian values which, his critics alleged, underpinned his support for the second Gulf War and the ‘war on terror’. Political Hinduism has also been resurgent in trying to restructure the secular foundations of the Indian state. From a marginal force in the 1980s, it stormed the citadels of political power in the late 1990s and prosecuted its sectarian creed by unleashing state power against religious minorities. The Gujarat pogrom of 2002, which saw the murder of 5,000 Muslims and the further displacement of 100,000 into relief camps, was the most notorious example (Singh, 2004). In short, since the late 1970s, religiously-based political movements have emerged in most world religions (Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Sikhism) and, in encountering or rejecting the predominantly secular public sphere, have created new dilemmas for public policy.

Nowhere is this confrontation more apparent than in the contestation between religion and the state in the South. Here the period since 1979 has witnessed the rise of religious nationalism that aims to ‘reinvent’ the nation in a new language of belonging saturated in religion, ethno-religious conflicts for self-determination, and radical religious movements that reject the raison d’être of the ‘secular state’ (Jurgensmeyer, 2000). This crisis of legitimacy, which pervades most states in the developing world today has roots in, among other things, what Appleby (2000) calls the ‘ambivalence of religion’: its
dual potential as a democratizing as well as a revolutionary force for those disenchanted with modernity and the collapse of governance. For this reason, understanding the role of religion in politics in the South today is central both to recognizing the dilemmas of governance and unlocking the potential for effecting ‘good governance’.

To be sure, there is a significant body of literature on religion and politics in the South, on such themes as democratization, religious nationalism, ethno-religious conflicts and the role of faith based organizations (FBOs) as members of civil society in the agenda for improving governance (Cf. Singh et al, 2007). This emerging output has been augmented by the recognition by leading development organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that religious and cultural liberty should be placed in the foreground of the development process because it offers a new point of departure for rethinking relationships between religion and the state in developing societies (UNDP, 2004). However, despite this interest, little systematic or comparative research has been undertaken on religious communities’ and organizations’ relationships with politics and governance in the South. This neglect appears all the more surprising in light of the resources commanded by FBOs in developing societies and their potential to contribute to the development process (Marshall, 2005; WHO, 2007).

This oversight, as Deneulin and Rakodi (2011) suggest, may well be due in part to the positivist bias of the social sciences, which has been strongly influenced by Western conceptions of modernity and progress. It is thirty years since World Development published a special issue on religious values and development, in which contributors argued that religion and the moral basis of societies should be integrated into development studies and policy, but there has been precious little theoretical or conceptual innovation since (Deneulin with Bano, 2009). At one end of the spectrum there is still a dominant positivist paradigm that pervades the social sciences, especially economics and political science. At the other is the ‘constructivist turn’, in which meaning and language have become the main foci for a critical appraisal of Western modernity, as well as ‘deconstructions’ of such concepts as secularism, religion and development itself (Nandy, 1999). Although constructivist approaches have been especially popular since 9/11, most notably in efforts to unveil the secular ‘theology’ of political science (Cf. Philpott, 2002), their utility in combining a new critical understanding with an ability to explain general change appears to still be relatively limited. Indeed, what is often absent in constructivist analysis is a serious recognition of structural constraints that create the complex web of
material, political and symbolic power which determines governance in developing societies. But if, as
constructivists insist, understanding of this is trapped in a ‘world of meanings and ‘meanings exhaust
the world’ then, as Gellner provocatively asks, “…where is the room for coercion through the whip, gun
or hunger?” (Gellner, 1992, p. 63).

It is these limitations of both positivism and constructivism that have led Deneulin and Rakodi to
suggest that a more appropriate approach to the study of religion and development is one that draws
on interpretivism, that is, an empathetic understanding of phenomena such as religion based on the
ideas and meanings attributed to it by its adherents. Interpretivism is distinct from the unbridled
subjectivism that is sometimes all too evident in some strands of constructivism; rather, it recognizes
that the nature of people’s participation in social and cultural life requires an appreciation of both the
structural context within which this participation takes place and the meanings and values that the
participants ascribe to it (Cf. Kohli, 1995).

1.2 Methodology and approach

Methodologically, this study begins from the premise that a comparative-historical approach,
combined with an interpretivist understanding, is needed to understand religion, politics and
governance in countries of the South. The former enables us to identify the broad parameters of the
relationship between religion and politics since independence. The latter, by incorporating detailed
case studies of religious actors2 – religious communities, FBOs, religious political parties and other
such organizations – gives us a more rounded appreciation of what engagement in politics in the
South means for these actors. Together these two approaches are likely to provide us with a more
informed insight into the subject than hitherto.

The research for this paper was undertaken as part of a larger comparative research programme on
the relationships between religions and development. It focuses on India, Pakistan, Nigeria and
Tanzania – countries which face similar challenges of governance and poverty reduction. In Nigeria
and Pakistan, for example, post-colonial democratization has been thwarted by periods of military rule.
Similarly, in India and, to a lesser extent in Tanzania, the secular heritage of independence has been
compromised by the rise of religiously-based political identities. In all four countries common
governance challenges offer invaluable lessons for understanding religious actors’ engagement with
politics. In addition, understanding the nature of this engagement may also hold possible clues about religious actors’ capacity to be either drivers or obstacles to developmental change.3

More specifically, the aims of this research component were to understand the relationships between religion, politics and governance4. In particular, it sought to:

(i) examine the relationships between religious communities and religious actors (organized religious groups and FBOs) and political processes and governance;
(ii) identify whether and how religious actors are obstacles to or levers of change for development;5
(iii) assess what engagement in the political process means for religious actors, especially their poor and women members; and
(iv) identify, within religious actors’ relationship with the state and broader processes of governance, potential entry points for achieving pro-poor change.

These aims were addressed in two ways. First, existing research in India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania was synthesized, with a particular emphasis on how the state-religion relationship has evolved and is changing. Second, detailed case studies were undertaken of selected religious actors, to examine how they interface with politics, explore in some depth their engagement in politics and assess how this is shaping contemporary governance in the four countries. These case studies involved the use of secondary data and extensive interviews with key informants and leaders of religious political parties, FBOs and faith communities (for a full list of the case studies, see Appendix 1).6

At the outset it needs to be emphasized that the four project countries were far from ideal comparators, despite sharing some similar socio-economic conditions, as outlined above. While three are formally secular states (India, Nigeria and Tanzania), Pakistan is an established Islamic republic; the size of the countries and their governance arrangements differ; and while three (India, Nigeria, Tanzania) are religiously and ethnically diverse, Pakistan is less so (see Appendix 2). The difficulties this diversity raises for comparability were compounded in the selection of appropriate and equivalent religious actors because of the heavily contested meaning of ‘religion’, ‘religious communities’ and ‘FBOs’.7
As a result, the case studies in the four countries were not identical. In India, the research focused on religiously marginal Dalit communities who were mobilized by religious and non-religious political parties competing for office and seeking to extend their support base. In Pakistan, because of the operational difficulties of studying some of the religious actors against a background of rising militancy and army operations against militants, the focus was on religious political parties. In Nigeria and Tanzania, on the other hand, because of the size, number and significance of religious organizations/FBOs and some officially sponsored bodies representing religious communities (e.g. in Tanzania BAKWATA and UAMSHO), it was deemed more appropriate to concentrate on these organizations rather than religious communities or religious political parties, which are proscribed by law. Strictly speaking, not all the bodies studied are FBOs, but nor are they exclusive representatives of organized religious communities or have the potential characteristics of religious parties. Because the organizations studied in Nigeria and Tanzania do not all fit into a single clearly definable category, we shall use the term religious organizations (ROs).

Limitations of space preclude a detailed discussion of relations between the national and sub-national levels of government in the four countries or some of the mechanisms adopted to manage religious and ethnic diversity, including affirmative action provisions, power sharing and informal convocational practices. However, it is recognized that mobilizations around religious identities, for example before and after colonialism, were important factors in the evolution of such mechanisms and that they have been significantly influenced by the changing nature of federal-state (national-sub-national) relations in these countries.

In order to reflect ethnic and religious diversity, where possible our case studies were regionally based and representative of the major religious traditions within the four countries (except in Pakistan, which is largely mono-religious). In India, the case studies included three marginal Dalit communities among Muslims, Buddhist and Sikhs in Maharashtra and Punjab, where the dominant traditions are Hinduism and Sikhism respectively. In Nigeria, the states of Kano, Oyo and Anambra were selected for their different configuration of Muslim-Christian populations. In Tanzania, the Christian and Muslim ROs selected included examples from both the religiously mixed mainland and Muslim Zanzibar. In Pakistan, in contrast, because of the politically significant nature of the first government by a coalition
of religious political parties, elected to power in the North Western Frontier Province between 2002 and 2007, the research concentrated on the Muttahida-Majlise-e-Amal (MMA).

The rest of this report is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the findings of the review of literature from the four countries, identifying how the significance of religion in these four polities has changed since independence, with a particular emphasis on changing state-religion relationships. Section 3 draws on the case study material to highlight religious actors’ engagement with contemporary issues of governance. Finally, Section 4 summarises the comparative lessons from the case studies for a broader understanding of religions, politics and governance in the South and beyond.
2 Religion, politics and governance in India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania since independence

2.1 Religion, politics and governance: an organizing framework

Most approaches to the subject of religion and politics tend to focus on the constitutional relationship between the church (religion(s)) and the state (Singh et al, 2007). While this, as we shall see below, is an appropriate point of reference, it rarely provides a useful insight into what Philpott calls “how religions meet the state” (2007, p. 506). A part of the reason is that, whereas the state is an easily identifiable category, recognizing religions and religious organizations that articulate a collective voice can be quite problematic, though at some level such religious actors do speak for a collectivity. These underlying tensions between religion and the state, which according to Philpott are inherent in their divergent claims, are balanced through the sociological principle of differentiation; that is, “the degree of mutual autonomy between religious bodies and state institutions in their foundational legal authority…the extent of each entity’s authority over the other’s basic prerogative to hold office, choose its officials, set its distinctive polices, carry out its activities, in short, govern itself” (ibid., p. 507). Differentiation ranges from high (completely separated and autonomous) to low (where religion and state are integrated), and can be consensual or conflictual (both in conditions of high or low differentiation). Table 1 below outlines some of the examples of such differentiation.

Table 1: Types of differentiation and exemplars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind</th>
<th>Consensual</th>
<th>Conflictual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-differentiated</td>
<td>United States, India*, States with ‘engaged Buddhism’, Tanzania*</td>
<td>Communist Poland, Chile under Pinochet, Kemalist Turkey, Post-colonial Indonesia, Nigeria*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-integrationist</td>
<td>Iran, Saudi Arabia, Colonial Latin America</td>
<td>Communist Bulgaria, Romania, Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Postcolonial Sri Lanka, Arab nationalist regimes, Pakistan*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* At independence

Source: Adapted from Philpott (2007, p. 508)
Differentiation and integration are, of course, not givens, but change over time.\textsuperscript{14} As will be seen from the four case studies below, economics and social conditions can affect the state’s relationship with religion. Conversely, changes in the ideas of religious actors can, over time, have a significant impact on their orientation towards the state. The third (‘Catholic’) wave of democratization in Latin America, for example, is normally associated with the teachings of the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) on human rights, which marked the ‘church’s withdrawal from temporal prerogatives – a definitive doctrinal embrace of differentiation’ (\textit{ibid.}, p. 510). Similarly, Islamist ideas have incubated in statist regimes in Muslim countries that have traditionally been characterized by authoritarian integration e.g. Egypt. In these examples, political Islam has been neutered, while the state has co-opted moderate religious leaders and provides legal support for Islam. It is in these cases of low and conflictual integration, however, that there has been a dramatic transformation from ‘religions of resistance’ to ‘religions of revolution’, underpinned by radical theologies that aim to establish a new form of Islamic integration.

Religious parties are often the main institutions that connect religion and the state. But how this relationship works in practice is heavily mediated by whether the polity is differentiated or integrated. In a differentiated polity like India, for instance, the mobilization inspired by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)\textsuperscript{15} poses a major challenge to India’s secular democracy, but the structures of differentiation ensure that the challenge is undertaken in a competitive environment. For example, elections in 2004 marked a significant national reversal for the Hindutva wave led by the BJP. In contrast, elections in an integrated polity, for example Pakistan, often result in religious parties playing an illiberal role because, although they accept the principle of competition in the electoral sphere, they resolutely support strong constitutional integration, “promot[ing] Islam’s place in society and allow[ing] little religious freedom” (Philpott, 2007, p. 518). As we shall see, historically, radical religious parties in Pakistan have maintained an incestuous relationship with the statist military regimes against popular democratic forces (e.g. the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)) and have only begun to directly oppose the state since the ‘war on terror’ and the army’s campaign against the Pakistan Taliban since 2009.

The distinction between differentiation and integration is also useful for understanding how states address issues of public policy in the fields of religious freedom and religious discrimination and disadvantage, and how they accommodate positive religious rights alongside civil rights such as
protection against discrimination on the basis of gender or sexuality. Thus it is in the differentiated polities, for example in the developed West, where principles of religious freedom are clearly entrenched and least circumscribed, and the public right not to be discriminated against on grounds of gender or sexuality has become a fundamental principle. In contrast, in integrated polities, while some minority religious communities might well be self-governing, as under the millet system of the Turkish Caliphate, the de jure recognition of civil rights is often heavily qualified, leading to asymmetrical conceptions of citizenship (Cf Parekh, 2000). As we shall see in the case of Nigeria, the right to freedom of religion has been taken to mean diametrically opposite things by the Christian and Muslim communities, with the political representatives of the latter using it to justify the introduction of shari’a law in northern Nigerian states. However, it would be inappropriate to suggest that differentiation and integration correspond only to a distinction between developed and developing nations: polities like India have managed to combine religious and civic rights alongside some autonomy in personal religious law (e.g. Muslim personal law), though as we shall see below, rightwing Hindu critics of this arrangement have long campaigned that it militates against the idea of common citizenship.

Taking the framework outlined above as our organizing guide, how does it help us to understand the encounter between religion and politics in India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania since independence? In what sense, if any, does differentiation and integration relate to the ‘return of religion’ in the public sphere? And what does the ‘return of religion’ in public life tell us about the nature of contemporary governance in these states?

Drawing on the historical analysis based on existing sources that was undertaken for the national case studies (Mahajan and Jodhka, 2009; Nolte et al, 2009; Waseem and Mufti, 2009; Nyirabu, 2009), four dimensions will be highlighted: (i) the triumph of the secular state at independence; (ii) the crisis of governance that affected all four states in the 1980s and 1990s and its impact on religious actors and their relationships with the state; and (iii) an assessment of the current nature of governance between religious actors and the state, given the benchmark of a secular state at independence.
2.2 The ‘secular’ state at independence

It has almost become a conventional wisdom to argue that developing countries in the South have witnessed the ‘decline of the secular state’; that is, the gradual erosion of the secular foundations of the nationalist movements that triumphed at independence, and the slow mobilization of religious actors and institutions (Haynes, 2007, Chs.10 and 12). However, such general narratives rarely examine the particular conditions which produced this arrangement or the historical statecraft of state-religion relationships which preceded it. In three of the four project countries (India, Nigeria and Tanzania) there were specific considerations that made state secularism an attractive option. In the event, the nature of these country-specific secularisms was defined not ab initio but was the product of historical and political compromises.16

In India, the post-1947 Gandhian-Nehruvian synthesis for managing religious diversity was shaped as much by traditional Hindu statecraft as Nehru’s commitment to the secular ideal, a commitment strengthened by the mass religious violence which accompanied the creation of Pakistan (Talbot and Singh, 2009). As such, the Indian constitution of 1950 was very much an Indian compromise with the forces of religion. Secularism as an idea found no mention in the constitution (it was inserted in 1976 as the result of a constitutional amendment), but neither did the constitution recognize an official religion. Individual and collective freedom to worship and propagate religion was guaranteed and the principal of non-discrimination on religious grounds established. The Muslim minority’s fears were assuaged by the concession of Muslim Personal Law, though with a constitutional commitment to move eventually towards a unified civil code that would embrace all religious communities. Taken together, these provisions fulfilled at least three requirements of the secular state: religious equality, religious liberty and state neutrality (Smith, 1967. Ch.4). And although no clear ‘wall of separation’ was established between religion and the state, Indian secularism came to be characterized by what Donald Eugene Smith, the distinguished scholar of Indian secularism, called the “no-preference doctrine”, in which no “special privileges were to be granted to any one religion” (ibid., p. 381). The ‘non-preference doctrine’, or what Bhargava (1998) calls ‘principled distance’, according to Mahajhan and Jodhka, “share the liberal imagination, even though the ideals cherished by liberals are realized somewhat differently in the Indian context” (2009, p. 16). Yet the Indian context has been defined primarily by a notion of Hindu tolerance, which has given Indian secularism its credo of ‘good will
towards all religions’ (*sarvadarma sadbha*) - a credo that is also open to non-liberal constructions and illiberal imagination, as will be explored below (Singh, 2000, Ch.3).

Nigerian state secularism also emerged out of a specific historical context and particular compromises. Foremost among these was the different traditions of governance under colonial rule in the North (mainly Islamic and ruled indirectly) and the South (indigenous African religions, Christian mission, and direct rule). In the North, which had been administered by religiously empowered *Emirs* under British guidance, “Islam constituted the basis of local government, and *Shari’a* courts, which had existed before colonial rule, were integrated into the colonial state” (Nolte *et al.*, 2009, p. 5). Criminal laws were codified into secular law only just before independence and a *Shari’a* Court of Appeal continued to exist in the Northern Region after 1960. In contrast, secularism as a creed was championed in the South by Christians, who were the socially mobilizing groups which had benefitted from modern education and direct colonial governance. Thus although secularism became the *grandnorm* of Nigerian politics after 1960, it was highly contested, required the accommodation of Muslim personal law, and would eventually lead to legal bifurcation of the state.

Similarly, Tanzanian state secularism after 1961 was integral to the nationalist movement, which came to power with the specific project of national state-building through the civic-territorial conception of a united national identity. This identity envisioned a form of social and economic development in which *all* religious groups and communities would benefit by, among other things, equal access to education. It was forged in opposition to tribal, ethnic and religious identities previously mobilized by the colonial state. Thus secularism, as in India, was perceived as a solution to the underlying problems of managing diversity in a religiously polarized and divided society (Bakari, 2008). However, like Nigeria, secularism was closely associated with the Christian community, which had been the main beneficiary of British colonial rule. The crafting of Tanzanian state secularism had to accommodate some Muslim demands, especially Muslim personal law; and this exceptionalism was reinforced by the merger with Zanzibar (1964), which retained its modes of Islamic governance.

Even in Pakistan, the creation of an Islamic Republic as a ‘homeland’ for Muslims failed to secure the integration of Islam and the state. The modernist, statist leadership of the Pakistan movement led by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, soon after the achievement of independence, articulated an almost secularist
position that personal beliefs of the citizens were irrelevant: “In the new state of Pakistan [Jinnah had declared]... everyone will be equal before the law, and people will cease to be Muslims and cease to be Hindus, in the eyes of the law” (quoted in Malik, 2002, p.6) Although the retreat from this position to the first constitution (1956) - which decreed that no laws repugnant to Islam would be passed - was gradual and inexorable, the statist regimes and controlling elite of Pakistan have always maintained a rearguard resistance to Islam’s encroachment into the realm of the state. In so doing they have set up a conflictual relationship between the state and Islam, in which “religion seeks to define, understand and penetrate the state, while the latter attempts to make an instrument out of religion” (Waseem and Mufti, 2009, p. 9).

Table 2 below provides a schematic presentation of the state-religion relationship at independence in India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania. It does not, of course, adequately capture the peculiarities of state secularisms in India, Nigeria and Tanzania, or the statist accommodation of Islam in Pakistan, but it does underscore the argument that most nationalist leaders at independence foresaw a minimal role for religion in the public sphere – a perspective further reinforced by the intellectual and ideological investment in economic development that, for most nationalist leaders at the time, was to be the precursor of societal secularization, in which the secular state would play a pre-eminent role (Brass, 1999). Indeed, in the first few decades after decolonization, it was ethnic and regional rather than religious-based movements, such as Biafra, East Pakistan/Bangladesh and regional linguistic movements in India, that threatened to undermine the national integration efforts in the newly independent countries. It was only in the early 1980s, with the ‘crisis of governance’, that political mobilizations around religious identities began to seriously call into question the legitimacy of the secular state.
### Table 2: State-religion relationships at independence in Tanzania, India, Nigeria and Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Nature</th>
<th>Main characteristics</th>
<th>Political forces supporting the arrangement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Freedom of religion; religious equality; state neutrality; right to change one’s religion; ban on religious political parties.</td>
<td>Tanganyika African National Union (TANU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim and customary personal law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td><em>Sarva dharma sambhava</em> (goodwill to all religions); freedom of religion; religious equality; state neutrality</td>
<td>Indian National Congress (INC); Communist Party of India (CPI); some national and regional parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim Personal Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Freedom of religion; religious equality; state neutrality.</td>
<td>Nigerian People’s Congress (NCP); National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim personal law; <em>Shar’ia</em> court of appeal in Northern Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Islamic republic</td>
<td>Islam the state religion; no laws repugnant to Islam; Islamic Advisory Council.</td>
<td>Bureaucratic-military complex; religious and non-religious political parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>But the body of common law is ‘essentially secular’ and based on English Common Law.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.3 From a ‘crisis of governance’ to new roles for religions in public life

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the post-colonial settlement in India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania was under severe strain. Internal and external developments eroded confidence in the secular nationalist project which had been so central to the legitimacy of secular elites. In the event, this erosion was to result in fully-fledged crises of governance, creating new opportunities and spaces for religions in public life.

The major factor triggering this crisis was the decline in the coalition of political forces that had underpinned the post-colonial state from independence onwards. By the 1970s, if not earlier, the developmental claims of these states were looking threadbare. Increasingly they came to resemble what Brass has called “chappati-in-the-sky” (Brass, 1999, p. 36). As a consequence, the electorate turned to other visions. In India, the Congress party lost its hegemony in 1977 after an experiment in authoritarianism during a period of Emergency when the constitution was suspended; and in the 1980s and 1990s, the country witnessed the spectacular rise of the BJP against the background of rising Hindu-Muslim communal violence which climaxed in the destruction of the Ayodhya mosque (1992). In Tanzania, the secular civic-territorial model of national identity started to be increasingly challenged by social and political identities rooted in ethnicity and religion (Campbell and Stein, 1991). Deep resentment of TANU’s monopoly of political power and its ideology of *Ujamaa* (self-reliance) ultimately led to the introduction of multi-party elections in 1992, though religious political parties remained banned. In Pakistan and Nigeria, on the other hand, although ethnic conflicts (Biafra and East Pakistan/Bangladesh) and problems of nation-building had thwarted the process of democratization with early military intervention, these were followed by phases of democratization (Nigeria 1974-83; Pakistan, 1971-77). However, in both countries rapid disillusionment with populist politicians led to renewed bouts of military intervention (Pakistan 1977-88; Nigeria 1983-99) that would subsequently usher in overt attempts to integrate religion and the state.

The second major factor which contributed to the ‘crisis of governance’ by the early 1980s was economic crisis, the impact of externally imposed structural adjustment policies and the pursuit of economic liberalization ((Mahajan and Jodhka, 2009; Nolte *et al*, 2009; Waseem and Mufti, 2009; Nyirabu, 2009). These polices, termed the ‘Washington consensus’, emphasized markets, de-
regulation and the downsizing of the state, with non-state actors and agencies (including FBOs) expected to play a greater role in service delivery. However, their immediate effect was to unravel the social formations that undergirded the post-colonial political formations. Thus India’s pursuit of gradual economic liberalization from the early 1980s onwards spurned a consumerist middle-class at the expense of the peasantry and the petit-bourgeoisie, thereby unleashing the BJP’s project of ‘reinventing India’, which was imbued with religious nationalist fervour (Corbridge and Harris, 2000). In Nigeria, the misuse of oil revenues, the crash in oil prices in 1981 and structural adjustment policies, with their austerity measures and subsequent military takeover, brought about far-reaching changes in Nigerian society marked by “social decay, state failure, massive corruption, endemic graduate unemployment, environmental degradation of the Niger Delta region, unprecedented abuse of human rights and crippling poverty among the masses” (Roberts, 2007, p.15). The ‘crisis of governance’ of the 1980s and 1990s was to have profound implications for the state-religion relationship, as the military regime promoted incremental Islamicization, in the process creating major difficulties for the restoration of the status quo ante when democratic governance was again introduced in 1999 (ibid). Similarly, in Tanzania the adoption of IMF imposed structural adjustment in 1986 had major consequences for the alliance of social classes that depended on the social welfarism of Ujamaa. These reforms made it necessary to “restructure political and social relations … creat[ing] the need to redefine the nature of the state and its relationship with society, [and] in the process, new social forces emerged, including some [that were] religiously inspired” (Nyirabu, 2009, p.25). In Pakistan, too, though a structural adjustment programme was not externally imposed, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979) and the subsequent flow of American aid reinforced the precarious hold of the Zia regime on the state and encouraged it to pursue a course of Islamicization to strength its legitimacy, as well as to ‘reinvent’ the idea of Pakistan an ‘authentic’ Islamic state (Waseem and Mufti, 2009). Zia’s regime, as we shall see below, was to leave an enduring legacy, from which all subsequent regimes (military and civilian) have struggled to distance themselves.

While the ‘crisis of governance’ created new spaces for the ‘return of religion’ to the public sphere in the four countries, how did this return manifest itself in our four case study countries? In what ways did religion now encounter the state?
Obviously it is not possible to discuss all the manifold dimensions of this process in the four countries, but in line with the framework given above, four particular areas will be highlighted: (i) electoral mobilization of religious demands by religious and non-religious parties in differentiated regimes; (ii) statist co-option of religious demands by integrationist regimes; (iii) the transformation of some ‘religions of resistance’ into ‘religions of revolution’ in both differentiated and integrationist regimes; and, (iv), post 9/11, the need to address religious discrimination and disadvantage in both differentiated and integrated regimes.

2.3.1 Electoral mobilization of religious demands by religious and non-religious parties in differentiated regimes

We have noted above that political parties have been the main institutions that have transmitted and processed religious demands into political systems. In the four countries under study, this has been accomplished by both religious and non-religious parties. In India, as Mahajan and Jodhka note, the effectiveness of religious parties has been moderated because to achieve electoral success in a democratic system, they have had to build coalitions beyond their own communities. Simultaneously, however, majoritarian parties that appeal to the Hindu religious community (83 per cent of the population), like the BJP, have been able to consolidate their constituencies by articulating a religio-nationalist agenda. Since the early 1980s, the BJP has grown from a minor national party which could secure only 2 seats and 7.7 per cent of the vote in the national parliamentary elections in 1984 to become the dominant party in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), securing 182 seats (25.5 per cent of the vote) in the 1999 national elections. The BJP-led NDA governed from Delhi between 1999 and 2004. The BJP’s meteoric rise is often ascribed to India’s ‘crisis of governability’ (Kohli, 1990), which enabled the ‘Hindutva wave’ to ‘reinvent India’. In this wave, the BJP and its sister organizations, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and Vishwa Hindu Prishad (VHP, or the World Council of Hindus), unleashed mass mobilizations based on the demand to construct a Hindu temple on the site of the Ajodhya mosque. In a radical innovation, these mobilizations introduced new modes of political pilgrimage, in which the nation was re-imagined in religious idioms, as well as remapped by cross-country marches, often leading to well-planned physical confrontations with minority Muslim communities (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000).
These overt manifestations of Hindu pride gave vent to the long-repressed language of belonging, while simultaneously tapping the heightened anxieties of upper- and middle-caste Hindus beset by threats of affirmative action (for the lower castes) and economic liberalization (Singh, 2004). While in power, the BJP was unable to implement its three key election promises – to build a Hindu temple in the place of the Ayodhya mosque, enact a uniform civil code (which would terminate Muslim personal law) and abolish article 370 of the constitution, which grants special status to Jammu and Kashmir. However, during its tenure in office, the party was able to steer a number of policy changes that sought to embed Hindutva values within Indian society. The need to reform the education system was used as a pretext to revise the school curriculum in line with the more extreme elements of Hindutva thought, based on the schooling model of the RSS. This was done by implementing a New National Curriculum Framework and editing approved textbooks in ways that directly promote Hinduism as the ‘essence of Indian culture’ and describe other religions as ‘alien or invading faiths’, in flagrant violation of Article 28 of the Constitution, which prohibits the teaching of religion in educational institutions managed out of state funds. In higher education, the major funding and research councils were packed with BJP nominees. Among the more outlandish schemes were attempts to ‘Indianize, nationalize and spiritualize’ higher education by seeking to impose the study of astrology and Vedic science on universities. Vedic creationism, like the new enthusiasm for archaeological surveys, came to be identified as means of authenticating Indian knowledge according to which, according to one leading authority, India is to be viewed as “the true mother of all civilisations [that] produced all science known to the Greeks and other ancient cultures” (Nanda, 2004, p.10).

Another area where there was a marked erosion of constitutional guarantees was the right to practise and propagate one’s faith. These freedoms have always been subject to qualification by consideration of public order, morality and health. The right to propagate one’s religion was reluctantly conceded at the insistence of Christian members of the Constituent Assembly, although since 1950 a number of states have passed legislation to regulate the activities of missionaries. Between 2002 and 2004, under the intentionally mistitled ‘Freedom of Religion Bills’, state governments in Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and Orissa have attempted to control religious conversions carried out by “force, fraud or allurement” (Singh, 2004). Intended primarily to limit conversions of low-caste Hindus and tribes to Christianity, Islam and Buddhism, this legislation requires that all conversions, individual or collective, be approved by a District Magistrate, while severely penalizing conversions in response to inducements. There are
some indications that this legislation – unlike most legislation in India – is being rigorously enforced, with calls from the more extreme elements within the BJP for national anti-conversion legislation. It remains to be seen whether the legislation will prove to be prohibitive or protective. What is clear, however, is that in some states of the Indian Union, the District Magistrate has become the final arbiter of religious conscience.

The principle of state neutrality in religious affairs was also compromised in other ways. Less serious contraventions included efforts to introduce a national cow protection bill (2003) and to replace the national anthem in state schools in India’s most populous state with religious songs. More worryingly, the BJP and its sister organizations were implicated in organized pogroms. The events which unfolded in the state of Gujarat in February 2002 after the murder of Hindus on a train in Godhra are too familiar to be recounted again (Gupta, 2010). The facts speak for themselves: in state-wide riots, unofficial reports estimate that almost 5,000 Muslims were killed and over 100,000 were displaced from their homes and had to seek shelter in camps. The BJP state government in Gujarat and the police were criticised for failing to stop the violence. In many instances the police clearly participated or encouraged it; in some cases the police reportedly told Muslim victims ‘we have no orders to save you’. Narinder Modi, the BJP Chief Minister of the state, who is identified with the militant faction of Hindutva, remained unresponsive to national and international criticism of his government for fanning the fires of hatred. Only when international pressure became an embarrassment did the central government respond to censure its regional strap. Even then, this was done in a piecemeal way, with the Prime Minister using an idiom which recalled the traditional obligations of the Hindu ruler to protect raj dharma (religion). Critics argued that Modi’s inaction was influenced mainly by the impending state elections, a desire to hang on to power by consolidating the Hindu vote; his more vociferous supporters were less sanguine. For them Gujarat was a model for the rest of India (Singh, 2004).

Yet despite the BJP’s success, the party was unable to restructure the religion-state relationship in India. The NDA’s constitutional commission, which was set up to review the working of the constitution, proved to be a damp squib, and its defeat in the 2004 parliamentary elections confirmed the view that on its own the BJP would struggle to secure more than 25 per cent of the national vote. While the potential for a Hindu majoritarian party to capture the state through elections remains, and as we have seen in the case of Gujarat appears more realizable at the state level, in reality social,
linguistic, religious, ethnic and caste divisions among Hindus operate to frustrate such an outcome. Centrist politics remains the natural ground for Indian parties seeking national power (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987).

Unlike India, where electoral competition has facilitated the emergence of religious identity politics, in Nigeria and Tanzania it has taken on a different dimension. One reason for this is that religious parties are banned in both states; another is that, like India to some extent, both Tanzanian and Nigerian electoral politics operate against the emergence of a majoritarian national religious party a la BJP, at least at the national level (Roberts, 2007; Mukandala et al, 2006). Consequently, the politicization of religious identities in electoral competition has taken an intra-party form where, though national parties appeal to religious constituencies for electoral support, they deflect the resonance of this appeal in governance, which often requires consociational modes of power sharing, such as the federal principle of proportionality in Nigeria and the balancing of religious representation in key appointments in Tanzania (Nolte et al, 2009; Heilman and Kaiser, 2002).

Thus in Nigeria the use of religious symbols and identities in election campaigns has been common since the late 1970s as, during periods of democratic rule, “politicians have urged their followers to vote along religious lines” (Falola, 1998, p. 38). This has been most explicit following episodes of communal violence, as for example in Kaduna in 1987, when election campaigns have been “conducted more in the churches and mosques by pastors and malams than by the contestants” (Roberts, 2007, p. 29). In the Northern states, especially during the third republic, elections were more of a religious exercise than a political one. During the 2003 general elections, for instance, Muhammed Buhari, the presidential candidate of the All Nigerian People’s party (ANPP), openly urged Muslims to vote only for Muslim candidates, thereby stoking the ire of its rival the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and Anglican bishops, who asked the federal government to intervene. Indeed, the ‘politicization of religion’ in elections has been a slow but a cumulative process, which has been hastened by the rise of the petro-economy that centralized the country’s financial resources and the crisis of governance since the 1980s. In fact some analysts argue that politicians and political parties now not only articulate the religious demands of their constituents but also have an incentive to amplify and exaggerate religious differences to provoke communal conflicts, in order to increase their chances of electoral success (Best, forthcoming; Ibrahim, 1997). Certainly the incidents of
communal conflict that precede elections are indicative of growing polarization in certain localities (Best, forthcoming).

In Tanzania the collapse of TANU’s *Ujamaa* ideology, economic liberalization and establishment of multi-party politics has been followed by the rise of religious identities. As Luanda (1996, p.168) has noted, at the “heart of the re-emergence of religion as an important factor in Tanzania politics is the struggle between the Muslim and Christian establishments for pre-eminence in national affairs …[and] for control of the secular state.” This conflict centres on a Muslim critique of the post-independence secular state as representing a form of Christian ‘hegemonic control’ that has produced discrimination and disadvantage for Muslims. The Muslim critique is countered by Christian responses that Muslim organizations have sought to promote separatism and covert Islamicization, especially over the issue of Zanzibar. However, this has not really been translated into electoral competition as in India and Nigeria. To be sure, there is strong evidence that religious loyalties do, to some degree, influence voting patterns between the two major parties Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and the Civic United Front (CUF), and the competition between them in Zanzibar, which is overwhelmingly Muslim, is very intense (Mallya, 2006). Nonetheless, these patterns coexist with cross-cutting cleavages, the government’s promotion of the belief that there is parity in numbers of Muslims and Christians, and the lack of group consensus within these communities - factors that all contribute to the success of centrist catch-all parties like the CCM (Heilman and Kaiser, 2002).

### 2.3.2 Statist co-option of religious demands and organizations by integrationist regimes

Of the four case study countries, the integrationist impulses have been strongest in Pakistan and northern Nigeria. In the former, the modernist elite which led the movement for Pakistan has struggled to adequately define ‘religion as a discourse of the state’, thus setting up a permanent conflictual relationship between state and Islam. From independence to the mid-1970s, this relationship was managed by statism, co-option and constitutional provisions that recognised the pre-eminence of Islam in Pakistani society but skilfully skirted the need for an Islamic state (Waseem and Mufti, 2009, pp.1-31). However, from the late 1970s onwards there was something of a qualitative transformation, as the crisis of governance identified above was compounded by the military takeover (1977), Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979), and a legitimacy deficit resulting from the execution of the PPP.
leader, Zalfikar Ali Bhutto. It was in these circumstances that the regime of general Zia-ul-Haq embarked on a programme of Islamicization as the authentic national identity for Pakistan. These changes included:

…the establishment of Islamic banks, the provision for abolition of interest (riba), a mandatory collection of social welfare tax (zakat) from Sunni bank-holdings, an Islamic land tax (ushi) and various research institutions to study Islamic economy. Educational reforms included the establishment of the International Islamic University and Sharia Training Institute, enhancement of importance of Arabic in the curricula, and increase in the Islamic content of textbooks. Social reforms stressed the sanctity of Ramadan, enforcement of pre-existing bans on drinking alcohol and gambling as well as encouraging women to wear the chaddar, little or no-make up in government offices, on the television screen and in other workplaces. Legal reforms included establishment of the Federal Sharia Court, parallel to pre-existing legal structures. Procedural reforms included redrafting of the Law of Evidence whereby a woman’s testimony was reduced to one-half of a man’s testimony. This led to severe opposition among women activists. Eventually the draft was significantly different from the original Ordinance. Finally, four new ordinances were introduced collectively known as the Hudood Ordinances, despite being opposed by the liberal intelligentsia, progressive forces on the left of the centre and activists from women and minority communities (Waseem and Mufti, 2009, pp.28-29).

Although Zia’s Islamicization drive was opposed by sections of the Shias, who viewed it as state-backed Sunnification, the process had two long-term consequences for religion-state relationships in Pakistan. First, it permanently shifted the balance towards Islam, as Zia vainly pursued the normative ideal of ‘consensual integration’ (see Table 1). Consequently, notwithstanding post-Zia democratization and General Pervaiz Musharraf’s ‘enlightened modernism’ (1999-2007), democratic and progressive military regimes have struggled to de-Islamicize legislation and structures dating from this era. In fact, the terms of trade in political discourse in Pakistan were permanently altered in favour of Islamicization (Aziz, 2008).

Second, Islamicization has also produced a well-entrenched Islamic establishment comprising religious parties, seminaries, transnational organizations, non-state actors and Jihadists, which has “one step in the system and the other out of it” (Waseem and Mufti, 2009, p.7). Historically, religious parties and organizations in Pakistan were characterized by a Jacobean drive for state power, but successive periods of military rule have nurtured a mullah-military alliance (Haqqani, 2005) that has led to the development of an Islamic establishment with a “structural presence of its own [with]
multiple links with the state characterized by patronage, parallelism and hostility” (Waseem and Mufti, 2009, p.11). This establishment has now produced a powerful counter-narrative to the idea of Pakistan, one that pushes it to its logical conclusion as an Islamic state. According to Waseem and Mufti (2009, p. 33-34), the Islamic establishment is such a major player in society and politics that it operates in four settings: organizational, sectarian, educational and iconoclastic. The success of religious parties in 2002 in electing an MMA provincial government in the NWFP marked a decisive breakthrough (its achievements will be discussed in Section 3).

Like Pakistan, integrationist pressures have also been present in Nigeria’s northern states, which have pre-colonial histories of Islamic polities and jurisprudence (Nolte et al, 2009). In some of these states, there have also been calculated efforts to turn the conflictual relationship between religion and the state into a cooperative one (see Table 1) by the introduction of shari’a law. This process began with the introduction in 1999 of shari’a law in the state of Zamfara for civil and criminal cases. It was subsequently extended to eleven other Muslim-majority states, despite the opposition from southern politicians, non-Muslims in these states and riots (e.g. in Kano state in October 2001, which led to the deaths of 100 people). At the end of 2009, shari’a law was still in force in many of the northern states and, despite some signs of declining support among Muslims, there is little indication that the state governments are likely to abolish it.

The introduction of shari’a in these states has been accompanied by efforts to curtail the religious freedom, citizenship rights and political activities of non-Muslims. As Nolte et al observe of Kano with reference to the state’s Christians:

The state government is tightly controlled by Muslims, and there are currently no Christians in elected positions at state level and very few in high or mid-level administrative posts. Generally, the Christians in Kano are marginalized and do not take part in decision-making. Christian organizations are not subject to direct government control, but the government may request compliance with state policies and regulations from their schools and other institutions. Kano state government has often prevented Christian groups from acquiring land for the building of churches or other buildings that might be put to religious use, and Christians are not only prevented from airing their programmes on state-controlled television and radio stations, but also on private and federally-owned stations which broadcast in Kano State (2009, pp.31).
In addition to these formal and informal pressures, non-Muslims are expected to observe the Islamic moral code, including the wearing of head scarves by Christian schoolgirls, and to accept discriminatory practices, including penal taxation on the activities of Christian organization (ibid). Needless to say, many critics of Nigerian secularism now argue that the introduction of shari’a in northern Nigeria has created a bifurcated polity that increasingly resembles a ‘Muslim north’ and ‘Christian south’ division in the country (Roberts, 2007, pp.1-18), though it needs be recognized that the application of shari’a extends only to private and penal law.

2.3.3 Transformation of some ‘religions of resistance’ into ‘religions of revolution’ in both differentiated and integrationist regimes

Contemporary encounters between religion and the state go beyond merely electoral or statist responses: in both differentiated and integrated regimes, changes in state policies (as result of the ‘crisis of governance’, among other things) and changes in religious theologies and practices (as result of new ideas and outlooks, especially among transnational religious communities in an age of globalization and diaspora activism) have transformed ‘religions of resistance’ into ‘religions of revolution’.21 Some of these ‘revolutions’ have been crushed with unremitting force (India and Nigeria); others continue to threaten the very viability of the state (Pakistan and Tanzania).22

In differentiated regimes such as India, the radicalization of religion as a revolutionary agent has been most pronounced in ethno-religious movements (Sikhs, Kashmiris and the Nagas) (Bose, 2003; Franke, 2009; Singh, 2000). In the 1980s, religion “surfaced as a central concern and set Punjab’s political and cultural agenda” (Mahajan and Jodhka, 2009, p.32), creating a militant secessionist movement in India’s richest province that led to the deaths of 25,000 people between 1984 and 1993 (Singh, 2000, Ch.10). Although the movement was ruthlessly crushed by using overwhelming force to ‘restore normalcy’, it has left a bitter legacy which retains the potential for ‘reinvention’ (Singh, 2009). Similarly, in the 1980s and 1990s the Jammu and Kashmir ethno-separatist movement, which had dated from independence, assumed an increasingly Islamist colour as ex-Afghan Muhujadin jihadists, and Pakistani irregulars turned a resistance movement into a full-scale uprising that resulted in the loss of 60,000 lives (Bose, 2003). As in Punjab, this insurgency was contained by using overwhelming force - a strategy regularly used by the Indian state against Christian insurgents in the north-eastern states (Baruah, 2010).
In Pakistan, though the contemporary Islamist challenge to the state has an underlying regional dimension (the insurgency in Afghanistan), it also has two other aspects. First, the insurgency represents radical *groupscules* within the Islamic establishment, which have been engaged in direct action since the army assault on the Red Mosque in Islamabad (2007), and which have historically nurtured the ‘Pakistan Taliban’. Second, the vertical divisions within the Islamic establishment are also, in some measure, being transformed into *horizontal mobilizations* in which Islam serves as a radical ideology of revolt centred on traditional grievances that include discrimination, underdevelopment and centuries of feudal oppression. Thus it has been convincingly argued that one of the reasons why militants were able to make such impressive inroads into the Swat Valley was because of the cumulative failure of the Pakistan state to establish sound governance after the end of Wali’s rule. This failure had been so systemic that the ‘Pakistan Taliban’-inspired movement had all the characteristics of a subaltern ‘uncivic rebellion’, in which Islamic radicalism was a rejection of modernity, but also included a plea for effective governance (Geiser, 2010). The same development appears to be taking place in the districts of southern Punjab (e.g. Dera Gazi Khan, Bhalwalpur) where Islamic radicals are beginning to effectively mobilize the poor peasantry and agricultural labourers, who have traditionally existed within a feudal moral universe (Aziz, 2010). In short, Islamic radicalism ‘from below’ of the poor and oppressed, who might be mobilized horizontally, potentially holds a far more serious existentialist threat to Pakistan statehood than a vertically organized Islamic establishment, which has demonstrated a propensity to accept state-led integration.

In Nigeria, too, radical Islamist movements in the northern states have attempted to raise the banner of revolt by seeking to mobilize ‘from below’ while competing against the appropriation of their demands by the traditional aristocracy. The Maitatsine riots in Kano, for instance, were a peasants’ revolt against Muslim aristocrats that led to thousands of deaths between 1979 and 1985 (Roberts, 2007, p. 22). According to Haynes (1995, p.527), these riots were not simply an “outbreak of Islamic fundamentalism, but rather an eruption of the ‘have nouts’ against the ‘haves’.” Most recently, the Boko Haram group, which supported direct action, was involved in a confrontation with security forces in which several hundred people were killed (*Vanguard*, 28 July 2009). Indeed, as Nolte *et al* (2009) have clearly demonstrated, in northern Nigeria, especially Kano, the process which led to the introduction of *shari’a* has been undergirded by a class struggle between the traditional landed aristocracy, with its support for Sufi and indigenized Islam, on the one hand and, since the Iranian
revolution, the rise of Arabist scriptural Islam supported by transnational movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, on the other. The latter (Izala) has sought to outflank the former, with followers mainly from the poor or poorly represented groups of society, including students, women and petty traders. These social differences between Izala and Sufi groups, moreover, “are reflected in their different approaches to religious and political practices, with the Izala’s strongly egalitarian ethos reflected in its consistent campaign for shari’a law in order to address the ills perceived to be present in society” (ibid., p.35).

Overall, these social differences among the Muslim sects in northern Nigeria provide interesting clues as to why some have pursued the path of direct action, others gradual mobilization by highlighting the idiom of equality, and still others have sought to steal the clothes of the Islamists by advocating shari’a law as a universal panacea. Interestingly it is among the Arabist Izala followers that the support for shari’a is strongest (84 per cent), while for other Muslims it is modest (59 per cent) (ibid., p.36).

2.3.4 Post-9/11, religious discrimination and disadvantage in differentiated and integrated regimes

Finally, the consequences of the ‘return of religion’ in the four countries under study are also clear in the emergence, in both differentiated and integrated regimes, of discourses and policy responses to claims of religious discrimination and disadvantage. To some extent this is the outcome of the human rights and ‘good governance’ agendas that have promoted religious, gender and cultural liberties (UNDP, 2004). At the same time, we need to acknowledge the impact of 9/11, which has led some of these states to reassess their policies towards religious minorities in order to better promote social integration and community cohesion. Together, these developments have introduced a greater sensitivity to the religious idiom, as well as innovations for how better to frame public policy.

Since 2004, such changes are most apparent in India. The election of a Congress government was followed by the establishment of the Sachar Committee on the social, economic and educational status of the Muslim community. The committee’s findings provided the first systematic analysis of the significant under-representation of Muslims in public life and government services, as well as their underachievement in such areas as education. It also highlights the Indian state’s failure to allocate adequate resources to achieve development objectives in localities of Muslim concentration, particularly in the rural areas (Government of India, 2006). As a consequence of the Sachar
Committee report, a range of policy initiatives have been developed to improve Muslim uptake of primary and secondary education, target development resources to Muslim majority districts, and develop equalities and anti-discrimination legislation that can create a framework for tackling religious marginalization and systemic discrimination (Mahajan and Jodhka, 2010). Despite the reservations of some, who argue that these measures are intended to rekindle Congress’s historic electoral relationship with Indian Muslims, it is generally recognized that the initiatives mark a fundamental change in the Indian state’s policy framework towards religious minorities (Singh, forthcoming).

There have been debates about Muslim socio-economic disadvantage since before independence in Tanzania, although the state has not undertaken a wholesale review *a la* Sachar Committee. Muslims have consistently argued “with evidence, that they [are] discriminated against” (Njozi, 2000, p. 7), particularly in terms of access to education, public sector employment and political office. The consequences of gradual democratization, the ‘war on terror’ and Islamic revivalism amongst a minority of Muslims, mainly in urban areas and Zanzibar, are that their concerns are now being articulated in political discourses that are difficult to ignore. For example, the Muslim youth in Zanzibar, which has been radicalized by global Islam, is increasingly adopting the language of human rights in seeking to articulate an ‘alternative Islam’, one that is not controlled by the official religious establishment (Turner, 2008). Muslims FBOs like BARAZA KUU, moreover, now openly argue that there is “a critical faith imbalance [in which] the country is ruled under a Christian hegemony which promotes Islamophobia” (Bakari, 2008, p.12). Indeed, instead of perpetuating this alleged hegemony, which regularly constructs all Muslim demands for reform as a threat to national integration, some Muslim organizations argue that there is need to accommodate religious difference “in the context of emerging realities of multiculturalism.” In essence, what is required according to them is the creation of new institutional arrangements and practices that would allow the accommodation of diverse interests, political accountability and good governance so as to ensure equality and justice in a society [with] diverse identities, including religious ones (*Ibid.*, p. 33).

There are also echoes of similar discourses and institutional innovations in Nigeria. Interestingly, competing constructions of the freedom of religion, particularly article 38(1) of the 1999 constitution, have been used to legitimize the introduction of *shari’a* law in the twelve northern states on the grounds that this is a *collective* exercise of the right. Such an interpretation has been highly contested.
by non-Muslims, who have argued that shari’a law inhibits their freedom of religion and compromises state secularism. Yet these sharp differences belie balancing mechanisms between the communities, including the principle of religious proportionality that has been increasingly adopted at both local state and federal levels. In addition, there are innovations, mechanisms and practices at federal, state and local levels that aim to promote inter-religious cooperation, as a palliative to endemic religious conflicts. In 2001, a federal Nigerian Inter-religious Council was established. In the south west, where “Muslim and Christian organizations closely engage and compete with each other” (Nolte et al, 2009, p.102), there have been inter-religious initiatives since the early 20th century. Indeed, “Nigeria’s current politics illustrate fascinating social, political and theological processes that may help the state to develop a more satisfying form of multi-religious practice” that are consistent with its broader claims of commitment to equity and justice (ibid).

Finally, in integrationist regimes such as Pakistan following 9/11, external pressure has been exerted to arrest, if not reverse, the incremental Islamicization of the polity. This pressure has been most evident in efforts to reform madrasa education, promote gender rights and respect the rights of religious minorities (Bano, 2007). Formally at least, the state has attempted to respond to these concerns from the donor agencies and multinational organizations. However, these policy agendas have stoked the ire of the Islamic establishment and its allies as anti-Islamic, and not unexpectedly, in Pakistan (and northern Nigeria), as we shall see in the detailed case study of the MMA below, the drive by development agencies and international organizations for gender equality is all too frequently understood as a conscious attempt to discredit Islam.

### 2.4 Religion, politics and governance in India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania today

Clearly since independence the relationship between religion, politics and governance in the four countries under study has been radically transformed. The most striking change has been erosion of the secularist hegemony that commanded the towering heights of the post-independence state. Fifty-to-sixty years on, the political formations which guided these states to independence no longer hold sway, or have been substantially reinvented; even the ‘robust’ secularist states such as India and Tanzania have faced formidable challenges, and today their continued commitment to sharing the ‘liberal imagination’ rests more on their internal social diversity - that militates against a dominant,
religiously homogenizing centre - than deeply entrenched secularist values among the citizenry. Of the other two countries, Nigeria remains a secularist state in name only, while its polity has been de facto bifurcated along religious lines, and Pakistan’s secularist state elites are presently engaged in a bitter civil war against Islamists for the survival of the state. Pakistan’s post-1947 history illustrates most dramatically the emergence of political and social formations that have rejected the secularist efforts to privatize religion. However, as we have seen in Nigeria, India and Tanzania, alternative forms of mobilization by religious actors – electoral, statist infiltration, politics of resistance - have substantially undermined the post-independence civic conception of citizenship, as Islamicization, shari’a law, ‘freedom of religion’ legislation, customary laws and proportionality have introduced asymmetric religious rights, often against bitter opposition from religious opponents and secularists. In short, the ‘return of religion’ in these four polities is much more than merely symbolic: above all, it has permeated the political idiom in which ideas, movements and discourses about identity and disadvantage are now increasingly constructed as a zero-sum game by one religious community vis-à-vis others.

The future direction of change in religion, politics and governance in the four polities is presented in Table 3.

Table 3: Types of differentiation and exemplars: India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania today

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind</th>
<th>Consensual</th>
<th>Confictual</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-differentiated</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Nigeria (Non-northern states)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low-integrationist</td>
<td>Nigeria (Northern states with shari’a)</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
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Direction of change
In India, although the challenge of Hindutva has been arrested, for the time being at least, it is likely that as long as the BJP remains as the major national party, it would be premature to rule out an electoral assertion against state secularism. Similarly, in Tanzania the process of democratization, if it takes firm roots, could undermine the one-party domination of the CUM, enabling the CUF to emerge as a potential alternative for those seeking more active engagement of faiths in governance – Muslim or otherwise. In Nigeria, the overall direction of change is far more complex: on the one hand, the northern states have moved to a more consensual accommodation between religion and the state, while on the other, the non-shari’a states retain a strong commitment to state secularism. In these conditions, we can neither rule out a greater polarization between these positions (with demands for shari’a in other states and demands by non-Muslims for a more differentiated polity committed to secularism), nor a gradual movement towards a conflictual differentiation (if support for shari’a in the northern states wanes and non-Muslim political formations are more accommodative and pursue a less strident secularism). Equally, in Pakistan today, while the momentum is with the mobilizing groups that demand consensual integration of religion and the state, the Pakistani army and the civic state establishment - which have regularly disarticulated the demand for an Islamic state - may well succeed in defeating the Islamist challenge. Even such an outcome, however, is unlikely to provide an enduring solution: at best it may restore the permanent antagonism between an increasingly Islamicized society and a modernist state elite.
3 Case studies of religious actors: patterns of contemporary governance

Many of the changes identified above can be more contextually analysed through detailed case studies. In this section, the case study materials are drawn on to analyse what engagement in the political process means for religious actors, especially their poor and women members; to identify the role of religious actors as obstacles to and levers of change for development; and to identify within religious actors’ relationships with the state and broader processes of governance entry points for potential pro-poor change. These very broad issues will be reviewed by evaluating the case study material with special reference to:

- mobilizations by marginalized religious communities in a differentiated political polity to secure ‘development goods’ i.e. representation in affirmative action programmes (India)
- the development performance of religious parties in an integrated polity (Pakistan)
- the role of religious organizations (ROs) in differentiated and integrated polities in advocacy and service delivery (Nigeria)
- the role of ROs in a differentiated polity (Tanzania)
- the record of religious actors in promoting inclusive development and governance that engages the poor and women (India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania)
- the contribution of religious actors to transforming contemporary governance to provide new frameworks of engagement in politics (India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania).

3.1 Marginalized religious communities and political mobilization (India)\(^\text{27}\)

It was noted in Section 2 that one of the key variables determining religious actors’ engagement with the political system is their religious ideas and outlook. In India, there is an interesting example of political mobilization by religious communities which view their identity both as a signifier of ‘victimization’ and a ‘resource’ for their liberation. This paradox arises because all the major religious communities of Indic origin - Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, and Sikh – have the cross-cutting cleavage of caste, a system of endogamous social hierarchy.\(^\text{28}\) Low caste groups within these religious traditions, often referred to as Dalits,\(^\text{29}\) are doubly marginalized: within their own religious communities - notwithstanding that some of these, such as Muslims, Sikhs and Christians, profess an egalitarian creed - and as victims of social exclusion and economic deprivation. Historically, these communities have eked out a miserable existence at the margins of Indian society, but after the social reform movements of the early 20\(^{th}\) century they developed an antagonistic outlook towards the
dominant religious traditions with which they were conventionally associated, especially Hinduism. They did so by evolving alternative social visions or, indeed, new religiously-based social movements that aim to transcend religious and social inequality (Juergensmeyer, 1988; Jodhka and Kumar, 2010). From the middle of the twentieth century, social mobilization by these movements coincided with a political response from the Indian state in the form of affirmative action programmes, though initially these programmes were restricted only to former Hindu low caste and tribal groups (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes). Since 1950, the scope of affirmative action programmes has been extended to include Other Backward Castes/Classes (OBCs), which include Dalit groups among non-Hindus, including Muslims. Because of the size of the Dalit groups (which make up more than 50 per cent of India’s population), incentive structures have thereby been created for political parties to mobilize these communities. Ironically, as we shall see, such mobilizations have also created a dynamic interplay between community identities and interests (Mahajan and Jodhka, 2009, pp.55-68).

For Dalit communities, religion has always provided the mainspring of engagement in politics to build a new social vision without discrimination and disadvantage (Juergensmeyer, 1988). At the same time this vision, especially since 1947, has been part of a ‘plebeian assertion’ to secure Dalit interests in a political system still dominated by the higher castes (Jaffrelot, 2009). These tensions between Dalit communities’ identity and the dilemma of how to articulating their interests politically are insightfully explored by Mahajan and Jodhka (2009) in three case studies.

In the first case, Dalit Muslims in Maharashtra successfully mobilized to secure employment and educational opportunities. However, an animated debate arose among them about whether community identity was compromised by participating in caste-based reservation – a social system closely identified with Hinduism. Groups in favour of reservation were opposed by religious leaders and the Ulemas “who wrote in religious journals… [and] some even went to the extent of issuing fatwas against people working on the OBC issue” (Mahajan and Jodhka, 2009, p.60). This formidable opposition was eventually overcome by engaging with the leaders in mosques and villages in ways that demonstrated to them the benefits of such participation. Indeed, so successful was this internal campaign, according to Mahajan and Jodhka, that the militant Hindu nationalist regional party, Shiv Sena, even attempted to co-opt the movement, notwithstanding its anti-Muslim stance, and even acceded to its demands that an individual’s OBC status – the need to confirm that a person is of this
category – be confirmed by a local rather than state official (ibid., pp. 55-68). In mobilizing in this way, OBC Muslims were actually knocking at an open door, because most of the major parties and the state government responded positively to their demands. Perhaps more significantly, this mobilization ‘from below’, it is suggested, strengthened communal civic engagement that thwarted the potential sectarian backlash (against Muslims) following terrorist outrages in Mumbai in 2004 and 2008.

The second case study from the state of Punjab demonstrates that narrow competition between political parties (secular and religious) can encourage political formations in India to be responsive to Dalit demands. In this case, the Congress party sought to divide the political constituency of its main rival, the Shromani Akali Dal (SAD), by increasing the reservation of Dalit Sikhs. Although this manoeuvre failed to deliver the necessary political dividend in the subsequent election, it established an entrenched Dalit stake in sharing the state’s reservations, which all subsequent state governments (Congress or SAD) were unable to reverse (ibid. pp. 46-54).

The third case study, again from Maharashtra, describes an exceptional case of an ex-Dalit community that has benefitted from affirmative action programmes over a considerable time. It aims to realise its social vision by constructing an alternative religious identity (Buddhism), while using its resources (size, development, access to state institutions) to advance its agenda and mitigate discrimination against community members. This twin strategy is predicated on the assumption that genuine equality can be achieved only by changing one’s religion and that self-development is the necessary logical step after affirmative action. Both strategies aim to build a self-empowered community conscious of the liberating potential of religious identity and the weakness of dependence on state largesse. Again, the size of this community in Maharashtra ensures that the leading political parties remain responsive to its demands (ibid., pp. 69-82).

In general, Mahajan and Jodhka offer five propositions from the Indian case studies. The first is that in a differentiated polity the structures of governance (and social diversity) can create a dynamic engagement between politics and religious communities which operates against the emergence of essentialist politics or communities. Second, related to this, such dynamic engagement can also help to frame the internal discourses within religious communities that sometimes accentuate divisions between progressive and traditional tendencies. Third, democracy also creates incentives for political
parties to be responsive to marginal groups like the Dalits, though of course, this is determined by their size and political significance. Fourth, in a differentiated polity religious parties, either at state level (e.g. SAD, Shiv Sena) or national level (e.g. BJP), are unable to consolidate their constituency behind the idea of a monolithic ‘community’ because of cross-cutting cleavages of caste and the existence of competitive non-religious parties. And finally, religious identity remains the mainspring of political mobilization for religious communities, even when they decide to change or ‘reinvent’ their identity (ibid., pp. 83-4).

3.2 The development performance of religious parties in an integrated political system (Pakistan)

Religious political parties, as was noted in Section 1, are often the main institutions for aggregating religious demands in a political system. In differentiated polities, such as India, these parties are regularly checkmated by competition from non-religious parties. In integrated polities, in contrast, religious political parties can be either anti- or pro-system. In the case of Pakistan, they have played these roles simultaneously because they are part of what Waseem and Mufti (2009) call the amorphous, multi-faceted ‘Islamic establishment’ that wages an unrelenting struggle against the modernist idea of Pakistan, but also provides succour to military regimes against democratic consolidation. Prone to electoral marginalization during periods of democratization, historically these parties have thrived under military regimes because of their ideology and capacity for street mobilization. In 2002, against the backdrop of war in Afghanistan and the unpopular military regime of General Pervez Musharraf, the MMA achieved a notable electoral success, winning in the NWFP and establishing a strong presence in Baluchistan, Sindh and the National Assembly. In the event, the MMA coalition was allowed to form the provincial government in the NWFP because the idea of ‘mulla (cleric) in’ office was deemed preferable to ‘mulla out’ because the latter was fraught with the risk of anti-government mobilizations (ibid., p. 15). The success of the MMA provides an exceptional case study to examine the degree to which it was able to implement its policies and to review any substantive difference in governance during its five years in office.

Although the MMA fought the 2002 election on a broad range of issues, including improving governance and development, its key plank was Islamicization. One of its leaders admitted that “We want to enforce a complete Islamic system, [which according to him is] the perfect code of human rights, one
which guarantees justice, security and peace for all citizens and protects their honour and employment” (*The News*, 28 October 2001). This vision was seen to be in consonance with the constitutionally sanctioned Council of Islamic Ideology and to promise a form of ‘Islamic welfare state’ that would be realized by working within the existing constitution (Waseem and Mufti, 2009, p.44).

Soon after the elections, the MMA pursued a vigorous policy of Islamicization that included: the banning of alcohol, gambling, and audio and video cassettes; the appointment of women coaches for women athletes; the appointment of female doctors for women; declaring Friday a public holiday; and the introduction of Qur’anic studies in primary and secondary schools, interest free banking and punishments such as *rajm* (stoning to death) and *qatt-e-yadd* (amputating hands). These measures were consolidated in the passing of the Shari’a Bill (2003), which envisaged the further wholesale Islamicization of society to include education and the judiciary. To establish an executive authority to enforce this process, the Hasba (accountability) Bill (2006) was passed, creating a parallel administrative structure with an ombudsman likened to a “Taliban style vice and virtue department” (*Dawn*, 3 May 2003). Although both these bills were subsequently rejected by the Pakistan Supreme Court, in passing these measures the MMA contributed significantly to creating an atmosphere of intolerance and radical change, in which its opponents were regularly castigated as anti-Islamic (*ibid.*, pp. 44-45).

Not only did the MMA’s Islamicization project became ensnared in constitutional and legal challenges (the bills were referred by the NWFP governor to the President and the Supreme Court), its record on development and governance was equally unimpressive. Notwithstanding the fact that provincial autonomy in Pakistan (and India) is heavily circumscribed by the centralization of constitutional and financial powers at the federal level (federal transfers in 2005-06 accounted for 92 per cent of NWFP’s total revenue receipts), the MMA introduced few innovations. Its period in office saw a modest increase in primary education enrolment (from 33 per cent in 2000-01 to 40 per cent in 2004-05), immunization for children aged 22-23 months (57 per cent in 2000-01 to 76 per cent in 2004-05), and ante-natal coverage of women (from 34 per cent in 2000-01 to 39 per cent in 2004-05). There was a substantial increase in the budget devoted to medical care (from Rs 80 million in 2000-01 to 170 million in 2004-5), but it was unaccompanied any major improvements in the quality of health care. In allocating development funds, the MMA sought to target its own localities on the grounds that they were least developed, but its opponents accused the coalition of engaging in the worst form of ‘pork-barrel
politics’. Comparative analysis of MMA’s development initiatives in health care and education in three districts underscore the view that the coalition lacked a clear vision of development and operated very much according to traditional patron-client networks in seeking to consolidate and extend its support base (Ibid., p. 49).

Nor was the MMA’s record of dealing with Musharraf’s military administration in Islamabad strikingly different from previous patterns of mullah-military cooperation (see Haqqani, 2005). In spite of deep popular resentment of military rule, in the name of ‘pragmatism’, of appearing to adjust to the ‘realities of power’, the coalition provided strategically vital support to Musharraf’s questionable attempt to extend his tenure in office through a Legal Framework Order. Although this decision was camouflaged in rhetorical attacks against ‘militarism’, most serious observers viewed MMA’s decision as a quid pro quo for the intelligence agencies’ assistance in the 2002 elections. Indeed, that the MMA was widely perceived as the military’s poodle, which barked loudly to keep anti-Americanism after 9/11 at bay, was further illustrated by its dismal performance in the February 2008 provincial and national elections. Genuinely regarded as the first ‘free and fair’ elections since the 1990s, they witnessed the landslide return of mainstream provincial and national parties, reducing the MMA-based religious parties to their nominal representation (from 45 seats in the National Assembly in 2002 to 7 in 2008, and from 68 seats in the NWFP provincial assembly in 2002 to only 14 in 2008), which has characterized most of Pakistani politics since 1947.

The pervasive inability of the MMA to deliver more effective governance was evident in a relatively critical assessment of its performance in other key areas. As we shall see below, the administration arrested, if not reversed, processes aimed at promoting gender equality. At the same time, its promise to reduce corruption remained just that: a promise. “One of the biggest disappointments felt by the people”, note Waseem and Mufti, “was that the MMA government was as, if not more, corrupt than previous governments” (2009, p. 50). In summing up the MMA’s record - and the Pakistani experience of governance by religious parties - Waseem and Mufti (pp. 9-10) conclude that:

Engagement in public life exposes religious forces to requirements [of] high moral standards, as defined by the corruption-accountability nexus, human rights regime, and the particular situation of women and minorities. ..the record of Islamic parties in Pakistan has been dismal on these counts. Faith –based groups have failed to act as drivers of social change. Their short-term objectives of acquiring and using power…thrived on the politics of identity at the grave cost of politics of issues and
policies. They have generally shied away from seeking to remove impediments to development and reform, including economic, social and gender inequality, patterns of feudal authority, and elitism in general. Islamists have lacked not only the will to challenge the structures of domination, but also the potential for joining agencies of change, such as political parties, civil society or the media, beyond the confines of religious politics.

Despite this powerful indictment we cannot exclude the possibility, however tenuous, that the MMA, by consolidating the Islamist political infrastructure in the region, was also twin-tracking in nurturing ‘uncivic rebellions’ by the ‘Pakistani Taliban’. There appears to be limited direct evidence for this conjecture, but the fallout in the NWFP since the Pakistan Army’s crackdown in Swat (May 2009) does lend some credence to the argument. Yet in the absence of convincing evidence, and in the light of overwhelming historical experience, it would seem reasonable to suggest that religious political parties in Pakistan remain the military’s one strategic asset in governance. In short, they are destined to play the role of the ideological storm troopers of conflictual integration.

3.3 Religious organizations in advocacy and service delivery in differentiated and integrated polity (Nigeria)

Religious political parties are constitutionally outlawed in some political systems, such as Nigeria and Tanzania. While this prohibition fails to excise completely the presence of religious demands within the political system, some of the more common functions associated with these parties are undertaken by other religious organizations. Unlike India and Pakistan, Christian organizations in many African countries play a major role in advocacy and service delivery, particularly education and health care, where historically they have had a strong comparative advantage. Although madrasa education is widely provided in Muslim areas, Muslim FBOs play a smaller role in the provision of healthcare and education because of their size and history. Given this different context, therefore, how do the ROs encounter the state? What underpins their motivations to engage with the public realm? And what is their contribution to ‘good governance’?

In Nigeria, as Nolte et al (2009) demonstrate, broadly speaking ROs’ interactions with the state are framed by two dimensions. First, they may occupy a position as critical religious actors who share a common religious vocabulary that seeks to promote justice and equality through good governance by emphasizing structural development, education and health care. In this sense, ROs are more than a
prophetic voice: they articulate alternative visions of development, often around aspects of service delivery, which highlight Nigerian state failure. Second, as in India and Pakistan, the effectiveness of ROs is mediated by the structures of governance in which they operate. These include: the historical tradition, the centralization of political power at the federal level, the new hierarchies of social inclusion and exclusion centred around ethnicity, indigeneity,31 the federal character principle (consociational proportionality), and the asymmetrical size of some of the religious communities (Christian and Muslim) that the ROs represent at the state and local levels. These complexities have given Nigeria an unusual quality, as a polity in which elements of both a differentiated (south/middle) and an integrated (north) relationship between religion and the state co-exist. But they also provide rich evidence of innovations at the State level that might have significant implications for religions, politics and governance in the future.

In three detailed case studies for this research, Nolte et al provide new insights into state-FBO relationships. The case studies were located in Kano (a Muslim majority state), Anambra (a Christian majority state) and Oyo (a mixed Christian-Muslim state). Their findings outline how FBOs' interactions with the states are deeply braided with Nigeria’s growing crisis of governability.

Kano, the historic centre of Islam in northern Nigeria, is the main exemplar of integrationist politics. Here the landed aristocracy, which has traditionally dominated the politics of the state, welcomed the introduction of shari’a in 2000, to disarticulate a challenge ‘from below’ from more radical Islamic formations. Nolte et al found that in Kano, some Muslim ROs are well-integrated into the state system, with close access to State representatives and State government responsiveness to their demands. Radical or critical Muslim groups, on the other hand, are effectively marginalized, resulting in a vicious cycle of radicalization in which they understand their exclusion primarily in religious terms, accusing the aristocratic leadership of the State of being unIslamic (ibid. p. 25). This exclusionary approach is coupled with strict control of Christian ROs, which has resulted in non-representation and penal taxation on their activities. Some Christian ROs are “suspected not only of making a profit but of ‘making money out of religion’, i.e. of acting in non-pious and selfish ways” (ibid., p. 22). Christian ROs, moreover, are seen as representing non-indigenes’ (in-migrants’) interests, because Kano Christians constitute “a clearly identifiable group of potentially threatening outsiders” (ibid., p. 17). Overall, according to Nolte et al,
In short, according to Nolte et al, Kano’s shift to integrationist politics has had some paradoxical effects. Undoubtedly it has fuelled Islamic radicalization and a sense of victimhood and discrimination among Christians. However, the debate about shari’a has also provided some underpinning for democratization in the state by welding more firmly the political and intellectual groups and in launching an engaged discussion (and Islamic jurisprudence) about the applicability of shari’a courts to non-Muslims (ibid., pp. 23-4). To what extent these trends are moving towards exclusionary democratization or inclusionary liberalization of shari’a remains to be seen.

In contrast to Kano, the state of Anambra in the south west of Nigeria has a Christian majority. However, governance in this state has historically depended on well-established links with northern Muslim politicians, who have been mentors to leading state politicians. Unlike Kano, in Anambra Nolte et al found that ROs operate within a non-discriminatory framework and without penal taxation, although they are differentiated by their activities (Christian ROs more inclined to education and health provision; Muslim towards self-support) and their closeness to power. This proximity is due less to religious difference than the imbrication of religious actors in ‘godfather politics’ - the federally sponsored and funded patron who delivers the state’s vote to national parties, and in the process, thoroughly deinstitutionalizes and destabilizes state politics. Thus the difference between the Anglican and Catholic Churches over elections in the state in 2007 had less to do with doctrinal matters than support for, and opposition to, ‘godfather politics’; and these differences often also cross-cut religious divides so that ethnicity (e.g. Hausa) trumps religion (e.g. Muslim or Christian). Yet unlike Kano, there is a considerable degree of religious tolerance, underpinned by the effective operation at the local level of the ‘federal character principle’ (religious and ethnic proportionality in appointments). This outcome, as Nolte et al perceptively surmise:
…is presumably possible because the political elite of the state consists of individuals whose power is not religious in the same manner as that of the northern Nigerian aristocracy. Also, the high degree of violence involving ‘godfathers’ and their clients suggests that there is a higher degree of fission within the elite, which suggests the elite might be less successful in subverting and excluding religious movements…All the same, the opportunities for FBOs to engage with government remain dependent on their political links. On the one hand, this means that the nation’s patronage politics are not necessarily religiously based or biased. On the other hand, as the rift between the Catholic and Anglican denominations illustrates, the politicization of religion also encourages FBOs to ‘religionize’ patronage politics (ibid, p. 62-63).

The highly competitive context within which religious actors like the ROs operate in Anambra also characterize the south-western state of Oyo, a largely Yoruba-speaking state with a mixed population of Christians, Muslims and traditionalists. In Oyo, the rivalries of ‘godfather’ politics have been complicated by the marginalization of Obasanjo, a former Nigerian president, who hails from the adjoining Ogun state. Despite these complications, ROs in the state were least affected by religious differences, and there appeared to be little difference in their mode of operation and effectiveness in dealing with the State administration. If anything, the State government encourages new ROs, probably because local elites are more able to manage them effectively. Where differences are observable, they often occur along ethnic lines, for example, Hausa-speaking Muslim ROs and the pervasive discrimination against Hausas, who are generally regarded as recent in-migrants. Despite these fissures, inter-religious cohesion is sustained by active utilization of the ‘federal character principle’, which ensures equitable representation in political and administrative structures. It is also reflected in periodic cross-communal mobilization against ‘godfather politics’ which, in one instance, “brought together Ibadan’s traditional elite, a Muslim candidate and a Catholic pro-democracy organization in order to defeat a Christian candidate who had been installed by a Muslim ‘godfather’” (ibid., p. 76). Again, as Nolte et al, conclude:

This case clearly illustrates that while religious rivalry constitutes part of everyday politics in Oyo, FBOs are involved in politics not so much on the basis of their religion but on the basis of their position within local politics. However, the boundaries between ethnicity, indigeneity and religion are sometimes blurred, and like in Anambra, it seems the politicization of religion by ‘godfathers’ or their opponents in the state encourages FBOs to introduce religion into patronage politics (ibid., p. 76).
In summarizing the evidence from the Nigerian case studies, it is instructive to note that historical tradition and structures of governance (or, rather, malgovernance) are the primary determinants of the effectiveness of religious actors in politics and of their inability to be the core drivers of change for pro-poor policies and development. Successive constitutional changes have placed a premium on religion, ethnicity, and indigeneity to the exclusion of non-religion, class, and non-indigeneity – all the elements that, arguably, make for a common sense of citizenship. These developments are most conspicuous in Kano, where (non-radical) Muslim organizations are well integrated into state structures; other states like Anambra and Oyo also reflect these changes, though here the fault lines of exclusion are not religion but ethnicity and indigeneity. In all three states, identity politics has produced exclusionary categories which, by virtue of their exclusion, are prone to radicalization and violence while using the same idioms as the included groups. This paradox has its roots in the ‘crisis of governance’. However, as Nolte et al conclude, it can only be addressed effectively by development:

…the ability of religious organizations to participate in politics and governance is strongly inter-related with patterns of exclusion based on linguistic, ethnic and religion identity as well as on intra-Nigerian struggles to limit the political participation of certain groups through the requirement of ‘indigeneity’ at the level of…states. As a result of this, the relationship between the state and FBOs is uneven and non-equitable: in all states there were some FBOs that were excluded from participation in local politics while others had close access to the state. The unevenness of relations to the state contributed to mistrust and fear in the relationship of FBOs with each other, and the resultant fears about religion or other identity-based forms of exclusion are likely to contribute to retaliatory practices at different levels, thus contributing to deepening social divisions. Consequently, attempts to reduce the intensity of religious conflicts must engage with concerns over poverty and development and diminish the impact of patrimonial politics and ‘indigeneity’ (ibid., p. 3).

3.4 The role of religious organizations in a differentiated polity (Tanzania)

In Tanzania, ROs perform functions similar to those in Nigeria. However, despite the roughly equal numbers of Christians and Muslims (see above), the Tanzania polity has so far resisted the pressures towards a closer integration of politics and religion, even in overwhelmingly Muslim Zanzibar. Conventionally, this outcome is to found in the existence of cross-cutting political cleavages, internal divisions within the two dominant religious communities and the socialist inheritance of the years after independence. In practice, these co-exist with a great deal of political control that is exercised over
Muslim affairs, to a point where radical critics suggest that Tanzanian secularism is a form of ‘hegemonic control’. Not unnaturally, in this context ROs’ encounters with the state produce highly discordant discourses, which divide sharply along religious lines.

The governance context in which ROs operate in Tanzania, as we have seen above, is defined by the change from a controlled socialist political system crafted by Julius Nyerere to a plural, competitive polity based on a market economy. This transformation has occurred since the mid-1980s and has been accompanied by pressures to reassess state-religion relationships that have rested on the bedrock of secularism. Greater openness and political competition has been followed by demands, especially from Muslim politicians, for more transparency and accountability in the ways the state manages its relations with religious communities. In particular, this has been represented by radical Muslim voices, which argue that Tanzanian politics has an inbuilt anti-Muslim bias which results in their exclusion, discrimination and disadvantage (Bakari, 2008).

Before this issue is addressed directly, it is necessary to acknowledge that case studies from Tanzania are less comprehensive and rigorous than those from India, Pakistan or Nigeria. Nevertheless, they provide valuable insights into contemporary discourses among Christian, Muslim and state-sponsored Muslim ROs about politics and their engagement with the state. These case studies include Christian ROs (the Christian Council of Tanzania – CCT - and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania - ELCT) and Muslim FBOs (Baraza Kuu La Waislamu Tanzania - BAKWATA), Baraza Kuu La Jumuiya Na Taasisi Kiislam Tanzania (BARAZA KUU – Supreme Council of Islamic Organizations), which operate in mainland Tanzania, and UAMSHO (Association for Islamic Propagation, Zanzibar) and the Mufti’s Office in Zanzibar (a government department that overseas Muslim affairs on the island).

Christian organizations were, in general, extremely supportive of the principle of state secularism, which they regard as the bedrock of Tanzanian politics, and do not view secularism as potentially discriminatory or problematic for other religious communities. They also acknowledge that they enjoy close access to state institutions, but assert that this is not always followed by positive policy decisions, for the state continues to exercise its relative autonomy in religious matters. At the same time, these organizations are adamant in their opposition to any erosion of the principle of state
secularism, hostility reflected in their mobilization against Zanzibar’s membership of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the demand for the reinstatement of Khadi courts on the mainland, and Muslim claims of discrimination, exclusion and disadvantage. The latter were often dismissed by informants in terms of cultural patterns of behaviour, for instance, lower average educational levels of the Muslim population or limited female participation in the workforce. Overall, the discourses of these ROs were uncritical of contemporary patterns of governance, which are regarded as the natural dispensation for Tanzania.

In contrast, Muslim ROs, especially BARAZA KUU and UAMSHO, perceive a structural imbalance in the Tanzanian polity towards Christianity, seen in its accommodation of Christian ROs. This imbalance, according to these organizations, has historical roots, in that under British colonialism churches were favoured and Christians gained access to the limited educational facilities available, many provided by missionaries. As a result, according to these organizations, Muslims have been and continue to be under-represented in key sectors of government employment and official positions. They also believe that Christian organizations, because of their privileged position and resources, have been more able to influence state policy than their Muslim equivalents. They have politically mobilized to press their demands, for example, the re-introduction of Khadi courts on the mainland. Perhaps most disconcerting for informants from these Muslim organizations in recent times has been the perceived use of anti-terror measures to limit the human rights of Muslim activists, including the right to religious freedom (Bakari and Ndumbaro, 2006). Although the state-sponsored Mufti’s Office in Zanzibar and BAKWATA do not support this critique, even they recognize that in recent years such transgressions have taken place (Nyirabu, 2009).

These discourses give us only glimpses into how religious actors operate in Tanzanian politics, and clearly a more comprehensive evaluation is required. Nonetheless, our fragmentary insights suggest that two key dimensions are framing the relationship between religion and politics: the gradual transition from a controlled socialist polity to a plural, market driven one; and the growing mobilization of some Muslim groups against a strongly felt sense of discrimination and disadvantage in the public sphere. It is in this setting that “inequalities and injustices that were viewed through a class lens under Ujamaa…are now being viewed through religious and ethnic lenses…[thereby] raising tension[s] between the state and religion” (ibid., p.50). While mobilization along religious lines is construed by
many as a threat to the conventional understanding of national integration, in which politics and religion occupy separate realms, for others, this mobilization provides an opportunity to craft new institutions of governance that can better ensure equality and justice, including the representation of religious identities (Bakari, 2009, p. 33; Bakari and Ndumbaro, 2006).

3.5 Religious actors and inclusive development that engages the poor and women (India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania)

As noted above, there is a general assumption that religious actors in the South are more likely than not to represent poor segments of society. This assumption is sometimes linked to state failure - which provides spaces for religious actors to provide service delivery that otherwise would not occur - and the size of and resources commanded by FBOs (Marshall, 2005). If this is, indeed, the case, then we need to ask how the organizations considered here measure up in representing the poor. How do the ROs engage with the most deprived and disadvantaged? And related to this, to what extent do religious actors in the cases studied address gender concerns in their vision of development and governance, both internally and within broader society?

Not unexpectedly our case studies provide mixed evidence. The clearest example of engagement with the poor emerged in the case of Dalits in India, who are identified as being on the ‘margins of the margins’ in terms of socio-economic indicators. That they were able to mobilize and to use their religio-caste status to do so owed as much to the political incentives for such mobilization (for political parties) as internal community dynamics. Interestingly, mobilization by some Dalit groups unleashed competitive demands from other Dalit groups seeking to protect their share of job reservation quotas, for example in Punjab (Mahajan and Jodhka, 2009, pp. 44-54). Equally, while the neo-Buddhists had historically represented the traditional Dalit group, improvements in their social status and social mobility in this community had somewhat distanced sections of it from the really disadvantaged, though to be fair, neo-Buddhists remain active in tackling pervasive discrimination against their community in rural areas (ibid., pp. 69-82).

Similarly, the evidence from the MMA case study suggests that the targeted recipients of the coalition’s policies were several different groups, which did not clearly represent the economically and socially disadvantaged. It is no doubt correct that the government redirected development resources to some
of the most underdeveloped districts, which also happened to be the support base of leading political figures in the coalition, but this was an extension of traditional patronage politics rather than a concerted effort to tackle poverty. In brief, poverty reduction for the MMA remained a secondary priority to its ideological commitment to Islamicize governance and society (Waseem and Mufti, 2009, pp.51-70).

In Nigeria, in contrast, there was significant evidence of ROs’ engagement with economically and socially marginalized groups. These ROs shared a common vocabulary of development, but also reflected their constituents and participated in poverty reduction measures. The Justice, Development and Peace Commission’s (JDPC) efforts in Anambra state, for instance, are “directed to alleviating the inconvenience of the poor, the physically-challenged, [and] the marginalized” (Nolte et al, 2009, p. 81). Nasrul-Lahi-II-Fathi Society of Nigeria (NASFAT) also attempts to encourage self-development and provides support for small-scale business ventures. However, the organizations acknowledged that these efforts are unable to overcome the sea of poverty in Nigeria, where the incidence of poverty had increased from about a quarter of the population in 1980 to about two-thirds in 1996 (ibid., p. 51). In these conditions, distinguishing between the poor and the deserving poor was portrayed as a real labour of Sisyphus, creating painful dilemmas for ROs engaged in working with the poor.

If the evidence on our case studies of religious actors’ articulation of the demands of the poor is somewhat mixed, their record on mainstreaming gender in their activities is also ambiguous. At one extreme, it verges on explicit notions of ‘separate development’; at the other, it acknowledges the need for elements of equality but still qualifies this substantially, to the extent of neglecting it altogether.

In the NWFP in Pakistan, the MMA’s conception of development involved ‘erasing women’ from presence in public life. This entailed restrictions on girls’ education; compelling women students to join a female only medical college; preventing women from voting or holding office; creating an atmosphere in which four women councillors were killed and many were allowed out only with a male chaperone; and tolerating honour killers of women (Waseem and Mufti, 2009, pp.53-4). This hostility was also directed towards women’s NGOs, which were seen to be “alienated from the issues at the grassroots” and inordinately “focused on women’s rights.” These NGOs, according to the MMA, were “undermining the cultural identity of Pakistan”, which is best articulated by Islamic NGOs which are
doing “God’s work” (ibid., p. 60). In sum, the MMA pursued an unrelenting vision of ‘separate development’, in which conventional assumptions about gender and development were turned upside down.

In Nigeria, the records of religious actors suggest that gender-centring is mediated by ethno-religious factors. While all the ROs studied have women’s wings that encourage women’s participation or use such participation strategically in their dealings with the state, male domination of the organizations is a common characteristic, enabling “women’s interests [to be]…kept under close control” (Nolte et al., 2009, p. 84-85). Nevertheless, there are some significant differences between ROs over the meaning of women’s empowerment, and these differences do not always correspond to religious traditions. Thus in northern Nigeria, the differences between Muslim and Christian organizations on the subject were ones of degree rather than kind, whereas in southern Nigeria the same organizations have a more positive assessment of the need to promote gender equality in their activities and internal organization. As Nolte et al conclude:

…differences between the world religions are less pronounced than differences associated with ethno-religious origin. Clearly, both Christians and Muslims in northern Nigeria emphasize a stronger gender separation than their counterparts in the south, and women’s roles are perceived as determined by their obligations towards their fathers, husbands and children. In turn, certainly among Muslims, these male relations are also obligated to support them. In Muslim and Christian communities in the south, however, women are seen as inherently capable and as powerful as men. However, the expectations of female leadership in most Muslim groups are limited to worldly success while some Christian churches afford women the same ability to provide spiritual leadership as men (ibid., p. 88-89).

Among the Dalit communities in India, the mobilization for affirmative action had undoubtedly been accompanied by the empowerment of women. However, women still lag behind men in terms of their representation and leadership roles in the organizations studied, which are mainly controlled by men, with separate chapters for women. According to one respondent, Dalit women are in:

…a double victimized position: one, at the level of being a Dalit and the other at being a woman. That is untouchability from the other communities and oppression from within their own community. But still [our] community does seem to be not so sensitive to the issues of women (Khairlanjhi, quoted in Mahajan and Jodhka, 2009, p. 81).
Not surprisingly this insensitivity was attributed largely to community leaders who place communal goals ahead of tackling patriarchy and marginalization within Dalit communities (ibid., p. 81).

Overall, our case studies suggest that it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions about religious actors – communities, political parties or ROs – being strongly anchored in support of the poorest sections of the community, or responding positively to the challenges of development and gender in their activities in ways that conform to the standard expectations of the ‘good governance’ agenda. Religious actors’ behaviour is mediated by their religious ideals and the social and governance structures within which they are embedded, and the existence of such diversity is, perhaps to some degree, to be expected.

### 3.6 The contribution of religious actors to transforming contemporary governance (India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania)

Traditionally, religious actors in the public sphere have been viewed by their critics as bearers of non-transactionable demands and divisive conceptions of citizenship, as well as inclined, as we have seen in the case of MMA in Pakistan, to promote discrimination, for example, against women (Barry, 2001). More often than not, they are seen as the bearers of collective values which demand special rights or opt-outs from general rule-making, especially in areas such as state-religion relations, pro-life issues, marriage, sexualities, health and morality (Levy, 2000). Such demands generally place religious actors on the ‘wrong side’ of the ‘progressive agenda’, because translating them into policy can result in asymmetrical forms of citizenship that are sometimes highly contested or, in some cases, result in real or imagined fears of religious hegemony by non-religious groups. Consequently, with reference to our case studies we need to ask: To what extent has the engagement of religious actors in politics allayed such fears? And is there any evidence of transformative practices amongst contemporary religious actors?

The Nigerian case studies and wider experience offer four major pointers that are especially noteworthy. First, creative encounters between Christian and Muslim ROs are, in some cases, resulting in theological changes which offer the possibility of accommodation with the ‘other’ through emulation rather than stigmatization, which has traditionally been the conventional response to inter-faith encounters (Cf. Jaffrelot, 1996). Hence NAFSAT, a Muslim RO, has been at the forefront of
emulating Pentecostal practices in catering to its constituency, while learning from its religious competitor to engage better with the local state. Second, the adoption of shari’a law in the northern states has, to some extent, avoided the Islamophobia present elsewhere in the South, mainly because the existence of significant non-Muslim communities in these states has generated a creative debate about the applicability of shari’a jurisdiction to non-Muslims, some of whom voluntarily choose to seek redress in the shari’a courts. Third, while seemingly mobilizing around the idiom of religion, religious actors are also using the text, or language, of the state to articulate their demands. Although there is a danger that such usage is a rhetorical device, at the same time it does open up such language to interrogation. Finally, religious actors are a major constituent of the social diversity that underpins Nigeria’s politics of proportionality at all levels, a politics that has become enshrined in the ‘federal character principle’. This may well, as Nolte _et al_ insist, result in “mediocrity”, pork-barrel politics, and “limitations on choice”, but it enables the state to remain the final arbiter, supports “mutual exchange and negotiations” and alleviates some forms of discrimination. The onus, therefore, according to Nolte _et al_, is on “the state to encourage more equitable relations between religious organizations, and to overcome or reduce the prevailing rhetoric of marginalization” (_ibid.,_ p. 108).

In response to encounters with the state, theological change is also discernible among religious actors in India. Dalit Muslims, like some Muslim women’s groups which are seeking to reform Muslim personal law from within, demonstrate that tradition can be contested on theological and empirical grounds, thus confirming the dictum that such change is perhaps better negotiated by religious actors themselves, through what Nussbaum calls the ‘principle of moral constraint’, than externally imposed (Nussbaum, 2000, p.195). Such encounters have reaffirmed what Rudolph and Rudoulph (1967) term the remarkable ‘modernity of tradition’, in which in India, ascriptive identities like caste, against the perceived conventional wisdom, continue to play a major role in democratic consolidation. Indeed, as Mahajan (2010b, p. 21) has observed, because in contemporary India religion seeks to _totalize_ politics, while caste (and other identities) _fragment_ it, Dalit-based religious groups among Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs act as important checks and balances against political movements which promote religious homogenization; with their size ensuring, electorally at least, that Dalit demands are recognized by both religious and non-religious parties. As in Nigeria, in India the state remains the final arbiter between religious groups because instead of asserting the hegemony they desire, they have to live with and accommodate plurality and diversity.
Undoubtedly there is similar evidence in Tanzania of changes in religious actors’ theological outlook as result of encounters with the state, though to be fair, the case studies did not fully capture this important dimension. What is evident is that some ROs, notably Muslim ones, are keen to appropriate discourses of rights and discrimination to critique governance, while simultaneously advocating new institutions that can accommodate religious and ethnic diversity, if not chime with the multicultural ideal (Bakari, 2008, p. 33). This response may well reflect the fact that criticism of the status quo in Tanzania is only now emerging into a systematic critique, following gradual economic and political liberalization. It is also indicative of the fact that the ROs are keen to build on their experience of encounters with the state and inter-religious relations with other ROs to ensure a berth for religion in the construction of Tanzanian multiculturalism, which can build on the country’s secular heritage and provide new political spaces for religious identities and inter-faith dialogues.

Finally, experience of religious actors in Pakistan probably provides the least convincing evidence for the argument that they are capable of transforming governance in ways which do not reinforce stereotypes of the incommensurate nature of politics and religion. However, as noted above on several occasions, the current crisis of Pakistan’s polity is a crisis within the permanent establishment, which includes religious actors. Insofar as segments of the latter articulate an alternative vision of Pakistan, they also give some voice to those for whom religion has become an act of rebellion, expressing serious disenchantment with the developmental performance of the state, however this is defined. In one sense such rebellions may well be symptoms rather than the cause. As Waseem and Mufti (2009, pp. 71-3) conclude, democratic consolidation in Pakistan will require an accommodation with Pakistan’s Islamic identity – politically mobilized or not – in ways that significantly diminish the propensity to violence or forms of political closure that always lead to military rule. To what extent the current campaign against militancy permanently restructures the rule of the game to ensure democratic consolidation remains to be seen.
4 Assessment: comparative lessons for religion, politics and governance in developing countries

Probably because it was largely unanticipated, the ‘return of religion’ to public life in both developed and developing societies is yet to produce a systematic body of literature capable of understanding the manifold complexities of this phenomenon at various levels, and within particular political and social formations. It is perhaps a truism to say that in the South “religion and politics are linked together in complex ways” (Deneulin and Rakodi, 2011, p.52): the question is how this complexity can be untangled and whether religion is an independent variable defining governance or a complex social phenomenon that is embedded in different ways across economic, social, cultural and political systems. After being overshadowed by security and policy concerns stemming from the rise of ethno-religious violence in the early 1990s and the fallout from 9/11, some of these issues are only now being addressed. Comparatively, notwithstanding the current phase of globalization, one of the most promising ways to map this change, as observed above, is through the sociological principle of differentiation, which seeks to explore the extent to which state and religion are differentiated and integrated, and the processes that separate them and bring them together. This principle enables us to identify discrete areas in the interface between the state and religion that each influences, or seeks to influence, the way this change manifests itself, and the modes of accommodation between the two. It does not, however, directly address the causes of such change.

One of the most striking observations from the review of literature on the relationships between religion and politics in India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania is the dramatic shift from the secularist (or quasi-secularist, in the case of Pakistan) settlement agreed at independence. It now seems quite obvious that this change was triggered by the ‘crisis of governance’ from the late 1970s onwards, which witnessed the erosion or significant weakening of the political formations dating from the end of colonial rule. In this crisis, new spaces were created for religious formations. Most dramatically, this change resulted in the mobilization of religious identities in elections by religious and religious-nationalist parties; efforts by integrationist regimes (Pakistan and northern Nigeria) to co-opt demands for Islamacization and the imposition of shari’a; the transformation of ‘religions of resistance’ into ‘religions of rebellion’ that have now become the harbingers of subaltern revolt; and the emergence of discourses of discrimination and disadvantage based on religious identity. Taken together, these changes have eroded some fundamental principles, such as the freedom of religion, freedom to change one’s religion, gender rights, and rights of religious minorities, as well as redefining the relationship between collective religious groups and the state. And though against these trends are powerful countervailing forces, such as the revival of the Congress party in India and the political
resilience of the secularist regime in Tanzania, the overwhelming weight of evidence, including from contemporary surveys, suggests that in the medium term religion will remain ‘de-privatized’.

Alongside these general trends, it is also useful to identify some key propositions that have implications beyond the four countries discussed here.

First, even in states that are religiously homogenous (e.g. Pakistan), democratic governance operates to undercut religious extremism because engagement in competitive politics by religious actors opens them up to scrutiny by the public and a need for accommodation. Conversely, political closure (e.g. military regimes) encourages religious essentialism, pressures towards a greater integration of religion and the state, and the use of religious actors by the state as a surrogate for its own legitimacy. Paradoxically, it also creates a vicious circle of radicalization because, as the state increasingly usurps religious functions, the only way of contesting the efficacy of these functions is by outbidding the state by appeal to more ‘authentic’ religious authorities or texts. Such integrationist efforts often falter on the rock of social inclusivity because, as in the cases of Nigeria and Pakistan, socially excluded or marginalized groups within a religious tradition are more easily mobilized by radical groups ‘from below’ than ‘from above’ by religious elites working within state structures (‘establishments’ e.g. Pakistan and the Muslim aristocracy in northern Nigeria). These kinds of integrationist efforts are probably most prone to turning ‘religions of resistance’ into ‘religions of rebellion’, because they are aimed at the cooption of religious demands without any serious commitment to deliver on part of the state.

Second, the interests of the poor among religious communities are more likely to be articulated if there are specific incentives for political parties to do so (such as the potential number of voters and their support base in electoral politics) and programmes targeted at these groups (e.g. affirmative action, proportionality) are available. As witnessed in the Indian case studies, these factors have not only Dalitized contemporary Indian politics, but the wholesale mobilization of Dalit communities in India has also proved an effective counter-balance against the drive towards religious homogenization by the Hindu nationalist BJP. Ironically, this interaction between democracy and development also has some unintended consequences for marginalized groups like Dalits themselves: it ‘deconstructs’ and ‘constructs’ communities as they seek to adapt to the rules of the political game, thereby reinforcing, as well as challenging, their engagement in politics (Cf. Mahajan and Jodhka, 2009).
Third, religious actors do not always have an unambiguous record on governance and development. While most share a critique of underdevelopment, their discourses on the meaning and purpose of development are widely divergent, with some enthusiastic about the normative ‘good governance’ agenda and others articulating alternative conceptions of ‘development’ which foreground religious ideals and practices. These tendencies were most apparent in the performance and activities of religious or religious nationalist political parties, such as the MMA coalition, which demonstrated a strong propensity towards the integration of religion and politics but weak performance on realizing its stated developmental. In their discourses and policies, these parties were inclined to project alternative visions of development which avoided problematizing gender discrimination, religious discrimination or exclusionary practices against the poor or marginal religious communities, either in terms of public policy or within the theologies of their own traditions. ROs examined, on the other hand, particularly in Africa, tend to demonstrate a greater affinity with the ‘good governance’ agenda, although this is qualified by the nature of the religious tradition with which they are associated.

Fourth, encounters between religion and the state are, as noted in our use of the differentiation-integration matrix, not static but dynamic, fluid and changeable. Just as the ‘good governance’ agenda in Africa and Asia has impelled the state to be more accommodative of cultural and religious diversity and gender equality, sometimes at the behest of external donors and multi-lateral development agencies, in the same way, in some cases, religious traditions and theologies have also provided creative new responses to traditional dilemmas. It is in these examples that new patterns of engagement between religious actors and the state and between religious actors themselves have been observed - patterns that extend inter-faith dialogue beyond mere tolerance and accommodation to echo Nandy’s (1998, p. 338) call for “each of the major faiths to include within it an in-house version of other faiths, both as internal criticism and as a reminder of the diversity of theories of transcendence.”

However it is necessary to acknowledge that such departures remain substantially at the margins of the main discourses on religion and the state in India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania. Indeed, their limited impact demonstrates how challenging it is for religious actors in Africa and Asia to be drivers of governance and developmental change because these actors are, by and large, socially embedded. These constraints, moreover, and the largely socially undifferentiated nature of these societies - where
the pressures to ‘totalize’ religions are strong - ensures that religion as a subject for public policy will continue to arouse deep public passions. The current discourse in India on the recommendations of the Sachar Committee is a test case for this area in developing countries in Asia and Africa.

In conclusion, the relationships between religion, politics and governance in our case study countries are far more complex and variegated than ever before, highlighting both the manifold dimensions of contemporary governance and the changing role of religious traditions within these societies. What is clear is that concentrating on understanding generic policies to improve governance and levels of development is probably more likely to help us unravel the real place of religion in contemporary governance in the South than an exclusive focus on the role and performance of religious actors. Recognizing the importance of this is the first crucial step towards a more meaningful understanding of the implications of ‘return of religion’ in developing societies.
Appendix 1

List of case study organizations and communities

India (Religious communities)
Valmikis and Mazhabis (Punjab)
Other Backward Caste Muslims (Maharashtra)
‘Ex-Hindu’ Buddhists/Mahars (Maharashtra)

Pakistan (Political parties)
Muttahida-Majlise-e-Amal (MMA-coalition in NWFP)

Nigeria (ROs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of RO</th>
<th>Anambra</th>
<th>Kano</th>
<th>Oyo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ansar-Ud-Deen Society (ADS)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglican Church (Church of Nigeria, CofN)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hausa Muslim Community Awka (HMCO)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izalatul-Bida’ Wa Iqamat (Izala)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Roman Catholic] Justice, Development and Peace Commission (JDPC)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasrul-Lahi-Ill-Fathi Society (NASFAT)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba Muslim Community Anambra (YMCO)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tanzania (ROs)

Christian

Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT)
Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania (ELCT)

Muslim

Baraza Kuu La Waislamu Tanzania (BAKWATA),
Baraza Kuu La Jumuiya Na Taasisi Kiislam Tanzania (BARAZA KUU – Supreme Council of Islamic Organisations), Zanzibar
UAMSHO (Association for Islamic Propagation, Zanzibar)
Mufti’s Office, Zanzibar
Appendix 2

Religious populations of India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania

**Religious population of India, 2001**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>80.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>13.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>2.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikhs</td>
<td>1.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhists</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jains</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion not stated</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Census of India 2001*

**Religious population of Pakistan, 1998**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>96.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qadiani (Ahmadi)</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheduled Castes</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Census of Pakistan 1998*

**Religious population of Nigeria, 2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Traditional Religions</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *CIA The World Factbook (2010 – online)*

**Religious population of Tanzania, 2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainland Tanzania*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Traditional Religions</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zanzibar**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Msanja and Lawi, 2006, p. 98 (based on sample survey, 2000).*

**CIA The World Factbook (2010 – online)**
Notes

1 The term South is used here to refer to low income developing countries in Asia and Africa.

2 The term ‘religious actors’ is used to refer to religious communities, faith based organizations (FBOs), religious political parties and other such organizations that articulate and represent religious political interests.

3 The selection of these countries was influenced by their geographical location (in South Asia and West and East Africa) and religious composition (in the case of India, Nigeria and Tanzania, two or more of the major world religions, and Pakistan as an overwhelmingly Muslim country) (see www.rad.bham.ac.uk).

4 The concept of governance is prone to multiple misconstructions and is often conflated with the normative ‘good governance agenda’. In this report, it refers to the authoritative management of policies and practices by the state, para-state agencies and networks. Governance is thus distinct from, but overlaps with, the broader processes of politics.

5 The term development in this report is used in its conventional sense as referring to economic and social change resulting in material transformation. This usage is, of course, not unproblematic, since development is a normative enterprise that rests on values. For a brief overview of thinking about development, see Nkurunziza (2007).

6 Gurharpal Singh at the University of Birmingham designed the overall research and was responsible for its comparative dimension. In each country, research was undertaken by a research lead/s (India – Gurpreet Mahajan and Surinder S. Jodhka, Pakistan - Mohamed Waseem and Mariam Mufti, Nigeria – Insa Nolte et al, Tanzania - Mohabe Nyirabu), supported by research assistants who undertook fieldwork. For further details see Mahajan and Jodhka (2009), Waseem and Mufti (2009), Nolte et al (2009) and Nyirabu (2009).

7 For a discussion of these terms, see Rakodi (2007). In this report we take a middle position between a static, trans-historical definition of religion (see Geertz, 1973) and religion as a free-floating ‘discursive practice’ (Casanova, 1994). Such a position, we believe, recognizes the functional equivalence of religion in the four countries but also acknowledges the extent to which changes and its social meaning vary with context. A distinction can also be drawn between religious or faith-based organizations and religious communities. FBOs can be defined as religious organizations with structures, aims and objectives and an organizational history, while religious or faith communities refers to wider religious entities that share a religious identity, but do not necessarily have such organizational characteristics.

8 The research programme has found it helpful to limit the use of the term FBO to organizations that are organizationally distinct within their parent religious traditions. Typically, they have a mission and usually funding, staff etc.

9 For a discussion of how these impacted on the case studies see Mahajan and Jodhka (2009), Waseem and Mufti (2009), Nolte et al (2009) and Nyirabu (2009).

10 For further details of the process through which the states were selected, see Mahajan and Jodhka (2009).

11 For the selection process in Nigeria, see Nolte et al (2009).

12 For Philpott, differentiation has four dimensions: i) whether the state grants a single religion constitutional status as the official one; ii) whether the state exercises the prerogative to promote religious purpose through legislation and judicial powers; iii) whether the state restricts the freedom of religion from functioning; and iv) whether religious organizations hold constitutional prerogatives. Differentiation, he argues, should not be equated with establishment (e.g. Iran and England) or the influence that “religion or state exercise on one and another through persuasion, ideological influence, or electoral power” (Philpott, 2007, p. 507).
13 “A consensual arrangement is a stable one, where both parties are satisfied with the status quo. A conflictual arrangement is one that at least one party wants to revamp...States where the authority of religion and state are mutually meshed...are ones where differentiation is low but consensual. In a final variant, where differentiation is low and conflictual, religious bodies are dominated and suppressed, against their own will, sometimes despite their resistance. This relationship, too, is integrationist in that the state has ‘integrated’ religion into its authority, as Communist Bulgaria and Romania did to the Orthodox Church, whose choice was to consent or to die” (Philpott, 2007, p. 507).

14 For some, like Casanova (1994), differentiation may or may not lead to ‘privatization of religion’, as is assumed in the model of highly differentiated societies. For Casanova, this outcome is possible because “religious institutions and organisations refuse to restrict themselves to the pastoral care of individual souls and continue to raise questions about the interconnections of private and public morality and to challenge the claims of sub-systems, particularly states and markets, to be exempt from extraneous normative considerations. One of the results of this ongoing contestation is a dual, interrelated process of repoliticisation of the private religious and moral spheres and renormativisation of the public economic and political spheres. This is what I call, for the lack of a better term, the ‘deprivatisation’ of religion” (ibid., pp. 5-6).

15 Strictly speaking the BJP is not a religious but a Hindu-nationalist party. Its programme is often described as promoting Hindutva (Hinduness, promotion of Hindu values). The BJP operates alongside its sister organizations, such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a paramilitary social organization, and the Vishwa Hindu Prishad (VHP), a religious body.

16 It needs to be recognized that there is no ideal model of a secular state. Each state secularism has its own peculiarities. For a discussion of some of these variations see Smith (1967).

17 The period 1991-2 is often referred to as the Third Republic, when local and state elections were held but the federal and presidential elections were annulled. In Nigeria, a partial overlap between ethnic and religious identities and the salience of ethnic politics in the struggles over access to resources (especially oil revenue and land) and political power leads some authors to prefer the term ethno-religious politics (see Nolte et al, 2009). Overt integration of religion and the state occurred mainly in the northern states, where Shari’a law was introduced. Less overt religious influence was more widespread.

18 Not only are different religions dominant in different regions, but also the religious demography inhibits outright dominance by one religion. Figures on the religious composition of both countries vary (and are contested), but one recent estimate indicates roughly 50 per cent Christian and 50 per cent Muslim in Nigeria, 60 per cent Christian and a third Muslim in Tanzania (Pew Forum, 2010, p. 64) (see also Appendix 2). Few in either country (particularly Nigeria) claim primary affiliation with ATR.

19 Wilkinson (2006), in a pioneering study of Indian elections, has demonstrated the direct connection between electoral competition and communal riots between Hindus and Muslims.

20 According to O’Leary and Arthur (1990, p.9), ‘hegemonic control’ exists where the main ethnic or religious group or groups “can effectively dominate through its political, economic and ideological resources and can extract what it requires from the subordinated.”

21 These terms are Bruce Lincoln’s (2003, pp. 82-91).

22 Due to operational difficulties, our Tanzania case study did not focus on the Islamist challenge. However, it is important to recognize that many of the dimensions of this challenge are similar to those in the other case study countries.
24 Since the death of its spiritual leader, Abubakar Gumi, Izala has separated into a number of groups. I am thankful to Insa Nolte for pointing this out.
25 Unsurprisingly following the ‘war on terror’, the ‘Gulf War II’ and 7/7, these policy innovations have been most apparent in the United Kingdom. For an overview of public policy in these areas see Dinham, Furby and Lowndes, 2009.
26 See Mukandala et al (2006) for an independent attempt to review existing and produce new evidence.
27 The discussion which follows draws substantially on Mahajan and Jodhka (2009).
28 For a further meaning of caste see Dumont (1966).
29 Dalits is the politically correct nomenclature for the ex-untouchables who have traditionally been on the lowest rung of the Hindu caste hierarchy. It is a broad term that includes Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (listed in the schedule of reservation for central and state employment since 1950) and Backward Castes (a socio-economically defined group that was added to the reservation quota in 1990). In this paper, the term is used to include groups among Muslims, Sikhs and Buddhists in Maharashtra and Punjab.
30 Since 1950, the Indian state has provided reservations for jobs for Scheduled Castes (former ‘untouchables’) and Scheduled Tribes (pastoral communities), as well as reserved legislative seats in both the provincial and national legislatures. The scope of these affirmative action provisions has been gradually extended, and in 1989 was increased to include ‘Other Backward Classes’. In addition to job quotas, these groups are provided with reservations in education, though reservations for OBCs was not accompanied by reservations of legislative assembly seats.
31 The term indigene is used in Nigeria to refer to local or indigenous populations and carries with it certain legal and political rights vis-à-vis non-indigenes. See Nolte et al (2009).
32 ‘Godfather politics’ here shares a family resemblance to what Manor (1983), writing on India, has called ‘de-institutionalisation of politics’ which was closely associated with triggering the ‘crisis of governance’ in India.
33 Operational and practical difficulties meant that we were unable to conduct the kind of comprehensive case studies in Tanzania that were undertaken in the three other countries.
34 Although there is clear evidence to support Muslim educational disadvantage and under-representation, the 2006 study showed that efforts have been made to redress some of the problems. The sample survey revealed that half the interviewees felt that the government had taken measures to address the educational imbalance (Ishumi, 2006, p. 452) and fewer than one per cent of both Christians and Muslims believed that religion influences access to civil service employment or promotion (Chaligha, 2006).
35 Jaffrelot (1996) offers a useful distinction between stigmatization (vilification) and emulation (“the borrowing of ideas and organizational principles…from opponents” (p. 12)).
36 Some of the new major research programmes include the Department for International Development-funded Religions and Development Research Programme at the University of Birmingham, U.K.; and the Arts and Humanities and the Economic and Social Research Councils (U.K.)-funded Religion and Society Research Programme.
37 It must be acknowledged that the principle of differentiation only indirectly gives us insights into the causes of the change in state-religion relationship. For the most part, as Philipott (2007) conjectures, these are exogenous to the relationship itself and may actually arise from changes in socio-economic circumstance, new ideologies, changes in demography, or external influences.
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