Understanding organisational performance in the City of Kampala: Implementation of local government development projects (2003-10)

Ursula M. Stelman

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This study of Kampala City Council found that there is a dysfunctional pre-occupation in the Ugandan local development planning system with managerialism and ‘process’ at the expense of public ‘outputs’. A culture of ‘planning is doing’ permeates the [decentralised] centrally controlled local government system. Donor conditions – biased toward ‘good governance’ and technocratic solutions – drive the development and funding agenda. There is a fundamental contradiction between what the formal system wants and what the community wants. The formal system demands bureaucratic managerial and accountability processes combined with imposed planning and a participation-obsessed local government system. The community wants to solve local development problems, yet has little power to influence and define projects according to their local needs – despite the genuine interest of local government officials in providing public goods and services for their communities.

1 Introduction

In the last three decades much foreign donor attention and financial resources have been focused on improving services to poor people in developing states (World Bank, 2004). The development literature is abundant with examples of poor governance and poor public sector performance1 despite longstanding development and capacity-building efforts. It is generally perceived that public sector organisations in poor African countries perform badly ‘even considering the difficult circumstances they operate in’ despite decades of development efforts (Therkildsen, 2001: 12).

This study argues that Uganda’s formal institutions come up against local realities, creating performance tensions which complicate collective efforts at the local level. The tensions created by the system of Central Government (CG) and donor-imposed2 bureaucratic managerial requirements, coupled with local realities, frustrated local development efforts and complicated the achievement of practical local projects. The realities of local politics (networks and alliances) and patronage relationships used to implement public goods and

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1 Poor performance can be defined as a lack of ability to implement or carry out tasks or duties set by policy goals (Therkildsen, 2001).

2 I do not mean to imply a simplistic ‘blame the donor’ perspective. Rather I am referring to a ‘system’ that is rooted in a managerialist ideology and ‘participatory planning’ remedies brought in by Western (American and European) donors. I am not implying specific interference by donor agencies or individual staff in the country.
services are frustrated by the lack of resources and the managerialist and formal, participation-obsessed centrally controlled local government system.

Uganda is an interesting case in the study of African development performance, decentralisation and Western world experimentation with market principles and managerial techniques. It has been viewed as a favourite by international donors for adhering to strict fiscal principles in line with IMF and World Bank expectations – demonstrating a ‘model’ for performance in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).³

Uganda’s performance has also been cited as a positive example of African state building innovation. The celebrated macroeconomic and human development accomplishments since the early 1990s include: growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) averaging 6 per cent annually; a decline in the percentage of Ugandans living in absolute poverty from 57 per cent in 1992/3 to 31 per cent in 2008 (World Bank IDA); increased enrolment in primary school education from 2.1 million in 1996 to 7.3 million in 2002 (The Republic of Uganda, 2003: 1); and the overall prevalence of HIV/AIDS dropping from 18 per cent in 1992 to 6.2 per cent in 2001-2003 (Kiyaga-Nsubuga, 2004: 179).

This research questions the picture of Uganda’s successes in development and decentralisation through a study of the performance of urban local government and emphasises the importance of both the political context and the organisational context, stressing real public outputs as critical for development. It challenges the common practices of using managerial techniques taken from western world experiences to improve performance in a development context. It supports the trend in scholarship that stresses the importance of ‘problem solving in the local context’ (Crook and Booth, 2011).

We know from the development and ‘pockets of productivity’ literature that ‘politics matters’ and ‘organisation matters’.⁴ These assertions are always predicated on ‘the local context’ – but what local context factors are most important? Managerial strategies implemented without regard for the context are doomed to failure. What, however, is the right balance? How and when do the spheres of the organisational and the political interact with local realities to create an environment conducive to successful provision of needed public goods and services?

2 Uganda’s local governance reforms

Uganda has integrated state governance issues and poverty eradication policy which together have been linked as a focus for central government activities and decentralisation efforts at the local level of government (Sverrisson, 2005: 322-359). The following diagram depicts the pyramidal structure of the local government system.

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³ The World Bank has been a vocal proponent of Uganda’s development success and progress since 1986. See World Bank (2011a).

⁴ See (Leonard 1991; Strauss 1998) or that high performing organisations do exist even in weak states (Tendler, 1997; Grindle, 1997a; Grindle, 2004a; Leonard, 1991; Paul, 1982; Bebbington and McCourt, 2007; Uphoff et al, 1998; Krishna et al., 1997).
Figure 1: Structure of Local Government in Uganda

Key:

1. **Village Council (LC I)** – called **Village/Zone or Ward in City context**
   (Local Council I is a Council of all adult residents who agree to be part of the Council)
2. **Parish Council (LC II)**
   (Local Council II is an administrative Council)
3. **Sub County Local Council (LC III)** – called **Division in City context**
   (Chairperson directly elected; Council directly elected; Local Council III reports directly to LC V)
4. **County Council Local Council (LC IV)**
   (Administrative Council not relevant in urban context)
5. **District Level Local Council (LC V)**
   (City elected Chairperson is called the Mayor who works with Executive Committee and elected Council with a Speaker)

Note: * Unit of analysis for this study.

The country has been reforming its governance system since the late 1980s and on paper it has made significant gains by: (1) building governance capacity through policy and donor support; (2) reforming the civil service and striving to recruit quality staff accountable to the public service commission; (3) establishing managerial expertise and clear lines of command; (4) supporting a bottom-up participatory decentralised governance system; (5) establishing political commitment of the central government to the reform agenda; and (6) providing discretionary funding and training opportunities for local capacity made available through initiatives such as the donor-supported Local Government Development Programme (LGDP) (Conyers, 2007: 18-28).

Performance success has been considered to include: the decentralisation of funds to local authorities through its Local Government Development Programme5 (Kiyaga-Nsubugu, 2004; 1999a).

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5 In 1999 the World Bank, impressed with Uganda’s economic policy, structural adjustment and civil service reforms introduced the LGDP programme. The intent of LGDP was to empower LGs and communities to better manage economic and social development by devolving to them the authority and capacity to identify, deliver and sustain a locally determined investment program for public goods and services. This would help to ensure improved delivery of basic services to society and, in the process, promote efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and accountability (World Bank, 1999a).
Onyach-Olaa, 2003); the decentralisation of responsibility for provision of most public services to District Councils; and significant improvements in the quantity and quality of service provision, particularly in the case of health and education facilities (Makara, 2000; cited in Conyers, 2007: 18-28). Conyers notes, however, that it is difficult to prove a causal relationship between decentralisation and public service delivery as the more likely cause is the infusion of donor funds under Uganda’s Poverty Alleviation Action Plan, not necessarily the decentralisation policy.

Despite criticism, Uganda has been described by the international community as a success story in development, implementation and decentralisation. Uganda’s system operates on the surface as a textbook-perfect model of good governance and decentralisation. The strong and active role of large and influential players in the funding and development community is largely responsible for this image.

Other observers have challenged the labelling of Uganda’s performance as ‘successful’ on a number of democratic fronts, including: the legitimacy of the decentralisation exercise in terms of real grassroots engagement; the centralisation of power particularly of financial resources; and an elitist and exclusionary relationship between central government, the donor community and select NGO alliances, creating an environment for controlling the civil society agenda (Brock, McGee and Gaventa, 2004: 94; Robinson, 2007). Uganda moved to a full multi-party system in the last Constitutional Amendment (2005) although the orderly transfer of power following a multi-party election has still not been tested.

Does Uganda’s image of success stand up to closer scrutiny? Looking from the bottom, Uganda’s reforms, largely supported by international funders, have not fundamentally improved performance, attained their community development goals, or delivered priority local services which might ultimately improve the quality of life for poor people. People on the ground perceive little signs of progress in their daily life struggles and are very frustrated with the endless expectations of accountability and participation processes for their own sake.

An ordinary person living in the City of Kampala does not necessarily have accurate knowledge of Uganda’s celebrated decentralised local governance system or of the donor-supported LGDP and the discretionary funding available for local development purposes. However they are typically clear about their community development needs and frustrated with the capacity of the local government to provide needed infrastructure and services.

‘The top five problems in my Parish are garbage, drainage, roads, disease, access roads to my home and toilets for the people. I have seen nothing in the Parish come from any government programmes in the last seven years. They have done nothing as they are feeding themselves … I am working with my neighbours to fix our local

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6 Uganda’s Poverty Alleviation Project (PAP) was the first African Development Fund (ADF) financed project which heavily relied on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in delivery of financial services to the poor in target areas. The project used a participation approach which relied on involvement of beneficiaries in all stages of micro-project development. See African Development Fund (1999).


8 The main development partners supporting decentralisation are the World Bank (IDA); the Government of Netherlands; the Republic of Ireland; the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA); and the Austrian Development Corporation.

9 Interviews and informal discussions with ordinary people in the City of Kampala community from 2003-2008.
road and install toilets for a small group … We save our resources and do a little at a time … I do not participate in any formal local processes, as we get nothing from it.’

Government actors and donor partners would find this a harsh criticism of institutional performance reform efforts and certainly not in keeping with the successful ‘decentralisation’ and ‘participation’ rhetoric of Uganda’s local government system.

3 Background: the Local Government Development Programme and Performance Assessment System

Uganda is a poor country, dependent on donor financial aid for its basic institutions, infrastructure and public services. After years of economic, political and civil chaos in the 1970s and early 1980s the country made significant gains in state building and restoring peace and economic stability by the 1990s. It embraced World Bank/IMF-endorsed economic and structural adjustment reform strategies. Uganda established much needed infrastructure and public systems such as universal primary education and health care.

The World Bank (WB) in alliance with a range of donor partners played a critical role in the early development years and they continue to act as key strategists, evaluators and funders for the decentralisation agenda. Donor funding particularly in the form of discretionary funds for capacity building and the country-wide LGDP led to the central government [supported by the donor partners] creating a National Assessment process for assessing and rating the performance of local government at all levels. Under this process, the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG), through its ‘Annual Assessment of Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures’ (Assessment), annually reports on the performance of local government in all Districts and urban Divisions in Uganda. Their measures prioritise the capacity and processes of local government performance, rooted in donor ideals of good governance and managerial excellence. Teams appointed by the MoLG were assigned to do the evaluation of performance. The National Assessment system was combined with an elaborate ‘bottom-up’ planning process, involving an annual cycle of participatory planning and budgeting meetings which local government officials are obliged to organise from Village to District levels. The resulting District or Divisional Development Plans have to be incorporated into a Ministry of Local Government and Uganda Planning Authority master plan (see Annex 2).

The MoLG performance measurement scheme divides the Assessment into two major categories: (1) Minimum Conditions and (2) Performance Measures. Monetary rewards or punishments to discretionary budgets are assigned based on meeting or not meeting set minimum conditions and performance criteria, as follows.

**Minimum conditions** must be met in order to be eligible to participate in the LGDP programme. They include the following parameters and indicators: a functional capacity for planning, including having a 3-year rolling plan; a functional Technical Planning Committee (TPC); observable linkages between the investment plan, budget and budget framework paper (BFP); a functional capacity in financial management and internal audit: evidence of draft final accounts for the previous year; a functional internal audit; and the existence of a local revenue enhancement plan (LREP). In addition the LG must meet LGDP project specific conditions which include having their own local revenue available to co-finance priority projects.

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10 Interview, Code F-3, community person from Kasubi Parish, Lubaga Division, 10 February, 2010.
Performance measures measure the actual performance of the LG (rated out of a score of 10). The measures focus on ‘how things are done’. The criteria are mostly process in nature and include: the quality of the development plan; the staff functional capacity in monitoring and mentoring; the LG’s capacity building performance; the communication and accountability systems; the budget allocation system; the procurement capacity as per rules and laws; local revenue generation; gender mainstreaming efforts; operation and maintenance; and Council, Executive and Committee performance. The latter includes council sector committees and so on. It is striking that these criteria are virtually all input-based criteria.

The LGDP programme started modestly as a pilot project in a rural District of the country with a few donor partner funders and turned into a countrywide programme overseen and coordinated by the World Bank. Over the years the LGDP, under the control and guidance of the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG), with its many reincarnations, has taken over the functionality of the local government system. It provided the financially struggling local government system discretionary funds to implement public infrastructure projects at the District, Division and Parish levels and it supported capacity building initiatives for technical staff and politicians. At the Parish level the local leadership worked within the Parish Development Committee (PDC) mechanism. Here local citizens were encouraged to volunteer their time and expertise to develop and oversee the implementation of local projects via the LGDP process.

The Government of Uganda’s decentralisation agenda and poverty reduction policy puts a great expectation on the local level of government and on ordinary people for participation in implementing senior government policy and delivering programs and services. A complicated, time and resource intense, bottom-up yet centrally controlled, development planning process has been prescribed by law and built into the local council political structures and governance processes from the Village to the District level. Local political, administrative and community level actors have been struggling to actualize these expectations despite severe staff and resource shortages, centrally controlled budgets, limited discretionary local revenues and an increasingly cynical community, fatigued by ‘participation’ and frustrated by limited success on the ground coupled with mounting criticism of their local performance.

4 The research

The specific aim of this study was to understand and explain the factors which made a difference to organisational performance. I used a qualitative and comparative case study method for the study. I was interested in gaining in-depth knowledge about which factors were most important from a local perspective for implementation success and shedding some light on the circumstances that contribute to performance successes or failure in implementing local projects.

I compared the five Divisions of Kampala City Council (KCC) in terms of their performance in implementing community development plans through the Second Local Government Development Programme (LGDP-II) during a specific time period (2003-2010) with a focus

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11 The comparative case method is about comparing and examining patterns of similarities and difference across a moderate number of cases (Ragin, 1994).
12 See for example Ragin (1994) Chapters 4 and Chapter 5.
13 The City of Kampala has 5 Divisions also called Local Council III (LC III).
14 The LGDP-II (June 2003) was initiated at a cost of US $165 million (World Bank 2003a:1). The World Bank provided US $125 million (US $75 million grant and US $50 million credit), and bilateral donors provided a grant of US $25.2 million, while the GoU was to provide US $14.8 million making a total of US $165
on two local government Divisions, Nakawa and Makindye. Nakawa and Makindye had been rated best and worst performers respectively in the annual National Local Government Performance Assessment (in the five year period 2005-2010).

Organisational performance, although complex with disputed definitions of performance measures, can usefully be viewed in terms of (a) inputs – the resources needed to deliver a service; (b) processes – the way in which a service is delivered; (c) outputs – the services the organisation produces; and (d) the outcomes – the impact of the service on citizens.15

I defined performance implementation success as: those LGDP-II16 projects that were conceived by a participatory bottom up community process, planned for, built into the official budgets, and implemented, thereby making the projects available for use by the intended target group(s). This study focused on outputs, which distinguishes it from the MoLG’s Annual Assessment which focuses on process criteria.

Information about output performance was gathered by reviewing the budgets, community development plans, LGDP-II projects implemented (in the study period); and by interviewing politicians, bureaucrats, community people and other stakeholders involved to determine the nature and number of community development projects that were successfully implemented.

5 The City of Kampala

Kampala City is one of the 111 Districts (LC V’s) of Uganda (as at 2012), a political administrative entity and the Capital City of Uganda.17 Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) was established by constitutional changes in 2010 and implemented in 2011. It replaced the former Kampala City Council (KCC). This study, however, dealt with the KCC organisation (2007-10).

KCC was administratively divided into the Headquarters (LC V) and 5 Divisions (LC III’s) which were legal units with Municipality status namely: Kawempe, Nakawa, Lubaga, Makindye and Central.18 The KCC headquarters at the LC V level was sometimes referred to as the sixth Division. In reality it is not an official Division but rather the operational unit of the District.

The five Divisions were further sub-divided into 99 Parishes which are administrative units (LC II’s), and 811 Villages which in the urban context are called Sub-Parishes/Zones or Wards (LC I’s) (Kampala City Council, 2007a:34) The District of Kampala is at the centre of Uganda’s ‘urbanised’ corridor, which runs from Mbarara and Masaka in the west, to Jinja, Tororo and Mbale in the east.

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15 For a discussion on the dimensions of performance, see Carter (1991:89), Carter, Klein and Day (1992:36); Holzer and Callahan (1998:119); Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000:12); Kusek and Rist et al., (2005). Outputs have also been defined as binding decisions and implementing actions taken by the urban decision makers (Easton 1965:350-351); Outputs can include decisions, policies, actions and regulations see Pelissero (2003:21-22).
16 LGDP-II (2003-2007 extended to March 2010) is the successor to the LGDP-I (2001-2003) which was put into place as a consequence of a successful pilot funded by the World Bank and bilateral donors.
17 In some documents the two Universities Makerere and Kyambogo are referenced as Divisions but they are not represented in Parliament.
Kampala is situated on Lake Victoria at the centre of the Buganda Kingdom. In October 1962, Kampala became the capital city of independent Uganda with a City Charter and Council. Today greater Kampala covers 195-240 sq. Km, including parts of Lake Victoria, and is spread over 20 rolling hills from the original 7 hills of Mengo, Lubaga, Kibuli, Nakasero, Kololo, Old Kampala, Mulago.

Kampala’s day-time population is estimated to be approximately 2.5 million (as of 2005) and has a night-time resident population of approximately 1.5 million. It is estimated that 15.4% of Uganda’s population live in urban areas (UN-Habitat, 2008b) and 41.36% of all urban residents live in the City of Kampala. Kampala’s urban growth is estimated at 5.6% p.a. in 2002 and the same in 2010.

The City of Kampala has many public service challenges as itemised by the first Kampala Citizens Report Card (July 2005). KCC reported that 54 percent of the population of Kampala live in ‘muzigo’ (one roomed houses), lack safe water, sanitation and roads, and have no secure source of income. The Economic Planning Unit further reported that 60% of Kampala City households survive on employment income from both the ‘informal and formal’ wage economy. A large number of people are engaged in informal income generating activities such as petty trade, vending, hawking of old and new clothes, general merchandise and urban agriculture (Kampala City Council, 2008d).

Kampala has a predominantly young population. In the 2002 census, 46% (542,269) of the population of Kampala consisted of children (population below 18 years of age) and 54% of adults (Kampala City Council, 2008). In the mid-2000s, the infant mortality rate was very high at 97 per 1000 live births; the maternal mortality ratio was 506 per 100,000, while the death rate was 73 per 1000. Life expectancy at birth was 45.7 years and 50.5 years for males and females respectively (Kampala City Council, 2008d: 15).

Kampala is characterised by a high level of ethnic diversity. The Baganda are the largest single group in Kampala (56%), while they account for 17.3% of the total Ugandan population. The Banyankole account for 6% of the total in Kampala and are 9.8% of the total Ugandan population. The Basoga are 4% in Kampala and 8.6% of the total Ugandan population. Non-Ugandans account for 3% per cent of the population of Kampala.

Religious affiliations continue to be a significant aspect of economic and social life in Kampala. The population is divided into six major religious groups. Catholics are 34 per cent of the total population while the Anglicans (Church of Uganda) are 32 per cent, Muslims are 22 per cent, Pentecostals are 9 per cent, Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) are one per cent, and all other Christian Groups are 2 per cent of the Kampala population.

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19 The Capital was moved from Entebbe back to Kampala.
20 The exact number various in different government documents.
21 UBOS (2002) and discussions with the economic planning unit KCC.
23 Ibid.
24 For example only 11% of households are connected to the National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC) system and 33% of households do not have proper sewerage disposal methods.
25 The 2002 census, shows that Nakawa is 34% Baganda, 8% Banyankole, 6% Acholi, 6% Basoga and 6% Iteso, making it among the most ethnically diverse sub-counties in Uganda. Makindye, on the other hand, is 53% Baganda and 6% Banyankole and thus much more homogenous.
The City of Kampala today reflects the influences of historic, cultural and religious rivalries, centre-local politics and power tensions rooted in colonial administrative decisions past wars and conflicts. It also grapples with economic difficulties, unresolved land ownership issues, growing concerns about poor public sector performance and the significant role of central government and donor conditions in day-to-day operations in the City.

6 A comparative analysis of Nakawa and Makindye Divisions

The Annual National Assessment performance trends (see Table 1) show that the best and most regularly rewarded KCC Division is Nakawa, which received five consecutive reward ratings from 2005-2009, triggering the associated financial bonuses. The second best is Lubaga (three rewards) although in the last few years it has received two consecutive penalties; followed by Central (two rewards) also with recent penalties two years running; KCC HQ (two rewards) in 2009 and 2005; and Kawempe (two rewards) in 2008 and 2005. The worst performing Division in the National Assessment is Makindye with only one reward in 2009.

Table 1: Comparison of Annual National Assessment Performance Results for Kampala City Council (2005-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Makindye</td>
<td>reward</td>
<td>penalty</td>
<td>penalty</td>
<td>penalty</td>
<td>static</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakawa</td>
<td>reward</td>
<td>reward</td>
<td>reward</td>
<td>reward</td>
<td>reward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>penalty</td>
<td>penalty</td>
<td>reward</td>
<td>reward</td>
<td>reward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubaga</td>
<td>penalty</td>
<td>penalty</td>
<td>reward</td>
<td>reward</td>
<td>reward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawempe</td>
<td>penalty</td>
<td>reward</td>
<td>static</td>
<td>penalty</td>
<td>reward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCC Headquarters</td>
<td>reward</td>
<td>penalty</td>
<td>penalty</td>
<td>penalty</td>
<td>reward</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


LGDP monies are allocated to the Divisions on a per capita basis. By this measure Nakawa receives about 20% more LGDP funds than Makindye. KCC’s HQ receives a separate allocation of LGDP funds that is typically 70% of the total amount given to the five Divisions. On a yearly basis the total KCC (HQ and 5 Divisions) Local Development Grant averages about $2.3m. On an average annual basis Makindye receives $250,000 while Nakawa receives about $310,000.

Both Nakawa and Makindye Divisions constantly battle with HQ over disbursement of LGDP monies. HQ controls the release of LGDP monies and is often very slow (for reasons mostly associated with procurement processes) in releasing funds to the Division. This has an impact on the funds available at the Division level to effectively implement LGDP projects. Because the Parishes only receive 30% of the LGDP funds that do reach the Division there is very little money available to do projects in the individual Parish – some Parishes get as little as US $150.00.

26 A performance score of 7/10 in the National Assessment is eligible for a 20% financial bonus. A score of 5/10 is a static result and a score of below 5/10 will result in a 20% financial penalty.
Despite differences in the official assessment results the research revealed that there were in fact no substantial differences in the LGDP outputs of the best rated and worst rated Divisions. Both Divisions delivered a comparable level of LGDP project outputs, mainly sector projects such as water and sanitation, roads, drainage and buildings. Some years they may have had different emphases, for example, Nakawa prioritising for roads and Makindye for drainage, but on the whole they tended to be similar in outputs (see Table 2).

Makindye, although rated the ‘worst performer’, tended to deliver more projects at the Parish level. These were small scale projects such as minor drainage improvements and road grading. The financial difficulties in building their Division HQ may explain this trend. That Makindye has stressed garbage collection as a Division-level priority was probably due to the leadership of the top bureaucrat – the Senior Principal Assistant Town Clerk (SPATC). Nakawa Division tended to prioritise for larger scale Division-level projects such as road works. In both Divisions, projects at the Division level typically got done relatively quickly driven by larger Sector, District and National infrastructure priorities, especially related to road works.

Table 2: Summary comparison by project categories of Division and Parish LGDP Projects 100% Completed (2005/6-2007/8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sanitation</th>
<th>Roads</th>
<th>Drainage</th>
<th>Buildings</th>
<th>Street lighting</th>
<th>Total Project Cost: UGX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Makindye</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>224,558,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nakawa</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>643,195,025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LGDP Accountability 4th Quarter Reports from KCC and interviews with Division Engineers

Analysing inputs and processes involved looking at organisational factors such as: management and leadership practices, the resources available and motivation factors; the accountability processes (plans integrated with budgets); the decision-making dynamics (the relationships among political elites, the administration and the community); and the participation of the community leadership relative to implementation results (level of involvement).

The outputs (or actual programmes, products and services) implemented were explored and compared in the study Divisions of KCC. Specifically the planned and budgeted LGDP projects implemented [within a specified time period] were reviewed relative to actual implementation successes and problems encountered in implementation on the ground.

An attempt to analyse outcomes, involved looking at the responsiveness issues (factoring in the desires of the Parish committees), and the satisfaction of the Parish leadership with the projects implemented.

Table 3 summarises performance measures used in reviewing the selected Divisions and the representative Parishes studied.
Table 3: Comparison of performance factors in KCC study Divisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance</th>
<th>Nakawa</th>
<th>Makindye</th>
<th>KCC HQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LCIII</td>
<td>Banda</td>
<td>Mbuya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inputs and Processes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>good</td>
<td>good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin</td>
<td>fair</td>
<td>fair</td>
<td>fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector</td>
<td>good</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Skills</td>
<td>good</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation to ‘do’</td>
<td>fair</td>
<td>good</td>
<td>good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources - LGDP</td>
<td>good</td>
<td>poor</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power to ‘do’</td>
<td>good</td>
<td>poor</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networks &amp; Alliances</td>
<td>fair</td>
<td>poor</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outputs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGDP II projects completed</td>
<td>fair</td>
<td>poor</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other – dev. projects (KUSP, KIIDP, KIEMP, NGOs)</td>
<td>fair</td>
<td>poor</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcomes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGDP - rate of sector specific project completion</td>
<td>good</td>
<td>poor</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGDP - responsive to community needs e.g. satisfaction with projects completed</td>
<td>fair</td>
<td>poor</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. Good, fair and poor are relative ratings given based on observation and interviews.
2. LGDP outputs are based on observations, interviews and quarterly reports of projects completed (see Stelman 2011, Chapter 5 - Table 21 & 22) and Annex 3 for a complete list of LGDP projects completed by Quarter (2005/6-2007/8).

The research found that there were some real differences in performance in a few narrow areas, particularly sectors driven by professionals at the KCC District and Division levels (e.g. engineers, planners, medical professionals). In some Divisions managerial governance and leadership approaches and skills contributed to how well the organisation worked – e.g. in Makindye the top bureaucrat (SPATC) and in Nakawa the political leader (LC III Chairperson) helped to create good organisational processes. There were a few areas of performance success in certain Makindye Parishes – e.g. Kibuli, and Wabigalo – which can be attributed to local entrepreneurial efforts through networks and alliances; mostly religious and informal relationships with powerful actors (elected and bureaucratic) at different levels of central and local government.

In Nakawa the political-bureaucratic system worked well internally. However the focus on good process did not directly impact on their capacity to deliver public goods in the LGDP programme. Yet the processes of managerial governing were well implemented and rewarded in the National Assessment. Staff and politicians worked well together. They met as required and they got the reports done. They did process well – therefore they were rewarded with financial bonuses.
Makindye, a poorly performing Division according to the National Assessment, was not rewarded on the basis of its process factors yet had successes in public sector performance. They were able to get Division level projects such as a new Headquarters building built and they had a number of Parish level projects successfully implemented, e.g. the integrated multi-funder supported road and drainage systems in Kibuli and the community centre in Wabigallo. Why was this? The simple reason was that they owned, valued and prioritised these public projects and did what was necessary to get them off the ground. The building of their Headquarters received much negative commentary by CG observers and the media. This is because there was misappropriation of public funds associated with the project. However the complete story of its creation, the entrepreneurial efforts invested in acquiring lands, and the multi-level governance leadership links and political lobbying that were necessary to take the project from idea to reality, does not often get told. Many local actors wanted the project done and therefore they worked together to make it happen. The first hurdle, the acquisition of the land needed, was a complicated step; yet they accomplished it because it was their vision.

7 Discussion: performance explanatory factors

In spite of the fact that they were rated as 'best' and 'worst' performers by the National Assessment system there was no substantive difference in LGDP outputs between the two divisions rated worst and best. Process success did not translate into output success. The performance ‘similarities’ in LGDP outputs found between Makindye and Nakawa was a crucial research finding as it showed how irrelevant the Annual Assessment scheme was.

The literature is in agreement that in Africa ‘a discrepancy exists between official norms of the state and public services on the one hand and the behaviour of political elites and officials on the other’ (Olivier de Sardan, 2008). However the literature lacks clarity as to what actually goes on ‘in reality’ in the level of delivery of public goods and services, and what affects the delivery of public services. There is a complexity in the African governance context in that the legislation, regulations, procedures, specifications and organisational structures have been patterned on Western models (Olivier de Sardan, 2008: 4) without regard to local institutional cultures and history (Booth, 2011).

The following factors were found to be important to explaining performance realities on the ground.

7.1 Over-emphasis on managerialism and technocratic approaches

Politicians and bureaucrats live in an ‘uneasy partnership’ (Aberbach et al., 1991). The strained relationship is related to the different roles and responsibilities performed by politicians (generalists) and bureaucrats (specialists) in city government (Pierre, 2011: 30). The roles relate to two fundamental goals of local government: democratic and managerial. These two aspects have historically created tensions and conflicts between politicians and bureaucrats. Cities in different country, policy and political contexts work within different traditions related to the kind of democracy and the managerial agenda. However from the late 1990s through 2000s the managerial dimension has dominated city governments of the Western world. The financial crises, globalisation and New Public Management (NPM) trends have also influenced how cities are governed.
KCC did not function as an autonomous decentralised system. Therefore an urban governance lens was insufficient to explain performance.\textsuperscript{27} I found that the entire functionality and organisational performance of the KCC local government was affected from the top by centrally imposed conditions. There was little room for problem solving in the local context by the local level of government.

Some scholars of the Uganda LG system have observed that Councils were weak in gathering and processing information; developing internal cohesion; making decisions independently of executive direction; and developing ties with constituents. Local plans and budgets were seen to be largely dictated by national ministries and donor elites and local level control was exercised only over a few decisions at the margins.\textsuperscript{28}

These same observers suggest, however, that these problems grew from weakness in the committee systems; infrequent meetings at all levels; the low education level of personnel; poor dynamics of budgeting and revenue systems; and the weakness and political disengagement of civil-society organisations. They suggest that there is weakness in managerial expertise and that ‘perhaps the single greatest cause of council weakness in Uganda is the weakness of their committees’. The authors conclude that the system suffers from a national framework that limits greatly the planning, programming, and fiscal autonomy of the District level. The case of Uganda is presented as that of a troubled decentralised system (Wunsch and Ottenmoeller 2004: 198; 2000).

The idea that Council and Committee weakness is the major problem in Ugandan local government is a managerialist perspective which is challenged by the evidence of this study. I found that, rather than solving local implementation problems, District, Division, and Parish Councils were preoccupied with process issues rather than problem solving local issues and public output activities. I observed political committees and technical working groups spending much time and group energy on managerial processes; planning steps, co-ordinating initiatives and accountability requirements. Groups discussed at length details of how reports were written, debating even in full Council meetings the processes and specific words in reports. There was little time, flexibility or systemic encouragement for solving the barriers to local implementation challenges and for engaging in entrepreneurial initiatives to find the needed resources to do specific projects.

My observations and conclusions point to a centralised state trying to operate through a rigidly controlled decentralised system. The KCC LG system was incapacitated by central and donor partner controlled expectations including: rigid procurement and fiscal controls; policy and sector driven, top-down priorities; managerial processes and techniques; and endless bottom-up participation, planning and accountability expectations. The actors generally did not believe that their actions had any meaningful impact on the implementation of public projects. In fact as Wunsch and Ottomoeller (2004) acknowledge, central micromanagement prevented the development of capacity to manage at the local levels and allowed only minimal opportunities for local decision making.\textsuperscript{29}

I found that the entire system of LG at KCC focused its efforts on the integration of plans and processes with budgets, on paper if not in reality. Yet Wunsch and Ottomoeller (2004)\textsuperscript{30}

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\textsuperscript{27} However, in my Ph.D. thesis I did find that urban governance theory was a helpful guide for the assessment of political administrative and community interactions, given that KCC was a city level of government.

\textsuperscript{28} Wunsch and Ottenmoeller (2004: 198).

\textsuperscript{29} Wunsch and Ottemoeller (2004: 198).

\textsuperscript{30} Other critics of KCC planning performance include Lwasa and Nyakaana (2005), Makara (1997).
have concluded that there was a lack of linkage between the planning and budgeting process and components arising from the higher and lower local government levels. They did not see integration between the three year rolling District Development Plan (DDP) with the Budget Framework Paper (BFP) and between the Sub-county planning processes and the sectoral plans at the District level.

Planning, accounting and integration were in practice the key activities of KCC personnel. Meetings (for the sake of meeting), planning and accounting were actually the prioritised activities of council-constituent relations. At both the District and Division levels of the KCC, the District Technical Planning Committee (DTPC), led by the Economic Development Planners, was very attentive to ‘process’ above all else – integrating plans from the bottom with LG budgets and CG policy directions. In fact the majority of LG activities at the LC III and LC V levels were managerial and technocratic functions. These activities were not necessarily sensitive to or reflective of bottom-up implementation barriers, priorities and plans. Technocrats were under tremendous pressure to make the system appear integrated on paper (in development plans and budgets) even when there were not the resources to integrate sector priorities and specific public service projects. This is a key explanation for the poor performance of the system.

Lower level politicians said they found it difficult to influence the successful implementation of their priority projects, influence innovative local action or influence the bureaucracy generally. Politicians complained about the bureaucracy's rigid attitude and accused it of allegiance to CG and mismanagement, while the bureaucracy complained about local political corruption and political interference.

### 7.2 Resource constraints were more important than staff capacity factors

I found, contrary to Wunsch and Ottoomoller's assessment, that local politicians and technical staff in KCC were surprisingly well educated, many with first and master's degrees. A common complaint from political, bureaucratic and community (volunteer) actors was the lack of adequate resources to do their jobs and too many meetings. Local politicians felt impotent to implement their community development agendas and many did not serve more than one term of council as a result of voter disillusionment.

It may be conceded that the limited local revenue base did pose serious obstacles to performance at KCC. However when it comes to managerial issues, it is difficult to imagine how any additional or more elaborate participation, processes and accountability expectations could be demanded from the KCC LC system, given such limited human and financial resources relative to need. Lack of funding is thus, in my view, a more plausible explanation of poor performance.

### 7.3 The ‘unfunded mandate’ problem

In my observations politicians, community members and the bureaucracy were overwhelmed with expectations and demands they found impossible to meet. Technical and bureaucratic staffs were often directed to find the money (somewhere) to get specific projects completed or to get unbudgeted priorities done. Often pressures to act came from executives, senior local political actors, CG Ministries, or CG sector leads (cascading down through sector leads at KCC). Bureaucrats often felt that they had to take personal risks to make things

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31 See Annex 1 and 2 for the National Assessment process and the Development Planning Cycles at KCC.
happen – such as moving monies around various bank accounts, or borrowing monies intended for other purposes to get priorities accomplished. However, although necessary to ‘make something happen’ these actions were often classified as corruption when found out (e.g. breaking budgeting and procurement rules) and were reported and dealt with by the justice system. Many KCC staff ended up charged with corruption and held personally responsible for actions taken, even when directed or encouraged to do so by executive committees and more powerful political or bureaucratic actors at higher levels.

Interviews with LC I and LC II actors suggested that the entire system puts a great deal of responsibility and expectations for service delivery on the lowest LC levels, their PDCs and local volunteers – without adequate support for their development priorities or resources to do the job. As the interviewees put it themselves, ‘there is a lot of talk about the bottom-up system but no real capacity to actually do anything’ – i.e. to provide basic services and implement community projects near the ground. One LC II Chairperson said: ‘I have to use my own pencils to do this job’.

My research found that the LC I-III levels at KCC did not feel that their priorities were factored into the larger District planning and priority agendas and they were expected to change their priorities based on feedback from the sector experts or for District priorities. LC I and LC II levels felt the pressure of top-down control from the LCIII level, exacerbated by limited communications. The LC III level had the same complaints about the LC V level. The LC V level expressed concerns over the roles of CG and MoLG specifically, and about the LC III levels’ lack of willingness to take direction from the LC V level.

A common sentiment was that there were too many expectations, rules and regulations and not enough resources to do the job. Each level saw the other as capable of corruption and the misappropriation of funds, given personal economic needs – and therefore as needing to be monitored. LLG actors and community leaders were often preoccupied with tracking how their resources were being redirected to other political priorities by senior government or misappropriated by government officials at all levels. They referred to networks of opportunity for personal gain.

7.4 A culture of ‘planning is doing’ permeated the KCC local government system

Rigid prescriptive processes (accountability and planning) have negatively affected creativity in terms of problem-solving and decision-making. There are few opportunities for thinking ‘outside of the box’. The controlled environment has forced some actors to work around the formal system in order to get even basic public services and public goods implemented, often resulting in accusations of financial irregularities and corruption.

‘In order to get things done … you [sometimes] must move monies around…break financial rules … participate in risky behaviour … but administrators do it.’

32 Wunsch and Ottemoeller (2004) also reported that LC III personnel felt that what was provided by the district were not local priorities. They felt it was rare to see sector plans changed to reflect local priorities and that there was a parallel planning process at national ministries and their district offices that ‘largely supplanted and displaced locally based planning’.

33 See Stelman (2011) Chapter 5 for realities at the Parish and Village levels.

34 Interview, Code B-12: KCC administration, 13 July, 2008. Also the same sentiments were expressed by interviews with, Code B-13, KCC administration 15 July, 2008; and Code D-5, 31 March, 2009.
In Uganda the local government system is asked to ‘think’ and ‘plan’, yet is restricted by lack of resources and rigid planning, accountability and procurement requirements from taking even modest locally determined steps to ‘act’ or to create and implement programmes and services desired and needed by the community. A culture of ‘planning is doing’ seems to have emerged at all levels of the system, despite available resources through the World Bank and donor funded LGDP programmes. Donor demands for accountability, international level procurement expectations and elaborate planning and public participation requirements force political and technical staff to spend most of their time and limited available resources on perfecting ‘planning processes’ and ‘accountability requirements’ with checks and double checks, as opposed to prioritising for performance ‘outputs’ or implementation on the ground.

The entire Ugandan system of government is constitutionally oriented to a ‘bottom-up’ policy agenda of implementation. Yet what is talked about and written in the Constitution and formal documents regarding engaging the people for development does not occur in reality. Uganda’s reputation as a very successful system that operates from the bottom up, building on the development needs of the people and working up through LC system all the way to CG and ultimately the Parliament, is more idealistic hope than reality. Most actors in the KCC system acknowledge parallel worlds of ‘what should be’ and ‘what is’.

The growing urban service needs outmatch the capacity to deliver basic services at all levels of local government at KCC and the problems keep growing while the LG system ‘plans’. How can local problems be solved creatively and in a timely manner with all the accountability expectations, detailed and growing planning steps and implementation related checks and balances demanded before one can act? The leaders and people at the bottom of the LC system feel that official rhetoric is ‘all empty words’. They say that ‘we look great on paper but the reality is very different’.

7.5 Sector leadership makes a difference

Sector priorities and professional agendas do tend to get implemented over time when there is sector interest and expertise manoeuvring the political and administrative agenda. When local priorities line up with bureaucratic sector priorities the projects tended to get done.

Professionals like engineers and planners influence the type of projects successfully implemented. Often the lowest level projects included in budgets line up with larger District and Division sector priorities. Lower levels become quite frustrated as often they end up overseeing a very small section of for example an access road or drainage system as their LGDP project. PDC members are often unable to bring their local development priorities to fruition yet sector driven initiatives somehow seem to get done.

An example of strong sector leadership can be seen at KCC in the Health sector. The Health Department was one of the most successful sectors at KCC HQ in implementing LGDP projects (e.g. the building of new LGDP funded health centres in most Divisions). A seasoned and experienced Department Head and his technical team worked with LC levels and with the community. They were able to implement many LGDP projects on the ground year after year. For example the Department head worked with the powerful Executive at the LC V level; with his engineering and planning colleagues, he used his team of medical officers to deal with the community issues at the LC III, LC II and LC I levels by holding public meetings, problem solving issues with local politicians, bureaucrats and the community to get the project done.
7.6 Local networks work to make things happen

The actions of formal and informal local leadership networks were the key factors responsible for performance success despite poor circumstances. At the level of the Parish both in Makindye and Nakawa the local leaders were more focused on actual projects and needs in their communities than on politics. Issues of party politics at LC I and II levels did not seem to be as significant as at the LC III and LC V levels. Units of ‘success’ (e.g. Kibuli Parish) were found even in the worst rated Division, Makindye. Successful units used horizontal and vertical leadership networks linked by a common public purpose to make small scale projects happen. The KCC technical experts were important to this link. When motivated, the actors paid attention to the local context, i.e. the barriers that existed in their local realities, and made efforts to problem solve them. Successful units had positive political-bureaucratic-community relationships. Local leaders championed projects, used powerful CG politicians (even the President directly) and used local innovations and strategies tapping into formal and informal systems. Religious networks were seen to be important in some cases – for example the Makindye Parish (Kibuli) context.

In Kibuli Parish the LCIII Councillor worked very closely with the LCI and LCII Chairmen, the Imams of the local Muslim community and the PDC and other community volunteers to create and oversee the implementation of projects and services. Kibuli was successful in implementing a network of drainage systems, financially supported by different funders and programmes accessed by local leaders. The community used entrepreneurial strategies to find new resources and took advantage of donated volunteer time (mainly from the Muslim community) and money to build needed drainage channels. These local efforts linked up with government and LGDP-funded projects and NGO-funded projects to develop their road and drainage systems. These successful efforts happened because of the local leadership, political will, technical support, and community involvement at the LCI and LCII levels – the levels closest to the people.

Local mediators and leaders that bridged the formal and informal systems had a lot to offer. Local leaders were galvanised around the formal local government LGDP project funding and used other funding sources and their formal and informal networks to act. Effective leadership networks consisted of lower level political leaders, formally appointed Parish Development Committee members, local religious leaders, e.g leaders of local Pentecostal churches, Pastors of mainstream churches, Muslim community leaders (Imams/Shaykhs), together with elders and executive members of their congregations and other interested community members (often young men). These leaders reached upward to higher local levels and to local and National NGOs to advocate for their community development priorities. They formed strong alliances and communication ties with lower level politicians and bureaucrats that reached up and linked with higher level politicians and bureaucrats and technical experts at the Division and District levels.

This type of lower level leadership ‘engagement’ existed in some capacity in all the six Parishes investigated with more and less success. But one local leader (here and there), however capable, was not enough to make a significant difference in performance results. The comparative case study revealed that a number of strong leaders needed to operate together at different levels in the bureaucracy, the political structure (central and local), and on the ground in the community for any given effort or specific public project to succeed. These political, bureaucratic, and community leadership links served to connect the LC levels with a common purpose and the special energy and resources needed for specific development projects to be implemented (e.g. community centres or health centres). However in some Parishes the motivation and effectiveness of these potential leadership networks was
negatively impacted by their limited connections to leaders in the formal political system and to ‘Big Men’ in the informal system. Rigid central and bureaucratic planning and accountability rules and regulations also had a demoralising effect on their collective entrepreneurial efforts. And the lack of adequate resources flowing down to the lowest levels had a negative impact on their motivation to take action.

It was, therefore, clear that leadership links, positive political and bureaucratic relations and a common commitment to make certain public goods a reality contributed to implementation success – albeit small – in some areas of the case studies compared. This finding echoes APPP concerns with ‘informal’ and culturally appropriate ways of working to further development performance.

8 Conclusion

The three phases of the Local Government Development Programme – LGDP-I, LGDP-II and III and the LGMDP – were widely perceived by many higher positioned stakeholders interviewed (mostly the LC V officials and MoLG technocrats) as positive, well implemented and constructive programmes for improving community infrastructure and for providing services to the community. These same positive views were not shared, however, by ordinary people at the lower levels – LC III, LC II, and LC I – and their respective Development Committees.

Lower level representatives agreed that the first completed phases of LGDP-I produced valued and tangible projects on the ground in many Parishes in KCC when the Parish controlled 70% of the funds that came to the Division for their development projects. However in the LGDP–II phase the bulk of the money went to the Division (70%) while Parishes received only 30% if they received anything at all.

‘When this [the LDGP] first started we participated because the programme gave us 70% of the funds for the Parish … we had a spirit to participate … we collected our money … the LDGP helped us then to open up many of our roads … when 70% funding stopped…we plan but all our projects stopped.’

In some of the case-study Parishes ordinary people pointed to successful projects (those that were still visible to the observer) from the earlier LGDP-I days. The projects included: drainage improvements, street lighting, road improvements, health centres, community centres and other needed infrastructure projects. Most community people interviewed point to these projects with pride. LGDP-I was perceived to have been an effective programme as a larger percentage of resources came to the bottom and procurement occurred closer to the ground – at the Division level. This approach (people felt) resulted in Parish and Village level community people playing a more significant role in overseeing the implementation of their priority projects.

By 2006, the funding formula was changed, with 70% of LGDP funds going to the Division as opposed to the Parish level. MoLG officials claimed that the change was made to decrease local corruption and to better meet national development objectives such as road infrastructure.

35 Evans (2002) observes that performance differences between developing world cities can be explained by the actions of actors inside and outside of the state that build networks and alliances and become more conscious of opportunities to build ties, make connections and exploit synergies.

36 Interview, Banda Parish Chairperson LCII, 15 February, 2010.
The performance of the LGDP-II in the study years 2003-10 was not, however, viewed as successful by many lower LC actors and ordinary people. The general explanations were that not enough resources come to the bottom; expensive procurement processes occur at higher levels (LC V) away from the oversight of community leaders; there is perceived corruption between contractors, technocrats and politicians involved; and there is a serious lack of communication and co-ordination between levels of local government. Parish representatives said that they were not consulted and involved in implementation; that technical and political alliances worked together to divert funds for personal gain; and that ‘big men’ in government ‘feed themselves’, their families and friends at the expense of local development needs. People complained that LGDP projects are over-priced, poor value and are done by contractors from outside the community. However policies, approaches and resources for actualising local priorities were seen by all as critical for successful development.

It was found that the tensions between rigid bureaucratic managerial requirements and local realities frustrated local development efforts, thereby complicating the achievement of community-desired local projects. There was a gap between the official system and the organisational performance realities on the ground. Frustration with lack of performance permeated the Kampala City Council system. Politicians, technical staff and community people were disillusioned with the discrepancy between the rhetoric of an effective Local Government system and the non-performance on the ground.

The official system speaks of decentralisation and bottom-up participation in governance and development. Yet the real local government system at KCC is a rigid and centrally (i.e. Central Government) controlled system shaped by donor conditionalities. The latter are biased towards ‘managerial’ and ‘process’ excellence at the expense of the ‘local realities’ and ‘public demands’. There was a fundamental contradiction between what the formal system demanded and what the community wanted. The formal system required bureaucratic managerial and accountability processes. It dictated the type of projects and development priorities. The community, however, had little power to influence and define the projects according to their local needs, wishes and desires – despite their ‘participation’ in formal planning procedures. Civil servants who were committed to making things happen were often unnecessarily sanctioned for sorting funding problems in informal ways. Limited discretionary resources were allocated to planning, procurement, and accountability activities rather than for public priorities and projects on the ground.

Parish Development Committees (PDCs) struggled to implement any practical outputs despite their genuine interest in providing public goods and services for their communities – based on their own understanding of what they really needed and how to get it. Local actors were frustrated by the lack of resources and the absurdities that the managerialist and formal, participation-obsessed local government system imposed on them.

Nevertheless, small pockets of successful performance were found in specific Parishes in the two study Divisions. These actors and groups found ways to work around the formal system with informal practices based on their local realities. They used informal networks and alliances; the powers of ‘big men’ and the focused passions of PDC and other local leaders, often working in the spaces between the LC levels to get things done.37

37 See Crook and Booth (2011) for a discussion on rethinking African governance and development. The article summarises early results from the Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP) stressing the importance of ‘problem solving in the local context.’
The comparative case study of the Divisions of Kampala demonstrates that if the policy approach rewards ‘process excellence’ then it could result in an organisational unit that does not necessarily deliver ‘outputs’ or public goods any better than an organisational unit performing poorly on the process dimension. The examples of Nakawa and Makindye Divisions make the case.

If public outputs are the intent then development support for creating and implementing public outputs must be valued and supported. The debate over what is more important, the organisation or the politics, must change. The new dialogue must be about balance and how to put the actual creation and implementation of public goods at the forefront of development efforts. Also what factors, formal and informal, are most conducive to encouraging an ‘action agenda’ to make and create public goods and services? In KCC, Parish Development Committees would do a better job in implementing their development priorities if they were given the resources, were supported and allowed to mobilise collective action locally in the way they know works best.

In Africa the Weberian view of bureaucracy (i.e. formal-legal authority) as rules-based, transparent processes is complicated by varying degrees of patrimonial and ‘informal’ practices which include ethnic and religious alliances. A system of personal rule, ‘big man’ practices and incentive structures still exist although they do not fundamentally define the formal system of governance. Although I did find some evidence of patrimonial practices, I did not find the neo-patrimonial state or the cultural view of African politics a satisfactory explanation for the Kampala case. The significance of this finding is that performance success was linked to the use of informal political and social networks that we would expect in any society, especially where the formal local government is so dominated by an imposed ‘managerialism’. This finding supports the APPP hypothesis on ‘hybridity’.

The flexibility and entrepreneurial spirit that some observers believe to be critical for performance (Grindle, 2007b) were found at the lowest levels of KCC (LC I, LC II, and PDC). Unfortunately, there were too little money and support at these levels to make a significant difference to Parish level performance.

Despite the fact that the ideas of ‘good governance’, ‘decentralisation’, and ‘NPM’ as keys to better performance are being challenged in the development literature, funding approaches still stress these as conditions for donor funds. Uganda is an excellent example of a system overwhelmed by donor conditions focused on managerialism at the expense of local political realities which can take advantage of local motivation for creating public value. Preoccupation with planning and accountability contributed to normalising endless technocratic planning and accountability exercises as the key activities of the City of Kampala.

Development policy and funding strategy must go beyond rhetoric to truly value local priorities and local approaches for implementing public projects. The donor funding systems need to support real local entrepreneurial strategies – which despite everything still exist closest to the ground.

38 The APPP hypothesis on ‘hybridity’ argues that institutions most likely to contribute to development in low-income Africa are ‘practical hybrids’, combining the authoritative coordination which can come from a developmental neo-patrimonial state with an enabling environment for local problem-solving and a constructive use of culturally legitimate ways of working (Crook and Booth, 2011:101).
References


Kampala City Council (2008b) ‘Nakawa Division Development Plan (May)’. Kampala: Economic Planning Unit, Kampala City Council.


### Annex 1: Schedule of Annual National Assessment process and Local Development Planning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Category of assessment</th>
<th>Assessment team</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>MoLG convenes Annual Decentralization Forum Local Governments carry out Internal District Assessment</td>
<td>Internal assessment team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July-August</td>
<td>National Assessment</td>
<td>NAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August- September</td>
<td>LG commences planning and budgeting (BFP) process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October (before end)</td>
<td>NAT</td>
<td>Members discuss report before submitting to MoLG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November (before end)</td>
<td>LG Finalization of National Assessment Reports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November (before end)</td>
<td>Synthesis Report of Assessment</td>
<td>Discussed by stakeholders: MoLG, PMU, MoFPED, LGFC and donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November (before end)</td>
<td>Synthesis Report</td>
<td>Discussed by Project Technical Team (CG/donors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November (before end)</td>
<td>Announcement of Assessment Results</td>
<td>Permanent Secretary MoLG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>District Assessment Reports</td>
<td>Submitted to their respective LG stakeholders (technical staff, political leaders, NGOs and CSOs, private sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January-June</td>
<td>Local Governments finalize and approve Three Year Development and Capacity Building Plans</td>
<td>PCU Finalizes Annual Procurement Plan (in May)</td>
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*Source: Compiled from World Bank (2003a: 9)*
Annex 2: Development Plan and Budget Planning Cycle – Kampala District

In KCC the planning year corresponds to the Local Government Financial Year which runs 1st of July to the 30th of June. The timetables and planning cycle includes the following stages:

(1) July/August

Meetings are held at District, Division and Parish levels led by planners to make sure that there is clarity regarding budget envelops available for local development projects i.e. LGDP-II.

(2) September

The planning process for the District Development Plan includes: the situation analysis; the preparatory processes for the entire planning cycle; feedback to the lower local governments; and an assessment of the current situation or SWOT analysis in Kampala District. A performance review of the previous FY is to be undertaken. Most of this relates to aligning National, District and Department targets and strategic directions.

i. The feedback to the lower levels relates to how much money is available for development projects; how well the LG performed in the National Assessment; and most importantly the National and sector priorities.

ii. KCC’s economic planner and other technical staffs present the situation analysis to the District Technical Planning Committee (TPC) as well as the District Executive Committee for approval.

iii. Priority areas for the next 3 Year Plan are formulated in line with District and National Priorities and PEAP National Policy pillars.

iv. The District Strategy is developed using an opinion-generating debate involving the Technical Planning Committee, political leaders and other development partners.

(3) January-February

The Budget Framework paper is compiled and presented at the District Budget Conference at which time further consultations are undertaken in order to achieve political consensus and input from other stakeholders and development partners.

i. The priorities identified are implemented through sector plans and financed through the annual budget. The projects under consideration are presented at the annual conference (Feb.) for the coming fiscal year.

ii. The Budget Conference is held at the District (LC V) and the Division (LC III) level - each held separately (X 6 in total) in a large downtown hotel - with a large group of stakeholders, central government, local government, donor partners, NGOs, CBOs etc. Attendance is by personal invitation.

iii. The output of the Budget conference constitutes the priorities for the next FY.
iv. Planning sessions are held by sectoral committees and District Technical Planning Committee, to appraise and cost identified priorities and to have sectoral linkages and consolidated draft plans.

v. The recommendations from sectoral committees are incorporated into the draft Development Plan. Profiles of the identified projects and the draft annual sectoral work plans for the next FY are developed.

(4) March

A letter goes out from the Division economic development planners to all the Parishes in the Division. A meeting is to be set up with the PDC to identify the Parish development plans and activities that they are interested in pursuing.

i. At this point information is shared top-down about National and District and Division priorities and the available local revenue for their discretionary use most likely from the LDGP programme.

ii. The Parishes prioritize their projects and submit in writing to the economic development planner to present to the Division (LCIII) Technical Planning Committee (TPC).

iii. The LGDP monies come from MoLG and go to the District. They are distributed to the Divisions/Parishes based on a formula. In practice Division discretion is used regarding monies needed at lower levels and the monies available.

(5) April

The decisions are taken back to the District level for development by the sectoral committees and the Technical Planning Committee consolidates the draft plan.

i. TPC integrates all Parish, Division and Head Quarters Departmental submissions into a three year District Development Plan (DDP).

ii. The Planning Unit - Economic development planners at KCC - co-ordinate the preparation of the DDP.

iii. The DDP is presented to many sector committees for approval and the District Executive committee for and finally to Council for approval.

(6) June

A joint meeting is held of the Executive Committee, Finance & Economic Affairs Committee, and Chairpersons of all Sector Committee together with Management to approve the Budget and recommend it Council.

i. Three documents must be integrated in this process: the Budget Framework Paper; the Development Plan; and the Local Revenue Enhancement Plan.

ii. Annual work plans must be approved by the 15th of June.
(7) **June 30:** Annual Budget must be approved by the City Council of Kampala.

(8) The DDP is submitted to the MoLG and tabled with the Ugandan Planning Authority.

**Nakawa LGDP Projects (2005/6-2007/8) completed as per 2007/8 Quarterly Reports**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Project description</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Budgeted project cost (UGX)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Drainage</td>
<td>Division</td>
<td>35,858,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drainage improvement in Naguru I, Naguru II and Luzira</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Drainage</td>
<td>Parish</td>
<td>31,512,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Construction of part of Kitintale Channel in Mutungo parish</td>
<td>Investment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Parish</td>
<td>26,887,350</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Road Drainage Improvement on Bukoto I Ntinda and Kiwatule</td>
<td>Investment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Division</td>
<td>68,813,940</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Periodic Maintenance of Roads in Mbuya parish</td>
<td>Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Parish</td>
<td>15,662,975</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Road Improvement in Bugolobi and Luzira parishes</td>
<td>Investment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Roads</td>
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<td>50,260,014</td>
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<td>Phase I of surface dressing/tarmacking of part of Banda Kyambogo road</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Roads</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Phase I of double surfacing of Ntinda and Kiwatule-Kyambogo Road</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Buildings</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Phased Construction</td>
<td>Investment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Parish</td>
<td>2,843,400</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Road Drainage Improvement of Nakawa Market Access road in Maguru I Parish</td>
<td>Investment</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Street Lighting</td>
<td>Parish</td>
<td>21,962,514</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Installation of Streetlights in Bukoto II Parish</td>
<td>Investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Parish</td>
<td>8,377,302</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Opening and Grading of Aida Kiyungi road in Butabika parish</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Parish</td>
<td>44,840,000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consultancy services for the preparation of detailed plans for the new Divisional HQ office</td>
<td>Investment</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>643,195,025</strong></td>
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</table>
### Makindye LGDP Projects (2005/6-2007/8) completed as per 2007/8 Quarterly Reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project #</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Project description</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Budgeted project cost (UGX)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Drainage Improvement of Lukuli road in Lukuli road in Lukuli Parish</td>
<td>Parish Investment</td>
<td>3,986,421</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Drainage Improvement of Calander Road in Makindye II Parish</td>
<td>Parish Investment</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Drainage Improvement along railway line in Kisugu parish</td>
<td>Parish Investment</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Pot Hole patching if estate road in Nsambya Estate</td>
<td>Parish Investment</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Drainage</td>
<td>Construction of storm water channel in Kavule zone of Kibuye II Parish</td>
<td>Parish Investment</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Drainage</td>
<td>Construction of storm water channel in Bungo zone of Gaba Parish</td>
<td>Parish Investment</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Drainage</td>
<td>Construction of storm water channel in Soweto Zone of Bukasa Parish</td>
<td>Parish Investment</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Drainage Improvement of Wasula Road in Kibuye I Parish</td>
<td>Parish Investment</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Drainage Improvement of Migade road in Makindye I Parish</td>
<td>Parish Investment</td>
<td>6,547,714</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Drainage</td>
<td>Storm water channel in Kamwanyi zone of Nsambya central Parish</td>
<td>Parish Investment</td>
<td>11,039,000</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Drainage Improvement of Katule Road in Katwe II Parish</td>
<td>Parish Investment</td>
<td>6,547,714</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Sanitation</td>
<td>Construction of a VIP Latrine at the officer’s mess in Luwafu Parish</td>
<td>Parish Investment</td>
<td>12,500,000</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Street Lighting along Lukuli Road Buziga Parish</td>
<td>Parish Investment</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Drainage Improvement of Kibuli II road in Kibuli Parish</td>
<td>Parish Investment</td>
<td>11,300,000</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Drainage</td>
<td>Construction of storm water channel in Muwanga zone of Katwe I Parish</td>
<td>Parish Investment</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Builds</td>
<td>Phased construction of Wabigalo hall in Wabigalo parish</td>
<td>Division Project</td>
<td>21,500,000</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Builds</td>
<td>Phased construction of school hall in Nsambya railways Parish</td>
<td>Parish Investment</td>
<td>6,779,800</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Drainage</td>
<td>Construction of storm water channel in Kabalagala Parish</td>
<td>Parish Investment</td>
<td>8,100,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Drainage</td>
<td>Construction of Storm water channel in Kansanga Parish</td>
<td>Division Project</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Street Lighting along Police Barracks roads in Nsambya Police Parish</td>
<td>Parish Investment</td>
<td>11,650,317</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** 224,558,968

*Source: LGDP Accountability 4th Quarter Reports from KCC and interviews with Division Engineers.*