

Understanding the tipping point of urban conflict:
violence, cities and poverty reduction in the developing world

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Understanding the tipping point of urban conflict: the case of Nairobi, Kenya

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Acronyms

AIC	African Inland Church
APRHC	African Population and Health Research Centre
AMREF	African Medical Research Foundation
CBD	Central Business District
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CCN	City Council of Nairobi
CDC	Centres for Disease Control and Prevention
CREAW	Centre for Rights, Education and Awareness
DC	District Commissioner
DO	District Officer
FBO	Faith Based Organisation
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FIDA	Federation of Kenya Women Lawyers
GURC	Global Urban Research Centre
ICC	International Criminal Court
KPLC	Kenya Power and Lighting Company
MP	Member of Parliament
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontieres
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
OP	Office of the President
PCCAA	Participatory Climate Change Adaptation Appraisal
PCEA	Presbyterian Church of East Africa
PEV	Post Election Violence
PNU	Party of National Unity
PVA	Participatory Violence Appraisal
SAPTA	Support for Addictions Prevention and Treatment in Africa
SUPKEM	Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UTP	Urban Tipping Point
YOBBEK	Youth Building Bridges and Education in Kibera

Abstract

This research studies the tipping point of urban conflict in Nairobi, Kenya. It employs the concepts of tipping points and violence chains. The research studies various types of conflict and violence at city level through literature and in three of Nairobi's hotspots: Kawangware, Kibera, and Mukuru settlements, through participatory violence appraisal (PVA). The research shows that the most significant type of violence is political violence. However, cumulatively, other types of violence, namely landlord-tenant, domestic and economic violence, are more significant. Focusing on political violence alone makes other types of violence invisible. The study shows that political violence in Kenya is rooted in colonial times in historical inequity in access to resources, and perpetuated in post-colonial times through the mediation of ethnicity. The study unpacks roles of institutions in tipping conflicts into and out of violence; it shows that an institutional analysis of actors involved in tipping conflict into violence and vice versa is important in preventing violence. It identifies the tipping points at sub-city level and shows the complex ways in which these types of conflict and violence are interlinked through chains. Breaking these violence chains is critical to preventing conflicts tipping into violence. A key way of breaking the chains is improving the overall governance framework. Further the study shows that violence in Nairobi's sub-city is spatially linked. Thus identification of violence hotspots is critical in dealing with violence; and spatial improvements such as slum upgrading initiatives, taking into consideration hotspots, can go a long way in preventing conflict tipping into violence.

Key Words: Political conflicts in Nairobi, political violence in Nairobi, tipping points of conflict, violence chains, violence hotspots

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background

One of the vexatious questions posed by the budding democratisation and poverty reduction interventions in Kenya's cities is: why does political violence spiral upwards, particularly at the sub-city level? In addition, why is there an apparent neglect of the adverse effects of political violence by policy and programme interventions at the city level? Understanding urban violence in cities such as Nairobi is vitally important if policy and development interventions are to remain relevant and successful. For instance, Nairobi is the intersection of international, national, city, as well as sub-city cultures and needs. Thus, in moderating all these needs, conflict is a daily reality. Invariably, these conflicts conflate into a number of other urban conflicts and even violence. The relationship between conflict and violence is both intricate and intertwined.

Conflict and violence are notions that have been applied interchangeably in everyday use and research. In the city, conflict and violence have been studied with different focuses. These include: security, crime, corruption, evictions, and gangs. Unlike earlier studies, this research explored the relationship between urban conflict and violence, with respect to urban political violence at the sub-city level. Nonetheless, managing urban political conflicts and violence requires a wide understanding of the relationship between urban conflict and violence. To explore this relationship further, the study used two concepts — the tipping point and violence chains — in three hotspots¹ in Nairobi's sub-city. These concepts are yet to constitute robust theories in violence studies. Therefore, this study makes an important first step on the journey of understanding how conflict generates political violence at the sub-city level and how such violence may be addressed.

1.2 Research objectives

Recent research has sought to determine the "tipping point" of urban conflict — i.e. the moment when conflict turns into a large-scale breakout of violence. This has generally been conceived in quantitative terms, with increases in poverty, the number of youths involved, levels of political exclusion, or gender-based insecurity beyond a certain threshold being seen to lead to a sudden change in social conditions. This study had three objectives:

To understand the nature of qualitative tipping points;
To determine the range of potential means to prevent urban conflict from tipping over into violence; and
To identify policy entry points that would allow the implementation of initiatives to reduce the risk of violence and/or break the strategic links within violence chains.

1.3 Conceptual framework

Conflict and violence are the two concepts that are being investigated in this study. Working definitions of these two concepts are not straightforward, since they often overlap, converge or are conflated, as reflected in widely-used terms such as 'violent crimes', 'criminal conflict', 'conflictual violence' and 'violent conflict'. Conflict has been defined as the state of opposition or hostilities; fight or struggle; the clashing of opposed principles; the opposition of incompatible

¹ Violence hotspots are physical locations of unusually high concentration and frequency of violence.

wishes or needs in a person — an instance of this or the distress resulting from this (Oxford University Dictionary). In this study, we understand *conflict* as situations where individuals and groups have incongruent interests that are contradictory and potentially mutually exclusive. In the first instance, we consider the urban environment as fostering conflict because of the concentration of people. The incongruent interests that in Nairobi relate to competition for scarce resources, such as land, housing, economic opportunities, etc. can be resolved through peaceful means. The moment when one group imposes their will forcefully on others, then the transition to violence is effected.

The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines violence as ‘the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in, or has a high likelihood of resulting in, injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation’ (WHO 2002). Political violence in Nairobi therefore means the imposition of one political group’s interest to the disfavour of others, often with the use of force, excessive power, physical or psychological hurt (see also Keane, 1996; Galtung, 1996).

The other two operational concepts that we use in the study are *tipping points* and *violence chains*. The concept of a tipping point was extended from “small events and actions can induce big changes” (Gladwell 2000) to a *paradigmatic* event (or factor). This term derives originally from theology.

A paradigmatic event may be defined as a historical occurrence that captures the imagination of a community in such a manner as to shape or form the community’s way of conceiving the totality of reality, as well as the community’s understanding of its ongoing experience of reality” (Grenz & Franke 2000: 79)².

The notion of a *violence chain* is inspired by the concept of a *value chain* and is used to highlight the way that violence operates systemically, and involves a range of interconnected processes — that may not necessarily be immediately obvious. Derived from the analytical work of Sturgeon (2008) on *value chains*, a *violence chain* involves three levels of analysis. First, the chain has components (different types of violence) and a character of linkages. Second, these different types of violence (components) articulate together, distributing power within the chain. Third, the components are embedded within a broader institutional setting (context), where these institutions structure a relationship between the components.

Issues of particular importance in focusing on violence chains include the following:

While the *value chain* is generally identified as a useful conceptual and operational instrument / tool to identify the way in which a chain creates and increases the value of a product, in the case of violence it is more likely to be a cumulative negative process (see Moser and Holland 1997; Moser 2006), with

² His reference for the concept of paradigmatic events comes from Janet Abu-Lughod (1999). For the concept of accumulation trends he has drawn on epidemiology (see S.L. Hatch (2005), and for distribution trends from climate change (see Russilla and Nyssa (2009).

important policy implications in terms of reducing violence by 'breaking' such chains.

One important contribution the concept of *violence chains* adds to the study is that it prioritises the importance of looking at the relationship between different types of violence rather than, as is more usually the case, a specific type of violence.

1.4. Research strategy and methodology

A Participatory Violence Appraisal (PVA) methodology (see Moser, 2011 for details) was adopted for this study. The PVA methodology builds on the pioneering work of Chambers (1994; 1995). The PVA draws on earlier research by Moser and McIlwaine (1999; 2004) who modified Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) for the assessment of violence in urban contexts. Moser and Stein's (2010) methodological tools for climate change adaptation also influenced the approach and methodology of this study. These include the development of a Participatory Climate Change Adaptation Appraisal (PCCAA) methodology that uses participatory methodology to identify 'bottom up' views, both asset vulnerability to climate change, as well as asset adaptation strategies to build long-term resilience, protect assets during adverse weather and rebuild them. Since violence studies are yet to substantiate the theories and concepts of tipping points and violence chains, the PVA is exploratory and untested.

Photo 1: Elders analysing violence using the PVA in Congo Village, Kawangware



Source: Nairobi Research Team


Rather than individual or household questionnaires, participatory methodology is based on purposive sampling from a range of focus groups that are representative of community members, in terms of age, gender, ethnicity, economic activities and other culturally specific variables. Since the introduction of a participatory methodology, over a decade ago, it has been widely used, particularly for participatory poverty assessments undertaken in both rural and urban areas, with an extensive associated debate reflecting both the advantages

and limitations of this methodology (see for instance Brock and McGee 2002; Kanbur 2003; Holland and Campbell 2005).

A community-level participatory approach at the micro-level is intended to provide insights into the experience of violence among low-income groups in a way that macro-level analysis cannot. A PVA not only allows poor groups to identify the extent to which violence-related problems affect their communities, but also encourages them to assess the causes and consequences of violence. Furthermore, such an approach assists in identifying interventions from the perspective of the poor, rather than from that of policy makers or academics.

Three informal settlements were used to analyse the relationship between conflict and violence in the generation of urban violence in Nairobi's sub-city. These were drawn from key hotspots in Nairobi and included Kawangware, Kibera and Mukuru. Nairobi is the capital city of Kenya where central administrative functions of the government are located. It is also the centre of industry, education and culture. International organisations also have their offices located in Nairobi e.g. the two United Nations agencies, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UN-Habitat) whose World headquarters are located in Gigiri. Regional offices of other United Nations agencies such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), reinforce Nairobi's importance as a diplomatic, commercial and cultural centre in Africa.

Figure 1: Map of Kenya showing Nairobi and the study communities



Kawangware, Kibera, and Mukuru settlements were selected for three reasons. First, Kawangware was both relatively less researched and easily accessible for the research teams; but it also had supportive key informants and helpful government officials. Kibera, although it has been the subject of several studies on violence, was also accessible and safe for the team. Second, it was vitally important that Kibera, as a key constituency of Kenya's Prime Minister and an important site for the on-going International Criminal Court (ICC) case against four prominent politicians and government officials, was included in the study. Therefore, Kibera as a site for this study was not only opportune, but extremely important to ensure that lessons and recommendations from this study had a very high promise for adoption at sub-city, city, national, as well as international, policy levels. Third, Mukuru was selected because there was growing research on violence that involved the activities of the *Mungiki* criminal gang but was also highly accessible. Since this study aimed at exploring the transformation of political conflict into violence, the role of *Mungiki* in Kenya's and Nairobi's political arena was further justification for the selection of Mukuru.

Data were gathered from at least 420 residents of the three study communities. These residents included: young people, women, gangs, politicians, religious leaders, elders, community health workers, CBOs, NGOs, business, tenants, landlords, and school children. The interviews and focus group discussions focused on perceptions of conflict, violence, prevalence of political violence, hotspots, roles of institutions in escalating and mitigating political violence. Eight in-depth interviews and 74 focus groups were conducted. Table 1 shows the distribution of these focus groups and interviews.

Table 1: Distribution of focus groups and in-depth interviews

Settlement	No of focus group discussions	No of in-depth interviews
Kawangware	19	3
Kibera	37	3
Mukuru	18	2
Total	74	8

1.5. Characteristics of the research communities

As shown in the section on methodology, the research sites were selected according to established criteria. Further, these research communities are well known violence hotspots. However, each community, as we show below, is distinctive.

Kawangware

Kawangware is situated towards the western side of the city of Nairobi. Kawangware has an estimated population of 210 thousand residents (Government of Kenya, 2010). It is about seven km from the city centre and neighbours to the east the up-market Lavington precinct. To the west, it neighbours Dagoretti. The predominant type of housing in Kawangware is of iron-sheet construction; this is because iron sheeting is cheap and can be afforded by most people. There are also brick houses, but these are more expensive. People living in Kawangware depend on the water supply provided by the City of Nairobi. Although there are a number of schools in the region, most of them are privately run. There is only one public secondary school, the Precious Girls Secondary School. There are a few supermarkets in Kawangware and two open-air markets where people go to buy farm produce from up-country. Only two main roads in Kawangware are tarred and the others are simply tracks.

From the focus groups conducted, there were different and even contradicting accounts on the antecedents and development of Kawangware. The older residents we interacted with claimed that before 1950, this area was a forest where the Maasai community grazed their animals. However, upon establishment of the Kenya colony, the white settler population displaced the Maasai and used the land for coffee farming. While the white settlers 'owned' the land Africans, mainly from the Kikuyu tribe, worked the farms as labourers. It is also claimed that from 1956, the Kikuyu took over the land from the white settlers. However, upon independence Nairobi rapidly changed from being a controlled colonial city to the easily accessible capital of a young postcolonial state. As more Africans moved to the city in search of better employment opportunities, the Luo, Luhya, and Kamba tribes gradually settled in this area. The rapid rural-urban migration in the early 1970s was obvious from the acute shortage of housing.

To respond to the housing shortage in Kawangware, the Kikuyu started constructing rental houses. We also learnt that from about 1975, people from other tribes started buying land from the Kikuyu landowners and constructed their own houses and homes. According to the residents, Kawangware was notably placid. For example, the assassinations of prominent politicians such as Tom Mboya and John Kariuki or even the aborted *coup d'état* of 1982 and subsequent elections did not trigger any violence. Instructively, the residents argue that it was from the 1992 general elections, that tribalism and political violence were introduced into the day-to-day life experiences of Kawangware. The residents further noted that differences on political issues and the perceived exclusion of other tribes from the benefits of government have made the conflicts and violence in Kawangware more intense and complicated, peaking during campaigns and general elections. In 2008, this violence was at its worst when it took a tribal dimension: the interviewees claim that non-Kikuyu residents mobilised and torched several houses belonging to the Kikuyu in the Kanungaga area of Kawangware.

Kibera

Kibera, also known among the Nubi community as Kibra, is Nairobi's and indeed Kenya's poster slum. It is located five km southeast of the city centre, and covers an area of approximately 225 hectares. Because of its strategic location, it is easy to access Nairobi's industrial area and the Central Business District (CBD) making Kibera a highly competitive location for both the poor and non-poor. The Kenya-Uganda Railway line comes into two areas i.e. upper and lower Kibera and bisects the settlement. Kibera Drive bounds the settlement on the north, to the east lies the Royal Golf Course, Nairobi National Park is down to the south, and Kenya prisons are to the east. Kibera is also a catchment for the Nairobi River and the Nairobi dam. Land ownership is contested. To some, the government owns all the land in Kibera, while to others, particularly of the Nubi community Kibera belongs to the Nubi. The latter support their claim of ownership with documentation from the colonial government. Discussions held in the various focus groups showed that Kibera indeed had a long and rich history. Table 2, summarises the chronology of the key events related to the history of this settlement.

The focus groups showed that violence was an important aspect of Kibera's history. The religious leaders argued that violence was inextricably tied to their past because of the injustice and exploitation of the Nubis, and the perceived treatment of the Nubi community as second-class citizens whose rights were never respected by the government and other tribes that reside in Kibera.

Table 2: A chronology of key events in the history of Kibera

Time	Key events
1924	Nubians great grandparents arrive in Kenya from Sudan, following their support for the British Army in removing Egyptians from Sudan
1930	Nubians settled in Kibra
1940	Kikuyus who were settling in Dagoretti were working on Nubians' farms in Kibra
1943	The Kikuyu farm workers were offered pieces of land in Serang'ombe, Gatwikira
Mid 1950s	The Meru settled in Kibra but working as house-helpers for the Nubians
1960	The Luos, who had been forced out of Kawangware by Kikuyus after a fight broke out between the two ethnic groups over a protest by the Luo people following the death of Tom Mboya, were rescued by the Nubians
1965	Shifta war by the Borana hit in Kibera
1969	First Nubian MP, Mr. Yunis Ali was elected. He was non-partisan
1972	Nubians fought for their land and Asmer Hamber, a Nubian was given document of ownership for the land
1974	Mwangi Mathai become the MP. He invited mostly Kikuyu in Kibra to work with him and the whole governance system was assumed by Kikuyu speakers The Kikuyu forcefully took great portion of land from the Nubians by use of guns and other weapons
1978	A Nandi District Officer by the name Lemmi Lammu was appointed. He invited most of the other tribes also to settle in Kibera Corruption intensified among the chiefs and other leaders who allowed for more land subdivisions
1982	The attempted coup by the air force, suppressed by the army, led to people losing jobs. There was a lot of tension, deaths and food shortages
1992	The introduction of a multi-party political system resulted in the emergence of Saba Saba clashes which led to the declaration of curfews in Kibera
2011	The Nubians are still fighting and have never been issued with land title deeds

Source: Three focus group discussions including: with Imams from Darajani, elders from Laini Saba, and Christian leaders

Mukuru

This settlement is situated about 10 km to the east of the city centre. It is sub divided into eight areas and located in the middle of the main industrial area of the city. The place was an old quarry where most stones that built the factories were excavated leaving huge holes, which today have been converted to a dumping site by the city council of Nairobi. Within the informal settlement, it is widely believed that Mukuru was established in the late 1970s. Accounts from the focus group discussions showed that Mukuru was originally a dormitory for farm labourers for the white settlers. Later, Mukuru became a key port of call for many who left the rural areas for better employment and other opportunities in the growing city of Nairobi. Makeshift homes and other temporary structures were popular housing solutions that continue to serve housing needs even today.

Like the other informal settlements, Mukuru has poor road networks, a scarcity of clean running water, and illegal connection of electricity in most households. Of the eight areas, this study focused on three that included Kayaba, Lunga Lunga and Fuata Nyayo. During the study, three focus groups identified important milestones in the development of Mukuru. This is presented in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Important milestones in the growth of Mukuru

Time	Key events
1970	The first village (Mukuru Kayaba) marked the beginning of a Mukuru settlement
1979	During this period some existing structures were demolished
1980	Philip Leakey and President Moi settled people back in Mukuru. This time, clear demarcations for the settlement were made
1984	More structures were built but a vast dumpsite adjacent to the settlement remained. Toilets were also constructed along the Ngong River banks
1986	There was an outbreak of fire which destroyed most carton-built structures in the settlement
	The first timber structures were built after the January 1986 inferno
1990	The wide bridge constructed over the River Ngong was swept away by storm water when the river flooded in the early 1990s.
1990	In 1990, the area burnt down again. This time the politicians came in and started dividing the area, allocating sections to the people in the community. From then on the residents built their houses using pieces of old corrugated iron sheet, a commonly-used building material.

Source: Three focus group discussions with religious leaders, men, and women in Kayaba

Part 1

City level context of violence

2.1. The national context

2.1.1 The colonial history of segregation

Nairobi was a market place for trade between the Kikuyu and the Maasai communities before the coming of the colonialists. Around 1900 it developed into a travellers' camp. The construction of the Kenya-Uganda Railways brought Nairobi to prominence, initially as a construction camp and later as the capital of the Kenya Colony.

Exclusion of individuals and communities were the hallmarks of colonialism, particularly those who offered resistance to colonial rule. Selective exclusion of individuals and communities worsened as the colonists exploited natural resources, emasculated the Kenyan people, and practised divide and rule. Of local people only a small minority, such as the 'home guards'³, enjoyed partial privileges of colonialism. Historically Kenya was made up of several ethnic-based states that fought over resources, and had various degrees of organisation (Lonsdale, J. 2008). Different levels of marginalisation occurred in colonial times; both geographically, targeting particular communities, and individually, segregating members of the same community. Investment in infrastructure, services and social amenities was focused mainly on parts of the country where the British colonialists lived, and or intended to exploit. The colonialists focused on parts of the country that had rich agricultural land, and on parts that offered strategic interests. This brought disquiet in areas that were largely neglected, like the northern parts of Kenya. Civil service and political representation in colonial times was along ethnic lines, with most small communities represented by people from the dominant tribes, who were initially just handpicked by the colonial administrators (see for example Elkins, 2005).

The colonialists had a great appetite for land, since most of the resources they were pursuing related to land. All public land in the colony was vested in the person of the Queen; it was leased to white farmers, mainly from British aristocratic families, for 999 years (Konyimbi, 2001). Agriculturally productive areas of Central Province and the Rift Valley (the White Highlands) were taken over by the colonialists, accompanied by brutal displacement of 'the natives'.

Kenya's struggle for independence is believed to have been fuelled by conflicts over land, with the Mau Mau movement being formed to help drive the colonialists off Kikuyu land. Mau Mau leaders were systematically assassinated at this time. Larger dimensions of the land conflicts were reflected in the 10-mile coastal strip and in Northern Kenya. The former had been a protectorate of the King of Oman. The attempts of the communities living in these regions to secede from Kenya after independence was partly informed by the fact that majority of the residents were Muslim who were keen to see their regions governed under the Islamic '*sharia*' law.

Nairobi had planned segregation on racial and ethnic lines, with European, Asian and African quarters (See for example Olima, 2003). Recruitment into the civil

³ Home guards were African employees of the colonialists, mainly providing security. In turn they got favours from the colonialists and were always at loggerheads with the local communities, particularly those who were involved in liberation movements.

service and hence residential locations in Nairobi was ethnically determined. This was to enable the colonial administration to control the African populations in the city; including to isolate and remove complete ethnic communities from the city if need be (see Elkins, 2005). This was the case during the Mau Mau movement in the 1950s when many members of the Kikuyu ethnic group were expelled from the city, for purportedly planning rebellion against the colonialists. The colonialist model of governance was based on a 'divide and rule' principle, along racial, tribal and economic lines; leaving Kenya a conflict-filled and divided country.

2.1.2 Violent post-colonial political regimes

Kenya attained independence in 1963, through a negotiated constitution between Kenyan regional leaders and the colonial government. The independence constitution had a government headed by the Prime Minister, Jomo Kenyatta, and multi-party politics, with KANU and KADU being the two most dominant parties. Under the guise of centralisation and nationalism (see Kenyatta, 1968), Kenyatta moved with speed to amend the independence constitution, eliminating the position of the Prime Minister, who was head of government, and introducing an imperial president who was both head of government and head of state, elected as the former but effectively acting as the latter. The new presidency was given sweeping powers and was above the law. Although the amendments did not exclude a multi-party system, Kenyatta, through the emasculation of leaders from other parties, forced them to abandon KADU for Kenyatta's KANU; making Kenya *de facto* a one-party state. Kenyatta's efforts were largely seen as attempts to entrench 'Kikuyu nationalism and cronyism' (Ogot and Ochieng' 1995: 94, in Dimova, 2010).

A disturbing aspect of the way the Kenyatta regime dealt with the consolidation of power was through the elimination of individuals who were seen as strong enough to challenge the government of the day. Kenyatta neutralised the influence of his vice president, Oginga Odinga, by creating eight vice president positions, and later on sacking him altogether from KANU and from government, ostensibly because Odinga was associated with a new political party, KAU. Kenyatta organised what Kajwanja (2005: 55) calls 'the little election of 1966', which got the left-leaning Odinga out of power and politics. Later eliminations from the political scene were more violent than Odinga's ousting. The list of high profile political assassinations during Kenyatta's regime included top politicians Pio Gama Pinto (1965), Tom Joseph Mboya (1969) and JM Kariuki (1975). There were also deaths of politicians through suspicious violent road accidents, which included those of Oruko Makasembo (1964) and Argwings Kodhek (1969).

Moi came to power after Kenyatta's death in 1978 and vowed to follow in the former's footsteps. He made KANU a *de jure* one-party state. Moi's competence in managing a modern state was questionable; and Moi and the KANU regime resisted attempts to change the constitution and management of public affairs, dismissing these as Western propaganda. In 1982 there was an unsuccessful military *coup d'état* against Moi's regime. Many people died as a result. After this Moi moved with speed to concentrate power even more by making Kenya a *de jure* one-party autocracy, where everybody was to belong to the ruling party KANU. Dissent resulted in expulsion from the party and the country; presidential autocracy and party dictatorship reigned supreme. Moi's opponents were detained without trial before being dispatched to political and often economic oblivion.

A number of unresolved political deaths are credited to this regime. These included murders of Members of Parliament and Ministers, Horace Ongili (1980), Echisa Echakara (1980), Robert Ouko (1990), and Paul Ndingi (2000). There were also suspicious deaths from road accidents, like that of former Chief Justice

Kitili Mwendwa (1980), and Moi's fierce critic, Bishop Alexander Muge. The regime also maimed its opponents, like Kenneth Matiba, Charles Rubia, and others who were agitating for political change. There were further quests for multiparty politics in the 1990s and early 2000 (Gimode, 2001). For example on 7 July 1990 in Kamukunji grounds in Nairobi, KANU youths and the police descended on demonstrators agitating for multi-party politics killing 20 people and injuring thousands (Kagwanja, 2005: 51–75).

The political conflicts in the late 1980s and early 1990s were aimed at creating space for people who held dissenting political views; people who were incarcerated by Moi; and those who were pushed out of political life through being alienated by the single party KANU. The conflict was about struggles to restore multi-party democracy by repealing Section 2A of the old constitution (which made Kenya a *de jure* one party state). The government countered these movements with brute force, but eventually gave way, allowing the first multi-party elections in 1992. This also led to the release of political detainees. Through intense divide and rule, and through complex ethnic political games, including the instigation of ethnic violence, the KANU regime managed to remain in power, but with some erosion of the presidential powers. A decade later through small incremental changes to the constitution and through mass dissatisfaction with the KANU rule, the opposition NARC was able to win elections in Kenya in 2002, and Moi, whose term had now been limited by the constitution to 10 years, went into retirement.

The arrival of the opposition did not bring to an end the imperial presidency. Although Mr. Kibaki had promised to make the necessary constitutional reforms that would make the president accountable to the republic, this was not to be: the country saw a new cabal of anti-reformers who enjoyed the unfettered powers around the presidency to peddle influence to their economic advantages. A long process of changing the constitution was put in place. The bone of contention was devolution of power. The Kibaki administration was not very keen on devolution; while sections of the ruling party NARC, led by Raila Odinga, were keener on a weaker presidency with powers devolved to the provinces, and the districts. This political contest on the direction of the country's constitution was taken to a referendum in 2005, where the proposed constitutional amendments by the Kibaki were roundly defeated. Kenya remained with the old constitution, which enabled the president to hand-pick key leaders in all arms of the state, including the managers of the 2007 elections. Although it is largely said that the winner of this election was not clear; what was clear was the president's hand in manipulating the results in his favour, including the announcement that he had won, and the night-time swearing in at State House, Nairobi, sparked off and fuelled the violence, where 1,130 people were murdered and over 600,000 were displaced. It was believed that crimes against humanity were committed which are now the subject of trials at the International Criminal Court at The Hague.

As part of the peace negotiations among the feuding political leaders, the constitutional reforms were resumed. This yielded a new constitution in 2010, which gave Kenyans a number of socio-economic rights. It sought to restore the separation and independence of the organs of state, namely the executive, the judiciary, and the legislature, with each having clear checks and balances, and removing the president's power to hand-pick the leaders of these organs of the state. Fundamentally, it transferred sovereignty of the state from the person of the president to the people of Kenya, in whose name all powers of the state are exercised (Republic of Kenya, 2010).

2.1.3 Political power, and access to land and employment

At independence, the government initiated a process of purchasing previously white-owned farms with a view to redistributing land to those who had lost their land during colonialism. Huge swathes of land were bought all over the country with state resources under this programme. However, this land was not redistributed as was intended; it ended up in the private hands of prominent persons in Kenyatta's administration, led by President Kenyatta himself.

Land issues were compounded by structural continuities over control of land from the colonial to the Kenyatta government. While previously land was vested in the person of the Queen of England, 'the crown', the Kenyatta administration merely exchanged the 'crown' with the 'president', who assumed absolute control over public land (K'Onyimbi, 2001). Syagga, Mitullah & Karirah-Gitau (2001) explain that *'The president...assumed all authority to "make grants or dispositions of any estates, interests or rights in or over un-alienated government land"'. Neither the Constitution nor the Government Lands Act imposes limitations on the president on his powers to allocate public land...'* This resulted in extensive land 'grabs' at the Coast, the Rift Valley, Central Province and Nairobi. Later in 1974 when JM Kariuki died, his death was associated with his struggles to help the landless access land through resettlement schemes.

Beyond land, the Kenyatta administration filled major public appointments with people from his Kikuyu community and opportunities in both public and private sectors were skewed in favour of the Kikuyu (Ogot and Ochieng, 1995).

Kenyatta's legacy of inequity in the distribution of power and resources was already entrenched by the time Moi took over as president in 1978. Moi quickly replaced the Kikuyu with his Kalenjin community members, fuelling further disquiet. He retained Kenyatta's power over land and distributed this to his friends, cronies and tribesmen. Moi actually established two Commissions of Inquiry into the land question: both confirmed what people already knew – that there was a breakdown in land administration, and corruption in land allocation (see Republic of Kenya, 2002).

Inequity in public sector employment was not discussed much under the Kenyatta government, when the Kikuyus dominated the civil service and the private sector; and later in Moi's regime, when these were systematically replaced with Moi's own Kalenjin people. Debate on ethnic access to public sector employment has intensified during Kibaki's presidency. Reports in the media showed that the public are starting to question this disparity in public sector employment. Writing in Standard of 9 April 2011, Kerrow (2011) reports that an ethnicity audit showed that 40 per cent of public sector jobs are held by Kikuyus and Kalenjins (they produced the first three presidents of the country). He reports further, that if one adds three other communities that produced vice presidents from independence, the resulting five communities account for 70 per cent of public sector jobs. The remaining 37 Kenyan communities share 30 per cent of employment in public sector. Ethnicity as a factor in public sector employment was illustrated by the fact that in 2011 over 44 per cent of employees in the president's office are from his Kikuyu backyard; while the Prime Minister office's managed to employ 22 per cent of the staff from his Luo community. There is discontent with perceived and real exclusions of individuals and communities from public sector jobs (Kerrow, 2011).

candidate Hon. Kalonzo Musyoka as Vice President on 9 January 2008. The third phase came after the killing of the late Embakasi MP, the Hon Melitus Mugabe Were on 29 January 2008 in Nairobi's Woodley Estate (Kenya National Commission of Human Rights Report, 2008).

There were large demonstrations in the CBD because the police focused on Uhuru Park grounds and in the slums and took longer to respond to calls on rowdy youths in the CBD (Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, 2008). Information available with the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (2008) indicates that initial violence appeared to target the Kikuyu in areas where they were a minority and they in turn organised attacks in areas where they were a majority. Once the violence broke out, looting, destruction of property and arson became rampant, forcing people to move to their "ethnic enclaves" perceived as safe, as tribally-aligned gangs took over and controlled neighbourhoods.

The violence was also characterised by forceful displacement and evictions. Areas such as Dandora and Mathare North saw deep-seated rent disputes escalating to violence. Some tenants took the opportunity provided by the post-election chaos to evict landlords and started paying reduced rents. The National Security Intelligence Report (Government of Kenya, 2008ii) shows that new rounds of violence ensued when the owners hired gangs to reclaim their property. An attempt in February 2008 by police to evict people who had illegally occupied other peoples' houses resulted in another series of violence with the '*Taliban*', a gang of youths from the Luo tribe.

In an interview with the Director of Kenyatta National Hospital (2008), the Kenya Human Rights Commission found that 61 people were treated for gun shots wounds at the facility. He was quoted:

What I can say is that a lot of gunshot wounds came from Kibera, Mathare, Kariobangi and Dandora. Those areas had a great number of patients. 61 patients out of 462 contributed to a percentage that was 13 per cent.

A report by the Human Rights Watch (2008) indicates that police in Nairobi also shot demonstrators under circumstances that were clearly unjustified. The report indicates that some local human rights workers in one area of Kibera slum recorded nine people shot dead by police and 19 injured between 27 December 2007 and 10 January 2008. In Mathare, residents reported that people were shot dead and bodies dumped in the Nairobi River⁴. The Independent Medical and Legal Unit⁵ reported that around 50 bodies in Nairobi mortuaries in the first half of January, dead from gunshot wounds, were most likely killed by the police.

The use of live bullets in Kibera and Mathare slums caused the death of or injury to many innocent people. One woman was hit in the chest at 8 a.m. in the morning on 31 December as bullets came through the wall⁶ of her home. Another man in Kibera was shot and killed the same day when he opened the door of his home to see what was going on. As a worker at the local mosque told Human Rights Watch:

On 31 December 2007 at 9 a.m. on Karanja Road, I was carrying wounded people who had been shot by police. A young man opened the door of his

⁴ Human Rights Interviews, Nairobi, 9 January 2008.

⁵ A respected Kenyan human rights NGO comprising doctors and lawyers

⁶ Slum dwellings are made of wood, sacking, and tin sheets, easily pierced by bullets.

house to see what was going on. Police aimed at him and shot at him three times. The first two missed, but the third bullet got him⁷.

The Human Rights Watch also documented cases of policemen hurling canisters of tear gas into families' homes in Nairobi slums; a strategy clearly unconnected to the controlling of crowds or protecting life and property. As one witness told Human Rights Watch:

I saw two men shot in the leg by policemen around 9 a.m. on 1 January 2008.... The policemen were threatening people to get out of the way and firing tear gas, they were also firing tear gas into houses; many children were affected, coughing and so on.

2.2.2 Violent crime in the city

There are no comprehensive records of violence for Kenya or even for the city of Nairobi. Most of the records of violence in Nairobi are criminal records: these are records of physical criminal violence. Galtung (1999: 10-12 in Gimode 2001) defines crimes as '*overt and covert physical and psychological injuries against other people*'. These include homicide, armed robberies, car jerking (car-jacking), murder, manslaughter, rape, etc. Nairobi records do not cover what Galtung (1999: 10-12 in Gimode 2001) calls psychological violence, which includes lies, threats, brainwashing, etc.

There was an upsurge of crime in Nairobi starting in the 1980s. This was also the case nationally. This comprised muggings on the streets, bank robberies, car jerking, etc. This wave was because of interrelated socio-economic and political factors. Not only was the country going through hard economic times, complete with IMF structural adjustment programmes, but the 1980s also represented the country's worst political times (Gimode, 2001: 299). This trend continued into the 1990s.

Police records show that crimes were quite varied in type and target. There were assassinations and kidnappings; bank robberies; muggings; car jerkings (jacking) and home robberies. Crime targeting high profile persons and business were predictably given more coverage in the press and police reports.

The Daily Nation of 15 September 1993 reported the gunning down of top UN official, Rietzel Nielson in cold blood. In August 1995, the principal of the Japanese School in Nairobi was shot dead (Weekly Review, 22 December). In that year, armed gangsters raided the Indian High Commissioner's residence, the Malawi High Commissioner's Residence and the Pakistan High Commissioner's, residence, stealing goods of unknown value. Armed thugs also shot a British diplomat, Graeme Gibson (Weekly Review December 1995) in the same year. President Moi is said to have argued that the violence was politically instigated by foreign governments to destabilise his government (Gimode, 2001: 299-304).

Bank robberies were common in Nairobi in the 1970s but had virtually disappeared by the 1980s (Gimode, 2001: 305). They resumed in the 1990s. Notable among these were:

⁷ Human Rights Watch interview (name withheld), Nairobi, 10 January 2008

- August 1994 robbery of Standard Chartered Bank, on Kimathi Avenue, in which one thug was killed (Weekly Review 2 September 1994, in Gimode 2001: 305);
- August 1994 robbery of Housing Finance Corporation;
- October 1996 Kirinyaga Street was blockaded by robbers who proceeded to rob shops along the entire street;
- 5 January 1997 robbery of Kenya Airfreight Handling of one million US dollars belonging to City Bank;
- 12 September 1998 robbery of Greenland Forex Bureau in City Centre (Weekly Review 12 September, in Gimode 2001: 305);
- February 1997 robbery of Standard Chartered Bank of about 2 million US\$; and
- 14 September 1997 robbery of Cargo Service Centre of about 3 million US\$ (Weekly Review 18 September 1997, in Gimode 2001).

This spate of robberies brought to question the capacity of Kenya police to deal with violent crime in the city (Daily Nation, 17 October 1996, in Gimode 2001: 306). In 1999 Government admitted that levels of crime in Nairobi were unacceptably high, attributing this to an influx of firearms from war-torn Somalia (Kenya Times, 21 April 1999).

Police records also show that car jerking peaked around 1992 and 1993. 2013 cars were stolen in 1992; 804 of them were recovered. The first nine months of 1993 recorded 2748 car jerkings; only 499 vehicles were recovered. Forty per cent of the robberies occurred at gunpoint (Daily Nation 15 December 1993, in Gimode 2001: 307).

The 1990s also showed a marked increase in home robberies. The Daily Nation reported the increase in violence, and the fact that some of these crimes were perpetrated by people known to the victims who feared reporting. There were claims the police were colluding with criminals or were unable to do anything about these events. This type of crime also targeted high-profile Asian businessmen. For example, there was the kidnapping at home and subsequent murder of bank owner (Imperial Bank) Abdulkarim Popat, in 1999. Another one was the murder of Pritam Singh Sandhu at his Lavington home on 19 March 1999.

Table 4: Comparative crime statistics

Year	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Murder	1001	981	902	999	1071	1536	1517	1603	1565	1167	1642
Rape	420	465	500	515	543	590	589	650	758	1224	1050
Offence against person	1502	1407	1493	1468	400	274	1363	326	357	2213	2601
Robbery	5751	5833	5697	6842	7406	10197	9242	8804	8571	5904	7465
Break-ins	14415	15539	14920	15231	15421	18445	16867	16067	12952	11204	12619
Other penal code crimes	10051	9230	14632	16909	20055	16651	16651	17540	15893	10510	9580

Source: After Gimode 2001.

We observe that there was a convergence between economic development of the country, political repression and conflicts, and levels of crime. These build up in the 1970s and 1980s and clearly peak in the 1990s. It is also interesting to note that this period between 1990 and 2000 is also the period of unprecedented criminal gang activity. Although the agenda of these gangs remain fuzzy, they are clearly linked with politicians and political processes. The common ones in the Kenyan scene include the Maasai *Morans*, the Kalenjin *Warrits*, the Kisii *Chinkororo*, the Kuria's *Sungu Sungu*, and *Kaya Mbombo* from the Coast, the Luo's *Talibans* and the Kikuyu's *Mungiki*. These murderous gangs claimed more than 3000 lives and displaced about half a million Kenyans between 1991 and 1998 (see Kagwanja, 2001; Kagwanja, 2001, 51-75; and Anderson 2002, 531-535). The politicians use them to intimidate their opponents, to maim and to murder.

The gangs have political, ethnic, and economic interests, that are all intertwined as Kagwanja (2001) details in his paper '*Power to Uhuru: Youth identity and generational politics in Kenya's 2002 elections*'. Kagwanja (2001) traces the origins of *Mungiki* in the politico-cultural context of the Kikuyu community long before independence, and suggests that the youth rebellion for generational change was always part and parcel of Kikuyu culture (Kagwanja 2005: 61). He notes that the *Mungiki* endorsement of the politician Uhuru Kenyatta for presidency was informed more by this agenda for generational change, rather than ethnic politics *per se* (*ibid*: 63). What is clear is that the gang was and is still linked with politicians. This is the link that made the then Attorney General, Mr. Amos Wako accuse the police of dereliction of duty, when it came to dealing with this gang (*ibid*: 63).

On the economic agenda of the *Mungiki*, Kagwanja argues that the main source of *Mungiki* funds before the 2003 elections was from politicians. After the elections this stream of income reduced, hence the need for the *Mungiki* to explore other options for finances. *Mungiki* were financed by politicians; and this was tailing off after the opposition NARC came to power in 2003, hence the need for the group to diversify their income sources. In Nairobi, for example, the sect controlled *matatu* (public transport) routes to Huruma, Kayole, Dandora and Kariobangi. They also controlled routes outside the city. Kagwanja reports that the sect made at least US\$2,500 per day as fees from these routes (Kagwanja, 2005: 68). They made additional money by offering 'forced' security in such city estates as Mathare, Mlango Kubwa, Kwa Teresa, etc. He further suggests that *Mungiki* were associated with high level crimes of car-jerking and bank robberies (*ibid*: 70).

Gang activities have specific tipping points depending on whether they are political, economic or criminal. Political conflicts relating to the gangs tend to tip into violence during political campaigns, and the resultant violence manifests itself in fights between opposing gangs, often with a political patron, also between gangs and law enforcement officers, or through violent demonstrations that are often accompanied by looting and harassment of the public. Economic gang conflicts tend to tip into violence during efforts to restore law and order in areas that have been taken over by gangs, who not only charge the residents exorbitant amounts of money ostensibly to offer services, yet become the problem as they subvert all attempts to offer these services. Gang members have caused insecurity to justify the need for them to offer such services. They often cut water and power supplies to various sections of the city, again to justify their illegal supply of these services. The violence takes the form of fights between law enforcement agencies and the gangs, between legitimate service providers and gangs. Criminal aspects of gang activity, like those of *Mungiki*, *Taliban*, the *Sungu Sungu*, tend to spill into widespread violence triggered by either the arrest of

leaders or the capture or death of criminals in the hands of law enforcement agencies. The resultant violence mainly takes the form of grisly murders of innocent citizens in retaliation. For example, on 5 January 2003 the *Mungiki* gang killed 10 people in Nakuru town. The police came to intervene and in the resulting confrontation, 50 more people were killed (See Profile: Kenya's Secretive Mungiki Sect. BBC, 11 February 2003 in Kagwanja, 2005: 65). Table 5 below shows some tipping points of gang conflicts.

Table 5: Criminal gang activities tipping into violence

Conflict	Tipping point	Violence
Political – clientelism; patronage	Campaigns for elections.	Fights between opposing gang members; or between gang members and supporters for opposing candidates.
Economic	Restoring order in service provision through legitimate force.	Fights with legally registered groups; and law enforcement agencies to control service provision; violent demonstrations.
Criminal	Arrest or death of criminals in the hands of law enforcement agencies.	Violent retaliatory murders of often innocent citizens.

Source: Authors


2.3 Socio-economic / spatial aspects of conflicts and violence in Nairobi

Aside from political and criminal violence in the city of Nairobi discussed in the previous section, there are many other types of conflict and violence in the city. These conflicts and violence are around socio-economic issues, and in many cases have a spatial dimension. They include conflicts over housing and land; conflicts that are a result of inequity in access to socio-spatial infrastructure; conflicts because of socio-economic exclusion, etc. The cause and solution to such conflicts are intertwined with the governance and management of the city, which is discussed next.

2.3.1 Conflicting administrative and governance system of the city

The city of Nairobi is divided into eight political constituencies, which follow the same boundaries as administrative divisions. They are: Makadara, Kamukunji, Starehe, Langata, Dagoretti, Westlands, Kasarani and Embakasi. The administrative divisions are further divided into 75 wards. The highest unit of governance is the City Council led by the Mayor, while the lowest is the ward represented by a councillor. Councillors are elected directly, while the Mayor and Chairmen of Departments are elected from among the councillors. The Chief Executive Officer of the city, the Town Clerk, is a civil servant appointed by the Minister of Local Government (see the Administrative structure in Figure 3 below)

Figure 3: Organisation structure of the City Council of Nairobi



Source: Ministry of Local Government

Decision-making processes by the city council are bureaucratic and non-participatory although limited consultations occur on minor projects through Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plans (LASDAPs)⁸. Inadequate participation limits the effectiveness of governance and affects service delivery and the distribution of resources in the city. Only a few organised, and well-resourced groups use up the spaces for consultation within the city. These include associations such as Nairobi Central Business District Association (NCBDA) and Karen-Langata Neighbourhood Association (KARENGATA). Other players in the management of the city include National Government Ministries that have a mandate to deal with local authority issues, e.g. Ministries of Local Government (MOLG), Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Ministry of Lands and from 2008 the Ministry of the Nairobi Metropolitan.

The provision of basic infrastructure such as roads, water, sewerage and street lighting was initially entirely the role of the city council. The council also provided basic services, including: education, healthcare, transportation, housing and waste collection. The council met a lot of challenges in providing these, ranging from management and governance issues, through staffing challenges to lack of funds: *the unfunded mandate*. Some of these responsibilities have since been moved from the council to national government-run corporations, like the Kenya Urban Roads Authority that manages the city roads, and the Nairobi Water and Sewer Company that provides water and sanitation to the city.

The main sources of finance for the city council of Nairobi include revenue collections, land rates and grants from the central government through Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF). In addition to the aforementioned, the council receives donor grants to facilitate the implementation of some development initiatives such as slum upgrading programmes. Other programmes within the

⁸ Participation in LASDAPs is a mandatory requirement of the Local Authority Transfer Fund Act number 8 of 1998.

city, on infrastructure, housing, education, security, etc. are national government programmes financed directly through national ministries.

The administrative system described above is ridden with a number of conflicts. First is the invisible hand of the national government in the management of city affairs. Although the city administration is meant to manage the city on a day-to-day basis, the Office of the President, the Department of Provincial Administration has a parallel structure for management of the city. For example: the wards are politically led by councillors who are elected; but there are also chiefs from the Provincial Administration managing these areas. The chiefs do not answer to the elected leaders but to the district officers, in charge of administrative districts. Although administrative districts correspond to constituencies, represented by Members of Parliament, there is no mechanism for aligning the work of the district officers, with the work of the Members of Parliament. Further, civil servants working in City Hall are under the Ministry of Local Government, creating tension between them and elected leaders in City Hall, namely the Mayor and the councillors. Lack of refinement of the governance and management system is not only rife with conflicts, but weakens the city's ability to deal with its internal conflicts and violence, which we continue to discuss in the subsequent sections.

The conflicts emanating from governance and administration of the city tip into violence for various reasons, especially during acts of enforcement of regulations, with the political leadership at loggerheads with the administration. In informal areas, there are traders, informal settlers, etc, who squat on public land. In many instances, attempts by the council to enforce development control in such areas are often met with resistance not only by the local people but also by their leaders, the Councillors. Many formal traders, city residents, and council officers feel that informal traders should be removed as they flout council trading regulations. However, they are tolerated for a number of reasons from political patronage to a legitimate claim to citizenship and a right to earn a living. Occasionally, for all sorts of reasons, e.g. important international meetings, the traders are evicted from the CBD as part of the CBD cleansing. This causes the conflict to tip into widespread violence characterised by running battles between council *askaris* [police] and the traders.

2.3.2 Land conflicts and violence in Nairobi

After the 2007/8 post-election violence, it was agreed that the unresolved issues around land was one of the major factors that fuelled the post-election violence, hence the need to deal with these terminally. The government had put in place the land policy process and many principles about land have been entrenched into the new Constitution of the Republic (Republic of Kenya, 2010). The new constitutional provisions are meant to deal with historical injustices around access, use, and disposal of public, private and community land (Republic of Kenya, 2010). Chapter Five of the Constitution (Republic of Kenya, 2010) attempts to carefully navigate the need to protect private land to ensure that investments and investors are protected, while at the same time protecting public and community land from speculators.

The dual manifestation of the land problem in Nairobi is in evictions and insecurity of tenure. The challenges range from persons with vested interests in public and private land, which they use illegally to their socio-economic advantage. In terms of social reproduction, there are perpetual squatters on public land whose tenure has not been secured. This has led to cases where individuals have squatted on public land for more than a century without being able to secure their tenure, as is the case with the Nubian population in the Kibera area. In some settlements

people have squatted for over 50 years, without their tenure being recognised, a case in point is Kiambiyu (Omenya, 2006). The situation is the same in most informal settlements in the city, making it difficult for either the state or the residents to improve these areas and make them liveable.

This informality and lack of security of tenure has been used by politicians to entrench themselves in power, thereby generating conflicts and violence. Systematic displacement of communities that are seen as hostile to a candidate running for election, to land grabbing and illegal resettlement of communities that back particular politicians, are rampant in Nairobi. Politicians are also known to use squatters to protect illegally-allocated public land. 'Clientele' relationships are rife between politicians and the squatters, where depending on the period, the politicians would either lead in demanding that the squatters be granted tenure security, and fight against evictions, or even plan land invasions, in exchange for votes.

Conflicts around land tend to tip into violence during enforcement of land use regulations, involving forced evictions. The resultant violence takes various forms — from fights between structure owners and tenants, through fights between local authority officers and tenants, to fights among the provincial administration, structure owners and tenants.

2.3.3 Housing conflicts and violence in Nairobi

Land and housing are intertwined, especially for the poor in the city. They are also major causes of conflicts. Housing conditions in Nairobi are still poor. Only 19 per cent of residents live in homes built with permanent materials (The World Bank, 2006). Only 12 per cent of slums have house walls made up of permanent materials, 45 per cent live in homes with corrugated iron walls, and 98 per cent have tin roofs over their heads (Government of Kenya, 2009). Eighteen per cent of city residents are home owners; 82 per cent are rent payers; 92 per cent of the slum dwellers are rent paying, yet only 3.6 per cent have formal agreements with their landlords; thus landlord/tenant conflict is a major cause of violence in Nairobi.

Lack of space and its poor quality is another source of housing conflict in Nairobi. While the city has an occupancy rate of 1.6 persons per room, informal settlements have an occupancy rate of 2.6 persons per room (*ibid*). The quality of housing is also affected by residential densities, which vary widely in the city. While high income neighbourhoods like Karen and Muthaiga have densities of four persons per hectare, lower income neighbourhoods like Kibira and Korogocho have densities of up to 800 persons per hectare (Huchzermeyer 2011).

Kenya has a huge housing deficit, with the housing shortage running into millions of units. The problem is more acute in Nairobi where the government stopped providing housing. The state has also failed to deal with supply factors for housing production, namely, planned land, appropriate finance, affordable materials and technology, skilled labour and pragmatic building regulations. The market has largely supplied high and middle-income housing, leaving the low-income to fend for themselves. Attempts by the poor to house themselves are generally criminalised through outdated planning and building regulations, limiting planning potential and improvement of these informal areas. A few slum upgrading programmes have been started in the city, e.g. Mathare 4A project, Kibera Soweto pilot of the Kenya National Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP), and the Korogocho infrastructure and services upgrading. Although the government is a key partner in these programmes, it is instructive that all these initiatives have been motivated by the country's development partners.

Nevertheless, the initiatives do not address the limitations in the legal framework for improvement of informal settlements.

Poor supply of low income housing has resulted in housing being very costly for the poor, deeply eroding their incomes, and compromising the basic quality of their lives. Resources that could have been spent on livelihood, on basic goods and services, like food and education, are now being spent on shelter and transport. It is instructive that those who cannot access basic housing in the city of Nairobi account for more than 50 per cent of the population. They occupy relatively small areas of the city; some experts estimate this at about five per cent of the land area of the city, where they live in dangerous slums and squatter settlements, and watch the rest of the city living in relatively affluent neighbourhoods (Syagga, Mitullah & Karirah-Gitau, 2001; see also Olima, 2003). It does not help that even in these crowded slums and informal settlements the poor still have to pay rents to slumlords who 'own' over 90 per cent of the informal structures. Tenants are prevented from improving their structures since the slum lords themselves do not own the land on which their structures stand. This produces conflict-filled situations ranging from fights between local leaders and the administration, fights between security forces allied to the Provincial Administration and the residents, and fights between the tenants and the landlords, among others. These conflicts take economic, political, even ethnic lines depending on the time of the conflict and the actors involved.

Housing conflicts are tipped into violence due to arbitrary increases in rents, refusal to pay rents and political incitement not to pay rents during elections. Refusal to pay rent or eviction of the non-paying tenant tends to be the actual tipping point of this type of conflict. The resultant violence takes different forms in different informal neighbourhoods in Nairobi. For example in Kibera it tends to take the form of fights between the renters and the local militia, *siafu*; or fights between Luo (renters) and Kikuyu (structure owners) ethnic groups.

Conflicts around tenure insecurity tend to tip into violence during evictions, or in some instances during housing repairs by renters which is often interpreted to mean that the renters are intent on displacing the structure owners; the latter's tenure is often insecure. The violence takes the form of forced eviction using thugs, or mysterious fires that burn sections of the slum. Occasionally, widespread fights result between renters and hired eviction teams.

Contested ownership of land and slum housing pits long-term residents (who tend to lay claim to the land and housing in their neighbourhoods) against various individuals and/or companies who would have been allocated land formally or informally. Sometimes groups of well-organised squatters invade land and settle there, laying claim to it. Again, evictions are normally the tipping point that pits the invaders and eviction gangs, local authority police, the Administration Police, etc into violent confrontations.

2.3.4 Consequences of socio-economic exclusion: conflicts and violence

A rapid increase in population has been seen in Nairobi since the pre-independence period. Nairobi's population grew from 8,000 in 1901 to 118,579 in 1948. By 1962, the city had a population of 343,500 people, although some of this growth could be attributed to the extension of the city's boundaries. Between 1948 and 1962 censuses, the population grew at an average rate of 5.9 per cent a year. CBS *et al.* (2004) documented the changes in the population size of Nairobi from the past censuses as follows: 827,775 in 1979, 1,324,570 in 1989, and 2,143,254 in 1999 and from the latest national population census (2009) it stands at 3,138,369 people with a growth rate of 4.1 per cent annually. This

gives the city at present a density of 4509 persons per km². The city has 985,016 households. The city is made up of 1,605,230 males and 1,533,139 females. Nairobi reflects the national ethnic composition dominated by the big ethnic groups – Kikuyu (6,622,576); Luhya (5,338,666); Kalenjin (4,967,328); Luo (4,044,440); and Kamba (3,893,157). The religious profile of the city's population is also a reflection of the national picture, where Christians make up 80 per cent of the population, followed by Muslims 10 per cent, members of other religions eight per cent, and with only two per cent saying they have no religion (Government of Kenya, 2009).

Seventy-eight per cent of adult slum dwellers have completed primary school and 92 per cent of school-going-age children are enrolled in schools (the World Bank, 2006): 155,936 children attend pre-primary schools; 490,314 attend primary schools; 176,837 and 69,345 attend secondary schools and universities respectively (Government of Kenya, 2009).

The city employs about 25 per cent of the national employed population (43 per cent of all urban workers in Kenya) (UN-Habitat, 2010). Nairobi is a major contributor to Kenya's economy, generating over 45 per cent of GDP (*ibid*). A quarter of the city's labour force is employed in the formal sector, while the informal sector accounts for 75 per cent. In the city, 73 per cent of slum dwellers live below the international poverty line (i.e. earn less than US\$1.25 a day) (The World Bank, 2006). This implies that over 40 per cent of those with employment in the city live below the poverty line; this is only possible because minimum wages are not respected or observed in the informal sector, casual jobs, household enterprises, and so on where these people are employed. They do not have job security; they do not have contracts; they do not have rights. They are left to deal with the conflicts that emanate from these problematic employment conditions.

The employment situation described above is worsening. Economic conditions are deteriorating much faster for Nairobi's residents than the national trend. For example, the proportion of people living below the poverty line in Nairobi increased from 26 per cent in 1992 to 50 per cent in 1997, to the current estimates of 73 per cent. The richest 10 per cent of the population of Nairobi accounts for 45.2 per cent of the city's income. The poorest 10 per cent accounts for only 1.6 per cent of the city's income. Forty six per cent of young people and 49 per cent of women are unemployed. Despite talk of economic equity, this is yet to have an impact. Nairobi remains economically very unequal with a *gini* coefficient of 0.57 slightly above the national average of 0.55 (UN-Habitat (2010). Despite being the major employer, little has been done to improve job creation and working conditions for the majority of the city's residents.

2.4 Transformations and linkages: the challenge of violence chains in Nairobi

The question that comes through this analysis is whether Nairobi residents suffer a variety of different forms of violence, or a small range of forms of violence, which are manifested differently, depending on the actors and circumstances? Are the conflicts and resultant violence what they appear to be? For example, why would somebody fight another simply because they come from a different ethnic group?

Temporal patterns of conflicts and violence in Nairobi is very telling. Socio-economic conflicts and violence over land, housing and employment, manifested as landlord/tenant conflicts tend to take place when there is no election. However, during elections the landlord/tenant conflicts emerge as ethnic conflicts or as

political conflicts between contesting political parties. Criminal gang activities also seem to escalate during elections, when they take on a more political and ethnic direction; as opposed to between elections, when their focus is extortion and violent crimes, such as robbery with violence.

We know from this study that most of the conflicts in Nairobi are interrelated, and show themselves in particular ways depending on spatial and temporal circumstances and on the actors and agents involved. Indeed various typologies of conflicts and violence in Nairobi are linked. Our interest in this study is to find what links the various types of conflict in Nairobi. We know that the linkages in the conflict chains are actors, time and space. Key actors not only link various types of conflict but also help the conflicts transform from one typology to another. For example, landlord/tenant conflicts are transformed into ethnic conflicts mainly by political leaders and criminals from particular ethnic groups. The actions of these two groups of actors enrich day-to-day conflicts, which then flare up as widespread violence. A case in point was the landlord/tenant conflict in Kibera over rent. The then president Moi got involved and suggested that landlords should not increase rents. This was backed up by the area MP Raila Odinga, a Luo. The result was large-scale violence between the Luos (mainly tenants) and the Kikuyu (mainly landlords). The involvement of the two politicians turned landlord/tenant conflict into a political and ethnic conflict.

Politicians and criminal gangs have been able to shift conflicts, transform them and cause them to tip into various types of violence. The two actors shift day-to-day socio-economic conflicts by representing these as political and ethnic problems. Vigilantes, like the Taliban and Mungiki in Nairobi, and the political parties, pose as though they have the power to address these conflicts, including replacing political leaders through bullet or ballot. They misrepresent the conflicts as ethnic, and rarely do they acknowledge that the conflicts may be because of larger inequities in access to socio-economic opportunities, infrastructural amenities and services.

In Nairobi, economic exclusion implies that a lot of people cannot access appropriate land and housing, leaving them in areas that not only have poor and dangerous housing; but also wholly inadequate housing which they still have to pay for. Because of planning requirements, these areas are excluded from infrastructure provision and social services, e.g. roads, schools, hospitals, police, etc. Thus conflict situations, with all sorts of triggers, tip into violent outbursts. And, again, there is an association with election cycles and how politicians and individuals use these highly enriched conflicts to their advantage, mainly by presenting them as ethnic conflicts.

Part 2

Evidence from the sub-city

3.1 Types of violence

Using the Kiswahili language, distinguishing the concepts of conflict and violence was problematic. In some cases, conflict – which in Kiswahili was variously expressed as: *mapigano*, *vita*, *mapambano*, *ugomvi*, *mgongano*, *mzozo*, *vurugu*, and *mgogoro* – also referred to violence. Operationally, the discussions tended to use the ideas of conflict and violence interchangeably. However, there was consensus in the groups on using the aspects of intensity and impact as possible ways of distinguishing between these concepts. From the discussions, six main types of violence emerged. These included: religious, ethnic/tribal, tenant/landlords, political, domestic, and economic.

Table 6: Matrix of perceptions of the most prevalent violence

Types of violence	Kawangware* percentage	Kibera** percentage	Mukuru*** percentage	Average
Political	26	32	19	26
Domestic	10	20	28	19
Tribal/ethnic	17	22	15	18
Economic (esp. robbery)	27	12	16	18
Tenant/landlord	20	10	18	16
Religious	0	4	4	3
Total	100	100	100	100

Sources:

* Kawangware data from listing, grouping and ranking in 12 focus groups

** Kibera data from listing, grouping and ranking in 23 focus groups

*** Mukuru data from listing, grouping and ranking in 13 focus groups

Overall, across the three areas, the types of violence were ranked according to their perceived prevalence with political being seen as the most prevalent, followed by domestic, tribal/ethnic, economic, tenant/landlord, and lastly religious. It was not a homogenous picture for looking at Table 6 there are a handful of 'notable' differences in the rankings:

- 1) Political violence in Kibera receives the highest ranking across all types of violence in all three areas: 32 per cent.
- 2) In Kibera this political ranking is over two and a half times that given to economic violence 12 per cent, whereas in Kawangware almost the same ranking is given to political and economic violence ie 26 and 27 per cent respectively.
- 3) In Mukuru the high level of domestic violence at 28 per cent is remarkable, especially with the Mukuru score for political violence being down at 19 per cent, so considerably less. This is also in contrast to the score for domestic violence in Kawangware at 10 per cent.
- 4) Economic violence is ranked high in Kawangware at 27 per cent, especially when seen alongside the Kibera 12 per cent ranking.

In Mukuru, ranking below the high 28 per cent for domestic violence the other types are bunched together, so tribal, economic, tenant/landlord, and political

violence ran at 15, 16, 18, and 19 per cent respectively. In all the three settlements, tribal/ethnic violence was seen to be significant, as was economic violence, also at an 18 per cent average.

Table 6 also shows that while religious violence was the least significant, some importance was attached to this category in Kibera and Mukuru.

What constitutes each of the above types of violence was context-specific. While Table 6 presents a partial even though important view of the different perceptions of conflicts and violence at the sub-city level, there were also considerable similarities as will be shown presently.

3.1.1 Religious

In the focus groups and from some of the interviews, religious conflicts are caused by differences in beliefs. The differences mainly between Christians and Muslims were considered mundane. When these differences escalated, they noted, there were cases of churches being burnt down so that mosques could be constructed. During a focus group discussion with the peace committee of the Makina area, one of the participants said:

In the case of the Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA) church Karanja Road, Muslim youths burnt down the church, and currently there stands a mosque on the same foundation (spot) where the church once stood. Unfortunately, the burning and looting took place under the watchful eye of the Police and the District Officers who could not do anything about it (Makina Peace Committee, personal communication, 24 March 2011).

The discussions also revealed that youth groups play a critical role in escalating religious differences to dangerously violent levels. To support the enormity of the importance of religious conflicts and violence, one of the key informants told of seven church properties that were vandalised and burnt during the 2008 post election violence in Kibera, these were:

PCEA church Karanja Road;
Korean Church at Toi market;
Lutheran Church along Kibera drive;
AIC church at Olympic bus stage;
PCEA in Gatwekera;
PCEA church Sihlangu; and
African Divine Church in Makina Village.

Leadership struggles and disputes was the other dimension of religious violence. The residents acknowledged the existence of conflicts in church leadership. A resident from Congo in Kawangware attributed this to individualism, saying, "*...If everyone wants to be a leader, how can there not be violence?*" (E. Khavere, personal communication, 20 March 2011).

3.1.2 Ethnic/tribal

Ethnic/tribal conflicts occur among people of different tribes that live together. Although a range of factors could cause ethnic or tribal violence, there was a strong convergence from all the focus group discussions that suggested that politicians and political conflicts played a vital role in flaming passions that fuelled violence between different tribes. Ethnic/tribal violence was arguably the most common type of violence in Kawangware, Kibera, and Mukuru. But this was mainly among the Kikuyu, Luos, Luhya, and Nubi communities. The Kikuyu, Luos,

and Luhyas were protagonists in the violence in all the settlements while the Nubi community seemed to figure only in Kibera.

To demonstrate the insidiousness of ethnic/tribal violence, a participant in a focus group discussion with the Reconciliation and Peace Building Committee in the Gatwekera area in Kibera remarked:

Our leaders at the local level, for example in Gatwekera, are the biggest cause of tribal violence. If you had a problem with a Luo resident and complained to the chief, since the chiefs, with exception of only one, are Luos, the chief will shamelessly conduct the discussions in the Luo language. Even before you intervene, you are told the matter will just end (Focus group at Serang'ombe)

Influential politicians who incite their communities against other opposing communities creating bad blood among communities living together in Kibera informal settlement also cause ethnic/tribal violence. Tribalism was said to have risen a notch higher by influencing school children to an extent that they identify their classmates along tribal blocks and even abuse each other. Residents across the three settlements were concerned that this situation was worsening as negative attitudes and stereotypical notions of persons of different ethnic groups were being nurtured among children in school. One of the participants in the groups sadly related an account of a child in lower primary school that was admonishing the other thus: *"...nyinyi wakikuyu ndiyo mliiba kura"*, literally meaning that the other child was from the tribe that stole votes in the 2007 elections that resulted in the unfortunate 2008 Post Election Violence (PEV).

Tribal based politics where politicians draw on their filial and tribal relations to compete for political positions, the youth argued, was another important consideration in ethnic and tribal violence. By drawing on tribal and family relations, competitive politics invariably sets different ethnic groups against one another. Young people in Kanungaga strongly believed that such politics results in political violence.

3.1.3 Tenant/landlord

Tenant/landlord violence was said to occur when landlords and structure owners forcibly and unjustifiably evict tenants; and also when the tenants refuse to pay the actual amount of rent as agreed between them and the landlord. There was an emerging convergence from the focus groups that the antecedents of tenant/landlord conflicts and violence was the 1998 presidential decree that urged tenants not to pay any rent to owners of structures built out of carton boxes. The groups added that since 1998, landlords have increasingly adopted ruthless means to evict 'troublesome' tenants including those who default on payment of rent. In a focus group discussion in Kianda in Kibera, one of the participants reflexively observed:

From that time in 1998 when President Moi came here things have not been the same. Moi said there was no reason to pay rent for carton boxes. That was an open licence for free housing. Many, especially in Gatwekera, have refused to pay rent. When the owners try to evict them, it is complete mayhem. Some owners have been more innovative; they bribe the chiefs and police who then hire gangs to burn and evict some tenants. Of course these evictions are bloody and violent. But tenants still insist on not paying rent (Anonymous, personal communication, 23 March 2011).

The residents also indicated that the struggle for political supremacy invariably leads to situations where tenants allied to Members of Parliament and other

powerful politicians refuse to pay for their rents since they have political protection. In a focus group with the Peace Committee in Kibera, it was argued that in 2001, President Moi and the area MP, Raila Odinga encouraged landlords to reduce the rents by half. The encouragement by these politicians only worsened the tensions between tenants and structure owners as more tenants stopped paying rents. In Kawangware and Mukuru, the provincial administration, particularly the chief's office, was said to play an active role in fanning tenant/landlord conflicts and violence.

3.1.4 Political

Political violence includes negative and hate speech, incitements, and reckless behaviour from politicians during campaigns and rallies. Regrettably, the articulation of hate speech and others was invariably contextualised along ethnic lines, preferences and stereotypes. In these settlements, the legendary Kikuyu/Luo rivalries – and competition for political and economic power, typified political conflict and violence. Members of these two ethnic groups passionately propound and defend their positions and interests including using violence. A former councillor argued that nothing could stop political conflict and violence:

Conflict and violence is a must, it is part of the political culture. It is not that we are always fighting. It is our way of saluting each other. We do this aggressively. Sometimes the process of salutations is so aggressive that we use machetes (O. Opete, personal communication, 21 March 2011).

In Mukuru, the focus groups related political violence to mindless electioneering. The sheer difference of political perspectives among the residents was understood as a critical factor in political violence. In all the three settlements, the discussions in the focus groups confirmed that whenever political rallies were held in these areas, supporters of opposing parties try to disrupt these rallies, and in most cases this led to violence.

3.1.5 Domestic

This type of violence was said to occur because of various factors. These included some of the following: irresponsibility by husbands, failure to provide for their families, abuse of drugs and alcohol, poverty, and unwanted pregnancies among school girls in the family. A participant in a focus group with women in Makina elaborated a typical example of domestic violence as follows:

One of the indomitable challenges we have as parents of young girls is that when your daughter is abused or gets pregnant, when you report it to the chief or police, nothing is done. In these situations, because the father is so enraged, when they get home, the mother and the young person who has been abused or made pregnant are ruthlessly beaten up. The mother is beaten as a reprimand for failure to protect her daughter from the predatory men.

Domestic violence was widespread and commonplace. In all the settlements infidelity was commonly referred to as "*mpango wa kando*", drug abuse and irresponsibility in terms of performance of household duties. One of the participants in a focus group of women in Lunga Lunga claimed infidelity triggered an inferno in Mukuru:

In the Fuata Nyayo area, a woman who returned from visiting her relatives in rural upcountry found her husband with another woman in their home. Feeling so betrayed by her husband, she hurled the burning stove in their

house at the couple. While the man and his liaison escaped, the house burnt down. Unfortunately, the fire spread to vast areas of Fuata Nyayo destroying several homes and properties in its wake (Focus group with elders at Lunga Lunga, 29 March 2011).

From the focus group discussions, it was clear that domestic violence, including gender-based violence prevailed in everyday life of Kawangware, Kibera, and Mukuru. In some cases, domestic violence was normalised.

3.1.6 Economic

The information from the focus groups suggested that economic violence was related to competition, and sometimes even rivalries among traders and entrepreneurs in these settlements. In some cases violent means such as robbery and arson were employed as strategies in economic violence. While participants in the focus groups openly discussed the other forms of violence, they were generally circumspect in sharing their perspective on economic violence.

3.2 Spatial manifestations of violence


As Table 6 above shows, political violence was seen to be the most prevalent, but not the only type of violence. In all the three settlements, tribal/ethnic violence was significant. The analysis in Table 6 presents a partial even though important view of the perceptions of violence at the sub-city level, particularly in the research communities. But these categories of violence also showed up in different areas and spaces of these settlements differently. These nuances are addressed in this section.

3.2.1 Kawangware

As shown in the map in Figure 4, Congo, Kanungaga, and Gatina are the key hotspots in Kawangware. Tribal violence is more prevalent in the northern sections of this settlement. Route 56, the road that traverses Kawangware from the north from the Mau Mau Bridge to Gitanga road and Naivasha road in the south was identified as an important site for expressions of violence. In the Congo area, political, ethnic/tribal, and domestic violence were identified as the top three types of violence respectively. The Congo area is also the commercial hub of Kawangware, and serves as an important public transport terminus. Unsurprisingly, the key land use of Congo, and the ease with politicians use Congo for campaigns predisposes it to political violence.

In the south, there are two main streets – Naivasha and Gitanga roads. The Gatina and Kanungaga areas in the north were naturally mainly residential. In Gatina, tribal violence was the most prevalent. This related to differences between tenants and landlords where the former held the notion that they were being unfairly treated by the latter. There were also differences among businesspersons. However, Kanungaga was also uniquely characterised by pervasive drunkenness. Small wonder that in Kawangware bar brawls and violence associated with drunkenness was rampant in Kanungaga. Other types of associated violence included: scuffles between the police and youths, and bar brawls between neighbours, and between tenants and landlords, and between City of Nairobi police and traders.

Figure 4: Patterns and types of violence in Kawangware




Source: Data from listing, grouping, ranking and maps in 14 focus groups

3.2.2 Kibera

Six spaces were identified as hotspots in Kibera. These spaces included: a road in Raila; the District Officer's (DO) office/camp in Makina; the railway line in Laini Saba and a footbridge in Gatwekera; an open space at the Udungu centre in Shilanga; and the main road at Fort Jesus. The map in Figure 5 shows the types of violence at the various hotspots in Kibera. While political violence was clearly the most dominant, the Raila area had a high prevalence of ethnic/tribal violence including gender-based violence. The Makina area that is predominantly a Nubi community and a Mashimoni area also had significant incidences of tenant/landlord-structure owners' violence. The history of Kibera, particularly the perceived marginalisation of the Nubi and control of economic and political power by the Kikuyu are critical factors in the violence in Kibera.

The common framing of the violence by the communities in Kibera was 'disenfranchisement of the Nubi.' Although historical injustices were important factors in the incidence and types of violence, like in Kawangware, there was a relationship between land use and types of violence. For instance, areas with mixed uses such as commercial and residential in Makina and Mashimoni had tenant/landlord violence; political and ethnic violence were identified interchangeably.

Figure 5: Perceptions of the scale of violence in Kibera



Source: Data from listing, ranking, grouping and maps in 4 focus groups

3.2.3 Mukuru

There are three hotspots in Mukuru. These include the footbridge in Kayaba, the road in Fuata Nyayo, and the open space near the banks of the Ngong River. Photo 2 below shows a notorious hotspot in Mukuru, a footbridge that links Mukuru to a section of the industrial area along Enterprise Road.


Economic violence is most prevalent. Although two hotspots had been identified, Kayaba was considered more volatile. Kayaba is significant in Mukuru because it is the main commercial space and boasts several land uses. But the footbridge is a melting point for the very poor, young people, women, police, and visitors and is also a critical transition point for the movement of goods and services in and out of Mukuru. Economic violence was associated mainly with youths. The map in Figure 6 shows these hotspots and the types of violence in these spaces.

Photo 2: The footbridge to Mukuru from Enterprise Road, a famous hotspot



Source: Authors

Figure 6: Perceptions of the scale of violence in Mukuru Kayaba



Source: Data from listing, ranking, grouping and mapping in 3 focus groups

3.3 Tipping points of violence

3.3.1 Tipping points

The moments or tipping points when small shifts in human behaviour resulted in radically altered circumstances, thus political violence, were when: there is no more space for development; politicians use abusive language; there is arbitrary and very high increases in rent; police harass youths; messages forewarning ethnic attacks are received; the onset of crude ritual killings; tenants refuse to pay rent; there are disagreements between followers of various political parties; perceptions of election rigging are unacceptable; disruption of political meetings/rallies; rigging of elections; and the community perceives decisions to be unjust.

3.3.2 When there is no more space

Neglect by the City Council of Nairobi in providing basic services and facilities were cited by several focus groups as an important cause of political violence. The failure to provide crucial services, including planning, invariably led to acute shortage of space for families in these communities. Participants in the focus groups said the pressure for space created conflict between the communities and the City Council *askaris* (Council 'police'), police and other Office of the President (OP) security agents.

In the Lunga Lunga area of Mukuru, the focus groups noted that when the police demand bribes from local traders so that they are allowed to trade in open spaces, the traders often resist and physically fight back, and almost always overwhelm the *askaris*. But the police also intervene. To counter the police involvement, the residents and the business people use youths to fight with the police by throwing stones, which results in more violence. Kennedy Osango, a retired politician in the area, noted:

Even the police van has turned into a *matatu* to collect money only and not security at all. They even cannot carry a dead person, money first! It is important to note that these police raids are frequent but at the convenience of the police. They strike any time especially in the evenings.

In other cases, long held personal differences e.g. between neighbours are aggravated because of diminished space and incidents turn violent. Juliet Onyango captured the challenges characteristic of conflicts that tipped into violence because of pressure on space:

'Imagine one sweeping his or her house and leaving the dirt at the neighbour's door. This normally brings in much conflict. It is when disrespectful things happen that you hear people fighting and even including political parties in these fights. Some think dirt is left in front of their homes because of political party differences.'

3.3.3 When politicians use abusive and hate speech

As shown in the earlier sections of this report, politicians' indiscriminate and passionate use of hate speech not only fuels but also sustains the scale and complexity of political violence. Whether it is to articulate party positions, personal philosophies or rebuke opponents, hate speech is their ubiquitous stock-in-trade. This use of hate speech has different effects. In Kibera for instance, the focus group discussions revealed that hate speech stokes tribal conflict that leads

to landlords renting houses to tenants largely from their own ethnic groups. While this is mainly to ensure safety, the other ethnic groups that need housing, perceive such practices as exclusion. This discontent results in conflicts and/or violence between tenants and landlords.

To further emphasise the effect of hate speech, another resident of Kibera noted: *"we are not affected by political conflicts as we are affected by its violence"* (J. Mideva, personal communication, 27 March 2011). When abusive and hate speech are used, the focus groups in Kibera showed that tribal violence also occurred. A lot of times this was perceived as political violence mutating into tribal/ethnic violence with the support of hate speech.

3.3.4 Arbitrary and very high increases in rent

The high cost of evidently squalid housing was identified as an extremely political issue in focus group discussions in all three study communities. In the Congo area in Kawangware, landlord and tenant conflicts revolved around the twin issues of exorbitant rents and very poor quality housing. Landlords or structure owners were known to arbitrarily hike rents without prior notice to tenants. Oftentimes the rents were doubled each time rents were increased. When the tenants questioned such increases, according to most focus groups, the refrain from the structure owners was: *"Enda Kibera huko ndiokwa free sio huku"*, literally meaning: "...you can move out and go Kibera, that is where there is free housing!"

It was convincingly argued in the focus groups, that such insensitive remarks by structure owners were unjustified and unsurprisingly tipped conflicts between the landlords and tenants into violence. While the structure owners hired youths and criminal gangs to evict tenants and protect their assets, tenants also fought back using stones, debris, and in some cases even fire. This violence between tenants and landlords often takes a political dimension as each of the conflicting parties uses a political party to articulate their conflict and to solve the violence.

3.3.5 When police harass young people

Focus groups results show the vulnerability of youth and the ease with which the police and other OP operatives harassed these young people in the study communities. Although the degree of harassment would vary across the three study communities, such harassment tipped different types of conflict into political violence. For instance, in Kawangware and Mukuru, the results of the focus group discussions showed that the City Council of Nairobi *askaris* always demanded bribes from traders including youths whom they perceived to be idle. The young people did not always pay the bribes and this invariably elicited arrests and use of excessive force to apprehend the youths. The participants of the focus groups also noted that the council police demanded daily rates even if a trader had not sold anything. They also identified the way market-shed rents were increased dramatically without reference to the traders. People from outside the community who buy land in the area and then forcefully evict those already on the land also precipitated violence. This normally erupts between the property developers, who at most times come with the police, and the people living in that particular area who are to be evicted. The above are only some of the ways in which the police harass the youth of the city.

In the Fuata Nyayo area of Mukuru, the focus group also added that conflicts caused by drunkenness between two individuals tip into violence between groups from different ethnic groups or in some instances even different political groups in the area. Others identified conflicts between individuals who are drunk whose

arguments involve the police and other law-enforcing agencies, or in some cases result in the involvement of their friends in group wars, which normally take ethnic lines or even inter-village violence. Instructively, for the young people, the involvement of the police was always framed as harassment. While persuasive, such an argument was not convincing as the youths were also active actors in violence, who required in such circumstances, intervention from the police.

The previous sections have shown the vulnerability of the young and the ease with which the police and other OP operatives harassed these youths in the study communities. Although the degree of harassment would vary across the three study communities, such harassment tipped different types of conflict into political violence.

3.3.6 Receipt of messages of ethnic attacks

The focus groups also showed that whenever a message of ethnic clashes in different parts of the city and even in different parts of the country were received by youths, they invariably mobilised and executed revenge attacks on members of ethnic groups in the study communities who were perceived to be aggressors of ethnic clashes. The focus groups said the messages of ethnic attacks were transmitted via television, radio, and mobile phones. Discussions in the three study communities showed trends of conflict tipping into violence whenever messages of attacks were received, from the onset of multi-party politics in 1991 increasing to a crescendo in 2008 with the post-election violence.

3.3.7 Onset of crude ritual killing

This tipping point manifests in ways similar to the receipt of messages of ethnic attacks above. The focus group discussions traced this factor to the late 1990s when the *Mungiki* supported Uhuru Kenyatta and President Moi, the political competition in the country. In the study communities, however, sordid discoveries of bodies that had been beheaded and skinned tipped conflicts within members of the Kikuyu ethnic group and also between youths and the police into overt political violence. Homes of suspected adherents of the *Mungiki* were torched; people suspected to be members of this group were killed. In some cases police who intervened were also killed. A focus group in Mukuru cited a widely publicised siege of Kikuyu MPs in a hotel in the suburbs of Nairobi that set off a series of violent attacks in the informal settlements.

3.3.8 When tenants refuse to pay rent

Focus group discussions in Congo, Kawangware also showed that refusal by tenants to pay rent tipped conflicts between landlords and tenants into ethnic and political violence. In Kawangware it was mainly between the Luhya who are mostly tenants and the Kikuyu who own most of the houses in Kibera, or between the Kikuyu and Luo, or the Nubi and Kikuyu ethnic groups. Although the group discussions showed that at different times from 1991, Kikuyus belonged to the same political parties as their counterparts, when the conflict tipped over, this invariably took on a political face.

In other cases, the tenants simply defaulted on payments of rent. While there were several causes of such default of payment, much blame was attributed to incitement by politicians. Such incitement turned conflicts between tenants and landlords, which tips into ethnic violence that then tips to economic violence as a result of property destruction and looting. A participant in one of the focus groups in Gatwekera area in Kibera said:

From the time in 1998 when Moi urged tenants not to pay rent for carton houses, there have been several people who have never paid rent at all. They are untouchable. Sometimes landlords bribe the chiefs to evict such tenants. Sometimes they are successful, but in most cases they are not. But if the tenants hear that the chief and police are going to evict them, then houses in Gatwekera are set alight!

Politicians also incite tenants not to pay any rent at all. An argument is made for not paying for arguably sub-standard housing. Surprisingly, the politicians encourage the same tenants to reside in obviously poor quality, dangerous and sub-standard housing. The refusal by the incited tenants tips to violence between them and the landlords and structure owners. This then tips over to violence over access to, use, and ownership of land that leads to economic crimes and violence manifested through the burning down of structures by the tenants. Differences in the policies of political parties may result in political violence which then tips into violence between tenants and landlords as a result of failure or refusal to pay rent by the tenants which may also spark tribal conflicts/violence.

Refusal to pay rent results in violence between the landlord and tenants where the landlords who raise rent without prior notice to tenants do not agree with their tenants and engage in nasty quarrels: the landlords may remove doors from their houses. Tenants respond violently arguing that they are entitled to houses with doors. In Kawangware Congo village this results in a further hike to the house rent. A good example is that in the 2007 elections, Kikuyu who are supporters of PNU raised house rents from 3000 shillings to 5000 shillings.

3.3.9 Political disagreements

Political disagreements were unanimously identified in all the three study communities as an important factor for tipping political conflicts into violence. In the Silanga area of Kibera, discussions with a mixed focus group showed that political conflict tipped over into violence when there were simple disagreements. The participants said supporters of different political parties normally fight each other during campaign periods and this normally affects the people of the area as they are beaten up too.

One respondent, Sammy Kianga observed that, *“kama tumeenda kupiga kura ya mlolongo kama yau chairman hivi, wafuasi wa chama ingine wa kiona umepanga line ya mtu mwingine na ulikua ume kula pesa ya mtu wao, wana kupiga baadaya kura”* (“During voting times like when electing a new chairman when we vote by open vote (not the secret ballot) and supporters of another aspirant see you queuing on the opponent’s line – yet you had received campaign money from the aspirant they support – they attack you after the voting is over”) (S. Kianga, personal communication, 23 March 2011).

In Kawangware, The respondents observed that tribal violence mostly occurs during election times where there are supporters of different politicians who are of different tribes. A participant observed that it begins when for example a Luo wants to vote for an ODM leader and a Kikuyu wants to vote for a PNU leader and the two people are living together in one village. One of them talks bad about the other politician whom he/she is not supporting; it is there and then that the fighting begins.

Political conflicts were said to occur when the supporters of PNU are not on good terms with supporters of ODM and they always quarrel over who has done what, who is doing what, and who should be doing what.

3.3.10 Disruption of political meetings/rallies

Political rivalry was identified in the three study communities as another factor that tipped political conflicts into violence. The politicians were said to use the youth of the city in causing violence. Because of high rates of unemployment among young people, it was seen as a cheap method for politicians who needed to undercut their competition.

In Congo, Kawangware various actors were identified as being behind instigating and escalating violence in this settlement. The participants in the focus groups identified these actors with reference to the roles they play that contribute to the initiating and escalating of conflicts and violence. These included the local MP and councillors. The discussions also revealed how politicians bribe youths to disrupt opposing political gatherings. They were also said to be behind inciting people from their ethnic groups to attack people from other ethnic groups for not supporting the party line.

3.3.11 Rigging elections

In Kawangware and Kibera, participants in the focus groups identified reported incidences of rigging of elections as another important factor that tilts political conflict into violence. Although rigging was said to be most emotive and triggered violence within the three study communities, the 2007 general elections and subsequent 2008 post-election violence, were seen as tipped by rigged elections at the study community level, city and national levels. In Silanga, youth leaders in the focus groups cited rigged elections as the main factor that led to political violence.

3.3.12 Communal perception of unjust decisions

The participants in virtually all the focus group discussions identified a dysfunctional justice system that delivered unjust decisions as an important factor in turning conflict to violence. Given the governance structure in Nairobi's informal settlements, the Chief, assistant chiefs, and headmen handle virtually all the disputes in these areas. While this aspect of the office of the president significantly contributes to the access to and delivery of justice for the poor and marginalised, there is considerable disquiet on the perceived bias and perceptions of injustice in the communities. It is these growing communal perceptions of injustice that when a dispute is perceived to have been badly handled that political conflict tips over to violence. For example, several participants in Kibera argued that when there was a conflict that involved a member of the Luo community and another from the Kikuyu, whenever the chiefs intervened, because they, the chiefs lacked faith, this meant that the situation turned to violence as members of the aggrieved group sought an alternative way to resolve the conflict. In Figure 6, the youths of Darajani clearly identified tipping points of political violence.

In other cases, the tenants simply defaulted on payments of rent. While there were several causes of such default of payment, a lot was attributed to incitement by politicians.

3.4 The role of institutions

3.4.1 Important institutions in violence in the case study communities

The analysis of the focus group discussions revealed that institutions play an important role at the moment when small shifts in human behaviour resulted in,

or tipped into, radically altered circumstances – political violence. The institutional maps and matrices from the three sites yielded mixed results on what were considered important institutions by the different community members. But there were also useful patterns in what was and should be considered important. The focus groups generally identified what they perceived as important, identifying whether these were inside or outside of their communities.

Various institutions, and in some instances individuals, are involved in processes of initiating, abating, and sometimes even mitigating violence. The types of institution identified varied. These included governmental, non-governmental (local and international), community-based and some faith-based organisations. The institutions/organisations were said to be mainly involved in issuing 'relief' (of materials and/or providing a service), capacity building of the affected parties mainly through organising and facilitating seminars on the benefits of peaceful co-existence and conflict resolution. In other instances, some of the institutions were identified as being critical in advocating for the affected persons' rights to be addressed especially by the government.

At least 12 institutions in Kawangware were considered important. The results from the focus groups showed the landowners association as the most important and the councillor and chief as the least important. Table 7 shows the analysis of the most important institutions from various focus groups in Kawangware.

Table 7: Important institutions in Kawangware

Institution	Tally	Rank
Landowners Association	4	1
Tenants Association	3	2
Police	3	2
AMREF	3	2
Member of Parliament (Hon Beth Mugo)	3	2
District Commissioner	3	2
Rent Tribunal	2	7
Church	2	7
Elders	2	7
Councillor	1	10
Chief	1	10

Source: Data from Ranking by six focus groups of: elders, youths, women, mixed, political mobilisers, and touts

The analysis in Table 7 above was derived from the results of six focus groups that ranked the institutions that had been identified on a scale of one to three to identify the top three important institutions. In each group institutions ranked three were the most important, and those ranked one were the least important. Although at the Kawangware level some institutions were the second most important, these were perceived as important for specific focus groups. To the mixed group, women, and youths, the tenants associations, AMREF, the MP were the most important institutions respectively. Table 8 summarises the explanations of the roles the institutions play in the event of violence in Kawangware.

Table 8: Roles of important institutions in Kawangware

Institutions/actor	Role played in the event of violence
AMREF	Providing those affected with medicine, food, blankets, clothes and tents
City Council of Nairobi	Putting out fires when houses are burnt Offering temporary housing to the affected people especially those displaced, or those with their houses burnt, or their schools.
Police	Quelling violence and arresting those engaged in violence
Huduma church	Providing those affected with medicine and food
The chiefs	Taking records of the people affected and forwarding the information to the institutions that help them
Councillor Obonyo	Helping the deceased with burial arrangements and paying hospital bills for those in hospitals
Hon. Beth Mugo	Settling hospital bills for those hospitalised Asking for more security personnel in the area

Source: Data from four focus group discussions; a youth group and elders of Congo area and religious leaders and youth from Stage 56.

In Kibera, the focus groups discussions identified important institutions and actors mainly in terms of the roles played in mitigating violence. Others also considered important institutions as those that were active in addressing day-to-day problems affecting the vulnerable groups in the settlement. In other cases specific individuals were also identified as important because the community recognised the roles they played in minimising conflict and violence. While some individuals were important in reducing conflict and violence, the focus groups noted that other individuals also contributed to aggravating conflict and violence.


Photo 3: One of Solo 7's contributions translated: A vote for the constitution is a vote for peace



One individual, *Solo 7*, widely known for his graffiti work on many of Kibera's walls advocating peaceful coexistence between people from different ethnic groupings, was an example of a specific individual identified as an important institution in Kibera.

As Figure 7 shows, a focus group with members of CBOs in Sihlanga considered the USAID as the most important institution.

Figure 7: Mapping important institutions in Sihlanga, Kibera



Source: Data from focus group with CBOs

The participants in the focus group diagram showed the institutions that work together by joining the circles that represent them and those that are inside other institutions by placing their circles inside the other institutions. The plus signs in the institutions were used to show the strength of the respective institutions with those with many plus signs indicating the institutions that were important in relation to averting violence or helping people during times of violence, while one with the least plus signs indicating their lesser importance.

Most of the institutions work with the government of Kenya in one way or another; for instance, UNICEF donates food to the area chief who in turn distributes to the community. Other institutions such as the churches and mosques get donations from the Red Cross and distribute to people in the settlement. Basically, most NGOs operate in conjunction with the government, the churches and mosques and the community. Table 10 summarises the roles important institutions play in violence in Kibera. Other institutions that were considered important although without specific roles in violence included: Umande Trust, the government, Pathfinder International, CDC, and UN Habitat.

Table 9: Roles of important institutions in Kibera

Institutions/actor	Role played in the event of violence
Community-based organisations	Constructs toilets and other essential facilities Provides relief food aid to affected members
SUPKEM	Giving relief food and clothing to Muslims
MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières)	Provides free medical services to victims of violence
AMREF	Provides free medical services to victims of violence
Faith-based organisations	Provides relief food, school fees, medical services, counselling, and emergency accommodation for the victims
Government/ provincial administration	Provides relief food and security
Red Cross	Provides medical services, relief food and tents
Religious leaders	Preaches peace
Care International	Provides relief food Conducts consultation forums for peace building Facilitates sporting activities to enhance community integration among the city's youth
UNICEF	Donates food to the area chief who in turn distributes to the community
Churches and Mosques	Gets donations from the Red Cross and distributes to people
Family Health Option Kenya	Family planning services
SAPTA	Deals with drug rehabilitation
Chief	He calls barazas ⁹ and summons the tribes that are fighting to live in unity, thus bringing peace
YOBBEK (Youth Building Bridges and Education in Kibera)	Holds forums and trains youths on peace and other related issues
Community Health Workers	Counselling when violence takes place
Sita Kimya ¹⁰	Deals with stopping sexual violence and domestic violence
Global for peace	Conducts forums on peace


Source: Data from six focus group discussions of: Imams, church leaders, and youths from Laini Saba and Sihlanga areas.

In Mukuru, discussions on important institutions were successfully undertaken with only elders in the Fuata Nyayo area. As Figure 8 below shows, to this group the assistant chief was the most important institution. However, it was noted that the police and the chief depended on each other to co-ordinate security in the area.

⁹ Kiswahili for public meetings normally presided over by an official of the office of the President e.g. a Chief, District Officer, or District Commissioner.

¹⁰ Kiswahili for: "I will not remain silent"

Figure 8: Important institutions in Fuata Nyayo, Mukuru



Source: Focus group discussion with elders

Table 10: Profile of important institutions in Mukuru

Category of institution	Name of institutions/individuals
Faith-based organisations	Catholic church, Sisters of Mercy
Non-governmental organisations	GOAL Kenya, Red Cross, World Vision, Mukuru Promotion Center, Uhuru Kenya, Make a better world Kenya, Practical action, APRHC, FIDA, Haki za Binadamu
Governmental	Provincial administration (DC, Police, Elders & Chief offices)
Private Institutions	G4S security firm & KK security firm
Individuals	Hon. Martha Karua, Hon. Gidion Mbuvi, friends
Financial institutions	Equity bank
Educational	Primary schools

Source: Data from 17 focus groups in Mukuru

3.4.2 Institutions that tip conflict into violence

Results from the focus groups in the three communities showed that with the exception of the Office of the President (OP) and politicians and political parties, institutions considered as important were not necessarily the same as those

perceived as overtly responsible for tipping conflict into violence. The discussions in the groups revealed that these institutions were either directly involved in the violence or procured another agent, especially youths or gangs, to increase the level of violence.

The Police and Provincial Administration, namely chiefs, elders, and District Officers/Commissioners, were widely considered by the three communities as critical in tipping conflict to violence. There was much circumspection when we sought to establish the precise ways that the OP tipped conflict to violence in these communities. Although the participants in the focus groups were clearly afraid to specify the details, they broadly confirmed a prevailing pattern of harassment and sometimes even active and overt participation of the key elements in the OP in violence. In Kibera, tribalism was also highlighted as an important factor in the violence attributed to the OP. In one of the focus groups a participant argued:

Whenever there are conflicts in my area, especially if I have a misunderstanding with a Luo, I would not waste my time to seek an intervention from the chief. The chiefs here are so tribal and biased in favour of Luos. I would rather hack the Luo with a machete and be taken to the Police and deal with the wrath of the Police. It is much better than going to the chief (P. Makau, personal communication, 22 March 2011).

Politicians and political institutions were the other critical agents in increasing violence. Parties, politicians, and youth leaders were identified as major types of political institution that escalated violence. These were particularly important in Kawangware and Kibera. Hate speech and incitement were the main method employed by these institutions to encourage community members to violence. Discussions with political mobilisers from the Congo area in Kawangware provided further insight on how violence was escalated. This group showed the roles that different actors played in increasing violence. Table 12 presents their analysis.

Table 11: The roles of institutions in escalating violence in Kawangware

Actors	Role
Idle youths	<p>They are incited by leaders or political leaders to cause violence in the area and are given money</p> <p>They read and listen to media when they see or hear news such as "Ruto anaenda Hague (Hon Ruto to go to the ICC in the Hague) " they begin mindless arguments that invariably turn violent</p> <p>They transmit information including rumours, e.g. that the residents of Kibera are fighting and demonstrating; encouraging others to foment chaos in Kawangware</p>
Elders (Wazee)	Actively train children on tribalism; encourage hatred and violence as a justifiable means of argument, defence or protection
Politicians	<p>They incite youths and hire them to unleash violence</p> <p>They make outlandish promises to the poor – on lowering the cost of essential commodities and housing – which are never fulfilled after elections</p>
Media	<p>Print and electronic media transmit information and even incorporate messages of incitement and hate</p> <p>FM stations and mobile phones are used to inform, mobilise, and even coordinate violence</p>

Source: Focus group with political mobilisers in Congo, Kawangware

The discussions with the political mobilisers in Congo showed the different ways in which institutions instigate violence. The sensitivity of the subject meant that participants would not freely share their sentiments. However, from Table 10, the differences in the three study communities are apparent. In Mukuru, two powerful institutions, i.e. the OP and criminal gangs, are critical in increasing violence. Unfortunately, the involvement of the OP only complicates the nature of violence in this community. Unlike the OP who are easily identifiable, the criminal gangs – while known to the residents of the communities – are not always easily identifiable, thus render interventions to mitigate violence more problematic.

Discussions in the focus groups also revealed that politicians sometimes hired members of criminal gangs to unleash violence. Although criminal gangs were notably associated with an increase in violence, some group discussions identified these criminal gangs as important actors in stopping violence and securing and protecting residents of these communities. It seemed that security by these criminal gangs tended to be provided along ethnic lines. The common wisdom was that criminal gangs provided protection to members of their own ethnic groups. Since it was impossible to live in a community without security, it is reasonable to argue that each ethnic group had a criminal gang that among other things ensured their security.


3.4.3 Institutions that tip violence back to conflict

The results from focus groups in all the three study communities confirmed that institutions considered important by the community were also perceived as useful in forestalling and even reducing violence. These institutions also directly provided relief to residents that suffered the effects of increased violence or when conflicts tipped over into violence. Various types of institutions were considered

important in mitigating violence. These included the government, hospitals, CBOs, FBOs, the media, individuals, and NGOs.

A further category of institution was apparent: institutions that played roles before the violence, during the violence and after the violence; and institutions that played roles only during and after the violence. The former category included these institutions: the OP, communities and their institutions, politicians, individuals, landlords, and tenants. The latter group comprised criminal gangs, hospitals, NGOs, the Red Cross, USAID, and FBOs, especially the churches.

Photo 4: Typical ways of identifying the roles of important institutions in Mukuru



The OP, politicians, communities, landlords, and tenants were involved in both increasing and reducing, and even stopping violence. The political elite was identified as playing the double role of stopping and/or increasing violence. As shown earlier politicians, mainly through incitement and hate speech, increased the magnitude of violence. In Kibera settlement for example, a focus group with members of a criminal gang group strongly believed that what the local MP said in a political rally determined significantly whether conflicts tipped over into violence. They further observed that in the event of violence, an order from the area Member of Parliament to stop often worked as most of the actors tended to obey his orders. Of course the local MP is also the current Prime Minister and is widely acknowledged for his charisma and power. Yet, his power and effectiveness in mitigating violence is also limited. The discussions with community members of Kibera showed that when the Police and other OP operatives unleashed violence, even the Prime Minister has limitations in containing or even stopping such violence.

Table 10 summarises information showing the significance of institutions in tipping conflict to violence; and conversely, tipping violence back to conflict. Evidently, government institutions are important in both roles, but are seen to play an even greater role in tipping conflict into violence. Second, NGOs are undoubtedly important actors in tipping violence back to conflict. The media and individuals, however, play a relatively weak role in both tipping conflict to violence; and tipping violence back to conflict.

Table 12: Institutions that tip conflict into violence and tip violence into conflict

Institution	Settlement							
	Tip conflict into violence			Total	Tip violence back to conflict			Total
	Kawangare	Kibera	Mukuru		Kawangare	Kibera	Mukuru	
Government	5	2	7	14	4	1	1	6
Political organisations	4	2	0	6	0	0	0	0
Local groups	0	4	0	4	0	0	0	0
Criminal groups	0	4	2	6				0
Media	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1
CBOs	1	0	0	1	1	2	1	4
Individuals	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	2
Hospitals	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	5
FBOs	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	4
NGOs	0	0	0	0	7	6	4	17
Total	12	12	9	33	16	15	8	39

Source: Focus group discussions in the study communities

Having considered the relationship between conflict and violence, we turn to the relationship between different types of violence. This is the subject of the next section.

3.5 The violence chains

The preceding sections have shown two key issues about violence in the study communities. First, that violence is a much broader issue than crime, safety and security. Second, those even though different types of violence manifest and proliferate in specific areas, the connections and linkages between different types of violence are often hidden by a focus on specific types of violence. From the earlier sections it is also evident that political violence is the most significant. However, there are other types of violence, i.e. domestic, ethnic, and economic and landlord/tenant violence, which, together, are undoubtedly more significant than political violence.


The first scenario looked at was when political party differences tipped into political violence; then when politicians bribed the youths, the political violence further escalated and manifested as ethnic violence. Further, the young people unleashed violence on real and perceived enemies of their political benefactors. As shown earlier, politicians easily procure the 'services' of youths and sustain this spiral of violence because of cheap fees payable to these unemployed and desperate jobs. In support of this view, one of the young men in the focus groups in Kibera declared:

It is not possible, I cannot just idle around and earn nothing if Raila or any other politician can give me 500 shillings to support him. I will get the cash immediately and then attack any of his opponents to demonstrate my support and loyalty. That way I am sure I will always be able to get something, especially during the campaigns.

In Kawangware, the violence chains in Figure 9 show that bad politics tipped into political fights and loss of property. As if that were not enough, bad politics resulted in murder, resulting in violent displacements, and arson. From the perspective of eight women's views on violence, in Figure 9 we clearly see the relationship of various types of violence to political violence in a specific hotspot at the sub-city in Nairobi. We are also able to visualise the complexity and multi-faceted nature of urban political violence at the sub-city level.

The crucial point about urban political violence from the violence chains in 10 is that in a specific place, after political conflict tips into political violence, complex and sequenced processes produce the violence. These processes push political violence into even higher levels, and sometimes even into further types of violence. Without doubt the perceptions and understanding of violence, its causes and the processes that create it are as varied and numerous as the groups and individuals that interacts with each other. Therefore, to gain a better understanding of the relationship between political conflict and violence, it is imperative to seek views of as many groups and individuals as possible.

Figure 9: Violence chain of political violence at Stage 56, Kawangware



Source: Focus group discussion with eight women

The second example of a violence chain was from the use of information provided by the media. Discussions showed that information was not always well understood by audiences. The misunderstanding of information was often seen to spark and/or increase the magnitude of political violence that further aggravated violence between people of different ethnic groups and supporters of different political parties to violence. This in turn, as the discussions suggested, resulted in full blown ethnic-political violence. For example, in Kibera, the 2008 PEV was justified as follows:

During the 2008 post-election violence between ODM and PNU, we just heard over the media that people from the Kikuyu community were killing those from the Luo community in Naivasha and Nakuru. Without wasting time, Luo youths flocked into Gatwikira (a village dominated by Kikuyu speakers) to take revenge (Mixed focus group in Sihlanga, Kibera, 23 March 2011).

While the above presents another perspective on how violence changes from one form and/or space to another, we also recognise the simplistic view of the violence presented to the participant. The Waki Commission, which investigated the post-election violence in Kenya, seems to implicate the state, particularly the police's complicity and active participation in the political violence in Kibera in the period immediately after the 2007 disputed general elections.

The third set of violence chains identified was related to personal differences that heighten violence between ethnic groups when political party differences and the suspicion of certain ethnic groups frame discourses during campaigns. Tribal or ethnic violence was said to occur mostly during election periods when people from one tribe attack the others that they feel did something wrong. One of the participants in the focus groups in Congo, Kawangware wondered:

There are times when a Kikuyu may have minor misunderstandings with a fellow Kikuyu and solve it amicably but a minor misunderstanding with a Luo almost always turns into a full-scale war and is violent (B. Simiyu, personal communication, 23 March 2011).

The violence experienced in the years 2007 and 2008 changed from being violence caused by rigged elections to being tribal violence, the people from the Luo community against those from the Kikuyu community.

Neglect of the family by husbands that results in domestic violence, which spirals into violence between neighbours, was the fourth set of factors that showed how complex political violence was at the sub-city level. A woman participant in the focus groups in Mukuru insightfully observed that:

Domestic violence occurs mostly when your husband comes home drunk and you begin fighting one another because there is no food in the house; and when the neighbours intervene the fight gets hotter because the woman believes that the other neighbour is ruining her house.


Looking at violence chains within the family, another participant in Kawangware added that sending or punishing another person's child without the parent's consent very easily deteriorated into debilitating violence.

When a neighbour sends (for) your child and when you come back and you find your child missing from home or you are told by another neighbour, you begin quarrelling and finally a fight breaks out because nobody wants to subject (give way). Also, when you beat a neighbour's child because they did something bad or not right the parent will not want to know: they say you didn't have the right to

cane my child without my permission, and there and then fighting sets in (focus group with women in Congo, Kawangware).

The final set of violence chains that illustrate how one form of violence escalated to further violence was related to the violence between landlords and tenants. Politicians from outside the study communities, including national level politicians, were identified as keen on inciting violence in these communities. As mentioned elsewhere in this report, these politicians pay youths with copious quantities of cheap illicit alcohol to unleash violence. In Figure 10, political mobilisers in Congo, Kawangware shared their perspective on how several types of violence eventually resulted in political violence in Kawangware.

Figure 10: Violence chain for political violence in Congo, Kawangware




While Figure 10 shows political violence as connected to, and at times caused by, various types of other violence, the political mobilisers in Kawangware identified several links. The first link in the above chains of violence was the connection between violence relating to bad politics that resulted in tribal or ethnic violence. Ethnic violence resulted in political violence on the one hand; and on the other hand, tribal or ethnic violence resulted in violence related to bad politics that also resulted in further political violence. The second chain involved violence caused by bribery that resulted in further violence related to corruption that in turn also

aggravated political violence. The next chain was comprised of violence caused by drunkenness that resulted in bang smoking violence that further heightened political violence. The final set in a violence chain was robbery that resulted in violence relating to lack of food that further aggravated political violence in Kawangware.

In Kawangware, it also appeared that because landlords applied discriminatory criteria to exclude undesirable ethnic groups, tenants and their kin that felt discriminated against organised attacks on their landlords. The landlords were also accused of hiring idle youth and criminal gangs to terrorise their tenants. In these patterns of violence, the participants claimed homes were often burned down thus triggering further cycles of violence.

However, a careful analysis of information from the focus groups, especially the discussions on violence chains revealed a counter-intuitive quality of political violence: that political violence is more lethal when driven by ethnicity. The violence chains in Figure 11 below illustrate their complexity, as shown by the numerous links/chains that result in political fights.

Figure 11: Political violence in Kibera



Source: Focus group with political mobilisers

The corollary of political violence as seen through violence assessment is at least two-fold. First, those responses to violence that focus mainly on political violence tend to make other types of violence invisible. Yet as the violence chains above have shown, political violence is also driven by other forms of violence, which are arguably invisible. Second, the complexity of political and other types of violence highlighted by violence chains places serious implications on how then violence should be addressed. Clearly, an evidently complex phenomenon of political violence requires an equally nuanced response. This is the subject of the next section of this report.

Part 3

Conclusions

4.1 Conclusions

4.1.1 Political violence

At a general level, this study has shown that violence is a much broader issue than safety and security. The latter has been the focus of policy. In Nairobi the study shows that political violence is the most significant type of violence, especially in the informal settlements. The study further shows that political violence is more lethal when ethnicity is the driver. However, there are other types of violence, i.e. domestic, ethnic, and economic and landlord/tenant violence, which, cumulatively, are more significant than political violence: policy should also take these into account.

A response to violence – focusing mainly on political violence – has made other forms of violence invisible. The concealment of these forms of violence makes them difficult to be targeted by policy. This has had the tendency of making these latter forms of violence ‘normal’. Policy response to violence needs to be comprehensive; it should recognise the complexity of violence; and take account of linkages between various types of violence, as shown in this study through analysis of the violence chains.

4.1.2 Violence and space

In terms of space, the study has shown that violence has a spatial dimension. In informal settlements conflicts and violence are a result of the quality and quantity of space. In Nairobi lack of adequate space for production and reproduction lead to conflicts and violence. Poor quality spaces are sites of violent acts, especially by criminal gangs. The quality of space issues can be dealt with through *CPTED – Crime Prevention through Environmental Design*. Lack of space, poor spatial qualities and lack of regulation of use of space intensifies spatial-related conflicts and violence.

The study confirms that space affects the behaviour of people. It further confirms that even in slums violence is likely to occur in particular spaces, the violence hotspots. The mapping of hotspots helps people to understand violence in concrete terms and can lead to very specific actions by communities.

4.1.3 Violence chains

The concept of ‘violence chains’ has been useful in this study, helping the authors to understand the complex relationships between various types of violence. It has enabled us to understand that violence is a much broader concept than crime. It helped unpack the complexity of violence. Further, it has helped us realise that there is a need for a paradigmatic shift in dealing with violence, beyond the narrow focus on crime and safety.

4.1.4 Tipping points

Tipping point of violence has been theorised; but not from the perspective of institutions. Combining the concept of tipping points and institutions led to clearer policy recommendations with clear roles and responsibilities of various

institutional actors. This has been achieved in the study by exploring the roles of institutions in tipping conflict to violence; and tipping violence back to conflict.

The study demonstrates the significance of scale in understanding tipping points. The dual focus on communities and the city shows that the tipping points in the community, though related to the city, are not always similar. Thus what is considered a tipping point at a local level may not be a tipping point at the city level.

4.1.5 Participatory Violence Appraisal

Different participants found participatory violence appraisal useful to the extent that it generated actual points of action for the prevention of violence. A case in point was the chiefs who immediately saw opportunities in mapping violence hotspots to mobilise the community to do something about these hotspots.

Beyond data collection, the discussions enabled by this methodology have shown the potential in developing policy bottom-up. This approach takes policy debates to the lowest level, gives voice to ordinary people, and shifts policy-making from normative, top-down, technocratic approaches to participatory popular approaches. Besides, this way of policy development shifts the power relations inherent in customary technocratic approaches to policy.

4.1.6 Urban studies

In the last 50 years studies of this nature have been limited to crime and safety: from the contributions of Jane Jacobs, *Life and Death of Great American Cities*; through Oscar Newman's *Defensible Space*, to the 40 years' work of Jeffrey Ray, *Crime Prevention through Environmental Design*. By focusing on crime, inadequate attention is given to conflicts that are inevitable in the city. A focus on crime inadequately addresses violence in the city. There is a need to shift from the narrow focus of crime prevention to violence mitigation. Such an approach will deal with preventing conflicts in the city turning violent: these are inadequately addressed by the focus on crime. Looking beyond safety and security to conflicts and violence has enabled us to open up the scope for spatial studies. It suggests broader approaches and solutions, relating to other challenges of a contemporary city e.g. social justice, citizenship, equity, access, fragmentation, segregation, invisible urbanism, etc.

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