SECURITY IN HYBRID POLITICAL CONTEXTS: AN END-USER APPROACH

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1. Introduction

This paper is based upon a systematic peer-led review of literature on hybrid security arrangements in fragile and conflict-affected spaces. The overall objective is to answer the question: What is the evidence that hybrid security arrangements benefit end-users in fragile and conflict-affected spaces? To answer this seemingly simple question we set ourselves three complementary tasks:

• To clarify the meanings of ‘security’ and of ‘hybrid’ as a necessary first step towards analysis of hybrid security arrangements. To do so we draw upon both the mainstream and the critical security literatures, but especially the latter since it challenges the state-centred focus of mainstream analysis.

• To assess the empirical literature on security provision in hybrid political orders from the viewpoint of those who are most vulnerable and insecure (‘end-users’). Does this literature provide a convincing and empirically robust account of hybrid security arrangements? And how far is it successful in identifying whether and how end-users do or do not benefit?

• To sketch a broad research agenda for empirical analysis of hybrid security arrangements in fragile and conflict-affected spaces considered ‘from below’, i.e. from the viewpoint of end-users.

Following a discussion of the contemporary security debate, the paper outlines the rationale behind the definitions and terms adopted for the evidence searches. In particular, we propose our own definitions of security, calling attention to its dual nature: on the one hand as a process of creating and maintaining social orders, including those we call states; and on the other hand as an entitlement of those who are protected by these social orders, i.e. of end-users. Our definitions aim to complement and advance the emerging concept of hybrid political orders (HPOs), which seeks to address the conceptual and empirical shortcomings of the fragile states literature.

This is followed by an abridged discussion of the methodology of systematic and peer-led literature searches carried out to answer the paper’s overarching research question. The results of the reviews are then critically assessed, focusing specifically on strengths and gaps in the empirical knowledge base. For the purpose of this analysis we distinguish between three different but interrelated spaces within which security is delivered, each characterised by its own distinctive power-relations and forms of security provision: securitised border spaces; fragile state Leviathans; and donor-saturated policy spaces.

The paper concludes with recommendations for a future research agenda informed by what we did and did not find in the evidence review. In particular, it turns the state-centred bias of existing research upside down by asking how such a research agenda could best prioritise the experience and viewpoint of end-users.

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1 A full discussion of the methodology and criticisms of the literature search process can be found in Appendix E.
1.1 Rationale

State-centric security and development analysis has been challenged by new research scholarship which contends that security provision in supposedly ungoverned regions is driven by a diverse range of actors and organising logics (Richmond 2009; Boege et al. 2009; MacGinty 2011). This new scholarship not only opens up the security-development nexus to critical empirical scrutiny, it also reconsiders established security paradigms from the point of view of those who are most vulnerable and insecure (Luckham 2009).

Terms such as ‘hybrid political orders’ (HPOs) or ‘hybrid governance’ have been introduced to capture the contested nature of governance and security arrangements in fragile and post conflict states. In particular it is argued that the state’s failure to provide public goods does not necessarily lead to an anarchic state, akin to Hobbesian reality. Rather, actors, organisations, and institutions adhere to norms that merge informal, formal, and globalised codes, and this mixture results in hybrid modes of political order. Security provision in hybrid contexts is negotiated, bargained and enforced through both formal and informal processes that coexist, overlap, and intertwine.

These new modes of analysis are also increasingly influential in policy circles. For instance the OECD’s International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) has called for deeper understanding of hybrid political orders (HPOs), arguing that such societies:

[c]ontinue to function, to form institutions, to negotiate politically, and to set and meet expectations. Traditional forms of authority are not necessarily inimical to the development of rules-based political systems ... In fact, the challenge is to understand how traditional and formal systems interact in any particular context, and to look for ways of constructively combining them. (OECD 2011)

We argue in this paper that such an approach demands fundamental interrogation of the premise underpinning much mainstream academic and policy thinking that security is an almost self-evident public good unproblematically delivered by states or by the international community in situations of state failure. For the most part, this mainstream has showed little interest in unpeeling security’s multiple layers of meaning (Luckham 2007; 2009; Smith 2005); it has not properly investigated the relationship of security to political power; it has not scrutinised security as a politically contested object; and it has not on the whole looked at it from the perspective of end-users, i.e. those who are secured. Whilst new approaches to human and citizen security have challenged the state-centric bias of previous security thinking, they still tend to overlook security’s relationships to political power, including its deeply contested nature in hybrid political orders.

In this context, the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report (WDR) represents an important step forward and potentially provides the basis for shifting the paradigm for understanding security. The WDR uses the concept of ‘citizen security’, and argues that armed conflict and high levels of violent crime be considered as part of a continuum. While it remains firmly within a framework that insists on legitimate and capable institutions as the policy solution to citizen insecurity, the WDR also acknowledges building such institutions is a long-term exercise and need not necessarily follow a western model. The fact that the World Bank, as the premier multilateral development institution, is publishing such an argument is as significant as the substance of the argument itself.

The WDR method includes case studies and large-n quantitative studies, and the analytical process focuses on building a consensus among a group of experts, including Bank staff and others. Yet the evidence the Report presents does not bear the weight of the analysis and policy conclusions constructed on these foundations. Most strikingly, it tends to be uncomfortable with issues of political power and inequality. It still treats violence (and citizen insecurity) as an aberration of,
rather than the potential product of, some well-ordered as well as badly functioning political systems. Furthermore, for all its emphasis on citizen security, it treats the perspective and potential agency of intended end-users too lightly, and it fails to place citizen insecurity in a global context, in which the existing international order might be a contributor to insecurity rather than a mechanism for its resolution. In sum, although there is good reason to be sympathetic to the arguments developed in the WDR, the research and analysis it presents falls short of rigorously demonstrating its conclusions.

To fill these gaps in the empirical understanding of end-user experiences of security in fragile and conflict-affected spaces we undertake a systematic review of the available research literature. We ask how the missing power relations, which determine security and insecurity for end-users, can be factored into research. And we propose alternative analytical frameworks for the empirical study of how end users navigate their security within the highly contested contexts of hybrid political orders.

1.2 Who Are End-users and Why Do They Matter?

Our focus on end-users stems from both analytical and normative or policy concerns. It follows directly from our analytical shift away from state-centric security to the perceptions and experience of those at the receiving end of security arrangements. It also stems from an interest in security policies and practices that can benefit those who are most vulnerable or who are at risk from inequitable or unevenly distributed security arrangements. Our working use of the term ‘end-user’ posits that:

**End-users are those at the receiving end of security arrangements, who should be safe and secure in their everyday lives.**

End-users could be individuals or collectives. They are both the actual or potential victims of insecurity, and conversely the actual or potential ‘recipients’ or beneficiaries of security. Yet at the same time we acknowledge the possibility that they may have the agency (power and resources) to shape the security agenda, as well as be subject to it, whether as creators of security (e.g. local level justice institutions), or alternatively as agents of insecurity (e.g. child soldiers).

Furthermore, we understand the notion of benefiting from security arrangements to be necessarily contextual and dependent on each individual actor’s preferences. Therefore, our starting point is an interest in the subjective beliefs and practical experiences of social actors affected by security arrangements. That is, we retain a normative interest in the ‘everyday’ provision and effect of security arrangements. Hence, we are concerned with investigations of how security and insecurity are perceived and experienced at the ‘grass roots’ level. We aim to ask how security appears ‘in translation,’ what its place is in local knowledge, and how its meaning changes in different national contexts and historical time-periods.

To provide an illustration of the value of an end-user approach, Coulter (2009: 23-4) introduces her research on bush wives and girl soldiers in Sierra Leone by arguing that the voices of these women have been obscured by the prevailing narratives of humanitarian agencies, NGOs, truth and reconciliation bodies, and international journalists. She argues that research, which is sensitive to their everyday concerns can not only give them a greater say it is also empirically sounder. Furthermore it is more likely to point the way to policies (for instance on demobilisation, gender or
post-conflict justice), which address the real conditions of those (like bush wives and girl soldiers) who have most suffered the effects of insecurity.

1.3 The Primary Research Question

Our research question follows directly from our prioritisation of those who are at the receiving end of security arrangements, especially those who are vulnerable to poverty and violence. It is designed to advance a research agenda that scrutinises these security arrangements through an end-user lens. Building upon contemporary critical analysis of security as well as the emerging literature on hybrid political orders, it asks how and by whom end users’ security is determined.

What is the evidence that hybrid security arrangements benefit end-users in fragile and conflict-affected spaces?

More specifically we attempt to assess how current research is addressing the following questions:

- Who are the ‘end-users’, do they have any voice, and do they have shared or conflicting perceptions of security?
- Who are the main actors in the security marketplace, and where do they fit in the prevailing distributions of power and profit?
- In what ways are security and security institutions gendered, and how is this reflected in their relationships with end-users?
- When and why do state security institutions and practices uphold or clash with the rights and security of end-users, and how far, if at all, are they accountable in cases of abuse or neglect?
- What happens when states are largely absent, indifferent, or oppressive – for instance in ‘fragile’ states or in un-administered border spaces?
- How and for whom do local-level justice and security institutions actually work?
- Does the engagement of donors, humanitarian agencies, and other international actors with security provision make a significant difference to the security and welfare of end-users, and how do the latter perceive their engagement?
- Who defines security and how are security discourses shaped by historical experience, political power, and cultural framing?
- How, when and by whom are dominant institutions and practices challenged, or could they be challenged, so as to transform the existing political and security landscape to the benefit of end-users?
2. Who Defines Security and How?

This section briefly explores the contemporary debates and political context informing conceptualisations of security and thus leads into the rationale behind the definitions of security incorporated in the primary research question. We suggest that prevailing state-centred analyses of security, and arguably even the more recent focus on citizen and human security, do not adequately incorporate the perspective of end-users. Nor for the most part do they recognise security as a contested political object. We also consider whether recent critical security analysis provides scholars and policy-makers with the tools needed to address these empirical and conceptual gaps.

2.1 Contemporary Security Debates: From Security To Securitisation

The state-centred or ‘realist’ conceptualisation of security that prevailed during the Cold War era (see the Box below) no longer has a monopoly over security thinking. A new liberal mainstream is characterised by bold assertions regarding the interface of security, development, and human freedom (UN 2004). The UN has officially adopted ‘human security’ and the ‘responsibility to protect’ as guiding principles of international conduct, and the policy literature on the reconstruction of ‘fragile’ states makes stabilisation and security first priorities. Furthermore, Western experiences in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have spurred a re-examination of counter-insurgency doctrines that place development, the reform of state security sectors, the protection of civilians, and political solutions at the front of military strategies.

The Evolving Concept of Security

Security has historically involved ‘seeing like a state’. It has been associated with the ability of states to resist internal and external threats, in particular military threats. Whilst the state has been considered as the thing to be secured, or the ‘referent object’, increasingly analytical attention has broadened to encompass the security of individuals, groups, and a far more diverse range of dangers and threats. The objectives of ‘security’ have also been broadened to include issues of human rights and emancipation, freedom from want, preventing infectious diseases, and managing climate change. Actors and organisations frame such issues through a security lens to ensure they are prioritised at least as much as traditional state and international security concerns. Thus, the study of security and insecurity is politically charged and highly normative.

However, these current re-conceptualisations of security arguably contain relatively little in the way of serious questioning of security itself. Moreover, the policy debates within the new mainstream still tend to focus on more particular and limited constructions. For instance, although the policy literature on security sector reform (SSR) has expanded its definition of the security sector from the core security structures of the state to the wider array of informal security and justice institutions that may supplement or even replace formal structures, one still finds little discussion of how and for whom security functions are exercised, nor of how these uphold or are upheld by prevailing power relations. Thus, in practice, security continues to be treated as politically non-controversial, with analysis as well as policy largely focused on technical solutions to current security challenges.

2 The phrase derives from Scott (1998), who applies it to forms of social engineering that we associate with development.
Even the comprehensive WDR 2011 shies away from broadly defining security. Instead, it confines itself to defining ‘citizen security’ alone, depicting it as including ‘both freedom from violence and freedom from fear of violence’. This is construed broadly as covering ‘security at home, in the workplace, and in political, social, and economic interactions with the state and other members of society’ (World Bank 2011, xvi). Conceptualised in such a manner, security can in principle be measured in terms of indicators of reduced violence, and under the still wider umbrella of human security, of other forms of vulnerability. The WDR 2011 also endorses the idea that citizen security can potentially be considered a supplementary Millennium Development Goal in its own right.

Such formulations are promising in that they depict security as an entitlement of citizens and human beings. Furthermore, they recognise that security is not necessarily obtained even when the state considers itself to be at peace; a move, which leaves the satisfaction of this entitlement open to empirical investigation. Nevertheless, it is arguable that it is unhelpful to regard security solely as an outcome or dependent variable: For under such *a priori* formulations of citizen or human security one risks ruling out empirical investigations of security’s contextually contingent meaning and its potential to variously benefit or harm end-users. Thus, we argue that security is also a process of political ordering, which cannot be considered separately from political authority. It matters enormously who defines security, how they deliver it and on behalf of whom. Those who clothe their actions with the mantle of national, international or even human or citizen security may in some instances actually damage the safety, livelihoods and welfare of end-users.

This is particularly important when the entitlements of citizenship are not extended throughout a population or when the state is not the primary actor mobilising to provide public goods. Applied within such contexts it is arguable that overarching terms like citizen and human security can serve to homogenise vulnerable people and groups within weak categorisations. Furthermore, the end-users of security can be erroneously portrayed as subjects of security arrangements rather than agents with varying capacities to influence, respond, or resist contemporary political orders. Thus, seemingly progressive concepts can direct attention away from the political power relations, global hierarchies and processes, which produce the effects of security.  

Such conceptual gaps can translate into ambiguity and confusion when policy-makers and actors attempt to operationalise concepts such as ‘human security’ and ‘civilian protection’. It can result in widely divergent vocabularies and aims, even amongst those operating within the same contexts. Subsumed beneath such confusions, the needs and perceptions of the end-users of security arrangements are insufficiently acknowledged and research that investigates their plight must compete to be heard amongst literature that subscribes to a variety of doctrines and normative positions.

In recent years a significant critical literature has interrogated the rise of security as a development issue through the critical lens of ‘securitisation’. Duffield’s analysis of *Global Governance and the New Wars. The Merging of Development and Security* (2001) has been especially seminal. Along with other writers influenced by critical security theory, he links security to wider critiques of liberal peace, humanitarianism, international development, global governance and state-building (Krause and Williams 1997; Booth 2005 Chandler 2006; Richmond 2009; MacGinty 2011). Although offering varying takes, these authors see securitisation as an aspect of an overarching hegemonic enterprise, which came into its own at the end of the Cold War. Permeated by the ideas of Western economic and political liberalism, they contend that this hegemony assumes the beneficial impacts of western engagement in state-building and development exercises around the

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3 These receive some discussion in the WDR 2011 but are neither confronted head on, nor placed within the policy conclusions and recommendations.

4 Despite being diffuse, hard to read and packed with unsubstantiated assertions: see Willett 2005 who unpacks the central ideas in a more accessible form in an African context.
world. However, these contemporary interventions differ significantly from the previous imperialisms as they are conducted in the name of the ‘international community’ and its stated objectives of good governance and development. This includes not only powerful states, but the entire panoply of international organisations, international financial institutions, aid agencies, and global civil society organisations which assure international security, promote democracy and human rights, deliver humanitarian assistance, and undertake development initiatives.

The ‘new aid programme’ promoted by these actors and their coalitions is viewed by critical security analysts as an innovative and subtle form of ‘power-knowledge’. On the one hand, it pays lip-service to progress, universal entitlements, human, and citizen security. On the other, it is largely indirect, preferring intermediation through regional organisations, national governments and an assortment of local actors (Veit 2010). This allows it to adopt the discourse of ‘local ownership’, permitting the international community to deny formal responsibility for end-user security, especially when things go wrong (Chandler 2000; 2006).

However, critical authors who utilise the lens of ‘securitisation’ are prone to their own forms of reductionism, including a tendency to discount the motives and values of international actors, and to underestimate the extent to which values of democracy, human rights and humanitarianism have had real traction in many parts of the developing world. They also tend to overplay the coherence of the concept of ‘securitisation’, underestimating the conflicts and tensions between the major political, military, and humanitarian players in global and national security marketplaces. In so doing they risk reducing national and local actors to bit-players in a global game. They also suffer somewhat from the Cassandra syndrome, downplaying evidence of improvements in peace and security globally as well as in individual national contexts such as Mozambique, Sierra Leone or Liberia (Human Security Report 2009/10). Yet whether or not the overall trends are positive, an enormous amount remains to be done to transform the conditions in which ‘security’ is often deployed in practice to stabilise particular local, national and global oppressions.

As we shall argue below, critical security analysis has inspired a new tradition of research, which probes behind the assumptions underpinning established conceptions of peace and security. It offers a more nuanced view of violent conflict, seeing it not only as an obstacle to development, but also as a potential source of social innovation and change (Duffield 2001; Cramer 2006). It also begins to explore the hybridity that characterises many contemporary contexts, situating the provision of security and the experience of end-users within wider social relations. This not only opens up the security-development nexus to critical empirical scrutiny, but, by suggesting that the meaning of security is contingent upon the contexts within which it is constructed, challenges researchers to empirically investigate security from the perspective of end-users, i.e. those who are most vulnerable and insecure.

2.2 Definitions: The Two Faces of Security

Our definitions start from the assertion that security derives its normative force from the idea that public power is used to protect not just the state, but also its citizens. In other words, the bedrock of state security is citizen security. However, in no way should this foreclose analysis of who ‘owns’ security, who benefits and how it is contested. Thus, although security remains a highly disputed concept we argue it is also a highly necessary one.

To study security empirically one needs definitions that cut across multiple layers of meaning. Analysis should grasp the forms security takes in the contested political terrains of supposedly fragile, or conflict-affected countries, and regions. Furthermore, although we share much common ground with citizen and with human security, we suggest analysis should focus more explicitly on
the social relationships, which determine the safety and welfare of those protected. This includes the ability of end users to act as political and social agents in their own right.

Thus, our definition of security contains two central elements that are complementary yet at times contradictory sides of the same coin. The first is on the ‘supply side’ and highlights how the effects of security are produced in states and other social orders. It reflects both our analytical focus upon HPOs and current policy concerns with state fragility and stabilisation.

**Security is a process of political and social ordering, maintained through authoritative discourses and practices of power.**

Traditional state-centred security privileges the state as both the subject and the object of security: the state both delivers security and is ‘secured’ from external and internal threats. However, our definition does not see security as a fixed end-state, nor does it identify it exclusively with the nation state. As well as the local, everyday processes of political and social ordering, the definition includes international security, i.e. the processes of political and social ordering, which ensure peace and security among states, and the processes of social ordering that extend across state boundaries. Furthermore, it is recognised that the processes central to security will in some instances operate in parallel with the state, even complementing it, while in others they will compete with it. For example, peacekeeping organisations, regional anti-crime and drug control initiatives, traditional and local-level justice institutions, and even local warlords, mafias and militias that enjoy authority in the areas they control variously complement and compete with the state depending on the nature of their interests.

Yet to identify security solely with the creation and maintenance of political and social order is also deeply problematic. In authoritarian systems or criminal orders it all too easily becomes identified with ‘the imposed silence and normalised quiet of power’– i.e. with enforced stability rather than security.\(^5\) Thus, we contend that security is also built upon the bedrock of legitimate power, being an entitlement of those who are protected. Hence, security also has a ‘demand side’. This is implied by our focus on end-users as well as conceptions of social protection, human rights and human and citizen security.

**Security is an entitlement of citizens, and more of widely human beings, to protection from violence and other forms of existential risk.**

Our two-part definition suggests that security is comprised of the web of relationships between political and social orders, and the entitlements between individuals and groups. This notion is applicable whether security arrangements are investigated in relation to citizens of states, members of local communities, vulnerable groups, or associations of humankind in some larger sense. This definition advances our argument that security is created and maintained through authoritative discourses and practices of power. In many cases these processes take place amongst a variety of actors and organisations contending and cooperating to establish structures of public authority. In particular, within weak and fragile states actors and organisations find opportunities to create, change, or sustain institutions that (re)produce favoured distributions of public goods such as

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security. This can be done in the name, and with the resources, of the state, religions, ethnic customs, the market and/or international laws, or through innovative combinations of any of the above. In essence, the provision of security becomes hybridised in a manner that reflects the overarching political order. We will return to this idea in our discussion of hybridity.

In reality this means that security tends to be unequally distributed: locally, nationally, and globally, and insecurity tends to fall disproportionately upon particular categories of end-users: the poor, vulnerable, excluded, and marginal. Although such an understanding acknowledges that authoritative practices of power tend to be identified with states, especially in realist thinking about security, our definitions are designed to allow for investigations of the processes that take place at levels of authority above, beyond and below the state. To capture this idea it is worth elaborating further the line of reasoning that led to these definitions.

Firstly, the dual definition interrogates the assumption that security is a public good necessary for development. Security, unlike development, tends to be a discourse of order and risk-avoidance rather than of change and transformation. Yet, it is also commonplace to argue that domestic security and political order are prerequisites for development. Our understanding allows for deep tensions between the two normative goals. For example, where security has become the governing principle of state policy, as in the national security states of mid 20th century Latin America or the pre-Arab Spring Middle East, it may actually harm development and reduce the safely and welfare of citizens (Barack and David 2009; Imbusch 2011).

Secondly, our definitions posit security and insecurity as inseparable from the exercise of political power; security is itself politically contested, sometimes violently. Those who protect security are typically mandated to use force or threats of force, as well as to maintain surveillance and gather intelligence about those considered a risk to public order. Thus, in parts of the Middle East and Central Asia, security provision tends to be inseparable from the deep state, obscuring parallel political agendas and open to all manner of abuses (Tabyshalieva 2006; Hanafi and Long 2010). Hence the mandates of security institutions, their accountability, observance of the rule of law, and respect for the rights of citizens are paramount issues in any political system.

Thirdly, by emphasising the hybrid nature of security we reject a purely state-centric approach. Instead we seek to uncover complex arrays of international, state, and non-state actors, who all cooperate and compete for power and resources, and determine patterns of security and insecurity. Thus, the definitions recognise that governance of (in)security, especially in conflict prone and post colonial states, is ‘multilayered’ (Scheye 2009; Baker 2010). The actors and institutions responsible for security range from the primarily global, such as the UN, international peacekeepers, private military companies or transnational militant movements, to the mainly national including national security and justice institutions, and the national governments and legislatures to which they are accountable, to the mostly local, including civil society, traditional leaders, business communities, and community security and justice bodies (Menkhaus 2007; Mallet 2010). More controversially, as we argue later, actors who operate beyond the rule of law and are often considered illiberal by Western paradigms, such as warlords, paramilitaries, millenarian cults, anti-globalisation movements and mafias, cannot be left out of contemporary security analysis (Reno 1998; Goodhand and Mansfield 2010).

Fourthly, when we emphasise that security is an entitlement of end-users we share common ground with current conceptions of human and citizen security (World Bank 2011; Jolly and Basu Ray 2007; Kaldor 2007). Despite flaws, these conceptions retain a radical cutting edge useful for analysis of social orders within which security arrangements are constructed through processes that sustain inequalities of power, status and wealth, be they global, within states, or in local communities. This brings to the fore the fact that the costs of the unequal distribution of security,
vertically as well as horizontally, often fall disproportionately upon poor, vulnerable, and excluded groups and individuals (Dixon and Moon 1989; Korf 2004; Hossain 2006; Mehler 2009; Fluri 2011). By emphasising that security is an entitlement we also stress the agency and voice of end-users, including their ability to protest, mobilise around their rights and hold those responsible for delivering security accountable.

Lastly, by focusing upon authoritative discourses and practices of power, we emphasise that security is tied up with deep issues about political rights and obligations. In principle, those who deliver security should have credible and legitimate mandates, based ultimately on the consent of those secured (i.e. end-users) as well as upon accountability to legislatures and other democratic institutions. However, in practice end-users tend to regard the claims made upon them by states and social orders as authoritative to the extent that they deliver tangible benefits on an everyday basis. Thus, security is viewed as an authoritative discourse because it entails rights and entitlements as well as obligations. Yet it is the obligations, which are most stressed in state-centric approaches to security. Controversies over these obligations tend to arise in cases where the label of international or regional security is used to manage, or paper over, local systems of occupation and repression as in Palestine, or where national security is invoked to justify rights abuses by authoritarian regimes as in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria (Hanafi 2010). In the cases of these countries, security provision was a contested political object embedded in relations of power and was ultimately challenged as such by those groups that rose against their governments.

Hence these are more than just definitional issues. Rather, they indicate deep tensions and contradictions in the theory and practice of security itself. In broad terms one can say that state security is necessary for some modicum of political order, but that in many instances it stands in conflict with human and citizen security. How these tensions are negotiated depends not only on state security providers, but also on end-users—those whom states and social orders are supposed to protect. Therefore, end-users are at the heart of our enquiry into the literature and we pay particularly close attention to research which uncovers their voices, asks how they themselves perceive security and insecurity, examines how they demand accountability from state security and justice institutions, and asks how they cope when the latter are ineffective, corrupt or oppressive.

3. ‘Hybrid’ Security Arrangements Within Fragile and Conflict-Affected Spaces

Our reconsideration of security has placed the focus upon the hybrid nature of security arrangements and the complex ways in which they tend to be negotiated within fragile and conflict affected spaces. To better understand how and for whom these security arrangements ‘work’ we shall now spell out the concept of hybrid security arrangements.

‘Hybrid’ security arrangements are characterised by complex interactions among a variety of actors following different animating logics and drawing on varying sources of authority within fragile and conflict-affected spaces.

The emerging hybrid political orders (HPOs) literature arises from critiques of existing analysis of the state. It deploys the concept of hybridity to aid analysis of governance contexts, which juxtapose diverse political and social actors. It aims to explain the interactions of traditional, personal, kin-based or clientelistic logics with modern, imported, or rational actor logics (Boege et al. 2009;
Richmond 2009; Mallet 2010; MacGinty 2011). However, the literature’s use of hybridity does not denote the ‘grafting’ together of separate actors and institutions to make new entities (MacGinty 2011). Instead, it denotes the ‘(re)negotiation and transformation’ or ‘unmaking’ and ‘remaking’ of political orders (Mallet 2010). This approach reflects a broader reconsideration of the analysis of state failure and fragility. Thus, the authors associated with the literature purposefully avoid characterising states that differ in their evolution from the Westphalian liberal state model as failing, fragile, or weak.

Though the processes it focuses on are often presented in terms of the interactions between the formal and informal actors and organising logics, few authors restrict ‘hybridity’ to this distinction alone (Kraushaar and Lamback 2009). Rather, as Wennmann (2011) argues, HPOs are characterised by the existence of multiple non-state providers of ‘security, welfare and representation’, as the state shares ‘authority, legitimacy, and capacity’ with other actors, networks and institutions that transcend the formal / informal distinction. Thus, the HPOs literature draws on the work of scholars investigating historical and contemporary instances of ‘legal pluralism’, ‘twilight institutions’, ‘mediated’ and ‘negotiated’ states (Griffiths 1986, Menkhaus 2006, Lund 2007, Hagmann and Peclard 2010). This allows it to argue that public authorities, including the state, ‘wax and wane’ as governance arrangements are never definitely formed but in a constant process of reproduction, negotiation and flux (Lund 2007: 697).

This broad understanding of hybridity de-naturalises prevailing images of the state and, by extension, the wider political order. It recognises that in many contexts public services including security and justice, are provided by actors and institutions beyond the state. Thus, it calls for empirically grounded understanding of when and how both formal and informal governance arrangements benefit wider populations and when they fail those they deem to govern. The ultimate object is to understand how public authorities ‘manage, exploit, and coexist with [HPOs]’ and to help them ‘to provide human and national security to their populations’ (Clunan and Trinkunas 2010). In sum, the HPOs literature’s use of ‘hybridity’ enables a more nuanced analysis of interactions between traditional, patronage, clientelistic, or tribalistic structures and ‘modern’ institutions with imported or rational actor logics.

Many studies of HPOs have concentrated on the provision of security and justice. For instance, Mallet (2010) uses Lund’s (2006) concept of ‘twilight institutions’ to describe the security and authority roles delegated to Northern Mozambique’s local chiefs by state officials and international donor organisations. Goodhand and Mansfield (2010) argue that Afghanistan’s warlords use their domination of illicit economies and patrimonial ‘joint extraction regimes’ to build political legitimacy through the provision of security and social services to client communities (Snyder 2006). Similarly, Menkhaus (2006) introduces the concept of the ‘mediated state’ to explain the manner in which the Somali government partners, co-opts or sub-contracts state security functions to localised coalitions of religious, clan and business leaders in order to assure secure trading markets, set up local courts and maintain traditional patterns of domination.

For the actors interested in shaping political orders, security and justice have ‘an almost unmatched symbolic prestige’ as these goods carry ‘connotations of right, certainty and power’ (Tamanaha 1993). Accordingly, the power to create new, and shape existing, security and justice institutions is argued to be intimately bound up with the political processes central to state making and state breaking (Ahmed 2006; E; Baker and Scheye 2007; Abrahamsen and Williams 2008; Gould 2007; North et al 2009). This phenomenon has accelerated and taken on a new character in recent years due to two main processes. Firstly, neo-liberal states increasingly look to outsource and privatise functions related to security and justice, and, secondly, many states have been forced to come to terms with their own inability or unwillingness to extend such services across the breadth of their de jure territory.
Their inherent ambiguity and complexity make HPOs difficult to empirically investigate and categorise. Furthermore, analysis of how the contests and negotiations within HPOs work, and for whom, must be carefully separated from assertions about their political or normative desirability as governance arrangements. It has to be acknowledged that HPOs can include actors and institutions that generate insecurities or reinforce patterns of social or gender exclusion. Indeed the constitution of public authority and the provision of public goods in HPOs rarely correspond to Western normative standards for governance and one may argue that the concept of hybridity works best as a critique of existing state-building and governance approaches, rather than offering a credible and well defined alternative to the latter.

To capture this complexity our broad understanding of HPOs covers a variety of situations in which different animating logics and forms of political authority coexist, collaborate, or compete to construct security arrangements. For instance religiously inspired armed movements, like the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, often have their own formal arrangements for providing security and justice in areas under their control, with strict rules for governing local populations. At the same time their capacity to provide these public goods is intimately connected to how they choose to integrate, cop-opt or compete with local tribal structures, as well as the institutions of the central state and indeed the international community. Thus, it would make little sense to characterise such political-religious movements as in essence informal, traditional or pre-modern, even though they challenge existing government institutions and work to frustrate Western notions of state-building. Although this vastly complicates the investigation of the spatial and temporal sites within which HPOs are negotiated, such interactions must not be overlooked by investigations that aim to understand the complexity of security arrangements.

The HPOs approach is, not surprisingly, controversial. Its critics tend to characterise the resulting structures as pathogenic, weakening or replacing government, and eroding political accountability and democratic governance. Thus, hybrid structures undoubtedly raise important and challenging questions. For example; to whom are they accountable, and how is the ‘public interest’ protected in the face of patronage and the profit motive of private parties? Do they simply legitimise the inclusion of spoilers within government? Is it possible to institutionalise what may be fluid and personality-dependent structures?

Despite these controversies, we argue that a flexible definition of HPOs may be consistent with the WDR 2011’s emphasis upon ‘collaborative, inclusive-enough coalitions’ which ‘restore confidence and transform institutions and help create continued momentum for positive change’ (World Bank 2011). Nevertheless the WDR 2011 is for the most part reticent about the political processes through which these coalitions might be formed in contexts of conflict and state fragility. Nor does it lay down clear criteria by which one might decide empirically that such coalitions are ‘inclusive-enough’ to ensure citizen security. State-builders are enjoined in general to seek ‘local legitimacy’ and involve ‘broader segments of society—local governments, business, labour, civil society movements, [and] in some cases opposition parties’ (World Bank 2011). Such an approach would seem broadly consistent with an end-user and well as an HPOs approach to security arrangements. Yet not much further is said about how WDR 2011’s approach might be put into practice in the complex and contested political environments of ‘fragile’ states.

However investigators can use the lens of social inclusion to begin to distinguish those HPOs that provide for workable public authority from HPOs that merely reinforce ‘elite bargains’, ‘coalitions’ or ‘pacts’ or indeed most historic forms of ‘limited access orders,’ which only seek the capacity to ‘contain violence and to secure the property, economic interests, and opportunities of pact members’ (Tilly 1998; Lindemann 2008; North et al. 2009). Nevertheless making such distinctions

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6 Beyond the obvious (and circular) criterion that inclusive-enough coalitions are those which best ensure citizen security
is analytically complex and very hard to operationalise empirically. In the real world many HPOs may be inclusive in certain respects but also remain limited access orders in many other respects.

Indeed Chabal and Daloz (1999) talk of the political functions of disorder in apparently dysfunctional states. Similarly, when coupled with our definition of security, our understanding of HPOs aims to uncover the deep tensions that often arise between the declared or manifest functions of security actors and institutions, and their undeclared or latent agendas. Thus, in countries with corrupt or abusive institutions, such as Mexico and Uganda, those responsible for delivering security and justice are often the perpetrators of insecurity (Serrano et al. 2011; Baker 2010). Conversely the alleged agents of insecurity, such as warlords or fundamentalist clerics in Afghanistan or Somalia, may offer alternative forms of protection or even claim to act as liberators (Goodhand and Mansfeld 2010; Renders and Terlinden 2010). Even in the donor-saturated contexts we analyse later in this paper, some national and international actors may have political or financial reasons for supporting security arrangements that perpetuate conflict. All of these examples take place within hybrid political spaces in which international and national actors coexist, collaborate, and compete to achieve their ends. Thus, they are far from the neutral, uncontested and self-contained spaces found in the mainstream security literature.

Our approach to hybrid security arrangements also encompasses the interactions between social actors and institutions following the logic of the marketplace on the one hand, and that of the state on the other hand. In particular, it acknowledges the work of North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) who join scholars attempting to identify the processes that create the ‘rules of the game’ within fragile societies (Khan 2000; Snyder 2006, Di John and Putzel 2009). They argue that all societies face the threat of violent distributional struggles. The solution is seen to rest with the ability of local elites to negotiate credible coalitions and enforce barriers-to-entry, thus limiting non-elites’ access to economic and political opportunities. When belonging to successful coalitions, elites may conclude that they are better off peacefully strengthening their patrimonial networks and security arrangements rather than engaging in further violence or in any meaningful processes of reform. However, strengthening, institutionalising and legitimising the coalition’s domination of the ‘political marketplace’ can also lead to the provision of important public goods including security, to a larger constituency of supporters (de Waal 2010). In many cases such arrangements are negotiated between actors at multiple levels: local, regional, state, and international, with diverse and sometimes conflicting aims. Yet, it must be recognised that the domination of material, political and symbolic resources by such coalitions can also entrench forms of inequality, which lead to the politicisation of identities, and a rise in insecurity (Stewart 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Østby 2008).

Although broad, our definitions of hybridity and security are derived from our reading of the recent debates in the literature. Viewed together, they suggest that to qualify as robust, empirical analysis should focus on the shifting coalitions and political accommodations that characterise HPOs, their relationships to security arrangements, and the perspectives and experiences of end-users. Below we consider how far the existing literature on security in contexts of conflict and state fragility meets these criteria.
4. The Literature Searches: methodology and findings

This section contains an abridged discussion of the literature review conducted by the paper’s research team. Full methodological details, results and an extensive commentary can be found in the appendix.\(^7\) The literature review was undertaken to answer our main research question and contribute to our research aims. It draws upon the working definitions of our key terms ‘end-user benefit’, ‘security’ and ‘hybrid governance and security arrangements’ outlined earlier. Each of these definitions has been designed to fulfil an analytical purpose: to support our research question as well as to inform our inclusion or exclusion criteria during the literature searches.

We then move to a broad overview of the evidence uncovered through the database and peer led search phases. We examine the general methodologies, contexts, themes, actors and expected but absent literature that can be identified through analysis of the gathered sources. Although we aim at general conclusions, we recognise that much of the literature covered in our searches is specific to time and place; varies between regional, national and cultural contexts; and marks shifts, sometimes radical ones, between historical periods, taking various forms in different political and social spaces. We argue that more nuanced alternative ways of examining the research literature are required in order extend enquiries beyond existing state-centric security discourses. We approach this challenge in two ways: Firstly, through a discussion of the short case studies interspersed throughout the analysis section and secondly, by following up the broad overview of the searches with a suggested typology of hybrid spaces - **Securitised Border Spaces**, **Fragile Leviathans**, and **Donor-Saturated Policy Spaces** - that is used to aid a deeper exploration of the sampled literature in Section 5 below.

4.1 The Goals and Methods of the Literature Searches

The literature searches aimed to explore the existing evidence about end-users’ experiences of hybrid security arrangements in fragile and conflict-affected spaces. They comprised three phases: a **systematic database search**, a **peer-led search**, and a **within-group knowledge-based search**. The searches aimed to locate empirical studies satisfying three overarching criteria: (a) they should be concerned with the provision of security arrangements, insecurity or violent conflict, (b) they should investigate how these affect the lives, entitlements and agency of end-users, particularly poor and vulnerable people, and (c) they should in some way analyse the political conditions in which security is determined in situations of hybrid governance. The works sourced within the first two phases were read, graded and annotated following the Justice and Security Research Programme (JSRP) grading method.\(^8\) This resulted in annotated bibliographies, which form the basis for our critical engagement with the literature presented in the subsequent sections of this paper.

The first phase of the literature review consisted of a systematic exploration of the published academic and grey literature relating to our research question. The goal was to arrive at a representative snapshot of the literature that would allow for an investigation of the empirical gaps in the evidence base that answers our primary research question. Based on the primary research question three key terms, *security*, *hybrid governance*, and *human security*, were chosen to run through eighteen online databases. Each term was broken down into fifteen or more synonyms agreed upon by the research team. When necessary the results of the database searches were narrowed using country names and article publication dates. This made the search more manageable given the size of the team and the time constraints. Once narrowed, each returned database query

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\(^7\) Appendix E.

\(^8\) This was developed at the London School of Economics (LSE) using the DFID evidence grading guidelines and with input from JSRP partners. See ‘JSRP evidence grading template’- Appendix F.
was screened for articles that appeared to be applicable to our research, using a qualitative selection criterion designed to reflect the interests of our primary research question. Articles that appeared suitable were sourced and stored for later grading. This process produced an initial result of 114,699 citations, which was narrowed to 168 articles chosen as potentially valuable for answering the research question. These were passed onto the grading exercise stage of the database query.9

The second phase of the evidence gathering was a peer-based inquiry of academic experts and in a few cases activists and security practitioners from Europe, North America, Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. The research team leader chose participants in consultation with team members.10 The sample included 137 experts, with approximately half drawn from the global North (Europe, Australasia and North America) and half from the global South (Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East).11 With 52% of those contacted actually responding, the inquiry gathered evidence submissions from 71 experts: 36 from the global North and 35 from the South. Each respondent was asked to identify five research pieces that they believed addressed the team’s central research question. In order to systematise their responses, participants were also asked to follow a version of the qualitative selection criteria applied to the database articles. Participants received an initial email and then a second reminder roughly a month later. Recommended books were added to a list for later use.12 Unfortunately, due to time constraints books could not be graded but were added to a list for later use.13 In total 114 recommended articles were sourced and graded.14

During the third phase members of the research team carried out short case studies on the state of the security and end-user focussed literature on the following conflict-affected regions: Afghanistan, Pakistan’s western frontier, the Arab Spring countries, Yemen, Palestine, the Horn of Africa, DRCongo and the Great Lakes, and Central Asia. The choice of regions reflected the research team’s expertise and lays no claims to wider representativeness. However the case studies were seen as a necessary antidote to the tendency of some of the research and policy literature to ignore the historical, regional and national specificity of security arrangements. Researchers were tasked with identifying key research publications and with providing brief overviews of the political and security contexts of each national and regional case. Attention was paid to the framing of the regions as potential examples of hybrid security and governance arrangements, and the evidence gaps in the literature as perceived by each author.

### 4.2 How Robust are the Findings of the Research Literature?

Broadly viewed, the systematic database and peer led searches uncovered surprisingly little high quality research able to match all three of our search criteria. Within the database searches, 74 sources were coded as containing less than 10% empirical data relating to our inclusion criteria, 53 between 10% and 50%, and 75 more than 50%. Amongst these there were only 16 quantitative studies in total, only 7 of which gathered their own datasets, the remainder relying on existing data sets. In comparison, there were 49 primary interview-based studies across both searches and 20 observation-based studies. Thus overall, studies based upon primary research were predominantly qualitative; employing unstructured interviews, focus-group discussions, and key informant

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9 Appendix A.
10 Appendix D
11 From the North the respondents included 6 respondents from the JSRP research team itself (out of 14 contacted); 11 other respondents from the UK and Ireland (out of 18 contacted), 9 respondents from continental Europe (out of 20 contacted) and 10 respondents from North America and Australasia (out of 18 contacted). There was a similarly even spread of respondents from the global South, including 10 (out of 21 contacted) from Sub-Saharan Africa, 9 (out of 19 contacted) from the Middle East, 8 (out of 13 contacted) from Asia and 8 (out of 14 contacted) from Latin America).
12 Appendix C
13 Appendix C
14 Appendix B
interviews or some mixture of these. No less than fifty-six sources fell under the ‘other’ category, within which empirical data mainly consisted of archival literature or government reports, commonly ending in recommendations of actions for policy actors.

Figure 1:

Methods Used in Peer and Database Led Searches

4.3 Geographical Coverage of the Literature Surveyed

Not surprisingly countries in regions in which Western donors have engaged heavily in security and development issues such as South Asia (40) and West Africa (49)\(^{15}\) were better represented in our searches than countries in which they have engaged less with these issues such as Central Asia (4) and East Asia (26)\(^ {16}\). Notably there was substantial representation of countries where the international community has engaged through ‘hard’ security policy tools: especially Afghanistan (19) but also Iraq (4), Pakistan (6) Somalia (9) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (9). Other countries relatively well represented in the searches included Sierra Leone (17), Liberia (14), DRC (11), Sudan (7), East Timor (5) and Sri Lanka (4). In sum these results suggest that the research community has tended to focus upon societies still facing or recently facing major humanitarian or political challenges, rather than those where such challenges have been largely overcome. Nevertheless, South Africa (12) was well represented in the searches, due no doubt to its prominence as a paradigm case of security transformation, as well as the fact that it has faced ongoing problems of social exclusion and criminal violence since the transition from apartheid. A scattering of other countries that have made ‘successful’ war-to-peace transitions were also present; Angola (3), Ethiopia (3), Cambodia (1) Cyprus (1), Somaliland (1) and Nicaragua (1).

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\(^{15}\) Appendix C

\(^{16}\) This bias might have been partly negated had Russian, East Asian, Middle Eastern or Latin American databases been included - although the team lacked the necessary language skills. However, consulted experts with more experience of the Arab world informed the research team that there is a general absence of comparable databases in Arabic.
Although the Middle East (41) was well covered with Lebanon (12), Iraq (4), Israel (5), and Palestine (9) all featuring frequently in both searches, a single paper on Algeria was the only study on security dynamics in North Africa \(^{17}\) and Libya was not covered at all. This may reflect the fact that the Arab Springs were largely unforeseen by the contemporary research community (Kaufmann 2011). In South Asia most of the focus was upon Afghanistan (19); Nepal (2), Kashmir (2), and Sri Lanka (3) were less well represented in the literature searches despite recent or ongoing conflicts in these countries. In general it is encouraging that the searches uncovered a significant body of peer reviewed literature on such fragile and politically contested societies despite the well known difficulties of conducting academically rigorous, and therefore publishable, research in such contexts.

4.4 The Main Research Themes: Still a State-Centric Bias?

Despite search criteria that strongly emphasised human security and end-users, the searches nevertheless returned a significant proportion of empirical studies of international intervention and state-building, particularly in the database search (Bah 2010, Hasic 2004, Hazen 2007, Menkhaus 2010, Gordon 2010, Goodhand and Sedra 2010, Hanafi and Long 2010, Wilder 2010). These were accompanied by more analytically focused works around the same themes (Higate and Henry 2010, Muggah and Krause 2009; Fischer and Schmelzle 2009). A major issue raised in a number of these sources, but tackled in considerable depth by Wardak et al’s work on Afghanistan (2008), was the difficulty of creating peacebuilding and humanitarian spaces in countries characterised by extreme violence and a heavy international presence. Reform of state security apparatus, including SSR, was also relatively well covered in both searches (Albrecht and Jackson 2009, Augé 2008, Ball 2006, Barak and David 2009, Marchal 2009). In addition a number of studies considered the impacts of

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\(^{17}\) This was an unexpected result given the region’s troubled history and the inclusion of French databases in the search.
DDR, including within societies into which ex-combatants are integrated (Lambach 2007, Derks et al 2011, Ruow and Willems 2010, Willems et al 2010, Widjojo et al 2008).

The state-centric bias of the literature surveyed was partially redressed by a number of studies of non-state security and justice provision. This included analyses of violent hybrid political movements such as the PLO, Hizbollah, Hamas in Lebanon and Palestine or militants in Nepal, operating both inside and outside state institutions, (Atzili 2010, Azani 2011, Hanafi 2010, Bohara et al 2006); of civil society including women’s groups that have resisted violence and attempted to create alternative non-violent forms of civic action (Fluri 2009, 2011, Garcia-Duran 2006, Moestue and Muggah 2009); of coalitions of traditional or clan authorities, civic and business groups adapting to state collapse and establishing new forms of public order, as in Somalia and Somaliland or the Eastern DRC (Menkhaus 2004 and 2006, Raeymakers 2010); of militias and criminal networks acting as political entrepreneurs and agents of both order and disorder, including their interface with formal justice and security institutions (Briscoe and Rodriguez 2010, Vlassenroot 2002, Jensen 2010, Jutersonke et al 2009); and of chiefs and other customary institutions dispensing justice and brokering relationships between states and societies, secular and spiritual power (Leonardi 2007, Tariq 2009, Scharf 2003, Isser et al 2009).

Relatively few empirical studies were found that investigated the theorised linkages (Baker 2010) between formal and informal institutions (Albrecht and Buur 2009, Samara 2009, Isser 2009). Those that were located concentrated mostly on the emergence of hybrid forms of security provision, often contracted out to a variety of non-state providers, in situations of fragile or contested statehood (Scheye 2009, Abrahamsen and Williams 2009, Habibie Center 2010). A few studies also focused on the different ways the privatisation of security has brought ‘shadow sovereigns’ (Nordstrom 2002) into being: through the activities of private security companies (Abrahamsen and Williams 2008, Rimli and Schmeidl 2007); via the nexus between oil and other natural resources and armed conflict (Le Billon 2001, Ross 2004, Ibeanu 2006, Omeje 2006); and through the spread of the ‘conflict trade’ (Cooper 2002) and of the drug trade (Dowdney 2003, Moraes and Nougier 2010).

There was a certain amount of coverage, especially in the peer search, of human security (Tabyshalieva 2006, UNDP 2004, 2010) including the survival strategies and informal networks of disadvantaged and conflict-affected households and groups (Korf 2004, Lorenzo-Lindell 2002); perceptions of everyday insecurity in conflict areas (Fluri 2011, Kumssa et al 2011, Wardak et al 2008); the enduring legacies of agrarian conflict in post-conflict settings (Van Leeuwen 2010); the links between urban poverty and criminal violence (Jensen 2010, Jutersonke et al 2009); and the role of poverty alleviation and local level security provision in the context of counterinsurgency (Jones and Munoz 2010).

Only a handful of the sources, however, focused directly upon the gender dimensions of security and insecurity (Hamber et al 2006, Fluri 2009, 2011, Chandler et al 2010, Moufflet 2008) despite search terms which singled out both women and gender as major categories of interest. Ethnic and religious identities were not quite as badly served as gender; with a number of studies focusing on the relationships between ethnic, religious and gender identities (Hamber 2006); the instrumentalisation of rape to reinforce ethnic inclusion and exclusion (Moufflet 2008); the entrenchment of identity-based segregation within educational systems and other social institutions (Den Boer and Van der Borgh 2011); ethnic and religious ties in hybrid patronage and political networks (Brendschot 2009, El-Kareh 2008); heightened insecurity around identities within disintegrating local structures (Hirt 2010); and the manipulation of hybrid identities during political transition and conflict (Reyntjens 2006, Donais et al 2003, Kefale 2010, Constantinou 2007).
4.5 Social Actors and Representation of End-users

The apparent bias of the studies located towards state institutions was somewhat counterbalanced when considering the social actors featured in the sample. By a considerable margin poor and vulnerable groups (including refugees and war victims) were the most referenced actors in both searches. Civil society and local-level groups also cropped up frequently, particularly within the peer search. Women were also singled out, but solely in the database search. Traditional and/or religious leaders and justice institutions were also referred to, although not as often as other local groups. Ex-combatants, including child soldiers and women combatants were another group featured, again in a relatively few studies.

Private sector, political and social elites and members of the military and police establishments appeared in both searches, the latter less often than one might have expected from state-centric bias detected in our classification of themes. Members of the official military, police and security establishments were mentioned more often in the database than in the peer search, but no more than non-state armed actors, including warlords, militias and criminal groups. International intervention forces and peacekeepers were also mentioned, indeed more often than other international actors, including international and regional organisations, international NGOs and bilateral donors (indeed the latter were not referred to at all in the literature we searched).

Figure 3:
4.6 Main Limitations and Omissions of the Searches

The searches concentrated very largely on peer-reviewed articles. However, the peer search also generated a bibliography of books, monographs, and reports that was far longer than what had been uncovered by the database queries. These included a number of book length anthropological studies of how security arrangements impact on, and are experienced by, end-users in particular national or regional contexts (Brinks 2008; Coulter 2006; Vigh 2006). There were reports commissioned by governments or non-governmental organisations, examining security sector reform, governance, and livelihoods in specific localities (Lebrun and Muggah 2005; Scheye 2009; Jones and Munoz 2010). A number of monographic studies cited investigated security over longer time periods than usual in the peer reviewed research article format (Abrahamsen and Williams 2008; Hill et al. 2007; Willems et al. 2010). In general the peer searches seemed to provide a more accurate snapshot of the diversity of evidence relating to end-user experiences under hybrid security arrangements than the database searches.

Both searches were almost as notable for what they left out as for what they included. Several major publications and researchers in the security and development field did not come up in the searches at all or were only cited once. Those cited only once in either search included key analysts such as Baker (2010), Chandler (2000), Cramer (2006), Goodhand and Sedra (2010), Nordstrom (2002), MacGinty (2011) Jütersonke et al. (2009) Paris (2002) and Richards (Chaveau and Richards 2008). It is notable that some of the most seminal researchers in the field of conflict, security and development were not cited at all among the peer-reviewed articles of either search. Works by Kaldor (2000), Keen (1994), Koonings and Kruijt (2004), Richmond (2011) and Uvin (2009) were among the books and monographs gathered by the peer search but there were no references at all to others such as Boas (2010), Hills (2009 and 2011), DeWaal (2009 and 2010) and Kalyvas (2006). Equally surprisingly, the work of Collier and Hoeflter (2004) or Fearon and Laitin (2003) on the economic and other determinants of violent conflict did not feature in either of the systematic searches.

Notable omissions within the fields of SSR and DDR included Cawthra and Luckham’s (2003) critical treatment of democratic control of security establishments, Sayigh’s (2007) pathbreaking analysis of SSR in the Middle East, Hutchful’s (2009) study of the role of SSR in peace agreements and Hendrickson’s (2008) empirical studies of defence decision-making. There were very few analyses seriously scrutinising security reforms from the point of view of end-users (Bakrania 2010, Loden 2007, Nathan 2007 are exceptions). Also omitted was Woodward (2003) whose question ‘in whose interests is security sector reform’, originally posed in the context of the Balkans, is especially pertinent for an end-user perspective.

There was only a scattering of studies of the gender dimensions of security, with no references at all to the work of key analysts like Enloe (1998, 2000 and 2004) or Moser (Moser and Clark 2001); Coulter (2006 and 2009) was referenced but only among the books uncovered by the peer search. These omissions may reflect the focus of our research terms and the strict inclusion criteria given to both the researchers and the contacted peers. On the other hand they may also point to a general neglect of end-user perspectives and non-state processes within the security research community.

Across both searches a few African researchers featured (Abdullah 2010; Aning et al. 2008; Bah 2010; Ibeanu 2006; Isima 2006; Omeje 2006 and 2009, Tar 2005). Seminal texts by African authors such as Mamdani (1996), Mbembe (2001), Hutchful and Bathily (1998), and by prominent Africanists such as Bayart (1993), Boas (2010), Lemarchand (2009), Lund (2006) or Reno (1998 and 2008) appeared only in the peer booklist or not at all. Authors from Latin America (Garcia-Duran 2004; Serrano et al 2011), Asia (Caballero-Anthony 2005; Sundar 2006; Tariq 2009) and the

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19 Appendix C
Middle East (Azani 2011; Djebbi 2006; Hannafi 2010) were no better represented. More encouragingly, however, a few of the uncovered papers were the product of partnerships between researchers from Northern and Southern institutions or between scholars (Bohara et al. 2006; Long and Hanafi 2010; Azarbaijani-Mmoghaddam et al. 2008; Kumssa et al. 2011). The Western-centric authorship of the sources recommended in both searches might be attributable to the self-referential tendencies of the research community, as well as the difficulties faced by Southern scholars in getting their research funded and published. Only a deeper search of Southern institutions and publications in Spanish, Portuguese and Arabic for example would ascertain whether there is a significant body of non-Western research that our searches may have missed.

Very few of the references in the peer driven search and bibliography were cited by more than one of our respondents. Moreover, there was remarkably little overlap between the references uncovered in the database and those found in the peer searches. However, the peer led search fared rather better at locating well-known resources, including key journal special issues or particularly influential books relevant to the primary research questions (Cramer 2006; Duffield 2007). Indeed, although it was not called for in the terms of reference, some participants even suggested entire online resources. 20

Both searches failed to report many of the academic articles, organisational reports, and opinion pieces deemed most significant by paper’s research team. Moreover ‘staple’ official or grey literature such as the World Bank’s World Development Report 2011, DFID’s and OECD’s reports on ‘fragile states’ and ‘good governance’ and the International Crisis Group’s commonly referenced country reports did not surface. Conversely it should be noted that the lengthy bibliography in the WDR 2011 also leaves out many of the most important sources and references, as well as referencing very little of the literature that came up in either of our searches.

4.7 Contributions of the National and Regional Case Studies

The research team led case studies were specifically designed to fill the gaps identified in the other searches, including major historical and contextual variations in the ways in which end-users experience security and insecurity. In particular, they aimed at compensating for the neglect of entire geographic regions, most notably the Horn of Africa and the Middle East beyond Lebanon and Palestine (Ulrichsen, 2011; Dahi, 2011; Bellin, 2004). They also challenged the dominance of state-led lenses in investigations of African security arrangements, and the lack of a historical understanding of modes of hybridity in countries such as Pakistan, Sudan or the DRC (Kakakhel, 2010; White, 2008; Autesserre, 2010; Jackson, 2006; Schomerus and Allen 2010). They also encouraged the team to think about new ways to frame the literature pertaining to hybridity, security, and end-users.

Indeed the database and peer searches managed to identify remarkably little of the impressive in-depth research and analysis highlighted in the case studies, apart from a handful of references to the Middle East and North Africa (Barak and David 2009, Hanafi 2010 and Hanafi and Long 2010). The case studies also referenced established grey resources such as the International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch, as well organisations such as the United Nations (ICG 2006; 2009; 2010a; 2010b; Global Witness 2009; UNDP 2010), which were largely ignored in the database and peer searches. It would seem that in practice researchers rely on such sources much more than the database and peer searches might indicate. The case study authors also made more use of book length studies (such as Dunn 2003; Turner 2007; Autesserre 2010; Hibou 2006; Roy 2011),

highlighting the limitations of database searches confined largely to article-length pieces, especially in situations where a research consensus has yet to be established.

The case study authors also made a point of seeking out research from an end-user perspective, especially in regard to security arrangements (Laipson 2007; ICG 2003; Leff 2009) - tending to highlight the agency of end-users including their capacity to negotiate their own security arrangements (Bruderlein 2005; Willems and Rouw 2011; White 2009). They complemented their analyses with other studies suggesting that in authoritarian or violent contexts end-users tended to suffer at the hands of both predatory elites and the international community (Alley 2011; Bellin 2004; Mkutu 2004).

Certain contextual similarities between different regions emerged among the case studies. For example, whilst it is well known that security arrangements in many conflict-affected countries are influenced in one way or another by the international community, little is known about how these international arrangements shape and in some cases are influenced in their turn by the power structures of local politics (Rothe and Collins, 2011; Dersso, 2010; Chalk, 2007; Herbst 2000). The case studies also underscored how little we know about everyday security arrangements in supposedly ungoverned regions of South Asia, Central Africa, the Balkans and the Middle East, where simplistic explanations of political dynamics have all to often dominated the field. They also reinforced the point implicit from the database and peer searches that those local actors considered malign by liberal approaches to state-building - including warlords, insurgents, and extremists (Borchgrevink 2010; Barfi 2010; White 2009) - sometimes deliver public goods including security to wider populations. In sum, the case studies have suggested that local security actors can play a wide range of roles, variously constructing equitable governance and working against it; resisting as well as cooperating with national and international actors (Mezzera et al. 2010; Putzel et al. 2008; Long and Hanafi 2010).

4.8 Overview: Why the Lack of Research and Policy Consensus?

Viewed together, the findings from the three searches did not indicate that there is much, if any, research, methodological or policy consensus about security, still less concerning its impacts on poor and vulnerable people. Each of the searches identified quite distinct bodies of literature, between which there was remarkably little overlap. Even within the confines of the peer search it would seem that our selected respondents have been working on, or have been inspired by, wildly different issue areas and locations. This is hardly surprising given the contested and hydra-headed nature of security itself and the definitional confusion that surrounds it.

Nor was there much agreement on the most appropriate methodologies. Studies based on quantitative research tended to score higher in our grading exercise, but these were few and far between in all three samples, no doubt reflecting the difficulty of pinning down complex and contested concepts such as security and hybridity in the form of quantitative indicators. Qualitative studies are arguably better suited to capturing the varied experiences of end-users as well as the shifting sands of rapidly changing historical contexts. However, many of the qualitative studies we analysed were sadly lacking in empirical rigour. Thus, a large proportion of the sources identified by our initial selection criteria were found on closer inspection to contain little or no fresh data. These findings seem to justify our original scepticism concerning the robustness of prevailing accounts of security, as well as the apparent shortage of truly end-user focused empirical studies in the mainstream or peer reviewed literature.

In sum there is a great variety of approaches and empirical studies that future research agendas can draw from. However, an enormous amount of work has to be done in order to clarify key concepts
and construct more unifying narratives for future analysis and research. Below we build on the literature uncovered by our searches, as well as other resources missed by the latter, in order to sketch an approach that reconsiders security ‘from below’, whilst recognising its hybrid nature and the multiple levels at which it is determined.

5. Reconsidering Hybrid Security Arrangements from an End-user Perspective: a multi-level approach

We propose now to interrogate our findings through three categories of hybridised political spaces namely: Unsecured Borderlands, Contested Leviathans, and Securitised Policy Spaces. We adopt this typology in order to underscore the multi-level determination of security both on the ‘demand side’ and on the ‘supply side’. Webs of security, as well as chains of insecurity, stretch from the global to the national to the most local levels and back.\(^21\) The lives and survival strategies of end-users, in particular poor and vulnerable people, depend to a significant degree upon remote national and global processes over which they have no control as well as upon powerful actors who are in no way accountable to them for the misery and insecurity they may cause. Conversely both global and national decision-makers often find themselves disconcerted by seemingly local upheavals that generate wider conflicts and insecurities: what some security analysts term ‘blowback’.

Of the three categories in our typology the one that most closely reflects our end-user perspective is that of ‘unsecured borderlands’: the supposedly ungoverned and insecure localities where the state lacks a monopoly of violence and security is delivered, if at all, by a variety of alternative primary providers. That does not mean, however, that these borderlands are isolated from global and national struggles for power and resources, indeed sometimes the reverse. What typifies them, however, is the proliferation of non-state armed actors determining the security and insecurity of end-users, and mediating between end-users, neglectful or oppressive states and distant, yet often highly intrusive, international actors.

‘Contested Leviathans’ are so termed to capture the contingent nature of state power and authority in many national contexts. Our characterisation builds on the critical literature, which challenges existing conceptualisations of the state and of state fragility as both analytically and empirically unsound (Call 2006; Menkhaus 2004, 2006; Baker 20102; Hagmann and Peclard 2010; Abrahamsen and Williams 2008, 2009; MacGinty 2011). To call them ‘fragile’ would be something of a misnomer, as even the most challenged retain considerable powers to coerce or watch over their citizens – if not to deliver security and other public goods. In these states the primary security actors are in principle the armed forces, the intelligence apparatus, police and judicial systems of the state. In reality, however, their authority tends to be disputed and their capacity to deliver security often has to be negotiated on the one hand with donors and other international actors, and on the other with a great variety of local armed and unarmed actors outside the narrow margins of the state.

‘Securitised policy spaces’ are national and regional policy arenas where the security and humanitarian concerns of the ‘international community’ tend to shape and sometimes trump those of national and local actors. We focus on them because of our concern with how the security of

\(^{21}\) Which metaphor one uses and for what has both political and analytical ramifications. ‘Webs’ implies that security is co-constructed through collaboration at the global, national and local levels – although it might also imply that social actors are caught as in a spider’s web. ‘Chains’ implies even more strongly that social actors find themselves imprisoned within coercive global, national and local structures and relationships. Yet some economists use the term ‘value chains’ to analyse the international division of labour, including that between rich and poor countries. See also Luckham (2009) where a different metaphor ‘ladders of (in)security’ is used to capture the same interconnectedness of global, national and local security arrangements.
poor and vulnerable end-users tends to be globally as well as locally determined. Our central contention is that members of the international community (including peacekeepers, donors, humanitarian agencies, international NGOs etc) in conflict-torn situations are seldom entirely neutral or disinterested. Indeed, they tend to be characterised by their own forms of hybrid politics, which can be viewed through similar analytical lenses to those turned upon national and local actors. Scrutinised through such lenses, the welfare and security of end-users all too often take second place to geopolitical concerns, inter-agency rivalries and patron-client relationships. Development, as well as security, interventions tend also to be mediated through complex webs of mutual interdependence with national and local elites, security agencies, non-state armed groups, corporate interests and others. Moreover, the international community itself is in flux and its mandate to deliver security in dangerous neighbourhoods tends to be contested, all the more now that emerging powers are challenging Western hegemony. Such a context demands not just a good understanding of the real politics of international engagement, but also of its limits and potentially perverse consequences for the security of the poor and vulnerable people it is supposed to benefit.

In sum, although we distinguish between the hybrid security arrangements that prevail at the local, national and global levels, we consider them interconnected. Our aim throughout will be to spell out the contested nature of security arrangements at each of these levels as well as their manifold interconnections. In so doing we shall draw not only upon the sources uncovered by our searches, but also upon a range of other reference materials.22

5.1 Unsecured Borderlands

Unsecured borderlands are spaces where state authority is suspended or violently challenged by alternative claimants to power and providers of security, including ‘non-state’ armed groups. Sometimes these borderlands traverse established state boundaries; but they may also take the form of unsecured spaces within existing states.

There are vast regions of the world where regular state administration has been suspended or violently challenged, sometimes for long periods. Our starting point is the security of poor and vulnerable end-users in these borderlands: how and by whom, if anyone, are they protected in the absence of the state; how do they cope with violence and insecurity; and have they any agency in determining their own security?

Unsecured borderlands are configured around both geographical and social divisions and exclusions. As the regional case studies presented in section 6.5 below describe, they often extend across national boundaries. Examples are the borderlands between Pakistan and Afghanistan and between Indian and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir (Aggarwal et al. 2009); those between eastern DRC and its neighbours in the Great Lakes (Raeymaekers 2010; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009); the transnational links spreading insecurity across Central Africa (Marchal 2009); the porous borders between Sudan and Northern Uganda (Finnstrom 2008); the transnational interconnections between Somalia, Somaliland, and Somali-speaking areas of Ethiopia and Northern Kenya; the fraught security relationships between Lebanon, Syria, Israel and Palestine; and the border spaces between Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. Indeed entire states like Somalia (Menkhaus 2004; 2006), Haiti, Central African Republic, or more arguably Yemen23 can arguably be seen as ‘regional borderlands’. National parks too share a number of the characteristics of border spaces, in some

22 These supplementary reference materials are needed because although the search criteria adopted for our literature and peer searches were specifically designed to offset the state-centric bias of the existing research and policy literatures, the sampled literature nevertheless displayed a strong focus upon states, their institutions and formal security provision.

23 See case studies below.
instances functioning as safe places, but in others becoming unpolic ed and unpolic eable spaces, where rebel s and guerrillas take refuge, as is the case in a number of the national parks in Central Africa and the Great Lakes (Dunn 2009).

Such militarised borderlands are commonly portrayed as nodes of insecurity, spreading violence within and across national boundaries, as well as globally. Nevertheless there are important differences among them, for instance between those where borders are porous and largely unpolicable as between Pakistan and Afghanistan and those where boundaries are heavily controlled and militarised, with state authority ignored or contested on either side, as in Indian- and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, or in Palestine. In al most no case, however, can regional borderlands be regarded as political voids. Well-organised security links often exist between states and non-state actors across national boundaries, such as those between Iran, Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon or between Pakistan’s military intelligence apparatus and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Much of the focus, especially in the security literature, has been upon how such links deepen insecurity and spread armed violence in border regions. But in some situations regional linkages have also been used to build peace in contested border spaces, both through trans-border cooperation amongst governments, as in ECOWAS peacekeeping in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Arthur 2011) or SADC support for peace-building in Burundi, and through civil society groups like the Mano River Union Women’s Organisat ion in West Africa. Analysis of this trans-border dimension of peace-building and especially its civil society dimension is a notable gap in the literature uncovered by our searches.

### Palestine

*Alaa Tartir*

The Palestinian case shares various features discussed in the other cases. However, it remains a particular case since the Palestinian nation still persists under a military Israeli occupation; its basic rights to security and self-determination are denied; the levels of fragmentation and Bantustanization are widening with the continuing failure of the peace process; and after two decades of the Oslo Peace Accords, an interim Palestinian Authority (PA) remains the governing body for parts of the West Bank and Gaza (WBandG). Hence a Palestinian state does not exist, either in *de jure* or in *de facto* terms.

The absence of a state and the existence of an almost ‘phantom’ authority (governance without a state), make the Palestinian case relevant to this research in that a type of hybrid governance and hybrid security has emerged and multiple state and non-state actors are co-governing and providing/creating (in)security. Although Palestinians continue to be under occupation, they also have two different conflicting governance and security paradigms in the West Bank and Gaza. The latter is Islamic, isolated, almost self-dependent, nascent, with resistance as its main tool, and is under siege and boycott, in spite of being democratically elected (*Hamas*). The West Bank is more secular and nationalistic, is highly dependent on aid and donors, relies on negotiation as its main tool, and seeks statehood (*PA/Fatah*).

The complexity of the situation in WBandG and the hybridity of its governance systems are insufficiently reflected in the security literature. There are gaps at both conceptual and empirical levels. Additionally, there is a shortage of genuine local analysis and perspectives. The literature does not adequately question the extent to which ‘the state’ in its Weberian and dominant Western models is necessary to make governance and security work. The WBandG is a particularly apt context in which to examine the hypothesis that in this global era there is no longer much congruence between existing state structures, governance and security. More analysis is needed of the deep transformations and shifts affecting governance and security.
delivery that occurred in the post-Arafat era (though see Roy 2011; Brown 2010).

The existing literature highlights this complexity through analysing four main aspects of security: the impact of the Israeli occupation on Palestinian citizens’ security; the impact of international aid and donor-driven governance and security sector reforms on the provision of security for both Palestinians and Israelis; the changes in Palestinian governance systems, including the intra-Palestinian conflict and its ultimate impact on human security; and finally, the variations in security measures and needs for Palestinians inside WBandG, those inside Israel, and the refugees in the Palestinian diaspora, mainly in the surrounding countries [see the brief bibliography below].

Mainstream literature on security in Palestine has mostly followed a top-down and macro political approach hence largely failing to analyse it from an end-user perspective. The main focus has been on state security, state building, and the peace process, and until recently the literature has still lacked any serious engagement with citizen security, including the factors determining the (in)security of ordinary Palestinians. However, the recent inclusion and utilisation of the human security framework in the Palestinian case by the UNDP Human Development Report for the Occupied Palestinian Territories (UNDP 2010) is considered a serious attempt in this regard.

On the other hand, the dominant strands in security thinking and practice remain the ones that deal with the ‘Israel Security First’ paradigm and the Palestinian security sector reform (PSSR). A major strand in this literature prioritises Israeli security concerns as a state, as opposed to human security for both Palestinian and Israelis as citizens. This shares some common ground with Western security discourse including support for Palestinian security sector reform (PSSR) insofar as the latter, along with fast-tracked state-building and restoration of the Palestinian Authority’s (PA’s) monopoly of violence, can also be seen as protecting Israel’s statehood. The literature points to the various limitations, failures, and successes of these reform agendas; however, much of the analysis remains at the technical and macro-level. The literature is still lacking analysis that focuses on the implications of the shifts in the governance systems in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) and its interlinking with the reform agenda. While the Palestinian case is shifting from hybridity in security under Arafat toward a more Weberian notion of monopoly of violence under Fayyad, the literature has not yet grasped its implications for ordinary citizens’ lives or for the struggle and resistance dynamics.

Some of the existing literature highlights the high levels of insecurity caused by the violations committed by the occupying power. However, it is also assumed that because of its limited abilities the PA will never be able to provide security to its citizens in the face of Israeli hostility. By contrast, the PA itself has also deepened insecurity levels through the oppression and policing that it practises, particularly on the ‘opposition’. Although the literature contains some analysis of the actors in the security marketplace, its main focus remains on the PA’s performance, weaknesses, and how to enhance it, and on the PA, Israel and, more recently, the donor community as the key players. This underestimates the role of other internal, external, regional and global actors in providing security or creating insecurity, including the military arms of the Palestinian political factions, the international missions in the OPT, families and clans, the refugees’ host country security systems and the regional and global powers. There is a need in particular for better analysis and research on the role of the various non-state security actors who have proliferated in the WBandG, including their hybrid and conflicting relationships with the occupying power, the PA and external actors.

Finally, it is important to study the implications for an end-user perspective and the Palestinian cause of the current changes in the Middle East, including the Arab Spring, the declaration of a
Palestinian state in 2011 and potential UN membership. These changes might open up spaces for the deployment of peacekeeping forces, for greater involvement of the international community in security aspects and for the enforcement of international law and moves toward a legal and rights-based framework. However, much will have to change in Israel, the WB and G and in their wider relationships to the Middle East before there can be major transformations in the prevailing dysfunctional security paradigms.

References:
Brown (2010); Bruderlein (2005); Friedrich and Luethold (2007) and (2008); Hanafi and Long (2010); ICG (2010a), (2008a) and (2008b); Khalidi and Agha (2005); Khan (2009); Le More (2008); Long and Hanafi (2010); Roy (2011); Sayigh (2011); Turner (2009); and UNDP (2010).

Not all unsecured borderlands are situated across or adjacent to national boundaries. The salient borders may be largely or wholly interior, as with Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka (Goodhand et al. 2009), Gujarat in India (Berenschot 2009), the Niger Delta in Nigeria (Ibeanu 2006; Omeje 2006), areas prone to Maoist violence in Nepal (Bohara et al. 2006), or the borders between Oromo and Somali regions in federal Ethiopia (Kefale 2010). In these cases and others, state authority is asserted, ignored or contested in marginalised regions characterised by deep-seated horizontal inequalities, ethnically or religiously polarised identities, or geographical patterns of urban and rural exclusion.

Hence it is not just the geographical but also the social dimensions of unsecured borderlands that concern us. Our literature survey covers several other examples of local spaces where the writ of the state does not extend or which suffer significant violence at the hands of both state and/or non-state armed groups, including Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon (Hanafi 2010 and Hanafi and Long 2010), urban slums like the Cape Flats in Cape Town, South Africa (Buur 2008; Jensen 2010), or favelas in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (Dowdney 2003). As the latter indicates, securitised border spaces can be found even in otherwise stable and well-governed countries. This has for instance been the case in Indian-controlled Kashmir, the isolated peripheral regions of north-west India (Aggarwal et al. 2009) or in Northern Ireland.

Far from being ungoverned, such border spaces tend to be characterised by their own hybrid forms of political regulation, often involving violence, as well as by complex interactions among a variety of armed groups. In practice, there also tend to be multiple articulations - with the ‘absent’ state, among neighbouring states, and indeed with global players. Certainly, one cannot in truth say the state is absent in places like the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan (see case study below), Darfur in Sudan, or Kashmir on either side of the Line of Control – where the state is rather differently and sometimes very coercively present. Global, as well as national, security marketplaces may penetrate even the most peripheral areas.

Pakistan’s Western Frontier
Tom Kirk

Created in 1947, Pakistan has witnessed periods of violence and conflict under a revolving door of dictatorships and democracies (Jalal 1995). Dominated by powerful feudalistic and militaristic elites, Pakistan has arguably been embroiled in a life-long struggle over its own raison d’être that remains largely oblivious to the wishes of the majority of its population (Cohen 2004; Lieven 2011). This difficult history has been further complicated by the nation’s recent status as a key Western ally in the ‘war on terror’. Close to 3,000 Pakistani soldiers and over 21,000 civilians have been killed or seriously injured in this conflict. In particular, Pakistan’s Western tribal belt, which shares a long and largely unguarded border with Afghanistan, has suffered from fierce fighting, drone strikes and large-scale population displacement.
The Western frontier region was divided into ‘settled areas’ and ‘tribal areas’ by the British Raj in 1901 (Chalk 2007; Ahmed 2008). The tribal areas were granted a semi-autonomous status in return for the elders’ acquiescence to colonial rule. This special administrative structure required elders to keep the border passes open for trade and strategic purposes in return for allowances and subsidies they could distribute among kin-based patronage networks. Furthermore, elders were charged with providing security and justice mechanisms to the wider population, subject only to a process of negotiation with the local political agents of the imperial power (Fazli 2011). This colonial-era governance and security arrangement could be understood as a hybrid model of political order.

This system was largely continued by Pakistan’s founders, in essence designating the Western frontier a colony within the young nation. Contemporarily, it places the citizens of the region under administrative structures that are completely different from the rest of the state. Yet, the central government consistently blames insecurity amongst the tribes on the supposed volatility of local customs and norms, or the purported influence of external actors. These arguments are deployed even though the tribesmen are deprived of constitutionally guaranteed civil and political rights under the archaic hybrid arrangements, including the protection of the Pakistan’s central courts (ICG 2006). This stark inequality is further aggravated by regional underdevelopment and the centralisation of power within Pakistan’s federal structure. Unsurprisingly, this has resulted in the alienation of the region’s dominant ethnic group; the Pashtun (Fazli 2011).

It is also notable that successive Pakistani governments have used the strategically located region to pursue their national security agendas vis-à-vis Afghanistan and India. A discourse depicting the supposed warlike nature of the Pashtun has been cultivated by Pakistan to attract international patronage, be it overt or covert (Tarzi and Lamb 2011). Unfortunately, when offered, this ‘assistance’ has largely taken the form of the militarisation of the borderlands, with guns, money, and military expertise flowing into the region. These resources have fuelled two geopolitical conflicts, as well as a host of regional and civil wars. As a result, the Western frontier has become a haven for a plethora of local and international jihadist groups and cross-border criminal networks.

The literature on security arrangements and citizen experiences of conflict in the region remains sparse. The difficulty of on-the-ground research, coupled with Pakistan’s obstructive security agencies, may partly account for this gap and a handful of academics, journalists, and non-governmental organisations arguably dominate the field. However, recent survey data has been used to back up suggestions that corrupt governance and a widespread ‘desire for change’ are primary drivers of violence (Shapiro and Fair 2010; Aziz and Luras 2010; Fair 2010). Furthermore, international efforts designed to win over the Western frontier’s residents with aid and bolster the state’s security apparatus have been sceptically examined in the grey literature (ICG 2006; White 2008). Critics suggest that aid is routinely misappropriated and that the state’s institutions remain largely unaccountable to local populations, factors which fuel many grievances underpinning contemporary violence (Sultan-i-Rome 2009).

Despite these findings, most studies of Pakistan’s Western region have been aimed at developing counter-insurgency strategies, explaining instability through reference to overspill from Afghanistan, or examining the spread of Saudi-backed extremist ideologies (White 2009; Khattak 2010; Ghufran 2011). However, some qualitative literature has noted that disjunctures in the state’s governance and security apparatus may partly account for the recent insecurity (White 2008). This can be added to reports of widespread abuse of powers, ineffectual responses to militancy and the government’s willingness to negotiate with elements of the insurgency, all of which drive calls for widespread security sector reform (HRW 2011, ICG 2008, 2009, 2010a).

Little work has been done to engage the local population and assess their basic security needs. This gap is apparent when compared with the deluge of research on end-users’ experiences of
From such a perspective, the most pressing and immediate issues that warrant attention in Pakistan are likely to be everyday security, captured state institutions, and the government’s persistent inability to build upon military victories against insurgents. Moreover, hardly any literature details the plight of local populations residing within designated no-go areas or living under armed non-state actors. Furthermore, despite having somewhere in the region of one million internally displaced people, observers are only just beginning to acknowledge the link between the ability of the Pakistani state to provide for their needs and the perpetuation of violence (ICG 2010b). Taken together, all of these issues speak to the lack of a recognisable post-conflict and/or post-disaster reconstruction plan (Lodhi 2009).

There is an immediate need to improve our understanding of the livelihoods and perceptions of inhabitants of the Western borderlands. Calls to investigate and explore alternative models of governance sit neatly within the Pakistani context and they are particularly important given recent amendments to Pakistan’s constitution that are aimed at bringing the region into the state’s mainstream administrative apparatus (Atran 2010; Mezzera et al. 2010). Yet the suitability of such remedies cannot be assessed with the current evidence relating to Pakistan’s Western regions. More research and innovative data-collection methods are needed to identify the core drivers of insecurity that keep Pakistan in the global spotlight.

References:
Ahmed (2008); Atran (2010); (Aziz and Lurås, 2010); Chalk (2007); Cohen (2004); Fair (2011) and (2010); Ganguly (2004); Ghufran (2011); Human Rights Watch (2011); Hussain (2011); ICG (2010b), (2010c), (2009b) and (2006b); Jalal (1995); Kakakhel (2010); Khattak (2010); Kheshgi (2010); Kukreja and Singham (2005); Lieven (2011); Lodhi (2011); Mezzera et al. (2010); Rotberg (2002); Saikal (2010); Sultan-i-Rome (2009); Talbot (2009); Tarzi and Lamb (2011); Department of State, USA. (2009); White (2009) and (2008).

Who is provided with security and how they are protected tends to be mediated through markets for conflict goods and services, for example, weapons, military aid, private security firms, and itinerant combatants, as well as via high-value commodities such as conflict resources and drugs. These markets and the privatisation of security that they encourage, as well as the implications for state sovereignty and security governance, are discussed in general terms by Abrahamsen and Williams (2008; 2009), Isima (2009) and Cooper (2002). There is a certain amount of broad-gauge and mostly anecdotal empirical analysis on the ways in which conflict trade spreads violence across national boundaries. What is still almost entirely lacking, however, is any serious empirical analysis of how security privatisation in border regions is related to ‘asset transfers’ between armed and unarmed groups, and the deepening of poverty and inequality in contested borderlands.

Unsecured borderlands are particularly appropriate contexts to consider how poor and vulnerable people themselves think about and experience security. Such borderlands poignantly, sometimes brutally, expose the limits of the framing of security that prevail in much academic and policy literature on security. There tend to be vast gaps between the latter and the perceptions and experiences of those at the receiving end of insecurity.

Even the concepts of human and citizen security seldom come close to conveying how people at grass-roots levels experience and perceive security and insecurity ‘from below’ (Luckham 2009). Indeed, it is uncertain if the term ‘security’ itself can be translated, or means the same in different vernaculars. Approximations can be found, as in the contrast made by Acholi people in war-torn Northern Uganda between ‘bad surroundings’ (piny marac) and ‘good surroundings’ (piny maber) (Finnstrom 2008). However, such terms have cultural resonances all of their own, as well as being open to change and reinterpretation as violent events transform local realities.
Yet our searches uncovered relatively few empirical analyses of local or vernacular understandings of conflict, peace, and security in insecure border spaces. One of the most comprehensive and methodologically satisfactory is Uvin’s (2009) study of life after violence in Burundi, which is based on in-depth interviews of a cross-section of people in rural towns and villages who had been refugees or internally displaced. Uvin compares them with others who had not moved from their homes during the violence. This study reaches similar conclusions through a different methodological route to Finnstrom’s (2008) Northern Ugandan study. Both studies conclude that most people do not make sharp distinctions between freedom from violence, social peace, the ability to meet basic needs, and the ability to move freely from place to place. Both authors suggest that local people tend to have more complex, less judgemental understandings of the armed groups responsible for violence than either national elites or international actors and both seem to endorse the sentiments of a respondent in Finnstrom’s study, ‘the silence of guns does not mean peace’.

A number of other studies provide insight into security as perceived by particular vulnerable or marginalised groups: residents of Palestinian refugee camps (Hanafi and Long 2010); female farmers in Pakistani Punjab (Saigol 2010); poor people in marginalised areas of India (Sundar 2011a; 2011b); disintegrating rural communities in Eritrea (Hirt 2010); rural households in Sri Lanka (Korf 2004); people relying on informal livelihoods in Guinea-Bissau (Lorenco-Lindell 2002), ‘bush wives’ and ‘girl soldiers’ in Sierra Leone (Coulter 2006); the children of the drug trade in Rio de Janeiro (Dowdney 2003); former child soldiers in Monrovia (Hoffman 2007); Bakassi boy vigilantes in Nigeria (Meagher 2007); youths participating in violent rebellion in Sierra Leone (Richards 1996); and even ordinary foot soldiers in the DRC (Baaz and Stern 2008). As is apparent from some of the studies cited toward the end of this list, subaltern groups engaged in violence can often be seen as victims as well, having little control over their own security and being mobilised into violence by the spread of insecurity, the absence of alternative forms of employment, the incentive systems created by the marketplaces in which combatants sell their services, and struggles amongst political elites.

There is also a crucial gender dimension (Coulter 2006; Saigol 2010), which includes but extends beyond the concerns of much of the gender literature with women as victims of political, domestic, and structural violence. An interesting analysis by De Mel (2009) of the gendering of Sri Lanka’s security paradigm highlights the relationships between ‘army boys’ and ‘garment girls’ illustrating how militarised masculinities and women’s roles mutually interconnect, especially in contexts of insecurity. Although a number of authors and commentators such as Cynthia Enloe (1988, 2000, 2004; Koch 2008; Barnes 2009; Hudson et al 2009; OECD 2010c) in particular have long explored the gendering of security institutions and practices, as well as their impact on the roles of men and women, this is not much reflected in the conflict and security literature we surveyed. Instead, studies brought to light by our searches tend to focus on the more well-rehearsed theme of women as victims, focusing for instance on their bodily integrity and vulnerability (Abdullah, Ibrahim, and King 2010) and on rape as an instrument of war (Moufflet 2008). However, Coulter (2006) challenges stereotypical views in her study of girl soldiers and bush wives in Sierra Leone as both perpetrators and victims of violence; as do Abdullah et al. (2010) in their analysis of the emancipatory potential of women as civil-society activists and peacemakers. This does not mean that women’s experiences of security are not distinct from men’s. Rather, Coulter (2006, 10) argues that “women’s choices in times of conflict and war are at best circumscribed, at worst non-existent”; although the choices of most men are also circumscribed, even if typically less seriously and in not always in the same ways.

24 Both the Finnstrom (2008) and Uvin (2009) studies were brought to our attention by the peer-group search. Since both are book-length studies, they are not included in the grading exercise.

25 Some of these insights are also reflected in the Afghanistan sample surveys referred to in the Afghanistan case study in section 6.5 below.
According to many of the studies already cited, those living in unsecured borderlands seldom have much faith in the capacity of state security and justice institutions to protect them, either because they are seen as remote and ill-equipped to deal with the day-to-day insecurities of people living at grass roots level, or because they are regarded as politically partisan, corrupt, or outright repressive. They tend to act and to be seen as agents of insecurity, rather than agents of security (Cawthra and Luckham 2003). Thus, an expanding literature on ‘informal’ or ‘non-state’ security and justice institutions suggests that they can or should replace absent or failing state security provision. Our searches covered Afghan *Arbakai* traditional justice institutions (Tariq 2009) and local defence forces (Jones and Munoz 2010), chiefs in Southern Sudan (Leonardi 2007), civil militias in western Sudan (Tar 2005), clan elders and tribally-based vigilantes in northern Kenya (Mtuku 2008 and 2010), community policing in Sierra Leone and Rwanda (Baker 2008), paramilitaries, private security companies, and community-led initiatives in Colombia (Abello Colak and Pearce 2009), private security companies in Afghanistan and Angola (Rimli and Schmeidl 2007), vigilante groups in South Africa (Buur 2008; Jensen 2010) and in Nigeria (Meagher 2007). Other studies of vigilantism include Abrahams (1998) and Pratten and Sen (2007). As Isima (2007) in a study of non-state security provision in Nigeria and South Africa suggests, however, there tend to be complex and often contradictory relationships between informal security provision and what he terms ‘civil militarism’ in which vigilantes, militias and other informal security providers tend to alternate between being protectors and oppressors of poor and vulnerable people.

What can be concluded more generally? First, as most of these studies show, informal security providers are hybrid, both in their own right and through their complex relationships with absent or defective states. Like state security agencies, they may be agents of security or of insecurity or both at the same time. They are seldom impartial and often have their own political or economic agendas, some of them violent. Those relying on traditional authority, such as the *Arbakai* in Afghanistan, or clan elders in Northern Kenya, are often patriarchal and reflect local inequalities. Vigilantes and similar groups may meet immediate needs for justice, but often do so at the expense of due process and respect for rights and the rule of law. Privatised forms of security provision protect against criminal violence but are market-driven and often biased towards those with wealth and power (Isima 2009). Militias, vigilantes, and other non-state armed groups may deliver a modicum of security in the absence of the state and enjoy a degree of public support, although they may very well be complicit with drug gangs and other criminal groups. Nor do they necessarily provide viable and legitimate alternatives to state security agencies. Moreover, in some situations, as with the *janjaweed* and other paramilitary formations in Darfur and Southern Sudan, they have acted in collusion with the state in repressing both armed and unarmed resistance, as well as sowing the seeds of division and insecurity.

In sum, whilst it is critical to understand non-state security provision and how it may fulfil unmet security and justice needs, a strong dose of realism is required. This calls for detailed empirical research on how informal mechanisms work and for whom. This conclusion is reinforced by much of the research and analysis of civil society, NGOs, and popular movements that we have reviewed. Much of this is aspirational and stresses ways in which civil-society groups can pose alternatives to violence. Examples of such studies include Van Leeuween’s (2010) study of civil society organisations and agrarian conflict in Guatemala, Oreljuela’s (2003) work on civil-society organisations in Sri Lanka, and Alther’s (2011) study of different Colombian communities that have resisted guerrilla and state violence. These works tend to be based on interviews with NGO activists, and sometimes with end-users in the communities concerned as well. While tending to be critical of the top-down focus of much NGO peace-building activity, they do not on the whole address how civil society groups and popular movements in practice navigate the politically contested terrains of war and violence. Inevitably, these terrains are harsh and unforgiving. As we see later in our analysis of donor-saturated spaces, they can throw up a diverse range of obstacles to
civic action and often lead to the co-option of humanitarian actors in political marketplaces dominated by power-maximising military and economic actors.

5.2 Contested Leviathans

*Contested Leviathans are states and state security structures whose authority and capacity to deliver security are fragile, disputed or compromised by the special interests that tend to predominate in hybrid political orders.*

As we have seen, unsecured borderlands and the people and communities inhabiting them tend to be situated at the neglected peripheries of states. Yet their security and welfare is still to a significant extent determined nationally and globally, as well as locally, as we have already seen. States and the political economies in which they are enmeshed still matter enormously for the security of citizens, both when they deliver security and when they fail to deliver it in dangerous neighbourhoods and fragile or failing states. Conversely, the fault-lines and insecurities that arise in the ‘bad surroundings’ of borderlands can penetrate deep into the core of even relatively well established states and security institutions, as well as spreading insecurity internationally in the form of terrorist and other threats.

At the extreme end of the fragility spectrum stand states whose capacity to exercise any form of legitimate authority, nationally or locally, is severely diminished. For instance, any semblance of public authority has vanished in Somalia (Renders and Terlinden 2010); it is confined to small enclaves and is largely non-operational in large swathes of national territory in the DRC (see case study below) and the Ivory Coast (Bah 2010); it is highly contested in Lebanon (Hanafi 2010, Hanafi and Long 2010); and it faces prolonged armed resistance in Afghanistan (Goodhand and Sedra 2010). However, even these are by no means ungoverned political arenas. Dysfunctional security institutions have usually continued to operate, have kept some capacity to coerce and maintain surveillance over citizens, and have intervened to protect or dislodge those in power. In a disturbingly large number of cases, ‘fragile’ regimes and their security apparatuses have had an almost mystifying capacity to survive for long periods whilst causing acute insecurity and social misery for their citizens, as in Zimbabwe or Burma.

**The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Great Lakes Region**

*Randi Solhjell*

The Great Lakes region in Central Africa is an important area to analyse as it spans numerous borders and crosses states where citizens experience daily insecurity and where domestic problems are often pushed beyond territorial delineations. Its importance relates, amongst other things, to the availability of immense natural resources and a young labour force marked by various and sometimes spurious governance structures. The area usually refers to the eastern DRC (the Kivus), Burundi, Rwanda, south-western Uganda, and to some extent parts of Tanzania. The turmoil in the DRC and in particular in the Kivus cannot be analysed without reference to Rwanda, as will be discussed below, in addition to Uganda and Burundi.

The DRC in particular is a state that has been widely explored by numerous writers and scholars as well as in the policy literature, ranging from *The Heart of Darkness* (Conrad 1902) to contemporary writing on the Great Lakes conflicts and the UN peace-operation (Autesserre 2010; ICG 2006). Since independence from Belgium in 1960, there has been a substantial literature on
the political system during the years of Mobutu Sese Seko’s rule in Zaire (see for example Young and Turner 1985). The early years of Mobutu’s presidency were relatively promising (1965–75) and were marked by state- and nation-building, and complex power networks linking the provinces and outskirts to the central government. However, the financial difficulties of the late 1970s and 1980s (a fall in copper prices and high oil prices), as well as economic mismanagement and debt, uncovered the underlying political and economic fragility of Zaire.

Since the onset of the first Congo war in 1996, the academic literature has largely shifted towards the wars and subsequent conflicts in the North and South Kivu and part of Ituri and Maniema provinces, as well as regional border and refugee issues in the Great Lakes border region with Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. The literature has addressed in various approaches the local, the national/state and the regional levels.

At the broader national level, the use of the state as the dominant narrative of the polity sometimes inhibits analysis and understanding of the political situation in the DRC, due to the almost complete absence of any form of Western-scripted statehood. In turn, concepts such as ‘failed state’ or ‘weak state’ are applied to a number of issues such as the lack of territorial integrity, development, popular participation and long-run legitimacy of the state (see e.g. Herbst 1996 and Reno 1998). Moreover, the root causes of the wars and subsequent conflicts in the DRC and Great Lakes region are often attributed largely to the presence of vast ‘conflict resources’ combined with a weak state. Yet the underlying factors are more often social and economic discrimination, including land and political exclusion that in turn has caused considerable marginalisation and poverty among the rural masses.

Regionally, some good analysis of the regional Great Lakes conflicts and history can be found in Prunier (2009) and Lemarchand (2009). These authors both address the historical and political dimensions of the region's instability that is sorely needed in the literature. Lemarchand's (2009: 270) analysis of the Kivus, for instance, focuses on the high population density and agricultural prosperity combined with a large influx of refugees and ‘new’ settlers from neighbouring Rwanda. Several authors also address what can be termed ‘identity politics’ in the eastern DRC. Here, the labels autochthones (sons of the soil) and allochthones (strangers) have been used as part of land entitlement (Bøås 2008, Jackson 2006). Such categorisations produced by the authorities, along with skewed interpretations of history, have had distinct impacts on local-level violence and social inequalities. Lemarchand (ibid) argues that the mobilising power of political discourses such as autochthones and allochthones has also pushed the boundaries of conflict upwards from the local to the regional level. As a result, the North Kivu region in eastern DRC has experienced major xenophobic violence towards those seen as allochthones, such as the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge (ibid), Congolese of Rwandan ancestry of both Hutu and Tutsi ethnicity.

Although these local/regional elements of instability are contextually important, it is less clear how, or in what way, they determine insecurity for people in eastern DRC. For instance, why do people ‘buy into’ the identity politics fostered by the authorities? Moreover, a major source of insecurity for people in the DRC is the security forces themselves (see for example ICG 2006:10). Here, the impacts of the UN (MONUC) stabilisation, SSR and DDR programmes need further investigation. Autesserre (2010), for instance, has criticised the UN’s lack of attention to local level violence that has had destabilising effects on the overall security and safety of the very population that the UN is mandated to protect. Instead, priority was given to national political processes such as the transitional government and the democratic elections in 2006 which were orchestrated by the UN. With regard to the economy, there is a need for deeper qualitative analysis on how resource extraction (including cassiterite, coltan, wolframite and gold) has had damaging impacts on the safety of the population (see for example Global Witness 2009).
Quantitative analysis on issues such as the resource curse and conflict diamonds does not sufficiently capture both the opportunities opened up and the insecurities and socio-economic inequalities suffered by the local population.

The DRC has faced much international concern over the reportedly exceptional levels of sexual violence against women and girls, especially in eastern DRC. The real levels of this crime are unknown and knowledge concerning perpetrators is limited. The latter are often portrayed as uncivilized men in the bush, as in the words of one Congolese doctor: ‘There used to be a lot of gorillas in there, but now they’ve been replaced by much more savage beasts’. Some rather more nuanced analysis of the complexity of the violence can be found in Baaz and Sterns’ (2010) work, where they argue that a one-dimensional focus on sexual violence in the DRC might be counter-productive, neither helping victims of such atrocities, nor contributing to their prevention. A more gender-nuanced analysis is required to understand different security threats for civilians and how they can be addressed within their own contexts. For instance, women often face threats such as intimidation, rape and robbery by state security forces when they walk to markets or fetch water. On the other hand women in need of maternal healthcare may only receive proper care if they claim to have been raped. Addressing these threats needs to be looked at holistically within SSR and other security programmes. It is repeatedly stated in the literature that state security forces often pose the greatest threat to civilians, but more detailed empirical scrutiny of such poor civil–military relations is necessary, in order to ascertain how and in what circumstances civilians - and in particular women - become targets and how best this can be prevented.

More research is needed on the post-war situation as the DRC slowly recovers from a period of great instability, even though large parts of the population still face daily insecurity and lack of basic necessities. The situation has been described as ‘neither-peace-nor-war’ (Beneduce et al. 2006: 32), as the presence of armed groups, enclaves of rebel-controlled areas and the army continue to threaten the lives of civilians. Enrolment in armed groups can still provide a way for boys to escape poverty due to lack of education and work opportunities, especially in the eastern provinces. Moreover, the ongoing political changes in the DRC have brought to the fore new social actors and created hybrid governance and security arrangements that have replaced old forms of order. These changes include formal decentralisation schemes, informal actors profiting from instability and imposing their own versions of security, mushrooming religious and other groups, and new forms of political activism, all of which need be taken into account.

This case study is based on:
Autesserre (2010); Baaz and Stern (2010); Beneduce et al. (2006); Dunn (2003); Global Witness (2009); Hochschild (2006); ICG (2006a); Jackson (2006); Lemarchand (2009); Nzongoa-Ntalaja (2002); Prunier (2009); Putzel et al. (2008); Reno (1998); Shatzberg (1988); Turner (2007); Wrong (2001); and Young and Turner (1985).

Empirical analysis has not been best served by hammering the variety of dysfunctional states into a single theoretical mould of state fragility. In all too many cases their categorisation as ‘fragile’ or ‘failing’ has been ex post in response to the outbreak of violence and insecurity, rather than being based on any ex ante analysis or prediction of their susceptibility to breakdown. Those who have long enough historical memories will recall that countries like the Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe, Rwanda before the genocide, and, arguably, Pakistan were once considered development success stories. However, the increasingly influential theoretical literature on HPOs questions existing conceptualisations of state fragility and state-building and instead advocates a more finely grained analysis of how statehood is negotiated in hybrid political orders (Hagmann and Peclard 2010; Boege et al. 2009; Clements et al. 2007; Kraushaar and Lambach 2009; Call 2009, 2010). It also

27 Rwanda has re-established its development credentials under its present government, despite presiding over a potential political time-bomb.
raises the possibility that in the supposedly ungoverned spaces of hybrid political orders such as Somalia and Somaliland one can sometimes have ‘governance without government’ (Menkhaus 2006; 2010), including informal security mechanisms to ensure the safety and welfare of end-users.

In contrast, the concept of hybridity has rarely been applied to seemingly more durable state Leviathans, including those now being challenged by the Arab Spring. Recent events in the Arab world have challenged what we knew or thought we knew about the closed or oligopolistic political marketplaces of many authoritarian and quasi-democratic regimes (see case study below). On the one hand, many such regimes have long deployed impressive capabilities for political coercion and surveillance of their citizens, sometimes penetrating deep into civil society, most notably in countries such as Egypt, Syria, and Ethiopia – and indeed even in states like Sudan, Yemen, or Pakistan that have been commonly if misleadingly characterised as ‘fragile’. On the other hand, diverse forms of hybrid political authority, in which formal chains of command and accountability have been supplemented or even superseded by informal patronage and corruption, have penetrated their state security structures. Seemingly solid state structures and security institutions have fast been rendered fragile through the emergence of internal contradictions. Their control over information has been undermined by new media technologies, and they have faced new forms of unarmed, as well as armed citizen resistance. Yet when challenged at moments of crisis or transition, these contested Leviathans seldom give up their claims on power willingly or peacefully. Even when they do start to cede power to democratically elected governments, as in Egypt and Burma, their security apparatus may seek to co-opt the transitions and mould them to their own security-dominated vision of the polity. This process makes the results of many of the movements currently sweeping the Arab world uncertain and ambiguous for the people that initiated the change.

The Middle East – The Arab Springs Countries
Bassma Kodmani, Sihem Mouelhi and Hameed Hakimi

Ruled by Ben Ali’s unshakable regime, Tunisia was perceived to be an exceptionally stable and peaceful country. However, in the winter of 2011 massive popular protests were sparked following the self-immolation of a street vendor. Widespread civil disobedience and revolutionary fervour eventually led to the swift collapse of the government. The Tunisian movement initiated a domino effect across North Africa and the Middle East. Populations overcame their fear of the machinery of oppressive regimes in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Oman, and Bahrain. Western states and stakeholders appear to have been caught by surprise, revealing their limited knowledge and understanding of the political and security dynamics animating the region.

Even before these events, the evident contrast between well-resourced states with over-inflated security apparatuses and insecure citizens had plagued the region for years. The over-securitisation of everyday life encouraged the growth of powerful security sectors, while the region’s governments remained largely unable or unwilling to conduct inter-sectarian political mediation or tackle debilitating social challenges. The latter have included growing inequality and rising poverty levels, attributed by many to liberal economic policies and widespread corruption amongst the officials that drive the region’s various ruling authorities. These problems have arguably encouraged regimes to fear their own populations and to continue to increase their control over ordinary citizens. However, this fear has also spurred a regional trend towards the provision of basic public goods such as security and justice by non-state actors; in effect, hybridising everyday life in line with increased securitisation.

Adding to the trend, the region’s authoritarian regimes have for decades occupied themselves
with crony capitalism. Ruling parties, including those in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and Yemen, have focused development on the bloated capital cities and rich neighbourhoods frequented by those with the ‘right’ connections. This blatant favouritism has allowed regimes to conduct their business unchecked, developing and linking their clientelist networks to global power structures. However, regimes have secured their rule at the expense of vast areas of their countries. This gap has forced citizens to turn to hybrid governance structures for solutions to their everyday needs. Within such areas, citizens have learnt to rely on local networks, either religious or tribal, which have grown to protect the livelihoods and social fabric of those most affected by their state’s neglect. In most countries, including in Egypt where state control is historically extremely centralised, this trend began extending to the area of security. Non-state actors took charge of the security of their own communities, some with and others without the blessing of the regimes themselves.

Several border zones have developed their own economies to accompany the social, commercial, and security arrangements relied upon by alienated populations. Within such spaces, non-state actors have proliferated. Autonomous organisations and networks with transnational links have emerged in a variety of cross-border regions; Egypt–Libya, the Sinai Peninsula, Libya–Sahel countries, Tunisia–Libya, Yemen–Saudi Arabia, Jordan–Iraq, Syria–Iraq, and Lebanon–Israel. Cross-border kinship ties, refugees and migrant workers began to dominate the political order and quickly became the only option for economic survival and access to the resources required for basic human needs. Over time, organisations and networks within these regions have constructed relationships with state officials and security forces. The latter have learned to tolerate the former as they provided the economic, social, and physical security that keeps neglected populations from challenging authoritarian regimes. This kind of informal arrangement has been called ‘khubzism’, ‘security pact’, and ‘authoritarian populist social contract’ by commentators (Sadiki 2000; Hibou 2006; Dahi 2011).

Research on security, in its broadest definition, has been scarce in the Middle East over the last twenty years. Existing work mainly takes a traditional approach focusing on state security, regional security, and foreign involvement in security arrangements. In fact, a review of the literature reveals that scholarly work tends to address security in Middle-Eastern states from a regional perspective rather than looking at more domestic and micro-level experiences of security. This emphasis on regional security has also been mirrored in the policy debates on security issues in the area. Furthermore, economically and politically dominant countries have arguably received disproportionate attention, thus creating biases in the literature (Barak et al. 2010). Moreover, discussions of regional security have been strongly influenced by foreign actors and their interests. This is unsurprising given that the region has witnessed two multi-national wars in Iraq, a long history of US patronage of the Gulf monarchies through an overt military presence (under CentCom), and a recent drive towards close security ‘cooperation’ under the remit of the war on terror. Such relationships have, in effect, amounted to the direct intrusion of Western intelligence and security agencies in the security sectors of the region’s countries, further enslaving the security discourse to the interests of external powers and big businesses (Luethold 2004).

A lack of interest in marginalised populations in the Middle East has been a constant trend, thus the existing research has overlooked bottom-up perspectives of security and failed to capture the everyday realities of ordinary citizens, including the potential conflicts between governance, state security, and human security. Academic research needs to be more focused on ‘end-users’ and could benefit from examination of the security experiences of for instance Palestinian refugees in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, displaced populations in Iraq, Kurdish minorities, etc. In hybrid political spaces (e.g. border zones, neglected regions, refugee camps, etc.), populations are being relegated and not only do they not participate in distribution of power, public goods and
resources, even their most basic socio-economic needs are not being fulfilled.

Moreover, as states and their security institutions are rendered more fragile by internal disagreements, the distribution of power based on political accommodations within hybrid political spaces has created new tensions. For example, Bahrain has been the scene of increasing religious tensions, where the governing Sunni minority is trying to solidify its dominance by shifting the demographic balance through massive naturalisation (Gengler 2011). In Tunisia, the focus of the government on the coastal, thus touristic, areas has created important regional disparities, which in the past few years have led to many instances of unrest in economically neglected regions (ICG 2011b). Tensions may even take a transnational dimension. For instance, in the past decade Kurdish activism in Syria has been influenced by Kurds from outside the country, which has led to increased repression and intensified control of the borders (Gambill 2004). Interestingly, in Libya, exacerbation of tribal tensions and the resulting weakening of governance has been the contradictory consequence of exploitation of hybridity by Gaddafi’s regime to secure power (ICG 2011c). The resulting weak state structures have increasingly tended to lack sufficient power or resources to resolve internal disputes and control their territory. Conflicts have then escalated and have had a spill-over effect into neighbouring nations (for example by creating refugees) and have facilitated the action of armed groups in the border zones, as we now see at the Libyan–Tunisian border (La Cimade 2011).

The recent uprisings have highlighted the shortcomings of the existing literature on security in the Middle East and North Africa and how this has prevented proper evaluation of the region’s volatility. It would appear that focusing on institutional analysis and failing to consider how oppressive security apparatuses in the region have affected the lives of citizens kept scholars from predicting the revolts (Tadros 2011). An academic research agenda that would take a comprehensive approach to security and governance in the particular context of hybrid political orders and how populations are affected is needed now even more than in the past.

This case study is based on: Barak and Assaf (2010); Bellin (2004); La Cimade (2011); Chartouni-Dubarry (2000); Gambill (2004); Gengler (2011); Dahi (2011); Desai and Tarik (2011); Hibou (2006); ICG (2011b and 2011c); Laipson (2007); Le Saout and Rollinde (2009); Luethold (2004); Ottaway and Hamzawy (2011); Sadiki (2000); Sayigh (2007); Tadros (2011); and Wheeler (2011).

‘Political armies’ and security institutions almost invariably remain major political players even in transitional or democratic regimes (for comparative analyses see Stepan 1988; Luckham 1996; Koonings and Krujt 2003). A particularly graphic example of the baleful influence of security services under a ‘violence called democracy’ is Guatemala (Schirmer 1998; Goldman 2007). Even less explored by researchers has been the consolidation of unaccountable security sectors and their abusive treatment of civilian end-users under states of emergency in the securitised border spaces of longer-established democracies like Colombia, Sri Lanka or India (for example in Kashmir and North Eastern areas contested by Naxalite insurgents).

To understand the role of security and justice institutions in the production of order and disorder across such a diverse array of political systems, still more to evaluate how they affect the security and welfare of their citizens, demands new kinds of analysis. The policy and academic literatures on both stabilisation and security reform have been major growth areas. Yet to a large extent, they have been couched in the short-term language of statecraft rather than based on much serious analysis of the way security institutions actually operate and transform power relations in ‘fragile’, or indeed

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28 The latter is a study by a political journalist of the murder of Bishop Gerardi by Guatemala’s security services during the transition to democracy. We cite it partly because it provides unrivalled insights into how the security services operated, and partly because political journalism sometimes offers better empirical analysis of the murkier corners of the state than much of social science.
‘stabilised’, states. They have scarcely begun to touch upon the deep politics of reform or to draw in any systematic way upon the critical literatures on the state, hybrid political orders and security. Much of the literature on state-building and the politics of security reform so far has been devoted to the sequencing of change, including whether security should precede or follow liberalisation (Paris 2004; Paris and Sisk 2009); to the accountability of key security actors such as the military and intelligence apparatuses (Cawthra and Luckham 2003; Bryden and Olonisakin 2010); and to the consolidation of political settlements around elite pacts and ‘inclusive enough’ political coalitions (World Bank 2011: see our earlier discussion). Only latterly have analysts begun to turn a more critical and empirically grounded eye upon these and other topics including the politics of stabilisation (Collinson et al. 2010), post-conflict security reform (Hutchful 2009; Sedra 2007, 2010; Peake et al 2009) and day-to-day policing and justice in conflict and post-conflict situations (Baker 2008, 2010; Hills 2009, 2011). Some of this body of work examines the relationship between formal security and justice institutions and what Baker (2002) terms ‘lawless law enforcers’. Not much of it extends serious empirical scrutiny to the impact of security institutions and practices upon end-users.

In sum, the prevailing analyses of state fragility tell us relatively little about how processes of political ordering translate into effective and legitimate public security, policing, and justice systems – or alternatively do not. Under hybrid governance systems, security arrangements often protect elites, including security elites, and reinforce inequalities in power and wealth. They tend all too often to be deployed to close political spaces, reduce political participation and resist accountability (Luckham and Hutchful 2010). But we still know very little about how the formal security arrangements of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states interconnect with the parallel powers of hybrid political orders, including systems of patronage, and the manipulation of ethnic and religious identities as instruments of security policy (the work of Enloe 1980 on the latter remains unrivalled). Nor is there much serious analysis of how regimes and their security apparatuses may sometimes even thrive upon durable disorder and insecurity, nationally, as in Burma and Zimbabwe, or within marginalised border regions like Darfur, Abyei, and Kofordan in Sudan. And there is still less investigation of the effects of such durable disorder on marginalised, vulnerable and insecure people.

There is a particular lack of detailed empirical micro-analysis of security institutions and practices, either in state or in non-state security contexts. The invisible faces of power and security, including the intelligence and surveillance systems that are often at the heart of authoritarian governance, are a major gap in our understanding of contested Leviathans. Moreover, as Tadros (2011) has shown in the case of Egypt, state security apparatuses can be seen as parallel powers in their own right, interconnecting with other corporate and political interests, and penetrating deep into civil society. Analyses of these apparatuses in Central and South America (Schirmer 1998; Koonings and Kruijt 1999; 2004) have described how they perpetuate the legacies of impunity, rights abuses and social injustice – even in supposedly democratic or ‘post-conflict’ states (see case study below). Yet little is understood about how state security and intelligence agencies have functioned in the securitised border spaces of democratic polities like Indian-controlled Kashmir (Aggarwal et al. 2009), north-eastern Sri Lanka, and southern Thailand, where they have sometimes operated with a brutal impunity completely at odds with the democratic principles they are supposed to protect.

**Central Asia**

*Martha Molfetas*

Since the fall of the iron curtain, the formerly USSR controlled and created states of Central Asia have been discovering themselves, often traumatically. In effect, these states have undergone a post-colonial transition, arguable akin to those of African states. They are ethnically diverse, in
part because of the arbitrary drawing of national borders, and they have faced difficult transitions from a totalitarian regime. Additionally, they all face issues of poverty, human insecurity, and weak state development (Spruyt 2007). Ethnified politics and authoritarianism are not new to the region, nor do they show much sign of disappearing. However, the new borders and political fragmentation in Central Asian states cannot easily erase their shared history, which is why it is important to understand their regional as well as their national dynamics. During the Soviet years Central Asia’s many ethnicities and nations were held in check through state-dictated policies of inclusion and secularism, including the emancipation of women (Kennedy-Pipe 2004). This was initially done to quell potential Islamic opposition movements from within, since in the USSR hegemonic security, regime politics, secularism and provision of some basic human securities went hand in hand.

Since 1991 five states have emerged: Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan. All, with the possible exception of Kyrgyzstan (Economist 2011), faced inter- and intra-state conflicts from their inception. Interestingly, all have a high dispersion of ethnicities. The USSR itself was an ethno-federal state, allowing certain groups to have power over others (Hughes and Sasse 2001), effectively instituting a Soviet indirect rule that has left many wary of Russian influence. All of the states in the region remain members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and this alliance allows Russia to intervene militarily and politically if it is in Russia’s interest, as they have done in the cases of Abkhazia and Tajikistan (Allison 2004; Hughes and Sasse 2001; Menon 1995). Cross-border ethnic dispersions are a crucial factor in the policies of states in the region, with for instance ethnic Uzbeks living in Tajikistan, ethnic Tajiks living in Uzbekistan, and ethnic Kyrgyz living in Tajikistan.

The regimes of Central Asia have tended to rule autocratically and to foster insecurity whilst purporting to be ‘democratic’ under their constitutions. From the perestroika and glasnost years onwards, state capacity to deliver basic services began to decline, whilst the power of state elites flourished, creating a de-democratising transition (Tilly 2007). Ethnified politics were used to divide people during the 1990’s, including the increased subordination of minorities. Governments have largely failed to address basic human insecurities including lack of access to water, food, employment, and education (Tabyshalieva 2006); at the same time they have tended to keep a lid on the media and civil society.

The region has become important for geopolitics, not least because of its proximity to the Afghan war and has given rise to increased US and Western presence along with the reassertion of Russian strategic presence. In consequence military security concerns have tended to trump human security and human rights (Maher 2011). Alongside this militarisation, however, there has been increased penetration by external business interests, including notably Chinese, Russian, and Turkish investments in the region (ICG 2001; Foust, 2011).

Much of the existing research has focused on these geopolitical shifts, including the various institutional legacies from the USSR (Hughes and Sasse 2001), increased militarisation (Hiro 2007) or the drug trade (Jackson 2006). Rather less attention has been paid to end-users’ experiences of exploitation and transition (Spruyt 2007; Tabyshalieva 2006), including the human costs of slave-labour in Uzbekistan’s cotton industry (‘Calming the Ferghana’ 1999; Hiro 2007) and of the major expansions in human and drug trafficking through and within Central Asia (Jackson 2006).

An area that exemplifies all the problems of Central Asia is the Ferghana Valley. Accounting for only five percent of the entire landmass of Central Asia, the Ferghana houses more than ten million people and provides arable land and water resources for the majority of the region (Slim 2002; Weisbrode 2001; Rubin and Lubin 1999). It is divided between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan. This fertile valley has become increasingly militarised, having over 140 international border disputes (ICG 2002); much of its land has recently been made off limits to all non-citizens. Today, security forces control all traffic in and out of the valley (Bichsel 2009). Kyrgyzstan houses a majority of the valley, controlling 40% of the Ferghana and has 51% of its population residing there (‘Kyrgyzstan’ 2011). There are multiple concerns for governments in the Ferghana, from transnational proliferation of the drug trade, to Islamic militancy and the fragility of these regional states. The weak ties of these states to one another only exacerbate the problems of this fertile region (Hiro 2009; Weisbrode 2001). The shortage and the differential access to resources have created tensions between ethnic groups and other communities, increasing insecurities (Schoeberlein 2002).

Several militant groups have emerged out of the Ferghana Valley, most notably the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Even though peaceful Islamic movements exist, the Uzbek government has grouped all these various groups as Wahhabis, since many Saudis reside in the region illegally (‘Uzbekistan’ 2011). The IMU has been actively resisting local authorities, even going as far as to assault police and politicians. Their ultimate goal is to create an Islamic Caliphate in the Ferghana (Economist 2009; Hiro 2010) and the IMU has also aligned itself with similar movements in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Chechnya (Economist 2009; ‘Uzbekistan’ 2011). In response to IMU actions, Uzbekistan has begun mining its borders and has instituted strict visa regulations. Similarly, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have begun to mine their own borders, in fear that IMU militants will penetrate their countries (Allison 2004; Slim 2002).

All these restraints have made daily life difficult for those in the valley; increasing human insecurity in tandem with the assertion of military security concerns, both by the states of the region and by militant groups (Slim 2002). Although there are treaties between the CIS and Russia, little has been done on the ground to influence outcomes and assure basic human securities for end-users. The states of the region are wary of working closely with Russia, all the more so after the events in the Caucasus and Ukraine. Security hybridisation has prevailed through the complex interfaces between authoritarian governments, Islamist movements, external business interests and the involvement of foreign powers, including Russia, the USA and increasingly China. Multilateral engagement with the problems of the region has been more limited, including some OSCE and EU involvement in bottom-up approaches to security, through providing education and health care as an alternative to militarisation (Peyrouse 2011). INGOs remain under-represented in the region, most of them being UN affiliated. Civil society capacity is low and the de-democratising trend has discouraged local NGOs (Tilly 2007). Kyrgyzstan may provide a glimmer of hope for the region, following the election of a new regime that has reportedly begun more seriously to address basic human needs (The Economist 2011).

In comparison we are rather better served with literature on another dimension of hybrid security arrangements, namely the various ways in which security elites act as ‘power and profit maximisers’, translating their control of security and organised violence into personal or institutional gain within national, regional, and global political marketplaces (De Waal 2009). The crucial connections tend to be established through shadow, criminal, drugs or arms economies (Cooper 2002; Nordstrom 2002); they often engulf securitised border regions (Raeymaekers 2010); they seek profits from conflict resources such as oil and diamonds (Ibeanu 2006; Ibeanu and Luckham 2007; Le Billon 2001; Omeje 2006; Ross 2004; Watts 2008); they sometimes interconnect with transnational crime (Briscoe and Rodriguez 2010); and they tend to feed into the
demand for privatised security provision (Abrahamsen and Williams 2009; Aning et al. 2008; Isima 2009; McFate 2008; Avant and Haufler 2010).

All of the above suggests that donor policies and programmes aiming to reform the security sectors of fragile and contested states should be viewed with a heavy dose of caution. There is a considerable policy literature on security sector reform (SSR) and on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants and on the place of both in stabilisation and state-building (DFID 2002, 2010; OECD 2007, 2007b, 2011; World Bank 2011). This literature has been largely prescriptive, focusing mainly upon policy goals such as better budgetary management of security spending, training and professionalisation, police and courts reforms, mechanisms of parliamentary accountability, or the provision of alternative livelihoods for ex-combatants. Desirable as these policy goals may be in their own right, achieving them tends to be exceedingly difficult in practice. Reforms are almost invariably associated with shifts in the balance of power within governments and within security establishments. They often challenge the patronage relationships and corruption that form the glue of hybrid governance arrangements, not least within national security establishments. Additionally, they tend to come unstuck in political marketplaces, where markets in resources, drugs, weapons, and the like generate powerful incentives, working against all efforts to reform and rebuild effective security establishments, as our national and regional case studies above and below suggest.

Some of these problems are acknowledged in the policy literature. Even so, one finds too little serious evidence-based analysis of the politics of reform: how and for what reasons policies and programmes are initiated; why they succeed or fail; who benefits and who loses; and whether they improve the security of end-users. Even when the political obstacles to reform are acknowledged, they tend to be discussed in terms of the absence of political will or the lack of ‘local ownership’ (Nathan 2007a, 2007b). There tends to be little analysis of the struggles of different actors, including security elites, to thwart reforms, or to co-opt them to serve their own interests – or acknowledgement that the problems may be inherent in externally-driven reform itself.

There have been calls for ‘pragmatic realism’ both about security reform (Scheye 2009) and concerning post-war stabilisation more generally (Coletta and Muggah 2009), arguing that analysis should be based on informed understanding of what reforms cannot achieve, as well as what they can. This pragmatic emphasis is reinforced by the growing interest in the Arab world, where transformation of the security arrangements of established authoritarian regimes was previously ruled out as unrealistic and bound to fail (Barak and David 2009; Sayigh 2007, 2011) – but will still be far from easy in the changed context of the Arab springs.

The foundations for such an evidence-based approach are spelt out in a number of case studies of the politics and practice of security sector reform and of security decision-making (Cawtha and Luckham 2003; Call 2007; Hendrickson 2008; Sedra 2010; Peake, Scheye and Hills 2009). An especially detailed account of the reform process in Sierra Leone can be found in Albrecht and Buur (2009) and Jackson and Albrecht (2011). However, these case studies mostly tell the story of reform and of the political obstacles encountered to it from the viewpoint of the reformers themselves – rather than investigating the experience of the end-users whom the reforms are supposed to benefit. They are informative about the problems of forming elite coalitions to achieve reform objectives, but rather less so about mobilising grass-roots popular support.

Nevertheless there has been some shift in analytical focus from the initial preoccupation with core state security functions towards security institutions having more tangible impacts on the safety and welfare of end-users, including traditional justice bodies (Tariq 2009) and local-level policing and justice institutions (Baker 2010). Much of the analysis of these local-level institutions has been descriptive, focusing upon how they can stand in for absent or abusive states; although there has
been some discussion, too, of their uneasy relationships with national-level policing and justice institutions, as well as with civil-society organisations (Albrecht and Buur 2009). But there has been rather less investigation of how local level justice bodies interact with the power and patronage structures of hybrid political orders, either locally or nationally. However, a persuasive argument has been made by Veit (2010) in the context of the DRC that international support for local-level security and justice institutions fits within a much longer colonial tradition of indirect rule, tending to subsume such local-level structures in broader national and international political marketplaces.

Existing analysis has been especially weak on how dysfunctional security institutions can be challenged or held accountable by end-users living in conditions of insecurity. In some situations authoritarian states and their security apparatuses close down all spaces for contestation and debate. In other countries with fractured and violent political marketplaces (De Waal 2009 and 2010) such as in the DRC, Somalia, or Afghanistan citizens face immense difficulties in organising for collective action even at a local level. In neither situation do we have enough analysis of how citizen demands for change could emerge into the open, and translate into strong and durable popular support for a reordering of the political and security landscape. Nor do we know enough about the conditions in which instead the fracturing of the political and security institutions of authoritarian regimes merely generates further insecurity and political violence.

Nor has there been enough analysis and research on how civil-society groups or popular movements have been able to support wider-based peace and democratisation processes. There is a general absence of detailed analysis of who in moments of political change attempts to block, divert or co-opt major political and security changes, and of who on the other hand organises, mobilises and brings people out on the streets or in the villages. Hattotuwa (2009) has drawn attention to how in the security-dominated political environment of post-conflict Sri Lanka the new media have kept spaces open for debate as well as engaged in the vernacular with grass roots audiences. A further vital issues that is ripe for investigation is the relationship between armed and unarmed resistance to entrenched security structures (Azani 2011), including the tensions as well as synergies between the two forms of resistance as in Syria. There is not enough empirical investigation of such issues, although the Arab Springs are now providing a series of object lessons in the politics of resistance, reform, and resistance to reform.

However researchers have been able to shed a certain amount of light on efforts to reconstitute security and political authority ‘from below’ in fractured political marketplaces in which various armed and unarmed political factions compete for power. Somaliland is widely cited as a paradigm case of such peacebuilding from below (Menkhaus 2006 and Horn of Africa case study below). Even so, we know next to nothing about the conditions under which Somaliland’s model might be feasible in other heavily contested political environments, like the rest of Somalia, DRC, Afghanistan. Paradoxically, as we shall see in the next section, we seem to be rather better supplied with studies of local armed resistance to international interventions than we are with empirical analyses of more peaceful forms of activism (McGinty 2011).

The Horn of Africa
Anna Acker and Medhane Tadesse

The Horn of Africa continues to be one of the most violent and unstable regions of the world. The countries of the region, namely the seven InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states (including South Sudan from late 2011) plus Eritrea (which joined IGAD in 1993 but has suspended its membership) have once more ranked highly on the 2011 Failed State Index. They have a history of both inter-state and internal violent conflict and epitomise a mixture of different fragilities. Effectively, the Horn of Africa represents a hybrid security complex where
national political and security marketplaces are closely intertwined or subsumed by local, regional and global markets. This highly complicates the task of analysing how and by whom security is provided.

Conflicts across the region have been historically protracted and interlinked. The continuous influence and geopolitical interests of external players have further engrained deep-seated antagonisms. The forging of shifting alliances did not end with the Cold War era. Since 9/11, the Horn of Africa has been perceived as a frontline region in the fight against al-Qaeda and has become a central focus for AFRICOM. As illustrated by the 2006 Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ethiopian-led invasion of Somalia, US allies in the region such as Ethiopia or Kenya have tended to advance their national and regional power interests under the guise of counter-terrorism strategies. Therefore, security and insecurity in the Horn of Africa tend, in reality, to be determined by complex arrays of international, regional, state, and non-state actors. These players both cooperate and compete in struggles over the region’s reserves of power and rich pool of natural resources.

On the receiving end of these struggles are the end-users, who get caught up in national and international geopolitics beyond their control and making. Their security and livelihoods are constantly jeopardised and superseded by national, regional, and global strategic interests.

The ongoing conditions of instability and conflict across the Horn create an apparent security vacuum that states and various groups and individuals seek to fill through the use of violence, sometimes in an organised and sustained fashion and at other times in a spontaneous and sporadic manner. These conflicts are rooted in deep-seated contestations about territory and border demarcations (e.g. the entire Somali region, Badme and the Ethio-Eritrean border conflict, the North–South Sudan border). Across the region, borderlands have become highly securitised spaces as most ethnic groups along the national borders of IGAD member states have been subject to increasing militarisation over recent decades. Trans-border alliances amongst governments and insurgent armed groups are an historically established phenomenon. Examples include Ethiopian support for the South Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and, in turn, the backing of the Sudanese government for the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) during the 1990s. The complex politics of ‘proxy wars’ continues to destabilise the region and is also supported by external actors. Additionally, internal and cross-border clashes and disputes occur between pastoral communities of Ethiopia and Northern Kenya. Inter-communal violence between Southern-Sudanese pastoralist communities in Jonglei is aggravated by its links to powerful political and military players (Willems and Rouw 2011). This diversity of conflicts and actors adds to the multi-layered web of insecurity that end-users have to manoeuvre through on a daily basis.

Few of the states on the Horn of Africa possess sufficiently strong and autonomous state institutions to be able to manage internal or cross-border political conflicts. On one end of the spectrum lies Somalia, which has not had a stable central government in twenty years and whose formal state institutions have been washed away since the overthrow of the Barre regime in 1991. Far from being ungoverned. Somalia plays host to various hybrid governance arrangements (also including the self-declared but internationally unrecognised sovereign state of Somaliland). Across Somalia, power is highly contested between various powerful factions (for example TFG, warlords, Al-Shabaab) and Mogadishu has become a synonym for urban warfare. On the other end of the spectrum is Ethiopia, which demonstrates a strong central government with impressive capabilities for political coercion and surveillance of its citizens. With government crackdowns on its opposition in 2005 and 2008, Ethiopia has firmly returned to the authoritarian camp, showing itself unwilling to provide basic services and security to parts of its population. For example, Ethiopian pastoral communities lack protection from the state and cope through an
increased possession and use of small arms, which they view as essential to safeguard their property, water points and grazing lands (Gebrewold 2002).

The contested Leviathans on the Horn weaken regional security structures by undermining the livelihoods of populations in neighbouring states. Examples include the ferocious atrocities committed by Ethiopian troops against civilians, specifically women, during the 2006 invasion of Somalia and the treatment of internally displaced persons (IDPs) along the Northern Kenyan border. Moreover, deeply entrenched historical mistrust and conflict prevent non-violent politics, trade, and agricultural policies from freeing the region from its dependency on humanitarian assistance.

The Horn of Africa has the highest number of peacekeepers in Africa (Bah 2009). It has been the locus of several recent and ongoing peacekeeping missions, ranging from the highly conventional UNMEE to the innovative UNAMID, and an AU-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia. But while conflicts in the region are deeply interlinked, the peace operations unfortunately are not (Bah 2009). Furthermore, humanitarian assistance tends to be superseded by the realpolitik of local, national, and international actors involved. This is illustrated by Al-Shabaab’s recent denial of the existence of a famine in southern Somalia or the instrumental interception of humanitarian supplies by a variety of actors. Again, the adverse impacts on end-users’ security are not taken into consideration or are purposefully exploited. According to Menkhaus (2009), a wide and deep gap exists between local realities and the assumptions on which aid and diplomatic policies are based.

While research on the provision of security has received considerable scholarly attention, there is a ‘double deficit’, in terms of the interaction between the overlapping security arrangements on the one hand, and the analysis of security from the perspective of end-users on the other. Neither is well researched or clearly understood. Further, while there is some literature emerging on the various security arrangements, as well as some case-study work on the impact of security on the local population, there has been little effort to relate the two. Particularly, there is little in terms of evidence-based, ‘ground-level’ research on how people ‘experience’ and ‘feel’ – positively as well as negatively – the impacts of hybrid governance and security systems. There is little analysis and understanding of the nature of these movements and non-statutory armed groups, as well as their relations with peace and security.

There is a need to examine the poor’s perception of security and their relations to externally driven security arrangements and security institutions in the respective countries. Correspondingly, researchers, policy-makers and development agencies have generally failed to acknowledge the important role often played by informal security actors as alternative (if not necessarily more credible) security providers to the poor. Understanding the customary and non-formal security and justice sector is thus key to unravelling how the poor access security and justice and address their own ‘security deficits’.

This case study is based on:
Bah (2009); Tadesse (2002); Bakonyi (2010); Borchgrevink (2010); Bradbury (2008); Bruchhaus and Sommer (2008); Dersso (2010); Gebrewold (2005); Hagmann and Hoahne (2009); Healy (2009); Hoehne and Luling (2010); Kagwanja (2006); Leff (2009); Le Roux and Kidane (2007); Maxted and Zegeye (2001); Menkhaus (2007) and (2004); Mequanent (2008); Mkutu (2004); Mukwaya (2004); Rothe and Collins (2011); Reid (2009); Schomerus and Allen (2010); Sharama and Mesfi (2011); Simonse (2011); Small Arms Survey (2011); Tadesse (2008) and (2004); Verhoeven (2009); Wasara (2002); Willems and Rouw (2011); and Young (2007).
5.3 Securitised Policy Spaces

Securitised policy spaces are policy arenas in which international actors (peacekeepers, donors, international agencies, INGOs etc) intervene to ensure peace and security, claiming to act for poor and vulnerable end users as well as for the international community.

Since security is determined at multiple levels, remote global political and economic conditions can have very specific, and sometimes painful, impacts on the welfare of people living on the ground. In some cases security is mediated through global marketplaces, in others through the global and regional spread of violence, and in some contexts via the direct policy interventions of powerful states, international institutions, donors, humanitarian agencies and international NGOs. As already observed, an increased number of security interventions tend to be undertaken in the name of the poor, insecure and dispossessed, often under the capacious umbrellas of peacebuilding, human or citizen security.

Here we ask what the literature does or does not tell us about whether such claims have merit; how they translate into ‘pro-poor’ security policies and programmes; and whether the latter actually benefit those who most suffer the effects of poverty and insecurity. We also consider the proposition advanced earlier, that even when intervening for mainly humanitarian goals, international actors rapidly become entangled in hybrid relationships with powerful national and local actors including some of the main agents of insecurity. Good intentions are no protection against the perverse and sometimes violent consequences of international engagement.

There are substantial policy literatures on peacebuilding and state reconstruction (DFID 2005, 2010; OECD 2005 2010, 2011; World Bank 2011), on stabilisation (Stabilisation Unit 2010), and on security and justice reform in fragile and post-conflict situations (Hutchful et al. 2009). As we have already seen, the WDR 2011 tackles the political dimensions of peacebuilding and security reform, drawing upon the talents of many scholars working in this field. Yet, it remains very difficult to translate these policy analyses into sound operational guidelines for international engagement in the ‘bad surroundings’ of fragile states. In particular, the repeated emphasis on the formation of ‘inclusive enough’ political coalitions, which seems to open the door to civil-society bodies and popular movements speaking for poor and excluded people, contains little discussion of the criteria by which one might decide whether particular political coalitions are ‘inclusive enough’, or of whom they might include or not include.

For the most part, policy analyses make broad-brush characterisations of transitions from war to peace, without going much into the specifics of particular regions and countries. The distinct historical trajectories by which states and regions become ‘fragile’ or insecure, or are ‘stabilised’ or opened up to reform, are all too often glossed over. Nor indeed has there been enough recognition of the major differences in the scale, types and impacts of international engagement, ranging from the relatively limited policy support for security and justice reforms in countries such as Nigeria, Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia, or Nepal on the one hand and, on the other, the wholesale reordering by the international community of entire states and their security institutions under the rubric of stabilisation as in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, East, Timor, Liberia, or Sierra Leone.29

Surprisingly little policy literature, or indeed of the substantial number of academic studies devoted to policy issues, cropped up in our literature searches. One reason could be that much of this

29 Luckham (2011) classifies different forms of international engagement and intervention.
analysis has looked at peacebuilding through the interventionist gaze of the international community, rather than through the lenses of national, let alone grass-roots stakeholders. This top-down perspective is reflected in diagnoses of peacebuilding that attribute failure and success variously to the sequencing of reform, including the actual or supposed prioritisation of political liberalisation over the building of institutions (Paris 2004); to the inability of donors and international agencies to coordinate policies and act with a single voice on matters of security (Toft 2010); to the inherent tensions between humanitarian and military action; and to lack of local ownership and absence of political will. All of these factors are no doubt important, but they do not sufficiently address the deep contradictions inherent in international engagement and peacebuilding itself.

One finds rather little deep textured analysis in this international policy literature of particular national histories, political marketplaces, and trajectories of conflict. The preferred modes of analysis tend to be anecdotal examples, chapter-length case studies based on secondary sources, and edited collections. Moreover, policy analyses have had a tendency to edit out the political interests and calculations of the major players, including the international ones. As we have already seen, the international community is open to the charge that development assistance and humanitarian aid, and still more its sponsorship of SSR and stabilisation programmes, have been ‘securitised’ or driven by their own foreign policy and security agendas. The prioritisation of stabilisation and security tends to be counterproductive where major political and social transformations are emerging from messy, and sometimes violent, upheavals and struggles – as is the case in the Arab world. It can also be problematic in situations of large-scale external military intervention and highly contested political authority, where stabilisation merges into counter-insurgency as in Afghanistan and Iraq. Only recently have analysts begun to spell out the contradictions of foreign interventions in the affairs of failed and failing states and to place them in longer-term historical perspective (Paris and Sisk 2009; Call 2010; Collinson et al. 2010; Goodhand and Sedra 2010; Gordon 2010; Lothe and Peake 2010).

However, a somewhat separate stream of critical analysts has turned its attention to the links between the liberal peace and stabilisation agendas (Chandler 2006; Pugh et al. 2008; Richmond and Franks 2009, Richmond 2011), as well as to the co-option of both by the war on terror (Keen 2006; Howell and Lind 2009). As argued earlier, these critical accounts share some of the empirical and other weaknesses of the studies they critique. Yet they have rightly called attention to the disproportionate resources, power and policy influence of international actors in fragile and conflict situations. A further important contribution of the critical literature has been has been to place these external actors firmly into the analytical frame as objects of study - rather than taking their policy agendas as the starting point for inquiry as in so much of the statebuilding and security reform literature.

Both MacGinty (2011) and Veit (2010) contend that the entire assemblage of external actors who are active in fragile states and securitised border spaces can be understood as international ‘regimes’ or hybrid political orders in their own right. For the ‘international community’ is a far from neutral or homogeneous political space. The priorities and animating logics of peacekeeping or intervention forces, aid and humanitarian agencies, and international NGOs differ and sometimes clash (Bagayoko 2009). Major tensions tend to surface in the area of civil-military cooperation, although most of the analysis so far has focused upon the relationships amongst international actors themselves (Gordon 2010) not the tensions with local security actors. There has been little detailed empirical enquiry into how the bureaucratic timetables, funding requirements, and inter-agency rivalries of international actors determine the workings of stabilisation policies or SSR programmes in practice. There has been even less rigorous empirical scrutiny of the relationships of their policies and programmes to the wider security agendas of military alliances, large powers, and global corporations.
Another notable gap, at least until recently, has been the lack of research on the messy and often violent real politics of peacebuilding and stabilisation, including the relationships between the international and local armed actors. Autesserre’s (2010) study of peacebuilding in the DRC is one of the first anywhere to be based upon in depth interviews with peacekeepers, with members of the national security forces and with members of non-state armed groups. Veit (2010) characterises the complex relationships in eastern DRC between international peacekeepers and humanitarian agencies with local elites and armed groups as a new trope in the old colonial narrative of indirect rule. These analyses have turned their analytical lens upon how the attempts of well-resourced international actors to ensure security are mediated through their reliance upon local elites and armed groups. This reliance all too often diverts them from their mandates and damages the security and welfare of the local people and communities they are supposed to protect. Similar deep tensions between international engagement and local dynamics would seem to be at play in Afghanistan, but with the major difference that the Taliban presents a formidable fighting and political force, able in conditions of asymmetric warfare to take full advantage of the international community’s dependence upon corrupt and unreliable local allies. The central paradox in both the DRC and Afghanistan is that representatives of the international community have become enmeshed in Faustian bargains with local warlords and other elites, diminishing their legitimacy and making it all the harder to stabilise a durable peace around a legitimate and effective state. Sometimes indeed, members of the international community end up internalising the characteristics of the hybrid political orders they are supposed to stabilise and reform.

Global markets too, as some of the literature cited in our peer-led searches highlights, have manifold impacts on the capacity of international actors to deliver security (or not) as well as upon how and on behalf of whom they intercede. Our searches uncovered analyses of security privatisation (Abrahamsen and Williams 2008; 2009); of the trade in conflict goods (Cooper 2002); and of the flows of natural resources and ‘illicit’ commodities such as drugs, which fuel political violence and armed conflicts (Le Billon 2001; Ross 2004; Omeje 2006; Ibeanu 2006). Fundamental shifts have taken place in the terms of trade in these global markets, which in turn have altered the terms of trade within the political marketplaces of hybrid political orders, sometimes fundamentally, as with the drug trade in Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, or Afghanistan. As illicit or shadow markets shift geographically across countries and regions, they start to reconfigure entire states, as seen dramatically in West African countries such as Guinea, which are becoming transit points in the drugs trade between Latin America and Europe. They also tend to bring a number of new actors into the security frame, not just in illicit or shadow markets, but in more open markets as well, including international security firms, natural resource corporations and even international NGOs (Avant and Hauffer 2010).

There are several ways in which penetration by these global and regional markets significantly complicates international peacebuilding and security reform programmes. Examples are the enormous difficulties of regulating poppy production and trade in Afghanistan and of breaking its links to warlordism and insurgency; the illicit trade in coltan and other high-value commodities in the DRC which has impeded the creation of a viable national economy and perpetuated the incentive systems sustaining criminal and political violence; the problems of implementing security and justice reforms in countries where resource or drug-induced corruption have begun to penetrate deep into security agencies themselves even in countries like Ghana; or the undue influence of security firms have gained in security reform processes in countries like Afghanistan or Liberia.

Major issues of accountability are raised by the massive presence of external actors in donor-saturated spaces. End-users have a hard enough time establishing accountability for the abuses they suffer at the hands of soldiers, police and intelligence agencies, let alone paramilitaries, militias, rebel forces or peacekeepers. Without mechanisms of democratic accountability they have little if
any chance of challenging security policies and development programmes that may harm their security and livelihoods. Yet international peacebuilders and humanitarian actors are accountable only to their own agencies and governments, and not in any meaningful way to the people they aid or protect, even when that protection fails or worsens the violence. The accountability gaps are even starker for those who are active in global and regional security marketplaces, be they dealers in illicit or high-value commodities, arms traders, security firms, or natural resource corporations. Each of these (and the marketplaces in which they operate) poses distinct regulatory issues. Yet at present, we lack serious empirical analysis of their impacts on end-users or of how and to whom such external actors might be held accountable.

6. Conclusion: Suggestions for Future Research

Our survey of the literature has found little consensus about the definition, study or practice of security. Many questions remain to be answered about who or what is secure, from what and how. Security is highly contested both in the realm of politics and in the realm of ideas. For some, security is primarily about political power including the use of organised force to establish and maintain social orders and to protect them from external and internal threats. For others it is about how individuals and communities are protected (or protect themselves) from violence, abuse of power and other existential risks. We combine both these approaches, although we acknowledge and analyse the deep tensions between them. In both senses security is intimately connected to public authority: how and by whom such authority is exercised, how it is legitimised and how it touches upon and affects individuals and communities. In sum, we have argued that in hybrid political orders security is both a process of political and social ordering, and an entitlement of end users.

However, our main departure point has been the second of these two faces of security. What does security look like ‘from below’, i.e. from the perspective of ‘end users’ be these citizens of states, members of local communities or those who are marginalised and insecure in border spaces? What are their vernacular understandings of security and how do these reflect the hybrid and contested nature of political authority at a local level? What connects their particular and local experiences and understandings to wider conceptions of citizen and of human security?

Whilst end-users have been our starting point, the analytical trail has tended to gravitate back to the first (and more state-centred) approach to security. For even when security and insecurity are experienced and decided locally, they are at the same time to be determined nationally and globally. It is at the interfaces between local agency, state power and global order that the most politically salient and analytically challenging issues tend to arise.

This duality of security has been reflected in our literature survey. Both our search terms and the terms of reference for respondents to the peer survey highlighted the perceptions and experience of end users. Nevertheless in practice a preponderance of the references generated by the searches are studies of national level security issues or of donor policies and programmes. Although they all refer to the security of poor and vulnerable people they tend to do so through the top down gaze of social researchers, national decision-makers, policy activists and international donors.

In part, this is indicative of the major gaps and imbalances in the research literature, which the Justice and Security Research Programme aims to redress. It is also symptomatic of massive asymmetries of power and knowledge in the theory and practice of security itself. Hence, in order to understand why end users are (in)secure one needs good empirical understanding both of their day
to day experience of security and of the wider political and social forces shaping that experience and all too often disempowering them.

These research gaps can be redressed by more empirical studies, which are more adequately grounded in the realities of how of poor and vulnerable end-users themselves navigate the terrains of war and insecurity. Fortunately our searches indicate that there already exists a modest but expanding body of research on local-level security provision upon which future inquiries can build.

But an end-user perspective demands not only in depth local-level research but also a different kind of analysis able to turn an end-user lens upon the global, regional and national power relations, which determine the security of poor and vulnerable people. We have noted the beginnings of such an analysis in the existing research literature, including investigations of the varied ways in which policy interventions may reinforce hybrid security arrangements and powerful local actors, and are in turn co-opted or diverted by the latter. Nevertheless the emphasis tends to be upon why policy interventions are ineffective or counterproductive. We know much less about how national and international security decision-makers are or could be influenced and held accountable by end-users themselves.

Below we sketch out some questions for further research taking citizen and human security as our starting point and spelling out what follows for empirical investigations in the different spaces in which security is determined. Although we consider each of these policy spaces separately the emphasis throughout is upon how security actors in them interconnect and jointly determine and respond to the security of poor and vulnerable people. In sum, we argue that researchers should ally an end-user perspective to a multilevel analysis of how and on behalf of whom hybrid security arrangements work in practice.

Unsecured borderlands

1. An investigation of how end users themselves navigate security and insecurity in unsecured borderlands, including their vernacular understandings and lived experience, should be the starting point for all empirical research.

As we have seen there is already an impressive range of micro-level empirical studies on which researchers and analysts can build. Yet these are geographically scattered, thematically and methodologically diverse and somewhat concentrated around the stories of particular vulnerable groups such as former combatants and child soldiers. Hence there is a need for more theoretical and conceptual integration, as well as empirical inquiry with more emphasis on the potential agency of end users and their capacity to influence or indeed frustrate formal policy structures and agendas. Particular questions that might be investigated would include:

- Who precisely are the ‘end-users’ and do they have shared or diverging perceptions of security? Do the latter “see” security differently from elites, security policy makers or indeed from other end-users?
- To whom, or to what, do end-users look for protection? When do they turn to formal security and justice institutions and when to informal security and justice providers?
- Do end-users believe that the benefits to them of existing security arrangements exceed the costs of compliance? When instead do they exit, protest or turn to violence?
- What strategies if any do end-users deploy to assure their security within securitised border spaces? How far do these strategies depend upon their accommodations with patrons, elites, criminal mafias, armed militias or other powerful and well-armed groups?
• Who in local contexts actually builds peace or mediates between conflicting groups? To what extent are they included or do they find themselves excluded (like women’s groups) from formal peace negotiations and peace-building.

2. **Careful mapping is required of local level security and justice arrangements in border spaces, including the informal power networks and political marketplaces typifying hybrid political orders.**

The research literature we have surveyed includes a number of studies of local level security, policing and justice arrangements. These studies are of somewhat variable empirical quality. A number provide best practice examples of the ways these provide alternatives to failing state security provision. Rather fewer scrutinise the less palatable Janus face of local-level security arrangements, including the reinforcement of local and national-level inequalities, gender discrimination and linkages to patronage and criminal networks – on which there is a considerable but largely separate literature. These different strands of analysis must be combined to provide warts and all diagnoses of how hybrid security arrangements actually work at the local level and for whom.

• Which informal or formal, actors, institutions and networks are the primary security and justice providers within the security marketplaces of border spaces? How do informal and formal security providers interact?

• How and for whom do these local-level justice and security arrangements actually work? Do they offer real protection from predatory elites, armed violence and other sources of insecurity? Who benefits and who is excluded?

• In what ways do criminal and other networks spread and fund insecurity in border spaces? When do they instead offer certain limited forms of protection?

• When and how do armed insurgents challenge the state’s monopoly of security provision? In what circumstances do they offer more effective protection and more convincing narratives of security?

• How reliant are the main informal and formal security actors in borderlands upon the use of violence? When and how does this violence close down political spaces, reduce participation and weaken accountability?

3. **Research methods should be innovative as well as rigorous in order to provide sufficiently grounded understanding of the hybrid political orders and power networks determining security at local level.**

The literature we have surveyed spans diverse methodologies for studying local-level security arrangements, ranging from ethnographic field work, to participatory research, to focused interviews, to quantitative surveys. Not enough of this research, as we have shown, meets rigorous methodological standards. The diversity of methodological approaches, subject matter and social context makes it difficult to draw comparisons or reach general conclusions. Few studies provide systematic accounts of their own research procedures. There is little in the way of methodological innovation. Few, if any, studies combine ethnographic and survey research; or make creative use of participatory methods to engage end-users; or use new crowd sourcing techniques to explore the potential of new media technologies.

• In what ways can research best encourage end-users to provide their own vernacular narratives of what it means to be secure or insecure, be it through life histories, participatory research, crowd sourcing, blogging\(^{30}\) or poetry\(^{31}\).

\(^{30}\) See Hattotuwa 2009 on the possibilities opened up by the new media.

\(^{31}\) See Hoehne and Luling 2010 Parts 5 to 7 on the role of poetry, culture and language in Somali understandings of war and peace.
- How might new forms of research partnership enable end-users themselves to gain a better understanding of the national and global as well as local determinants of their (in)security?
- In what ways can quantitative techniques be combined creatively with qualitative research, for example by using formal techniques of network analysis to map the social networks of hybrid political orders, or time series analyses to keep track of patterns of change?
- How can a historical perspective be built into research so as to document major shifts in local power relations or economic trends, for instance through time series analysis, life histories or use of local archival sources?
- How can researchers work with international organisations and NGOs with a long-established presence in the field for instance to develop baseline data or to engage end-users?

**Contested state Leviathans**

1. *Empirical scrutiny is badly needed of how, and for who, state security arrangements work or fail to work in hybrid political orders, including the main ‘security gaps’ between state provision and the needs and expectations of end users.* In our survey of the literature we noted the mismatch between the policy literature, which tends to assume that states and their security and justice institutions are capable in principle of delivering security if reforms are pushed through; and critical research which suggests that insecurity and violence may be entrenched in the heart of the state itself and ‘work’ to the benefit of predatory state and other elites. It is essential to develop methods of analysis, which transcend this division between the policy and research literatures. On the one hand, to ensure that policy is not based on unrealistic expectations about the realities of power in hybrid political orders. On the other hand, to ensure that critical analysis does not discount the potential for change in existing security arrangements so as to improve the security of poor and vulnerable people.

Research should also take account of the great diversity among states and hybrid political orders and of their relationships with their peripheral regions. Different forms of political authority coexist and are also in competition with each other, not least over how and by whom security is defined and provided at national and local levels. Two contrasting situations are especially pertinent (a) where states, which are apparently fragile and insecure, continue somehow to exist in conditions of durable disorder, and (b) where previously ‘strong’ authoritarian or quasi-authoritarian states face actual or potential challenges to their authority and monopoly of violence. Whilst each of these situations are distinct, both reflect a more general trend for the state to lose ground to other ways of organising political power, wealth accumulation and security.

- What analytical and empirical tools can be used to understand situations where state power unravels and security slips out of the control of security institutions, especially in marginalised border regions? Can they also shed light upon how state authority and security might be re-established?
- How are power and security networked within and around the state, considered as a hybrid political arena in its own right? In what ways do patronage networks, clan, ethnicity, religious confession etc influence how power is allocated nationally and locally and determine who is secure from whom?
- What forms do political alliances and coalitions take: are they simply among elites or do they also include various popular forces? In what circumstances are these coalitions ‘inclusive enough’ (in the World Bank’s terminology) to overcome conflicts and ensure the security of end-users?
• Are ‘failing’ states and their security and justice institutions mostly agents of security or of insecurity for end-users? How and by whom (if at all) can they be held accountable for human rights abuses, violence against citizens and failure to establish law and order?
• When and how do citizens challenge dominant state security institutions and practices, as during the Arab springs? What tension points in the edifices of power open actual or potential spaces for change? Why are these so often ignored or identified only after the event?
• Why and how have elites and security institutions managed to frustrate, divert or co-opt reforms (i.e. the Thermidor scenario of some post-communist and Arab spring countries) or reignite violence? What does research tell us about such reversals and how can it inform ‘democratic strategies’ to prevent them?

2. Mapping informal security relationships within and around the state, including its uneven relationships with unsecured borderlands, is a crucial first step, and can provide an antidote to purely state-centred analysis. Many states, as well as their security and justice systems, are not so much fragile as socially and geographically exclusive. Their writ does not extend to all regions in national territory or even within major urban centres. Security as a public good is distributed unevenly, just like the impacts of violence and conflict. An important category of conflict-affected countries includes those such as Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Ethiopia or Uganda, where powerful if sometimes mal-functioning state institutions coexist with major zones of insecurity and political violence within the same national context. Even in more obviously fragile states security tends to be unevenly distributed. It is impossible to analyse such patterns of inclusion and exclusion without better understanding each country’s history and national experience.

• What historical processes have rendered borderlands peripheral and insecure: for instance major shifts in the locus of power, nationally and locally; uneven development patterns; politicisation of identities; or the spread of conflict and insecurity across national boundaries from neighbouring states?
• Are unsecured borderlands truly ‘ungoverned’? If not how and by whom are they governed; and how does the state make its presence felt and for whom in these regions does it ‘work’?
• How do the state and national level elites negotiate security with stakeholders in regional and local security marketplaces – or do they simply impose it through violence? In what ways do these local stakeholders in their turn attempt to influence or coerce national-level actors?
• How and why do states subcontract security provision in border spaces to other providers (e.g. traditional authorities, paramilitaries, militias, vigilantes)? What are the consequences of subcontracting for the state’s monopoly of violence, for public authority and for the security of end-users?
• In what circumstances do asymmetric military challenges to the state and its security institutions arise from guerrillas or insurgents operating in securitised border spaces; and how do they respond or fail to do so?
• How do cross-border relationships with states and insurgents in neighbouring countries affect governance and the security of end-users in securitised border spaces?

3. Strategies to carry out empirical research in highly contested, unstable and dangerous national and local neighbourhoods tend to be underdeveloped and require far more discussion. A major reason why policy makers and social scientists still tend to be caught out by the sudden exposure of the underlying fragility of apparently established authoritarian systems, as currently in the Arab world and previously communist systems in Eastern Europe, is the difficulty of penetrating and understanding the deep state and its security apparatuses. Secrecy is not just endemic it is often the way the state itself works. Even when power is relocated outside the state into clandestine social networks and patronage systems researchers and policy analysts tend to be equally much at sea.
Added to this are the risks to personal safety both of researchers and of their informants in bad and violent neighbourhoods. On the other hand fragile state Leviathans are seldom monolithic, and this may open opportunities for research inquiry in the most unexpected places, especially at moments of political crisis.

- What are the most appropriate analytical tools for empirical analysis and mapping of situations of hybridity within and outside the state: Network analysis? Study over time of how coalitions form and re-form within political marketplaces? Analysis of the bureaucratic relationships, which underpin the deep state? Class analysis of who benefits and who loses from existing security arrangements?

- How can researchers negotiate entry into the secret spaces and covert networks of the state? How may their efforts to gain access also potentially constrain their independence as researchers?

- How can researchers build convincing accounts of the deep state and of the informal networks of power through the gathering and triangulation of scraps of information from a variety of non-obtrusive measure and indirect data sources? How can this *bricolage* of different sources be made more comprehensively rigorous?

- What opportunities are opened up by investigative journalism and by the new media, for instance to subject the deep state to scrutiny, or to provide entry points into previously inaccessible border spaces?

- How can social researchers work with and learn from organisations that specialise in the documentation and analysis of violent conflicts and human rights abuses; for example Amnesty International, Global Witness, the International Crisis Group, or the Small Arms Survey?

**Securitised policy spaces**

1. *Much has been said about the ways in which development and humanitarian assistance are or are not securitised. Yet we still lack rigorous independent analysis of how donors, international organisations and international NGOs engage in the security marketplace.* We have argued earlier that the same tools of analysis can and should be applied to international actors as to all other actors in hybrid political orders. Even when motivated by humanitarian and development concerns, their interventions are not and cannot be entirely neutral. The policy arenas in which donors and other international actors operate tend to be shaped by strategic and political considerations, bureaucratic timetables, inter-agency rivalries and networks of influence. Collective action is often complicated by the difficulties of reconciling clashing interests, perceptions and ways of working. Donor interventions almost inevitably reallocate power and influence among national and local stakeholders in the countries and localities where they operate. And these local stakeholders in turn try to extract political advantage, co-opt or divert aid and security support for their own ends. Hence the real politics of donor engagement in stabilising fragile states and reforming their security institutions is a pressing research and policy concern, not least because it can have tangible impacts on the security and welfare of end-users

We earlier made a distinction between two distinct kinds of policy space in which donors and other international actors operate with many gradations in between: (a) those that are truly donor-saturated, notably where the international community has a direct military and political presence, as in Afghanistan, the DRC or previously Sierra Leone and Liberia; (b) those where the international community influences the delivery of security and justice indirectly through diplomacy, aid and security assistance. In neither case are policy spaces political power-free zones, especially as concerns security issues. And in neither case can donors call all the shots. Even in situations when
they command apparently overwhelming military and financial resources their interventions can easily be derailed by local and national political dynamics over which they may have little control.

- How far are securitised policy spaces characterised by their own distinct forms of hybridity and informal networks of power and interest?
- What are the main stress points within the international community’s development, ‘social protection’, ‘human security’ or ‘pro-poor’ policies and programmes and between these agendas and its foreign policy and strategic (e.g. counter-terrorist and counterdrug) priorities? How in practice are such tensions resolved, or instead pasted over?
- What are the links between ‘hard’ (including military) and ‘soft’ forms of international intervention? What civil-military tensions exist on the ground between security and humanitarian actors; and how if at all are they resolved?
- When and how do international actors subcontract responsibilities to national and local actors, both formal and informal? Is there substance to the charge that this subcontracting reinforces local power relations and fosters problematic forms of ‘indirect rule’, intermediated by local military establishments, political elites, warlords and paramilitaries, who manipulate international programmes for their own ends?
- In what circumstances do external policy interventions on balance foster positive transformations in local power relations, enable reform constituencies or open spaces for changes that benefit end-users?
- Is there any real answerability of international actors to national and local stakeholders and in particular poor and vulnerable people – and if so through what accountability mechanisms?

2. Research should not only map the ways donors, international organisations and NGOs navigate the terrains of war and political turmoil. It can also help them to identify and minimise the potentially regressive outcomes of their interventions, including the creation of new forms of insecurity for end-users. Some of these regressive outcomes reflect tensions between the security, development and humanitarian objectives of international actors themselves. Others stem from poor historical and political understandings of the national and regional contexts in which international actors intervene. And others again arise because international actors do not factor in the political dynamics and security arrangements of hybrid political orders. An underlying dilemma for all external actors is whether they should ‘work with the grain’ of hybrid security arrangements in the hope of ultimately transforming them; or whether instead they should press for more far reaching reforms at risk of generating sustained and violent opposition. In either case, however, it is imperative to consider the impacts on poor and vulnerable people; and to ask how if at all the latter can hold international actors accountable.

- How can international actors begin to apply an end user perspective to their own security, humanitarian and development agendas? What capabilities do they require in order to ensure that security reforms actually work for poor and vulnerable people? In what ways can they be more reflexive, learn from mistakes, and be more modest about what they can actually achieve in difficult neighbourhoods?
- Can and should international actors insist that governments and security and justice institutions in fragile states meet the highest human rights, gender equality and ‘responsibility to protect’ standards? When and how does insistence on such standards backfire?
- Do international actors including intervention forces, peacekeepers, aid agencies, humanitarian organisations and NGOs themselves measure up to human rights and humanitarian standards? And what redress if any is available to end-users when they fall short of these standards?
• What does working with the grain of existing security and political arrangements mean in practice for international actors? Is it ever justifiable for them to make Faustian bargains with violent and venal elites, warlords, or militias claiming to protect end-users, in what circumstances and with what dangers?

• What potential ‘weapons of the weak’ if any are available to end-users in their dealings with the international community? When and how can they influence or indeed challenge prevailing security policies and practices in meaningful ways; and how can international actors best assist them in doing so?

3. It is crucial that research methods are not only relevant to the policy concerns of security decision-makers but also that they tap the experience, perceptions and needs of end-users. Policy-makers sometimes grumble that the social research that arrives on their desks does not address their most pressing policy concerns. Researchers for their part complain that policy makers disregard their findings in pursuing quick policy fixes in situations of great historical and social complexity. At the same time both researchers and policy-makers tend to be remote from the day-to-day lives and security concerns of poor and vulnerable people. These end-users have to cope with risks and insecurities that stem partly from global dislocations they may barely understand. They interact with a range of international actors, including researchers, who are accountable in the final analysis to those who mandate, fund or organise their activities, rather than those they study. End-users cannot hope to hold either policy-makers or researchers accountable without better access to the research upon which the framing of policy is based. More fundamentally they need research that reflects their own concerns, including better empirical understanding of how and by whom their security is determined.

• How can research be designed to provide windows into, or slices across, the multiple (global, national, local) levels determining the security of end-users? How might such a multilevel approach be used to identify entry points where policy interventions can make a real difference to the security and welfare of end-users?

• What is the appropriate mix in violent or politically contested neighbourhoods between academic research meeting rigorous international standards; research providing an evidence base for policy; and participatory research aiming to benefit and empower local people and communities?

• Do external researchers and policy makers in dangerous places have a responsibility to ‘do no harm’ and what does this involve? What are the risks of research being misused, for instance to target sources of dissent or to facilitate counterinsurgency and how can these risks be guarded against? What oversight and redress if any do local people and communities have vis-à-vis research in their own neighbourhoods?

• How do policy makers respond to research which casts a critical light on their policies and programmes (for example on state-building or on SSR), or which highlights their failure to protect end-users? How should they take such analysis on board and how might they be encouraged to be more self-critical?

• How best can external researchers and policy-makers work with southern counterparts and with end-users both to improve their own empirical understanding and to build local and national research capacity?

• How might researchers and policy makers engage end-users more fully in the framing and planning as well as implementation and dissemination of research, for instance through participatory methods, community engagement, policy dialogue, networking, information-sharing, use of new media etc? What tangible benefits would accrue to end-users, including greater ability to understand and respond to the global and local conditions increasing their insecurity?
In sum, our survey has generated many more questions than we began with – and many more than any single research programme could possibly answer. We have also violated one of our own central precepts, that research should as much as possible be rooted in particular historical, national and local contexts and experiences. Some of our questions are in principle researchable. But others are not, instead raising meta-issues, which researchers can or should address, such as the balance between research and policy or the responsibilities of researchers towards end-users.

Despite all the research that has already been conducted, security remains such an acutely contested area that firm empirical conclusions are very rare, especially about how security touches on the lives of poor and vulnerable people. Research, like policy, has been skewed by the inequalities inherent in the theory and practice of security itself. We hope that our questions will encourage researchers to pay greater attention to the capabilities and concerns of those whom the prevailing security architecture has left out or failed.
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Appendix A: Database Search Annotated Bibliography


This article analyses the UN’s women’s empowerment strategy with Sierra Leone providing a case study. The authors argue that ‘empowerment lite’ is occurring, with wide gaps between the rhetoric and practice of both the UN’s and the government’s strategies. They call for feminists to reclaim the discourse from what they see as the neoliberal establishment. Overall it provides an interesting analysis of policy strategies adopted in Sierra Leone, but the reviewer was unsure of its relevance for the primary research question.

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This article describes the historical trajectory of women's empowerment in Sierra Leone, focussing on political and economical participation as well as bodily integrity. The article seems summative and descriptive with some insights into work of activists and activist groups. It is not clear whether cited from other empirical studies or based on own primary research. Likewise, where the authors give statistical figures on representation/elections the sources are unclear.

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The article seeks to contribute to better understanding of Pakistan’s internal political structure (isolation of general Musharraf on the internal level, manipulations of existing political parties, creation of a hybrid structure where the army would keep its political influence and power). The paper describes and analyses the issue of national unity in the context of insurgency in Baluchistan and instabilities in tribal zones (Waziristan). The author recommends integration provincial institutions into the policy making process.


The article depicts quotidian actions and routines in the lives of Palestinians living on camps in Israel. This piece points out the lack of documentation on the risks for those living in the camps, whilst simultaneously attempting to disassociate violent actions from Palestinians at large. While provide an interesting account, it lacks a variety of sources known to the reviewer. However, it is strong on descriptions of the obstacles Palestinians must go through to negotiate checkpoints and the author focuses on access to resources.
The work offers a close examination of militarization policies after the 2001 Kargil War between India and Pakistan. The article argues that military institutions are not able to foster development, humanitarian aid, democratic freedom, and peacebuilding and in fact can deter peacebuilding.

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The article offers a good analysis of issues surrounding SSR and the involvement of non-state actors. The authors ask who are the key personnel, whilst remaining aware of the importance of engaging communities in SSR, something they argue many initiatives fail to do in practice. In terms of the quality, overall the articles’ insights are accompanied by a good use of primary sources (reports etc) and it references the wider literature well.

| Coder: AA | Score data quality: 2.66 |
| Score quality analysis: 4.00 | Total score: 6.50 |
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The articles discusses the importance of regional entities like ECOWAS in regard to military intervention, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction. The cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia are used to demonstrate how regional organisations can be more effective in policing their own neighborhoods than international organisations or states. In particular, it suggests ECOWAS learned
that the intervention force’s and leaders’ political will to intervene through financial and logistical support may be crucial to averting similar crises in the sub-region.

This article discusses some of the ways in which weak states are attractive to militant groups, using PLO and Hezbollah as the primary cases. It explores the various mechanisms through which the vacuum of power translates into opportunities for such groups. These mechanisms include the easiness of acquiring support and recruitment within refugees or marginalized populations; the ability of the violent non-state transnational organization to establish a “surrogate state” in supplying institutions and services that enhance its public appeal; the relations between civil or communal conflict and the success of such groups; and the use of transnational violent groups as proxies for other states. The article is mainly a review of literature and uses secondary sources to support its arguments.

The article presents the security and defense sector reforms in French speaking Sub-Saharan Africa. The author begins with the notion of reform and explains the specificities of the security and
defense reforms in different countries of the region (democratization, creation of new institutions, restructuring, training, etc.). The author points out a few of the elements that should be developed or taken into account by security transformation and the state reconstruction programmes, however, his analysis suffers from a lack of depth and arguments are not sustained with examples. Practically, there is no empirical evidence in the article.

The authors examine under what conditions non-state actors are likely to take on more authority in a particular issue area. When actors are forced to adopt new policies due to previous failures, one outcome of policies the non-state actors choose can be governance roles, in particular within the area of security. The authors argue that NGOs and corporations, e.g. humanitarian groups and extractive sector firms, have increasingly taken on governance tasks in the security arena. Overall, this is an important and good paper that address the role of NGOs and private firms' role as authority (governance) and providers of security. For instance, it argues that humanitarian aid without adequate security to protect both civilians and NGO staff will not reach the desired results. Thus, it argues that non-state organizations that provide security for such initiatives, are not necessarily in opposition to the state and may in fact help it win legitimacy. Although many good examples are used to illustrate the author's arguments and they conduct a good review of the literature on this topic, it does not display any empirical data collection methods.

The book contributes to understanding the Hezbollah movement in Lebanon. The basic assumption of the study is the view of Hezbollah as a revolutionary Lebanese social movement that includes both pan-Islamic ideologies and being a pragmatic Lebanese movement combining open and formal activity with violent terroristic activity outside the system. The primary sources considered in the study are statements, speeches and interviews with Lebanese officials and Hezbollah and Israeli leaders published in the Arab and Lebanese media. The author covers various levels and time periods, e.g. local, national, regional and throughout its existence. Hezbollah provides a good example of a hybrid movement operating both inside and outside state institutions. Good discussion on dynamics, e.g. the movement's anti-Israel ideology could be at the expense of civilian security in the South and the need for Hezbollah to find some balance in sustaining domestic Lebanese support.

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Quantity of data/information used: More than 50% empirical information
Type(s) of data/information used: Other

How insightful in terms of data/information? Considerable amount of new data / information
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory? Some significant new analysis / theoretical insight

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Bah's work aims to take a multi-disciplinary approach to understanding the conflict in Cote D'Ivoire through utilising the lenses of constructivism, colonial legacies, and democratization. The early problems of the Ivoirian democracy were due to the ethnisation and racialisation of groups having different citizenship statuses within Cote D'Ivoire. This work does a great job of blending sociology and political science, while underscoring the importance of colonial legacies when examining conflicts.

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Type(s) of data/information used: Other

How insightful in terms of data/information? Some new data / information
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory? No significant new analysis / theoretical insight
This article examines the circumstances in which linkages between state and non-state security and justice occur; the benefits enjoyed by the partners; and the problems encountered. It considers how their success is to be measured, and how and when they can be facilitated and made sustainable. It comes to the conclusion that, for all their limitations, states, donors and international agencies would be foolish to ignore links with non-state security and justice providers. Overall, conceptual contribution in hybrid regimes of enforcing linkages between state and non-state actors as providers of justice and security with some case examples from African countries like Guinea, Rwanda, Uganda and Niger and Asia (Pakistan, Timor-Leste). Less clarity on methods (interviews) and biases.

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| Quantity of data/information used: | 10%-50% empirical information |
| Type(s) of data/information used: | Qualitative: interview based |
| How insightful in terms of data/information?: | Some new data / information |
| How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?: | Some significant new analysis / theoretical insight |

This article discusses the lack of adequate attention to the Arab Security Sector and its complex political and social roles in the Arab States and presents the contours of a new research agenda for this topic. First, the authors demonstrate the insufficient scholarly attention accorded to this in the period 1990 – 2005. Second, they focus on three major areas where recent theoretical and comparative advances in the study of civil – military relations have not been paralleled in the study of the Arab Security Sector: (1) the role of the Arab Security Sector in the process of state formation; (2) informal connections between actors within the Arab Security Sector and actors operating in the political system; and (3) the role of the Arab Security Sector in reflecting and reinforcing patterns of intersectoral relations in the Arab States. Overall, the contribution of the article is in identifying gaps in the literature and suggested research avenues, such as the need to focus on Arab security sector reform.

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| Quantity of data/information used: | Less than 10% empirical information |
| Type(s) of data/information used: | Theoretical |
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| How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?: | Some significant new analysis / theoretical insight |

During the transition to democracy, states have used various mechanisms to address previous human rights abuses including domestic trials, truth and reconciliation commissions and internationalized tribunals. This volume analyzes the transitional justice choices made by four countries: Argentina, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sierra Leone and East Timor. For each country, there is a chapter which provides a historical overview concerning the causes of the conflict and two subsequent chapters which highlight a different method of transitional justice implemented. The volume highlights the opportunities and the constraints faced by states and the international community to provide accountability for human rights violations. Overall, some empirical data, but mostly a review of literature and documents in a more historical fashion. Mainly relevant for justice, not security literature.

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How insightful in terms of data/information? Theoretical
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory? Some significant new analysis / theoretical insight


This article discusses the role that local politicians played during the 2002 Hindu–Muslim violence in Gujarat, India. The author argues that the capacity and interests of political actors to instigate and organise communal rioting is closely related to their capacity to provide access to state resources. The cooperation during the riots between politicians and various types of rioters – from local criminals, Hindu-nationalist activists, neighbourhood leaders to police officials – can be understood in the light of the daily functioning of the local patronage networks that help citizens deal with state institutions. Overall, indepth and valuable contribution to understand political violence and instigators among politicians in a volatile area of India.

The essay collection in this book is intended to discuss interaction between traditional authorities (chiefs) and the modern (state) agents and institutions in both colonial and post-colonial periods in Africa. The introduction chapter evaluated here is meant as a theoretical overview of some of these linkages, reforms and internal struggles among these agents and structures they make up. Still a relevant overview on the power dynamics and traditional vs modern authorities and institutions in Africa. No empirical data in the chapter.


The article criticises the concept of state fragility that has gained prominence within the development and security agenda and that the authors argue overly focuses on the deficiencies and shortcomings of governance in so-called fragile states. In contrast, the concept of hybrid political order takes a more positive outlook by focusing on the strength and resilience of socio-political formations that are present on the ground, that work, and that provide public goods for people and communities. Overall, the article contributes to a more optimistic and locally grounded understanding of state formation, development and security. No empirical research undertaken.
Bohara, A. K., Mitchell, N. J. and Nepal, M. 2006. "Exchange of Political Violence: A Subnational Analysis of Conflict in Nepal". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 50(1). pp 108-128. The article addresses the issue of what affects political violence and human rights violations by both government and Maoist insurgents in Nepal. The argument here is that the interaction of government and opposition is modified by both the physical and political context of the interaction. The authors develop and test hypotheses using a subnational research design. The independent variable terrain seems to be of key value. Also, an involved citizenry, measured by participation and social capital, can inhibit conflict and create conditions where it is less likely that state or non-state actors use violence. The article contributes to some understanding of what affects the use of political violence against civilians and is fairly clear cut on theory, hypothesis and methods.

Bougarel, Xavier. 2006. "L'ombre des héros : après-guerre et anciens combattants en Bosnie-Herzégovine". *Revue internationales des sciences sociales*, 58 (3). pp 513-24. Bougarel looks at the emergence and evolution of the veterans' social identity within the post-conflict Bosnian society. Mainstream views argue that the way veterans channel their demands through affiliation with nationalist parties and the way they oppose the ICTY and international institutions constitute obstacles to the peace process. Bougarel argues that this view has two main shortcomings. First, it does not take into account the veterans' role in intercommunal mediation processes and only looks at their collective demands and actions in themselves. Second, they do not account for the way the veteran's identity is formed around other pre-war social identities. Bougarel
does not come up with new data, but simply provides a critical assessment of the existing literature. While he makes interesting points, he does not seek to fill the gaps that he identifies in the literature.


The authors propose two new concepts, of non-state sovereign entrepreneurs and the non-territorial sovereign organizations they form, and relate them to issues pertaining to state sovereignty, governance failures, and violent social conflict over the appropriation of the powers that accrue to states in modern international law. They argue that rule making and enforcement is no longer vested solely in the state. No new contribution at all in this article.


The paper analyses the motivations, organisational rationales and precipitants for the 138 suicide bombings that took place in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza between October 2000 and July 2005. Using several sources, including Arabic newspapers, it concludes that much of the impetus for suicide bombings is attributable to reprisal attacks. The authors use their own coding from Pape's
data as well as Arabic news articles and find that Pape's strategic rationality hypothesis in regard to suicide bombing is wrong.


This is the introduction to a series of articles regarding post-conflict societies and the formation of social identities, narratives and groups based on the conflictual past.


Through an examination of various states with capacity, legitimacy and security gaps, Call identifies variations in the Western labelling of 'failed state' or 'fragile state.' Call demonstrates how these terms are relative to Western policies and impact the sovereignty of weaker states. This piece is highly theoretical, citing examples, and could be used to assess the implications of the label 'failed state'. Additionally, it can be used to underscore the problems arising for weaker states in great power politics. No clear evidence of primary empirical work.

Focusing on peace-building, reform and reconciliation strategies, media representations, and redefinitions of feminism and hegemony in a global twenty-first century, this book brings together cross-disciplinary empirical research and real-life applications from 21 international contributors who document gender, and in particular women’s involvement, from being victims to being valiant in wartime and in social activism. Overall, great variation in the different chapters concerning empirical research and methods as some authors are mainly activists. Chapter 6 by Keaney-Mischel is particularly interesting on gender mainstreaming policies in the UN in fieldbased operations from UN gender advisors' own perspective.


Starting with the presentation of how security issues have entered the development aid discourse the author aims to explain different approaches to the strategies of international development aid. The
most relevant would be the second part of this article in which he lists threats to internal security. However, the article is mostly a literature review (articles and donors’ policy).


Chouala highlights the emergence of a new approach to peacebuilding and collective security in what he calls the new African Union era. The creation of the Peace and Security Council, which represents the institutionalisation and legitimization of force and military intervention as a means for conflict resolution and peacebuilding, is the institutional manifestation of this. Chouala also notices the development of three new dimensions to the conceptualisation of collective security in Africa: its enlargement to include military, political, social and economic aspects; the adoption of a regional and global perspective; and its new transnational dimension. The author does not define what he means by 'new African Union era, and may be overestimating the potential of the African Union in conflict management. He also does not assess the relationship the African Union has with other international bodies concerned with conflict management.
A qualitative study on ex-combatants’ social, political and security experience after the 2007 general election in Sierra Leone. The paper shows how political parties strategically remobilised ex-combatants into security squads, both to protect themselves and to gather votes. It looks at the tactical motives behind ex-combatants’ choice to join political campaigning. Empirically interesting, the article sets out how the continuation of violence and dynamics of power networks can affect post-conflict countries.

A close examination of negative peace building and development, or cosmopolitan peacekeeping in Sierra Leone and Burundi. Peacekeeping and peacemaking have integrated hard and soft power to reach success. In particular, the case-study suggests the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) as a model of successful peacekeeping aimed at fostering everyday security through the deployment of a robust peacekeeping mission. However, the authors conclude that while the right to protect the norm has facilitated conflict management, it has not created positive peace. Instead negative peace is increasingly the new norm for post-conflict areas. The article deploys a case study and survey of the African Union.
This paper proposes that stabilisation operations are successful when the political strategies are well defined and applied, when local actors are involved and participate effectively and when military and humanitarian dimensions are integrated in the political strategy.

Overall, a good piece. Clear, and provides numerous directions to further reading (at the end of the document). Ideas and guidance in the main text itself is not referenced, although this is unsurprising given that the authors would have had to extrapolate 'lessons' from the various sources of evidence at their disposal. Perhaps the only real question mark is whether external engagement with NSJS (notwithstanding all types of prior consultation - see pp. 4 and 10) may actively undermine any state-led efforts to institutionalise a standardized, nation-wide security and justice system. In short, this appears evidence-informed, but is not itself a piece of evidence.

An article that challenges the assumptions of conflicts as purely harmful and aims for systematic empirical research on the positive outcomes in terms of basic needs after domestic conflicts. Using a variation of the panel regression model, the authors regress an index of basic needs satisfaction on
measures of domestic conflict scope and intensity for a sample of 85 contemporary nations. The authors identify the variable of state response - repression or reform - as key for results on welfare for citizens. There are some design problems relating to other intervening variables (e.g. international actors' response) and the overall understanding of time, i.e. when does changes occur and under what circumstance, and why should welfare outcomes even be related to conflict?

In this very short article the author evaluates the dynamics of the civil society in the Middle East (within active societies on one hand and Islamist on the other hand in the context of conflict). However, the presentation is too short and therefore we cannot find useful information in this article.

The authors examine a case of the rape and murder of two young women in the town of Shopian in the Kashmir valley and the subsequent popular uprising against India, in order to understand the dynamics of (in)justice under militarisation and occupation. The article lack details on methods (participant observation), but includes rich descriptions on local actors (civil society) positioning against perceptions of state legal injustice by Indian authorities.

El-Kareh’s presentation of the political system in Lebanon reveals its vulnerability and the fragility of Lebanese society itself. Reforming the system of political representation (nowadays community-based) is challenged by the assassination of the Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and jeopardized by the issue of a weak national unity.


A book that examines the dynamic power relations between imperial powers (UK, US, USSR) and the Afghan State apparatus, where the latter has depended on outside support for its rule and the former has exploited the situation. Good at explaining fluctuations and continuations of imperial-national relations for Afghan political development and some novel analysis of documents (both primary and secondary). The instability of national security forces is addressed, e.g. corruption, smuggling posts and disloyalty to donors.
This article discusses the case of the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) through their focus on local spaces of socio-political mobilization, in particular by using still and video documentation to capture state violence, with the goal of gaining national political recognition. Good empirical data and analysis that include aspects of gender and geopolitics in the literature on political violence.

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An article on Afghan civilian security measures that argues for the need to examine particularities of specific conflict sites, situations and civilian experience. The analysis addresses security and insecurity in four specific areas: (1) Afghan civilian security measures, (2) domestic spaces as sites of security and violence, (3) mobile forms of security and insecurity and (4) the divergent perceptions and experiences of security and insecurity between international civilian workers living in Afghanistan and Afghan civilian citizens. Using qualitative techniques, on immediate bias of this article is that informants are solely international staff and Afghan civil society members associated with international organization, yet the focus is on Afghan civilians’ (in)security and bodypolitics at a local, domestic level such as the everyday practice of body searches in conflict zones.

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An article that discusses the issue of competing governance zones in so-called weak states. Main focus on potential 'new' research areas, policy recommendations, and has a highly normative, top-down agenda from the author.

Geenen studies the social reinsertion of former combatants in Ruyini (Burundi) and Kinshasa (DRC) and notices that despite problems and delays in the implementation of reinsertion programmes for former combatants in both cases, the situation in Ruyini is more of a success than in Kinshasa. The author notices differences in the local context which impact the reinsertion process of former combatants and argues that programmes should be adapted to them. She also notices that delays in the execution of the programmes tend to create social tensions. The article lacks a clear line of argument and the author does not provide sufficient information on her methodology and the way the interviews were analysed.
A consultancy report for DfID on non-state justice systems as part of accessible justice and preventing escalation of disputes in the cases of Bangladesh and the Philippines. Some good points on accessibility to justice for end-users, but lack of linkage to a broader literature.

The limitations of, and alternatives to, developmentalist approaches in fragile states, are explored in this paper, with particular reference to donor policies and practices in Afghanistan post 2001. The authors examine how aid policies and programmes have become part of a complex bargaining game involving international actors, domestic elites, and societal groups. They argue that international donors’ failure to appreciate or engage sensitively and strategically with these bargaining processes, when combined with contradictory intervention objectives, has contributed to the steady unravelling of Afghanistan’s fragile war-to-peace transition.
This article describes the gendering of security discourses, using case studies from Lebanon, Northern Ireland and South Africa. The author relies on elite-based focus group interviews with women from civil society organisations which allows for an insight into the qualitative and experiential aspects of security in each case.

The author aims to expose the changes on the Lebanese political scene after the Syrian retreat from Lebanon in 2005. He focuses on institutional development, cleavages in Lebanese society and the increase in Hezbollah’s role after the retreat. His explanation is quite general and the main argument of the author is unclear.
Doctoral thesis on a conceptual framework for the post-conflict reconstruction experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Excellent and transparent triangulation of methods towards grounded theory, aimed at studies of post-conflict situations.

Hazen illustrates why international peacekeeping missions are ineffective at peacebuilding. Typically, peacekeeping missions are sent with the goal of peacebuilding. Hazen uses the case of Sierra Leone to demonstrate this with theoretical works and other instances where peacekeepers were unable to become peacebuilders. The article argues that peacekeeping missions are a poor choice for peace building given their limited mandates, capacity, leverage, resources and duration. Peacekeepers should focus on peacekeeping, by which they can lay the foundation for peace building. It concludes that peace building should be primarily the task of national governments and their populations.
An article on state-directed transnationalism and deterritorialised patterns of governance and its resulting centralisation in Eritrea and diaspora civil society. Largely elite-centered focus on data and discussion, suffers from little clarity of the researcher's position in the ethnographic study.

An article on spatial security provided by peacekeepers and how this space shapes perceptions of security for the host population. Offers an interesting take on peacekeeping and a substantial number of interviews (268 informants) but is ultimately too short to provide a rich narrative.
A paper that discusses the problems of community destabilisation and anomie (normlessness) in Eritrea. Small sample of informants through narrative interviews, good in capturing qualitative, identity-related issues of insecurity.

A book that conceptualises peacebuilding, third party mediation and the experience of Sri Lanka's resurgence in and recovery from war. Good in deciphering the "peacebuilding" concept. Empirically, an elite-centered focus is evident, rather than grassroots engagement.

A paper that addresses specific areas of human security in Bangladesh and some of its challenges and successes. It is based on reviews of reports and scholarly literature, but remains useful in understanding human security from an end-user perspective.


Through an extensive literature review, the author notices a gap between macro- and micro-level analysis. He argues that micro-level dynamics shaped the macro-level understanding of violence and vice versa and that both approaches should therefore be used and thought about simultaneously through the concept of 'alliance'. With that in mind, Ingeleare analyses transitional justice in the post-genocidal era and the Gacaca Jurisdiction. The article provides a new and interesting analytical framework and makes a convincing argument, but does not elaborate on how it should be used and which new findings it may lead to, neither in terms of explaining the conflict or in explaining post-conflict processes and their outcomes.
A doctoral thesis on reforms to demilitarise and the challenges of increased civil militarisation in the case of Nigeria and South Africa. Good data collection overview and relevant empirical issue on dynamics of state-society relations of militarisation.

Book on the origin of SSR concept and strategy, UK involvement and the case of Sierra Leone. Empirical sources on international/UK actors and their decisions and actions and not end-users.
The text was derived from a keynote speech given by the Norwegian Minister of International Development at the opening of a seminar on peacebuilding. She argues that to improve peacebuilding efficiency around the world, conceptual clarifications must be made about peacebuilding, and global strategies for peacebuilding and intervention must be developed. Nothing particularly innovative is introduced.

An article on the dynamic forms of survival strategies in households during civil war in the context of Sri Lanka. A key conclusion from the empirical studies was that even though the four case studies were located geographically very close together, their livelihood outcomes differed considerably depending on the very specific local political geography. Good empirical study on specific adaptions among end-users to security threats.

A book focused on what human security means and its dynamics in northern Kenya and bordering regions. Empirical strength with focus groups in understanding ownership among end-users of development programmes.

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Type(s) of data/information used: Qualitative; interview based

How insightful in terms of data/information? Some new data / information
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory? Some significant new analysis / theoretical insight


An article that addresses the providers of security in post-conflict societies. The paper identifies three types of post-conflict societies and analyses dynamics of the security market in cases where international troops have intervened. A comparison of seven countries shows that intervention forces were able to establish themselves as market leaders when a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme was successfully conducted in the immediate post-conflict period. Mixed methods, adding some qualitative analysis to the quantitative testing.

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With the emergence of a new approach to international intervention calling for “security and development” came the opportunity for cooperation and 'consensus' among development and security agencies. However, this 'consensus' is fragile and contested by conflictual interests and viewpoints on the "security and development" approach to intervention in war zones. The article
seeks to highlight new dynamics among different agents of international intervention, but fails to identify its consequences on the practices of peacebuilding and on the outcomes of interventions.

The study presents the implementation and the presence of Hezbollah in Lebanese universities, its interactions with students and how norms of the party are adapted by young militants. The article gives an overview of Lebanese society’s complexity and concentrates on the internal cohesion of the group.

The article addresses the oral history of chiefships in the aftermaths of the SPLA war in two Southern Sudanese chiefdoms. The complex histories and debates about a local chiefship may seem overly particularistic and irrelevant in comparison to more sweeping accounts of the root causes of Sudan’s civil wars (Johnson 2003). But the argument here is that specific oral histories and ongoing disputes regarding chiefs in Central Equatoria reveal much about the historical relationship between state and society – and in particular the mediation with external violence – which is central to understanding the legitimacy of local authority (cf. West 1998). The motifs of scapegoats or
proxies, sacrifice and curse which feature in the local histories also resonate with earlier anthropological and historical research across Southern Sudan, reflecting the ambivalence of ‘government’ chiefship, and the relations between secular and spiritual power and between agnatic and affinal kin structures. Empirically useful study on more state-society relations and perceptions of power as well as governance interventions.


The article provides an historical summary of reform efforts in Liberia since 2003, identifying some of the challenges and lessons learned in the process. The author argues that there is a need for greater local capacity building and engagement with civil society (esp. with regard to the security sector) Quality of work: succinct historical timeline, mentioning of some local initiatives and workshops, no evidence about own empirical research.


A book that offers a detailed study on informal networks for disadvantaged groups in Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, and the diversity of support systems. The processes are analysed in a historical perspective, whereby the historical imprint on current forms of informality and the forces that have
shaped them through time are uncovered. The picture that emerges is that of a multifaceted process involving a wide variety of agents and relations that earlier analyses of informality have often failed to recognise. Key to the study is how disadvantaged groups who rely on informality for survival are faring in the context of wider contemporary changes, including those related to structural adjustment programmes. Detailed and good on "unpacking" informality in a case study.


A book that offers a model of the hybridisation process that countries experience from international peacebuilding agendas. Using the case studies of Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Lebanon and Northern Ireland, the author dissects peace interventions along the themes of security, statebuilding and civil society as well as economic and constitutional reform. He proposes using the concepts of hybridity and hybridisation to understand the dynamics in societies undergoing transition. Particular attention is paid to the ability of local communities to resist, subvert and exploit international actors. The book is part of a developing and radical critique of aspects of international peacebuilding. It argues that peace should not be discussed timidly, and that local, traditional or indigenous approaches to peace-making should not be romanticised. The work suffers from a lack of clarity on the methods (fieldwork) and how data is gathered, but offers good theoretical insight.
A book on security discourse in the African context and areas of "new" threats to security and the role of regional and international actors in conflict prevention and resolution. The book explores the underlying tensions between a state-centric concept of security, and the concept of human security with respect to a number of new security threats emanating from situations of forced displacement of populations, terrorism, diseases, food insecurity, and the impacts of climate change, all of which are prevalent in Africa and give a particular resonance to the evolving security discourse. The volume undertakes an interdisciplinary investigation of the tensions between state security and human security in the search for solutions to African crises by the international community and regional actors. Theoretically important contribution, however largely aimed at major actors, e.g. AU, US, UN etc. operating in Africa.

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The author discusses the SSR as well as the regional dimension of the crisis (Central African Republic, Chad, Sudan, and Democratic Republic of Congo) and analyses the political and economic dimension of transnational armed groups/movements in the region.

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International Financial Institutions (IFI) set good governance and civil society participation as new conditions in the production of Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS). In Rwanda, IFI gave a positive evaluation of civil participation in the making of PRS. That being said, two contextual problems make it difficult for the Rwandese population to associate with the PRS: (1) war and genocides have created an environment of distrust and suspicion in which it is difficult for civil associations to thrive and (2) the authoritarian regime discourages civil actors from faithfully engaging in political and public debates. The article is well structured and makes an interesting argument, but no original or new data is provided to support it. Fieldwork would have provided a more detailed and accurate understanding of the problems of the Rwandese civil society.


The paper analyses a variety of the dominant explanations of major international actors and donors, showing how these frequently do not distinguish with sufficient clarity between the ‘root causes’ of a conflict, its aggravating factors and its triggers. Specifically, a correct assessment of conflict prolonging (or sustaining) factors is of vital importance in Africa’s lingering confrontations. Broader approaches (e.g. “structural stability”) offer a better analytical framework than familiar one-dimensional explanations. Moreover, for explaining and dealing with violent conflicts a shift of attention from the nation-state towards the local and sub-regional level is needed. Overall a paper concerned with theoretical rather than empirical discussion and some suggestions for policy makers in interpreting root causes of conflict.

An article on elite struggles and insecurity in Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire and Central African Republic. A comparative analysis of elite security needs and devices is undertaken, permitting the author to draw some preliminary conclusions: The ineffectiveness of state institutions (presidential guards, etc.) in breaking the insecurity trap by providing special elite-protection services is obvious. The record of private security services is most debatable and efforts by international actors need to be looked at more closely: UN peacekeepers can be effective when they are sufficient in number and have the appropriate mandate. The record of French interventions in former colonies has over time become ever more ambivalent and has lost any preventive meaning. The article is largely a descriptive account of events in the cases studied, and a review of secondary sources like UN security council reports.

The author argues that little attention has been paid to the factual effect of the state’s security forces on the security of African citizens. The article addresses this issue through the comparative case studies of Liberia and the Central African Republic, which are perceived as two extreme cases of strong and weak international involvement, respectively, in post-conflict security sector reform. The self-help mechanisms used to compensate for the lack of state-sponsored security need more attention. However, it has to be acknowledged that the ideal of a neutral and effective force loyal to the state is shared by a great majority of the population. The article is largely a review of UN Security Council Reports, rather than bottom-up views on security as envisioned in the introduction.


Conflicts that appear to be self-reinforcing in the short-term can in the long-term produce conditions out of which new political orders emerge. This paper uses Somalia to illustrate the dramatic changes that can occur in patterns of armed conflict, criminality and governance in a collapsed state. Among other factors, shifting interests in the business community have helped Somali communities adapt to state collapse, manage risk and provide a more predictable economic environment. Author has gathered data from previous role as political advisor to the UN operation in Somalia, but it remains difficult to see how the data was compiled.

The article assesses the challenges of state revival in Somalia. It reviews the roots of state collapse in the country, attempts to explain the repeated failure of state-building projects and considers prospects for integrating local, "organic" sources of governance with top-down, "inorganic" state-building processes. For the author, Somalia is not, however, merely a repository of lessons learned on how not to pursue state building. Rather, in some respects, it is argued to be at the forefront of a poorly understood trend—the rise of informal systems of adaptation, security, and governance in response to the prolonged absence of a central government. This development is being driven by the evolving role of coalitions of business groups, traditional authorities, and civic groups in promoting more “organic” forms of public order and the rule of law. Detailed and interesting case analysis, though knowledge on the utilised sources is less clear.

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In the case of Somalia, various factors over time have led to the distrust of aid organisations. Transitional predatory governments can divert aid into their own coffers. Menkhaus uses the Somali case to show an extreme example of the issues aid organisations can have in transitioning states whose governments are volatile. He argues that the tensions between stabilisation and humanitarian goals in contemporary Somalia reflect a long history of politicisation of humanitarian operations in the country

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Rape in eastern Congo is often thought of and discussed exclusively as a war weapon. This focus on political rape provided local associations with the opportunity to instrumentalise them for political purposes. That being said, sexual violence in Eastern Congo is not limited to war rapes, a significant proportion of sexual violence is perpetrated outside the war context. It is included in a larger process of legitimation of violence as a tool for social inclusion and change. The paper argues that the focus on war rapes by local and international organisations accentuates the suffering and exclusion of other rape victims. However, the reviewer feels that the study requires more convincing empirical proof of the instrumentalisation of war rape by political associations and international organisations, and of the inclusion of rape in a larger context of social legitimation of violence, which are two essential step of the argument.


The article examines Burundian negotiations towards the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms and makes two suggestion: a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a Special Tribunal which would include foreign and Burundian members. The presentation is rather theoretical and gives rather historical briefing and technical details on the matter (structure, missions, financing). Little information on the community itself and the end-user’s perspective.

An article addressing the role of civil society in providing security as well as insecurity for the population and some debates about this in the case of the Balkans. The author looks at the degree of will and the ability of the local population to engage in civil society action, as well as the ability and interest of foreign organisations to sponsor, facilitate, and assist indigenous initiatives in situations of either improving or deteriorating security. There is some insight to the questionable opportunistic role of some civil society actors, but the article suffers from being fairly generalised.


This article explores and defines the grids of economic and political power that circulate apart from formal state systems. The author argues that very little exists by way of methodologies to collect these data or theories to assess them, due to the dangers and difficulties of gathering information on extra-state phenomena, and to a reluctance to do so for fear of damaging political or military reputations. Nevertheless, she argues that these systems are critical to the way political violence and peace are expressed in the world today. Key contribution is the theoretical discourse of these informal networks, "shadow sovereignty", and real-life importance in hybrid regimes, as well as the lack of methodological tools to conduct field-based research. Some lack of clarity on her own empirical research.
The article challenges the concept of civil society and at the same time assessing its place and role for peace-building in Sri Lanka. The author argues that although civic peace organisations work hard to take on a peacebuilding role, their activities are often project-oriented and top-down, rather than mass-based and bottom-up. Moreover, critical assessments of the impact of small-scale activities and analysis of the linkage between them and the larger conflict context (in which the work of similar organisations as well as external forces has to be taken into account) need to be further developed, by civil-society actors as well as researchers. There is a great lack of clarity on the identity of the interviewees.

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The author tracks the evolution of civil society in Burundi (1993-2005) and its interactions with political events in the country. He argues that although civil society is developing it is not influential and needs to cooperate with the media in order to put more pressure on the government.

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The author offers an empirical comparison of federalism in Nigeria and Sudan (information obtained in existing literature). It is found that while federalism allowed Nigeria to avoid implosion, the same cannot be said about Sudan. It is then argued that this contrast can be attributed to governance and the way federalism was implemented by authoritarian regimes and how resources were distributed among the federated entities. While the initial research question addresses the pertinence of federalism as a solution to pluralism in African countries, the author fails to provide a substantial assessment of the generalisability of his conclusions to the whole African continent.

The author explores the perception of civil society in Africa since the 1990s. The paper argues there has lately been a loss of faith in the notion that “civil societies” play a positive role on the African continent. The shift of perception about this concept outlines the role of words and doctrines in the way development issues are being constructed. Although interesting, the author, only takes into account the point of view of international donors rather than the perspective of end-users.

The author aims to scrutinise the political transitions in Rwanda and in Burundi and explains how they failed to establish democracy and guarantee the security of their citizens. He argues that the latest political transitions in Rwanda and Burundi provide an illustration of the problematic nature of the transition paradigm which supposes a linear evolution leading from dictatorship to democracy. He attributes the failure of peaceful transitions to the impasse that accompanies the struggle over a stake perceived as crucial - political power and control of the state.


The authors seeks to understand the role of the 'hero' imagery in post-conflict reconciliation in Rwanda. It is found that it fails to provide a source for consensus amongst society and that it actually accentuates social cleavages, feeds an atmosphere of distrust and therefore fails to contribute to national reconstruction. The author does not convincingly explain the causal link between 'hero' imagery and problems of national reconciliation and reconstruction in Rwanda.

The article gives an overview of the public opinion on the economic and political situation in Abidjan in 2002. The comparison of assessments made by the citizens of Abidjan, Colonou, Bamako, Niamey and Lomé brings a broader view of the end-users' perception of national institutions.

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From a well known practitioner, this paper offers a report on justice and security in post-colonial and fragile states. Analytically strong, the author delves into the core of security, authority and legitimacy within fragile and post-conflict states as well as informal parallel structures of power and the needs of end-users needs. The paper relies on the experience of the author and a number of secondary sources.

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The report examines the terminology used over the last 50 years when talking about non-state justice. The terms take on particular ideological baggage, depending on whether the form of non-state justice is pro-state or anti-state. The report also explores the different forms that non-state justice takes in the six countries under scrutiny: South Africa, Malawi, Lesotho, Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique. Finally, policy recommendations about how states, donors and citizens could contribute to better governance and more effective co-operation between different forms of non-state justice is also discussed. The report is largely descriptive and normative; essentially an academic report on justice and security in post-colonial and fragile states.


This article seeks to add to the debate on the role of informal economic networks in violent conflicts. It argues that social transformations arising from conflict can be either productive or destructive, depending on the particular institutions embedded in social networks. It also emphasises how the historical relationship of informal networks to the state shapes the institutional content of informal networks. Two case studies are used to exemplify these contrasting cases. In Somalia, customary institutions of trust and reciprocity were preserved during conflict, and contributed to economic coordination and conflict mediation. In Sierra Leone, the intrusion of patrimonial networks into community life contributed to the development of youth networks based on social misconduct and opportunism, causing social collapse. Heavily case-oriented in nature, the paper is largely void of primary empirical data collection and comprised of a review of other literature.
Due to socio-cultural factors, the process of post-conflict reintegration for child soldiers is different for girls than it is for boys. Formal demobilisation programmes and strategies rarely respond to the specific needs of girls and their ambitions for reinsertion into society which are often linked to respectability and marriage. While acknowledging it, the author makes prescriptions that are highly problematic on a moral level. If put in the context of the 'universalism versus cultural pluralism' debate, this article adheres to the latter.

The article discusses the successful bottom-up justice and security institutions in south-east Afghanistan that are delivering justice and security to the people in a complex atmosphere characterised by a weak and contested state, high levels of corruption, massive international and regional intervention, internal conflict based on ideology and ethnicity, and the exclusion of one ethnic group and over-representation of another in the political arena. Based on a range of stakeholder interviews, the brief but detailed empirical study illuminates community-based security where state institutions are weak and corrupt.

An article that assesses the so-called New World Order (Western hegemony) and the "stateless" Somalia that represent "the old world". The authors examine the dominant view of the Somali people and the sources of the problem in Somalia. They argue that in general, the crises experienced by indigenous peoples reveal one of the most obvious contradictions of The New World Order: an ostensible commitment to formal and abstract equality and another to substantive identities such as national ones in the name of which forms of exclusion and inequality are licensed. There are some interesting aspects in the article concerning land rights, identities and other historical claims in local communities.
This article is about the role of civil society after violent conflict. It argues that the transformations that civil society organisations (CSOs) make are more ambiguous than supporting donors and NGOs presume. The article analyses how, ten years after the 1996 peace agreements, Guatemalan CSOs deal with agrarian conflict. It discusses in detail the case of a church-related organisation assisting peasants with agrarian conflicts and the challenges it faced in defining its strategies. The article argues that supporting donors and NGOs should re-politicise their analyses and focus on the importance of broader social and political processes in post-conflict settings for the strategic options open to CSOs. The author manages to capture both the voices of elites (i.e. CSOs) as well as "end-users" of land and agrarian settlements. Good points on fragmentation after a peace agreement.

This article examines the applicability of the theory of consociational democracy in Burundi. It presents the political system of Burundi with its power-sharing arrangements, predicts a period of political stability and points out main challenges within the system (political will of elites to function in the new setting, corruption, amendments to the Constitution – opposition to the system of quotas, transitional justice).
This is the introduction to the issue of post-conflict reconstruction in Africa, with a focus on DRC. The aim is to highlight the complexity and the difficulties of peacebuilding in failed states in Africa. The author addresses the shortcomings of the new 'development and security' approach to peacebuilding, of externally imposed institutional reforms, and the lack of sectorial coordination between all the different peacebuilding agents.

The purpose of this article is to give an alternative to the implementation of a security system which is mostly based on the Western security model. As developing countries are challenged by financial issues, and since Guibert’s division of internal and external forces is inadaptable to Africa’s security problems, the author prefers to concentrate on the four operational functions of the Public Force (confinement, intelligence, population control, intervention) rather than to separate the internal and external aspects of the security system. Additionally, he favors the traditional/customary structures that provide security. The analysis takes local perspectives seriously and highlights the existence of differences between the needs of each African country. Yet, the article lacks practical examples and overestimates the regional cooperation between Public Forces of neighbouring countries.

The article addresses the lack of political reform in the DRC since 2006, the limitations and flaws of the international peace-building measures as well as insecurity in the eastern provinces. The authors argue that by continuously underplaying informal forms of governance in the eastern borderlands; the international community is missing a crucial chance to trigger a fundamental political transformation in the DRC. It also significantly underestimates the extent to which international intervention is used as a strategy of extraversion by state and non-state actors alike. The secondary data presented is meant as an overview/briefing of the situation in the DRC.


The author analyses the importance of local militias in Eastern Congo, the history of their creation, the motivations, structure and their relations with the local and traditional society. The article is well argued and firmly grounded in the empirical evidence, however, the sourcing is sometimes unclear and the author does not provide details on the identity of the interviewed members of militias. Additionally, in the introduction and in the footnotes, the author notifies that the information provided by some of militants may be biased.
Offers an analysis of refugee return and reintegration in Burundian transition arguing that the refugee issue is a political one, not merely humanitarian or economic. Overall this paper represents an excellent summary of literature on the Burundian case.

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The author seeks to explain the Somalian crisis and its longevity. He starts with an evaluation of the concept of 'failed state' and argues that its static nature lead to inadequate institutional prescriptions. It is then argued that there are four main factors responsible for the fragility of the Somalian context: (1) the collapse of the state in 1991, (2) population movements which exacerbated hostilities around resources, (3) the rise of politico-military radical Islam, and (4) external intervention. Nothing particularly new is said about Somalia in this article.

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This paper details the distinct contributions, attributes and recent examples of how cooperatives achieve economic and social development during conflict and in failing, failed and recovering states including Bosnia, East Timor, Lebanon, Mozambique, Rwanda, Macedonia and Nepal. It concludes that cooperatives are often embedded in cultures where violence is prevalent and they can result in rapid economic development as ethnic bridging institutions. The author argues that they have successfully helped create jobs for returning minorities and ex-combatants to conflict regions, and have been particularly effective when markets are distant and high-value. Finally, to become transformational, cooperatives networks need to be created beyond initial ethnic or group minorities. The article is mainly a review of literature and a specific development project documentation.

The authors present interviews and other information on the segregated higher education system in Kosovo, specific to the University of Pristina which has a Serbian government funded campus in Mitrovica, and a Pristina campus funded by Kosovo/UNMIK. The higher education system speaks to the wider problem of ethnic cleavages within Kosovo and the difficulties UNMIK faces in amending them.
Appendix B: Annotated Bibliography - Peer Search

This work provides a literary review of the privatisation of military and police globally, with a special focus on Africa. In the case of Africa, private companies provide security for volatile resource rich areas such as Nigeria, Sudan, and the DCR. Private military contractors exist in both the global and local context, and with many African regimes tied to military might, some opt to utilise private military for their own protection. The authors’ key argument is that mercenaries are on the rise, causing a variety of issues of legitimacy and security policy for weak states.

The authors point out a significant gap in the literature on security - its privatisation. Nigeria and Sierra Leone are used to depict different ways in which private security has been used and has pushed the boundaries of sovereignty. Nigeria is depicted as a state within which resources are pivotal to both the government and to global actors, including oil companies. Thus, private security forces have clashed with both civilians and insurgent groups. In the case of Sierra Leone, private security firms have challenged state sovereignty. The paper lacks individual civilian accounts of daily life under global companies, mercenaries and weak states but the authors’ overall argument that mercenaries have blurred the line between public/private and global/local, thus creating illicit authority, remains important.

This report is not theory based, instead there is a strong focus on events and interviews. Sierra Leone’s security transition and the actual security of individuals in Sierra Leone is surveyed. The support of the UK in the transition process for Sierra Leone was pivotal to its current success, however much is left to be done in regard to levels of corruption and daily safety. The security concerns for citizens interviewed were: social/sexual violence, SSR, security threats, and wider environmental threats like human trafficking. A weakness of the article is a lack of analysis, it is heavily laden with events and surveys strung together to create a loose collage of data. While the authors do take into account possible biases, they leave out theory or significant analysis of the data.


Alther recounts different Columbian communities who have resisted violent guerilla groups. She interviews people from peace communities who refuse to aid guerilla groups and who have created their own peaceful security mechanisms. The author takes into account the global context by citing:
the War on Terror, the War on Drugs, and international NGO involvement in regard to providing for these vulnerable communities and combatting violent groups. The author has an obvious bias in the work in that she does not interview guerillas or people in the Colombian government but only citizens in ethnically marginalised peace-communities. NGO's serve these communities by bridging the gap between grassroots peacebuilding and state politics. However, NGO's fail to provide sustainable protection, instead focusing on humanitarian needs.

The United States’ use of military and private military contractors (PMCs) in Africa are in question here. It is hypothesized and supported with relevant information that American interests in Africa are variously linked to oil access, competing with China, and the War on Terror. Many African states are examined to underscore the ineffectiveness of American led peacebuilding in Africa. It is argued that PMCs are now used more widely for the US due to a military overstretch. This work takes into account the historical relevance of violence in Africa in the early 1990's as a pivotal point, when America stepped away with caution. However, in the post 9/11 world, Africa has received more attention from America, although this attention is hinged on the war on terror, oil access and competing with China.

The work relies on interviews from soldiers in the DRC to understand the context in which 'people in uniforms commit violence.' The DRC has been the site of traumatic acts of indiscriminate violence, however, the author deems it imperative to understand the context in which soldiers regard the military in order to understand the motivation for severe violence towards civilians. Taking into consideration the way soldiers/perpetrators understand themselves and their violent actions can provide a vital context for comprehending the atrocities in the DRC. A weakness of the piece is that only soldiers are interviewed, no government officials, generals, or even civilians are interviewed. Attention is paid to the atrocities: indiscriminate killing, cannibalism, rape, torture, maiming. The soldiers overwhelmingly felt let down by the promises the military could give them, education being key. The majority joined the military from deprivation, as the only alternative to poverty. This piece is good for an end-user perspective.

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Baker examines security transformation in post-conflict Rwanda and Sierra Leone. He finds in cases of extreme violence, such as the genocide of Rwanda, that security transformation is successful in eradicating corrupt individuals and creating harmony in communities within a hybrid context. Conversely, Sierra Leone’s security apparatuses were altered after conflict, but clashed with local security apparatuses. Overall, the piece relies on interviews and secondary sources to demonstrate that local policing needs a partnership within the state. The argument is highly dependent on regime type, regime ideology, and the change in regimes post-conflict. A weakness of the work is that the interviews are poorly sited, it is not explained explicitly what affiliation the individuals interviewed had.
This report analyzes the engagement of civil society organisations (CSOs) in issues of justice and security in countries of the south in Africa and South Asia. Specifically, the report looks at the triangular relationships between CSOs, their donors, and regimes. It is found that CSOs’ engagement largely depends on the political space provided by the regime and that donors find themselves in a delicate position between CSO’s and governmental security and judicial structures.

This guide introduces literature on SSR in Southeast Asia, highlighting key issues and priority documents. It also provides a brief introduction to security challenges in South East Asia and identifies some key recommendations. It provides an annotated bibliography of key articles and documents.
Ball argues that the World Bank and International Monetary Fund should not refrain from getting involved in the improvement of security sector governance based on the restrictions of political activities set out in their Agreement Articles. Ball reviews shifting policy trends within WB/IMF towards the gradual dilution of the restrictive mandate of Agreement Articles (with a focus on their stance towards security), and tries to embed these in current security/development trends. As Ball seems to be a lead figure among proponents of ‘good security-sector governance’, consulting international donors and contributing towards their policy directions, this article gives a useful representation of mainstream donor perspectives directly from the horse's mouth. The end-user does not feature in this article, since the focus is put on IFI policy and their potential involvement in (state-focused) security sector reform.

This survey is the sixth in a series which tracks changes in public perceptions of safety and security in Kosovo over time. It tests how people believe access to, responsiveness, and performance of security and justice institutions in Kosovo are developing. The survey's findings show that the
political crisis in Kosovo in late 2010 had an adverse effect on security and local safety perceptions, attitudes towards small arms and the readiness of people to acquire arms. The Kosovo Police which was previously highly regarded by the majority is now viewed sceptically. People are tired of what they see as insufficiently accountable and ineffective institutions, both at the national level, such as the police, customs and justice sectors and international level, particularly with regards to EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). The report generates key recommendations to the government of Kosovo. The report is based on qualitative and quantitative data collected through a household survey and focus group discussions.


The study addresses the root causes of state fragility in Guatemala and how the country's governance systems are being reshaped by a broad and often clandestine series of processes, whereby the traditional sources of power are being challenged or questioned. The state weakness and highly competitive democracy has given rise to a new class of political 'entrepreneurs', seeking to represent private or group interests at the state level while nurturing their own careers and fortunes in the process. A good qualitative case study on a fragile state with flawed democracy, and competition and cooperation between private and public elites. However, little or no linkages with the end-users in Guatemala as the interviews are elite-focused.

This report includes three case studies on conflict management in Indonesia from Papua, Poso in Central Sulawesi and Maluku. Research conducted for this report indicates that today’s peace remains fragile as root causes and new grievances emerging from the conflicts were not fully addressed. The methodology is explained in Annex 1 and reveals that the researcher interviewed government and civil society representatives, and some community leaders, but not representatives such as end-users with a role in managing communal conflict. For instance, the author draws the conclusion that residents in the communities are poorly informed on the content of the peace agreements, but appears not to have spoken to them, thus reinforcing lack of information to the local population.

Buur uses an ethnographic account of South African local policing apparatuses, and other state apparatus problems in regard to enforcing the new post-Apartheid constitution. The new constitution does not allow for vigilantism, while the traditional norms for many in South Africa allow for torture, beating, and even killing for certain crimes or for dishonouring one’s family. The work also utilises some interviews to support the research. As a whole the work represents the problems that states face when democratisation clashes with long-standing traditions. State actors are left compromising between the two. A weakness of the work is that no interviews are done with South African government officials. Many of the problems are occurring in areas that are socio-economically disenfranchised from apartheid times and it will take more than a new constitution to solve the problems South Africa faces as it transitions from an ethnically exclusionary past. This work is an example of a “weak leviathan” and of hybrid forms of punishment/governance.


This paper examines how the framing of security in Southeast Asia influences the security dimension in the region. It argues ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) has been a key factor in the acceptance and promulgation of security framing. The framework is fundamentally state-centric, but provides conceptual flexibility for emerging security concerns in the region. It represents essentially a case study of ASEAN and its role in shaping the regional security framework, based on a review of policy papers and relevant literature.

Carr examines the futurology of the American military industrial complex as a means to fight enemies which may not even exist. He uses primary sources to show this invigoration in futurology of militaries and businesses over a period dating back to the Cold War. The work is extremely fluid and lacks continuity, it is almost as if it were a stream of consciousness in a blog post. However, the main concepts are: futurology, USA hegemony and decline, the privatisation of security, and the projection of social sciences and these are well portrayed here. Carr argues that increased militarisation may indeed be a double-edged sword, as it provides justification for an endless war on terror, and shapes future conflicts. He concludes that non-military and non-conservative think tanks should pick up the role of futurology to avoid the dystopia already predicted for the future.


This book seeks to highlight the dubious premises upon which international policies of democratisation are based, and to question the assumption that democracy can be taught or imposed by international bodies on the basis that some ‘cultures’ are not ‘rational’ or ‘civil’ enough to govern themselves. Further, the book seeks to analyse how democratisation policies operate in practice, drawing out the regulatory and disempowering content behind the language of rights,
protection, multi-ethnic governance, open media, and civil society-building. Finally, the book seeks to uncover why, despite its lack of success on the ground, democratisation in Bosnia has been such an attractive focus for international institutions, and why the small state has been at the forefront of the international foreign policy agenda for the past three years. Overall, a book that covers an extreme case of intervention and governance from external powers. Chapter 6 on "building civil society" addresses critical aspects of who donors and policy makers choose to cooperate with in the so-called civil society. The methodological approach is less clear; a mix of interviews with critical ex-pat voices, a review of media, and policy documents.


Charney aims to explore the role of business activities for peace in South Africa and to generate comparative implications for democratic transitions. He claims that business activities helped to set up a framework at grassroots levels which was conducive to ending violence as it provided an incentive for "stabilising agents" in civil society to take over the state's role of regulating conflict. After a historical review of both the peace process and the role business played for peace nationally he focusses on a case study at local level (Alexandra township). The case study seems to be widely based on interviews with local politicians. The paper provides interesting insights into the stabilising role businesses may play in a transition to peace. It could be improved by expanding the focus of interview partners to representatives of civil society and/or "end-users".
The work utilises the existing literature on development and post-conflict reconstruction to address a key point that not all conflicts are ethnic or cultural. The cases of Sierra Leone and Cote D'Ivoire are examined in a socio-political-historical context to describe the various rivalries based on agrarian conflicts by competing groups. It is argued that the problem that development institutions face is to hinge their hopes for peace on community-based reconstruction. Analysis linking the organisational rivalries to material struggles fought by agrarian organisations is provided here. The work is based firmly in an historical context, attempting to link the 1400's with the woes of the 1990's. The work provides a literature review aided with some primary sources.

### Score Quality Analysis

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Colletta and Muggah provide a useful typology of emerging innovative and experimental security promotion activities. They aim to reinforce mainstream SSR/DDR programmes. The articles summarises emerging alternative security promotions, interim stabilisation measures and second generation activities, while briefly explaining each with references to country examples. This typology is based on "original evidence". This article provides a very useful typology of alternative security promotions. It seems to be based on orginal evidence, but this is not further explained or referred to. However, it is a very useful start for further in-depth empirical research.

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Collinson, S., Elhawary, S., and Muggah, R. 2010. “States of Fragility: Stabilisation and its implications for Humanitarian Action”. Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper, May. This working paper focuses on problems humanitarian and development aid faces with security and development now becoming fused. It utilises various countries while focusing specifically on Afghanistan. A weakness of the work is that it does not provide an in-depth case analysis but uses anecdotes from various cases to support the authors claim, that stabilisation hinges on security and various political arenas. It concludes that the current world is more war-torn and difficult for humanitarian actors to work in and it requires a new context of stability building, not just aid.

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Commins, S. 2011. “Urban Fragility and Security in Africa”. Africa Security Brief, 12. pp 1-8. This brief focusses on Africa's high urbanisation rates, increased urban violence, and widespread insecurity and its consequences for cities and their inhabitants. This urban fragility contributes to state fragility and thus represents an inherent security risk. The author formulates some recommendations on action for governments and international actors. It provides a summary of current urban trends in Africa. There is no original empirical research and it displays no real analysis or argumentation.

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Constantinou uses historical legacies and the reinforcement of religious identities to put the 'Cyprus Problem' within a framework of hybridity. Hybrid governance, hybrid communities, constitutional enforcement of identities, and historical fluidity of identities are key to his argument. Hyphenated identities were and are established based on religion, and even today ethnicity plays a larger role than a unifying idea of 'Cypriot'. Constitutionally reinforced identities of division have deterred any possibility of reaching across the Green Line, in order for peace to prevail, these ethnic policies of division must be torn down. The work relies heavily on existing literature and historical events, and is well represented as a literature review.


This is a theoretical work utilising various anecdotes from recent and ongoing conflicts in: Colombia, Afghanistan, DRC, and Sierra Leone. Cooper brings to the forefront a literature gap and fills it—how does conflict trade sustain insurgency, unrest, and lead to state fragility? Both illegal and legal trade can contribute to state collapse, and can also provide leverage to promote peace. The work utilises primary sources varying from crisis and humanitarian reports, speeches, and papers from international bodies. What the work is lacking is an in-depth case to further illustrate this point, instead Cooper relies on anecdotes coupled with theororetical works such as Tilly.
Cramer approaches the endogeneity problem between conflict and deprivation. He examines the cases of Rwanda and Mozambique to illustrate the problems of maldistribution while also citing anecdotal cases to prove his point. A considerable caution in the application of supposedly equalising/stabilising policies is needed if Western led development and reconstruction is to promote peace, growth, and political stability. A weakness of the work is its lack of parsimony, especially in regard to addressing the endogeneity question. Overall the work utilises a myriad of primary sources and puts them within the context of the wider literature. The work does address an important question: how do institutionalised inequalities and poverty fuel conflict and vice versa?

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| Total score:  | 5.50             |
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| Type(s) of data/information used: | Other          |
| How insightful in terms of data/information? | Some new data / information |
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This report demonstrates the problems Colombia faces in reintegration of combatants and DDR. Colombia has the world’s longest history of DDR and yet is still unsuccessful; we need to reassess the success of DDR as a policy if it does not work in practice. As a whole, former combatants have difficulty adjusting back to normal life and this report cites several possible policy solutions to this problem: decentralisation, civil society, and alternatives to dependency and violence. The work relies heavily on primary sources but interviews with ex-combatants are needed.

| Coder:       | MM                |
| Score data quality: | 3               |
| Score quality analysis: | 3.00          |
| Total score:  | 6.00             |
| Quantity of data/information used: | 10%-50% empirical information |
| Type(s) of data/information used: | Other          |
| How insightful in terms of data/information? | Some new data / information |
| How insightful in terms of analysis/theory? | Some significant new analysis / theoretical insight |
The authors considers the problem of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon from a ‘human security’ standpoint, and argue that it highlights different levels and sources of threats to the refugees and how they jeopardize Lebanese stability. The article does not provide any significant new data, analysis or solution.

The authors examine post-Dayton Bosnia and find that the international community’s efforts to transform Bosnia into a multi-ethnic democracy have failed in light of ethnic nationalisms, and local power issues. Bosnia has a problem of stateness, state consolidation, and post-totalitarian transition. These problems cannot be solved solely with large sums of money and international involvement. Donais and Pickel call on the international community to reassess their efforts and accept a permanent division of Bosnia. The work relies on primary sources and theoretical works, additionally the work provides a useful examination of the reality on the ground in Bosnia.
Doornbos uses the term ‘negotiated statehood’ to put into context different levels of governance and local governmental structures within the context of African states. Typically a western lens is used to examine what Africa is lacking, but rather than doing this the author uses literature to express the plausibility of an Africa already with governmental structures. The concept of negotiated statehood allows room for pliability in emerging state forms. Overall the work is parsimonious, however it proves little more than a literature review.

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This book represents an in-depth case study of children in organised armed violence in Rio de Janeiro. Qualitative data sources include: semi-structured interviews with children, adolescents and young adults working for drug factions, semi-structured interviews with ex-drug traffickers and relevant informants, group interviews with youths from the *favela*, group interviews with adult *favela* residents, questionnaires, interviews with detainees in juvenile justice system, liason with relevant social programmes, study of international humanitarian law regarding the rights of the child in conflict situation, media (Brazilian national and city press), two interviews with a community policing unit, group interview with the surgical team at Souza Aguiar Hospital regarding firearm-related injuries/age of patients, review of relevant research and literature. Quantitative secondary data analysed including: Public health, crime, police, small arms statistics.

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This policy brief aims to establish the challenges for NGOs working with civil society in fragile states by reviewing state of the art knowledge and research. It represents a review of research and literature on the subject, distilling prominent themes which need more attention. Good succinct summary, no new insights.

This report looks at the reasons for the successful outcomes of the Aceh peace process. It is a case study written by the head of the mission addressing the Aceh peace process as a success story and addressing why that happened and what are the challenges ahead. The success was due to ‘the determination of both parties, considerable pressure from Aceh’s people, and significant support from the international community’. Hence the recommendation was that this model is replicable and can be used elsewhere in the world. The empirical evidence in terms of data is relatively weak since the brief is mainly focused on evolution of events and processes and the actors’ role.
Feltes, T. 2009. “Building Peace and Justice in Countries in Transition: The Kosovo Experience”. Centre of Criminology, Law Faculty, Ruhr University, Bochum, Germany.

Security in post-conflict Kosovo is examined in this work. Kosovo is a unique case of international trusteeship where various international actors have come together to enforce law and order and aid in state building. The present system does not incorporate citizens, and this could result in social fragmentation. The work relies heavily on primary sources as well as literature to demonstrate the need for end-users in regard to security.

| Coder:       | MM                      |
| Score data quality: | 2.66                    |
| Score quality analysis: | 3.00          |
| Total score:            | 5.50                  |

Quantity of data/information used: 10%-50% empirical information
Type(s) of data/information used: Other

How insightful in terms of data/information? Some new data / information
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory? Considerable amount of new analysis / theoretical insight


The report attempts to present an overview of the last 25 years of peace initiatives in Colombia and gives views from a diverse group of Colombians. The report contains an analysis of obstacles faced in peace initiatives and negotiations as well as suggestions of how to overcome them in the future. The conclusion is that there can be a peaceful resolution of the conflict and that this process must be negotiated, integral, and participatory. Overall, some good points on peace initiatives, e.g. how civil society groups have failed to bring peace to Colombia, but mainly a review of the literature.

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Quantity of data/information used: Less than 10% empirical information
Type(s) of data/information used: Theoretical

How insightful in terms of data/information? Theoretical
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory? Some significant new analysis / theoretical insight
García-Durán, M. 2006. “Nonviolent Movements for Peace in Columbia and International Solidarity”. Centre For Peace and Reconciliation Studies, Coventry University. This paper aims to address the non-violent resistance movement in Colombia and supporting the analysis with a few statistics from Datapaz. The author provides examples of civic peace Initiatives and their Thematic and Geographical Approach, while also presenting the varied repertoire of action. The paper concludes that living in a context of protracted armed conflict can also develop different ways of resistance to violence, however international solidarity and support is crucial.

| Coder:       | AT          |
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| Total score: | 4.00       |

Quantity of data/information used: 10%-50% empirical information
Type(s) of data/information used: Quantitative; existing dataset

How insightful in terms of data/information? Some new data / information
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory? No significant new analysis / theoretical insight

Gordon, S. 2010. “The United Kingdom’s Stabilisation Model and Afghanistan: the Impact on Humanitarian Actors”. Disasters, 34. pp 1-20. Gordon examines UK stabilisation policy in Afghanistan. The separation between humanitarian and stabilisation needs, and aid is not sustainable in the long run. State-building in Afghanistan is a reality in disarray filled with exclusions, exploitation, and a lack of pan-Afghanistani harmony. The work relies on interviews and primary sources to demonstrate the gap between end-user security and aid. In the transitioning state of Afghanistan, both are necessary. A weakness of the work is that no interviews are taken from citizens or governmental officials, only the international arena is considered with vague discriptions of end-user security.

| Coder:       | MM          |
| Score data quality: | 2.66       |
| Score quality analysis: | 3.00       |
| Total score: | 5.50       |

Quantity of data/information used: 10%-50% empirical information
Type(s) of data/information used: Other

How insightful in terms of data/information? Some new data / information
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory? Some significant new analysis / theoretical insight

Habibie Center. 2010. “National Strategy to Consolidate Peace”. Annual Report 2010. This report analyses conflict and violence patterns in Indonesia and relates it to the ongoing process of democratic consolidation. It then analyses actual and potential policy responses to the increasing risk of political violence. It develops four policy recomendations that relate to: institutional...
preparedness, social cohesion, developing peace, sensitivity into governmental and non-
governmental interventions, and peace consolidation. The report draws its conclusions from
existing data and reports.

Hagmann, T. and Didier, P. 2010. “Negotiating Statehood: Dynamics of Power and
Hagmann and Peclard critically assess the predominant state failure literature. They propose a
heuristic framework entitled ‘negotiating statehood,’ which serves to assess the dynamic processes
and multiple social actors involved in state formation and the ‘institutionalisation of power
relations.’ It anchors the framework in empirical examples from a variety of political contexts
across Africa. The article provides helpful new analytical insights due to the introduced framework.
The paper is purposely theory-based, as it represents the introduction to empirical studies applying
the framework. It may be useful to review other works in this volume as well.

in Search of Legitimacy”. Working Paper Series No. 1, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy
and International Affairs, American University of Beirut.
This research is mainly based on fieldwork conducted by the research team within camps in
Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza Strip. “This study will attempt to clarify the
relationship between power, sovereignty, and space in Palestinian refugee camps in the Arab East,
by examining the modes of governance negotiated inside the camps. ‘Modes of governance’ refers to how a camp is managed in terms of its relationship with the legal authorities and local municipalities of the host country, as well as the internal relationships between groups within the camps, especially regarding conflict resolution for everyday problems. The uniqueness of this research is that it addresses the Palestinian refugees in different countries and indeed follow a bottom up approach toward understanding the governance and security concerns of the refugees.


This article uses the same set of interview outcomes from the Taylor and Hanafi (2010) article, so it is based upon data collected from four focus groups to examine life in the Nahr al-Bared, Beddawi, and ‘Ayn al-Hilweh refugee camps in Lebanon from a governance perspective. The authors contend that a lack of legitimate governance structures in the camps has inhibited the improvement of socio-economic and living conditions for the residents and jeopardized the security of Palestinians and Lebanese alike. Furthermore, the authors posit that in the near-absence of legitimate government, Islamism, and an ‘economy of morals’ has emerged to help ensure the daily functioning of the camps. The notion of ‘the state of exception’ is applied to understand the end-user perspective feeling towered security and governance. Once again, the article provides a first-hand evidence from the refugees and their representative as well.

Coder: AT
Score data quality: 3.33
Score quality analysis: 3.00
Total score: 6.50

Quantity of data/information used: More than 50% empirical information
Type(s) of data/information used: Qualitative; interview based

How insightful in terms of data/information? Some new data / information
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory? Some significant new analysis / theoretical insight

This paper represents an early review of security sector reforms, analysing DFID's approach to SSR and its role in shaping the agenda. Hendrickson also assesses the increasing interest of development agencies in the security sector and examines the challenges and practical dilemmas which lie ahead. This paper links research with policy and includes some empirical evidence due to a brief case study of DDID's early involvement in SSR. At the time of publishing this must have been cutting-edge as it captures the contemporary development thinking and proposes a new agenda. However, twelve years into the evolving security-development nexus this paper does not provide essential insights.

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The article focuses on informal mechanisms of self-protection used at local levels beset by violence and ignored by state security mechanisms. It argues that understanding what works (including informal and community-driven systems) will profoundly improve SSR efforts. The article employs two case studies to explore informal security mechanism as an alternative to state security. The case studies are mainly based on the author's observations in the field.

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This article argues that the 'nomos' of West Africa's postmodernity are the barracks and orgins of male sociality around the exercise of violence and that they circulate that violence within an exchange economy. The article is based on ethnographic research in Monrovia, focussed on Brookfields and Duala.

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**How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?** Some significant new analysis / theoretical insight

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Ibeanu utilises observations and the interconnectedness of oil companies and state apparatuses to support the conclusion that true democracy must exist in Nigeria, and oil companies need to disassociate themselves from the Nigerian state. Many of the pipeline disruptions are blamed on disgruntled communities in order for oil companies to save money. If a disruption to oil pipelines is caused by Nigerians then the oil companies do not have to pay for environmental degradation, or to replace these pipelines. Interestingly, many of Nigeria’s pipelines are outdated. In the end there are high levels of corruption between oil firms and government, the only way out is for a complete transformation. The work describes fully the context and importance of the Niger Delta from a resource perspective, it also relies on first hand observations and primary sources. As a whole it addresses key problems that Nigeria faces and provides potential policy tools to remedy community refurbishment and environmental degradation.

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**Quantity of data/information used:** More than 50% empirical information  
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**How insightful in terms of data/information?** Considerable amount of new data / information  
**How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?** Some significant new analysis / theoretical insight

161
This paper represents a literature review on violence research in Latin American and the Caribbean. It is part of the publication 'Violence and Violence Research in the Global South,' which also covers other regions of interest for the security evidence paper (i.e. sub-Saharan Africa). The paper gives an overview of the historical development of violence analysing its specificities and changes. The focus is put on the recent rise of violence in the region with special regard to youth violence. It also briefly addresses the causes, costs and consequences for Latin American societies.

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The report is intended to provide the Liberian government and other stakeholders in the country with more robust evidence than has hitherto been available on how both formal and customary justice systems are perceived and utilized by Liberians. Liberians are overwhelmingly dissatisfied with the formal justice system, particularly at the local levels. Affordability, accessibility, and timeliness are three of the main concerns. This is a well-written and insightful report that goes to the core of local justice systems and how Liberians themselves view themselves, rather than what NGOs and other experts think. The daily problems Liberians face is contextualised and gives solid examples of the limits of both customary and formal system and the general insecurity.

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Jensen analyses how the security-development nexus is expressed in the context of Cape Town's coloured townships. He argues the 'nexus' is context-dependant, in the case of Cape Town it is expressed in the counterinsurgent policies and practices surrounding a 'war on gangs'. The article also makes a connection to Holston's notion of "differentiated citizenship", providing an analytical space to assess how power is maintained when faced with an uprising of those it marginalises. Jensen argues that the war on gangs has maintained and reproduced stereotyping of the Cape Flats as violent communities undermining their status as citizens. The analysis is based on ethnographic material from Cape Town collected between 1997 and 2003. The article also revises the history of gangs and the war on gangs in Cape Town. Drawing on the ethnographic material and counterinsurgency manuals it compares the ongoing war on crime in Cape Town and explores its wider implications for citizenship in the Cape Flats. Excellent insights are made, however, despite its ethnographic base this article has a mainly theoretical focus, not making full use of the material gathered.

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Type(s) of data/information used: Qualitative; observation based

How insightful in terms of data/information? Some new data / information
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory? Considerable amount of new analysis / theoretical insight

Urban violence and the "new urban insurgency" are frequently addressed by repressive and muscular state-led responses. This article argues that first generation approaches such as 'mano dura' only serve to radicalise gangs and foster more organised forms of criminality. Furthermore, the authors are also sceptical of more preventive second generation interventions ('mano amiga'). The authors apply a threefold approach to measuring the effectiveness of the described interventions applying discursive, practical and outcome-based criteria. The study does not seem to include the authors’ own empirical primary research.

The paper is primarily an ideological piece that addresses the ‘war on terror’ paradigm and its impact on Africa. It asks how the militarisation of Africa was justified, and how and why this justification underwent a ‘paradigm shift’ with the launch of AFRICOM from the GWOT to the ‘security-development’ discourse.


Kefale discusses how the federal restructuring of Ethiopia in the 1960s led to a renegotiation of identity, statehood and centre-periphery relations among Somali and Oromo clans. It focuses on how this restructuring led to intra-federal boundary conflicts, arguing that the negotiating statehood framework provides useful analytical insights into political changes driven by powerholders at the centre and their implications for peripheral communities and actors. The author gives a historical assessment of the federal restructuring, linking it to the concept of "negotiating statehood." It illustrates the renegotiation of identity with two case studies, employing primary research through interviews and focus group discussions found on page 617.

The article focusses on the instrumentalisation of women's emancipation in Central Asia pursued by the Kremlin to secure the periphery of USSR against external forces and internal Islamic opposition. Female emancipation was perceived by the government as an essential means to create a secular and unified Soviet state. The article links these political/security to issues in critical security studies. This article contains a historical review of the issue at stake, supported by interviews with 'activists'.


The authors of this report discuss the problems Papua New Guinea faces from indigenous clashes with the government, and as Indonesia’s autonomy fades. There has been a long history of ethnic marginalisation and violence over the past decades. The report outlines these events and provides solutions ranging from transitional justice to DDR. Overall the report is lacking in adequate data citation, and reaches a conclusion only briefly discussed in the section previous. Usefully, the report discusses Pacific/SE Asian conflicts, but it only briefly recognises the importance of end-users.

Le Billon takes a broad theoretical account to describe the two provocations for resource driven conflicts: to control valuable resources and to finance armed conflicts. He cites various anecdotal information to describe resource curse as something that can prevail in deeply fragmented and deprived societies where resources are readily available for looting or control. The work provides a good theoretical overview of literature on resource curse with examples of resource driven conflicts. There are not enough primary sources to make this work outstanding, however the insightfulness of the resource-conflict paradigm is conveying and can easily be applied to cases like the DRC, Sierra Leone, and of course Nigeria.


The article is based upon over 20 hours of focus groups and in-depth interviews with diverse representation from three Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon (Nahral-Bared, Beddawi and ‘Ayn al-Hilweh). It mainly consists of quotes from the refugees themselves about how they perceive the various forms of security arrangements and to what extent they feel secure. Thus, the authors
analyse Palestinian perceptions of both Lebanese and Palestinian security institutions, detailing the ways in which conventional, state-centric approaches to security by both parties have been insufficient. There is no theoretical contribution here, and it exclusively echoes the voices of the refugees.


This paper considers efforts to stabilise Timor-Leste and build the state in the decade since 1999. It argues that two distinct approaches to stabilisation can be observed there: The first is a ‘security-first’ approach, while the second emphasises traditional development activities and institution-building as the foundation for a stable country. However, the coordinating and integrating activities remain a challenge and the question of whether, or how, to measure progress has gone largely unaddressed. This authors conducted interviews with the élites, donor representatives and NGOs in the main, rather than with end-users. A major result of these interviews was that interviews “with multilateral and bilateral actors and NGOs alike was done in the absence of empirically grounded indicators that actually define and measure stabilisation.” Hence ‘this personal ‘evidence base’ results inevitably in contrary ‘conclusions’. The paper ends by concluding that ‘In Timor-Leste, as elsewhere, stabilisation has proven unable to contend with the ‘underlying’ causes or drivers of conflict, including persistent political cleavages, ethnic and community divisions, and social and economic inequalities’.

This briefing focusses on the tremendous challenge of SSR in Liberia (i.e. how to transform military from a symbol of terror to an instrument of democracy), and the US decision to outsource the task to private military companies. It outlines key elements and outcomes of this procedure and aims to draw implications with an eye towards AFRICOM. The work provides an historical and policy review. It is an interesting brief, but suffers from little discussion of private actors in hybrid spaces. It should be noted that the author was a principal architect of this SSR programme.


This article traces the process through which popular security arrangements were developed and subsequently hijacked by opportunistic political officials engaged in power struggles between the state and federal governments. Detailing the strategies and struggles involved in the process of political hijack, this inside account of the Bakassi Boys reveals the underlying resilience of civil notions of justice and public accountability in contemporary Africa.” In this paper, “evidence is based on extensive interviews with Aba residents and with informal shoe producers involved in the
original organisation of the Bakassi Boys, coupled with the realities of living and working in Aba during a key phase of their rise and derailment.” It is a very focused detailed study that provides original information.


The report evaluates the mid-term impact of Viva Rio, a Brazilian NGO, in Port-au-Prince in Haiti. It recognises the particularity of its actions and puts it in the context of south-south cooperation. While it recognises the limits of its analysis, the report remains optimistic towards the organisation and its potential. That being said, the report is written and presented in a way that makes it seem biased in favour of the organisation.


This article presents the challenges of responding to the illicit drug market and its associated violence in Rio, highlighting the characteristics and dynamics of the markets, the impacts of the current drug policy approach adopted by the State of Rio on the scale of the illicit market, and its
implications for the human rights and security of affected populations, in particular for the slum dwellers. This article provides a statistical and historical record on the drug trade and drug policies in Rio but does not present the issue or its influence from an end-user perspective.

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This report represents guidelines to assist DfID and SIDA in their development of an integrated approach to violence reduction intervention in the Central American region. It is associated with the background report "violence in the central american region." The guidelines provide a three-phased approach, each associated with objectives and tools, which are all aimed to help the two agencies with the following tasks: Define a future over-arching framework when designing related programmes, mainstream such an understanding in all operation in Central American future poverty reduction strategies and development cooperation in Central America, and inform key partners of the current dynamics of violence as well as potential approaches to violence reduction. The guidelines advise DfID and SIDA to develop a unified conceptual framework for understanding violence in Central America; a mapping of different typologies of violence and lastly an integrated framework for intervention which links violence reduction, citizen security and citizenship.

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The authors call for an improvement of the instruments applied for addressing the heterogenous character of presumed sources of violence in the process of peacebuilding. Attention needs to be paid not only to instruments of violence but also to the political and economic motivations of agents. Practical armed violence prevention and reduction programmes need to draw on current scholarship and policy experience and take into consideration the emerging programmes which are based on bottom-up analysis and evidence-based programming. The author argues these activities offer a new paradigm and compelling alternative beyond the narrow scope of DDR. This article represents a review and analysis of conventional DDR programmes and of the complex landscape of armed violence an emerging alternative programmes. It generates a list of recommendations for more comprehensive approaches.


The article dissects the principle of 'ownership' in SSR which is currently a rhetorical device and a guide for donor officials. Nathan argues that political and practical solutions are required to meet the challenge of local ownership. The article provides an analysis of the definition of local ownership in SSR and suggests how donor governments can operationalise and engage meaningfully with this concept. The author describes the challenges of local ownerships for current donor strategy and suggests capacity building strategies that donors could employ such as establishing security policy and planning units, providing small grant schemes for civil society.
Nathan, L. 2007. “Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform: A Guide for Donors”. *Department for International Development, September.* This study was commissioned by the SSR Strategy of the UK Government's Global Conflict Prevention Pool, and aims to contribute to the operationalising of donor's policy commitment to local ownership of SSR. It provides planning and diagnostic tools for national and international actors. The piece also includes case studies of: Afghanistan, Liberia, Ethiopia, and Guatemala.

Nixon, S. R. 2008. “Integration and Indigenous Approaches into a 'New Subsistence State': The Case of Justice and Conflict Resolution in East Timor”. PhD Thesis, C Darwin University. This thesis develops the concept of a 'new subsistence state' as a state in which non-state social organisations play an important role, and applies it to East Timor. Nixon then analyses the possibility of integrating the justice and conflict resolution capacities of such organisations into the state in order to increase its capacities. The thesis uses many forms of primary sources such as reports, newspaper articles, interviews and participant observation.
Scheye, E. and McLean, A. 2006. “Enhancing the delivery of justice and security in fragile states”. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committe (OECD/DAC) Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, Paris. This study provides an in-depth analysis of the challenges faced in security and justice service delivery, together with recommendations for development agencies working in fragile and conflict-affected countries. Its central recommendation is that development agencies take a multi-layered approach to their support of security and justice reform programmes. The primary objective of this approach is to help development agencies overcome the challenge of targeting donor assistance to state and non-state actors simultaneously and to ensure short-term service delivery with long-term institutional reforms. This study was undertaken under the auspices of the SSR Task Team of the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC) and was the product of a consultative process that brought together policy makers and field practitioners from both donor countries and states affected by conflict. The findings of this work were informed by a workshop hosted by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) in March 2006.

Omeje, K. 2006. “Petrobusiness and Security Threats in the Niger Delta, Nigeria”. Current Sociology. 54(3). pp 477-499. The work utilises various primary sources from oil companies to governments to demonstrate how different oil companies in the Niger Delta utilise different forms of conflict management. Because the Nigerian state is too weak to enforce any rules towards oil firms in regard to environmental...
degradation, problems persist due to the magnitude of poverty and the developmental needs of local communities. The work is succinct, well-cited and triangulates information.

This paper argues that international peacebuilders have promulgated a particular vision of how states should organise themselves internally, based on the principles of liberal democracy and market-oriented economics, thus peacebuilders have effectively ‘transmitted’ standards of appropriate behaviour from the Western-liberal core of the international system to the failed states of the periphery. From this perspective, peacebuilding resembles an updated (and more benign) version of the mission civilisatrice, or the colonial-era belief that the European imperial powers had a duty to ‘civilise’ dependent populations and territories. In reaching these conclusions Paris cites many of the international experiences and provide a sort of evaluation to their operations. This paper leans more toward the theoretical aspects although it used existing empirical evidence in the form of lessonslearnt.

The article takes the peacebuilding notion and argues that “mainstream approaches have hitherto emphasised improvements in the techniques of making, keeping, and building peace, rather than exploring the norms and values of a liberal paradigm that fosters silence around structural violence emanating from zones of peace and probity.” Hence the article “contends that the silence has been broken by a crisis of legitimacy of the liberal paradigm, heralded by hybrid forms of peace that reflect local adaptations and resistance to foreign presence, as well as by alternative concepts of intervention.” This piece is very theoretical and critical to the liberal peace paradigm. The article concludes that interdisciplinary frameworks can provide economic studies with opportunities to reveal the agency of peacebuilding ‘hosts’ in their everyday lives and interactions with interventionists. Overall, the paper is a theoretical piece and does not directly address the end-user perspective.

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| Score quality analysis: | Theoretical |
| Total score: | |
| Quantity of data/information used: | Theoretical |
| How insightful in terms of data/information? | Considerable amount of new analysis / theoretical insight |
| How insightful in terms of analysis/theory? | |


This article proposes an explanation for the emergence of non-state governance in situations of apparent state collapse, based on an ethnographic study of the armed rebellion in Butembo (eastern Democratic Republic of Congo). The main argument in this article is that state collapse does not necessarily have to be associated with the end of governance: despite high levels of insecurity and uncertainty, people continue to seek answers to the intractable problem of order and the organisation of political life, especially where state power is either weak or (theoretically) absent. A second idea proposed is that in spite of their destructiveness, violence and armed conflict can sometimes produce collective political outcomes such as the protection of economic rents and security. This work provides a historical review and ethnographic field research, the methodology is not explained in detail.

The article demonstrates how the polity’s tolerance for heterogeneous negotiations and different forms of statehood allowed local political actors to establish peace in their own local settings first. Although it did not produce uniform statehood, it provided the basis for communities to explore the scope for common statehood. On the national level, hybrid elements initially allowed for a healthy adaptation of statehood to local needs, and for legitimate, productive instruments of negotiation. This responsiveness was not maintained, and current hybrid elements threaten to undermine the polity’s stability. The negotiation of statehood was not homogeneous in the different parts of Somaliland and by using two case studies (Sanaag Region and Awdal Region) the authors illustrate the differences in intergroup bargaining and how the resulting local realities behind statehood differ, despite the nominal existence of state structures such as regional administrations, representative organs and electoral processes. The article is based on existing knowledge and presents it in the form of historical changes. It does not address its topic from end-user perspective.

This report represents a literature review of the link between community security and DDR processes. It aims to close the existing gap in both policy and academic literature regarding this link. The country case studies provide interesting empirical insights for future research. The report proposes that community security and community based DDR initiatives can complement state-centered approaches and may even be able to substitute for the state if it is unable or unwilling to carry out such tasks.

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This report considers community security and community based DDR in Burundi. It analyses ex-combatants motivation for (de)mobilisation, the relations between different actors involved in the DDR process, how local communities perceive the DDR process and local security itself. The findings suggest that ex-combatants’ motivation to stop fighting was based on a sense that they had achieved their political ends. Economic motivations started to play an increasing role over the course of DDR when ex-combatants began to face economic hardship and stigmatisation. The relations between the Burundian government and international actors, specifically the World Bank, are problematic. The report highlights that the focus on national government has had adverse consequences for the involvement of local actors such as NGOs, community members and the excombatants themselves. The report ends with practical recommendations for the actors involved in DDR programming. The report is based on ten weeks research in Burundi between April and June 2010 and is part of the activities of the Peace Security and Development Network working group on community-security and community-based DDR (i.e. see DRC study). Methods include focus group discussions, semi-structured interviews, key-informant interviews and participatory observation.
This working paper calls for a new phase of peacebuilding, pointing out various examples from Sudan, Cambodia, Bosnia, and Palestine/Israel of how liberal peacebuilding has failed. According to the author, it has failed when judged not just by the tainted governments now in power, but by the lack of end-user security, the existence of hybrid states, and the inability for these countries to secure true sovereignty. Liberal peacebuilding is an ideal that in actuality can prove ineffective and harmful. A weakness of the work is that it only provides a literature review and the cases presented are anecdotal and not truly explored. Overall, this work would mainly prove useful for a theoretical perspective on end-users and why a new method is needed.

This Swiss Peace report aims to expand the approaches through which the role and effects of private security companies (PSCs) are discussed in the literature/policy realm. The report identifies a gap in current knowledge: little is known about how local populations perceive PSCs and how PSCs impact their everyday lives. The report aims to counteract this through an explorative study into the perceived positive and negative, direct and indirect effects of PSCs on local population, focussing on two case studies of Afghanistan and Angola. The main results from the two case studies is a
largely negative view of those interviewed towards PSCs. The study proposes lessons learnt and recommendations for both governments and PSCs to address this widespread resentment. The methods applied in this study varied for the two cases. For Afghanistan semi-structured interviews were conducted with key stakeholders, focus group discussions were held with civilian populations in three different regions. In addition, the author conducted a literature and media review. The case of Angola relied exclusively on desk research (literature and media review) and semi-structured phone interviews with NGOs.

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This article reviews 14 recent cross-national econometric studies, and many qualitative studies, that cast light on the relationship between natural resources and civil war. It suggests that collectively they imply four underlying regularities: first, oil increases the likelihood of conflict, particularly separatist conflict; second, ‘lootable’ commodities like gemstones and drugs do not make conflict more likely to begin, but they tend to lengthen existing conflicts; third, there is no apparent link between legal agricultural commodities and civil war; and finally, the association between primary commodities – a broad category that includes both oil and agricultural goods – and the onset of civil war is not robust. This article mainly reviews and analyses the existing literature and explain the results and variances. It urges future research to advance the quality of the econometric analysis of natural resource and civil war.

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**Quantity of data/information used:** 10%-50% empirical information
**Type(s) of data/information used:** Qualitative; interview based Other

**How insightful in terms of data/information?** Considerable amount of new data / information
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**Quantity of data/information used:** Less than 10% empirical information
**Type(s) of data/information used:** Theoretical

**How insightful in terms of data/information?** Theoretical
**How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?** Some significant new analysis / theoretical insight

The report aims to link community security with DDR programmes in a context specific way. It analyses local perceptions of security and the success of DDR programming. A widespread perception of 'broken promises' exists due to a lack of follow-up in DDR programming. DDR is perceived to miss the point as it does not successfully address the issue of with engaging ex-combatants and reintegrating them into communities. It rather seems to be focussed on ridding areas of firearms. Local traditional community systems are not utilised by international donors and DDR programmers pressed for quick results. End-users perceive this to be counterproductive, especially in regards to reintegration. Significantly, the high level of frustration of ex-combatants may lead to their remobilisation as the insecure setting still provides inroads to active militias. Furthermore, DDR programmes are not linked to other peacebuilding activities. The report generates practical recommendations for local communities, DDR programmers and the international community (page 42). Additionally this paper also provides a simple but useful analysis of security, local perceptions of security and the various security actors involved. The report is based on 11 weeks of field research in eastern DRC between September and December 2009. Methods applied include focus group discussions, semi-structured interviews, key informant interviews and participatory observations, a total of 750 people were interviewed in Ituri and North and South Kivu.


This article is based on a field work for PhD research and uses two case studies to demonstrates how Angolan elite associations have gained increasing political significance through their representation of local interests. Using the examples of regional elite associations, the article retraces the struggle over resources and citizenship, which is embedded in contemporary urban–rural interactions that mark political change. The author seeks to examine and demonstrate how actors ‘on the ground’ negotiate their lives as citizens in relation to a centralised and authoritarian state. Despite the small number of case studies, it illustrates well how these actors contest and reshape the state’s apparent hegemony through the mobilisation of particular repertoires.
The author analyses the evolution of policing in the townships of Cape Town in the context of a neo-liberalising city. Crime is commonly framed as a security threat because it poses a danger to market-led growth. Policing has become increasingly aggressive, with urban governance pursuing a strategy of containment. This trend is counter productive and undermines the developmental process it seeks to provide. This article is based on rich field work in Cape Town, drawing on official documents, statements by city officials, police and business leaders, research and reporting on police operations; media report and interviews with development workers.

The authors address the issue of warlordism in Afghanistan after the US invasion and the War on Terror. With the fall of the Taliban a power vaccuum emerged and allowed actors to elevate themselves to warlords. Although warlordism and insecurity go hand in hand, warlordism could also be seen as part of state consolidation. The authors argue that the international community needs to put more emphasis on human security and on understanding how local security structures work.
The piece relies heavily on primary sources to elaborate the security dilemma faced by the failed state structures in Afghanistan. Overall the work is succinct and utilises different examples of warlordism in Afghanistan to illustrate its arguments.


The work places the effectiveness of development and donor monies towards end-users within the pragmatic realism perspective. Scheye cites various cases where hybrid local (and traditional) governmental structures have been more successful for end-users than federally created structures. While it is important for donors to have personnel on the ground, Scheye finds that by channelling money through large INGO's with more in-country experience, rather than western-led NGOs, funding will more directly effect citizens. The work would have benefitted from more case study analysis to illustrate the argument. Only Western primary sources are used, creating a potential for bias.

This document contains a dialogue between various scholars concerning the mainstream discourse on state failure, state-building and peacebuilding, and introduces and discusses the notion of hybrid political orders. It is mainly theoretical and uses secondary sources.

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This report explains how relationships between local populations, village-level policing entities and clans can be effective counterinsurgency tools. Moreover, it argues that it is in the interest of the US Military to utilise tribes that already foster local security, policing and resistance to anti-government elements. The work takes into account local dynamics of kinship and local policing efforts over the past 130 years to demonstrate the importance of local actors and existing decentralised clan units, for the success or failure of American forces. The work utilises existing theory on counterinsurgency and Afghan ethnography to conclude that a new doctrine of local cooperation needs to be created.

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>How insightful in terms of data/information?</td>
<td>Some new data / information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?</td>
<td>Some significant new analysis / theoretical insight</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This article examines the growth of private security initiatives in Swaziland, arguing that this growth cannot be understood with reference to the ‘weak’ African state but must be seen in the context of an unequal political economy and the utilisation of public security forces for regime security. The article reviews the political economy of private security in Swaziland and investigates its impacts in urban areas and the rural response to lack of state security. The author conducted interviews and cites them in the article.

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</table>

**Quantity of data/information used:** 10%-50% empirical information

**Type(s) of data/information used:** Qualitative; interview based

**How insightful in terms of data/information?** Some new data / information

**How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?** Some significant new analysis / theoretical insight

---


This is a chapter on public security reform in Cote d'Ivoire, taken from the Small Arms Survey 2011. With its dual system of security provision Cote d'Ivoire represents a complex process of post-conflict security sector reform. The main findings are that the perception of insecurity in the rebel-run areas is higher and that civilians in the government zone are as likely to become victims of armed violence as those outside it. The chapter also reviews the deficiencies of local security forces and argues that the level of insecurity encourages civilians to provide their own security through community self-defence and vigilante groups, which in turn creates new forms of insecurity. It also outlines how security sector reform efforts in Côte d'Ivoire have focused on the reunification of the security apparatus rather than on addressing the lack of democratic oversight, strategic objectives and professionalism, or the logistical weaknesses of the security forces. The creation of the new, unified armed forces has generated optimism comparable to that projected on the post-colonial military; however, 50 years later, new challenges have reduced the capacity of the military to be an ‘agent of modernisation.’ As literature seems scarce, the chapter relies on field research conducted by the author in February and March 2010, and includes a survey of 2,600 households, focus groups and interviews with key informants.

This chapter on Haiti is taken from the Small Arms Survey 2011. It aims to assess security promotion efforts before and after the 2010 earthquake. Its central objective is to give voice to the real threats facing Haitians. The key findings indicate that Haiti lacks both human resources and infrastructural capacity to police its country. A household survey of data generated since 2004 suggests that security has improved in Haiti over the past decade and has continued to improve since the earthquake. Although police involvement in criminal activity, as reported by crime victims, decreased sharply after the transition to an elected government in 2007, the surveys show that, in 2010, more than two-thirds of the general population would turn first to the police if faced with a threat to their person or property. This chapter draws on the findings of three household surveys conducted before and after the earthquake, which it uses to argue for firearms licences and the continuation of policing reform efforts.


This report utilises participatory research methods via a participatory rural appraisal (PRA) including institutional analysis, diagrams, matrices, mapping and modelling, and semi-structured interviews. It is unclear whom these interviews are with, and much of the data in charts is poorly
designed making it difficult to comprehend. The work focuses on Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands where small arms violence is high and human security is low. This piece provides useful insight into human insecurity and borderlands. Small arms activities are high in rural areas and have been absorbed into longstanding dynamics of conflict. The goal of the report is to prove that PRA is an effective means for evaluating human security while offering solutions such as violence reduction programmes and weapons collection programmes.

Stern, M. And Ojendal, J. 2011. “Mapping Security-Development: A question of Methodology?”. Security Dialogue, 42(1). pp 105-110. This article is a response to constructive criticism voiced against the author's earlier publication on the mapping of the security-development-sector. The authors embrace Reid-Henry’s comments on the need to engage with creative methodologies for the study of the 'nexus.' This commentary is useful for JSRP research because it supports the need to find alternative methodologies beyond the predominant standard of reviewing policy and literature and estimating impacts.
This paper argues that ‘in a region that has a long history of backwardness and neglect, the conflict is also over natural resources, political power and even history.’ The use of violence as a counterfoil to violence implies that the two sides are caught in the repetitive cycle of attack and reprisal; in a more decisive sense, it also portends a shift in the paradigms of development and governance in a backward region. The paper provides a purely ethnographic analysis of a case study in India, based mainly on interviews with local inhabitants.

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type(s) of data/information used:</td>
<td>Qualitative; observation based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Some new data / information</td>
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<tr>
<td>How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?</td>
<td>Some significant new analysis / theoretical insight</td>
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This article describes the process of grouping, forced labour, surveillance and starvation in the camps based on the memories of elderly Naga and Mizo villagers in north-east India. The paper argues that ‘while descriptions of the process of grouping are consistent, people’s opinions vary on its implications for their own lives, depending on their past and current location’. A pure ethnographic approach was followed to present the case.

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<td>How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?</td>
<td>Some significant new analysis / theoretical insight</td>
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Central Asian states share a common legacy and are examined in this UNESCO report as requiring similar ways to harness human security. The report goes into detail on different theories and aspects of human security, ranging from food security to job security. The report argues that in order for a state to be stable and functioning, a bottom-up approach to statebuilding and human security should be taken, since the top-down approach has proved ineffective. The report takes each sub-aspect of human security and examines it against the structures and failures of each Central Asian country. It is well presented and considers various factors at play ranging from post-totalitarianism, to resource curse and poverty. It provides a good example of end-user results, and the need for human security to ensure state security.

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<tr>
<td>How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?</td>
<td>Some significant new analysis / theoretical insight</td>
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The article surveys relevant recent public health research, explains why collaboration between public health researchers, conflict analysts and human rights monitors is useful, and outlines possible future research scenarios, including those pertaining to the indirect and long-term consequences of conflict; human rights and security in conflict prone areas; and the link between human rights, conflict, and International Humanitarian Law.

This report mainly aims to present the United Nations approaches to security sector reform. It discusses the evolution of the UN approach to SSR, its scope and content, experiences to date, the lessons learnt and policy recommendations. The report argues that security, development and human rights are preconditions for sustainable peace. However, it argues that, despite the extensive experience that the UN has, support for SSR has remained largely an ad hoc undertaking. The organisation has not elaborated principles and standards to guide its support for national actors in enhancing or re-establishing security. The report offers a number of recommendations that include: developing UN policies and guidelines; strengthening strategic advisory and specialist capacities; strengthening field capacity for SSR; assessing gaps and resource requirements; designating lead entities; enhancing the coordination and delivery of support; building partnerships to provide effective support, expertise and adequate resources to national security sector reform processes; and establishing a UN inter-agency SSR support unit to deliver on those priorities. Overall, this report is more concerned with institutional arrangements rather than citizen participation.

The Human Development Report uses a human security lens to look at the linkages between safety, dignity and livelihoods. The report argues that while many gains have been made in the past two years (2002-2004), Afghanistan could still fall into a cycle of conflict and instability unless the genuine grievances of people, e.g. lack of jobs, education, dignity, participation etc, are dealt with adequately. The report analyses the roots of insecurity in Afghanistan today and makes recommendations for policies and actions required from the new government, civil society and the international community. Probably one of the best and most reliable accessible sources on human security data in Afghanistan. Excellent in addressing safety and security challenges for end-users.

![Table]

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How insightful in terms of data/information? Considerable amount of new data / information
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory? Some significant new analysis / theoretical insight


Believing that the state-building process in the occupied Palestinian territories/Palestine needs to be reconsidered, the PHDR 2009/2010 captures and explains this predicament by utilising the concept of human security from the perspectives of achieving freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom to live in dignity. Hence, while noticing the ravages of prolonged occupation and the failings of conventional development techniques, the report supports a pragmatic approach that focuses on participatory state building as being critical to the promotion of political and social cohesion and overall human security in Palestine. This ‘new’ approach calls for a set of priorities that include achieving territorial contiguity, economic integration, social cohesion, sovereignty and political reconciliation. To do so, donors have to adopt a Do No Harm principles and ensure de-linking aid from the political process; a Commission for Effective Governance needs to be established; and the indigenous principles and reconciliation mechanisms such as ‘Sumud’ and ‘National Sulha’ need to be reformulated and reactivated. The report conducts its own survey in addition to utilising many existing surveys. Of importance is that the report utilises Computer Aided Telephone Interviewing. Over 4,700 interviews were completed successfully from the five regions of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The report aimed to survey the indicators of human security, personal security, community security, political security, economic security, health security, food security and environmental security. This innovative survey is central to the report and was also used in the analysis section.
UNDP. 2007. “Returning to Uncertainty? Addressing Vulnerabilities in Northern Uganda”. UNDP in collaboration with the Republic of Uganda. This report addresses the issues, challenges and uncertainties of the return process of internally displaced persons (IDP) with a particular concern for policymaking. It is mainly concerned with their living conditions and the factors which determine their decision to return to their homes such as security, access to land, and infrastructure. The report displays a solid and rigorous methodology and clearly states its limits while justifying them through a discussion of resource limitations.


This report aims to give a voice to the victims of the Congo conflicts. It is based on a survey conducted in Eastern DRC and captures the population's experience of violence, their perspectives
on peace and security and their views on possible resolution mechanisms. The findings are broad and offer statistical insights into the many dimensions of the conflict. The survey was followed up with a quantitative cross-sectional survey of 2,620 individuals in eastern DRC and 1,133 individuals in Kinshasa and Kisangani combined. The authors offer a good discussion of their research design and instruments (see p.15-17.)


This report by ENNA and BAAG bring to light how difficult it is for the military to be peacebuilders and conversely how difficult it is for humanitarian spaces to exist in a conflict environment. The findings of the report show that more attention needs to be paid to Afghan civil society, the effectiveness of aid through military operations, and the interaction between civilians and the military. The work utilises interviews and primary sources to demonstrate these points while providing policy points for different actors present in Afghanistan. The interviewers are both Western and Afghan, male and female, and they interview 140 individuals involved in government, NGO's and the military, as well as civilians.

The paper argues that ‘Given the policy impact of the assumption that aid promotes US security objectives in Pakistan, there is surprisingly little analysis or evidence of its effectiveness in this regard’. The paper helps to address this gap by first reviewing the history and assumptions underpinning current US aid and stabilisation policies. It then uses field research on the 2005 earthquake relief efforts in northern Pakistan to assess the impact of the ‘War on Terror’ on the humanitarian response. In particular, it examines the assumption of influential US policymakers that humanitarian aid following the earthquake was an effective way to promote US security objectives by ‘winning hearts and minds’—an assumption that has been used to justify all subsequent major US foreign aid commitments to Pakistan’. Regarding the methodology, the field research was conducted in Mansehra and Battagram districts in the NWFP, and Muzaffarabad district in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. The field research included 19 male focus-group discussions with 162 participants, and seven female focus-group discussions with 54 participants. In addition, 55 key informant interviews were held with Pakistani military and civilian officials, the staff of donor bodies, United Nations agencies, and local and international non-governmental organisations. This survey reveals that while few aid providers or recipients perceived the humanitarian response to the disaster as having been primarily motivated by WoT considerations, Pakistan’s status as a strategic ally and front-line state in the WoT nevertheless clearly contributed to greater instrumentalisation of humanitarian assistance.

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<tr>
<td>How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?</td>
<td>No significant new analysis / theoretical insight</td>
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</table>


This article is a literature review on urban violence drawing on a typology that distinguishes between political, institutional, economic and social violence and that highlights potential overlaps and convergence of these in phenomena such as the drug trade, informal justice and youth gangs. The author emphasises the importance of macro level structural forces and how various influences impact on local conditions, stimulating or shaping violence.
| Coder:       | AA                       |
| Score data quality: | Score quality analysis: |
| Total score: | Quantity of data/information used: Less than 10% empirical information |
| Type(s) of data/information used: Theoretical |
| How insightful in terms of data/information? Theoretical |
| How insightful in terms of analysis/theory? Some significant new analysis / theoretical insight |
Appendix C: Books, Chapters and Foreign Publications from Peer Search

Books


Veit, A. 2010 Intervention as Indirect Rule: Civil War and Statebuilding in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Frankfurt-on-Main: Campus


Veit, Alex. 2010 Intervention as Indirect Rule: Civil War in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Frankfurt-on-Main: Campus


Chapters


Non-English Language Publications


Martínez, R. Tulchin, J. eds. 2006. La Seguridad Desde Las dos Orillas: un Debate Entre Europa y Latinoamerica. CIDOB.


*Identified within the first five recommended texts but could not source*


Appendix D: Peer led searches: respondents

LSE and Justice and Security Research Programme
Virginie Collombier
Jude Howell
Mary Kaldor
David Keen
Kate Meagher
Mareike Schomerus

UK + Ireland
Bruce Baker
Christopher Cramer
Lyndsay Hilker
Alice Hills
Roger McGinty
Gordon Peake
Jenny Pearce
Michael Pugh
Oliver Richmond
Jan Selby
Mandy Turner

Continental Europe
Jean Francois Bayart
Morten Boås
Volke Boege
Luc van de Goor
Kristian Berg Harpviken
Dirk Kruijt
Reinoud Leenders
Philippe Le Billon
Eric Scheye
Astri Suhrke

N America, Australasia
Rita Abrahamson
Chuck Call
Anne Marie Goetz
Andrew Mack
Ken Menkhaus
Robert Muggah
Gerd Schonwalder
Monica Duffy Toft
Susan Woodward,
Elizabeth Jean Wood
SSA
Sandy Africa
Uju Agomoh
Adedeji Ebo
Eboe Hutchful
Okey Ibeanu
Jeff Isima
Anicia Lala
Boubacar N’Diaye
Janine Rauch
Medhane Tadesse

Middle East
Mustapha Kamal Al-Sayyid
Pinar Bilgin
Yousef Chaitani
Sari Hanafi
Bassma Kodmani
Tarah Mahfoud
Kadry Said
Yezid Sayigh
Mariz Tadros

Asia
Sunil Bastian
Anuradha Chenoy
Shalmali Guttal
Sanjana Hattotuwa
Carolina Hernandez
Syed Rifaat Hussain
Herman Joseph Kraft
Riefqi Muna

Latin America
Aleajandra Abello
Bernado Arevalo
Gastonton Chillier
Lucia Dammert
Marcela Donadio
Claudio Fuentes
Maria Patricia Gonzalez
Monica Serrano
Appendix E: Commentary on Methodology of Evidence Searches

Phase One: Systematic Database Search

The first phase of the literature review consisted of a systematic exploration of the published and openly available literature relating to our research question. The eighteen databases chosen for consultation in this phase were selected on the basis of their common usage and reference within academic and practitioner communities (see Table 2). The synonyms chosen (see Table 1) for the database queries aimed to reflect the existing divisions and conceptualisations of security in the academic and practitioner communities. They were also selected for their use within literature streams that move beyond a state-centric approach to the provision of security.

Table 1

<table>
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<tr>
<th>SEARCH TERMS</th>
<th>Hybrid Governance</th>
<th>Human Security</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
<td>OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securitisation</td>
<td>Neo-patrimonial</td>
<td>OR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>OR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Mediated states</td>
<td>OR</td>
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<td>OR</td>
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<td>OR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stabilization</td>
<td>Non-state</td>
<td>OR</td>
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<td>AND Non state</td>
<td>OR</td>
</tr>
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<td>Transnational</td>
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<td>Entitlements</td>
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<tr>
<td>security*</td>
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This process was undertaken to allow all the research assistants to use a single search string in each of the databases that supported multiple word searches. Boolean logic was also utilised by most of the databases concerned.\(^{32}\) Initial results were often in the thousands, which meant additional strategies were used to make the results more manageable. Firstly, following Boolean logic, researchers could choose to add a list of country names to the search string. This narrowed results to articles that referenced the following areas: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Yemen, Palestine, West Bank, and Gaza, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Somaliland, Sudan, Darfur, DRC, DR Congo, Zaire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Kosovo, Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Eritrea, Rwanda, and

\(^{32}\) For a detailed explanation of Boolean logic as applied to search engines, see [http://www.internettutorials.net/boolean.asp](http://www.internettutorials.net/boolean.asp)
Burundi. Secondly, researchers could often narrow or sort results by ‘relevance’, which in most cases meant that the results that included the terms most often were displayed first. Thirdly, researchers were instructed to simply screen the first 500 articles that appeared. All searches were also limited to post-1989 publications.

In practice, researchers were instructed to use the latter two narrowing methods first. Following this, if the query still returned more than 500 results, a quick scan of the titles of the first 500 articles was conducted. If it was felt that the first 500 articles looked largely unrelated to our research question then the country narrowing option was used. However, if they looked suitable the analyst was instructed to proceed to the next stage without applying the country narrowing option. Once narrowed, each query was then screened for articles that looked applicable to our research question. Articles that appeared suitable were sourced and stored for later grading. The following selection criteria, which are designed to reflect our primary research question’s interests, were used to select articles:

Does the source include empirical data, quantitative or qualitative? Does it uncover how security affects the lives, entitlements, and agency of end-users in hybrid governance contexts? Does it provide any empirical analysis of the relationships between security and the workings of power in these contexts, and of how they impact upon end-users? Does it include empirical analysis of the interplay between international, state and non-state providers of security, especially at the local level? Does it provide empirical insights into the experience, perceptions, coping strategies, and voice of vulnerable or marginalized people and groups facing insecurity in hybridized contexts? Does it include the findings of ‘action’-orientated or participatory research? If none of these elements are present, does it go beyond purely theoretical arguments and offer rigorous discussion or re-analysis of existing empirical evidence?

The table below records the initial query, whether it was narrowed by country and the final number of articles chosen to be graded. An initial result of 114,699 articles was achieved for all databases that were successfully queried. Refinement by countries was deemed necessary for four databases. This resulted in 170 articles passing the initial selection criteria (two were later found to be duplications). These were chosen as potentially valuable for answering the research question, and were passed onto the grading exercise stage of the database query.\textsuperscript{33}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{DATABASE SEARCH RESULTS} & \textbf{# hits} & \textbf{# hits country} & \textbf{# hits all} \\
\hline
Scopus & N/A & N/A & N/A \\
ISS & 9924 & 905 & 16 \\
IBSS/PAIS/ProQuest & 75000 & N/A & 16 \\
CIAO & 1980 & N/A & 11 \\
EBSCO & 13590 & 1328 & 28 \\
BBC Monitoring service on Nexis & 976 & 641 & 0 \\
Google Scholar & N/A & N/A & N/A \\
Scirus & 208 & N/A & 16 \\
Refseek & 1500 & N/A & 18 \\
OAISTER & 7096 & 259 & 2 \\
Worldcat & N/A & N/A & N/A \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Table 2}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{33} Appendix A.
The process of choosing key search terms and attendant synonyms relied on the team’s combined knowledge of the field and interpretation of the primary research question. As the group mostly consisted of researchers from the disciplinary backgrounds of political science and development, our choice of terms may have been limited. For instance, the terminology in disciplines such as anthropology, gender studies, and the practitioner community might not have been natural choices for the group. This potential bias came to light once the results of the subsequent peer review revealed an emphasis on historical, sociological, and ethnographical studies, which were all sorely lacking in the database search (see Appendices). Furthermore, the team’s attempt at including gender sensitive terms from the outset may have resulted in a disproportionate amount of studies examining women affected by conflict; in effect an over compensation due to an implicit bias in our method (Abdullah & Fofana-Ibrahim 2010; Abdullah et al.2010).

Furthermore, in choosing synonyms we also had to consider the trade-off between analytical depth and common usage as we were restrained by the number of terms a search engine could accommodate in one query string. In practice the eventual number of terms used, decided upon with consultation with LSE library staff, was too high for many of the databases. Individual researchers were forced to experiment with search strings on an intuitive basis. During this process the sensitivity of different search engines to changes in the terms and syntax was immediately noted as minor changes provoked considerable variations in a number of results. For instance some databases allowed the use of shortcuts such as Securi* or fragile* to capture all possible variations of the word and phrase, while others did not—forcing a subjective choice between which terms to use. This vastly complicated the systemisation of the search.

Some of the databases simply proved to be inadequate for our purposes. For example, one researcher reported that IBSS prevented remote access, and there was a consortium-wide software fault preventing our use of SCOPUS. Many of the databases also had difficultly narrowing down the search results by our preferred methods. In one case, the final selection of articles was filtered from 75,000 initial hits to 1,500 using the two non-term based narrowing methods described above. This researcher eventually reviewed the first five hundred articles abstracts as the database could not accommodate the extra terms needed to also narrow by countries. Beyond even narrowing, it was discovered that databases potentially enabling us to identify relevant ‘grey literature’ or books and monographs, such as Worldcat and Google Scholar covered too many mediums for a set of empirically driven articles to be produced. Furthermore, upon referring papers to the selection criteria it was noted that some researchers were more able to identify the use of certain methodologies than others. This largely depended on their own disciplinary background, with qualitative methods easier to spot for researchers used to its own methodological ‘signs’.

It was felt that if the searches were to be performed again, terms might have to be significantly revised or limited to narrower criteria – though this would also risk limiting the searches so narrowly that they would not address our research question. Also researchers might benefit from more training in identifying methodological rigour and the deployment of uncommon methods within studies.
The grading exercise was a little more systematic. However it was immediately noted that variations in the ability and commitment of individual researchers meant that the exercise could not be evenly carried out across the team: one team member did roughly 60% of the grading exercise. In practice there may been biases towards qualitative work. Notably roughly six times as many qualitative articles emerged from the database search as quantitative studies. This may, however, have reflected the fact that many of the existing quantitative studies are macro-level and simply do not tap into the experience of end-users emphasised in our approach. Likewise the concept of hybrid political orders is relatively new and seemingly not well reflected in standard governance indicators.

Nevertheless, papers coded as quantitative with new data gathered had statistically significantly higher scores than other categories of papers. Interestingly, controlling for grader identity, amount and type of empirical information, papers found through the database searches scored significantly lower than those found through the peer searches. The effect is about 0.35 - although this difference disappears when not controlling for both grader identity and quantity of empirical information. At the same time we can reject the null-hypothesis that there is no difference in scores between the coders and conclude that coder identity does matter for the grade given.

The grading exercise also proved difficult when authors were ambiguous about their methodology or the nature of their sources.\(^{34}\) In many cases it was not even clear if authors drew on primary or secondary sources. For example, in many of the studies reviewed researchers in our team reported that often neither the interviewee groups were identified, nor the timeframe of the research conducted. Furthermore, much of the literature comprised useful theoretical discussions or reviews of existing bodies of work - yet it received low grades as it contained little original empirical evidence.\(^{35}\) These considerations all point to the problem of what is considered to count as evidence. Even with a fairly rigorous selection criteria, individual researchers’ subjectivity plays into the grading exercise and final scores.

**Phase Two: The Peer-led Searches**

The peer led search phase closely resembles what academics may traditionally do when confronted with a new project; consult within their social circle and review the work of prominent authors in the field. It is recognised that much of the success of this stage can be attributed to the social capital of the Security team leader, Robin Luckham, who contacted participants personally and also drew on the networks of the Global Consortium for Security Transformation, especially to identify Southern respondents. It is also noted that subjectivity played a part in the selection of participants and that the same disciplinary biases were at play when researchers recommended authors to add to the bibliographies.

**Phase Three: Group-led Area Studies**

It is noted that the commissioning of short case studies represents the least systematic phase of literature review. Furthermore, the diverse backgrounds of the authors, from post-graduate students to established academics and practitioners, meant that the knowledge called upon in each study

\(^{34}\) Baker (2010) provides a good example of an authoritative voice with many case studies, but he leaves considerable ambiguity of his selection of interviewees or methodological rigour.

\(^{35}\) Worth highlighting is Colletta & Muggah (2009) which provide a useful typology of emerging innovative and experimental security promotion activities based on ‘original evidence’. Hagmann & Peclard (2010) introduce a social journal edition on ‘negotiated statehood’ and outline a holistic framework for empirically investigating the dynamic processes and multiple social actors involved in state formation and the ‘institutionalisation of power relations’. Stern & Ojendal (2011) argue that there is a need for more creative methodologies in the study of the security and development nexus. They suggest that a departure from the predominant standard of reviewing policy and estimating impacts is required. Other interesting, yet empirically weak, articles include Nordstrom (2002), Boege et al. (2009), and Oreljeula (2003).
differed considerably. Despite this, the exercise suggested that engaging with the research question directly rather than in a systematic and more theoretical way is a useful process. Such an approach most closely approximates academia’s traditional mode of evidence gathering. It allows researchers to think about the issues and concepts deployed in the research question in relation to contexts they are familiar with. This was viewed as vital to team’s research aim of moving beyond the mainstream discourse on security arrangements.
Appendix F: JSRP Evidence Grading Template

**EVIDENCE PAPERS GRADING FORM**

Full citation: 

Initials grader: 

1. Please assess the amount of evidence the work contains (enter a '1' to select):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Roughly how much of the work being assessed presents empirical data/information—rather than theory, hypotheses, review of other literature etc.?</th>
<th>50% or more</th>
<th>between 10% and 50%</th>
<th>10% or less</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

2. Please select main category/ies of empirical data/information the work uses (enter a '1' to select):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Quantitative, using existing dataset</th>
<th>B. Quantitative, gathering own data</th>
<th>C. Qualitative, interview based</th>
<th>D. Qualitative, ethnographic / participatory observation</th>
<th>E. Other primary sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3. Please answer the following questions, for selected category/ies only:

A. Quantitative, using existing dataset (enter a '1' to select)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators used accurately capture the phenomenon the author aims to draw conclusions about (proxies are appropriate, measures are sensitive to changes on the ground).</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The process of compiling the data is transparent: the author provides the source of his data and describes how data is collected by a third party.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential biases in the data are acknowledged: data not missing at random, limited number of observations, measurement error, etc.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The paper has a sound identification strategy: the author shows that the observed relationship indicates a causal relationship and that it is not due to reversed causality, non-random allocation of 'treatment', intervening third (omitted) variables, etc. The author acknowledges limitations and provides robustness checks.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions are supported by the data. Limitations to the internal validity (do conclusions apply to case(s) investigated?) and external validity (do conclusions apply to cases other than those studied?) are discussed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### B. Quantitative, compiling own dataset (enter a '1' to select)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Method of data collection is transparent and clear.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data collected is representative of the wider population the research question implies: participants are selected in some systematic way. Nonresponse is limited.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential biases in the data are limited/acknowledged: interviewer bias (respondent influenced by characteristics of interviewer), strategic bias (respondent provides inaccurate answers with some personal gain in mind), recall bias.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The paper has a sound identification strategy: the author shows that the observed relationship indicates a causal relationship and that it is not due to reversed causality, non-random allocation of 'treatment', intervening third (omitted) variables, etc. The author acknowledges limitations and provides robustness checks.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions are supported by the data. Limitations to the internal validity (do conclusions apply to case(s) investigated?) and external validity (do conclusions apply to cases other than those studied?) are discussed.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### C. Qualitative, interview based (enter a '1' to select)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information collected is adequately representative of the population / group the research aims to draw conclusions about</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The method of interviewing is clear, including the time frame of interviews, number of interviewees.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential interview biases are limited/acknowledged: interviewer bias (respondent influenced by characteristics of interviewer), strategic bias (respondent provides inaccurate answers with some personal gain in mind), recall bias.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions drawn are supported by the interviews; findings show that a substantial share of the interviews supports the conclusion(s).</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The analysis is contextualized in a broader literature / history. Generalizability of the conclusion(s) is considered.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### D. Qualitative, ethnographic / participatory observation (enter a '1' to select)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information collected is adequately representative of the population / group the research aims to draw conclusions about.</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential biases in the collection of information are limited. Efforts to triangulate information are made.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information is richly textured; nuanced and detailed information about local level experiences is included. Information is not limited to a handful of quotes.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions drawn are supported by the observations made. Findings show that a substantial share of observations supports the conclusion(s).</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The analysis is contextualized in a broader literature / history. The broader relevance of the conclusion is considered.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### E. Other primary sources (i.e. archives, government documents, reports, photographs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information collected is adequately representative of the population / group the research aims to draw conclusions about.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential biases in the collection of information are limited. Efforts to triangulate information are made.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method of data collection is transparent and clear.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions drawn are supported by the information collected. Findings show that a substantial share of information collected supports the conclusion(s).</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The analysis is contextualized in a broader literature / history. The broader relevance of the conclusion is considered.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL SCORE QUALITY DATA / INFO**

**TOTAL SCORE QUALITY ANALYSIS**

**TOTAL SCORE**

**TOTAL SCORE MENDELEY**

### 4. Please assess the overall quality of the work (enter a '1' to select)

#### 4.1 In comparison to other literature you have reviewed, how insightful do you consider this work to be in terms of data/information?

| No significant new data/information presented |       |
| Some new data/information presented |       |
| A considerable amount of new data/information presented |       |

#### 4.2 In comparison to other literature you have reviewed, how insightful do you consider this work to be?

<p>| No significant new analysis or theoretical insight. |       |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>in terms of analysis presented?</th>
<th>Some new analysis or theoretical insight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A considerable amount of insightful analysis or theoretical insight</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Please give a 1-3 line summary of the main argument of the work and a 1-3 line annotation (assessment of the quality of the work)

Completeness check: Please answer question 1
Appendix G: Thematic Chart Representing Peer and Database Searches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content / Theme / Actor</th>
<th>Tally</th>
<th>Good References Database</th>
<th>Good References Peer</th>
<th>Additional Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health standards</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health literacy</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International human rights</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other vulnerable groups</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders and justice institutions</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combatants including child soldiers and women</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political and social elites</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military, police and security</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state armed actors</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International and regional organisations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External intervention forces and peacekeepers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES ON TABLE:**

The "Good References" are those with scores of 3 or above. Field and search area also have good context in regard to the purpose of this paper. The "Non-applicable References" are those that do not apply to any of the contexts. In the event a work strongly argued more than one context, more than one context was labeled. Theoretically oriented and literature reviews were not labeled within different contexts, theories, or actors since there was no grade. If the theoretical literature reviews were strongly and applicable to no purpose, they were placed in the "Non-applicable" section. All works which received any score above zero were tallied in the total amounts for Peer and Database Searches. The following categories were removed due to zero results in other search: "Subalternizing of Security Functions to Non-state armed Actors" and "Internalization."
The Justice and Security Research Programme is an international consortium of research partners, undertaking work on end-user experiences of justice and security in conflict-affected areas. The London School of Economics and Political Science is the lead organisation and is working in partnership with:

- African Security Sector Network (Ethiopia)
- Conflict Research Group, University of Gent (Belgium)
- Social Science Research Council (USA)
- South East European Research Network (Macedonia)
- Video Journalism Movement (Netherlands)
- World Peace Foundation, Tufts University (USA)

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Tel: +44 (0)20 7849 4631