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An Inquiry into the Use of Illegal Electoral Practices and Effects of Political Violence*

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Abstract

This article investigates whether vote-buying and the instigation of violence in the disputed 2007 Kenyan elections were strategically motivated, and whether those affected by electoral violence changed their views towards ethno-politics and the use of violence. To answer these questions, a panel survey conducted before and after the elections is combined with external indicators of electoral violence. We find that political parties targeted vote-buying towards specific groups to weaken the support of their political rivals and to mobilize their own supporters. Furthermore, parties instigated violence strategically in areas where they were less likely to win. Although the victims of violence would prefer that parties are no longer allowed to organize in ethnic or religious lines, they are more likely to identify in ethnic terms, support the use of violence and avoid relying on the police to resolve disputes. The overall findings suggest an increased risk of electoral-violence reoccurring.

Keywords: Political competition; electoral violence; vote-buying; election fraud; ethnic identity; Kenya

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1. Introduction

Despite the advances in the protection of human rights and progress in the introduction of political-competition, a number of recent elections in Africa have been illegitimate and violent. This has called into question whether democracy is in retreat in the continent and how competitive electoral processes can be made to work in countries deeply divided by ethnic allegiances (Collier, Gutiérrez-Romero and Kimenyi 2010; Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Lynch and Crawford 2011; Souaré 2008). The debate is particularly pertinent as ethnic allegiances and conflicts have tended to strengthen at election times (Eifert, Miguel and Posner 2010), with political parties relying on illegal electioneering strategies, which the generally weak electoral commissions and judiciary system have done little to prevent (Bratton 2008; Collier and Vicente 2008). Thousands of people have died as a result of electoral violence, putting into jeopardy the democratic and modest economic progress that some African countries have recently enjoyed (Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero 2012; Fisher 2002; Ksoll, Macchiavello and Morjaria 2009). To assess this issue it is crucial to analyze when political parties are more likely to resort to illegal practices, and their consequences on the future of democracy in the continent.

In this paper, we undertake a micro-level analysis of Kenya, in order to shed light on a macro-level phenomenon: electoral violence. The objectives of this paper are threefold. First, to analyze whether political parties in Kenya employed illegal electioneering practices strategically before and after the 2007 General Elections. Second, to investigate whether the post-electoral violence that erupted once the Presidential results were announced affected people's ethnic identity, their support for democracy and the acceptability for the use of violence. Third, to link the micro-level findings with a deeper understanding of these issues at the general level, which should in turn feed into the debate on how the electoral process in Africa could be improved.

To explore these research questions two surveys were conducted, one just two weeks before the 2007 elections and a second one in the summer of 2008 re-interviewing the previous respondents. Since the self-reported incidences of violence captured in the surveys might provide a partial picture of the incidence of violence at local level, external data sources are used to measure the death toll and number of injured people. These indicators were obtained from the Commission in Kenya in charge of investigating the 2008 post-electoral conflict (CIPEV) and were also estimated independently by monitoring the Kenyan media outlets (newspapers, radio and TV stations) on a daily basis over the period December 2007- March 2008. By triangulating the panel survey to these external data sources a comprehensive picture of the micro-dynamics of the post-electoral violence was built, allowing us to assess the consequences of the violence at the personal and small-area (district) levels.

Recent literature has described the extent to which Kenyans were affected by the post-electoral violence in terms of personal injury, property damage, economic loss, displacement and death toll (Anderson and Lochery 2008; CIPEV 2008; Human Rights Watch 2008; Ksoll, Macchiavello and Morjaria 2009; Yamano, Tanaka and Gitau 2010). Previous studies have also analyzed the profile of the victims of violence, and identified that those living in areas where gangs operated, with alleged links to political parties, had a higher risk of experiencing post-electoral violence (CIPEV 2008; Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero 2012). This article aims to contribute to this literature by identifying whether the operation of these gangs and the instigation of violence by political actors both before and after the elections was strategic. The article also aims to go beyond previous studies by assessing to what extent having experienced violence at the personal or district level has affected the stance of people on key issues such as the role of ethno-politics. Since one cannot observe what would have happened to the opinions of those affected by violence if the violence had not happened, the impact of post-electoral violence is assessed using a difference-in-difference estimator. This method allows the build up of a counterfactual, where the change of opinions among those affected by violence is compared to those individuals not affected by violence.

The article finds that both the Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), the two leading political parties contending in the 2007 Kenyan presidential elections, used vote-buying practices extensively. Both targeted the less contested areas and potential swing or moderate voters with the aim of weakening the support for their main political rival. Political parties also instigated violence strategically, but avoided making direct threats. Instead, political actors focused on instigating people to be violent, particularly in the more contested areas. Similarly, organized gangs were found to be operating strategically in closely contested areas, both before and after the elections.

The electoral ordeal reduced the desire of the general population for holding elections. Paradoxically, those who were not affected by the post-electoral violence are less likely to prefer holding elections than those who were personally affected by the violence. Those affected by the post-electoral violence at personal level seem to be trapped in a vicious circle. After the elections they are more likely to prefer that parties are no longer allowed to form on ethnic or religious lines, but their ethnic identity was strengthened and continues to be as important as before the elections in deciding which parties they most like or dislike. Furthermore, those who were affected by violence at personal level are more likely to support the use violence in order to solve conflicts, in line with international evidence that violence breeds violence (Balcells 2010; Fisher 2002).

The analysis is focused on Kenya for two reasons. First, Kenya was perceived internationally as having reached democratic stability. This perception changed suddenly as the country moved overnight to the brink of civil war after the 2007 Presidential electoral results were announced, leaving over one thousand people dead in just a couple of months and over a quarter of million people displaced from their homes (CIPEV 2008). Second, Kenya, like many other African countries, is

ethnically diverse, a characteristic that makes it particularly vulnerable to violent conflict. Although previous studies have found that economic indicators, such as a fall in GDP, are more important determinants of civil conflict than ethnic diversity (Collier and Rohner 2008), Kenya actually experienced its highest rates of economic growth ahead of the disputed election. Hence, the Kenyan case provides an example where weak electoral institutions and parties seeking political profit at the expense of instigating ethnic divisions can overturn democratic progress and lead to conflict, even in a phase of economic prosperity.

The paper continues as follows. Next section provides a brief overview of the institutional failures that led to the post-electoral violence. Section 3 describes the data sources used, as well as the instances in which political parties instigated violence and vote-buying. In section 4 we assess econometrically whether parties behaved strategically and the effects of being a victim of post-electoral violence. The last section presents the conclusions.

2. The Build up Towards Post-Electoral Violence

Kenya was once seen as beacon of peace, having transferred power peacefully from the long-ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) and Daniel arap Moi to Mwai Kibaki and the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) in the elections of 2002. The optimism from this step towards democratic consolidation was nonetheless short lived. In the subsequent General Elections of December 27, 2007 the political campaign appeared to be competitive, peaceful and Kenyans turned up to vote in large numbers (Gibson and Long 2009). Opinion polls ahead of the elections revealed that Kibaki's performance evaluations were high among the general population and his policies were thought to have improved well-being, compared to those of his predecessor (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008). However, ethnicity, just like in the violent elections of the 1990s, turned out to be the main factor influencing the electoral behavior of citizens and politicians. The three main presidential candidates were overwhelmingly supported by people from their own ethnic groups: incumbent president Mwai Kibaki by the Kikuyus, Raila Odinga by the Luos and Kalonzo Muzyoka by the Kambas. Other ethnic groups that did not have a presidential candidate contending in the election also divided their support (see table 3).

Political parties relied on narrow sectarian agendas and conducted their campaigns in a confrontational manner, exploiting ethnic divisions (CIPEV 2008, p. 347-348). Several communities reported the activities of organized gangs ahead of the election, and to have received hate campaigns via leaflets and SMS inciting ethnic violence (Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero 2012). Despite the heated political campaigning, only a few incidences of pre-electoral violence were reported (41), and concentrated in the Molo district which tends to experience land disputes particularly during elections.

Unprecedented levels of ethnic and political violence erupted shortly after the Election Day, once the electoral results were announced. The incumbent President Kibaki was declared the winner of the election with 51.3 percent of the votes compared to 48.7 percent for Odinga. The manipulation of

the Kenyan presidential election results allegedly by the two main political parties contending ignited the violence, similarly to what Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Cameroon have recently experienced (Lynch and Crawford 2011). However, the electoral irregularities with the tallying of the votes were not the sole cause of the post-electoral violence.

Several institutions failed and wrong political choices were made long before the elections, which contributed to the political crisis and explain why the post-electoral violence spread so quickly and broadly (five out of the eight provinces). In contrast to the 2002 peaceful elections, political parties in 2007 were splintered along ethnic lines like in the first two troubled multi-party elections of 1992 and 1997. Kibaki's administration received criticisms that little efforts were made to tackle ethno-politics, solve land disputed and disarm the organized political-gangs which emerged with the introduction of multi-party politics in Kenya (CIPEV 2008). Armed gangs (such as *Mungiki*, *Taliban*, *Chinkororo*, *Kamjeshi*, *Baghdad Boys*) continued to operate even though legally prohibited (CIPEV 2008, p.27). Despite the evidence gathered including the names of politicians involved with these organized gangs, no perpetrator has been punished leading to a culture of impunity and State condoned violence. It is estimated that during the period 1991-2001 alone 4,000 people were killed as a result of state-condoned violence (Kagwanja 2003).

Another key element that triggered the political crisis was that after early counts of the votes indicated that Odinga would win, the Electoral Commission, declared Kibaki the winner of the election and swore him immediately into office amid allegations of irregularities. A few days later, the Chairman of the Electoral Commission admitted that he had suffered immense pressure to announce the results despite not being sure who had won the elections. This was one of the multiple failures of the Electoral Commission and security forces, which fell short of preventing the instigation of violence by political actors and the widespread practices of vote-buying and intimidation.

A coalition government was agreed on February 28, 2008 after weeks of blood shed. Kibaki was to remain the elected President, while Muzyoka would become the Vice-President and Odinga the Prime Minister. Although the Kenyan coalition government has scored a major victory by reforming the constitution in 2010, the Kenyan judiciary system has failed up to-date to put on trial the alleged perpetrators of the post-electoral violence. Instead, it is the International Crime Court (ICC) that has decided to prosecute some of alleged perpetrators of violence, including a number of high-profile politicians for crimes against humanity (BBC 2011).

Despite gradually bringing perpetrators of violence to justice, the underlying behavior of political parties in terms of strategic vote-buying, violence instigation and their alleged links to organized gangs are to be fully understood.

3. Illegal Electoral Practices: Panel Data and External Sources

To assess the scope of electoral irregularities and the effects of post-electoral violence two nationally representative surveys are used, one conducted two weeks before the 2007 General Elections and a second one that revisited the previous respondents in August 2008. The pre-electoral survey is based

on a nationally and regionally representative sample of 1,207 individuals drawn from 77 out of 210 constituencies in Kenya with a margin of sampling error of +/-3 percent at a 95 percent confidence level. The sample captures the rural/urban split and its ethnic distribution is consistent with the most recent Kenyan census. The post-electoral survey re-interviewed 54.2 percent of previous respondents. In order to make meaningful comparisons between the two surveys, the respondents from the pre-electoral survey that could not be re-interviewed were replaced by new respondents with the same overall characteristics.¹ The main characteristics of the respondents are shown in the Appendix in Table (A.1).

At the time of the pre-electoral survey, most respondents claimed they were registered voters and that planned to vote in the Presidential election (93%). The responses to the question “*If elections were held tomorrow, which party’s candidate would you vote for as national President?*” showed that 40.1 percent of respondents intended to vote for Kibaki, 46.7 percent for Odinga and 8.4 percent for Muzyoka. These predictions (shown in Figure 1 as the poll reported on 12 December) coincide with the voting projections made by the majority of other opinion polls and by a major exit poll conducted by the University of California, San Diego on December 27, 2007.

The majority of the pre-electoral survey respondents expected that the elections would be free and fair. Table (1) shows the responses to the following question: “*How free and fair do you expect the next elections of December 2007 to be?*” Only a small group expected that the elections would not be free and fair in terms of the vote-count (6.35%), which turned to be one of the major issues marring the elections. Both the ODM and PNU were accused of stuffing ballots in their hotspots. According to the ECK results, the provinces of Central, Nyanza and the Rift Valley had a higher turnout out than the national average. However, given that these provinces had a lot to lose if their preferred candidate were not elected, this could explain to some extent the higher than average turnout. Although there are also some differences between the survey’s intention to vote and the ECK results at provincial level (Table 2), it is also hard to deduct from these comparisons whether there was any rigging and the extent of it.

Electoral Irregularities

Regardless of whether there was actually any issue with the tallying of the votes, perhaps a more important aspect is whether voters actually thought the election had been rigged. To assess this issue, the post-electoral survey asked: “*Which presidential candidate do you think legitimately won the presidential election of 2007?*”. As shown in Table (3) the majority of the respondents (61.3%) believed that Odinga won the election legitimately, while only 25 percent thought it was Kibaki and less than 0.1 percent believed it was Muzyoka. A further 13.5 percent of respondents was not sure which candidate had legitimately won the election.

Rigging was not the only irregularity surrounding the election. Table (4) shows that vote-buying was widely spread before the elections, with 27 percent of respondents answering positively to:

“During the present campaign for the 2007 elections, did a candidate or someone from a political party offer you something, like food or a gift, in return for your vote?”. Vote-buying was higher among the ethnic groups who without a presidential candidate contending in the elections such as the Luhya, Kisis and Meru. The widespread vote-buying practices were also captured by other studies conducted in Kenya during the 2007 campaign (Kramon 2011). In particular, the Coalition for Accountable Political Finance estimates that the parliamentary candidates spent 40 percent of their budget on vote-buying (CAPF 2008).

Direct threats from political parties were less common, with 9 percent of respondents answered positively to: *“During the present campaign for the December 2007 elections, has anyone threatened negative consequences to you in order to get you to vote a certain way?”* The reported incidence of direct threats from political parties was slightly higher among the Luos (10.8%) and Luhyas (14.7%).

Threatening and vote-buying are not cheap activities, so it is not surprising that the ODM and the PNU, the parties with the biggest budgets, were the ones that appeared the most active. Specifically, among the respondents who reported having received an offer for their vote 46 percent reported the ODM and 58 percent the PNU as having made the offer. Among the respondents that reported to have been threatened by a specific party 33 percent reported the ODM and 26 percent reported the PNU.

In terms of other electoral irregularities, close to 30 percent of respondents claimed that before the elections *“Political representatives had been openly advocating violence in our community”*, and this figure practically remained unchanged after the elections. Nearly 23 percent of respondents before the elections answered positively to: *“Have you heard about violent groups such as gangs or youths connected with politics being active in your neighborhood”*. This figure increased to 31 percent after the elections. *Mungiki* was the gang mentioned by far the most frequently, (a gang presumably associated to the PNU party) with 10.85 percent of all respondents specifically mentioning this gang operating in their communities either before or after the elections.

To assess whether the survey respondents were affected by the outbreaks of post-electoral violence the following was asked: *“Were you personally affected in the outbreaks of violence after 2007 in any of the following ways?”* Approximately 20 percent of respondents reported a specific personal impact after the elections, in terms of personal injury, being displaced from home, destruction of property, loss of jobs or earnings. The number of affected respondents goes up to 29 percent when considering whether the respondent had *“a close friend or relative who died because of the electoral violence of the 2007 general elections”*.

The Luos and Kikuyos, who were clearly supporting the two leading presidential candidates, were among the most affected by the post-electoral violence. But, other ethnic groups without a candidate of their own ethnicity contending in the elections also suffered from violence such as the of Luhya, Kisi, Kalenjin and Mijikenda.

Incidence of Violence according to CIPEV and the Media

An independent commission created to investigate the 2008 Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) estimated that 1,133 people died as a direct result of the post-electoral violence. These figures were estimated from reports of health institutions, police records and witnesses who testified to the Commission (CIPEV 2008).

To independently verify the incidence of the death toll and the incidences of violence at small area level, the 12 of the major media outlets in Kenya were monitored on a *24 hour* and *daily basis* from December 1, 2007 until March 31, 2008. The monitored media included two of the major Kenyan newspapers, five Kenyan radio stations and four Kenyan TV stations and reports.² Although it is not possible to ascertain that the events reported in the media are indeed accurate and comprehensive, the estimated death toll from the post-electoral violence based on the media outlets monitored (1,128) is close to the official death toll of the post-electoral violence (1,113) at aggregate level, and also at the provincial and district levels. The incidence of violence was concentrated predominantly in the Rift Valley, Nyanza and Nairobi, as shown in Table (5).

Figure (2) shows the number of daily casualties during the period in question captured through monitoring of the media that was directly related to electoral violence. The first spike of post-electoral violence corresponds to the violent incidents that erupted, immediately after the announcement of the electoral results. The variation in local support drove the spatial distribution of violence, the revenge killings by both parties' supporters, the excessive police force used. The opposition party relied on riots and street protests since channeling their complain through formal legislatures seemed in vain, as observed in other political disputes (Machado, Scartascini and Tommasi 2011; Wilkinson 2004). The number of politically related riots increased from 31 during the pre-election period to 111 after the elections (Table 6).

According to the ICC the violence in the Rift Valley was strategically planned to attack supporters of President Kibaki after the election. In particular, the Kikuyus were chased out of the province as a revenge to the president for the irregularities in the election, and also because some took the opportunity to 'clean' their province from non-natives that moved there decades before through the government's land schemes. In retaliation, organized gangs like *Mungiki* and the police were given authorization to use excessive force to attack ODM supporters, which brought the second major spike of violence between 25 and 30 of January. Violence ceased soon after the power sharing agreement was reached on February 28.

The violence observed suggests that although some of it erupted spontaneously as a result of the belief that the election had been rigged, but there were also premeditated attacks, involving politicians, businessmen and others who enlisted criminal gangs even before the actual election (CIPEV 2008). Thus, it is important to assess whether political actors instigated or orchestrated the violence strategically, targeting specific areas and voters.

4. Political Party's Strategic Behavior and the Effects of Violence

This section assesses two key features of the disputed elections. First, it analyses whether political actors used illegal electoral practices strategically, such as vote-buying, violence instigation, and rigging. Then the section explores the consequences of post-electoral violence on Kenyan's attitudes towards democracy, ethnic identity and the use of violence.

According to the literature, political parties wishing to maximize their profit may choose to employ illegal electoral strategies to advance their interests taking into account their budget constraints, the strength of electoral institutions, and carefully plan whether to rely on (ethnic) mobilization or combine it with vote-buying, violence-instigation, and ultimately rigging the elections (Chaturverdi 2005; Collier and Vicente 2012; Ghandi and Preworksi 2009; Robinson and Torvik 2009; Synder 2000; Wilkinson 2004). There is however no theoretical consensus on the extent to which political parties relying on ethnic affiliations, like in the Kenya, will focus their courting efforts towards their supporters. For instance, Cox and McCubbins (1986) develop a theoretical model predicting that parties with a strong attachment to a particular group, an ethnic one for instance, will devote resources exclusively towards their supporters and not to swing voters. According to this model, trying to lure swing voters is a risky strategy since parties cannot be sure whether their offers will be effective. An alternative explanation for parties targeting their strongholds is given by Nitcher (2008) who finds that parties seeking to increase their turnout will seek to mobilize their own supporters, as what he defines 'turnout-buying'. In contrast, other theoretical models developed by Dixit and Londregan (1996) and Stokes (2005) suggest it is not an optimal strategy to devote resources exclusively to groups whose votes are already guaranteed. Instead, these models predict that political parties will target vote-buying towards 'moderate voters' who are relatively indifferent between the contending candidates, thus having a higher chance of being influenced.

In Kenya is possible that political parties might have devoted resources towards swing or moderate voters given that to win the presidential election, 25 percent of the vote must be secured in five out of the eight provinces. Otherwise, the election would have to go for a second round between the top two front runners. Nonetheless, parties might have had incentives to also devote resources to their hotspots given how closely contested the presidential election was, which makes the outcome more likely to depend on the actual turnout that each of the candidates would have. Thus, using the definition of Nitcher (2008) parties might have combined 'vote-buying' strategies towards swing areas and also 'turnout-buying' in their own strongholds. The ODM in particular, could have been more likely to use turnout-buying, as the Luo supporters who concentrate in the Nyanza province have had a lower turnout in all the previous multi-party elections than the national average. In contrast, the Central province, where the majority of the PNU supporters concentrate, has had a higher turnout in all the previous multi-party elections than the national average.

With regards to the instigation of violence, Collier and Vicente (2012) develop a model distinguishing between vote-buying, rigging, and intimidation tactics. The model assumes that swing voters can be effectively persuaded not to vote if presented with violence. Their model predicts that in areas where the incumbent party has electoral support, the party will prefer to use bribery or ballot fraud. However, the chances of political parties (incumbent or opposition) relying on violence increases in areas where they have less electoral support, where the targets of intimidation will be swing voters, as predicted also by the theoretical model of Robinson and Torvik (2009). Instigation of violence is then used as a strategy of ‘damage control’, where the political parties expect to deter people from voting for their rivals and since the core-supporters might not be persuaded not to vote, the intimidation efforts are targeted towards the swing voters. According to a report written by the European Union electoral observers about the Kenyan elections, there was wide-spread ballot stuffing and defective data collation, transmission and problems with the tallying of the votes. Moreover, as the model by Collier and Vicente (2012) predicts, the EU observers reported the presidential turnout figures in Kibaki's strongholds to be suspiciously high, and mysteriously higher than the observed turnout of the MP elections held on the same day. However, the same problem was found in Odinga’s strongholds (Rice 2008). Throup (2008) analyzing the irregularities of the electoral results reaches the conclusion that the ODM may be as guilty as the PNU party in the ballot stuffing. In anticipation that the election was going to be close, both parties probably resorted to the stuffing of ballots as a precautionary measure, and they would have found it easier in their own hotspots where they would face less resistance from local people and they could also simply inflate the turnout of their ethnic-supporters.

Since all the major parties contending in the Kenyan presidential election were recently created, they don’t have previous electoral results to gauge the local area’s political loyalties. Nonetheless, all the opinion polls conducted ahead of the election showed that the electorate was clearly divided on ethnic terms. Hence, it would have been a relatively easy task for parties to identify which areas they were more likely to win, and within each area who the potential voters were that could be targeted for either vote-buying or intimidating. Based on the existing theories, the following four hypotheses will be tested.

Hypothesis 1: The ODM and PNU are more likely to devote resources to ‘turnout-buying’ in their own hotspots as a strategy to mobilize their own supporters.

Hypothesis 2: The ODM and PNU devoted resources to ‘vote-buying’ targeted people perceived to be ‘swing or moderate’ voters and areas with less closely contested elections.

Hypothesis 3: Political actors were more likely to instigate violence in areas with more closely contested elections, targeting particularly the ‘swing or moderate’ voters.

Hypothesis 4: The hotspots of the PNU and ODM parties were more likely to have wider differences in turnouts in the presidential and MP elections than other areas.

Strategic Behavior of Political Parties

To analyze whether there was any strategic use of illegal electoral practices a series of probit models are estimated, based on equation (1). The dependent variable is whether the respondent reported to have suffered from an illegal electoral practice. The independent variables used are the respondent's ethnic origin and wealth (X_{ic}) and the political characteristics of the constituency c where the respondent i was living in 2007 (POL_{ic}).

$$Pr(\text{suffered illegal electoral practice}=1)=\phi(X_{ic}\beta+POL_{ic}\delta) \quad \text{eq.(1)}$$

The marginal effects of the probit models are reported in Table (7). In column (1) of this Table, the dependent variable is whether the respondents received an offer for their vote directly from the PNU party ahead of the election. In column (2) the dependent variable is whether the offer came from the ODM party. The focus is exclusively on these two parties because they accounted for 83 percent of all the vote-buying offers that the respondents reported during the 2007 campaign.

Respondents in PNU and ODM hotspots had the same probability of having received an offer for their votes from either party. Thus, hypothesis 1 is supported. Since the PNU, the ODM and the ODM-K were newly created parties for the 2007 elections, it is not possible to assess from previous electoral results in which areas these parties had more influence. So the parties' hotspots were identified based on the ethnic composition of the constituency. For instance, the ethnic hotspots of the ODM are defined as those constituencies where the majority of the population is of Luo, Luhya or Kalenjin origin, groups which overwhelmingly supported this party. The ethnic hotspots of the PNU are the constituencies where the majority of people are Kikuyos and Merus, and the ethnic hotspots of the ODM-K are where the people are predominantly Kambas.

However, neither of the two parties focused their vote-buying exclusively on their respective hotspots. Supporting hypothesis 2, the PNU used vote-buying in constituencies which had less closely contested presidential elections, regardless of which presidential candidate was in the lead. In contrast the ODM focused its vote-buying in the less contested areas, but only where the ODM had the advantage in voter's preference over the PNU. The degree of competitiveness was estimated as the raw difference in the share of the intention to vote between the first and second most preferred presidential candidate based on how the respondents claimed they would vote in the elections. The differences in vote-buying could also suggest that the PNU targeted less closely contested areas to convey to these areas that the party would offer patronage goods in the future, regardless of their voter's preferences. In contrast, the ODM could have targeted areas where they had less competition

to strengthen the signal that it would channel patronage resources to its supporters if the party was elected.

Both parties targeted specific ethnic groups within each area, which could be perceived as swing or moderate voters, supporting hypothesis 2 as well. The PNU targeted the Kissis, which had a relatively lower support for the ODM (64.9%).³ The ODM targeted the Merus, which was one of the main supporters of the PNU party. Since there was no Meru nominee running for the Presidency or Vice-Presidency in the PNU, perhaps they could have been more easily persuaded to switch their alliance than the Kikuyos. Although the ODM rarely targeted Kikuyos for vote-buying, the Kalenjin and Mijikenda were even less likely to be targeted for vote-buying than the Kikuyos.

A key difference in the vote-buying strategies of the two parties was the type of voter targeted. One could argue that poorer voters could have been perceived as potential ‘swing or moderate voters’ if presented with gifts or signals of future patronage that they would value more than wealthier voters. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that the ODM targeted the wealthier respondents, perhaps thinking that their manifesto had already earned the support of the poor, whereas the PNU did not discriminate voters by wealth.⁴ This suggests that although the ODM focused on areas where it already had an advantage in the preference of the voters, the type of individuals targeted were those which were perceived to need further convincing to move away from the PNU, whose presidential candidate, Kibaki, was known to have done little to re-distribute wealth from the rich to the poor.

We find plenty evidence to support hypothesis 3. For instance, both the PNU and the ODM seem to have chosen strategically the areas and people to threaten (Columns 3 and 4), although they threaten a relatively few people (60 in our sample). Both parties focused their threats in closely contested areas and where they had an advantage over their rival, but they were less likely to threaten members of their own ethnic group. For instance, the ODM was less likely to target the Luo, Luhya, Kissi and Kalenjin than the Kikuyu. The PNU was less likely to threaten the Kissis, which was the group the PNU was trying to lure via vote-buying. Another distinctive feature was that the PNU was also more likely to threaten in the ethnic hotspot of the ODM than in their own hotspot.

The instigation of violence by political actors was one of the most commonly reported illegal activities, both before and after the elections. Column (5) shows the probability of the respondent having reported that politicians instigated violence in their community before the elections, whilst column (6) shows the same issue but after the election. In neither of these two cases did the survey ask which specific candidates or parties were instigating the violence. Residents living in areas with more closely contested presidential elections were more likely to report politicians instigating violence in their areas, both before and after the elections. There were however key differences in the areas and respondents that were targeted before and after the elections.

Before the elections, respondents living in ODM hotspots were less likely to report politicians instigating violence in their communities than those living in the hotspots of the PNU. However, after

the elections the ODM and PNU hotspots reported equally that political actors instigated people to use violence.

The involvement of organized gangs, allegedly hired by political actors, has been much discussed as playing a central role in the post-electoral violence. Columns (7) and (8) show that before the elections respondents living in the hotspot of the ODM were equally likely to have heard of gangs operating in their areas as those living in PNU hotspots. However, the Luhyas were more likely to have heard of gangs operating in their area than the Kikuyos. Also wealthier respondents were more likely to have reported gangs operating in their areas before, but not after the election.

After the elections, gangs were reported more by people living in constituencies where the elections had been more closely contested, and again by those of Luhya ethnic origin. Columns (9) and (10) show that people reported the *Mungiki* gang operating more in constituencies which had closely contested presidential elections.

In sum, it seems that politicians acted strategically in their use of vote-buying as well as in the direct and indirect instigation of violence. The degree of competition in local elections affected the specific type of strategy adopted. The closely contested areas were more likely to report the instigation of violence. In contrast, the areas with less contested elections experienced more vote-buying. Both parties tried to lure support away from their political rivals. We found no evidence that the respondents that received an offer for their vote before the elections were threatened by the same party after the elections.

To finalize the inquiry we focus on the allegations of electoral fraud. Column (11) tests hypothesis 4, which suggests that political parties were more likely to have miscounted the votes in ODM and PNU areas. To test this hypothesis, an OLS regression is estimated, using as the dependent variable the raw difference between the official turnout in the presidential election and the turnout in the MPs elections at constituency level. The explanatory variables used in this model are how closely contested the presidential election was according to the pre-electoral survey, as well as whether the constituency was the hotspot of a particular party in terms of ethnic composition terms. Since elections were held in 76 out of the 77 constituencies sampled, the model is ran only for these areas.

The results suggest that the hotspots of the PNU and ODM were as likely to have had differences in turnout in the presidential and MP elections, as hypothesis 4 predicts. The hotspots of the ODM-K and other parties were less likely to have differences in turnouts than the PNU hotspots. However, how closely contested the election was did not affect the observed differences in voter turnout between the presidential and MP elections, suggesting that ballot boxes for the presidential election might have been inflated in the hotspots of the two main parties.

Robustness checks

One issue of concern is the likely endogeneity between the measured degree of electoral competition and the areas targeted for vote-buying, instigation of violence or rigging. To assess the robustness of

the results all the regressions were re-run using instrumental variables (regional and district indicators) to deal with the likely endogeneity in the variable measuring the degree of competition. The results (not included here) in terms of signs and significance levels did not change.

It was also explored whether the probability of reporting vote-buying, threats and instigation of violence was affected by the party affiliation of the incumbent local MP. The party affiliation of the MP did not matter in any of the cases explored, hence the results were not reported in Table (7). Since most of the incumbent MPs were elected in 2002 with an affiliation to the NARC alliance which broke down in 2005, their new affiliation was established by linking the incumbent MP to the party for which they were contending to be re-elected in 2007.

Changes in Perceptions Before-After the Disputed Elections

This sub-section explores whether the post-electoral violence affected the views of respondents about political competition, ethnic identity and the use of violence. Since we cannot observe what would have happened to the opinions of those affected by violence if the violence had not happened, the impact of post-electoral violence is assessed using the difference-in-difference estimator via propensity score matching as expressed in equation (2). The difference-in-difference estimator β builds up a counterfactual, where the change of opinions among those affected by violence are compared to those not affected by violence. Hence the difference-in-difference estimator is the mean difference in outcomes between the change in opinions among those affected by violence and those who were not affected by violence, weighted by the distribution of the propensity score matching. This score allows a comparison between individuals and areas (exposed to violence and those who were not) which had similar characteristics before the post-electoral violence erupted, minimizing the likelihood that these two groups already had different opinions and characteristics before the violence erupted.

$$\beta = E\{Y_{11} - Y_{10} | T=1, p(X_i)\} - E\{Y_{01} - Y_{00} | T=0, p(X_i)\} \quad \text{eq.(2)}$$

where Y_{it} denotes the outcome in treatment status i and period t . A person in state $i=1$ is a treated unit if exposed to violence. $T = \{0, 1\}$ is the indicator of exposure to violence, X is the multi-dimensional vector of individual and area characteristics before the violence and $p(X)$ is the propensity score.

The propensity score matching denotes the conditional probability of receiving a treatment, in this case violence, given the pre-treatment characteristics, as shown in equation (3). The score is obtained using the non-parametric Kernel-method selecting those which satisfied the balancing hypothesis, which ensures that the distribution of characteristics X is the same for those exposed to violence and those who were not. The variables used to estimate the propensity score matching are the respondent's ethnicity, education, age, whether they had experienced land disputes before the 2007

elections or in the 1997, 2002 or 2005 elections and the incidence of poverty (in 2006) in the constituency where the respondent was living before the outbreaks of post-electoral violence.

$$p(X) \equiv Pr\{T=1|X\} = E\{T|X\} \quad \text{eq. (3)}$$

In regression form the difference-in-difference estimator can be expressed as in equation (4), where X denotes the respondent's characteristics mentioned above, T whether respondent i was a victim or exposed to violence in area c at time t . The coefficient α_0 indicates the views held before the election by those not affected in the post-electoral violence. α_1 refers to the change in views after the elections by those not affected in the post-electoral violence. α_2 represents the difference in views held before the election between the victims and those not affected in the post-electoral violence. The coefficient β measures the difference in the change of perceptions (before-after elections) between the victims and those not affected by the post-electoral violence. In other words, β represents the difference-in-difference estimator.

$$\text{change in views}_{ict} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 2008 + \alpha_2 T_{ict} + \beta T_{ict} * 2008 + X_{ict} \mu \quad \text{eq. (4)}$$

People could have been affected by violence in different ways. First, they could have been the direct recipients of the violence, for instance in terms of personal injury or destruction of property. In addition, they could have been affected by violence by being unable to carry out with their day to day business activities losing earnings or their jobs. Even if they were lucky enough to escape from these instances of violence, they could have changed their attitudes towards the role of elections and ethnopolitics, simply by living in an area that was exposed to violence. Three proxies were used to assess whether the survey respondent was a victim of post-electoral violence or exposed to this violence.

The first proxy, victims of direct violence, captures whether the respondent was the direct recipient of post-electoral violence if the respondent answered positively to the following question '*Were you personally affected in the outbreaks of violence after 2007 in any of the following ways?: personal injury, damage to your personal property, the destruction of your home, being forced to leave your home, the destruction of your business or forced to leave your land because of electoral conflict*'. The change in opinions among these victims of violence are compared to those respondents that did not report to have suffered from any of these instances of violence and who were living in areas that were not exposed to violence. The areas that were not exposed to violence are identified as the districts which did not report people being injured or killed as a direct effect of the post-electoral violence according to the CIPEV report.⁵

The second proxy, secondary violence, adds to the previous group of direct violence those who in addition answered positively to '*Were you personally affected in the outbreaks of violence after 2007 in any of the following ways?: loss of earnings from your business or loss of job*'. As in the

previous case, the change in opinions among this group of victims of violence are compared to those respondents that did not report to have suffered from any of these instances of violence and who were living in areas that were not exposed to violence.

The third proxy compares people who were not victims of direct or secondary violence, but who were living in districts exposed to violence according to the CIPEV report. The change in opinions among this group are compared to those who did not experience violence, and who were living in districts that did not experience violence.

Table (8) focuses on the changes in the perceptions before and after the elections regarding democracy and the role of political competition. Columns (1) to (3) show that there was approximately a 20 percentage point increase in the number of people who claimed “*not to be satisfied with how democracy works in Kenya*” among the non-victims in areas not exposed to post-electoral violence (coefficient year 2008). Since the level of dissatisfaction with how democracy works also increased among those affected by violence –either directly, in economic terms or in areas exposed to violence-, this increased level of dissatisfaction cannot be attributed alone to the direct experience of violence or to having lived in a district that was exposed to violence. Unsurprisingly therefore, the difference-in-difference coefficients are not statistically significant for any of the three proxies used.

Columns (4) to (6) explore the changes in the support for the following statement: ‘*since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country’s leaders.*’ There was a 21 percentage point increase in the support of this statement following the post-electoral violence among those not affected and in areas not exposed to violence (coefficient year 2008). Although these perceptions also increased among the victims or in areas exposed to violence, this increase was roughly half that of non-victims. In other words, the victims or those in areas exposed to violence are more likely to prefer elections than the non-victims, despite elections sometimes producing bad results.

Columns (7) to (9) assess the change in support for the statement: “*Elections and the National Assembly should be abolished, so that the president can decide everything*”. There was no change in the support for this statement among those not affected and in areas not exposed to violence (coefficient year 2008). In contrast, the victims of violence or in areas exposed to violence are less likely to agree with this statement after the elections. This suggests that among those who were affected by violence, despite their struggles, they still think it is worth choosing their leaders by some means, instead of letting their president decide everything, as used to be the case in Kenya before the multi-party elections were re-introduced in 1991.

Columns (10) to (12) focus on the change in the perception that “*Competition between political parties leads to violent conflict*”. The great majority of respondents, regardless of whether they were affected or not by violence held this perception before the election (90%), and it did not change after the election.

We explore in table (9) whether there were any changes in ethnic identity and the role of ethno-politics. Columns (1) to (3) show whether there was any change in the percentage of people who identified first and foremost in ethnic terms. We obtain this information from the question: ‘*We have spoken to many Kenyans in this country and they have all described themselves in different ways. Some people describe themselves in terms of their language, religion, race, and others describe themselves in economic terms, such as working class, middle class or a farmer. Besides being a citizen of Kenya, which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?*’ Before the elections about 21 percent of those not affected and in areas not exposed to violence identified in ethnic terms. This perception was almost halved after the elections. In contrast, for the victims of violence, there was an increase in the percentage of those who identified in ethnic terms, for all the three proxies of violence used, thus the difference-in-difference estimator is positive and statistically significant.

Columns (4) to (6) show the changes in the support for the statement “*parties should not be allowed to form on a basis of tribe or religion*”. Before the elections, about 66 percent of those not affected or in areas not exposed to violence agreed with the statement, and there was no change after the elections. In contrast, the victims of violence or in areas exposed to violence increased their support for the above statement, despite identifying more in ethnic terms after the disputed elections.

After the elections, the ethnicity of politicians was still very influential on which party respondents like the least or the most. Columns (7) and (9) show the changes in the support for the statement “*In deciding which party you most **dislike**, do you consider the ethnic or regional origin of the party's leader?*”. Before the elections, about 78 percent of those not affected or in areas not exposed to violence agreed that they considered the attributes of ethnicity or regional origin. After the election, this perception increased slightly and in the same proportion among both the victims and non-victims of violence, hence the difference-in-difference estimator is not statistically significant. Similarly, columns (10) and (12) show the change to: “*In deciding which party you most **like**, do you consider the ethnic or regional origin of the party's leader?*”. Before the elections roughly half of those not affected or in areas not exposed to post-electoral violence agreed that they consider the ethnicity or regional origin of the party leader’s ethnicity. After the election, there was a 13 percentage point increase among those who considered the party leader’s ethnicity or origin, and this change was roughly the same among those who experienced only physical violence or were exposed to violence. The only exception was the victims of physical and economic violence, among which the difference-in-difference estimator shows a reduction, albeit small (coefficient 0.088).

Table (10) explores whether having being affected by violence changed the fear of being victimized in future elections, and the tolerance towards the use of violence. Columns (1) to (3) show the changes to “*Do you fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence during election campaigns*”. Roughly 81 percent of those not affected or in areas not exposed to post-electoral violence were actually fearful of being victims of violence before the elections. After the elections this

figure went up slightly, and by the same magnitude as for those who actually experienced violence, thus the difference-in-difference estimator is not statistically significant.

Given the history of violent elections and the fact that some politicians were instigating violence –directly or indirectly-, it is perhaps not surprising to find that the majority of people feared being victimized during the 2007 political campaign. Thus, it is important to assess the extent to which people stood up against the violence instigated by politicians. Columns (4) to (6) show the change in support for the statement “*People in your community have been standing clearly against violence originated by politicians*”. Nearly 70% of both victims and non-victims of violence agreed with that statement, and this figure did not change after the elections among either of the groups analyzed. This finding appears to support somewhat LeBas (2010). She conducted a survey in 2009 in six Nairobi slums finding that those living in highly violent neighborhoods did not increase their reliance on ethnicity in order to evaluate politicians who use violence. According to our results, there were no changes in the standing against violent politicians after the elections.

Columns (7) to (9) show that having been a victim of electoral violence either physical or economic, increased the probability of agreeing with “*If you were a victim of a violent crime, you would find another way to deal with the matter instead of calling the police*”. Lastly, columns (10) and (12) show the change in support for the statement: ‘*in Kenya it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause*’. Before the election about 13 percent among those not affected and in areas not exposed to post-electoral violence agreed with this statement. After the elections the percentage of people with tolerance for the use of violence went up in this group (6 percentage points), but it went up even more among the direct victims of violence (16 percentage points) –but not those exposed indirectly to the violence-, thus the difference-in-difference estimator is positive and statistically significant. In other words, this evidence supports the idea that violence breeds violence (Fridja 1994; Balcells 2010).

5. Conclusions and Implications

This article sought to test whether political parties used illegal electoral practices strategically in the 2007 Kenyan elections, and to assess the effects of the post-electoral violence on the future of democracy in the country. The overall micro-level findings shown, although drawn from the specific case of Kenya, can offer several insights into when electoral violence is likely to be organized intentionally, what type of consequences this political violence can have, and how the electoral process in Africa could be improved.

The evidence suggests that political parties used illegal electoral practices strategically, despite the fact that the main parties contending had formed only recently, lacked political infrastructure such as provincial branch offices and provided little instruction to their local candidates, a characteristic shared with other African countries (LeBas 2011; Kramon 2011). The results suggest that the ethno-political cleavages that shape the formation of political parties and the mobilization of

voters in African democracies (Mozaffar, Scarrit and Galaich 2003), are also a robust factor in explaining the strategic use of illegal electoral practices.

We found three important implications for the future of democracy. First, the reasons for the widespread vote-buying in Kenya (with 27% of respondents reporting vote-buying), as in other similar countries (Bratton 2008; Vicente and Wantchekon 2009), could be rooted in a prisoner's dilemma caused by the prevailing ethno-political system. All political parties would be better off financially if no-one buys votes, making more resources available for the provision of public goods. However, as Kramon (2011) argues, given that no politician can commit to not buying votes, the expensive dominant strategy is to vote-buy, despite the effectiveness of vote buying being reduced by all parties doing the same. In Kenya, the observed behavior of ethnic-voting is driven by the expectations that candidates will deliver patronage goods to their co-ethnics (Gutiérrez-Romero 2012), hence vote-buying is an important signal of the candidate's commitment. Evidence supporting this argument has been found in Ghana and Burundi, where voters expect vote-buying as a sign of their candidate's interest (Benegas 2003; Nugent 2007). A few randomized studies in Africa have shown promise in reducing vote-buying practices through voter education campaigns and more access to information (Vicente and Wantchekon 2009), an approach that deserves further investigation.

Second, while some of the electoral violence occurred opportunistically, the article found that political actors choose to reinforce their chances of election with the instigation of violence. The distribution of electoral support shaped the use of violence, both before and after the elections, as other studies have found (Dunning 2011). The areas with more closely contested elections received more threats, more instigation of violence, and reported a higher incidence of gangs operating in their areas with political links both before and after the elections. The reason political actors targeted these areas was to prevent rival supporters from voting, using these tactics as a measure of 'damage control'. These practices were widespread and not limited to a specific party. However, organized gangs, with alleged links to the PNU, targeted specific ethnic groups such as the Luhya supporting the ODM. This finding is consistent with the predictions of Collier and Vicente (2012), who suggest that if the challenger party has a large support base, the incumbent party will intimidate the challenger's moderate supporters, as a repression tactic for them not to vote. The results however fill the gap in the existing theoretical literature as to what type of intimidation tactics are used. Both parties used predominantly indirect intimidation tactics by instigating people to be violent through sectarian campaigns and gangs, but avoided making direct-threats. A potential reason for these findings, is the fact that both parties had a chance to win the elections, and potentially therefore an interest in not discrediting the electoral process entirely and making themselves directly accountable for the violence.

Third, more electoral irregularities were observed in the hotspots of the two main political parties, corroborating the hypothesis of Collier and Vicente (2012) that the incumbent party will seek to vote-buy and rig in its own hotspots. However, the Kenyan case also provides evidence that a strong

challenger party will also resort to rigging if the competition is close, and the incumbent candidate is expected to rig.

The article also analyzed the changes in Kenyan's views after the post-electoral violence. The electoral ordeal deepened the divisions on how the country should be run. Those not affected by violence increased their desire for abolishing elections altogether. In contrast, the victims of violence at personal level would prefer not allowing parties to align on the basis of ethnicity or religion. Paradoxically though among these victims of violence, more identify in ethnic terms, and still use the ethnicity of the candidates to gauge which party to support. Previous research has found that ethnic identity in African countries is strengthened right before the elections, as political parties mobilize voters in that way to claim power, land and wealth (Eifert, Miguel and Posner 2010; Lynch 2011). This article found that violence not only reinforced ethnic identity, but also the acceptability of the use of violence among the victims of violence.

Several of the effects of violence discussed in this article support the findings of previous studies suggesting that citizens' political attitudes respond to violence, especially in new or emerging democracies. For instance, Booth and Richard (1998, 2000) provide evidence for Central America, a region exposed to political violence during the 1980s and 1990s, showing that violence increased the alienation from elections and reduced several types of political participation. Similar to this article, the authors also found that violence can produce 'unintended consequences' for those who employed it, as victims of violence increased their willingness to organize and use violence for example to overthrow governments.

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
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Figures and Tables

Figure 1. Exit Poll and Opinion Polls ahead of the 2007 Election



Source: Author's pre-electoral survey (poll for December 12), Exit Poll by University of California San Diego, and Gallop's opinion polls.

Table 1. Expectation about the 2007 General Elections

	In general elections will not be free and fair	Use of violence by candidates or parties	Vote-buying by candidates or parties	Counting of the results
Completely free and fair	21.32	14.48	16.84	35.56
Free and fair, but with minor problems	32.22	35.39	31.16	31.24
Free and fair, but with major problems	26.69	22.54	19.37	15.3
Not free and fair	11.39	16.03	19.85	6.35
Don't know	8.38	11.55	12.77	11.55

Source: Author's pre-electoral survey.

Table 2. Intention to Vote and Official Electoral Results

	ECK Results					Pre-election Survey			
	Registered Voters	Turnout	Mwai Kibaki	Raila Odinga	Kalonzo Musyoka	Expected to vote	Mwai Kibaki	Raila Odinga	Kalonzo Musyoka
Nairobi	8.9	51.5	47.7	44.0	8.1	93.7	40.4	48.3	9.0
Central	15.3	82.1	97.0	1.9	0.7	92.7	88.2	4.9	2.9
Coast	7.3	57.0	33.1	59.4	6.5	91.9	24.5	59.9	7.5
Eastern	17.6	65.9	50.4	5.0	43.8	91.9	55.8	5.0	34.3
Nyanza	14.3	76.2	16.9	82.4	0.3	93.3	13.2	83.2	0.6
Rift Valley	23.5	72.8	33.5	64.6	1.4	96.6	42.5	50.0	2.5
Western	10.9	62.0	32.2	65.9	0.7	87.6	19.2	74.2	0.8
North Eastern	2.2	61.3	50.3	47.2	2.3	92.3	63.9	30.6	2.8
National Average		69.0	46.4	44.1	8.9	93.0	40.1	46.7	8.4

Source: Author's pre-electoral survey and Kenyan Electoral Commission.

Table 3. Intention to vote and belief about who legitimately won the presidential election

	Population %	Who would you vote for President?			Who do you think won the elections?		
		Mwai Kibaki	Raila Odinga	Kalonzo Muzyoka	Mwai Kibaki	Raila Odinga	Kalonzo Muzyoka
Kikuyu	18.5	90.2	6.1	0.5	65.7	18.7	0.0
Luo	12.3	3.6	94.9	0.0	0.6	94.8	0.0
Luhya	15.7	22.8	69.5	1.2	4.8	77.8	0.0
Kamba	9.4	18.3	1.0	76.9	31.4	47.1	1.5
Meru	8.1	88.9	5.6	2.2	73.1	11.1	0.0
Kissi	8.0	26.6	64.9	1.1	6.7	75.7	0.0
Kalenjin	8.9	14.3	80.6	2.0	4.2	87.1	0.0
Mijikenda	6.2	24.3	61.4	4.3	11.8	83.3	0.0
Somali	3.2	57.1	34.3	2.9	10.8	71.7	0.0
Others	9.9	34.5	56.6	1.8	13.3	75.7	0.0
National Average		40.1	46.7	8.4	25.1	61.3	0.1


Source: Author's electoral surveys.

Table 4. Distribution of electoral irregularities before the elections

	Personally Received Offer for Vote	Personally Received a Threat to Vote in Certain Way	Politicians Instigated Violence in community		Heard of Gangs Operating in community		Personal Victim of Violence (Physical or Economical)	Personal Victim of Violence and Lost a Close Friend or Relative
	Before election	Before election	Before election	After election	Before election	After election	After election	After election
Kikuyu	26.1	8.8	33.2	32.8	28.4	32.5	20.0	28.6
Luo	25.0	10.8	26.4	35.6	28.1	38.6	25.6	47.7
Luhya	33.7	14.7	26.8	28.6	47.9	58.5	26.6	38.7
Kamba	23.2	5.4	31.3	18.2	12.0	12.1	8.5	13.2
Meru	31.3	8.1	23.2	3.5	1.7	3.5	3.5	4.3
Kissi	33.0	8.2	27.8	27.3	18.3	32.5	24.0	41.0
Kalenjin	16.5	7.8	28.2	44.7	26.2	47.1	28.4	38.4
Mijikenda	13.3	4.0	38.7	46.2	3.7	8.5	22.0	23.2
Somali	34.2	0.0	23.7	19.2	6.6	2.4	12.3	14.5
Others	30.3	10.1	37.0	27.3	17.0	27.1	15.0	20.7
National Average	26.9	9.0	29.9	29.0	23.1	31.1	19.6	29.1

Source: Author's electoral surveys.

Figure 2. Electoral Death Toll According to Kenya Media



Source: Author's own estimation based on the media monitored.

Table 5. Post-Electoral Death Toll According to CIPEV and Media

	Injured	Death Toll	
	CIPEV	CIPEV	Media
Rift Valley	2193	744	754
Nyanza	747	134	172
Central	0	5	5
Western	146	98	117
Coast	133	27	36
Nairobi	342	125	44
Total	3,561	1,133	1128

Source: CIPEV(2008) and Kenyan media houses monitored

Table 6. Number of Reported Riots in the Media

Province	Pre-election	Post-election
Central	3	7
Coast	3	6
Eastern	1	1
Nairobi	3	16
Nyanza	9	17
Rift Valley	9	51
Western	3	13
Total	31	111

Source: Kenyan media houses monitored

Table 7. Vote-buying, politically-instigated violence and gangs-connected to politics

	Received offer for vote from:		Received threats from:		Politicians Instigated Violence in Community		Heard Gangs Connected to Politics Operating in Community		Heard of Mungiki Operating in Community		Difference in turnout between Presidential and MP elections (11)
	PNU	ODM	PNU	ODM	Before elections	After elections	Before elections	After elections	Before elections	After elections	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	
Expected Win Difference in Presidential Election 2007 ²	0.078*	-0.071	-0.043**	-0.055**	-0.132*	-0.217**	-0.091	-0.314***	-0.070**	-0.132***	-2.589
	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.060)	(0.071)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(2.324)
Constituency has more preference for PNU than ODM*Expected win difference	0.047		0.069**								
	(0.068)		(0.029)								
Constituency has more preference for ODM than PNU*Expected win difference		0.140**		0.076**	0.053	0.075	0.003	0.132	-0.092**	-0.020	
		(0.058)		(0.031)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.073)	(0.086)	(0.041)	(0.044)	
Ethnicity (Kikuyu reference group)											
Luo	0.002	-0.027	0.052	-0.026**	0.016	0.028	0.048	0.024	0.011	-0.014	
	(0.054)	(0.040)	(0.047)	(0.010)	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.060)	(0.064)	(0.032)	(0.028)	
Luhya	0.064	-0.024	0.018	-0.022**	-0.005	-0.085*	0.189**	0.144**	-0.025	-0.034*	
	(0.056)	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.011)	(0.059)	(0.049)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.020)	(0.020)	
Kamba	0.053	0.067		-0.001	-0.015	-0.164***	-0.092*	-0.201***	-0.030	-0.062***	
	(0.073)	(0.070)		(0.027)	(0.073)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.022)	(0.015)	
Meru	-0.016	0.116*	-0.000	0.008	-0.088*	-0.255***	-0.222***	-0.259***	-0.067***	-0.080***	
	(0.043)	(0.062)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.051)	(0.029)	(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.010)	(0.010)	
Kissi	0.162**	0.001	-0.016*	-0.018*	-0.017	-0.066	-0.034	-0.060	-0.019	-0.038*	
	(0.075)	(0.045)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.067)	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.059)	(0.027)	(0.022)	
Kalenjin	-0.022	-0.068**	0.019	-0.026**	0.016	0.067	0.015	0.050	-0.029	-0.008	
	(0.051)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.008)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.057)	(0.066)	(0.020)	(0.028)	
Mijikenda	0.025	-0.065*	-0.008		0.103	0.090	-0.180***	-0.241***			
	(0.065)	(0.033)	(0.016)		(0.079)	(0.076)	(0.029)	(0.032)			
Somali	0.020	0.124			-0.110	-0.130**	-0.162***	-0.283***	-0.060***		
	(0.080)	(0.086)			(0.071)	(0.062)	(0.035)	(0.019)	(0.010)		
Others	0.065	0.016	0.020	-0.027***	0.030	-0.089*	-0.085**	-0.125**	-0.047***	-0.059***	
	(0.059)	(0.045)	(0.030)	(0.008)	(0.061)	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.046)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
Ethnic hotspot (PNU reference group)											
Ethnic hotspot ODM	0.053	0.027	0.045*	-0.014	-0.140**	-0.020	-0.067	-0.029	-0.041*	-0.072**	-1.090
	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(1.795)
Ethnic hotspot ODM-K	-0.020	-0.041		-0.029**	-0.052	-0.014	-0.112**	-0.073	-0.037*	-0.023	-5.278*
	(0.057)	(0.042)		(0.010)	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.044)	(0.064)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(2.876)
Other	0.044	0.058	0.238	0.019	-0.061	-0.061	-0.105**	-0.056	-0.068***	-0.060***	-4.949**
	(0.059)	(0.053)	(0.154)	(0.034)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.043)	(0.064)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(2.467)
Wealth Asset Index	0.086	0.132**	0.001	0.044	0.133	0.186**	0.155*	0.150	0.114**	0.126**	4.391**
	(0.076)	(0.067)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.085)	(0.097)	(0.048)	(0.053)	(2.059)
R-squared	0.024	0.035	0.100	0.051	0.017	0.068	0.119	0.145	0.136	0.133	0.0852
Number of observations	1207	1207	1014	1094	1207	1207	1207	1207	1132	1094	76

Significance Level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

¹ Index on expected win difference taken from pre-election survey at constituency level from the question:

"Which party do you think will win the National Presidential elections in December 2007?"

Table 8. Changes in Perceptions on Democracy and Trust on Institutions

	Not satisfied how democracy works in Kenya			Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders			Elections and the National Assembly should be abolished so that the president can decide everything			Competition between political parties lead to violent conflict		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Constant	0.350*** (0.025)	0.344*** (0.027)	0.343*** (0.029)	0.088*** (0.019)	0.088*** (0.021)	0.086*** (0.022)	0.212*** (0.021)	0.219*** (0.022)	0.221*** (0.022)	0.898*** (0.014)	0.904*** (0.016)	0.902*** (0.015)
Year 2008	0.206*** (0.036)	0.211*** (0.039)	0.214*** (0.042)	0.212*** (0.027)	0.217*** (0.029)	0.218*** (0.031)	0.039 (0.029)	0.040 (0.031)	0.036 (0.031)	0.024 (0.020)	0.025 (0.022)	0.028 (0.021)
Victim of physical violence	0.038 (0.038)			0.007 (0.029)			-0.014 (0.031)			-0.005 (0.021)		
Victim of physical violence*2008	0.033 (0.054)			-0.092** (0.041)			-0.087** (0.044)			0.042 (0.030)		
Victim of physical and economic violence		0.046 (0.037)			0.013 (0.028)			-0.038 (0.030)			-0.030 (0.021)	
Victim of physical and economic violence*2008		0.023 (0.052)			-0.108** (0.039)			-0.086** (0.042)			0.038 (0.030)	
Non-victim but living in area that suffered violence			0.111** (0.035)			0.019 (0.026)			-0.060** (0.026)			0.008 (0.018)
Non-victim but living in area that suffered violence*2008			-0.060 (0.050)			-0.094** (0.037)			-0.076** (0.037)			0.019 (0.026)
R-squared	0.052	0.053	0.036	0.056	0.051	0.044	0.008	0.013	0.017	0.008	0.008	0.008
Number of observations	1315	1399	1866	1352	1432	1918	1352	1432	1918	1352	1432	1918

Controlling for: respondent's ethnicity, education, age, had land disputes before the 2007 elections or in the 1997, 2002, 2005 previous elections and constituency's incidence of poverty
Significance Level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 9. Changes in views on Identity, Parties, and Electoral Competition

	Identify first and foremost as Ethnic			Parties should not be allowed to form on tribe or religion basis			In deciding which party most dislike, considers the party's perceived tribalism			In deciding which party likes most, considers the ethnic or regional origin of the party's leader		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Constant	0.218*** (0.019)	0.216*** (0.021)	0.213*** (0.021)	0.662*** (0.024)	0.665*** (0.026)	0.662*** (0.028)	0.779*** (0.020)	0.781*** (0.022)	0.781*** (0.022)	0.501*** (0.026)	0.509*** (0.028)	0.508*** (0.029)
Year 2008	-0.102*** (0.027)	-0.098*** (0.029)	-0.097** (0.030)	0.046 (0.034)	0.041 (0.037)	0.036 (0.039)	0.074** (0.029)	0.069** (0.031)	0.073** (0.032)	0.130*** (0.036)	0.134*** (0.039)	0.132** (0.041)
Victim of physical violence	-0.074** (0.028)			-0.123*** (0.036)			-0.007 (0.031)			-0.004 (0.038)		
Victim of physical violence*2008	0.126** (0.040)			0.122** (0.052)			-0.038 (0.043)			-0.088 (0.054)		
Victim of physical and economic violence		-0.047* (0.028)			-0.097** (0.036)			-0.008 (0.030)			-0.034 (0.037)	
Victim of physical and economic violence*2008		0.098** (0.040)			0.085* (0.050)			-0.023 (0.042)			-0.088* (0.053)	
Non-victim but living in area that suffered violence			-0.081** (0.025)			-0.045 (0.033)			-0.005 (0.027)			-0.073** (0.035)
Non-victim but living in area that suffered violence*2008			0.112** (0.035)			0.051 (0.047)			0.030 (0.038)			-0.020 (0.049)
R-squared	0.011	0.008	0.007	0.019	0.014	0.007	0.007	0.006	0.016	0.013	0.015	0.020
Number of observations	1352	1432	1918	1352	1432	1918	1352	1432	1918	1352	1432	1918

Controlling for: respondent's ethnicity, education, age, had land disputes before the 2007 elections or in the 1997, 2002, 2005 previous elections and constituency's incidence of poverty
Significance Level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 10. Changes in Expectations about Violence and Welfare

	Fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence during election campaigns			People in village have been standing clearly against violence originated by politicians			If were victim of a violent crime, would find another way to deal with the matter instead of calling the police			It is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Constant	0.813*** (0.018)	0.816*** (0.019)	0.815*** (0.020)	0.676*** (0.025)	0.675*** (0.026)	0.676*** (0.028)	0.053*** (0.014)	0.050*** (0.015)	0.051*** (0.015)	0.128*** (0.019)	0.132*** (0.021)	0.131*** (0.022)
Year 2008	0.051** (0.025)	0.052* (0.027)	0.056** (0.028)	-0.006 (0.035)	-0.006 (0.037)	-0.010 (0.039)	0.002 (0.020)	-0.004 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.021)	0.065** (0.027)	0.066** (0.029)	0.067** (0.031)
Victim of physical violence	0.049* (0.026)			-0.005 (0.037)			0.025 (0.021)			-0.020 (0.029)		
Victim of physical violence*2008	0.021 (0.037)			-0.084 (0.052)			0.076** (0.030)			0.097** (0.041)		
Victim of physical and economic violence		0.029 (0.026)			-0.011 (0.036)			0.025 (0.020)			-0.031 (0.028)	
Victim of physical and economic violence*2008		0.003 (0.037)			-0.053 (0.051)			0.071** (0.029)			0.068* (0.039)	
Non-victim but living in area that suffered violence			0.044* (0.024)			0.005 (0.033)			0.031* (0.018)			-0.013 (0.026)
Non-victim but living in area that suffered violence*2008			-0.019 (0.034)			-0.009 (0.047)			-0.007 (0.025)			0.025 (0.037)
R-squared	0.015	0.008	0.006	0.006	0.004	0.000	0.022	0.021	0.003	0.026	0.021	0.013
Number of observations	1352	1432	1918	1352	1432	1918	1352	1432	1918	1352	1432	1918

Controlling for: respondent's ethnicity, education, age, had land disputes before the 2007 elections or in the 1997, 2002, 2005 previous elections and constituency's incidence of poverty

Significance Level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix

Table A.1. Characteristics of Pre- and Post- Election Survey Respondents

		Pre-election survey	Post-election survey (including original respondents and replacements)	Post-election survey (including original respondents only)
		Percent	Percent	Percent
Aged 18-26		37.67	38.26	42.0
Wealth asset index 0 - 40%		16.03	16.03	16.6
Victim of post-electoral violence		29.29	28.90	29.4
Male		52.48	52.24	54.0
Ethnicity				
	Kikuyu	18.47	17.93	16.9
	Luo	12.29	12.32	13.2
	Luhya	15.70	14.51	20.5
	Kamba	9.36	9.70	9.3
	Meru	8.14	8.31	6.3
	Kissi	7.97	8.05	8.1
	Kalenjin	8.87	9.08	9.6
	Mijikenda	6.18	6.87	5.3
	Somali	3.17	3.25	2.1
	Others	9.85	9.98	8.7
Rural		60.93	61.40	62.2
Province				
	Nairobi	7.03	7.83	5.9
	Central	9.17	8.70	7.8
	Coast	12.34	13.15	10.2
	Eastern	16.54	16.46	14.2
	Nyanza	15.25	14.49	15.4
	Rift Valley	24.68	24.51	25.8
	Western	12.08	11.58	18.4
	North Eastern	2.91	3.27	2.3
Education				
	No schooling-complete high school	75.10	69.99	74.4
	More than high school	24.90	28.72	25.6
Election was not free and fair or had major problems in terms of				
	Violence	52.40	69.83	72.3
	Vote Buying	54.35	74.38	74.5
	Ballot Fraud	33.52	79.24	79.9
Identify first and foremost as				
	Kenyan	37.3	53.3	57.3
	Ethnic	17.1	14.1	13.6
Trust a lot the president		32.7	21.3	19.2
		9.6	26.3	24.3
Prefers violence to support a just cause		12.0	17.1	13.6
Prefer to ignore the law and solve problems immediately using other means		9.1	16.2	13.9
A political party offered respondent something in return from vote		26.7	33.8	35.5
Someone threaten respondent to influence vote		9.0	8.2	8.4
Politicians instigated violence in respondent's community		30.4	29.3	30.0
Respondent heard about ethnic violence in community		19.0	34.7	39.1
Violent conflicts arise in people of respondent's ethnic group in community		34.7	18.3	19.3
Violent conflicts arise between people of different ethnic group in respondent's community		53.1	41.8	46.0
Respondent heard of violent groups connected with politics being active in community		23.7	31.2	37.0
Observations		1207	1207	667

Source: Author's electoral surveys.

Notes

¹ The newly drawn respondents have the same gender, education level and living in the same constituency as the respondents that could not be re-interviewed. In addition if the respondent that could not be traced was a Meru, Kikuyu, Luo or Luhya the respondent was replaced with a person of the same ethnicity. Respondents were replaced in this way as according to pilot work conducted in the worst affected areas by the violence suggested that the great majority of displaced people were of Meru, Kikuyu, Luo or Luhya origins, who in the great majority of cases moved within the same constituency.

² The media monitoring was done directly by the Steadman Group. The radio stations monitored included KBC radio service, Citizen Radio, Inooro FM, Kass FM, Ramogi FM, Mulembe. The TV stations monitored included KBC TV, CTV, NTV, KTN and the newspapers monitored included were the Daily Nation and the Standard. To avoid repetition or duplication of incidences the content of the media reports was crossed checked by date, location and across media houses.

³ One of the possible reasons why the Luhya were not targeted for vote-buying with more intensity than other groups could be that both the ODM and the PNU had tried to secure the affiliations of this group by pledging a vice-presidency to a Luhya candidate.

⁴ Wealth levels were assessed by constructing a asset index based on the responses to the question: “*from the following list which of these things does your household own?*”. The list of things includes 15 possible durable assets, which were used to construct a normalized wealth-asset index ranging from 0 to 1 (owns all 15 listed assets: book, radio, television, bicycle, motor vehicle, house, oven, fridge, washing machine, land telephone, land, cattle, computer and mobile phones).

⁵ All the respondents who reported to have experienced direct effects of violence were living in the districts that CIPEV identified with either people being injured or killed as direct effect of post-electoral violence.