




Researching livelihoods and services affected by conflict



Livelihoods, basic services and social protection in Democratic Republic of the Congo

Working Paper 2

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July 2012



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About us

Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) aims to generate a stronger evidence base on how people make a living, educate their children, deal with illness and access other basic services in conflict-affected situations (CAS). Providing better access to basic services, social protection and support to livelihoods matters for the human welfare of people affected by conflict, the achievement of development targets such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and international efforts at peace- and state-building.

At the centre of SLRC's research are three core themes, developed over the course of an intensive one-year inception phase:

- State legitimacy: experiences, perceptions and expectations of the state and local governance in conflict-affected situations
- State capacity: building effective states that deliver services and social protection in conflict-affected situations
- Livelihood trajectories and economic activity under conflict

The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) is the lead organisation. SLRC partners include the Centre for Poverty Analysis (CEPA) in Sri Lanka, Feinstein International Center (FIC, Tufts University), the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in Pakistan, Disaster Studies of Wageningen University (WUR) in the Netherlands, the Nepal Centre for Contemporary Research (NCCR), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

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Abbreviations

ACF	Action Contre la Faim
AfDB (BAD)	African Development Bank
AFDL	Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire)
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AREU	Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
BCC	Banque Centrale du Congo
BTC/CTB	Belgian Technical Cooperation
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CASM	Communities and Artisanal & Small-scale Mining
CEEC	Centre d'Evaluation, d'Expertise et de Certification
CEPA	Centre for Poverty Analysis
CIFOR	Center for International Forestry Research
CISP	Comite International de Développement du Peuple
COOPI	Italian Development Cooperation
COPA	Comité des Parents
COSA	Comité de santé
CNDP	Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (National Congress for the Defence of the People)
CTSE	Cellule Technique pour les Statistiques de l'Education
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DRC (RDC)	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSCR	Document de Strategie de Croissance et la Réduction de la Pauvreté
EDS	Enquête Démographique et de Santé
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FDLR	Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GER	Gross Enrolment Rate
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HAP	Humanitarian Action Plan
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDMC	Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IITA	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture
IMF (FMI)	International Monetary Fund
INERA	Institut National pour l'Etude et la Recherche Agronomiques
INS	Institut National de la Statistique
IOM (OIM)	International Organisation for Migration
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
IPIS	International Peace Information Service
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IREP	Initiative pour un investissement Responsable des Entreprises Privées en RDC
ISSSS	International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy
LRA	The Lord's Resistance Army
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund

MFI	Micro Financing Institution
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
MIX	Microfinance Information Exchange
MLC	Mouvement de libération congolais (Congolese Liberation Movement)
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NER	Nett Enrolment Rate
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OVC (OEV)	Orphans and Vulnerable Children
PARSE	Projet d'appui au redressement du secteur éducatif
PARSS	Projet d'appui à la réhabilitation du secteur de la santé
PEMU	Projet d'eau en milieu urbain
PGAI	Plateforme de Gestion de l'Aide et des Investissements
PPC	Public-Private Cooperation
PNA	Programme National d'Assainissement
PNDS	Plan National de Développement Sanitaire 2011-2015
PPP	Public-Private Partnership
PPSSP	Programme de Promotion des Soins de Santé Primaires en Zones de Santé Rurales
PRONANUT	Programme National de Nutrition
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PURUS	Projet d'Urgence de Réhabilitation Urbaine et Sociale
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy)
RCD-ML	RCD-Mouvement de libération (RCD-Liberation Movement)
RDC	République Démocratique du Congo
REAFOR	recherche agricole et forestière en République Démocratique du Congo
REGIDESO	Régie de distribution des eaux de la République du Congo
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SAESSCAM	Service d'Assistance et d'Encadrement du Small Scale Mining
SDPI	Sustainable Development Policy Institute
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SLRC	Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium
SNCC	Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer du Congo
SNHR	Service National d'Hydraulique Rural
SNSA	Service National des Statistiques Agricoles
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SSU	Stabilisation Support Unit (MONUSCO)
STAREC	Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan for Eastern DRC
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP (PNUD)	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
US	United States
USD	United States Dollar
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WASH	Water, hygiene and sanitation
WB	World Bank
WFP (PAM)	World Food Programme
WUR	Wageningen University and Research centre

Preface

This paper is one of a series of evidence papers produced by the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) as part of its inception phase (January 2011 – March 2012). Seven country evidence papers have been produced (Afghanistan, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, South Sudan, Uganda and DRC) and are supported by two global evidence papers focusing on social protection and basic services, and growth and livelihoods respectively. Each paper systematically explores and assesses the available evidence about livelihoods, social protection and basic services in the country. The papers do not attempt to generate new data, nor produce new analyses. Rather they assess what is already known and review the quality of the current evidence base. The papers, along with a series of global and country-based stakeholder consultations, have been used to formulate the future research agenda of the SLRC.

This paper was written by Bart Weijs, Dorothea Hilhorst and Adriaan Ferf. Responsibility for the arguments and views presented in the paper lie with the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of SLRC partner organisations or the UK Department for International Development (DFID) which funds the SLRC

Executive summary

The people in DRC have suffered enormous loss of life and livelihoods due to almost two decades of war and insecurity. This paper undertakes a critical review of existing evidence on livelihoods and the delivery of basic services and social protection interventions in DRC, paying extra attention to the eastern provinces. Livelihoods sectors that are dealt with cover mining, agriculture, and petty trade. Basic services refer to health, education, transport, water and sanitation. The objective of the paper is to help pinpoint strategic opportunities for future research on how best to promote improvements in the quality of life for conflict-affected populations. The paper consists of four sections, starting with an overview of the country context and conflict history (#2), followed by an overview of livelihoods in DRC (#3), including a review of the existing responses on the part of government institutions, aid agencies, local populations and the private sector to support livelihoods; also a section (#4) summarising the populations' access to basic services and social protection interventions. Finally (#5), the paper presents an analysis of the data, evidence and the methodologies utilised in the literature reviewed.

The present functioning of the state, state structures and governance in DRC can best be understood through the historical legacy of a neo-patrimonial state and clientelism, taking into consideration the increasing economic downturn, institutional deterioration, and loss of national assets (Chapter 2). To a greater extent, public servants, including the army and the police, became dependent on the self-financing of salaries and operational cost through informal taxation, corruption, and extortion of the general public, all of which was legitimatised by the Mobutu regime (*débrouillez-vous!*). Only recently (in 2006), after a transitional period, were national and provincial governments elected, which saw national policies begin to emerge. Decentralisation, as foreseen in the constitution, has been realised only to some extent. Provincial authorities are nevertheless a force to reckon with, as are (at local level) traditional (inherited and authoritarian) kings and chiefs, who maintain a large and sometimes dominating position in the rural areas including the Eastern Provinces. Thus, the context, which covers the domain of service delivery, is one of institutional multiplicity, based on incomplete decentralisation, the existence of customary institutions, other sources of authority, and also humanitarian and development interventions; and an all-pervasive system of 'taxation', whereby people seek to use their position to supplement income. Nonetheless, this multiplicity may also open up avenues for cultivating new, hybrid forms of service delivery.

Poverty is widespread (over 70 percent live below the poverty line). As well as poor health and education, the main limitations to livelihoods development are caused by the exploitative governance system, lack of security and effective means of transport. Many observers see agriculture (3.1.3) as the main opportunity for increasing the standard of life, seeing as the majority of people are involved in agriculture in some way (92 percent, with almost half the households leading a 'purely agricultural' way of life), and DRC's agricultural potential is vast (only an estimated 10 percent of the arable land is actually used). However, most agricultural activity is aimed at subsistence, and the sector suffers the consequences of conflict. This includes a deteriorated transport system, as well as a lack of investment, both from the government and international donors. A large part of the population remains (moderately) food insecure, dependent on food aid, and the country as a whole has a food deficit, importing up to 30 percent of its food needs.

Artisanal mining (3.1.2) forms an alternative livelihood strategy. Estimates vary on how many people are directly involved (between 500,000 and 2 million). Also, it is unclear what effect the growth of the artisanal mining sector has on the agricultural sector; artisanal mining is a way of coping with an adverse agricultural environment, and more people involved in mining might also lead to an increased demand for (agricultural) products. However, the involvement of criminal networks, (former) rebel groups and even the national army's interest in mining operations, have all exploited artisanal miners (*creuseurs*), and complicated matters by using the mining revenues to sustain levels of insecurity and exploitation, especially in mining areas in Eastern DRC.

In border regions, however, small-scale cross-border trade continues to flourish (3.1.4) with a great number of people benefiting from the high levels of economic growth attained by neighbouring countries, which have a better transport infrastructure set in place than DRC.

Basic services (Chapter 4), notably health, education, water and sanitation, and transport, are all considered fragile and insufficient.

- People have limited access to health and education services, mainly due to limited facilities, poverty, and low quality of services. This results in low scores on public health indicators, and is even worse for women. The same applies to education, although because of a high public commitment to education, effects are mainly qualitative (enrolment rates are above regional level), with gender disparities visible especially in higher classes in primary school and further education (4.1.2–3).
- Health and education are fee-based and the contribution of the state is insufficient. Through user fees these sectors function as an alternative tax base, transferring money from the local health zones upwards through the national organisation. International organisations in health and education provide funding for infrastructure and operations, and are strongly involved in the development of policies (4.1.2–3).
- Water coverage is limited, especially in rural areas, while sanitation coverage is extremely weak. International assistance mainly focused on water; there was little attention on sanitation and hygiene. The government's role (policy, supervision, support and funding) is minimal to non-existent outside the urban areas (4.1.5).
- The transport infrastructure nearly completely disappeared after decades of war, neglect and misuse. The country essentially fell apart into a set of enclaves, which remains the case to some extent. Rehabilitation of transport infrastructure was a priority after the war and much international funding was used to improve roads, rail and water transport infrastructure. However, there is a great deal that still needs to be done in order to connect different parts of the country to one another as well as to the surrounding countries, and for it to make an impact on economic and livelihood development (4.1.4).
- Policies on social protection are incoherent, and the few social protection schemes only benefit a limited number of people. However, many aid interventions can essentially be classified as forms of social protection, and the attention given to this sector is increasing (4.2).

The current strong focus on gender-based violence, especially in the Eastern Provinces, to some extent fails to tackle the large socio-economic, political and cultural gender inequalities in DRC. Strong customary powers and religious institutions are particularly important in upholding large gender inequalities and reproducing gender norms. Although the Constitution requires gender parity, women are hardly represented in democratic institutions, and certainly not in positions of power. Women's development opportunities remain constrained seeing as they are still almost systematically deprived from their rights to inherit, to own land and have to ask the permission of their husbands for economic activities such as opening a bank account.

With regards to data availability and quality (Chapter 5): this investigation finds a strong bias towards humanitarian issues and eastern DRC, a lack of studies that aim to bring underlying structures and dynamics into the picture, as well as a lack of focus on local needs. Additionally, there is little centralised data collection and exchange of findings, critical appraisal of available data, and a lack of methodologically sound, robust scholarly research. Local research capacity is lacking, there is a gap between research and policy, and a gap in understanding the multiple dimensions of gender. A great deal of data on basic services and livelihoods is based on (irregular) national surveys, facilitated by international organisations. The reliability of official figures is questionable, but there are few alternatives.

In conclusion, there is much scope for research in DRC. Therefore, this report comes to the following domains for further research¹ (Annex 1): institutional multiplicity in basic service provision; financial services; rural-urban relations in transport and trade; the nature of entrepreneurship; the nature and social effects of women's economic power; and depleting livestock and its consequences.

¹ This is also based on a stakeholder consultation (Hilhorst and Ferf 2011)

1 Introduction

The people in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have suffered enormous loss of life and livelihoods due to almost two decades of war and insecurity. This paper synthesises current evidence on how people are recovering their livelihoods and accessing basic services and social protection interventions in DRC, paying particular attention to the eastern provinces. Livelihoods sectors that are dealt with include mining, agriculture, and petty trade; basic services refer to health, education, transport, and water and sanitation.

The objective of the paper is to help pinpoint strategic opportunities for future research of the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (and others) on ways to promote improvements in the quality of life for conflict-affected populations. It does this by undertaking a rigorous review of existing literature on livelihoods and the delivery of basic services and social protection interventions in DRC, including both academic and grey literature.² The methodological approach, as well as further information regarding the background of this research, can be found in the terms of reference, in Annex 4.

The review is driven by the following (extensive) set of research questions:

- *People*: What is known about peoples' own responses, disaggregated by gender, to the conflict? What are their tactics for making a living and maintaining access to basic services and social protection?
- *Governance*: How do state and society interact in the institutional arrangements that mediate livelihoods, social protection and access to services? What are the gender dimensions of these interactions?
- *Aid*: What aid is being provided and how effective is it in supporting access to basic services, livelihoods and social protection? What is known about the gendered impact of aid?
- *Private sector*: What is known about the role of the private sector in a) delivering services and social protection, and b) stimulating multipliers and growth linkages?
- *Linkages*: What linkages between people-aid-governance determine outcomes in relation to livelihoods and access to social protection and basic services?
- *Data*: What current, gender-disaggregated data exists on poverty levels, livelihoods, growth, access to basic services, access to social protection and key health and nutrition indicators? What quality is it?
- *Quality*: What is the quality of the current evidence (including the extent to which gender is analysed)?
- *Methods*: What methods are currently being used to research livelihoods, access to services and social protection?
- *Gaps*: What gaps exist in the evidence, research methods and secondary data?

In answering these questions, a broad division has been made between livelihoods, basic services and social protection, as well as a reflection on the availability and quality of data. This reflects in the four sections of this evidence paper, starting with an overview of the country context and conflict history (Chapter 2). The next section (Chapter 3) is an overview of livelihoods in DRC, and includes a review of the existing responses on the part of government institutions, aid agencies, local populations and the private sector to support livelihoods. The third section (Chapter 4) summarises the populations' ability to access basic services and assesses social protection interventions. As with the livelihoods section, it

² Literature reviewed includes: published academic literature such as journal articles, books, and periodicals, as well as available 'grey' literature, including policy papers, evaluations, and other unpublished documents gathered in-country during a stakeholder consultation in July 2011.

also includes a review of the existing responses on the part of government institutions, aid agencies, local populations and the private sector to support access to basic services and social protection. Finally, (Chapter 5) the paper presents an analysis of the overall data, evidence and the methodologies utilised in the literature reviewed.

Disaster Studies at Wageningen University produced this paper as a member of the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC), a collaboration between a number of institutions seeking to improve the response to the world's foremost humanitarian and development challenges. This evidence paper will be complemented by similar papers on other conflict-affected states.³ Together this composite body of work will provide critical insights into the best ways to promote improvements in the quality of life for people affected by the conflict and its related challenges.

It is important to note that while it is understood that the conflict-affected areas of DRC have substantial contextual variations, given the broad scope and extensive topics covered in the paper. This means that in some instances, broad conclusions are presented that may not be relevant for all areas. In addition, certain sections only highlight specific examples from one sub-region or region, even when they include examples from other areas.⁴

³ South Sudan and Uganda in Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka in Asia.

⁴ This approach has also been taken in the interest of reducing the length of the paper.


2 Country context

2.1 Social, economic, and political context

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), a former Belgian colony, is the second-largest country in Africa,⁵ and is in possession of a wealth of natural resources. Estimates of its (2011) population range from 66.4 million (Ministère de la Santé Publique 2010, p.14) to 73.5 million (OCHA 2010, p.3),⁶ with a relatively high growth rate of 2.8%. Approximately a third of the population lives in urban areas (Ministère du Plan 2011b), of which Kinshasa, the capital, is the largest; with a population of 6 to 10 million (again estimates differ depending on the source). About half (48 percent in 2007) the population is younger than 15, and the UNDP estimates life expectancy at birth (in 2010) at 48 years.⁷

In the last decade, DRC has managed to end a period of economic decline (which started in the 1970s, as shown by Akitoby & Cinyabuguma (2004) and also Putzel et al. (2008)). Stabilisation measures and economic restructuring, under the watchful eyes of international agencies, led to 3 percent economic growth in 2002, with higher rates in the following years, although the global economic crisis caused rates to drop in 2008 and 2009 (Kabuya Kalala & Cassimon 2010, pp.9–10). In the following years, growth rates have recovered, but this has been largely due to a ‘massive inflow of foreign aid’ (Putzel et al. 2008, p.15), which amounted to 16 percent of GDP in 2009 and 12 percent in 2010 (World Bank 2011a, p.25). Aid is not equally divided, with the lion’s share going to the conflict-affected eastern provinces and the capital, Kinshasa. Additionally, over 50 percent of aid is directed at humanitarian issues and social infrastructure and services, with production-oriented sectors such as agriculture receiving relatively little attention (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Foreign aid by sector



Source: World Bank 2011a, p.24

Even though the last decade has seen economic growth, GDP per capita levels still remain far behind levels during the 1960s; 71.3 percent of the population lives below the poverty line of one dollar a day (based on the 2005 1–2–3 survey).⁸ In its most recent assessment of the country’s progress towards the millennium goals, the government indicates that given the current circumstances, the ability of DRC to achieve the MDGs within the time limit is ‘illusory’, especially the goals regarding poverty, maternal mortality, HIV/Aids and other major diseases, and environmental sustainability (République Démocratique du Congo 2010, p.25). DRC’s 2010 Human Development Index score is 0.239, which

⁵ Bordering the Republic of Congo (or Congo-Brazzaville), the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania (though separated by Lake Tanganyika), Zambia, and Angola.

⁶ The last national census was held in 1984, <http://reliefweb.int/node/425198>.

⁷ <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/COD.html>

⁸ <http://www.ins.cd/cgi-bin/RpWebEngine.exe/PortalAction?>

puts the country in 168th place (just above Zimbabwe, which is in last position), far below the average of Sub-Saharan Africa (0.389) and the rest of the world (0.624) (UNDP 2010). The composite index shows that in terms of health, education and income, it is the low per capita income level which is chiefly responsible for the country's low rank.

In October 2010, an estimated 4.5 million Congolese were in a situation of acute food and livelihoods crisis, according to the Integrated Phase Classification of October 2010 (Ministère de l'Agriculture, Pêche et Elevage 2010, p.2). The May 2011 IPC shows that 'the country overall remains chronically food-insecure, [...] confirmed by the nutritional situation which remains very serious in many parts of the country, mainly in the stabilized areas.' (OCHA 2011a, pp.38–39) Key findings of the 2010 MICS analysis show that DRC has made important progress, but that there remains much to be done. Today, three out of four children go to primary school, (secondary education: 32 percent), an increase of 23 percent compared to 2000, with near parity for girls and boys – though only around half the women aged 15–24 are literate. Although the under-five mortality rate is still high (158 out of every 1,000 children die before their fifth birthday), there is a positive trend compared to 2001, when 205 out of every 1,000 did not reach the age of five. 24 percent of children under five are underweight, 43 percent are stunted⁹ and 9 percent are wasted.¹⁰ Only one in seven people uses an improved sanitation facility (14percent) and less than half the population (47percent) has access to safe drinking water, with a large difference between rural (31 percent) and urban (83 percent) areas (Institut National de la Statistique 2010).

During a transition period following the Sun City Accords, a new constitution was adopted in 2004, and the country democratically elected a government in 2006, headed by President Joseph Kabila. He was reelected in the 2011 elections. The country is divided into 11 provinces, which are governed by democratically elected provincial governments, and in turn are divided into districts (25 in total). In order to ensure a better representation of the various ethnic groups, as well as providing a more equal division of resources, a division into 25 provinces (roughly corresponding with the districts) was foreseen in the constitution. However, decentralisation has currently stalled, with the government failing to adopt and implement the necessary laws, or to decentralise the necessary resources. Therefore, there remains some doubt as to whether the decentralisation will ever be fully implemented.

The current political and economic state of the country is partly the result of the First and Second Congo Wars, and the high levels of insecurity that ensued. Although the process of economic downturn, institutional deterioration, and loss of national assets can be dated back to the first decade after independence (in 1960). After taking control of the country, Joseph-Desiré Mobutu renamed the country to Zaire, and developed a system of governance in which he was hailed the centre of authority, whereupon he impersonalised the state by assuming the role 'Father of the Nation', thus turning it into a neo-patrimonial state. He ensured his power by using state resources to reward his supporters, and by constantly keeping his subjects off-balance. One moment he would give out privileges, but soon take them away and grant them to someone else: one could fall from grace at any time. This system of rewarding his supporters, or clientelism, entailed a strong increase in numbers of public servants and employees of state companies, as well as placing his supporters in leading positions. With the consequent decline of state services and companies, as well as the large amount of resources required for the maintenance of Mobutu's clientelist system, it was no longer possible to cover the salaries of public servants, or the national army. Mobutu dealt with this by allowing them to supplement their salaries by exploiting the population: 'article quinze' or 'débrouillez-vous' (Vlassenroot & Romkema 2007, p.9). This exploitative patron-client system penetrated Congolese (Zaire's) society and became institutionalised. The result was a strong decline of the country's infrastructure and its economy, and a strong growth of the informal economy.

There is a vast array of national and international, governmental and non-governmental organisations involved in development and relief efforts in DRC – a recent investigation counted some 75 NGOs from Belgium and the Netherlands alone! (EVD et al. 2009, p.15). These are traditionally divided into

⁹ Low height-for-age, when a child is short for his/her age but not necessarily thin; also known as chronic malnutrition, carrying long-term developmental risks.

¹⁰ Low weight-for-height, when a child is thin for his/her height but not necessarily short; also known as acute malnutrition, carrying an immediate risk of morbidity and mortality.

humanitarian aid and development aid. However, the division is frequently blurred, and development and relief programmes can often take place at the same time in the same place. Humanitarian financing amounted to approximately 600 million in 2010, according to Bailey (2011, p.11), with interventions coordinated by OCHA, and governed by the Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) 2011 (OCHA 2010). In contrast, development financing totalled around 2 billion in 2010 (Bailey 2011, p.11), but coordination of these programmes is still lacking (*ibid*), seeing as nearly all aid is in the form of ‘non-system-aligned projects or programmes’, thereby bypassing the weak public financial system (Kabuya Kalala & Cassimon 2010, p.7). However, the Congolese government is making attempts to increase coordination and transparency. It organised an Aid Effectiveness Forum in June 2009, where a number of measures to improve coordination between donors and the government were agreed upon, and a Plateforme de Gestion de l'Aide et des Investissements¹¹ was established. The website associated with this platform supplies information on major donors and the amounts invested per sector, but gives no indication as to how complete this information is. Due to the lack of coordination and financial tracking of aid in DRC, ‘what [development aid] is achieving is largely a mystery’, according to Bailey (2011, p.12).

Table 1: HAP 2011 budget by cluster

Humanitarian Action Plan for the Democratic Republic of the Congo for 2011 As on 15 November 2010 http://fts.unocha.org	
Compiled by OCHA based on information furnished by donors and agencies.	
Sector Group	Funds Required (US\$)
NON FOOD ITEMS AND EMERGENCY SHELTER	75,241,735
COORDINATION	20,750,000
WATER, HYGIENE AND SANITATION	95,617,000
EDUCATION	28,800,000
LOGISTICS	49,484,785
MULTI-SECTOR	17,420,000
NUTRITION	41,090,620
PROTECTION	49,765,531
EARLY RECOVERY	11,020,000
HEALTH	35,100,000
FOOD SECURITY	295,000,000
Grand Total	719,289,671

Source: OCHA 2010, p.4

2.2 Nature of conflict

The conflict and its subsequent ‘no peace, no war’ situation in DRC have led to the displacement of an estimated 1.7 million Congolese, including 128,782 newly displaced in the first quarter of 2011 (OCHA 2011a, p.38). Millions live in fear and rely on humanitarian assistance for survival (OCHA 2011b). The majority of these displaced can be found in the (north)eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, and Province Orientale, but there are also some 50,000 in Katanga. Additionally, an estimated 450,000 Congolese refugees reside in neighbouring countries, with over 120,000 people fleeing inter-ethnic clashes in the province of Equateur (*ibid*) to recently move across the border to the Republic of Congo.¹² The International Rescue Committee (IRC) estimates that between August 1998 and April 2007, 5.4 million excess deaths have occurred due to the prolonged violence, with 2.1 million since the formal end of the war (Coghlan et al. 2007). The IRC studies are contested (Human Security Report Project 2011, pp.123–131),¹³ with some claiming the amount of excess deaths may be as ‘low’ as 200,000

¹¹ ‘Platform for the Management of Aid and Investments’: <http://pga.ministereduplan.cd/>

¹² http://www.refugeesinternational.org/where-we-work/africa/dr-congo?gclid=CO2p4t_OiqsCFQOIdgodSOCFuw

¹³ Mainly due to the differences in quality between the various surveys and to the fact that it is very hard to retrospectively determine the mortality rate before the start of the conflict.

(Lambert & Lohlé-Tart 2008). Nevertheless, after analysing both studies, the Health and Nutrition Tracking Service concluded that ‘the mortality in the DRC is at very high levels, and a reason for grave concern’ (HNTS 2009, p.22). Less than 10 percent of deaths are directly related to violence, according to the IRC, and the vast majority died because of ‘indirect public health effects of conflict’ (Coghlan et al. 2007, p.1). In its last study, covering 2006, the IRC found that 47 percent of deaths were of children.

The conflict, and persisting insecurity, is characterised by widespread sexual violence,¹⁴ with at least 200,000 cases reported since the start of the conflict, and 15,000 cases in 2009 alone (Kelly et al. 2011, p.6). However, due to underreporting, this is thought to be a low estimate; according to recent study by Peterman et al., approximately 1.69 to 1.80 million women reported having been raped during their lifetime, with over 400,000 women in the preceding 12 months, in 2006/2007 (2011, p.1060). Even though the war may be officially over, high levels of sexual violence persist, indicating that the people are still living in war-like conditions (C. Dolan 2010). A recent study by Oxfam found that three-quarters of the (1,705) people surveyed felt that their security had not improved since last year, a figure rising to 90 percent in the north-eastern parts affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army (2011, p.1).

The ‘proliferation of weapons and ammunitions’ in DRC, in part originating with the national army FARDC, plays a large role in the continuation of daily violence against civilians, according to an open letter by Amnesty International and many other organisations (Amnesty International & others 2008). The letter calls upon the UN to strengthen its embargo on DRC, and the instalment of procedures to ensure that military equipment is not used by any group other than FARDC. Estimations of numbers of illicit small arms and large weapons in DRC remain unavailable.

In 2008, the Child Soldiers Global Report estimated that 7,000 child soldiers remained in armed groups, including the national army (child recruitment officially ended in 2003), mostly in the eastern provinces (Ituri, North and South Kivu, Maniema, Katanga) and Equateur. These children were used as ‘combatants, porters, guards and sexual slaves’ (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2008, pp.106–113). Between the end of 2003, and mid-2007, an estimated 30,000 child soldiers have been demobilised (Amnesty International 2006). Thousands left armed forces without officially being demobilised. Even though girls accounted for approximately 40 percent of child soldiers in DRC (*ibid*), only 12 percent of formally demobilised children were girls. In some areas, notably North Kivu, active recruitment continued in 2007. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes faced many problems, including lack of interest from authorities, a shortage of funds, and little knowledge of how to deal with female child soldiers.

The enormous mineral wealth that can be found in the eastern provinces of DRC is deeply intertwined with the conflict, leading Gambino (2011, p.15) to term DRC ‘a classic case of the resource curse’.¹⁵ The war fuelled the formation of militias that used their control of mines in order to raise funds in order to sustain their activities. ‘In a situation where insecurity and illegality fed on each other, the mining economy became a particularly opaque conflict economy (“conflict minerals”). The eastern DRC became an area of uncontrolled extraction of raw materials, organised by local and regional interests operating with actors in the international market.’ (International Alert 2010c, p.5) During the wars, the Ugandan and Rwandan armies used the Congolese minerals to finance the war effort, with Rwanda even installing a ‘Congo desk’ to control Congolese mineral imports. To this day, various armed groups, as well as the Congolese national army FARDC, are taking part in this exploitation of natural resources. The involvement of high army officials and the desire to maintain this situation continues to stall the process of the integration (and *mixage et brassage*, or mixing and brewing) of former rebel groups into the army (International Alert 2010c).¹⁶ Recent initiatives (e.g. by the Enough Project) against conflict minerals have led to a conflict minerals provision in the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States, which requires companies that manufacture products using conflict minerals to report whether these mineral originate in DRC or a neighbouring country. If this is the case, the company is required to give a detailed

¹⁴ ‘Including gang rape, abduction for purposes of sexual slavery, forced participation of family members in rape, and mutilation of women’s genitalia with knives and guns, among other atrocities’ (Peterman et al. 2011, p.1060)

¹⁵ The resource curse entails that countries rich in natural resources are more likely to experience violent conflict, as greed leads people to attempt to lay hands on these riches.

¹⁶ The International Peace Information Service (IPIS) publishes maps of mining areas and the (armed) actors involved: <http://www.ipisresearch.be/mapping.php>

report on the origin of the minerals, resulting in possible public disclosure of their conflict-fuelling activities.¹⁷

In the early 90s, the country's economic and institutional decline affected Mobutu's rule, leading to an 'intensive national political competition' (Raeymaekers 2011, p.6), which at local levels translated into a struggle for land and political representation. This competition became ethnicised in the East, notably North Kivu, between 'original' inhabitants of the area and their 'foreign' Rwandan-speaking (Hutu and Tutsi) neighbours, with violent outbursts that left several thousands dead in 1993. The local conflict became regionalised through the genocide in neighbouring Rwanda in 1994, with more than a million Rwandan (Hutu) refugees fleeing to eastern Zaire. After taking control of Rwanda and ending the genocide, the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) undertook military campaigns in Zaire in order to retaliate against raids by the Hutu militia Interahamwe, who has sought refuge in Zaire. With support of Uganda and Burundi, as well as Zairian rebels, a 'liberation force' was formed, and this 'Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire' (AFDL) reached Kinshasa in 1997, ending Mobutu's rule, and installing a new ruler, Laurent-Désiré Kabila.

Though initially welcomed, Kabila's increasingly authoritarian and 'autochthonous' agenda made him lose his foreign support within a year. A new rebel movement was formed in Goma, 1998, the 'Congolese Rally for Democracy' (RCD), which was the beginning of a 'full-fledged regional conflict', involving Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi opposing Kabila, while Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad, and Libya showing support to Kabila.¹⁸ Rwanda and Uganda took control of a large part of the east of DRC, and Uganda started to support its own movement, the 'Movement for the Liberation of Congo' (MLC) in the north of the country. Kabila in turn supported the Hutu's cause in the east, helping them to rally against their Rwandan (Tutsi) enemies. A large number of different groups, with shifting alliances and territories, was formed during the following years, resulting in a 'steady fragmentation of the country's national territory in various rebel strongholds linked to different foreign markets and supporters' (Raeymaekers 2011, p.7). The Uppsala University Conflict Data Program (UCDP) counts 17 'non-state' conflicts in DRC since 1989, including conflicts between rebel groups and population groups (14 with acts of violence since 2002), and 22 different parties that have committed 'one-sided violence' against civilians (since 2002, acts of violence by 19 groups, including the national army).¹⁹

A first peace agreement was signed in 1999, followed by another three, which only 'marginally' affected the conflict, despite the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission MONUC in place since 1999. In the meantime, President Kabila was assassinated, and succeeded by his son, Joseph Kabila. In July 2003, Congolese parties involved in the conflict signed a peace agreement that established a transitional government with the major factions, leading to democratic elections held in 2006. Even so, the violence continued, in a situation characterised as 'no peace, no war' (Richards 2005). Particularly in eastern parts of the country, North and South Kivu, Province Oriental (Ituri), Maniema, parts of Katanga and Kasai, the population still faces 'war-like levels of violence and poverty'. Hutu refugees united in the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR) continued attacks on civilians, and in response Laurent Nkunda formed the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP). These were in conflict with each other, and the newly formed national army FARDC, which integrated former rebel movements, thereby making it guilty of 'systematic extortion and rampant rape' (Raeymaekers 2011, p.9) – acts which are still being committed (Oxfam 2011). To further complicate matters, since 2008, the originally Ugandan rebel movement the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has also staged attacks in the northeast of the country (Oxfam 2011, p.3). In recent years, other parts of the country have also seen eruptions of violence (notably Equateur); in the east, with the conclusion of an agreement between the CNDP and the government, and weakening of the FDLR, levels of security seem to be improving. However, there remains a long way to go, as 'beneath these recurrent instances of acute violence lay a number of structural conditions of (un)governability that will not simply disappear with elections or even government decentralisation' (Raeymaekers 2011, pp.6–10).

¹⁷ <http://www.enoughproject.org/special-topics/understanding-conflict-minerals-provisions>

¹⁸ The large involvement of other African countries has led some observers to use the term 'Africa's World War' (Groupe URD & GPPI 2010, p.22).

¹⁹ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Date of retrieval: September 7, 2011) UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia: www.ucdp.uu.se/database, Uppsala University

This country context reveals that DRC faces many (interlinked) challenges. A first major challenge is posed by the fact that the majority of the population still live in conditions of poverty and lack access to basic services. A second challenge: levels of insecurity persist in certain areas, the integration of rebel forces into the national army is complicated, and (in the east) armed forces are involved in the (informal) exploitation of mines. Third, the country greatly depends on aid, even though recent years have seen economic growth; the agricultural sector fails to provide for all, a large amount of food is imported, and part of the population depends on food aid. Finally, the system of self-help through 'taxation' and patrimonialism is prevalent and persistent, and further complicates institutional reform as well as humanitarian and development assistance. The following sections will delve deeper into these issues, exploring the evidence on the state of livelihoods, and basic services and social protection in the DRC.


3 Livelihoods and growth

3.1 Livelihoods overview

This section will first provide a general description of livelihoods in DRC, before zooming in on the three sectors that are under special scrutiny: mining, agriculture, and (petty) trade. Next, this section will go into the various interventions that can be distinguished in these sectors, whether government-led, community-based, agency-led, or private sector-led, with a special focus on participation

3.1.1 General

Figure 2: Contributions to growth by sector



Source: Ministère du Plan 2011b, p.35

A livelihood ‘comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living; a livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with, and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihoods opportunities for the next generation’ (Chambers & Conway 1992). Official figures on Congolese people’s livelihood strategies are hard to come by. An indication of what are important sectors can be found in the sources of growth over the past ten years, as identified by the Ministère du Plan (2011b, p.35; see also World Bank 2011b). The Table shows that while at first growth was mainly supported by the mining industry and construction, the second half of the last decade saw a strong contribution of agriculture and services, especially in wholesale and retail. Trade, agriculture, mining, construction, transport and telecommunications, are also designated key sectors in the national growth strategy.

In the draft versions of the 2011 Document de Strategie de Croissance et la Réduction de la Pauvreté (Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper, or DSCR2) (Ministère du Plan 2011a; Ministère du Plan 2011b), the Congolese government (estimating the population available for work at 34,510,000) bases its unemployment figures on the 2005 1-2-3 survey: unemployment rates (taux de chômage) in urban areas reach 17.8 percent, while national unemployment stands at 6.5 percent (2011b, p.36). The rate increases to 32.23 percent among youth in urban environments (15-24), making it unlikely for DRC to reach the Millennium goal of reducing youth unemployment to 10 percent by 2015. However, the Ministry also describes the difficulty of various statistics presenting a diverging picture of the state of employment in DRC: ILO statistics give unemployment rates of 3.72 percent – 4.49 percent for men and 2.97 for women, while other unemployment rates (source unclear) are 9.41 percent for men and 8.43 percent for women; the IMF, on the other hand, finds unemployment levels of 48.2 percent in 2006, 47.2 percent in 2007, and 53.2 percent in 2008. Finally, World Bank studies come up with a cumulative rate of underemployment of 72.73percent, which, corresponding with the poverty rate of 71.3 percent, reflects the ‘niveau réel’ of unemployment in DRC, according to the Ministry (Ministère du Plan 2011a, p.68).

Little disaggregated data can be found, either by sector, or at the provincial or district level. The informal nature of many livelihoods contributes to this: estimates vary, with Meni (2000, p.3), vice-president of the Académie Nationale des Sciences du Développement, estimating only 1 percent of all employment in urban areas to be formal in 2000. With figures drawn from De Herdt and Marysse (1996), he shows that since 1955, formal employment rates have dropped from 39 percent of the urban work force (15–59) to 29.1 percent in 1961, and a mere 5 percent in 1990. However, in 2011, the Ministry of Planning estimates the rate of informal employment at 90.6 percent, with formal employment rates thus reaching almost 10 percent (of which two-thirds are in the public sector) (2011b, p.36).

Poverty is both the reason and consequence of people engaging in informal activities: they are driven to these activities because they are in need of resources, and yet many informal activities serve for subsistence only – forming a ‘poverty trap’. The vast majority of the Congolese population is poor, and the poverty has many facets: low income, non-food needs, lack of access to health care, schooling and decent housing, etc. The incidence of poverty, according to the 1–2–3 Survey in 2005, was estimated at 71.3 percent, with the share of the poorest fifth of the population in national consumption at 8 percent and the depth of poverty in the same year estimated at 32 percent. There is no more recent study collecting household consumption data for poverty analysis, and the statistical information available to date is insufficient to fully grasp the evolution of poverty in the country over a longer period.

By its nature, informal economic activity is extremely hard to document and measure, as it is not reflected in official statistics. ‘From official statistics ... it is necessary to conclude that most of the population died of starvation some time ago’, says Wyatt MacGaffey (1982, p.103; as quoted by Putzel et al. 2008). In the early 1990s, Janet MacGaffey estimated the ‘unrecorded and illicit transactions’ of the informal economy to be three times the size of official GDP (1991, p.11; as quoted by Putzel et al. 2008). Schneider et al. (2010) similarly made an attempt to measure the size of the ‘shadow economy’, as they call it, finding that the Congolese informal economy had a size of 47–48 percent of the GDP in 2007 : still relatively large, but a great deal smaller than the 1991 estimate, illustrating the complexity of measuring the informal economy. Putzel et al. conclude on this subject that ‘in the DRC, the economy is informal and understanding better how it works will be essential to designing strategies to promote growth and poverty reduction’ (2008, p.17). In fragile, ‘weak’ states, as DRC, ‘distinctions between formal and informal or official and unofficial are simply meaningless, even where ‘recognized’ forms of governance exist’ (Little 2005, p.18) : governments are often involved in ‘unofficial’ export of commodities, and illicit companies are allowed to operate openly, sometimes supported by the government (Hibou 1999, p.80).

Notwithstanding the informal nature of the majority of people’s livelihoods, some figures can be found in various provincial-level documents: i.e. the 2009 PNUD-RDC document on Maniema reveals that the majority are employed in the agricultural sector, as it accounts for 87.3 percent of employment, while ‘informal’ jobs account for another 5.8 percent; these figures are based on the 2005 1–2–3 survey (PNUD RDC 2009a). There are documents describing each of the 11 provinces (see, for example, PNUD RDC 2009b; PNUD RDC 2009c). However, it is difficult to ascertain the quality of the data.

In its 2007-2008 Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) (see Table 2), the World Food Programme finds that ‘farming or related activities (sale of agricultural products or hunting, fishing and gathering) is the main livelihood activity for 92 percent of rural households (it varies from 83.3 percent in South Kivu to 97 percent in Bas Congo)’, contributing to about 64 percent of households’ food consumption. Fishing is the second livelihood activity in Equateur and Katanga, while petty trade is the second activity in the Kivu. In Kasai, the first livelihood activities are wage labour and mining activities. (WFP et al. 2008, p.3) Furthermore, the WFP et al. find that only 23 percent of the households engage in just one income/food generating activity, while 45.5 percent engages in two, and 31.6 percent in three or more activities. There exist large differences between provinces, with 10.8 percent in Equateur and Maniema respectively, with 7.4 percent engaging in only one activity, while in Bas Congo and Kasai Oriental the proportion rises to almost half the households (47.1 percent and 44.1 percent) (WFP et al. 2008, p.40).

Table 2: Main household activities, excluding Kinshasa

Agro-pastoral	Agriculture	92.6%
	Fishing	19.8%
	Livestock	11.3%
	Hunting	9.7%
	Gathering	4.8%
Commerce	Agricultural products	17.6%
	Petty trade	12.3%
Wage work	Day jobs	6.9%
	Civil service	5.5%
Crafts/small businesses		10.3%

Source: WFP et al. 2008, p.41

Agriculture is the principle activity for the different types of livelihoods. Almost half (47.9 percent) the households have a 'purely agricultural' way of life. Another third (31.8 percent) of the households have a way of life based on agriculture, such as trade in agricultural products (11.9 percent), group fishing, hunting and gathering. Even the officials, employees or contractors (9.7 percent), derive a third of their income from agriculture. Only about 1 percent of the households live mainly on assistance, through donations or money transfers (WFP et al. 2008, p.43).


3.1.2 Mining

The mining sector has been one of the main sources of economic growth in recent years, according to official documents (Ministère du Plan 2011b, p.35). However, these figures do not capture the whole of the mining sector, as mining as a livelihood in DRC can be essentially divided into two different domains: formal, large-scale industrial mining (mainly in Katanga), and informal, small-scale artisanal mining (in the Kivus, Maniema, Province Oriental, the Kasais). In official documents, figures on mining generally refer to the formal mining sector, while figures on artisanal mining are to be found in NGO reports – though recent government and WB reports also refer to these estimates. In both cases, however, the collection of data is complicated, and figures are at best an estimation of the real scale. The two parts of the sector also do not operate independently from each other: in many large-scale mining sites in Katanga, for example, informal artisanal miners come out at night to do their own mining; or industrial smaller-scale local smelters buy ore from artisanal miners. Also, resources mined by artisans end up in formal processing industries.

Both forms of mining represent options for livelihood strategies: formal jobs in industrial mining, versus informal jobs in the artisanal mining sector. The focus of research/policy on artisanal mining has predominantly been on its negative effects, as a form of exploitation, resources fuelling conflict, and working under unhealthy and dangerous circumstances. This is still the dominant discourse today, but a new, more nuanced discourse is arising, voiced by organisations such as Pact, International Alert, and the Communities and Artisanal & Small-scale Mining initiative. This discourse approaches artisanal mining as a livelihood strategy, aiming to improve the working circumstances and returns, and protection of workers, as a way of 'formalisation', and to gather data on the artisanal mining industry (International Alert 2010c; International Alert 2010a; International Alert 2010b; Pact, Inc. 2010; Garrett 2008; Garrett & Mitchell 2009).

From the early 1990s onwards, industrial production of minerals fell because of 'the civil war, mismanagement of state-owned enterprises, weak and corrupt government services, and a downturn in international commodity prices' (World Bank 2010b, p.45) (see Akitoby & Cinyabuguma (2004, pp.9–10) for a more detailed account). The demise of the industrial mining sector has not only had grave consequences for the national economy, but also for the provinces and communities where operations were located, seeing as companies were no longer able to maintain their support for infrastructure and social activities in these communities.

Figure 3: The demise of industrial mining in DRC



Source: Akitoby & Cinyabuguma 2004, pp.9–10

On the other hand, the downfall of industrial mining increased opportunities for small-scale miners, meaning artisanal mining expanded, currently accounting for an estimated 90 percent of the minerals exported (World Bank 2010b, p.45). It was legalised in the Congolese mining code of 2002 as ‘any activity by means of which a person of Congolese nationality carries out extraction and concentration of mineral substances using artisanal tools, methods and processes, within an artisanal exploitation area limited in terms of surface industrial mining’ (République Démocratique du Congo 2002). ‘In theory, industrial mining is regulated at the national level by the Ministry of Mines and the Mining Registry (*cadastre minier*) in Kinshasa. Artisanal mining permits are granted at the provincial level by the Mining Ministry’s local representatives and the sector is regulated by SAESSCAM, a state agency. The *Centre d’Evaluation, d’Expertise et de Certification* (CEEC) is involved in assessing the quality of the minerals and certifying their origin’ (International Alert 2010b, p.70).

Apart from the diggers, a great deal more people are directly and indirectly dependent on the artisanal mining sector, involving ‘local, national, regional and international actors including miners, mine support workers, porters, intermediate buyers, civil servants, security forces, transporters, assayers, urban day labourers, exporters, state officials, and mineral processors’ (Garrett & Mitchell 2009, p.23); and of course the dependents of artisanal miners and people involved in this trading chain. Estimates on the amount of Congolese that depend directly or indirectly on artisanal mining for their livelihoods vary greatly, ranging from two to ten million (which would be approximately 15 percent of the total population).²⁰ There is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding figures on artisanal mining, and the amount of people that depend on it for a living.

In its first draft of the DSCR2, the Congolese government estimates mineral deposits in DRC (Ministère du Plan 2011a, p.19) at: 75 million tonnes of copper, 4.5 million tonnes of cobalt, 1 billion tonnes of iron, 450 thousand tonnes of cassiterite, 7 million tonnes of zinc, 7 million tonnes of manganese, 600 tonnes of gold, 240 million carats of diamonds, 30 million tonnes of niobium and 3,150 tonnes of lithium. However, it is difficult to corroborate these statistics – though organisations such as Pact and the World Bank confirm DRC’s ‘enormous’ mineral wealth, including some of the world’s major deposits: the largest cobalt reserves in the world; the second richest copper region in the world; the largest known diamond reserves globally (25 percent of the known resources); and the world’s largest untapped gold deposits. As shown under the ‘nature of conflict’ heading, this mineral wealth has fuelled conflict, making the collection of accurate data difficult. ‘The opaqueness of the mining sector is not simply due to deliberate concealment and fraud, nor to the problems caused by the continued presence and activities of armed groups. The problem starts with the existence of huge gaps in available information about the geography of production’ (International Alert 2010c, p.5).

²⁰ See the chapter on data for a more elaborate description of the origin of these estimates

3.1.3 Agriculture

Sources agree that the agricultural sector in DRC is a sector with an enormous potential for growth. The round table on agriculture in DRC stated in 2004, 'at the present stage of economic development of the DRC', no other sector can put as many people to work, generate incomes and substantial added value, in equity, reaching the poorest segments of the population. 'The Congo has an enormous agricultural potential and can become a bread basket (grenier) of Africa' (Tollens 2004). Similarly, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nation (FAO) says: 'with 80 million hectares of arable land [of a total surface area of 227 million hectares], DR Congo's agricultural potential is enormous' (2011). The agricultural sector has more than 80 million hectares of arable land at its disposal, with sufficient fertility, 4 million hectares of irrigable land, a diverse climate and an important river system for practicing a wide range of cultures (WFP et al. 2008, p.42). Some even claim that 'the Democratic Republic of the Congo can feed all Africa and the countries of the European Union' (about 2 billion people), though it is unclear what evidence this is based upon. The World Bank, in its 2011 'Boosting Growth and Employment' report, even refers to a figure of 3 billion people, based on a 1984 study done by the FAO, UNFPA, and IIASA (2011a, p.57).


However, the agricultural potential contrasts with the amount of land under cultivation, and the number of undernourished people in DRC: 'only 10 percent of [the arable land] is being used, and the total is declining. The surface cultivated for a staple crop like cassava has declined from 2.4 million hectares in 1991 to 1.9 million in 2001. An estimated 75 percent of the Congolese population is underfed.' (FAO 2011) DRC is a 'food deficit' country, with the western part as an exception (particularly Bas Congo). Over the last ten years, there has been a significant decline of the production of almost all agricultural products. For example, the production of cassava has decreased by 23 percent between 1992 and 2006; the production of plantain has decreased by 75 percent between 1990 and 2006.' Maize production has increased by 33 percent between 1990 and 2006, but production has decreased by 22 percent in Maniema and North Kivu, and in Katanga by 12 percent (WFP 2008, p.3).

The agricultural sector accounts for approximately 40 percent of GDP (Ministère du Plan 2011a, p.18). Principal products are coffee, cacao and cassava/manioc, while other commodities are palm oil, rubber, fish, livestock, rice, fruit, tea, corn, and plantain (EVD et al. 2009, p.10). The agricultural contribution to exports declined continuously from about 40 percent of exports in 1960 to less than 10 percent in 2000 (Akitoby & Cinyabuguma 2004, p.8), and the Ministry of Planning estimates this percentage has not significantly changed to date (Ministère du Plan 2011b, p.50). However, the World Bank judges the current situation 'favourable for a sustained recovery of agricultural growth, both on the domestic market and on regional and international markets' (2010a, pp.117-118). With approximately 65 percent of the Congolese people living in rural areas (World Bank data), agricultural growth has the potential to significantly impact the lives of the majority of Congolese, improving their living conditions, and food security. As described previously, for 92 percent of the rural households, farming or sale of agricultural products, hunting, fishing and gathering, is the main livelihood activity, contributing to about 64 percent of households' food consumption. Thus, the main source of food is people's own production, with the market as second source (except in the Kivus, where the market is the first source) (WFP 2008, p.3). Overview of livelihood support initiatives.

3.1.4 Petty trade

Estimations of the size of the commercial or petty trade sector in DRC are hard to come by, as most, or even all activities are informal. An indication of the importance of the sector can be found in estimations of the size of the informal economy, and in the number of people that do not have formal employment, described under the 'general' heading at the beginning of this chapter. In the latest (2011) 'Doing Business' report of the World Bank, DRC ranks 175th out of 183 countries (World Bank & IFC 2010, p.157). This indicates the difficulty of starting a business in this country, and perhaps partly explains the size of the informal economy.

Figure 4: Commercial zones in DRC



Source: World Bank 2010a, p.119

Several studies reveal the importance of cross-border trade in the border regions of the country. The map to the right, drawn from the World Bank Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (2010a, p.119), indicates ‘major areas of cross-border trade’. According to this report, DRC can be divided into several regions, which are integrated economically: ‘the principal outlet for producers in Bas-Congo, Bandundu and Equateur is the metropolitan region of Kinshasa, but also markets in the Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Cameroon and the Central African Republic. The main market for producers in the South of the country is the mining basin of Katanga, but also Zambia, Angola, Zimbabwe, and even South Africa. The principal external outlets for producers in the two Kivus and Ituri are countries around the Great Lakes, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, and the regions to the west of Tanzania and Kenya’ (*ibid*, p.118). Informal cross-border trade is stimulated by the relatively sustained growth of neighbouring countries, and by the fact that these countries can serve as platforms for export, seeing as their infrastructure is better. For example, a large part of coffee exported from Rwanda was grown in Kivu, moving through the ‘Northern corridor (Goma – Kigali – Kampala – Nairobi – Mombasa)’ (2010a, p.119).

Many people engage in activities of petty trade in order to make a living, but frequently also as a supplement to household income. In the border areas, people trade across the border, usually crossing with small amounts of goods at a time. In their study on informal cross-border trade between North Kivu (DRC) and West Province (Rwanda), Kimanuka and Lange (2010), estimate that 22,000 people are to a certain extent dependent on the trade, on both sides of the border. For the Congolese traders, trade is the primary means of subsistence for 58 percent, while salary and ‘self-reliance’ account for another 25 and 16 percent. This shows that for many traders, this business is an additional livelihood strategy – though it is the primary strategy for the majority in this study. The large majority are women (over 75 percent); and they are involved in small-scale commerce. Male traders, on the other hand, often have access to more working capital and higher earnings. An estimation of the scale of informal trade, compared to the official import and export figures, can be found in Brenton et al. (2011, p.7): ‘a crude comparison of data on formal trade from COMESA’s COMSTAT and estimates of informal trade by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics suggests that informal trade in agricultural products may be as much as 5 times higher than recorded trade for DRCs trade with neighbours in the Great Lakes region’.

A study on cross-border trade between Southern Sudan, northern Uganda and north-eastern DRC, Titeca (2009) finds ‘intensive trade’, which has evolved since the mid-1980s, involving many inhabitants of the three areas. However, though he analysed price differences between the three

countries for important commodities and foodstuffs and raw materials, he does not supply estimations of the number of people involved, and how trade forms part of their set of livelihood strategies.

3.2 Livelihood interventions

This section will go over livelihood interventions, starting with the government policy and programmes. Next, people-led initiatives will be discussed, followed by agency-led interventions, as well as private sector interventions. Finally, the focus will move to participation.

3.2.1 Government-led interventions

Table 3: Sectoral budget allocations 2011–2015

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Pilier 1 : Renforcer la gouvernance et la paix	40,1	19,6	20,2	19,9	20,2	20,5
Gouvernance et renforcement de la démocratie	14,1	6,0	6,0	5,8	5,7	5,5
Défense nationale et sécurité	14,9	7,2	7,5	7,4	7,9	8,4
Gouvernance économique et financière	9,6	5,9	6,2	6,1	6,1	6,0
Gouvernance administrative	1,5	0,6	0,6	0,6	0,6	0,7
Pilier 2 : Diversifier l'économie, accélérer la croissance et promouvoir l'emploi	30,7	47,4	46,7	45,6	44,7	43,3
Production	5,0	4,7	5,3	5,8	6,3	6,8
Services	1,0	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2
Intégration économique	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2
Emploi	0,5	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,2
Infrastructures	13,1	35,9	34,2	32,8	31,6	30,3
Energie et hydrauliques	10,9	6,3	6,7	6,5	6,1	5,6
Pilier 3 : Améliorer les services sociaux de base et renforcer le capital humain	25,7	29,6	29,5	30,9	31,7	32,9
Education	15,5	13,4	13,8	13,9	14,3	14,5
Santé et nutrition	7,5	11,9	11,2	12,2	12,6	13,7
Protection sociale et inclusion des groupes vulnérables	1,8	1,5	1,6	1,5	1,5	1,4
Sport et culture	0,8	0,3	0,4	0,6	0,6	0,6
Habitat et assainissement du cadre de vie	0,2	2,5	2,6	2,7	2,8	2,8
Pilier 4 : Protéger l'environnement et lutter contre le changement climatique	3,6	3,4	3,6	3,5	3,4	3,2
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Source: Ministère du Plan 2011b, p.79

According to the Congolese government's draft DSCR2, employment forms a 'major concern'. The government is basing its employment policy on achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and 'promoting the private sector through improving the business environment and public investments, including infrastructure' (Ministère du Plan 2011b, p.57). The budget for the 2011-2015 period (see the Table 4) shows that a great deal of the budget is invested in the second 'pillar': economic diversification, accelerating growth and promoting employment. Within this pillar, the government invests heavily in infrastructure and energy (over 40 percent in 2011). Production gets 5-6 percent, which is a continuation of the allocation rate of before 2011. This means the government is allocating less than 10 percent of its budget to the agricultural sector, as is stipulated by the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) (Tollens 2004, p.23),²¹ which DRC is taking part in, according to the draft DSCR2 (Ministère du Plan 2011b, p.51). 1.5percent of the budget is allocated to social protection, which affects livelihoods, seeing as it deals with pensions and unemployment: this allocation remains quite constant, and indicates its relative (un)importance, and/or the government's inability to invest in social protection measures. Additionally, recent years have shown great discrepancies between the budget allocations and actual spending; there is no guarantee that allocated funds will be spent accordingly (see for example the Table on health spending under the 'government commitment to basic services' heading).

Though the government lays out a number of plans for improving employment, and investing in various sectors that are important to the national economy, their inclusion in the DSCR2 is no guarantee that these plans will actually be carried out. As the Ministry comments in its discussion of risks surrounding implementation, 'one of the major weaknesses in the implementation of the [first] PRSP [...] was the

²¹ <http://www.nepad.org/foodsecurity/agriculture/about>

weakness of its appropriation by the political and administrative authorities of the country. Although officially recognized by all as the only framework for policies, programs and development activities, *most political-administrative authorities and managers did not pay particular attention. They planned, budgeted, implemented and monitored public interventions, without taking [the PRSP] into account* (Ministère du Plan 2011b, p.90, emphasis added).

Mining

As the country is endowed with a wealth of resources, the mining sector (both industrial and artisanal mining), is of prime national importance. In its draft DSCR2, the government expresses its intent to 'strengthen the legal and regulatory framework governing the sector, fight against fraud and enhance transparency in the management of mineral resources and organize the activities of small-scale mining, while preserving the environment' (Ministère du Plan 2011b, p.55). In the artisanal mining sector, the government aims at legalisation, through the 'creation and supervision of cooperatives', further institutionalising artisanal mining zones, and setting in place a 'system of traceability and certification', in response to the requirements posed by the Dodd-Frank Act.²²

By a presidential decision on September 9, 2010, Kabila declared a six-month ban (till March 10, 2011) on mining in the two Kivus and Maniema, in order to stop the illegal exploitation of natural resources in Eastern DRC (Tegera 2011). The success of the ban is questionable, however, as units of the Congolese army FARDC have reportedly taken advantage of the situation to strengthen their control over certain mines, and thus control over mines has shifted from one armed authority to the other, both seeking to use this control for their own benefits. In other areas, thousands of miners, traders, and their dependents lost their income (Tegera 2011; Verbruggen et al. 2011, pp.18–19).

The government now deems the east sufficiently secure to launch a 'Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan for War-affected Areas' (STAREC²³), of which one of the goals is the restoration of state authority over the minerals sector, through FARDC supervision, deployment of state agencies, and setting up checkpoints. According to Verbruggen et al, 'it is hard to say how much progress has been made', but several small initiatives have been announced, none directly related to mining, and MONUSCO announced the investment of USD 30 million into the programme. Additionally, through STAREC a plan has been launched to set up five mineral trading centres, where miners and traders would be able to do business without interference by armed forces, and would be controlled by state agents, accessible to miners, and linked to regional hubs by fixed transportation routes (Verbruggen et al. 2011, p.20).

Agriculture

Regarding agricultural policy, a central document is the 'Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development', adopted in April 2010. This document sets out strategic lines for the development of the sector and assuring food security: improving market access, rural infrastructure and trade capacity; improving crop production, livestock, fisheries and handicrafts; reinforcing governance, institutional capacities and human resources; and organising rural communities into self-management structures and assuring sector financing (Ministère du Plan 2011b, p.50). However, as the budget 2011–2015 shows, the government is allocating less than the CAADP recommended 10 percent to the sector, questioning the government's ability to develop the sector. A presentation on the agricultural sector at a DSCR2 review meeting showed that the agricultural share of the budget was 2 percent or lower from 2007 to 2009, the actual implementation rate was 78 percent or lower, and 'it must be noted that 90 percent of these funds are primarily used for the compensation of state employees' (Anon 2010a, p.21). DRC also used to have a well-developed agricultural research capacity, in the form of INERA, the national institute for agricultural research. This research capacity has dropped to an all-time low after 20 years of neglect: only nine of the 32 research stations at independence remain in 2011, and even these are 'poorly equipped' and 'understaffed'. The International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) remains involved in rehabilitation of existing infrastructure, prioritising research on the basic pests.

²² <http://www.enoughproject.org/special-topics/understanding-conflict-minerals-provisions>

²³ 'Programme de Stabilisation et de Reconstruction des Zones sortant des conflits armés'

Such research is of extreme importance, seeing as the country's staple crops, such as cassava and plantain are heavily affected by crop diseases.²⁴

Petty trade

As petty trade largely takes place in the informal economy, the government has no programmes or policies specifically directed at these activities. However, generally speaking, the government expresses its intent to increasingly formalise the informal economy, in order to widen its tax base, as well as to decrease the amount of illegal activities, protect its citizens from exploitation, and increase the standard of living of the Congolese people.

Regarding cross-border trade, no comprehensive border-management policy currently exists. A recent World Bank study conducted in the east makes the following recommendations: to ensure that 'only the four agencies that are legally entitled to be at the border are present', as currently up to 15 agencies operate at the border, causing much 'harassment'; to increase the transparency and predictability of the trade policy regime, such as recording all payments made to an official, in a clearly designated building, excluding payment in kind; improving infrastructure at border crossings, both the transport infrastructure and the buildings used by officials, including the provision of basic facilities such as electricity and water for officials; and finally strengthening cross-border coordination and cooperation through key border agencies working alongside Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda (World Bank 2011c).

3.2.2 Coping and community-based initiatives

In situations affected by conflict, the people who are affected are the first responders, employing a variety of strategies to minimise risk and/or continue or restore (some of) their livelihood activities. Very few studies have documented the various types of strategies that have been used in DRC. A division can be made into two categories: personal/household-level coping strategies, and forms of community organisation. In rural areas, violence and persisting high levels of insecurity during and after the conflict have limited access to fields, and led to a destruction of assets, livestock (the number of livestock in North Kivu was reduced by more than 50 percent during the war, according to Vlassenroot et al (2006, p.11)), as well as limited access to markets, due to road and river transport no longer being available.

Private

In general, agriculture became limited to farming for subsistence, with adaptations made to farming practices. The few studies that address livelihood strategies adaptations mention, among others, shifting to lower-risk but less efficient crops, thereby decreasing the investments in land (Jaspars & Maxwell 2009, p.5); shifting from cattle to small stock in North Kivu (Vlassenroot et al. 2006, p.11; also the case of the "Cobaye" in South Kivu, Maass et al. 2010); avoiding storage of seeds or stock (Raeymaekers 2006), and especially during the conflict, markets that were traditionally held during the morning were moved to the evening in order to allow work during the day (Jackson 2003). Many people resorted to eating fewer meals a day, with 60 percent eating two meals, and 27 percent surviving on one meal a day (Vlassenroot et al. 2006, p.11).

Others have become day labourers, with some communities employing displaced people to undertake the more dangerous work (Oxfam 2011, p.9). Alternatively, people have migrated to other (not always more secure) areas, for example cultivating land within a national park (Raeymaekers 2006). Additional strategies are aimed at livelihood diversification, with a view towards ending agricultural activities altogether. Both in rural as well as in urban areas, people, especially women, turn to trade as a 'survival livelihood', repackaging and reselling all kinds of products, making them a small margin of profit (Jackson 2003, p.33). Small-scale cross-border trade is also a source of income.

Mining is another important alternative livelihood, seeing as in many parts of DRC the land contains minerals that are relatively easily accessible, making this a 'low tech, labour-intensive industry comprised of activities with few barriers to entry' (Banchirigah & Hilson 2010, p.158). This activity already existed before the conflict, and it is unclear whether the conflict has led many more people to

²⁴ <http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/49321/icode/>

engage in mining. Nevertheless, some areas *do* show a shift in dominant livelihood activity. More than just seasonal work, or a temporary ‘coltan fever’ (Jackson 2003, p.22), mining appears to have become a ‘deeply rooted activity’ (Banchirigah & Hilson 2010, p.175). Some areas in the east that were previously highly agriculturally productive have now become mining zones. A case in point is that of Walikale, North Kivu, which used to be a major supplier of agricultural products, but now imports its staple food (Vlassenroot et al. 2006, p.11). Mining areas present other activities for people to engage in, such as minerals trade, commerce, but also child prostitution (Oxfam 2011, pp.8–9; Jaspars et al. 2007, p.12; Kelly et al. 2011).

Many others moved to cities for security and built an urban-based livelihood. A town such as Bukavu grew from 100.000 to over 1 million inhabitants since the 90s. While people in insecure rural environments turn away from agriculture, people in urban settings have developed ‘peri-urban and urban agriculture’ (Vlassenroot et al. 2006, p.10; Tambwe et al. 2011; FAO 2010). With the (step by step) improving security and increasing access to markets, new opportunities are emerging and will have an impact on livelihoods strategies, but this is yet to be documented at length. Additionally, a frequently reported livelihood strategy for girls and young women is the engagement in transactional sex, as the ‘easiest way of obtaining money for everything from food for their families to new clothes or hairstyles’. Parents and other adults accept this, because they appreciate that girls might do so ‘to be able to buy clothes and other things they need when parents are unable to provide for them’ (Bailey et al. 2011, p.29).

External assistance, in the form of international aid, represents another livelihood strategy; both in terms of accessing aid, through having the right connections, bribes, applying for aid with multiple agencies (Jaspars et al. 2007, p.12); as well as in terms of the employment and business opportunities generated by the aid sector. Büscher and Vlassenroot estimate that ‘UN agencies and humanitarian actors today provide most of the official labour positions in Goma’. Also, the growing humanitarian sector in Goma has led to an increasing number of local NGOs: seeing as people understand the creation of an NGO as a way of gaining access to international funds, which means ‘these organisations have become vital components of the survival strategies of urban inhabitants’. Furthermore, the sector’s consumption demands, in the form of equipment, housing and recreation, strongly stimulates the (local) economy, the real estate sector, construction, ‘tourist’ infrastructure, security services – though ‘in most cases’ it is the well-educated and business elite that profit from these opportunities, with the majority of urban residents having to make a living in the informal sector (Büscher & Vlassenroot 2010, pp.S264–266).

Another form of external assistance is formed by remittances (*des fonds envoyés*), though it is difficult to give figures on the amount of remittances that emigrants send to DRC. According to the IOM, the literature contains mostly qualitative analyses, and even sources as the World Bank and UNCTAD do not have sufficient data to estimate the amount of the remittances sent home by the Congolese diaspora (2010, p.27).²⁵ The impact of remittances is ‘very difficult to determine’ (De Bruyn & Wets 2006, p.23) seeing as the little information there is comes from small-scale studies and interviews. According to the IOM, ‘various documentary sources and studies’ indicate that many households, ‘up to 80 percent in large cities’, depend on remittances, with the major part of these money transfers made informally. Most of this money is used for the immediate needs of the beneficiaries, with little investments in community development or the economy (De Bruyn & Wets 2006, pp.16–17). Besides money, material goods are also sent home. The IOM concludes that ‘due to a lack and/or shortage of studies and reliable data on these issues and the predominance of the informal economy, it is difficult to estimate the overall impact of remittances on the country’s economy’ (2010, p.27). This conclusion is shared by Kabuya Kalala & Cassimon (2010, pp.6–7). Nevertheless, these authors *do* mention the recorded remittances in the balance of payments, which, according to their sources (IMF and BCC) increased from USD 81m in 2007 to USD 212m in 2008, and are estimated at USD 135m in 2009. Other sources, such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), have made an attempt at quantifying the amount of remittances received by DRC; IFAD estimates the total remittances to the country at USD 636m, or 7.4 percent of the GDP, in 2006. Thus, even though research evidence is

²⁵ The Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011 of the World Bank has no remittances data available on DRC: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1199807908806/CongoDem.Rep.pdf>

limited and the total amount of remittances can only be estimated, the figures show that these funds make a difference to people's livelihoods, and, although until now, most of the funds have been used to satisfy immediate needs, these funds may now be employed to generate new livelihood opportunities.

Finally, there are those who turn to more malicious strategies to make a living, such as through taking part in the system of taxation and exploitation by joining a militia (Jackson 2003, p.33). Though in recent years, with the increasing levels of security, people are also found to be joining in order to profit from DDR programmes and to secure a position in the FARDC, with the opportunity to misuse that position in regards to the exploitation of miners (Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers 2009, pp.480–481). Other strategies include criminal activities such as theft or robbery.

Communal

Besides these personal/household-level coping strategies, there are also some examples of communal organisation, some pre-dating the war, while others were established in line with the increased levels of security. Vlassenroot et al. (2006, pp.16–17) mention traditional social mechanisms, based on kinship, which can be mobilised to deal with food insecurity, such as collectively owned land that can be cultivated in case of food shortages. Also, Raeymakers (2006, p.36) finds that some farmers established groups to minimise the payments associated with accessing markets; however, the farmers' experience with these cooperatives was not positive, as they were not able to establish the necessary levels of trust.

Vlassenroot et al (2006, p.17) describe various successful local initiatives to deal with food security that developed during the war: the *Groupe d'Etude et d'Actions pour un Développement bien Défini*, uniting 99 grassroots associations, the *Programme d'Actions Locales*, the *Union des Groupements des Femmes Paysannes du Nord-Kivu*, *Groupe Technique d'Encadrement Régional (GTER)*, *Groupe d'Appui aux Initiatives du Développement Rural (Gaider)* and *Initiatives Femmes-Enfants et Développement (IFED)*. At the provincial level, local development organisations have been united into *Conseils Régionaux des Organisations Non-Gouvernementales de Développement (CRONGD)*, which at the national level, are united into a *Conseil National des Organisations Non-Gouvernementales de Développement (CNONGD)*.

Another example of a communal organisation can be found in EVD et al. (2009, p.16): *La Ligue des Organisations des Femmes Paysannes au Congo (LOFEPACO)*,²⁶ which has been involved in the processing of agricultural products in Butembo, North Kivu, since May 2007. This has seen the creation of a market for (female) farmers to sell their products, as well as adding value to them. The EVD et al. report mentions additional community organisations, such as FOPAC (*Federations des organisations des producteurs agricoles du Congo*) and SYDIP (*Syndicat de defence des interets paysans*)²⁷ (see also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2011, pp.151–152), which are representatives or federations of (eastern) farmers' organisations. FOPAC supports farmers in restoring their situation and improving production and trade, and also improves (trading) positions of farmers and exchanges important trade information like prices; finally, the organisation also represents farmers towards businesses and governmental organisations in DRC.

International organisations are frequently involved in setting up or reviving cooperatives, of which examples can be found in the agricultural sector (such as coffee, livestock, fishing), small trade associations, micro finance and the artisanal mining industry (EVD et al. 2009, p.17); these will be discussed in further detail in the following paragraphs. Vlassenroot et al. (2006, p.26) are critical towards the behaviour of international agencies, indicating that local structures and humanitarian organisations' own mechanisms and strategies to deal with food crises were often ignored by international actors, limiting the role of local actors mostly to executing agency programmes. The local coordination structures such as the CRONGD often lost their coordinating roles to international agencies.

²⁶ <http://www.agriterra.org/en/stories/56881/from-fresh-tomato-into-tomato-sugar>

²⁷ http://www.sydip.org/?menu=organisations&view=organisation&organisation_id=15330

3.2.3 Agency-led interventions

Many aid organisations have programmes directed at restoring people's livelihoods, through the provision of resources, knowledge, and micro-credit. DDR programmes also frequently have a livelihoods component. However, the number of studies on the impact of livelihoods programmes that have been found is limited, and no reports or articles have been found that present an overview of livelihoods interventions in DRC. In fact, says Bailey (2011, p.8) 'very little is known about the impact of assistance – whether on livelihoods, markets or conflict', while many programmes assume a (causal) link between reintegration and recovery assistance, and between conflict prevention and peace-building impacts.

In humanitarian assistance, a great deal of livelihood interventions are to do with improving food security, through aiming at specific sectors, such as production, income, and market (Jaspars et al. 2007, p.39).²⁸ However, various authors describe a tendency to focus too much on the availability of food, instead of on the underlying causes, which have to do with access and stability (Levine & Chastre 2004; Vlassenroot et al. 2006; Alinovi et al. 2007; Lecoutere et al. 2009). In their report 'Missing the Point', Livine and Chastre (2004), in part based on evidence from DRC, criticised interventions for not being based on necessary assessments (even though much information was available), but instead on the available small set of actions that were implemented in almost every situation. Additionally, the focus fell too much on food production and food aid.

The 'achievements' section on the food security cluster in the Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 reveals that when dealing with food security, the distribution of agricultural kits and foodstuffs is still the dominant approach (OCHA 2010, p.15). With an estimated USD 295m required for meeting the needs in 2011, the Food Security Cluster is still by far the largest within the HAP (accounting for approximately 40 percent of total needs) (*ibid*, p.4). 'Restoring livelihoods of affected communities' is one of the strategic objectives of the HAP 2011 (*ibid*, p.27); nevertheless, the largest part (USD 175,5m) of the food security budget goes to 'general distribution of food to vulnerable groups' (*ibid*, p.49). Because of the sheer size of its budget, the Food Security Cluster is a major player in the area of livelihoods interventions (intending to provide support to approximately 1,467,666 households in crisis in 2011 (*ibid*, 48)).²⁹ The sector involves around 140 organisations, who work in collaboration with provincial inspectorates of agriculture, fishery and livestock. Two organisations have the lead at national level: FAO/WFP and ACF USA. They work together with the ICRC, SNSA (Ministry of Agriculture, Fishing and Livestock), CISP, COOPI, PRONANUT, Acted, Cesvi, Oxfam UK, World Vision, Africare, Caritas, Aldi, InterAction, Cedi, EUB, Foleco, CRS, and Solidarities (OCHA 2010, p.117).

The Early Recovery Cluster is also involved in livelihood interventions, though at a smaller scale than the food security cluster, targeting 126,512 beneficiaries in 2011. In relatively stable areas, which are still prone to armed violence (Equateur, Maniema and Katanga, Bukama, Malemaba Nkulu and Bafwasende), the cluster supports local governance activities, complementary response activities to check malnutrition and food insecurity, and restoring means of livelihood. The cluster aims to provide support in setting up income-generating activities for the vulnerable (with special attention to women and empowering women's groups). They also pay community volunteer workers (men and women) through cash-for-work or vouchers-for-work programmes, targeting minor improvements to economic infrastructure (market, granaries) and environmental protection (OCHA 2010, p.62, see p.116 for an overview of the agencies involved).

Tentatively, the provision of goods is the dominant mode of humanitarian livelihood interventions in DRC, ranging from direct food aid, to supplying the means for cooking (stoves, mills), to supplying seeds and tools for (agricultural) production, restocking livestock, and providing veterinary care and veterinary drugs. Vouchers-for-work and cash-for-work programmes are becoming increasingly popular, because

²⁸ Production support can include agricultural support (provision of seeds and tools, seed vouchers, agricultural extension, etc.), livestock support (fodder distribution, destocking, veterinary care, etc.), and the provision of equipment and assets (carpentry, blacksmithing, pottery, etc); income support can include activities such as skills or business training, income generation, micro-credit, direct cash transfers, fee waivers (for example school fees and healthcare user fees), micro insurance and price subsidies; and market support can include activities such as voucher interventions (bringing together traders and consumers), building/repairing market infrastructure, helping to create cooperatives and the sale of subsidised goods. (Jaspars et al. 2007, p.39)

²⁹ An overview of programmes can be found on <http://fts.unocha.org/>.

these stimulate local markets and allow recipients to make their own livelihood choices (Guluma 2004; Jaspars et al. 2007, p.39; Bailey 2009; Jaspars & Maxwell 2009). More and more organisations are setting up fairs where people can use vouchers to purchase food and essential items (OCHA 2010, p.10). Other interventions aim to enhance or support policies, institutions and processes; such as the establishment of a national famine early warning system (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, or IPC) and disaster management capacities, or infrastructure support (roads, bridges). Further examples include the support of local services, cooperatives or women's groups; advocating the opening of borders, diminishing taxation or the establishment of policies on land rights (Jaspars et al. 2007, p.39). In the case of the latter examples, the distinction between humanitarian aid and development aid becomes thin, being perhaps only related to levels of security.

Two large strategies that seek to improve stability in conflict-affected areas are the (government) Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan for War-affected Areas (STAREC) and the (UN) International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (ISSSS), which supports STAREC. These strategies combine security interventions (mainly security sector reform and demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of combatants), restoring state authority in zones previously controlled by armed groups, facilitating the return and reintegration of IDPs and refugees and reducing the trafficking of natural resources (Bailey 2011, p.5, see p.6 for an overview of the objectives of both strategies). As mentioned previously, STAREC has led to some progress (Verbruggen et al. 2011, pp.18–19). On March 31st, 2011, the ISSSS had spent/committed approximately USD 230m, mainly in the Kivus and Ituri, along six 'strategic axes' defined by STAREC. USD 51m was spent on security, including integration of armed groups, support to the FARDC, and DDR for residual combatants (USD 17m), with a total of 4,900 combatants demobilised within the ISSSS framework, and a new initiative aimed at another 4,000 in the Kivus and Maniema.³⁰ Another USD 63m has been dedicated to return, reintegration and recovery – supporting the secure return and durable socio-economic reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees to their place of origin, and contributing to local economic recovery. Projects include income generation, establishment of village development committees, agricultural training and equipment, and improvement of health/educational circumstances (Stabilization Support Unit 2011). Additionally, donors such as USAID and DFID bilaterally support stabilisation, peace-building and recovery programmes implemented by NGOs, including community-driven reconstruction, conflict resolution and governance activities (Bailey 2011, p.5).

UN-HABITAT and UNHCR support the setting up of *Comités Locaux Permanents de Conciliation*³¹ in North Kivu to support STAREC in addressing (land) problems that arise as displaced people and refugees return to their villages or settle in other areas. In many contexts, including DRC, correctly judging the role that land plays as a source of conflict and livelihoods remains a weakness in the humanitarian response: increased attention to understanding and resolving land issues could represent 'a critical step forward' (Bailey 2011, p.8). However, there are reports that some of these local committees have been created too hastily, without sufficient consideration given to local dynamics and existing institutions, leading to tensions around their membership and role.

In DRC, the FAO urban agriculture project forms a 'success story' (FAO 2010, p.2). In cooperation with national and provincial governments, and city administrations, the project aimed at developing 'urban and peri-urban horticulture' in Kinshasa and four other cities, reaching more than 16,000 small-scale vegetable growers and improving irrigation and drainage on almost half of the total area dedicated to horticulture. According to the FAO, 'horticulture in and around the five cities now produces some 150,000 tonnes of vegetables a year, and has generated employment for an estimated 60,000 people in the value chain.' Besides this project, the FAO is also leading REAFOR, a programme that started in 2006, in support of agricultural and forestry research. The programme is financed by the EU, and the FAO cooperates with IITA and CIFOR in order to improve the research capacity in DRC – of INERA, the national agricultural research institute.

³⁰ Principal donors for the ISSSS are the United States, the Netherlands, the UN Peace Building Fund, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Belgium, Canada, Japan, Spain, the European Commission, Germany, Norway and France.

³¹ Permanent Local Reconciliation Committees

Table 4: MFIs in DRC according to MIXMarket.org (28-7-2011)

▼ Name	↕ Date	↕ Gross loan portfolio i	↕ Number of active borrowers i
Advans Banque Congo	2009	738,561	310
CAPEB	2005	83,356	540
CEC/RFMC	2003	2,640	75
COOPEC Bosangani	2006	46,876	258
COOPEC CAMEC Inkisi	2008	242,569	1,056
COOPEC CAMEC Kimpese	2008	39,739	–
COOPEC CAMEC Lukala	2008	30,181	–
COOPEC CAMEC MN	2006	79,178	281
COOPEC IDECE NIOKI	2003	39,453	232
Coopec Katundu	2001	39,138	470
COOPEC Nyawera	2007	5,206,833	1,429
COOPEC/ACCO	2008	31,723	243
FINCA - DRC	2009	10,352,380	44,532
Hekima	2010	1,241,711	11,370
IMF HOPE RDC	2007	1,084,329	11,160
PAIDEK	2009	1,837,744	10,835
ProCredit Bank- DRC	2010	40,797,933	7,734
Shalupe	2003	18,836	1,349

Involvement of aid organisations in household and small business in DRC is mainly through micro financing, providing people the finances they need to start a business (Santos 2003). However, little information could be retrieved on the impact of micro financing, as even World Bank documents make scarce mention of it. However, there is evidence that the African Development Bank, for example, is investing in support of small businesses in DRC.³² Other organisations involved include organisations such as HOPE international.³³ An overview of micro financing in DRC can be found on the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) website, an organisation collecting worldwide micro financing statistics. According to the MIX and CGAP report on micro financing in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the Central Bank of DRC has recently revised its regulations on micro financing, seeking to simplify its instructions (2011, p.6).³⁴ However, as the Table shows, the total number of active borrowers (approximately 75,000) remains small when compared to the total number of active borrowers in SSA of 7,771,000 (MIX & CGAP 2011, p.2): little less than 1 percent.

Interventions in the artisanal mining sector generally focus on advocacy and research, and development of alternative livelihoods. A recent comprehensive review of the artisanal mining sector is the PROMINES study by Pact (2010). This study is funded by the World Bank's USD 50m 'Growth with Governance in the Mineral Sector' project, a joint approach with the British Department for International Development (DFID), which is providing an additional USD 42m (World Bank 2008b; 2010b). The objective of the artisanal mining component is to improve the legal status, working practices, and economic return of artisanal mining in DRC, whilst establishing mechanisms to sustainably reduce its negative impacts on society, security and the environment (Pact, Inc. 2010, p.108).

Development efforts frequently engage in the creation of incentives for miners to 'diversify their skills, pursue other sources of income, and thus ultimately transition out of mining', because of the issues associated with artisanal mining, and also agricultural livelihoods are 'heavily cited' in this respect. However, projects undertaken in Katanga with the objective to help miners switch to agriculture have had 'mixed success'. The success is often related to targeted women, who seem more prone to alternatives, or to developing agriculture as a supplement to artisanal mining. According to Pact, 'agriculture also suffers from something of an image problem where many young people do not aspire to the rural subsistence life but would prefer to work in the mines or in the towns, ideally as employees of mining companies'.

³² <http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/supporting-microfinance-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-drc-4039/>

³³ http://www.hopeinternational.org/site/PageServer?pagename=work_countries_congo

³⁴ <http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/country/Congo%2C%20Democratic%20Republic%20of%20the>

There is a strong demand by miners for access to credit for artisanal mine development, since they are not considered credit-worthy by traditional financial institutions, and ‘the pool of microfinance providers is often restricted in artisanal mining areas’. Pact describes a pilot project in Ituri in 2009, which shows that focusing on micro-savings is an important first step towards extending microcredit. Funded by USAID and AngloGold Ashanti, Pact carried out a project to provide literacy and financial skills training to groups of artisanal miners in Ituri, linked to the creation of savings groups. These groups created a communal savings box and learned how to use this capital to invest in improving their mining resources or to consider supplementary or alternative livelihoods (Pact, Inc. 2010, pp.102–104).

3.2.4 Private sector-led interventions

Evidence on private sector interventions influencing livelihoods in DRC is extremely limited, and only indirectly drawn from available materials.

In 2008, a USD 9bn mining deal was struck between the Congolese government and a consortium of Chinese companies, through which a new company, Sicominex, would invest in Congolese infrastructure, in exchange for a mining concession in Katanga (Jansson et al. 2009, pp.33–36). Following IMF concerns, the deal was reduced by USD 3bn, but it still represents a major investment, intended for transport and social infrastructure, including the construction of new roads totalling 3,600km, rehabilitation of another 3,000 km, as well as the construction of several hospitals and two universities. Thus, this investment will contribute to the opening and connecting of markets, health, and education, and possibly stimulate agricultural livelihoods, as well as increasing security in areas that were previously out of the reach of the FARDC. On the other hand, it is unknown to what extent use will be made of Congolese workers, and what employment opportunities will be generated for the Congolese.

Traditionally, mining companies were involved in social protection programmes for their employees, as well as health and education, and housing. ‘At its height, [Gécamines] had employed 35,000 people, housed its workers, ran education facilities for 100,000 children, and provided access to basic health care’ (Perks n.d., p.5). These structures have now fallen into serious disrepair. Some companies are now also required to invest in food supply (Pact, Inc. 2010); and some companies are making attempts to provide alternative livelihoods to artisanal miners in their concessions. However, the extent of current investments by mining companies in this area remains unclear. The increasing private sector involvement in mining, with companies buying concessions from the government, and attempts to industrialise the sector, may lead to competition with artisanal miners, but also provides employment opportunities, and could lead to synergies between artisanal and industrial miners.

Additionally, the private sector has a role to play in the reduction of conflict minerals, improving traceability, and the working conditions of Congolese artisanal miners. Globally, there have been several private-sector efforts to address the issue of conflict minerals: however, these efforts are mainly driven by the search for supply chain solutions, and do not necessarily aim to improve the livelihoods of artisanal miners. Nevertheless, Perks (n.d., p.4) describes two examples of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in DRC that have had an impact on the living circumstances of people in mining concessions. One is the Extractive Industries Alliance/Network, which involved four internationally listed mining companies (Anvil Mining Ltd., Tenke Fungurume Mining, First Quantum Minerals, and AngloGold Ashanti), together with USAID and Pact. The PPP affected two distinct geographic areas of the country, southern Katanga and north-eastern Orientale, from 2006-2009, with an annual budget of USD 6m, of which 75 percent was supplied by the private companies (EVD et al. 2009, p.32). The other PPP was the Conflict Management and Artisanal Mining project, from May 2007 to June 2008, involving Anvil Mining, DCP (which would later merge with Katanga Mining), Nikanor, Tenke Fungurume Mining, together with the International Finance Corporation (IFC), USAID, and Pact. The project aimed at the development of a long-term and comprehensive plan for artisanal mining in Kolwezi, southern Katanga.³⁵ While the first PPP was primarily a ‘development’ PPP with specific objectives for social and economic development, and security, the Kolwezi PPP was primarily a conflict research project, to

³⁵ Interventions that were considered were: the rehabilitation of roads; mine employment including basic training; mine supply contracts for micro-enterprises; co-habitation of safe, fair artisanal mining; livelihood alternatives in agriculture and micro-enterprise (with a specific emphasis on support for women); and appropriate vocational and alternative education opportunities for children for whom formal education is not currently an option. http://www.pactworld.org/cs/conflict_management_and_artisanal_mining

inform future planning and risk mitigation. A specific partnership, the Tenke Fungurume Social Development Program, which started in 2006, and formed part of the Extractive Industries Alliance, is still active, aiming at sustainable social and economic development in communities in and around the TFM mining concession in Katanga Province, DRC. Initially 43 villages were targeted, in addition to the urban towns of Tenke and Fungurume, where a range of projects were implemented.³⁶

This research found little Congolese private sector involvement. One initiative is the Private Sector Development Initiative by the *Initiative pour un investissement Responsable des Entreprises Privées en RDC* (IREP) and GIZ (formerly GTZ), both contributing USD 100,000. The initiative is directed towards the promotion of responsible business investments, good practices in corporate citizenship and collective action towards sustainable development. IREP is not a legal body but an informal network, involving stakeholders from government, civil society and the donor community. Currently ten private companies active in DRC are members of IREP.³⁷

An apparently nationally-funded institution providing micro-credit is Mecreco, operating in Goma. Mecreco provides micro-credit to local entrepreneurs, restricted to small-scale loans (USD 3,000 for individuals and USD 500 per person for groups) and not for the agricultural sector because of the short-term return payment. As a result, the loans are mainly used for small-scale commercial activities such as the trading of goods. The unstable security situation has not allowed for significant long-term investments in, for example, agriculture or infrastructure in recent years (EVD et al. 2009, pp.14–15).

3.2.5 Participation

A great deal of agency interventions now have participatory components, and also the government, who in its development of the DSCR2, invited community participation. Research on participatory methods, however, remains limited.

One form of participation in humanitarian response is the use of vouchers (Bailey et al. 2011, p.25), supported by UNICEF in particular. These are combined with fairs, or day-long markets, where recipients can purchase items with vouchers. NGOs implementing projects using vouchers to meet basic needs include Solidarité, the Norwegian Refugee Council, Catholic Relief Services, CARE, Caritas and Concern, who pioneered the inclusion of payment of school fees as part of their broader voucher activities targeting displaced and returnee populations (Bailey 2009). According to Bailey et al., ‘the main advantages of vouchers over in-kind assistance are that they offer more choice to recipients and they support local traders. The disadvantage is that they are administratively more complex’ (2011, p.25).

A large programme with a strong community participation component in eastern DRC (the Kivus, Maniema, Katanga) is the IRC Tuungane Community-driven Planning and Reconstruction programme, with a 2007-2010 budget of USD 40m, and a 2011-2014 budget of USD 100m. The programme works through elected village committees, deliberately not incorporating the elite of teachers, priests and authority. In practice, however, these people have a large say in the outcome of discussions in the committees. These newly established institutions may open up new forms of political space for emerging elites or poor people, and there was a growing expectation in early 2011 that most of committee members would be elected in the coming chiefdom council when local and municipal elections take place in 2013. However, there are also some drawbacks: by strengthening the power of some, they may further weaken other more vulnerable populations rather than enhancing empowerment and ownership. The concerns with the abuse and lack of accountability of chiefs and other local power holders generate a pervading mistrust that hampers agencies’ engagement with local institutions. Concerns with the risk of elite capture may stand in the way of exploring opportunities to work with elites while appealing to their sense of public responsibility (Hilhorst et al. 2010, pp.1115–1116).

³⁶ For more information on the programme, see http://www.pactworld.org/cs/tfm_page.

³⁷ <http://www.gtz.de/en/dokumente/giz2011-en-psb-congo-drc-responsible-business-investment.pdf>

Box 1: Community-driven planning and reconstruction in Eastern DRC

The International Rescue Committee (IRC) and CARE International, began the 'Tuungane' community driven planning and reconstruction programme to improve stability and quality of life for communities in eastern DRC (the Kivus, Maniema, Katanga). It started as a 3-year programme (2007-2010), to cover 1,780,000 people in 280 communities, including 1,266 (originally 1,400) villages. Of the budget of USD 40m, over 20 million was to be invested in village and community projects (USD 54 per household). After 2010, the programme was extended to 2014, with a 2011-2014 budget of USD 100m.

The programme has three main objectives:

Social cohesion: improved trust, confidence and cooperation between community members, including marginalised groups, and between people and their local institutions.

Democratic governance: community members understand the value of democratic local governance structures and experience active participation and transparent, accountable decision making.

Socio-economic recovery: improved social services and increased economic activity within the communities.

The fundamental approach of the programme is to place communities in charge of reconstruction: through helping communities analyse and determine response strategies, and creating sustainable democratic and transparent governance structures, which are capable of responsibly and transparently owning, managing, and implementing their own socio-economic recovery and reconciliation projects. The budget for the projects and facilitation is provided by the Tuungane staff, but project execution remains the responsibility of the community.

A mid-term evaluation of the first three years found that the programme's contribution to social and economic development in the communities varied greatly, as well as levels of community participation and involvement. In approximately a quarter of the villages the programme initiated a dynamic participatory development process that made a significant, tangible and appreciated contribution to social service provision and created new perspectives for the village population. In about another quarter, the projects were relevant, but the contribution to social service provision less significant and the process less participatory and dynamic.

Knowledge levels of the Tuungane principles and practices were lower than expected. Only the better educated had an overview of the sequence of activities and an understanding of the main principles and practices of good governance and social cohesion. Few of the village committees understood the concept of inclusion and could translate this into appropriate actions, though there was no evidence that vulnerable members of the communities were excluded. Women were equally represented, but training on gender roles had had no apparent effect on other sectors. Traditional leadership and local elites were well presented in a large number of the development committees, but their exact influence on village decision making could only be established in some cases when it was clearly dominant.

The evaluation concluded that, considering the extremely difficult conditions in DRC, the programme performed satisfactorily on the socio-economic development programme objective. However, with respect to the other two objectives, the results were less impressive. Few people understood the applicability of the good governance principles and practices beyond the Tuungane programme, and successful projects were generally situated in communities that had little issues with social cohesion, while in other communities the programme was unable to bridge existing differences.

The programme illustrates the complexity of doing interventions in DRC, especially at a large scale. The outcomes also show the preference of communities for socio-economic development interventions, while they are less much interested in the social cohesion and democratic governance objectives.

Source: Ferf and Milabyo 2009

4 Basic services and social protection

4.1 Basic services overview

This section will first provide a general description of the national commitment to basic services and social protection, before zooming in on the sectors that are under special scrutiny: health, education, transport, water and sanitation, and social protection. Afterwards, this section will go into the various interventions that can be distinguished in these sectors, whether government-led, community-based, agency-led, or private sector-led, with a special focus on participation.

4.1.1 National commitment to basic services and social protection

In its draft DSCR2, the government expresses its intent to provide the whole population with access to basic services. The strengthening of human capital is an important focus, primarily in education and health sectors, but 'areas of social protection, culture and sports are also concerned' (Ministère du Plan 2011b, p.60). However, as the following sections on health, education, transport, water and sanitation, and social protection show, the role of the state in policy formulation, providing supervision and support, as well as in direct service provision, is in many cases limited. For example, only 10 percent of primary education is provided by the state, the rest is delivered by the private sector; and in the sectors of health and water and sanitation, a great deal of services are provided by NGOs.

Table 5: State and health budget allocations and executions 1998–2009

Année	Budget Global			Budget Santé			
	Budget global	Exécution budget global	Taux d'exécution	Budget Santé	Exécution budget santé	Taux budget alloué à la Santé	Taux d'exécution budget Santé
1998	680 848 463	572 001 443	84,01%	12 304 616	10 967 616	1,81%	89%
1999	739 692 508	739 692 508	100,00%	12 523 433	12 523 433	1,69%	100%
2000	1 108 269 326	1 025 704 800	92,55%	10 469 422	1 782 044	0,94%	17%
2001	328 830 688	498 628 088	151,64%	10 978 871	3 600 861	3,34%	33%
2002	580 188 092	527 957 268	91,00%	4 725 654	944 010	0,81%	20%
2003	905 342 872	709 608 221	78,38%	23 911 701	22 768 880	2,64%	95%
2004	1 168 244 552	2 545 087	0,22%	84 175 668	22 653 576	7,21%	27%
2005	1 791 487 613	1 375 620 715	76,79%	79 858 697	51 219 329	4,46%	64%
2006	2 178 731 940	1 397 559 718	64,15%	96 019 449	45 198 481	4,41%	47%
2007	2 446 981 439	1 625 249 346	66,42%	88 589 100	96 407 247	3,62%	109%
2008	3 562 830 326	2 762 935 307	77,55%	107 581 930	107 235 491	3,02%	100%
2009	4 995 544 984	2 783 606 796	55,72%	264 049 473	390 917 761	5,29%	148%

Source: Ministère de la Santé Publique 2010, p.47

Trust in the central government has been eroded by a history of underfunding and uncertainty of funding. Table 7 shows the rates of execution for the overall budget (*Budget Global*) and the health budget (*Budget Santé*) over recent years: there is generally a great difference between allocations and actual expenses. Additionally, even though in the last years the actual health expenses have been larger than the budget allocations, they still do not come close to the 15 percent of the total budget stipulated by the Abuja declaration (Ministère de la Santé Publique 2010, p.47).³⁸ The Table below, which is 'Pilier 3' of the DSCR2 budget for the 2010–2015 period (the rest of the Table can be found in section 3.2.1, on livelihoods interventions) shows the government plans to increase its efforts in this area, with the 'santé et nutrition' proportion rising to 13.7 percent. The budgetary allocation to education remains relatively constant (questioning the goal of free primary education for all), while around 1.5 percent of the budget is allocated to social protection – an allocation which remains quite constant, and indicates its relative (un)importance, and/or the government's inability to invest in social protection measures. These figures contrast with the 2011 budget published on the website of the *Ministère du Budget* (see

³⁸ http://www.un.org/ga/aids/pdf/abuja_declaration.pdf

the next Table): according to this source, only 4.2 percent of the budget is allocated to the health sector, and 8.8 percent to education (and 1.8 percent to social protection). These examples serve as an illustration of the uncertainty surrounding budget allocations.

Table 6: Budget allocations ‘Pillier 3’ 2011–2015 (first column is 2010)

Total (FC)	6,444,290,353,605	100,00%
administration	2,594,083,360,849	40,25%
defence	203,015,749,752	3,15%
order and public security	269,405,664,597	4,18%
economic affairs	1,817,792,297,723	28,21%
<i>Of which to agriculture, forestry, fishing</i>	<i>1,121,145,298,709</i>	<i>2,71%</i>
<i>transport</i>	<i>1,121,145,298,709</i>	<i>17,40%</i>
<i>energy</i>	<i>329,645,658,703</i>	<i>5,12%</i>
<i>industry and public works</i>	<i>118,251,023,330</i>	<i>1,83%</i>
environmental protection	77,871,937,503	1,21%
housing and community	483,006,935,642	7,50%
<i>Of which to water supply</i>	<i>111,560,324,613</i>	<i>1,73%</i>
health	273,496,740,822	4,24%
religion, culture, sports	36,965,472,159	0,57%
education	568,075,030,007	8,82%
social protection etc	120,577,164,552	1,87%

Source: Ministère du Plan 2011b, p.79)

Besides the irregularity of funding, the multiplicity of governmental and non-governmental institutions, with overlapping mandates and responsibilities, is another characteristic that greatly influences national commitment to basic services and social protection. This ‘institutional multiplicity’ (Di John 2008, pp.33–34) materialises in the form of a large number of different programmes and divisions, unclear and unenforced mandates of the different levels in the governance system;³⁹ but also in the form of a multiplicity of donors and NGOs that are active in the country, with the corresponding multiplicity of programmes and funding mechanisms. The result is a complex system, in which prices and (levels of) services are constantly up for negotiation, and the education and health sectors have become effective alternative systems of taxation, driven by user fees. Gravity still pulls finances towards the capital, as under Mobutu, with the central government currently failing to complete the process decentralising resources.

³⁹ In, for example, the transport sector, various Ministries share common responsibilities, and oversight authorities neither have the capacities nor the resources to fulfil their duty to regulate their subsector (World Bank 2010c, p.56).

Table 7: Government budget 2011

Pilier 3 : Améliorer les services sociaux de base et renforcer le capital humain	25,7	29,6	29,5	30,9	31,7	32,9
Education	15,5	13,4	13,8	13,9	14,3	14,5
Santé et nutrition	7,5	11,9	11,2	12,2	12,6	13,7
Protection sociale et inclusion des groupes vulnérables	1,8	1,5	1,6	1,5	1,5	1,4
Sport et culture	0,8	0,3	0,4	0,6	0,6	0,6
Habitat et assainissement du cadre de vie	0,2	2,5	2,6	2,7	2,8	2,8

Source: Ministère du Budget 2010

The result of unreliable funding and institutional multiplicity is that the government fails to fulfil the goals it committed to in the first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP1): for example, to increase drinking water supply rate from 22 percent in 2005 to 26.9 percent in 2008, with the aim of bringing it to 40 percent in 2015; and to increase sanitation coverage from 9percent in 2005 to 15percent in 2008, to be placed on the trajectory of reaching 45 percent by 2015 (Anon 2010b). Additionally, many aid agencies do not trust the central government, and choose to work directly with decentralised institutions, localities, or for example *aires de santé* (USAID is named as an example, (Waldman 2006, p.v)); others such as the World Bank create parallel management units that work alongside, and may bypass, government institutions. The following sub-sections will examine the situation in various sectors in more detail.

4.1.2 Health

Life expectancy in DRC is low at 48 years in 2008 (World Bank data). Infant mortality rates for the 2005–2009 period remained flat at 126 per 1,000 live births, with rural children far more likely to die before their first birthday than urban children (*ibid*). Additionally, 24percent of children under five are underweight for their age (Institut National de la Statistique 2010, p.23). However, despite the fact that total fertility remains high at six births per woman, the maternal mortality rate is dropping, from 740 per 100,000 in 2005 to 670 in 2009 (World Bank data). Considering that 75 percent of women are expected to deliver in health facilities (Institut National de la Statistique 2010), this questions the quality of care in maternity units. ‘Infectious diseases top the mortality listings, with malaria, diarrhoea and acute respiratory disease the most common causes of under-five child deaths. Cholera is endemic in many provinces leading to large epidemics of thousands of cases (recent spread from Oriental to Kinshasa). Other epidemics include dysentery, meningitis, plague, ebola and monkey pox’ (SBPB 2011, p.30). Child immunisation rates, however, are slowly moving up, from 60percent in 2005 to 69percent in 2008 (World Bank data, Bailey et al). Various sources, such as the *Enquête Démographique et de Santé* (Ministère du Plan 2008), report different figures, indicating the difficulties associated with the collection of data in DRC; nevertheless, these figures draw a general picture, illustrating trends, though not necessarily accurately describing the reality.

The health sector is organised into three levels (Ministère de la Santé Publique 2010, p.18): central, intermediary or provincial, and ‘periferique’. The central level is formed by the Minister’s Office, the General Secretariat, comprising of 13 departments and 52 programmes, and also the national hospitals; this level is where policy is made, and translated into law and regulation, and also where the intermediary level is monitored and assisted. The intermediary level consists of 11 provincial inspections, 65 health districts, and covers the provincial hospitals. This level is responsible for translating regulations into practice, and implementation in the lower level. The lowest level is responsible for primary health care, and ‘theoretically’ is made up of 515 ‘zones de santé’, or health zones, with 393 general reference hospitals, and 8504 planned ‘aires de santé’, of which 8266 have a health centre. Each health zone covers a population of about 110,000 (Waldman 2006, 6). Health centres are expected to offer a minimum services health package to the population in the respective *aires de santé*, while the reference hospitals are to offer a package of complementary services, as well as supporting the services delivered by the *aires de santé*.


Healthcare in DRC is predominantly fee-based, which dates back to the Structural Adjustment period of the 1980s), although there exist some experiments with free care, while humanitarian agencies generally supply care for free (Waldman 2006; Bailey et al. 2011). The health sector is characterised by a ‘help yourself’ mentality, *debrouillez-vous*: if users are not able to pay, they have to resort to alternative ways of treatment. Many people indicate that being unable to pay is a major barrier, and

prefer traditional forms of healthcare instead (MSF-Eastern DRC 2005). Some studies have concluded that 50–60 percent of the sick do not seek consultation (World Bank 2005b). Alternatively, the fees can require patients to borrow money, or sell assets, and employ alternative strategies to attain the necessary funds – including to livelihood-destructive strategies, pushing them further into poverty. Within public health institutions, there are formal and informal employees (*mechanisées* et non-mechanisées); the formally employed receive payment, but not enough to lift them above the poverty threshold. Thus, both formal and informal employees have to draw (part of) their income from the people they serve, which takes place through the system of user fees. Part of the income generated in this way by local and provincial health facilities is transferred upwards, through the system of administration. The administrative part of the health sector suffers the same under-payment as the healthcare professionals, and thus the inspectors, directors, health zone, provincial and even national staff supplement their budgets and salaries through the user fees levied at the level of the health zones. Similar to the education sector, the healthcare sector has thus become an alternative system of taxation (Ministère de la Santé Publique 2010, p.34).

There exist rural-urban differences: there is a concentration of doctors and nurses, and medical facilities in urban areas; and these services are also better accessible, in contrast to the rural areas where transportation methods are limited, both in terms of the availability of transport and condition of roads, as well as issues related to security.

4.1.3 Education

Figure 5: Parallel education institutions in DRC



Source: Ministère de l'Enseignement Primaire, Secondaire et Professionnel 2010, p.15

Primary and secondary education falls under the Ministry of Primary, Secondary and Professional Education (*l'Enseignement Primaire, Secondaire et Professionnel* or EPSP). Schools in DRC can broadly be divided into three categories: state, confessional, and private. The confessional schools represent a majority of almost 70 percent, the state less than 20 percent, and private schools around 10 percent (Ministère de l'Enseignement Primaire, Secondaire et Professionnel 2010, p.15). This system can historically be traced back to colonial times, when virtually all the schools were under the care of missionaries. Of the confessional schools, the catholic denomination is largest, educating approximately 50 percent of the students, followed by the Protestants (37 percent), Kimbanguists (8 percent) and Islamists (2 percent).⁴⁰

Organisationally, the country is divided into thirty 'provinces éducationnelles', with provincial divisions and sub-divisions representing the Minister, although management of these provinces is 'strongly'

⁴⁰ Other denominations include 'La Fraternité (laïque mais issu des Frères des Écoles Chrétiennes), les Adventistes, les Salutistes, les Orthodoxes, la Lumière, le réseau Églises de Réveil etc.' (Ministry, p 15)

decentralised, according to the Ministry (*ibid*, p.18). Additionally, there is also a Minister of Primary, Secondary and Professional Education in each of the 11 provinces of DRC, of which the mandate vis-à-vis the national Ministry is unclear. State schools are run through this network; the confessional schools, on the other hand, have their own denominational networks, with representatives at each level, national, provincial and sub-provincial or 'territoire' (*ibid*, p.18). This results in a multiplicity of parallel institutions, as illustrated in the diagram.

Legally, primary education is mandatory, from the age of 6 till the age of 11; these six years are concluded with the TENAFEB (Test de Fin d'Etudes Primaires). The age for secondary education ranges from 12 to 17, with the 'Examen d'Etat' as the finals. According to article 43 of the constitution of 2006, primary education at public institutions ought to be free for all (République Démocratique du Congo 2006); however, though some provinces have experimented with free education, and the national government remains determined to make free education available to all, this is not (yet) the case in most of the country.

According to the official statistics, in 2008–09, there were 34,512 primary schools with 274,453 teachers, with an estimated student enrolment of 10.2 million. The number of secondary schools numbered 16,927 with 4.4 million students and 212,273 teachers (CTSE 2010). These numbers are more than double compared to the World Bank's (2005a, p.xviii) 2001–2002 statistics.

Parents are the main contributors to the education sector, through the payment of school fees. Payment of teachers by parents (*frais de motivation*) was induced by the structural adjustments in 1980s, but also by structural underpayment of government employees dating back to the 1970s. This notably concerns the teachers, who were stimulated to supplement their salaries by making use of their position (De Herdt & Poncelet 2010, p.4). This means that in order to gain access to education, students and their parents have to pay a variety of fees, the largest of which involve the payment of teachers; but there are also fees covering insurance, the maintenance of school buildings, entry to the TENAFEB and State exams, etc. If fees fail to be paid, students can be denied education. All manners of alternative payments exist, ranging from renegotiating the level of the fees, to payment in kind or payment through labour, and even sexual favours, leading to phrases such as a '*diplôme sexuellement transmissible*' (De Herdt & Poncelet 2010, p.5). Another way to deal with school fees is through the 'Comité des Parents' (COPA), through which parents can influence school policy. In practice, however, a great deal of power lies with the director of the school. Teachers are poorly paid by the government, their employer, so they get their payment de facto from the parents that send their children to school. This system of '*debrouillez-vous*' was initially expected to be temporary, but became institutionalised (PAGE 2007). The national administration has little budget, and is unwilling or unable to make the budget allocations necessary to pay the teachers a decent salary, so in effect, the education system is largely paid by the collection of 'taxes' in form of school fees paid by the parents. Religious coordination offices also collect a significant part of the revenues (De Herdt & Poncelet 2010, p.4).

4.1.4 Transport

At the time of independence, DRC possessed a 'comprehensive transport system', made up of roads, rivers (with the Congo River as backbone) and railways. According to Akitoby & Cinyabuguma (2004, pp.10–11), on average, 12 percent of real GDP was generated by this sector in the period between 1960–2000. Given the large size of the country, combined with its limited sea access, and the fact that its mineral deposits are far removed from the main port, the transport sector is of 'vital importance'. However, years of mismanagement, and ensuing years of civil war, have seriously affected this sector. 'As a result, farmers have great difficulty in selling any surplus, while food prices in urban centers are high. Interregional connections are often limited to minimal air transport; as a result the country has essentially broken down into a set of economic enclaves' (*ibid*). The World Bank (2010a, p.94) states that at present, 'many parts of the country are not accessible'. Of the ten most important provincial cities, two (Matadi and Bandundu) are connected to Kinshasa by road (sealed or beaten earth), two by water (Kisangani and Mbandaka) and six (the majority) solely by air (Kananga, Mbuji-Mayi, Lubumbashi, Kindu, Goma, Bukavu and Kisangani).

In theory, DRC's road network is made up of '58,385 km. of national roads, 86,615 km. of rural roads, and 7,400 km. of urban roads', with an estimated 5percent of the 58,385 km of national roads sealed (World Bank 2010a, p.94). There are two main highways on the national road network, the East-West

road linking the port of Matadi to Lubumbashi, via Kinshasa, and the North-South road, which links Lubumbashi to Kisangani, via Bukavu and Goma. There is little information on the state the road network is in, but a large part of the network remains in a poor condition and in need of repair. However, according to the Bank, the road between Matadi and Kinshasa has recently been repaired, and plans are being made to rebuild and seal most of the two main highways, supported by several donors including China (*ibid*).

Table 8: Walking distance to amenities

	Haut Katanga	Maniema	Sud Kivu	Tanganyika	Total
Water	36	43	52	44	44
Market	317	334	157	101	224
Transport	396	702	360	131	386
Primary School	92	50	45	37	56
Secondary School	206	77	84	57	106
Hospital	166	94	109	75	110
Police Station	207	245	142	84	166
Groupement Chief	234	212	208	130	194
Village Chief	15	12	16	29	19

Note: Table reports time, in minutes walking, to the closest amenities of various types.

Source: Humphreys 2008, p.30

The dire state of the Congolese transport sector has led to the breaking up of the country into 'enclaves', 'enclavement', with areas that are cut off from the outside world, as described in a MONUSCO report of plans to restore the 363 km Bukavu-Shabunda road, and to re-establish state authority ('*désenclavement*') in areas where the last contact with the outside world dates back to the 1980s, according to the local population.⁴¹ People's access to schools, health facilities, markets, authorities, courts,⁴² and even other villages is limited, as illustrated by the Tables drawn from Humphreys (2008). Bailey et al. (2011, p.12) similarly find that limited transport opportunities restrict rural development, with households speaking of isolation, impeding the development of economic opportunities, and provision of basic social services such as health care and education. In some areas, children simply do not attend school, while in other places, they walk three to four hours daily. The distance from a health centre was an important reason not to access health services (30.68 percent, of the 17 percent that had not accessed these services) (*ibid*, p.14). According to the World Bank, people are isolated even in urban areas: public transport is not always available, and is costly, and the absence of electricity makes telecommunications difficult (World Bank 2011a, p.26). On the other hand, studies underscore the beneficial impacts of road rehabilitation, with one study noting that food prices in local markets dropped by between 30 percent and 50 percent, bringing them back down towards prevailing prices (Jackson 2003, p32).

Table 9: Patterns of political access and isolation

During the last 30 Days has the respondent...	Never	1 or 2 Times	Sometimes	Regularly
Visited with someone from a 30 min walk village	34%	22%	21%	24%
Engaged in economic transactions with someone from a 30 min walk village	45%	16%	21%	19%
Visited with someone from a different localite	36%	19%	22%	23%
Did economic transactions with someone from a different localite	48%	14%	19%	19%

Source: Humphreys 2008, p.38

⁴¹ <http://reliefweb.int/node/423736>

⁴² <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=93100>

Additionally, oversight authorities are poorly equipped to control the activities within their subsectors. Large parts of the transport sector are therefore left unregulated or self-regulated. This situation has a negative impact on safety levels, as operators that do not comply with the safety standards are still allowed to provide transport services. For example, in the air transport subsector, according to the World Bank, 50 airlines compete for a one million domestic passengers market, because of low entry costs, and lack of enforcement of safety and security regulations (2010c, p.57).

4.1.5 Water and sanitation

DRC is one of the few countries in Africa that does not face desertification or water-scarcity. Its water resources include '30 or so rivers, 20,000 kilometres of river-banks and the 4,670-kilometre long Congo river (which has the world's second biggest estuary outflow – 40,000 m³ per second)' (AfDB & OECD 2007, p.218). The country has Africa's largest water supply, with internal renewable water resources averaging 900 km³ a year – nearly one-quarter of all of Africa's fresh water. The water potential of DRC is 'huge' and 'almost entirely untapped' (*ibid*). Despite this, 53 percent of the population do not have access to an improved water source. Only 30 percent of users of piped water supplies in Kinshasa have meters, and the three state companies that use 55percent of the total water supply do not pay for it, compared with domestic users who pay an average of USD 0.61 per m³ (ADF 2007).

About half of the population (47 percent) uses an improved water source. There is a major urban-rural divide, with 83 percent access to improved water supplies in urban areas compared to only 31percent access in rural areas (Institut National de la Statistique 2010, p.15). Three separate government ministries coordinate water supplies for the purposes of drinking and irrigation.⁴³ This (unclear) division of responsibility contributed to the decay of the national water distribution networks REGIDESO, which was a comparatively well-performing service in the 1980s. By the end of 2006, out of REGIDESO's 94 centres, only 60 remained operational. Of the 34 dysfunctional centres, at least 11 or one third of the installations were looted and systematically destroyed during the war (UNEP 2011, p.31). Only nine cities now have operational water distribution networks. Geographically, urban water coverage is disproportionately concentrated in a few centres. More than 85 percent of urban water connections are found in four provinces: Kinshasa, Bas Congo, Katanga and war-torn South Kivu (*ibid*). A study of a semi-rural commune of Kinshasa in 2005 showed that 46 percent of its population used REGIDESO, 31 percent wells or protected springs installed by a Catholic parish, the health zone and NGOs, while 18 percent took their water from unprotected springs. The average household paid USD 8.10 a month for water even though the average monthly income of half of the households was only USD 50 (Katsongo 2005).

The National Sanitation Programme (*Programme National d'Assainissement, PNA*) is basically operational only in Kinshasa (Tearfund et al. 2007, p.22), but with very low capacity, 'in practical terms non-existent' (*ibid*, p.24). The bulk of urban sanitation is provided by the private sector with drainage of septic tanks. Waste is then discharged into the Congo river with little oversight. Only Kinshasa and Lubumbashi have minimum household waste collection services, although many NGOs are supporting sustainable cost recovery schemes. Wastewater drainage systems have not been maintained and lead to regular flooding following heavy rainfall, as happens yearly in Kinshasa (including January 2011 and half the city in October 2010) and significant flooding in Lubumbashi in February 2010.

Only 14 percent of Congolese have access to an improved sanitation facility for the disposal of human waste, with only 4percent of households in rural areas compared to 36percent in urban areas (Institut National de la Statistique 2010, p.15). Very little progress has been made in access to sanitation in the last 20 years. Research in this area is complicated and leads to contradicting figures. For example, according to WHO/UNICEF (2010), access to improved sanitation in rural areas has improved from 4 percent in 1990 to just 23 percent in 2008, with an equal increase in access to shared sanitation from 4 percent in 1990 to 22 percent in 2008. The majority of the population (70 percent) in urban areas use unimproved and shared toilets. Access to improved sanitation remained 23 percent in urban areas between 1990 to 2008. This clearly contradicts with the previously mentioned INS MICS 2010 figures

⁴³ The Ministry of Rural Development (with the National Rural Hydraulic Service), the Ministry of Planning, with the National Action Committee on Water and Sanitation, and the Ministry of the Environment with the Water Department.

(these figures suggest higher access in rural areas than MICS figures, while lower access in urban areas). Nevertheless, the figures sustain the conclusion that the majority of the Congolese population do not have access to improved sanitation facilities.

Nineteen percent of under-five deaths in 2008 were caused by diarrhoea and 18 percent of children under-five had suffered an episode of diarrhoea in the two weeks preceding the 2010 Multiple Cluster Indicators Survey (MICS). The World Health Organisation supports the government's disease surveillance system, designed to rapidly detect outbreaks of water-borne disease such as dysentery or cholera. Cholera is perhaps one of the most striking indicators of need in the water and sanitation sectors. DRC is one of the top five countries in the world affected by the disease. The cholera bacteria are prevalent in water systems, principally in the lakes and rivers of the south-east of the country where they remain the sources of repeated epidemics. In 2008 there were more than 25,000 reported cases and 500 deaths (Bompangue et al. 2008).

Whereas recurrent cholera epidemics particularly point towards the lack of clean drinking water, the ongoing high number of dysentery cases point particularly to the lack of sanitation. The Ministry of Public Health's 2005 statistical report of epidemic disease recorded 55,000 cases of dysentery, and that 42 percent of children under three had round worms (Ministère de la Santé Publique 2005).

In the countryside, the national rural water service, SNHR, has very few resources and its institutional framework remains inappropriate. It is mostly NGOs and religious organisations that share the responsibility for supplying drinking water in the countryside. The population has not managed to take charge of operating nor maintaining the facilities. Despite the great need, only four drilling enterprises are currently active in DRC. Water is not always drinkable because wells and other supply sources are not covered or protected, and regional disparities are also very wide. Women, as traditional water carriers (89 percent of the cases, according to one study in North Kivu) (MDF Afrique Centrale 2008), have a particularly heavy burden (AfDB & OECD 2007, p.219).

4.2 Social protection

Social protection can be described as 'a set of interventions which aim to address poverty, vulnerability and risk and may be carried out by the state, by non-governmental actors or the private sector or through informal individual or community initiatives.' (Bailey et al. 2011, p.2) In the draft of the new poverty reduction and growth strategy paper DSCR2, the government describes the extreme poverty of a large part of its population as one of the major challenges DRC is faced with (Ministère du Plan 2011b). According to this document, 70 percent of the Congolese population lives below the poverty threshold (2011b, p.18), which is the figure generally employed in documents on the country. However, though this poverty rate renders social protection measures anything but superfluous, Bailey et al. conclude, 'national policy on social protection is unclear, often implemented by numerous stakeholders with an insufficiently coherent strategy, and tends to reach only a small proportion of the population – mainly in urban areas' (2011, p.vii).

Research into social protection in DRC is complicated by the different ways in which 'social protection' is understood: 'social protection, as a concept and approach, has a range of interpretations in DRC. In general, it is seen as policies, programmes and informal networks that address the needs of vulnerable populations in order to prevent their destitution. Government officials and aid agencies often refer to categories of vulnerable people, specifically disabled persons, elderly, vulnerable women and children (including those separated from their families) and people displaced because of conflict. At the same time, there is a widespread belief that nearly 'everyone is vulnerable' owing to widespread poverty. This makes it conceptually difficult to separate out social protection from broader efforts to reduce poverty and to strengthen the provision of basic services' (Bailey et al. 2011, p.18).

The development of the DSCR2 has led to a review of the social protection sector, as well as the development of a national social protection strategy, in which several ministries participate.⁴⁴ The

⁴⁴ The Ministry of Employment, Labour and Social Welfare (METPS); the Ministry of Social Affairs, Humanitarian Action and National Solidarity (MINAS); the Ministry of Gender, Family and Children (MGFE); the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (MJDH); the Ministry of Education; and the Ministry of Public Health.

government has also recently adopted a National Strategy for Social Protection of Vulnerable Groups (2008), expanded by a Plan of National Action for Orphans and Vulnerable Children in 2009. Additionally, the law on child protection was scheduled to be enacted in 2011. Nevertheless, the budget for social protection programming is almost non-existent, exacerbated by low allocations to basic social services (primarily education and health). Ministries that play a central role in social protection are under-resourced in comparison with more powerful ministries such as those focused on infrastructure, mining or defence. 'This reflects the relatively low priority given to the social sectors despite discourse suggesting the contrary' (Bailey et al. 2011, p.22).

Thus, the number of people who have access to formal social protection measures is small. According to the DSCR2, 9 percent of orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) receive outside support, 15 percent of the children from broken families are supported by institutions, 86,000 people receive social security and 42,000 pensioners and welfare recipients are supported. Since access to formal social protection measures is small, the majority of people rely on informal protection mechanisms. In their research in the provinces of Kinshasa, Katanga and Bas Congo, Bailey et al. find that informal transfers, from friends, family or the church, are perceived as the strongest support mechanism (2011, p.22). People do not rely on the government, nor do they expect it to support them; neither do many look to NGOs. It is, however, possible that in areas where there is a strong humanitarian presence, such as in the east of the country, people are more trusting of these organisations. In large parts of the country, people's reliance on friends, family and the church makes them vulnerable in situations where poverty is widespread. What Bailey et al. find striking is that 38 percent were not able to identify any source of support; it would appear social safety nets failed to cover their needs.

4.3 Basic services and social protection interventions

This section will go over basic services and social protection interventions, starting with the government policy and programmes. Next, people-led initiatives will be discussed, followed by agency-led interventions, and private sector interventions. Finally, the focus will move to participation.

4.3.1 Government policy and programmes

As explained previously, government commitment to basic services and social protection is complicated. On one hand, various documents, notably the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, express the government's commitment to universal access to basic services. On the other, actual sector budgets are too low, and there can be significant differences between budget allocations and actual expenses. There is also a multiplicity of institutions in the basic services and social protection sectors, both at national, provincial and local levels, which, according to the local constellation of powers (K. Titeca & De Herdt 2011), leads to 'negotiation', a great deal of manoeuvring space for the province and *territoires* to act differently. As a result of this, the reality on the ground frequently does not conform to the laws that exist nationally (which can often be conflicting with other laws: for instance, the law on education allows school fees, which conflicts with the constitution which deems that primary education is free for all) (PAGE 2007, p.3). Thus, even though the government may express its commitment to improving and expanding basic services and social protection, there exists a wide gap between what is stated officially and what happens on the ground. The following paragraphs will set out government policy and programming that are implemented in the basic services and social protection sectors.

Health

Government public health policy is described in the '*Plan National de Développement Sanitaire 2011–2015 (PNDS)*' (Ministère de la Santé Publique 2010), the national plan for development of the health sector, which replaces the '*Plan Directeur de Développement Sanitaire 2000–2009*' (Ministère de la Santé Publique 2000). In this plan, the government prioritises four 'strategic areas': (1) the progressive development of the health zones and continuity of care; (2) supporting the delivery of quality care; (3) strengthening leadership and governance; and (4) reinforcing collaboration between sectors (e.g. education, employment). The development of health zones is the basic strategy laid out in the PNDS to offer the general population access to basic health services. The government aims to improve the coverage and quality of these zones, streamlining the functioning of health facilities at different levels of the system (Ministère de la Santé Publique 2010, p.63). Besides this general plan for the provision of health care, there also exists a specific (multi-sectoral) programme for dealing with HIV/AIDS, the '*Programme National Multisectoriel de Lutte contre le Sida (PNMLS)*'. Funding for this programme comes largely from households and external partners: for example in 2009, according to the Ministry of Health, the state only contributed 0.19 percent of the budget (2010, pp.66–67). Additionally, in that same year, there was a large gap between the available resources and the actual needs in response to HIV and AIDS.

Education

The national policy on education is described in the '*Stratégie de développement de l'enseignement primaire, secondaire et professionnel (2010/11–2015/16)*'.⁴⁵ The three major objectives are (1) to increase access, accessibility, equity and retention in the various levels of education, in particular basic education, especially for girls, the vulnerable, disadvantaged, children in need; (2) to improve the quality and relevance of teaching; and (3) to strengthen sector governance (Ministère du Plan 2011b, p.61). According to the DSCR2, the government intends to promote a free and compulsory primary education, conform the constitution, including the abolishment of school fees, and the reduction of regional disparities. The government has made a start by deleting the direct costs paid by households from first to third grade at the start of 2011, except in the cities of Kinshasa and Lubumbashi, and plans to come to a completely free primary education by 2015/2016 (*ibid*, p.62). However, as described previously, with the multiplicity of institutions and negotiation processes that occur, the reality on the ground does not necessarily reflect policies made at a national level; additionally, budget allocations to education do not appear to be on the increase. As De Herdt and Poncelet find in their study of school fees, although negotiations take place at different levels, it is at local levels that a great deal of variation arises – it is here that the levels of school fees are determined. The actual fees are result of the local configuration of powers (school councils, director, parents, etc.), and are only 'marginally' influenced by legal norms (De Herdt & Poncelet 2010, p.5). This means the challenge of reducing school fees is primarily an institutional rather than financial issue, which the government appears to acknowledge by making sector governance one of the three priorities of the sector strategy.

Transport

The government adopted a transport sector reform strategy in December 2009 (Ministère du Plan 2011b, p.52). In the road sector, the three priorities are road maintenance, the current plans for further investment, and reform of public operators. The government plans to deal with road maintenance through the National Road Maintenance Fund (FONER), as well as through mobilising manual labour for routine maintenance, particularly for rural roads, supervised by small and medium-sized enterprises or local groups. Prime targets are major corridors (Kinshasa-Lubumbashi and Lumumbashi-Bukavu-Goma-Kisangani), as well as rural roads that are essential for accessing agricultural markets. With regards to the railway sector, a main priority is the financial and operational restructuring of the *Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer du Congo (SNCC)*, seeing as its role is strategic for the mining sector. Additionally, the DSCR2 describes the government's intentions regarding air transport, transportation by water, and governance of the entire sector, expressing the intent to 'establish an environment conducive to the

⁴⁵ Strategy for the development of primary, secondary and professional education.

development of public-private partnerships and improve compliance with international and regional standards' (*ibid*).

Water and sanitation

Although in 2007, Tearfund et al. found 'a void in terms of policy and planning on sanitation and hygiene, which runs from national through to local level' (2007, p.43), DRC is currently working on its first Water Code (with support from GTZ, now GIZ), a law that governs the water and sanitation sector as a whole (Ministère de la Santé Publique & Ministère de l'Enseignement Primaire, Secondaire et Professionnel 2010). The government's strategic objectives in these areas coincide with the MDGs: to halve the number of people without sustainable access to safe water and sanitation by 2015. A first priority for the 2011 to 2015 period is the restructuring and strengthening of institutional frameworks and coordination (Ministère du Plan 2011b, p.69). As in other sectors, decision making and responsibilities are spread between 'a dozen' ministries and public institutions. Urban water operations and distribution are undertaken by state-owned company REGIDESO, which faces 'technical-management, commercial and financial' problems. The national rural water service SNHR has 'very few' resources, and its institutional framework is not appropriate. Finally, the national sanitation programme PNA handles domestic and industrial waste, and produces drinking water (under REGIDESO and the ministry of environment), but is 'practically non-existent' (AfDB & OECD 2007, p.218). Besides reform of the water and sanitation sector, the government also signed contracts (in 2010) to repair and expand clean-water supply networks in the towns of Lisala, Kasangulu and Tshikapa as part of the PEASU (*Projet d'eau potable et d'assainissement en milieu semi-urbain*) water and sanitation project. This USD 47m programme is funded by the AfDB and will give around 1.5 million people access to clean water, and 1 million access to sanitation, increasing national access to clean water from 22 percent to 27 percent, and access to sanitation from 9 percent to 15 percent.⁴⁶ Additionally, the project will also enable the creation of a national inventory of water infrastructure, as well as the development of a programme for national supply of water and sanitation by 2015. Another urban water programme, *Projet d'eau en milieu urbain (Pemu)*,⁴⁷ started in 2009 and is funded (USD 190m) by the World Bank, to reform water company REGIDESO and rebuild its infrastructure. Furthermore, the German government is helping to organise the water and sanitation sector better, through the development of the water code amongst other methods (AfDB et al. 2011, p.15; UNEP 2011).

Social protection

The development of the DSCR2 has led to a review of the social protection sector, and the development of a national social protection strategy, in which several ministries participate.⁴⁸ The government has also recently adopted a National Strategy for Social Protection of Vulnerable Groups (2008), expanded by a Plan of National Action for Orphans and Vulnerable Children in 2009. Additionally, the law on child protection was scheduled to be enacted in, 2011. A national social protection policy is also in the process of development (Ministère du Plan 2011b, p.68). The number of people who currently have access to formal social protection measures is small. According to the DSCR2, 9 percent of orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) receive support, as well as 15 percent of the children in broken families, 86,000 people receive social security, and there are 42,000 pensioners and welfare recipients (*rentiers*) (*ibid*, p.18). Bailey et al. (2011, p.19) describe the National Institute for Social Security (INSS), which is what the Ministry is most likely referring to here; this Institute mainly provides pensions (though the monthly rate is limited, and payments irregular) for people who are formally employed, and is funded through mandatory contributions from employees and employers. The INSS only covers a small proportion (less than 2 percent) of the Congolese population, and recipients generally already have a more secure economic situation given their employment status. However, it would appear there are plans to expand the coverage.

⁴⁶ 70 million universal currency units (UC); 1 UC was equivalent to approximately 1.5 USD, September 31, 2010.

⁴⁷ Urban Water Supply Project, Project ID: P091092.

⁴⁸ The Ministry of Employment, Labour and Social Welfare (METPS); the Ministry of Social Affairs, Humanitarian Action and National Solidarity (MINAS); the Ministry of Gender, Family and Children (MGFE); the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (MJDH); the Ministry of Education; and the Ministry of Public Health.

4.3.2 Coping and community-based initiatives

Little is known about the ways people gain access to basic services and social protection mechanisms in conflict situations, and DRC is no exception. This section will discuss the strategies people employ, both in private (household), as well as in the communities they are part of, in order to access basic services (health, education, transport and water and sanitation) and social protection in DRC.

Private

During the war, health and education services depended almost entirely on user fees (Waldman 2006, p.11). Seeing as this is a result of developments initiated during the structural adjustment period in the 1980s, it cannot be classified as a people-led initiative: nevertheless, it *does* underscore the importance of local communities, and highlights how large a role their contribution plays in gaining access to these services. Very little documentation describes private initiatives used in order to gain access to basic services. With respect to education, various ways are described in which parents deal with the issues surrounding user fees, which can be summed up as ‘payment of school fees in kind or through manual labour’: parents may offer goods to school administrators, loan their property to the school, or the parents or children may do manual labour (work in the teacher’s field, for example) to compensate for missing school fees (PAGE 2007, p.51). Another variant, described by De Herdt and Poncelet (2010, p.5) involves payment through sexual favours. Parents are also institutionally involved through the parents’ committees (COPAs), through which they can have a say in school policy.

In the health sector, these practices have not been documented, though as with education, user fees apply. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that people may employ similar strategies of payment in kind or through labour. Additionally, people may resort to traditional medical knowledge, and refer to traditional doctors. The Ministry of Health also invests in the training of (voluntary) community health workers, in order to sensitise the local population; though strictly not a private initiative, this does represent a way in which individuals may lower the barriers of access to health services for their fellow community members (there is no information available on how many of these community health workers have actually been trained) (Waldman 2006, p.12). Additionally, community members may participate in health zone health committees (COSAs).

Very little is known about people’s initiatives in gaining access to transport, or water and sanitation. UNEP mentions an example of an informal bicycle trade, which supplies households with water in Mbuji-Mayi, the capital of Kasai Oriental (2011, p.37). It is quite likely there are similar practices of collecting and selling water in other areas as well. In the transport sector, the lack of well-functioning public transport has led to a large amount of small, private transportation enterprises. Through negotiation, people can deal with prices that are too high, and also in this instance, payment in kind or through labour is possible.

Documentation on social protection in DRC is also very limited. A number of individual social protection strategies have already been mentioned in the section on livelihoods. Besides these livelihoods strategies, Bailey et al. find that ‘informal transfers [from friends, family, and the church] are the strongest source of support’. However, widespread poverty forms a strong limitation to the extent to which people can rely on their networks, and Bailey et al. find that many individuals ‘do nothing to cope with economic, social and environmental vulnerabilities’, since they lack access to formal and informal social protection mechanisms, and can see no opportunities therein (2011, p.32).

Communal

People have developed various types of communal mechanisms to gain access to basic services and social protection. An important form, usually dedicated to health costs, and as such also a social protection measure, is a ‘*mutuelle*’ (or ‘*mutuelle de santé*’, when dedicated to health). These are systems in which people pool funds to cover the health expenses of the members of the *mutuelle*. An example is the Bwamanda hospital insurance scheme, which was launched in 1986, and covered 60–65 percent of the population of the district between 1988 and 1997 (Criel et al. 1999, pp.898–899). However, no recent data on this *mutuelle* is available, which points to a weakness of these insurance schemes: there exist a variety of *mutuelles* in DRC, yet no systematic data on these schemes have come to light; coverage of these systems is likely to be low, with Bernard (2008, p.45) estimating

mutuelles in Kinshasa to have several thousand members (which, compared to the total number of inhabitants of the city, is negligible⁴⁹). According to Bailey et al, the government is interested in stimulating the development of these *mutuelles de santé*, with national coverage as the ultimate objective. However, problems that need to be addressed before this can be the case, are the chronic levels of poverty that limit people's ability to contribute to the fund (and effectively exclude those most in need), and the state of the healthcare system, which would not be able to deal with the increased demand for medical care (Bailey et al. 2011, pp.19–20).

Besides *mutuelles* in the health and social protection sectors, there are also a number of communal activities in the education sector. These activities are closely connected to the individual strategies described above, as they have to do with school finances. To financially support schools, parents' associations may organise community initiatives, such as community fields and gardens which generate income for the school through the sale of harvests. In these cases, there is generally an awareness that 'school matters are everyone's business' (PAGE 2007, p.50). Additionally, there is also community work to compensate for construction or other periodic fees. The PAGE study found several communities in which parents, or even the community as a whole, reach the compromise in which they conduct maintenance or construction work as a group, instead of making the payments that were earmarked for the same purpose (*ibid*, p.51).

With respect to the water and sanitation sector, no communal initiatives have been found. However, one interesting initiative described by Douma (2011, pp.6–7) has to do with the electricity sector: the Chai Electricity Committee (CEC) in the Chai neighbourhood in Bukavu. This committee stems from a local development organisation (ADC, *Association de Développement de Chai*), founded in 1998 by a group of youth from Chai. The ADC went on to create the CEC in 2000, dedicated to the electrification of Chai, making the CEC 'an entirely indigenous, bottom-up MSP [Multiple Stakeholder Process] that was initiated out of the need to improve service delivery and living conditions of the Chai citizens'. Compared to similar committees in other neighbourhoods, the Chai committee is labelled as relatively active and successful, at least in part. They focused activity on consumer-rights awareness raising, a lobby towards SNEL (the national electricity company) and on raising money through household contributions (usually USD 50 per household), to be able to buy the necessary materials and equipment for connection (raising USD 3,800, topped up with money from the Parish, and, during the election period, with USD 5,000 by the political party PPRD).

Finally, in the transport sector, no mention of communal organisations has been found. There is mention of local communities getting involved in the maintenance of roads, but these initiatives are then fuelled by the organisations that rehabilitate roads, and thus cannot be labelled as people-led.

4.3.3 Aid agency-led interventions

There are a large number of aid agencies active in the education and health sectors in DRC, with transport and water and sanitation receiving somewhat less attention. Although the number of social protection programmes remains rather limited. The total number of programmes is vast, but there is a general lack of coordination. As mentioned previously, many aid agencies bypass the central government, and choose to work directly with localities; others such as the World Bank create parallel management units. Only in recent years, following the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, and the 2009 National High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Kinshasa, attempts are being made to streamline aid investments in DRC, through a national *Plateforme de Gestion de l'Aide et des Investissements* (PGAI).⁵⁰ As yet, there remains a notable absence of a comprehensive overview of what programmes are being carried out when, where, in which sector, and by whom. Bearing this in mind, the following paragraphs give an overview of the main agency-led interventions in these sectors.

⁴⁹ Estimates range from 6-10 million.


⁵⁰ National Platform for the Management of Aid and Investments: <http://pga.ministereduplan.cd>.

Health

In DRC, many health services over the last 20-30 years have been provided by church organisations and NGOs. In the late 1990s, the health system was near collapse, which saw church organisations and NGOs becoming the principal care providers at district and peripheral levels, with religious organisations operating an estimated one-third of health facilities in 2005 (World Bank 2005b, p.7). Though sources attest to the importance and influence of the church in delivering basic services in DRC, little research has been done into the way in which religious structures operate.

Aid agencies have 'traditionally' aimed at supporting service delivery in health zones (Waldman 2006, p.9), with support including infrastructure, equipment, drugs, staff training, and salary supplements to the staff. An example is USAID, which, through the reinstated SANRU program, has to date assisted 81 health zones. The European Commission's *Programme Santé PS9FED* supported health services in four provinces (now succeeded by PS10FED) (RDC & CE 2008). Coopération Belge concentrated its support on health zones in Bas-Congo and Kisangani. The AfDB similarly supported health sector development in Province Orientale, while the World Bank supported essential health services in 83 health zones in its PARSS programme: *Projet d'appui à la réhabilitation du secteur de la santé*, with approximately 9.4 million recipients. While involving different organisations, humanitarian interventions in the east have intended to support the same minimum package of activities: MSF branches have supported services delivery in over 30 health zones, while organisations such as IRC and Action Contre la Faim have taken care of other health zones – all these figures are from 2006 (Waldman 2006, p.9).

Figure 6: Coverage of health zones by aid organisations



Source: World Bank 2008a, p.196

Though the general approach is the same, the participation of a variety of actors has led to the development of a number of different management systems. There is discussion on whether or not to work with user fees: most humanitarian organisations provide free basic health care, although some do not.⁵¹ Additionally, assistance has not been distributed equally, with some health zones receiving more

⁵¹ For the discussion: <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2677>, <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2609>

aid than others, and some not getting any support at all (result of the ‘Balkanization’ of the health sector by development agencies) (Waldman 2006, p.v). Though aid organisations coordinate their support to health zones to a certain extent, the fact that they do not target the same zones means that recent, accurate maps describing their involvement are lacking. The World Bank (2008a, p.196) provides a map (Figure 5); estimating 85 percent of the zones are reached with some level of financing. But the black and white quality of the map is such that for many health zones, it is impossible to make out whether they receive support, and by which organisation.

Waldman (2006, p.10) provides the most recent overview of major health projects in DRC. As Table 11 shows, the World Bank is a major financier, through the PARSS project, or Health Sector Rehabilitation Support Project.⁵² Combined with several more recent projects, WB support to the health sector now totals over USD 260m.⁵³

The Table also makes clear that a large part of aid - about half, according to the World Bank (2008a, p.10) is channelled through vertical programmes, devoted to specific diseases or issues, such as tuberculosis, malaria, HIV/AIDS, or vaccination. According to the Ministry of Health, the narrow focus of these programmes and NGOs has led to neglect of the health zones as operational units of primary health care (Ministère de la Santé Publique 2010, p.50): as health zones may receive very specific support, which does not allow them to cure other diseases. Managing the plethora of agencies and programmes is not an easy matter for health zone employees that have not received the training to deal with these matters.

A new, recent development is results-based funding. This was initially introduced by Cordaid in Eastern Kivu, with an external organization auditing the results (in terms of improved health, improved management of health services, etc.). Now this approach is becoming more widely accepted in the donor community, as the new model for funding, being applied in other sectors as well.

Table 10: An overview of major projects in the health sector

Project	Total	Target Population	Length
Health Sector Rehabilitation Support Project (PARSS) – World Bank	\$150 Mil	83 HZ	4 years (12/2005–12/2009)
EC Programme Santé – PIN 9 ^{ème} FED	€ 80 Mill	4 provinces	5 years (2003–07)
Programme d’urgence et de soutien au processus de réunification économique et sociale (PUSPRES)	\$20 Mill	3 cities	2 years
AfDB	\$40 Mil	1 province	5 years (09/04–10/09)
USAID ^a	\$40 Mil	80 HZ	4 years (2004–08)
DGCD (indirect bilateral aid) ^b	\$29 Mil	61 HZ & 4 provinces	6 years
DGCD (direct bilateral aid) ^b	€ 30 Mil	DS & 6 Dir/Progr.	5 years
Global Fund – Tuberculosis (Round 5) ^c	\$36.2 Mil	11 provinces	5 years (2006–10)
Global Fund – Tuberculosis (Round 2)	\$7.6 Mil	11 provinces	3 years (08/03–07/06)
Global Fund – Malaria ^c	\$53.9 Mil	156 HZ	5 years (10/04–09/09)
Global Fund – HIV/AIDS ^b	\$113.6 Mil	11 provinces	5 years (10/04–09/09)
Great Lakes Initiative on HIV/AIDS (GLIA) ^d – WB	\$20 Mil	5 provinces	4 years (2005–09)
Multisectoral AIDS Program (MAP) – WB ^a	\$35 Mil	11 provinces	5 years (2005–10)
PDDS/POR (Government)	\$35 Mil	26 HZ, 3 DS	5 years
GAVI	\$49 Mil	EPI	5 years (2003–07)

Sources: Gouvernement de la République Démocratique du Congo Ministère de la Santé Publique 2005; Global Fund; GAVI; World Bank “Active Projects” 2006; AfDB 2006.

Note: € = Euro.

- This reflects USAID assistance targeted towards providing the minimum package of services in specific health zones (roughly \$9-10 million per year). USAID spends an average of \$18-20 million a year on health, with an additional annual contribution of \$7 million from OFDA.
- These figures taken from the Annual Review of the DRC MOH. The DGCD website states that they spend an average of € 10 million annually on health in the DRC.

Source: Waldman (2006, p.10)

⁵² Project ID: P088751

⁵³ Related projects are P122251-DRC Malaria Control Additional Financing to Health Sector Rehab Support, P125677-DRC Polio Control Additional Financing to Health Sector Rehab Support, P126088-DRC Additional Financing Primary Health Care.

Finally, humanitarian interventions are described in the Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 (HAP): the Health Cluster has budgeted USD 35.1m for 2011, while, related to health, the Nutrition Cluster has a budget of USD 41.1m, and the Food Security Cluster (described in the livelihoods section) USD 295m (OCHA 2010, p.4). The HAP identifies a total of 196 health zones (of the total 515), which is 38 percent, as emergency zones, including 75 health zones with epidemics and endemic diseases in North Kivu and Province Orientale; 50 health zones that would accommodate displaced persons and the people resettled in Katanga, Equateur, Oriental, North Kivu and Bandudu; and 71 newly accessible health zones with poor health coverage and likelihood of natural disaster in the provinces of Equateur, Orientale, South Kivu and Katanga (*ibid*, p.44). The health cluster aims to help reduce morbidity and mortality linked to the health consequences of crisis situations, primarily targeting eight provinces: North Kivu and South Kivu, Province Orientale, Equateur, Maniema, Western Kasai, Eastern Kasai and Katanga. The cluster works with three 'strategic thrusts': (1) increase of basic interventions for reproductive health and infant health, (2) preparedness and response to epidemics, and (3) strengthening technical and institutional capacities during emergency situations (*ibid*, pp.44–45). Beneficiaries targeted by the cluster in 2011 represent 7.5 million people, including 3.9 million women and 1.6 million children.

The largest NGO programme is the IRC Tuungane Community-driven Planning and Reconstruction programme, with a 2007–2010 budget of USD 40m, and a 2011–2014 budget of USD 100m (see also Box 1, under 3.4.5). The programme works in different sectors, including education (reconstruction of classrooms), health (restocking clinics), water (rehabilitation of water points) and infrastructure (constructing community roads and bridges), depending on the preferred choice of the communities.

Education

For aid organisations, the education sector is of prime importance, as investment in education is designated as one of the best measures for 'pro-poor' growth, and achieving universal enrolment to primary education is one of the millennium goals. There are numerous aid organisations involved, in various ways, ranging from technical support to the administration (UNESCO in the collection of data by the ministry of Education (CTSE 2010)) to assisting parents in the payment of school fees, providing school materials, and improvement of infrastructure. These organisations sometimes face conflicting interests, however, as the focus on fragile states pulls funding to the eastern DRC (USAID, for example, decided to focus its aid on the east (Waldman 2006)), while a great deal of poverty also exists in other provinces; there also exists a conflict of interest between the humanitarian approach of 'keeping people alive', and investing in development, a more long-term commitment.

The World Bank is also a major financier of support to the education sector, investing 25 percent of USD180 m of the *Projet d'Urgence de Réhabilitation Urbaine et Sociale (PURUS)*⁵⁴ in the operating costs of schools, followed by a USD 150m *Projet d'appui au redressement du secteur éducatif (PARSE)*,⁵⁵ in support of the administrative system and coordination. By strengthening mechanisms for accountability, both upwards and downwards, the World Bank aims to ensure that the funds are employed for re-equipping and rehabilitating schools. De Herdt and Poncelet are critical of these projects (2010, pp.64–65), as they find that the funds indeed arrive at the schools, but that there were 'relatively many' irregularities in their use. Additionally, funds may have the negative effect that the school administration will require more money, arguing that operating costs will be covered by the World Bank (De Herdt and Poncelet 2010, pp.64–65). According to these authors, both PURUS and PARSE do not address one of the root problems of the education system: the wages that lie below the poverty line (*ibid*, p.66).

Key donors in the sector share the vision to reduce school fees, through development of a National Strategy for the Reduction of School Fees (Boak 2009, p.21). Once the plan is ready, funding is to be disbursed through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). DFID is also financing a nationwide teacher census (as well as a comprehensive school mapping exercise) after which it intends to fund teacher salaries, also via the MDTF.

⁵⁴ Emergency Urban and Social Rehabilitation Project, project ID: P104497.

⁵⁵ Support Project for the Recovery of the Congolese Education Sector, project ID: P086294.

Besides addressing the issue of school fees, support to the education sector has entailed many small-scale interventions addressing issues such as the rehabilitation of schools, the provision of textbooks, materials, and training of teachers. For example, BTC has built a large number of schools some years ago, funded by the World Bank; UNICEF has built many schools, and CORDAID and ICCO as well, with funding by the Dutch government; Tearfund did the same with Belgium government funding, IRC as part of the Community Driven Recovery program in eastern DRC, with DFID funding, and many others. The Belgian government is the longest standing bilateral donor in DRC. They are providing substantial technical and financial assistance to the development, printing and distribution of textbooks as well as training in their use. Additionally, they have provided technical as well as logistical support related to education strategy development; for example, CTB and DFID jointly financed the Round Table in May 2009 regarding the Strategy for Education Development involving a wide range of stakeholders (Boak 2009, p.21).

With respect to interventions in education by humanitarian actors, the HAP describes a budget of USD 28.8m for the Education Cluster. The cluster's interventions will be based on the following crisis-related thresholds, which will determine the involvement of the cluster while taking into account security and accessibility conditions: (1) > 30 percent of displaced children are out of school; (2) > 20 percent of children in return zones are not attending school; (3) > 50 percent of classrooms destroyed; (4) > 50 percent of classrooms exceeding the ratio of 50 students to one teacher in secure areas. (OCHA 2010, p.50) The cluster estimates the total population of target children 'at risk' in 2011 at 1,634,670, and aims to provide assistance to 4percent of children aged 3–5, 30percent of children aged 6–11 and 3 percent of adolescents, which is a total population of 247,194.

Transport

In the years following the signing of the peace treaty, reconstructing the Congolese road network has been a top priority (World Bank 2010d, p.9). According to the World Bank, the status of the country's limited paved network, which is fewer than 3,000 km, has significantly improved and is now comparable with those of other lower income countries in the region. However, the unpaved roads, the vast majority of the network, are in what it calls 'serious disrepair'. Many agencies have been involved in rehabilitating parts of this network, though no clear overview exists. Through various projects, the World Bank has invested over USD 170m in the rehabilitation of roads and transportation, and an additional USD 255m in the transport sector, mainly railways (70percent).⁵⁶ In the Pro-Routes Project, the World Bank collaborates with DFID, which invests another USD 72.6m. The African Development Bank has invested USD 76.6m in the Nsele-Lufi and Kwango-Kenge Road Rehabilitation Project.⁵⁷

Besides these agencies, the mining deal struck between the Congolese government and a consortium of Chinese companies, discussed in the livelihoods section, also represents a major investment in Congolese infrastructure, with the construction of new roads totalling 3,600 km and the rehabilitation of another 3,000 km (Jansson et al. 2009, pp.33–36).

There are also a large number of smaller-scale interventions, for example by Welthungerhilfe (German Agro Action), which is involved in the rehabilitation of roads in the Kivus, Maniema, and Province Orientale, funded by the EU, ending the isolation of rural areas ('*désenclavement*'). When the organisation attempted to set up a maintenance and management system for the rehabilitated roads, however, this met with a lack of cooperation on the part of users, as well as the government: users failed to adhere to the wet season restrictions, while the government ended up claiming the revenues generated by the road toll (World Bank 2010a, p.101). Another case is the restoration of the 363 km Bukavu-Shabunda road, and re-establishing state authority in areas of which the last contact with the

⁵⁶ P092724 Agriculture Rehabilitation and Recovery Support; P101745 Pro-Routes Project; P120709 Pro-Routes Project Additional Financing; P092537 Multi-Modal Transport Project.

⁵⁷ <http://www.afdb.org/en/projects-and-operations/project-portfolio/project/p-cd-db0-001/>

outside world dates back to the 1980s, according to the local population.⁵⁸ Examples of other organisations involved in road rehabilitation are Malteser International⁵⁹ and BTC.

Humanitarian interventions related to transportation are described in the HAP, under the Logistics Cluster, which has a budget of USD 49.5m. In 2010, approximately 1,500 kilometres of roads, landing strips and bridges were rehabilitated, in order to enable humanitarian actors to reach vulnerable populations; also, an inter-agency air transport service was assured (OCHA 2010, p.7). In 2011, the cluster aims to improve access of humanitarian agencies to beneficiaries, facilitate transport of humanitarian aid to the most vulnerable and build the logistic capacity of the humanitarian community to respond to emergencies, amongst other through roads and airstrips rehabilitation (*ibid*, p.68).

Water and Sanitation

The water and sanitation sector has historically benefited from the involvement of international development partners. During the war, aid organisations suspended their activities, but many re-engaged after the signing of the peace treaty. According to UNEP, international aid currently accounts for almost 95 percent of total investments in the water sector, which equals around USD 62m per year. Though financial commitments are higher (disbursement rate is 38 percent), the implementation of projects is delayed, largely due to 'limited technical capacity, logistical constraints and complex project application procedures'. Though donor support is significant, there still remains an estimated yearly financial gap of USD 102m to meet the PRSP's revised water goals. (UNEP 2011, p.24)

Table 11: Major funding sources for the rural and peri-urban water and sanitation sector

Programmes / donors	Sum disbursed (USD Million)	Beneficiary population	Period
Sanitised Villages programme (UNICEF, DFID, JICA, USAID)	40	800,000	2008-2009
Autonomous community-based water supply systems (Belgium-DGCD, DFID, EU, AFD)	11	100,000	2007-2009
Pooled Fund	9	225,000	2008-2009
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	n.a	1,475,795	2002-2009
OXFAM-Quebec	2.5	200,000	2004-2009
GoDRC Unit for Programme Coordination (UCOP/World Bank)	0.72	111,286	2008-2009
GoDRC Central Coordination Bureau (BCECO)	0.542	15,000	2003-2009
GoDRC Social Fund	0.998	221,148	2008-2009
Total	64.8	3,148,229	

Source: UNEP 2011, p.25

⁵⁸ <http://reliefweb.int/node/423736>

⁵⁹ <http://www.malteser-international.org/en/home/where-we-help/africa/dr-congo/relief-reconstruction-rehabilitation/new-roads-between-kigulube-and-nzovu.html>

Table 12: Current financial commitments for the urban water supply sector by donor

Rank	Donor	Amount (USD Million)	Percentage
1.	World Bank	219	43.8%
2.	African Development Bank (AfDB)	113.6	22.7%
3.	Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)	62	12.4%
4.	German Development Bank (KfW)	58.6	11.7%
5.	GoDRC/REGIDESO	19.4	3.9%
6.	Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA)	15	3.0%
7.	European Union	8.2	1.6%
8.	French Development Agency (AFD)	2.6	0.5%
9.	International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC/UNDP)	1.1	0.2%
10.	Belgian Development Cooperation (DGDC)	1	0.2%
	Total	500.5	100%

Source: UNEP 2011, p.26

An important programme is the ‘*Village Assaini*’ (Sanitized Villages) programme, which is directed at small villages with 500-1,000 inhabitants. The programme, started in 2006, is implemented by the Ministry of Health, supported by UNICEF and other development partners,⁶⁰ and aims to systematically develop the rural water sector. Key elements are tapping springs and constructing shallow wells through community mobilisation and capacity building. However, though the programme is aimed at reaching 9 million people in 15,200 villages by 2012, there were only 1,300 villages (1.6 million people) that were declared to have reached ‘sanitized village’ status by mid-2010. The programme is suffering a ‘lack of technical know-how as well as multiple logistical and institutional constraints’. (UNEP 2011, p.35) UNICEF also specifically targets schools through ‘Sanitized Schools’ projects, and builds capacity through training one Rural Development Technician per *aire de santé*, who is trained in improving springs and constructing simple latrines (Tearfund et al. 2007, p.38).

Additionally, donors like the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the German government are also involved in financing and development of the water and sanitation sector, as described under the ‘government policy and programmes’ heading.

UNICEF also implements humanitarian programmes, such as PEAR (Programme of Expanded Assistance to Returnees) Plus. This is a multi-sector UNICEF programme, which aims to support durable solutions for returning IDPs in North Kivu, South Kivu, Katanga and Ituri through education, child protection, health and water and sanitation activities. (Bailey 2011, p.7) UNICEF heads the Water and Sanitation Cluster, which was established in 2006, and meets once a month to share information on the projects implemented by its members in order to avoid overlap and harmonise the distribution of water services.

Members represent UN agencies, national and international NGOs, and state institutions, though the latter hardly participate in the cluster meetings. All members execute their own projects and though these differ in approach, they have an equal say in the meetings. Recently, the Ministry of Plan has taken over some of the lead tasks. However, it remains to be seen if this has been a decision based on real motivation to strengthen state capacities, or whether it is merely a measure to come somewhat in line with new policy guidelines created by the Congolese parliament. (Douma 2011, p.8)

According to the Humanitarian Action Plan for 2011, the Water, Hygiene and Sanitation Cluster have a budget of USD 95.6m. In 2010, humanitarian interventions have supplied over 2.2 million people with access to drinking water, and close to one million benefited from the full WASH (water, hygiene and sanitation) package. The cluster specifically aims to ‘reduce the risk of transmission of water-borne infectious diseases on the displaced or returnee populations, or victims of epidemics or natural disasters, through prevention and emergency response measures while respecting the five cluster

⁶⁰ DFID contributes £25,000,000, <http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Project=200196>.

commitments on the security and dignity of the girls, women, boys and men'. Beneficiaries are displaced/returned populations, people living in camps, populations affected or threatened by cholera epidemics/vector-borne diseases, and populations living in vulnerable zones. (OCHA 2010, p.37)

Social Protection

Social protection has recently come onto the agenda of aid agencies, and so far, there are only a limited number of programmes that are explicitly labelled as social protection. There are many programmes that fall in the category of social protection, but are not conceptualised as such by the implementing organisation, which makes it hard to determine the scope of social protection measures undertaken by NGOs in DRC. The range of sectors and interventions that have to do with social protection is wide, as Bailey et al. (2011, p.24) show in their research for UNICEF, in which they attempt to bring social protection to the attention of aid agencies:

- 'Food security and nutrition: Food and seed distribution, agricultural support, nutrition interventions;
- Poverty reduction: Livelihoods support, income generation, capacity building, support to markets, public works;
- Child protection and OVC: Projects addressing children at risk, children separated from families, children with disabilities, street children, increasing access to education for children;
- Governance: Capacity building, peace building, social cohesion, democracy promotion;
- Basic services: Support to/provision of health services and water/sanitation, rehabilitation of social infrastructure, capacity building;
- Protection and addressing sexual and gender-based violence: Access to medical services, judicial reform, sensitisation, psychosocial care;
- Emergency assistance: Assistance to displaced, returnee and host populations affected by conflict (in all the above sectors, as well as non-food items and shelter).'

In the livelihoods section, interventions related to food security, poverty reduction, and emergency assistance have already been dealt with. Similarly, basic services interventions have been dealt with in the preceding paragraphs, and access to formal social protection mechanisms has been described under the 'government policy and programmes' heading. Given the large number of actors and lack of coordination of development projects, listing all projects that relate to social protection would be 'nearly impossible' (Bailey et al. 2011, p.24).

One social protection intervention that has not been mentioned under other headings is the *Fonds Social de la République*, funded by the World Bank, which supports public works projects, and community development projects with a focus on infrastructure. These projects offer job opportunities and income (*ibid*, p.20). An example of such a project is the Katanga Labor Intensive Public Works Project, which was executed in 2010, in order to mitigate the impacts of the global financial crisis (World Bank 2011a, p.67). Bailey et al also find some small-scale social protection interventions, by the Ministère des Actions Sociales, and provincial governments.

Finally, the UN stabilisation and peace consolidation mission MONUSCO also does interventions which have to do with social protection. With a USD 1.4bn budget, and approximately 20,000 total uniformed personnel, it is the largest organisation operating in eastern DRC.⁶¹ As its stabilisation strategy, the ISSSS was developed, which now works through the STAREC programme. Besides this strategy, MONUSCO also has a mandate for e.g. child protection, combating HIV/AIDS, protecting human rights, and countering sexual violence, in order to provide a 'peace dividend' to the local population.

⁶¹ <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/facts.shtml>

4.3.4 Private sector-led interventions

There is little information available on private sector interventions with respect to basic services and social protection in DRC. As there are plans for privatising state companies, such as water company REGIDESO, or railway company SNCC, the private sector will become involved in the delivery of basic services. Additionally, there are private schools, and private health facilities, the activities both of which have apparently increased, with little oversight from the government.

Besides these examples, there is the activity of so-called 'emerging partners' of DRC, of which China is most active, followed by India and Korea, with an increasing activity of Turkey, and a small presence of Brazil. In many cases, these interventions involve (state-owned) companies. These countries are most interested in mining, construction, information and communication, agriculture, technology transfer and social development. (AfDB et al. 2011, p.13) The interest of China in the mining sector has already been mentioned, with the building of infrastructure in exchange. However, China is also involved in telecommunications, the building of a national optic fibre network, and the 150 MW Zongo-II hydroelectric project. In the next few years, China also plans to get more involved in grants to health systems and agricultural training.

India provides low-interest credit, e.g. to urban transport in Kinshasa, the mining enterprise Miba in Kasai-Oriental, and to build a cement factory in the Orientale province. Additionally, India regularly provides professional training and university scholarships. India's largest telecom firm, Bharti Airtel, has bought the Congolese telecom company Zain and a new firm, Congo China Telecom (CCT), has also been set up. Korea and Brazil currently focus on technology transfer, offering training, university scholarships and internships. Korea is also involved in strengthening government institutions and negotiating to build a deep-water port in Banana (Bas-Congo).

Cooperation with the emerging partners is defined by a formal agreement with China and a draft agreement with India. Other agreements give investors special facilities and tax and customs deductions. Also, the national investment office (*Agence nationale pour la promotion des investissements* – Anapi) is drafting a plan to create special economic zones. According to the AfDB et al, 'partnerships with emerging countries, which sub-contract to some Congolese firms, should produce significant benefits in the medium term, including more local jobs, cheaper consumer goods and technology transfer' (2011, p.13).

4.3.5 Participation

A large number of agency interventions and government programmes now involve some kind of community participation, ranging from the handing out of vouchers, to the creation of village committees that take the lead in the implementation of projects. In the education sector, parents participate in the COPAs, whereas in the health sector, communities participate through the COSAs.

An example of community participation in sustainable water service delivery is the Belgian Technical Cooperation's (BTC) water programme in peri-urban and rural areas. The project involves the establishment of Water User Associations (WUAs) to manage small piped networks. BTC plans to construct 65 of these systems in informal settlements of Kinshasa, Mbuji-Mayi and Kindu, and in rural communities in South Kivu and Bas Congo. Each water supply network is managed by an autonomous WUA and serves around 20,000 persons, adding up to around 1.4 million people gaining access to safe water. As of early 2010, seven water supply networks were fully operational.

The WUA approach is distinctive from other community-based management initiatives in that it functions essentially as a small-scale enterprise with fulltime employees and a separate bank account. Its operating principle is ensuring at least full-cost recovery. The management office includes an administrator, accountant, secretary and technicians. Some WUAs have also appointed lawyers to represent their interests. Sales agents, almost all women, manage the WUA's public stand-posts and collect payments on site for water sold in plastic containers. Stand-posts are all equipped with meters to gauge water volume withdrawals, which are matched with incoming financial receipts.

The average final turnover for a WUA ranges typically from USD 70,000-120,000 per year. The considerable income generated from water sales has not only sufficed to pay salaries and maintain infrastructure, but has also unlocked various opportunities to undertake additional development

investments. For example, one of the WUAs, based in Mbuji-Mayi procured back-up generators and is planning to extend its piped network and build additional stand posts. By becoming financially self-sustaining, the WUA has a better chance of achieving a lasting water service over the long term (UNEP 2011, pp.55-56).

5 Data, evidence quality, research and methods

This section presents an analysis of the quality of the evidence collected for this study. First, it goes into the research culture of DRC. Next is an overview of available data, and how the various sectors of livelihoods and basic services, social protection are covered. This is followed by the methods that the studies employ, and the quality of the evidence. A separate piece is devoted to gender, and the section concludes with an overview of the major research gaps. The section incorporates findings of a stakeholder consultation, held in July 2011 (Hilhorst & Ferf 2011).

5.1 Research culture

At the government level, routine collection of data is almost non-existent. The National Bureau of Statistics is still working to regain the pre-war capacity, and data are usually collected by Ministries, initiated by (funding of and/or training by) international organisations. Data gathering is complicated by issues of transportation and security.

Scholarly research on basic services and livelihoods in DRC is limited, as universities are in the first place geared to education. Additionally, payment is low and professors aim to teach in multiple universities. Many professors and assistant professors are privately engaged in consultancies. However, there is evidence that some universities are becoming more research-oriented, as both the Catholic University in Bukavu and the Institut Supérieur de Développement Rural (ISDR) have set up a unit for commissioned research, to aim to organise the consultancies of their staff. Additionally, there are efforts to resume more programme-oriented and institutional collaboration with international universities (the Belgian VLIRO programme has recently engaged in several 12-year collaboration programmes). There are also several structural collaborations between Belgian universities and NGOs in DRC.

Besides the government and universities, some domestic organisations, such as the Pole institute in Goma, also specialise in research. These do research commissioned by external agencies, which is frequently combined with development programming. Additionally, there are a number of independent consultants (i.e. not related to a university), who mainly seek commissions of development and humanitarian agencies, alternating consultancy work with project-based employment.

Domestic NGOs have until recently had little interest in research beyond data-gathering for immediate operational purposes. Recently, this trend appears to be reversing, with NGOs in Bukavu becoming more interested in research into contextual factors, such as the effects of conflict and root conditions to development, such as access to land.

Apart from basic data collection, research in DRC is generally initiated and funded by external actors. Development and humanitarian agencies typically focus on short-term research, following the humanitarian agenda, geared to specific operational problems. Donors and other international organisations commission large-scale studies that are usually sectoral in nature. There is also research initiated by international academic programmes, but international collaborations have eroded during the war, and research has become strongly focused on individual PhD projects, mostly at Belgian universities. However, more programme-oriented research and institutional collaborations are currently re-emerging. Finally, research is also motivated by political-economic interests, resulting in a great deal of research into the mining sector, commissioned by the various actors mentioned above. Recent engagement of US-based NGOs around the nexus of minerals, violence and the use of metals in cell-phones has not only led to a semi-boycott of DRC minerals, through the Dodd Frank Act, but also to an interest in research, spurred by celebrity requests to American universities.

The multitude of actors involved and the externally-driven nature of research result in fragmented and patchy research. Much research is small-scale, methodologically unclear and based on small sample sizes, restricted to NGO's thematic or geographical areas. This means that broader issues remain

under-researched, and that a great deal of research focuses on the eastern, conflict-affected areas, even though socio-economic indicators in other parts of the country are not significantly better, and may even be worse, than in the Kivus. Research also foregrounds conflict dynamics, thereby paying less attention to the fact that many problems are related to other (development, environmental, demographic and governance) dynamics and display continuities with times before the conflict.

Thus, the weak domestic research capacity, combined with the externally-driven research agenda, lead to a situation where research is not based on internal demand. Much research is development-oriented and people-oriented, but the extent to which it coincides with domestic demands remains questionable. Furthermore, because of the multiplicity of actors and agendas involved, research is fragmented, and attention is unevenly distributed. There is little evidence that, for example, the cluster approach in the humanitarian sector has led to the development of common research agendas, pooling of resources for research, or systematic sharing and collection of evidence.

Finally, even though donors and international organisations are important drivers of databases on basic services and development, as the next section will show, there is not yet a high institutionalisation of data gathering – though some organisations are involved in institutionally strengthening the National Bureau of Statistics and ministerial research capacities. And because practically all research is driven by external actors, there is little domestic experience with organising research programmes.

5.2 Data

In order to tackle the problems faced by DRC, reliable - and specific - data are invaluable. However, years of mismanagement under Mobutu and civil war/protracted conflict have seriously complicated the gathering of data, and the last national census even dates back to the 1980s. In recent years, much effort has been put into the creation of a base of data, and various studies have been done, supported by international organisations. The Tables below present overviews of available data collections of recent years. The first Table presents primary data with a national coverage (the focus is on health, education, poverty and food security), and the second Table lists data collections that are compiled from various sources (including the primary data collections in Table 14). Of the primary data collections, the MICS and 1–2–3 surveys are most frequently cited as source for data on poverty and development.

Table 13: An overview of the available primary data collections

Year	Organisation	Title
1995	UNICEF	MICS1
1999		Enquête Nationale sur l'Habitat et les profils socio- économiques – ENHAPS, Household economy study
2002–6	UNICEF	Enquête Nationale sur la Situation des Enfants et des Femmes, MICS2/2001
2004–2005	INS	Enquête 1-2-3 ⁶²
2005–6	WFP	Evaluation indépendante de la sécurité alimentaire en République Démocratique du Congo (RDC)
2005–12	WFP	Analyse de la sécurité alimentaire et de la vulnérabilité: CFSVA
2008	Ministère du Plan & Santé	Enquête Démographique et de Santé (EDS) 2007
2008	WFP & Ministère du Plan & INS	Analyse globale de la sécurité alimentaire et de la vulnérabilité (CFSVA)
2010–9	INS	Democratic Republic of the Congo Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey MICS - 2010 Preliminary Findings

⁶² Available at: <http://www.ins.cd/cgi-bin/RpWebEngine.exe/PortalAction?>

2011–2015?	INS	New enquête 1-2-3 (Ministère du Plan 2011b, p.84)
2013?	INS	National census ⁶³

Table 14: An overview of the available secondary data collections*

Year	Organisation	Title
1998		Les états des lieux du secteur de la santé
2004–11	WB	Democratic Republic of Congo Country Status Report on Education; Priorities and Options for Regenerating the Education Sector
2005	WB	Health, Nutrition and Population Country Status Report
2005–12	Ministère du Plan	Rapport National : Analyse participative de la pauvreté en RDC
2006–6	République Démocratique du Congo	DSCR1 1: Document de la Stratégie de Croissance et de Réduction de la Pauvreté
2006–10	WFP & FAO	Evaluation conjointe des besoins en République Démocratique du Congo
2008	PNUD	RAPPORT NATIONAL SUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT HUMAIN 2008. Restauration de la Paix et Reconstruction
2008	UNICEF	PAUVRETE DES ENFANTS ET DISPARITES EN REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
2010–3	Ministère de la Santé Publique	Plan National de Développement Sanitaire PNDS 2011-2015
2010	PNUD	Genre et VIH/SIDA en République Démocratique du Congo, Note d'analyse et d'orientation
2010	RDC	Rapport National des Progrès des OMD
2010	WB	The Democratic Republic of Congo's Infrastructure: A Continental Perspective
2010	Ministry of Trade, Small and Medium- sized Enterprises	Diagnostic Trade Integration Study
2011–3	WB	Democratic Republic of Congo Bi-Annual Economic Report
2011	Ministère du Plan	Document de Stratégie de Croissance et de Réduction de la Pauvreté de deuxième génération (Draft 03)
2011	WB	Growth and Employment

* Some studies may involve primary research, but most combine data from other sources

Undertaking a survey in DRC is a challenge in itself, due to the vast area that needs to be covered, and the challenges posed by the dysfunctional transport sector and varying levels of insecurity. Additionally, data on the size of the population, for example, are based on estimates and extrapolations, not on an actual census. The surveys are considered to be relatively representative at the national and provincial levels. However, the data cannot be disaggregated to lower levels, limiting its use in specifically tackling issues in certain areas.

Apart from national-level surveys, most data are fragmented, but there are some beginnings of systematic collection of research outcomes. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is making an attempt regarding humanitarian issues,⁶⁴ and the new national *Plateforme de Gestion de l'Aide et des Investissements* (PGAI) aims to collect information on aid investments in DRC.⁶⁵ Additionally, with regards to food security, malnutrition and mortality, maps have been compiled since September 2007 (Ministère de l'Agriculture, Pêche et Elevage 2011). The data is collected at the provincial level, based on studies by governmental services, NGOs, and UN agencies (Groupe National de Travail Interinstitution sur l'IPC 2008). However, these maps are a great simplification of reality on the ground, and it is unclear to what extent data at the provincial level can be disaggregated to local

⁶³ <http://reliefweb.int/node/425198>

⁶⁴ rdc-humanitaire.net

⁶⁵ <http://pga.ministereduplan.cd>

levels. Map data on internal displacement and conflict can be found on the website of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC).⁶⁶ Thus, existing data collections generally focus on humanitarian indicators – to answer the most urgent needs.

5.2.1 Livelihoods

With respect to livelihoods, the official statistics are unreliable and incomplete, as a great deal of activity takes place in the informal economy, beyond the reach of statistical services. However, there exists a number of smaller-scale, micro-level studies. The best studied sector is the artisanal mining sector; additional studies relate to agriculture and food security. A different study is the MICROCON study by Raeymakers (2011), who investigates the livelihoods of young displaced migrants in Butembo, and describes their ambitions towards ‘urban professions and lifestyles’, versus returning to their rural areas of origin.

Even though there are a series of studies on the **mining** sector, collection of data is complicated: artisanal miners, traders and others involved in the sector are often reluctant to share information for a range of reasons, such as their dubious legal status, suspicion, and fear of increased taxation. (Pact, Inc. 2010, p.17) Governmental statistical services lack capacity, and the World Bank concludes that it is ‘impossible to make any definitive statement about the amount of taxes the mining sector generates – except that the government does not collect and record enough of them.’ The statistics available publicly and those made available to the IMF and the WB are poorly organised, incomplete, and of questionable reliability (World Bank 2008b, p.25).

Development of the **agricultural** sector is often deemed the best way to lift the millions that depend on agriculture out of poverty. Nevertheless, research on agriculture is strongly focused on humanitarian issues such as food security and nutrition. The governmental agency for agricultural research INERA is in the process of being re-established after losing a great deal of its capacity, and the reliability of agricultural statistics is questionable. Rigorous evaluations of agricultural interventions are lacking, for example on the impact of the rehabilitation of rural ‘feeder’ roads, or the distribution of seeds and tools. There is also little evidence on the impact on local livelihoods of the acquisition of large pieces of land by foreign companies, which is a growing business. Thus, although agricultural development is claimed to be pro-poor, it remains unclear what interventions lead to the increase of agricultural production, and how this increase affects the poor.

Many households draw an important part of their income from **petty trade**. Apart from some (ethnographic) case studies and large-scale analyses that estimate the size of the informal economy, there is little evidence to be found. Official statistics fail to capture these livelihoods. The Doing Business Index indicates that there are many barriers to starting a business, stimulating people to engage in the informal economy. There is no solid evidence on for example how this sector contributes to the economic development of DRC, or whether these livelihoods allow people to escape the poverty trap, or how the Congolese determine what livelihoods strategy to engage in. Evidence is also lacking on the impact of livelihoods interventions, and how the presence of the international community affects people’s livelihood decisions.

5.2.2 Basic services (health, education, transport, water/sanitation) and social protection

In recent years, national Ministries have started to provide yearly statistics on basic services and social protection, with support of international organisations. However, even though datasets are improving and there are various initiatives to establish collections of research, there still remains a lot to be done. UNEP, for example, concludes that ‘the water sector is seriously handicapped by a profound data gap’ (UNEP 2011, p.71); and Waldman, referring to the health sector, observes that ‘research on demand-side initiatives is lacking’ (Waldman 2006, p.11). Data on public expenditure on basic services and social protection also fail to be coherently collected, and budget allocations tend to vary from report to report. The World Bank (2008a, p.2) Public Expenditure Review expresses its reliance on ‘educated guesses’ and ‘small sample surveys’, due to lack of coherent data collection and uniform registration of government expenditures.

⁶⁶ <http://www.internal-displacement.org>

Research in the **health** sector tends to focus on humanitarian issues, such as the prevalence of infectious diseases, or malnutrition rates, frequently focusing on single issues, such as cholera, or HIV/AIDS. There is also (especially in the east) a lot of research on health issues of abused women (Douma and Hilhorst 2012). Thus, although the World Bank has published some reports, there has been less attention for the sector as a whole, or for issues that are less urgent than an outbreak of cholera or the abuse of women. In research, a great deal of effort goes into the implementation of national surveys, and the collection of statistics. However, thorough research on the governance side of the health sector is lacking, as well as on how the health sector functions as an alternative tax base for the government.

As with the health sector, a lot of attention with respect to **education** goes to the collection of (gendered) statistics. This is spurred by the Millennium Development Goals, which set specific targets for e.g. enrolment rates. However, the reliability of these statistics, considering the challenging circumstances under which data have to be collected, remains unclear. There is a good study on the governance of the education sector (De Herdt & Poncelet 2010), which shows how the sector functions as an alternative tax base, and how employees draw a large part of their income from parents' contributions. This suggests there are many reasons for schools to over- or underreport statistics. There have been many interventions by international organisations in the education sector, and the World Bank has a large program to reform the sector – but studies on the impact of these interventions do not seem to be available.

There are several World Bank studies into the **transport** sector, which indicate the overall state of the country's roads and transport services (e.g. World Bank 2010c, 2010d, 2011a). Rehabilitation of infrastructure was a priority after the war and much international funding was used to improve roads, rail and water transport systems. Nevertheless, though the international community has made large investments in road reconstruction, little evidence can be found on whether the anticipated effects of improved connections have indeed been realised. Questions such as: How are roads being used? How is the transport sector organised? And what is the role of taxation connected to road use?, have yet to be thoroughly investigated.

As described above, the **water and sanitation** sector is still lacking data. Though the MDGs have also stimulated data collection in this area, one of the most comprehensive recent reports on the sector by UNEP (2011) finds that water provision in rural and peri-urban areas has become largely informalised, complicating the collection of accurate data. Additionally, not all the available data are readily comparable, as standards for measurement have changed over the last decade. There is no mechanism in the WASH cluster for monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian interventions. There are various promising new initiatives, but an overall overview and thorough comparison and evaluation of outcomes is still lacking.

There is not much literature on **social protection** in DRC, but a good overview is presented by Bailey et al. (2011). Research is complicated by the cross-cutting nature (across Ministries) of social protection issues. Additionally, a common understanding of the nature of social protection is lacking, and many NGOs do not see and describe their interventions as forms of social protection. Also, especially the older data available (for example, Criel et al (1999) on the Bwamanda hospital insurance scheme) may be outdated, due to the country's subsequent turmoil. Nevertheless, many interventions can qualify as social protection (such as food for work programmes, programmes for street children, or programmes to give more people access to education), but they are fragmented, and there is no overall system of data collection. However, in recent years UNICEF has pushed to get social protection on the agenda, and this seems to be leading to a more coherent Congolese approach to social protection.

All in all, there exist large gaps in the available evidence for each of these sectors. Research in DRC is a challenge, and considering the difficulties, a great deal of research has been completed. Mostly, this research has focused on collection of statistics needed to direct humanitarian interventions and track progress of the MDGs. The research that does investigate underlying mechanisms is often fragmented, and the lack of a centralised collection of data hampers the development of a solid evidence base. The major research gaps will be identified at the end of this section.

5.3 Research methods

One of the objectives of this investigation was to find what types of evidence exist on livelihoods, basic services, and social protection in DRC. Based on the methods employed to gather the data, the evidence can roughly be divided into three categories: large-scale randomised surveys, local/micro-level surveys that combine quantitative and qualitative methods, and qualitative studies.

The nation-wide surveys (see Table 14) are usually based on large random (stratified) samples, and involve questionnaires at the household level. These surveys provide information that can be disaggregated to the provincial and even district level. A lot of international attention is paid to these quantitative surveys, because of the demand for 'hard' data on a large number of indicators. The drawback of these studies is that they generally give a good overall picture, but little information on causes-effect relationships, and why indicators differ between regions. There are many accounts of the lack of quality of the data, due to lack of training and supervision of the enquirers. Only few researches check with respondents whether they indeed filled in the forms. "Garbage in garbage out" is the term used by one of the respondents to the stakeholder consultation.

Local/micro level surveys combine questionnaires and interviews, or focus groups. These investigations are frequently set up by non-governmental organisations, and performed by consultants or academic researchers. These investigations are often less representative and conclusions can be less readily generalised, but they do provide more insight into the local context and how an intervention leads to certain outcomes.

Qualitative studies often consist of a combination of interviews and personal observations, and can provide thorough insight into the local dynamics. However, these studies may base conclusions on little empirical evidence, and the quality of these studies depends greatly on the experience and insight of the researcher into the local context.

5.4 Evidence quality

Though referring to the mining sector, the following statement by Pact may be applied to all types of research in DRC: 'Data should be considered as being the best available from the stated source in that particular area but not necessarily fully accurate or relevant to other areas as procedures, competence, and willingness or ability to collaborate with the research team varied considerably between sites.' (Pact, Inc. 2010, pp.17–18) This statement touches on the difficulty of collecting reliable high-quality evidence in the country, as this is complicated by the security situation, the vast area to be covered and deteriorated infrastructure, and the challenge of gaining reliable and capable local researchers.

Due to these difficulties, reports on DRC frequently make use of estimates. However, the use of estimates can lead to a widely diverging range of outcomes, especially when these estimates are cited as facts. An example of this can be found in studies seeking to estimate the amount of people engaged in the artisanal mining sector (see Box 2).

In general, the focus of research lies on collecting statistics necessary to measure progress and impact of interventions. However, these statistics are of course subject to bias, and this is increased by the complexities of doing research in DRC. Yet, there is little critical reflection on the reliability of data to be found in the documents collected for this research. Notably government documents have the tendency to uncritically mention data of which the origin is hard to identify, and the reliability is thus hard to ascertain. Literature reviews also do not seem to question data, and no critical assessments of the available evidence have been encountered.

Box 2: Inflating the estimated number of people engaged in artisanal mining

The following examples illustrate how the incorrect use of estimates leads to inflated statistics on the Congolese mining sector. In the executive summary of its 2008 Mining Sector Report, the World Bank says that 10 million people (16% of the Congolese population) are either directly or indirectly dependent on artisanal mining (World Bank 2008b, p.7). However, further on in the document, this number is nuanced to 'as many as' (p.10). Reading on, different figures turn out to form the basis of the 10 million: 'Estimates vary on the number of artisanal miners in DRC: 500,000 to 2,000,000 diggers (*creuseurs*) are thought to be actively and directly involved in extraction of minerals. With an average of four to five dependents for each digger, *the total number of persons whose livelihood depends on this activity for could be as high as 8 to 10 million* – or 14 to 16 percent of the total population of Congo.' (p.56, emphasis added) Thus, the claim of ten million dependents is the *high* estimate, based on the *high* estimate of the number of *creuseurs*. If on the other hand the *low* estimate were true, there would be between 2 and 2.5 million Congolese who depend on artisanal mining – significantly less than the 10 million mentioned in the executive summary.

Published by the World Bank, the 10 million figure then begins to be spread, as it is cited by other reports, which claim 18percent of the Congolese population to be (indirectly) dependent on the artisanal mining industry (EVD et al. 2009, p.10; but see also Perks 2011, p.181; Perks n.d., p.6). Another liberal interpretation of the 10 million figure can be found in the 2011 Boosting Growth and Employment report of the World Bank (2011a, p.57), where the initial figure of 500,000 to 2,000,000 workers is now used to describe the informal *and the formal* sector, thus describing the mining sector as a whole – while referring to a World Bank report (2010b), which clearly indicates these figures describe the *artisanal* mining sector.

In another report, the World Bank describes the trade in minerals, through which another estimated 1 million would be earning a living (World Bank 2010b, p.55). Upon investigating the source of this figure, this turns out to include *creuseurs* and their dependents, which means that this figure cannot be simply added to the 10 million mentioned previously (Garrett & Mitchell 2009, p.23). Garrett and Mitchell do not elaborate upon the calculations behind this figure.

When the collection of solid evidence is difficult or even impossible, as is the case in parts of DRC, the careful and balanced use of estimates is a good solution. However, when not treated with care, figures that are originally carefully formulated can get other, inflated meanings, while projecting a false sense of reliability and certainty.

Besides the inflation of estimates described in Box 2, another result of uncritical treatment of statistics is the selective use of data. The availability of various values related to the same indicator, depending on which study one looks into, makes it possible to use the number that best fits with one's own goals, instead of aiming at a correct representation of reality. This leads to a playing with numbers, using the statistics that present the situation in the most favourable fashion. An example of this can be found in the use of Gross Enrolment Rate, which is a somewhat misleading figure, because it refers to the amount enrolled divided by the total number in the age group: among the amount enrolled are also many that are older, thus a GER of 100 percent can be attained, without all primary school-aged children attending primary school. The Net Enrolment Rate (75 percent in 2010 (Institut National de la Statistique 2010) shows a different picture than the GER, and so does the school completion rate 29 percent, in 2006 (Bashir 2009, p.vii). Depending on the point one wants to make, a corresponding statistic can be chosen.

There is also potential for bias in random selection of respondent households. Many surveys use the practice of selection of neighbours from a random starting point within a village; this is not necessarily biased, provided the point is in fact random. Yet, methods based on choosing a point on random transect have a tendency to select households along major axes of the village, and that may easily be households with particular characteristics. Nearest neighbour methods also have a tendency to under-represent outlying parts (HNTS 2009). Many studies indicate that they have trained their interviewers to prevent bias, but the extent to which they actually manage this frequently remains unknown and is not reflected upon.

In recent years, the use of randomised control groups in humanitarian/development interventions has gained increased attention. One study worth mentioning here is the investigation of the IRC Tuungane project for community-driven reconstruction. Beneficiary communities for this study were randomly selected, and compared with a control group, from the start of the project. In this way, the study is to provide solid evidence on the impact of the reconstruction intervention (Humphreys 2008; Ferf & Milabyo 2009; Ferf 2010).

Though the number of surveys is increasing, it remains unclear whether the quality and reliability of the data are on the rise as well. Outcomes may be better understood as indicating trends than as a factual representation of reality on the ground. Yet, with some exceptions, data on livelihoods, basic services and social protection in DRC is frequently treated uncritically, while the complexities associated with doing research in the country warrant caution. In the future, however, with attempts to build collections of data, it will become easier to compare data, and identify unusual outcomes.

5.5 Gender analysis: extent and quality

There is little research that focuses specifically on gender in DRC, but the Country Gender Profile commissioned by Sida (2009) is a noticeable exception. This report presents a thorough overview of gender in terms of policy, peace-building and security, political participation, human rights, socio-economic situation, gender-based violence and health. The study finds that 'despite a few encouraging indicators towards gender equality, especially in terms of legal reform (e.g. the constitution and the law on sexual violence) women are underprivileged in most domains'. Sida identifies religious and customary institutions as the two main sources that seem particularly important in reproducing gender norms and upholding gender inequalities. The weakness of the state is brought forward as a major explanation to the maintaining of customary power and norms, and churches tend to occupy prominent positions in efforts to legitimise current gender inequalities in DRC. Sida also finds that there is a lack of gender-sensitive statistics, and that speaking in terms of a male-female dichotomy hides 'more complex realities', for which more thorough analysis is necessary.

The recent large surveys on basic services and livelihoods take gender into account in a rather mechanical, limited form, disaggregating statistics for men and women. Some smaller studies also pay attention to gender, such as studies by Pact, which pays special attention to women (Pact, Inc. 2010); and a recent book on the mining sector contains a chapter on women in the artisanal mining sector in DRC (Perks 2011). Relating to petty trade, the border crossing studies are gendered, focusing on the specific issues encountered by women (Brenton et al. 2011; Kimanuka & Lange 2010). Data on MFIs are also gendered, with MIX attempting to get gendered data of the MFIs, but this has not been a complete success. However, micro-financing, being a sector traditionally aimed at facilitating female market participation, can be expected to be sensitive to issues of gender.

Data on education is disaggregated by gender, and the Ministry attempts to achieve '*parité parfait*' or perfect parity.⁶⁷ National data on the teaching population also includes the male/female ratio, and in reports, special attention is given to the challenges women are facing, etc. However, no gendered data can be found on e.g. the contents of the curriculum, or behaviour of teachers, the way homosexuals or transgenders are treated - as in many African countries, these are controversial issues, and no mention of these issues and if/how they are dealt with has been encountered during this research. Similarly, data from national surveys on health are gendered, with specific data on maternal health, etc.; but for example data on infant mortality are not disaggregated by sex. No gendered data on treatment, or healthcare professionals, have been found.

In DRC, there seems little awareness of the continuities in the gendered nature of labour and power. None of the experts consulted knew of gender studies before the war. People held contradictory opinions about whether the large economic contribution of women was a new phenomenon, triggered by conflict and male unemployment, or an altered, yet continued practice (Hilhorst and Ferf 2011).

⁶⁷ <http://epsp.cd/>

There has been a lot of research attention on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in DRC – for example the Women in War programme by the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (Kelly et al. 2009; Bartels et al. 2010; Kelly et al. 2011). See also Dolan (2010) and Smits and Cruz (2011). However, this attention for SGBV has generally involved a very one-dimensional understanding of gender, portraying women as victims and men as perpetrators (though Smits and Cruz aim to add more context). A 2012 report by Douma and Hilhorst shows that this focus on SGBV has led to all kinds of unintended consequences, as sexual violence assistance is increasingly begun to be seen as a form of business. This report argues that interventions cannot focus on SGBV alone, but need to take into account the ‘domestic character of sexual violence, the lack of reproductive healthcare, the prevention of teenage pregnancies and child abuse, the malfunctioning of justice and the dire poverty underlying requests for assistance’.

The state of the evidence with respect to gender confirms the conclusion of Sida (2009) – though gender is mainstreamed in national surveys and most programmes (for example IRC, which has routinely gathered gendered patterns in workloads in the 1.100 villages included in the Tuungane programme), it is generally a limited and flat understanding of gender. Indeed, complex gendered realities as described by Sida have only come into focus in a few studies.

5.6 Data, evidence and research method gaps

Some of the major gaps in evidence and data are listed below. In addition, Annex 1 reviews research questions that highlight additional research gaps.

- There is a **strong focus on humanitarian issues and eastern DRC**: other parts of the country receive considerably less attention. Much research is geared towards supporting specific humanitarian interventions (in sectors such as basic health and food security). Research on broader development issues (such as employment, the informal sector, economic sectors, value chains, financial services, etc.) is lacking.
- There is a **lack of studies that aim to bring underlying structures and dynamics into the picture**: many studies focus on collecting information on basic indicators, without mapping underlying causes. This is related to the humanitarian focus of research: humanitarian organisations often want quick data for their interventions. Though many data can be disaggregated to different localities, there is little understanding of what actually happens on the ground.
- Related to this, there is also a **lack of focus on local needs**, versus the agendas of intervening agencies and donors. Still many interventions start with a predefined set of local needs, or focus on a very specific area for intervention (such as disease-specific interventions), insufficiently aware of broader dynamics.
- There is a **lack of centralised data collection and exchange of findings**. Though there are some initiatives, these mainly reflect the humanitarian agenda (food security, or basic health indicators, for example). There is little exchange of information between aid organisations, such as sharing baseline studies and assessments of the impacts of interventions. There are no online databases that present the available data at the sectoral level. Gaps in data are reflected by the sometimes patchy nature of the sectoral descriptions in this report.
- The **critical appraisal of available data** is also lacking. There is no standard for what levels of reliability and error are acceptable in a country as complex as DRC. The available documentation provides little critical reflection on the robustness of the data and its implications. When data is reflected upon, the conclusion often is that there may be drawbacks, but this data is the best data available.
- Related to this, there is a **lack of methodologically sound, robust scholarly research**. For historical reasons, DRC has only quite recently gained substantial international attention, and the country presents a complicated research area. In all of the sectors investigated in this report, robust scholarly research is lacking. Data is often collected at an ad hoc basis, and there is little data that is updated regularly, yielding reliable time-series data.

- **Local capacity is lacking:** the Congolese research sector has been severely hit by decades of violence and bad governance, and has only recently started to recover. There are few well-trained Congolese researchers, and the research culture is consultancy-oriented. The few local research institutes are overflowed with requests by international organisations. This means that Congolese researchers voices are currently missing, which is reflected by the data collected for this report.
- There is a **gap between research and policy**. Scientists and policy makers are disconnected, resulting in an ad hoc basis of the use of research outcomes in policy. National research institutes are still recovering from the conflict, and the research culture at universities is still under development. The empirical base for policy is lacking solid empirical and insightful evidence, and this evidence is also frequently not requested by policy makers: 'research [...] seems to suffer from a kind of embargo on the part of the Congolese government' (Lututala 2010). Except for large, national (health and poverty) surveys, the government does not seem to make use of available knowledge to inform its policies.
- In research and policy, **a thorough understanding of the multiple dimensions of gender** is absent. Much research focuses on the gendered collection of indicators, without gaining insight into the deeper dynamics. In interventions, a one-dimensional approach to gender leads to unintended and unforeseen consequences.

6 Conclusion

A first major lesson of the evidence on livelihoods, basic services and protection in DRC is that the current political and economic state of the country is not only the result of the First and Second Congo Wars and ensuing high levels of insecurity. It is also the outcome of a process of economic downturn, institutional deterioration, and loss of national assets dates back to the first decade after independence (1960). Increasingly, public servants, including army and police, became dependent on self-financing of salaries and operational cost through informal taxation, corruption, and extortion of the general public, which was legitimized by the Mobutu regime (*débrouillez-vous!*). The result was a strong decline of the country's infrastructure and its economy, and a growth of the informal economy. The consecutive periods of war further undermined the already extremely weak state institutions, with only some marginal functions continuing (national primary and secondary exams, for example, and some health statistics).

The present functioning of the state, and state structures and governance, in the country can best be understood through this historical legacy. Only in 2006, after a transitional period, national and provincial governments were elected, and did national policies start emerging. However, decentralization, as foreseen in the constitution, has only been realized to some extent, as de-concentration of state functions has not been accompanied by the necessary resources. This process of decentralization is highly disputed, and parallel tendencies of centralization of power can be observed. Provincial authorities are nevertheless a factor to reckon with, as are local traditional (inherited and authoritarian) kings and chiefs, who maintain a large and sometimes dominating position in the rural areas in amongst others the Eastern Provinces.

The process of self-financing of many state functions still continues, with the public continuing to make the biggest contribution to the provision of services and the functioning of the supervisory and management structures, notably in the health and education sectors, but also through legal (local taxes and levies such as market, environment and business taxes) and illegal payments (collection at the markets, at road blocks, etc.) in cash or kind, be it to the army, the police, armed groups, public servants, etc.

The result of this is that most state services are concerned with collecting resources to cover the minimum standard of living of the public servants, without funds for operational costs or basic investments and only delivering rudimentary, or sometimes no, services in return. Parallel to the state there are other institutions that perform state functions, especially religious organizations, with parallel organizational structures, and which also siphon off a part of the contribution for other (religious) purposes. For the population there is a multitude of formal and informal or customary institutions to reckon and deal with, with frequently changing rules, highly dependent on the moment and persons in power.

In its new Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper, the government expressed its intent to improve the situation and invest in basic services and livelihood support. However, budget allocations to basic services and social protection (which covers livelihood support) are too small and insecure. Allocated funds are frequently spent on other goals than what they were reserved for, so that the desired impact is not made, e.g. supplying free primary education for all, which is a constitutional right.

Thus, the context, including the domain of service delivery is one of institutional multiplicity, both through incomplete decentralisation, the existence of customary institutions, other sources of authority, and also humanitarian and development interventions; and an all-pervasive system of 'taxation', by people seeking to use their position to supplement their income, catching people up in continuous negotiations, about prices, taxes, etc. The term institutional multiplicity means that multiple normative systems prevail and hybrid institutions evolve. The hybrid and multiple institutions that evolve are patchy and do not add up to a full coverage of services, may be politicised and contentious, or lack resources, quality, or accountability. Nonetheless, this multiplicity may also open up space for cultivating new, hybrid forms of service delivery (Noor et al. 2010).

However, growth figures do not necessarily imply that there is economic development. Official foreign aid equalled 12 percent of GDP in 2010, and most of the investments are externally financed, by international donors, with large investments in infrastructure (especially transport) and there are hardly any private sector investments (except in the mining sector). The adverse investment climate with high levels of corruption, state malfunctioning and instability constrains economic development: in the latest Doing Business report of the World Bank, DRC ranks 175th out of 183 countries (World Bank 2011b, p.13); DRC ranked 164 (of 178) on Transparency International's 2010 index (Transparency International 2011) and TI calls corruption 'endemic' (Bomboko et al. 2007, p.10). The economy is characterised by a large informal economy (which is estimated to contribute between 50 and 75 percent to the national product, but figures are extremely unreliable); inequality and widespread poverty; a weak agricultural sector, mostly subsistence; a wealth of (mineral) resources, but a de-industrialised mining sector; a weak industrial sector; inadequate systems of communication and transport, and a large, unexploited hydroelectric potential.

The collapse of the Mobutu regime and the dramatic decline of the economy has driven people into subsistence activities, during the war, and many parts of the country were made completely isolated (*enclavement*). People's livelihoods were heavily affected, through the loss of their assets, family members, and lack of security; but similarly by the 'predatory governance systems', as they lost a great deal of potential surplus through the elaborate systems of taxation (legal and illegal, extortion). With no stimulus to invest, a great deal of the livelihoods served for subsistence only, and this is still the case in many parts of the country. People engage in a range of activities in order to make a living, broadly grouped into agro-pastoral, commerce, wage work, and crafts or small business. Excluding Kinshasa, the majority of the households (77 percent) engages in two or more different types of activities (WFP et al. 2008, p.40), the majority of which is informal (according to the Ministry of Planning, approximately 10 percent of total employment is formal).

Informality in DRC does not mean no taxation, or no rules; instead, there are all kinds of levies and regulations, and people constantly have to enter into negotiations. The distinction between formal and informal is often blurred, and is also less relevant in understanding this country, as for example even formal taxes are open to negotiation, informal traders have formal government jobs, or informally mined ore is bought by an ore smelter that sells its product on the formal market.

Poverty is widespread (over 70 percent live below the poverty line), both in terms of income, as in terms of health, education, security, with the exploitative governance system, lack of security and transport as main limitations to livelihoods development. Poverty is both the reason and consequence of people engaging in informal activities: they are driven to it because they are in need of resources, and yet many informal activities serve for subsistence only. There is virtually no financial sector, no credit or insurance available, and micro financing schemes are only available to a fraction of the population. However, there are some indications that the situation is changing. Improved transport opportunities and levels of security have led to *désenclavement* of areas that were previously isolated, and facilitate rural-urban exchange. It is not clear what the improved infrastructure means in practice and if and how it alters economic mechanisms and powers. Though exact numbers are unknown (estimates range from 135 million USD (2009) to USD 636m (2006)), the Congolese diaspora contributes to the standard of living of many Congolese households through remittances.

Agriculture is seen as the main opportunity for increasing the standard of life of most Congolese. Ninety two percent of the people are involved in agriculture in some way (and almost half the households have a 'purely agricultural' way of life), and DRC's agricultural potential is vast (only an estimated 10 percent of the arable land is actually used). However, most agricultural activity is aimed at subsistence, and the sector suffers the consequences of conflict, a deteriorated transport system, and lack of investment, both from the government, and also international donors (less than 5 percent of foreign aid is directed at 'production sectors', while 'social infrastructure and services' receive over 30 percent (World Bank 2011a, p.24)). A large part of the population even remains dependent on food aid, and the country has a food deficit which has forced it to import as much as 30 percent of its food needs. This deficit makes the country highly vulnerable to external shocks, such as rising food prices; and due to the disconnect within the country between producers and market, for reasons described above, production does not increase sufficiently with rising demand.

Artisanal mining forms an alternative livelihood strategy, and provides an income for many, though estimates vary from 500,000 to 2 million directly involved. Many people move from agriculture to mining, some seasonally, some permanently. It is unclear what effect the growth of the artisanal mining sector has on the agricultural sector; artisanal mining is a way of coping with an adverse agricultural environment, and more people involved in mining might also lead to an increased demand for (agricultural) products. However, the involvement of criminal networks, former rebel groups and even the national army in mining operations, exploiting artisanal miners (*creuseurs*), complicates matters, as part of the mining revenues is used to sustain levels of insecurity and exploitation, especially in mining areas in Eastern DRC. Artisanal miners frequently do not earn enough to improve their standard of living, though it may be more than they would earn in agriculture. As the whole of the artisanal mining sector operates within the informal economy, the sector contributes little to government revenues. Thus, the effects of the growth of the artisanal mining sector on other sectors remain unclear. Research into mining has displayed a tendency to foreground the conflict dynamics of the sector, and only recently start to explore the sector as a source of livelihoods.

In border regions, small-scale cross-border trade is flourishing, with a great deal of people involved, as neighbouring countries attain high levels of economic growth and have a better transport infrastructure in place than DRC. Due to the deterioration of the national transport network, DRC can be divided into several economic areas, which are more integrated into regional, cross-border economies than into the national economy. Petty trading activities in the streets form another strategy to supplement household income that many Congolese engage in, even those with a formal income; but for many it is a poverty trap, as they earn just enough to make a meagre living. Since all these activities take place in the informal economy, the size of this sector is unknown. Knowledge about the informal sector is patchy and often lacking, which may be related to the fact that much research follows aid agendas that have not yet focused strongly on the informal sector.

Basic services, notably health, education, water and sanitation, and transport, are all fragile and insufficient. People have limited access to health and education services, because of limited facilities, poverty, and low quality of services; with as a result low scores on public health indicators, even worse for women, and education - though because of high public commitment to education, effects are mainly qualitative (enrolment rates are above regional level), with gender disparities especially in higher classes in primary education and thereafter. The role of the state in policy formulation, providing supervision and support as well as in direct service provision is very limited. Only 10 percent of primary education is provided by the state, with as main providers religious organisations, dominated by the Catholic Church, while private sector education is still limited but increasing. Some excellent research has been done and is on-going (by Antwerp university, amongst others) on the educational sector. The way that churches influence the sector remains an open question - apart from the fact that it is a powerful influence, little is documented on how this power works in practice.

Health and education charge minimal fees, but the contribution of the state is insufficient, and through user fees these sectors simultaneously function as an alternative tax base, transferring money from the local health zones upwards through the national organisation. International organisations in health and education provide funding for infrastructure and operations, and are strongly involved in the development of policies. These organisations, especially the humanitarian ones, have frequently worked parallel to the government, targeting specific health zones and working according to their own agendas. This entailed for example a focus on one or more specific diseases, instead of improving health care in general, and providing care under different conditions (often for free), mainly concentrated on zones in conflict areas, while the status of public health services in other provinces was equally bad.

Water coverage is limited, especially in rural areas while sanitation coverage is extremely weak. International assistance mainly focussed on water and there was little attention for sanitation and hygiene. The government's role (policy, supervision, support and funding) is minimal to non-existent outside the urban areas.

The transport infrastructure nearly completely disappeared after decades of neglect and misuse, and war. The country essentially fell apart into a set of enclaves, which partly still is the case, with many parts hardly accessible and with amongst others farmers having enormous difficulties to bring surpluses to areas with demand. Similarly, health and education services are often difficult to access.

Rehabilitation of transport infrastructure was a priority after the war and much international funding was used to improve roads, rail and water transport infrastructure.

However, there is a great deal still to be done in order to connect different parts of the country to each other and the surrounding countries, and to make an impact on economic and livelihood development. Effects of rehabilitation are visible on a small scale, but this is highly vulnerable as little maintenance infrastructure exists; much is not operational, except where mining companies have a direct interest. State transport companies (railways, among others) are still highly inefficient and ineffective. Governance of the sector is extremely weak with large parts unregulated or self-regulated, and an unclear distribution of responsibilities and mandates. Although there is a wide agreement that infrastructure and transport are important, given the enclavement during the war, research on this sector is still limited.

National policy on social protection is incoherent, and the few social protection schemes that exist only benefit an extremely limited number of people. There are some mutual insurance schemes, *mutuelles*, in which people cooperate for mutual insurance; the government has plans to expand this form of insurance to the whole country, but as yet, the coverage of *mutuelles* is very limited. It is difficult to gain information on social protection programming by international organisations, as many programmes, e.g. food-for-work projects, or food aid, seed donations, are not labelled as social protection by these organisations. This means there is little coordination of social protection programming, resulting in a patchwork of projects with social protection components. However, international attention for social protection is increasing.

Regarding data availability and quality: national statistical institutions are building capacity, but at the moment the data on basic services and livelihoods is based on (irregular) national surveys, facilitated by international organisations. Due to a large degree of informality, even in formal jobs, the reliability of official figures is questionable, but there are few alternatives. NGOs generally collect data for their programmes through baseline studies and assessments, but there is not much sharing between organisations. There are a few databases that are frequently updated; notably data on food security and mortality, collected by the national Ministry of Agriculture, visualised in Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) maps; survey data on mortality and malnutrition, in the online CE DAT Complex Emergency Database; and data on humanitarian interventions, collected by OCHA on their website rdc-humanitaire.net. The databases are mainly focused on humanitarian issues, and no databases exist that collect data on basic services and livelihoods. Finally, local research capacity is limited, as national universities are only at the beginning of developing their research programmes.

Although OCHA has an overview of humanitarian interventions, there is no holistic overview of all humanitarian and development interventions. Additionally, there is now also a national *Plateforme de Gestion de l'Aide et des Investissements* (PGAI), which aims to collect information on aid investments in DRC. Recent years have seen a shift from humanitarian to development aid. The rationale behind investing in basic services, besides improving the standards of life of the Congolese people, is to increase government legitimacy (see for the relationship between basic service provision and fragile states Ndaruhutse et al. (2011)); however little evidence exists on how citizens view the government in DRC, and the state-building effect in DRC is questionable. Little evidence or impact assessments of livelihoods interventions have been found.

The strong focus on gender-based violence, especially in the Eastern Provinces hides to some extent the significant socio-economic, political and cultural gender inequalities in DRC. The large role of customary powers together with the strong position of religious institutions in the Congolese society are identified as particularly important in upholding large gender inequalities and re-producing gender norms. Although the constitution requires gender parity, women are hardly represented in democratic institutions and certainly not in positions of power and although women provide most of the labour in rural economies, their development opportunities are constrained as they are still almost systematically deprived from their rights to inherit, in many cases not allowed to own land and have to ask the permission of their husbands for economic activities such as to open a bank account.

This investigation has identified the following major gaps in evidence:

- A strong bias towards humanitarian issues and eastern DRC;
- A shortage of studies that aim to bring underlying structures and dynamics into the picture;
- Poor focus on local needs;
- A lack of centralised data collection and exchange of findings;
- Little critical appraisal of available data;
- Little methodologically sound, robust scholarly research;
- Poor local capacity;
- A disconnect between research and policy,
- A one-dimensional understanding of the complexities of gender.

Annexes

Annex 1: Research questions and future partnerships

In this annex, we first propose an approach to doing quality research and to design research for development use. We will propose specific topics for research that emerged from the evidence paper and the interviews of the stakeholder consultations.

Current research often focuses on a small geographic area, does not take a long-term perspective, and does not place issues in a wider context. One of the problems is the back-grounding of important historical, social and economic dynamics that are not directly related to the conflict.

Research into livelihoods, economic development and basic services needs to be interdisciplinary. It needs to be:

- **Economically sound.** When we talk about markets or sectors, we need to know how these work. This requires both qualitative and quantitative baselines. There is a broadly expressed need for quantitative data. However, qualitative data are equally important. It is not enough to know how many fees are being paid; we also want to know people's attitudes; where they find room for exceptions; which fees are considered more legitimate than others; how fees influence competition, production and prices
- **Sociologically sound.** The working of economic processes rarely follow economic rationalities alone. They are ordered by rationalities that amalgamate power processes, gender relations, conflict dynamics, and other historically grown cultural patterns. The relations are mutual, as these factors are also influenced by changes in the economy.
- **Politically sound.** The working of socio-economic processes interfaces with governance. Research into the interface of economic processes and governance need to take into account the institutional multiplicity of governance in DRC, as was elaborated in Chapter 4. This means that studies need to take into account, the multiplicities within the state, the internationalization of governance, the power of traditional authorities, the churches and rebel groups and other local power holders. Because humanitarianism and development are forms of governance, their (implicit) assumptions and effects need to be integral to research. This is a particular challenge as much research is commissioned by aid agencies.

Specific research topics

Basic services: different providers, different systems, different conditions.

Basic service provision in DRC is characterized by multiplicity. There are different providers (government, churches, NGOs, private) that use different systems, especially in relation to the level of cost-recovery applied. This results to some extent in situations of parallel service delivery. It also brings about situations where mixed systems are run by multiple agencies, the so-called multi-stakeholders arrangements. Policy discussion about the directions of service delivery are hampered by the lack of evidence base that outlines which systems work for what specific situations. Research in this field concentrates on areas where different systems work together, either by design or in practice. The policy objective would be to enhance the complementarity and collaboration of different service providers, and to advance the policy dialogue on scenarios of service provision in DRC.

Financial services in DRC

There is currently a trend towards micro-finance programmes. These operate in the framework of development interventions. There is, however, very little knowledge on what financial services are available to people in DRC. As there is hardly a banking and insurance system in the country (partly as a result of practices where savings were confiscated during the war), insight is required who are the

money-lenders, to whom is capital accessible, what are lending practices, what systems are available for saving, insurance, and so on. The policy objective would be to identify local systems that can be used to build future financial services on, to identify blockages for local development of financial services, and to explore possible collaborations between externally-driven and domestic service provisions. This would also position micro-credit activities in a wider policy.

Rural-urban relations: transport and trade

During the war, rural areas were strongly disconnected from urban centres. In the last years, much investment has been done in the construction of roads to reconnect urban and rural areas. Little is known on how this has affected the rural-urban relations. Have roads led to a higher level of domestic urban provision? There is apparently a significant difference between areas. North Kivu seems more successful in creating a provincial economy than South Kivu, where Bukavu strongly depends on imports of basic goods. Have roads led to the expected increase in trade, how has it affected competition and price levels, are their poverty reduction effects? Are there particular reasons why roads do not accelerate development as anticipated? The policy objective of this research is to advance our learning on the impact of roads, to advance insight in the important sector of transport and to advance insights into trading mechanisms as an important driver of socio-economic development.

The nature of entrepreneurs in DRC

In the context of fragile states, the private sector is increasingly considered a vital driver of change that may enhance economic development *and* play a role in strengthening performance and accountability relations of the state. It is important to explore these assumptions by empirical studies into the nature of entrepreneurs in DRC. What is their background, keys to success, level of embeddedness in elite networks? What is their style of enterprise? Is there specialization or risk spreading and fragmentation of activity? What is their social role: how do they affect the state and what redistribution mechanisms evolve? How have practices of patronage and clientelism transformed, that dominated economic relations in DRC during the Mobutu times? What are feasible and effective mechanisms to support enterprise in such a way that it contributes to development for all?

The nature and social effects of women's economic power.

There are an increasing number of interventions directed to the economic empowerment of women in DRC. These are inspired by the need to provide women with income to afford health and education for their children. They also assume that increased economic empowerment will translate in an improved position of women more broadly. Many programmes emerge, for example, from projects that aim to protect women against sexual violence. These programmes seem to have little empirical back-up. What is the nature of women's economic roles historically, and how is it interwoven with the powers of state, church and traditional authorities? How to avoid that programmes for women add to their workload but not to their decision-making power and social position in society?

Depleting livestock and its consequences

One of the sectors most vulnerable to conflict is the livestock sector. During the conflict, livestock depleted to a fraction of its pre-war numbers. Until now, restocking of livestock continues to be problematic, as livestock is prone to be robbed or confiscated in taxation schemes. The issue has multiple aspects worth researching. One aspect is the nexus between livestock, conflict and reconstruction. Another aspect concerns the livelihood meaning of livestock. Often livestock constitutes a primary safety net for destitute people, who find in the selling of livestock a last resort to generate cash. In relation to this the research can also look into alternatives to livestock as safety net, in particular small-scale financial services that provide opportunities for saving.

Annex 2: Search and prioritisation

How was the existing literature searched?

In terms of published literature, using a few overview documents on livelihoods and social protection along with the guidance documents for the desired output of this project, a list of relevant terms and phrases was produced. Search 'strings', or particular combinations of words and phrases were used to search potential reservoirs of relevant information. The following combinations of terms were used (both in English and in French).

'DRC' 'DR Congo' 'eastern DRC' 'Kivu'

And

'Basic services' 'agriculture' 'aid' 'mining' 'livelihoods' 'livelihood strategies' 'trade' 'petty trade' 'health' 'education' 'transport' 'water' 'sanitation' 'social protection' 'coping' 'conflict' 'food security' 'fragile states' 'gender' 'IDP' 'governance' 'growth' 'humanitarian aid' 'intervention' 'private sector' 'roads' 'urbanisation' 'land ownership' 'DDR'

Though most of the documents reviewed were found using these terms, the research as a whole is not limited to this list. These terms were the starting point for the search, and more detailed searches were carried out as necessary depending on documents recovered. For example, if a paper on a specific topic yielded relevant references to further documents with different keywords, an additional search these keywords was performed, besides retrieval of relevant documents based on references provided in the paper.

Where was the search done?

A wide net was cast in searching for relevant published literature related to livelihoods and social protection. A variety of academic databases, publisher sites, and institutional websites was used to search for the various strings of relevant words and phrases.

Institutional websites were first searched for location-specific documents to see how many sources a given site had available. In some cases, the number of resources was limited, thus it was unnecessary to further narrow down the topic. In the case of larger institutions (such as World Bank) the search was narrowed to fit the thematic topics such as livelihoods, basic services, and so on.

Institutional Websites searched:

Complex Emergency Database (<http://www.cedat.be>)
Crisis State Research Centre, LSE
Eldis
FAO
Human Security Gateway
International Peace Information Service (IPIS)
International Labour Organization (www.ilo.org)
International Alert
MSF
DRC National Ministries
ODI
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

Academic and publisher databases searched:

CAB Direct
EconLit
Google Scholar
Informaworld
Ingenta
International Bibliography of the Social Sciences
JSTOR (African Studies Population Studies Public Policy and Administration Economics)
LexisNexis Academic
Project Muse
Proquest
PubMed
Sage Journals (Public Administration Economics and

Pole Institute (www.pole-institute.org)	Development Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution)
Rdc-humanitaire (OCHA) (http://rdc-humanitaire.net)	Scopus
ReliefWeb (http://reliefweb.int/)	SpringerLink
Research for Development, DFID (http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/)	Tufts Catalog
Small Arms Survey	Web of Science
UNDP (www.undp.org)	Wiley Interscience (All Economic All Development Studies All Political Science)
UNICEF	
USAID (http://www.usaid.gov/)	
WFP	
World Bank	


In terms of the 'grey' literature, given the breadth of issues and the sheer volume, a representative sample of the available and most commonly cited documents, including locally done primary research or study not available on the internet, was used.

Furthermore, some grey literature was identified in-country from various government and agency sources. However, acquiring relevant grey literature was challenging. Some of the grey literature identified also lack basic bibliographic information such as date and proper referencing to other documents.

How did we prioritise what to summarise and synthesise?

The initial searches above resulted in the identification of some 290 documents and peer-reviewed articles. These were then prioritised according to the relevance of the paper or document to the study, after a brief reading of the executive summary or abstract. In all about 145 documents were read, and incorporated in the synthesis represented by this paper.

Annex 3: Map of DRC



Map No. 4007 Rev. 8 UNITED NATIONS
January 2004

Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section

Annex 4: Terms of reference

Evidence papers protocol

In our general and technical tender for the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) we raised concerns about the current state of literature on fragile states and on service delivery, social protection and livelihoods. We argued that the literature tended to provide generic overviews of issues (sometimes even literature reviews of other literature reviews) rather than more rigorous empirical and context-specific analysis. We identified four core weaknesses:


- A case study focus on small geographical pockets or individual sectors that led to a partial rather than comprehensive portrayal of people's own lives and livelihoods in fragile and conflict-affected situations;
- A lack of comparable studies due to the use of different methods, definitions and contexts;
- A focus on snapshots or stock-takes of livelihoods, social protection and service delivery and a lack of longitudinal analysis that enables our understanding, particularly at household and community level, to be dynamic instead of static; and
- Research that is isolated from rather than integrated into economic analyses of growth and development

The production of evidence papers during the inception phase of our RPC provides an opportunity to us to test the extent and depth of these weaknesses and to begin to tackle the weaknesses. In the inception phase of the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) we will be producing 10 evidence papers (Figure 21):

- 1 Global synthesis of what we know about growth and livelihoods in fragile and conflict-affected situations
- 2 Global synthesis of what we know about basic services and social protection in fragile and conflict-affected situations
- 3 Synthesis of what we know about growth, livelihoods, basic services and social protection in Nepal
- 4 Synthesis of what we know about growth, livelihoods, basic services and social protection in Sri Lanka
- 5 Synthesis of what we know about growth, livelihoods, basic services and social protection in Afghanistan
- 6 Synthesis of what we know about growth, livelihoods, basic services and social protection in Pakistan
- 7 Synthesis of what we know about growth, livelihoods, basic services and social protection in DRC
- 8 Synthesis of what we know about growth, livelihoods, basic services and social protection in South Sudan
- 9 Synthesis of what we know about growth, livelihoods, basic services and social protection in Uganda
- 10 Gender paper

This paper describes our methodological protocol for the production of the evidence papers. It describes how we will capture elements of the systematic review methodology without carrying out a systematic review. A full systematic review would have limited usefulness given: the large number of questions that we have to answer; the lack of agreed terminology or complexity of many of the themes (and therefore search strings) that our research covers ('fragile', 'social cohesion', 'basic services', 'livelihoods', 'growth'); and that recent reviews have demonstrated that only very small numbers of high quality research outputs are identified by systematic reviews

Figure 7: Contribution of evidence papers to inception phase



However, our evidence papers will certainly benefit from adapting some of elements of the systematic review, especially because we will have a large team working on the papers, spread across different geographical locations and institutional homes. Benefits include:

- More careful development of research questions (rather than research themes or areas), including deconstruction of research questions in terms of *population*, *intervention*, *comparator* and *outcome*. This is particularly important given the very broad parameters of our research;
- Ensuring a consistent sampling and interpretation of literature;
- Reducing bias in our analysis of policies and programmes;
- Systematically assessing research quality and using this to identify gaps in research outputs based on quality rather than quantity of outputs; and
- The opportunity to establish a baseline for assessing the current state of research and replicating our process in 5-6 years' time to assess our impact

Research questions

Our research questions have been developed in consultation with RPC partners and affiliates and with DFID. They are significantly more complex than typical systematic review questions.

For evidence papers 1 -2 (Growth and Livelihoods, Basic Services and Social Protection), authors will be required to answer the following questions:

- **People:** What is known about peoples' own responses, disaggregated by gender, to conflict and their tactics for making a living and maintaining access to basic services and social protection?
- **Governance:** How do state and society interact in the institutional arrangements that mediate livelihoods, social protection and access to services? What are the gender dimensions of these interactions?

- **Aid:** What aid is being provided and its effectiveness in supporting access to basic services, livelihoods and social protection? What is known about the gendered impact of aid?
- **Private sector:** What is known about the role of the private sector in a) delivering services and social protection and b) stimulating multipliers and growth linkages?
- **Linkages:** What linkages between people-aid-governance determine outcomes in relation to livelihoods and access to social protection and basic services?
- **Data:** What current, gender-disaggregated data exists on poverty levels, livelihoods, growth, access to basic services, access to social protection and key health and nutrition indicators and what quality is it?
- **Quality:** What is the quality of the current evidence (including the extent to which gender is analysed)
- **Methods:** What methods are currently being used to research livelihoods, access to services and social protection
- **Gaps:** What gaps exist in the evidence, research methods and secondary data

For each of evidence papers 3 – 5 (Afghanistan / Pakistan, Sri Lanka / Nepal, Uganda / South Sudan / DRC), authors will be required to answer the same questions:

- **People:** What are peoples' own responses, disaggregated by gender, to conflict and tactics for making a living and maintaining access to basic services?
- **Governance:** How do state and society interact in the institutional arrangements that mediate livelihoods, social protection and access to services? What are the gender dimensions of these interactions?
- **Aid:** What aid is being provided and its effectiveness in supporting access to basic services, livelihoods and social protection? What is known about the gendered impacts of aid?
- **Linkages:** What linkages between people-aid-governance determine outcomes in relation to livelihoods and access to social protection and basic services?
- **Private sector:** What is known about the role of the private sector in a) delivering services and social protection and b) stimulating multipliers and growth linkages?
- **Data:** What current, gender-disaggregated data exists on poverty levels, livelihoods, growth, access to basic services, access to social protection and key health and nutrition indicators and what quality is it?
- **Quality:** What is the quality of the current evidence (including the extent to which gender is analysed)
- **Methods:** The types of methods currently being used to research livelihoods, access to services and social protection
- **Gaps:** What gaps exist in the evidence, research methods and secondary data

For such a large research programme with multiple outputs, it is difficult to pin down the parameters of research questions as would be the case in a systematic review: there will be no single definition of *population, intervention, comparator and outcome*⁶⁸ that makes sense across all questions and

⁶⁸ **Population** - who are you looking at? E.g. All beneficiaries of service delivery? Only poor people receiving services? All poor people? All people in fragile or conflict-affected countries? **Intervention**- what kind of programme/ change are you studying? E.g. receiving social protection, providing separate toilets for girls in schools, ensuring markets are regulated? **Comparator** - what are you comparing the intervention against? E.g. beneficiaries versus non-beneficiaries; cash transfer programmes versus public works programmes, or comparing beneficiary situation before and after receiving services. **Outcome**- what impacts are you looking at? How income changes? How attitudes towards the state change? If girls' school attendance increases?

countries. Guidelines and regular consultation will be used to ensure that across the team, there is some consistency in setting parameters.

Searching and recording strategy

All of the evidence papers will be based on a thorough and systematic literature search. A broad range of relevant academic databases will be searched (see Appendix 1 for an initial list). The London-based team will coordinate the search so that there is no replication of effort across the different teams responsible for papers 1 – 5. For each evidence paper the team will list of databases/ sources to be used and the search terms that will be applied. Criteria will be developed for how to decide on the relevance of sources. The list of databases and sources, search terms and criteria will be shared between the different evidence paper teams to ensure a consistent and replicable approach. The London-based team (evidence papers 1 and 2) will lead on the identification of formal published literature, particularly that found in open and closed access journals. The country-based teams (evidence papers 3–5) will focus on grey literature specific to their respective countries. All teams will regularly share other literature that their searches uncover.

A database system (possibly EPPI Reviewer 4– to be confirmed) will be used to manage and code studies found during the review.

The following will therefore be developed jointly by the research assistants / evidence paper leaders and research directors over the next month:

- A list of databases and sources to be used
- Agreed search terms to be applied and definitions for terms
- Criteria for deciding on the relevance of articles and other literature to be included in the analysis
- An agreed matrix for analysing and classifying the results of these searches

All studies will record the search process and the criteria by which literature is included or excluded (what search terms are used, where results are found, why literature was excluded etc.) in a way that will enable the studies to be replicated in 2015 and ensure that the analysis is transparent and objective.

Evidence papers 3–5 will also require a review of the grey literature including policy documents, evaluations and other unpublished documents. This should be gathered in-country and globally by consulting with key stakeholders (donors, aid agencies, government etc.) in an iterative process with the stakeholder consultation.

The review will cover both content (what are the key issues raised in the literature) and make judgements about the quality of the evidence and methods used.

Analysis

The results from these searches will be systematically analysed using an agreed matrix for classifying results. This will be developed by the London teams for the global syntheses and shared and adapted by the teams working evidence papers 3–5.

The analysis process for the global syntheses will be agreed in week commencing Monday 2nd May. It is anticipated that either

- 1 Specific sectors will be allocated to the four team members (RS, RM and 2 x research assistants) and each researcher will iteratively build an analysis of that sector with sectoral inputs from sector specialist; or
- 2 Research themes (especially people-aid-governance) will be divided between the researchers and they will iteratively build an analysis of that theme with inputs for sector leads; or

Based on this division of labour the teams will produce a shared analysis of quality and methods. The team for papers 1–2 will produce weekly reports on progress and findings and meet weekly to share results of analysis. These reports will be shared with those working on other evidence papers.

The process (for the global synthesis) will be shared with teams working on evidence papers 3–5 who will adapt it to fit the specific context for their work. It is anticipated that evidence Papers 3–5 will follow the shared outline to maximise comparative findings. A draft outline is proposed below which will be revised based on comments now and discussion with the research teams once the reviews are underway. A decision will need to be made about whether each evidence paper has two-three separate chapters for each countries, or whether each sections includes all (2 or 3) countries.

Appendix

Appendix 1: Example search strategy for electronic databases

Subject-specific databases to be searched:

Econlit (Ebsco)

Francis (Ebsco)

Africa-Wide Information (Ebsco)

International Political Science Abstracts (IPSA) (Ebsco)

International Security & Counter-Terrorism Reference Center (ISCTRC) (Ebsco)

Middle Eastern & Central Asian Studies (MECAS) (Ebsco)

Peace Research Abstracts

Political Science Complete (Ebsco)

Public Administration Abstracts (Ebsco)

Public Affairs Index (Ebsco)

Social Sciences Abstracts (Ebsco)

Family & Society Studies Worldwide (FSSW) (Ebsco)

Social Science Citation Index (Web of Knowledge)

Publisher platforms to be searched:

Wiley Interscience (All Economic; All Development Studies; Social Policy & Welfare; All Political Science)
(using short search string)

International Bibliography of the Social Sciences

Sage Journals (Public Administration, Economics and Development, Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, Regional Studies, Politics & International Relations)

Jstor (African Studies, Population Studies, Public Policy and Administration, Asian Studies, Economics, Middle East Studies, Political Science)

Cab Direct

Institutional websites to be searched

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

World Bank

UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

USAID

Human Security Gateway

Eldis

Governance Resource Centre

Research4DFID

ILO & UN (ILO developed UN policy) quietly

CPRC

IDEAS

SSRN

Poverty Action Lab Evaluations

(Meta) search engines to be searched

Google Scholar

Metacrawler

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