

From Negligence to Populism: An Analysis of Mozambique's Agricultural Political Economy

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“Agriculture is an activity practiced by poor people and used to educate children and take them out of the field.”

Sussundenga Peasant

1. Introduction

1.1 Context

Mozambique is a multiparty democracy located in the southern African region. With abundant natural resources its agricultural potential is greatly unexplored (in 2004, only 9% of arable land was cultivated) and, with a few exceptions, the sector has broadly underperformed since Independence. Low levels of agricultural productivity and rural incomes (the latest household survey indicates rural poverty in on the rise) result from a combination of factors, including: two decades of civil war with devastating effects across rural areas; low levels of agricultural research and technology uptake; underdevelopment of markets for agricultural inputs and outputs; insufficient private investment due to pervasive market failures; weak governance capacity and ineffective public spending. Adding to these, this paper argues that politics, the nature of the “political settlement” and configuration of the political system in particular, are also an explanation for poor performance and for failure to address some of the existing constraints. Politically-driven policies adopted by the ruling elites have generally discriminated against the majority of agricultural producers, who continue to be poor, vulnerable and dependent from handouts from government, donors or NGOs.

1.2 Argument

The paper analyses the changing configuration of the political system since the Rome Peace Agreement of 1992. It discusses how the “political settlement” underlying the Peace Agreement and the outcomes of multiparty elections thereafter have shaped governance, including policy-making concerning the agriculture sector and the rural economy. The paper argues that private interests and electoral objectives have been important drivers of policy decisions taken by the governing elites concerning the agriculture sector and local governance, with precedence over donor influence. By contrasting the political choices and governance approaches adopted by the two different presidential administrations in office since the first multiparty elections were held in 1994, it is argued that one (led by Joaquim Chissano) is marked by features of “neopatrimonialism”, whereas the other (led by Armando Guebuza) is showing signs of electoral “populism”. The former is characterised by significant rent distribution by the governing elite to a narrow “selectorate”. The latter is manifested by a paternalistic

and politically mobilising discourse emanating directly from the President and appealing to the broader electorate, particularly the rural population of the central and Northern region of the country, who has been traditionally opposed to the ruling party.

1.3 The broader study, conceptual framework and research methods

The theoretical concepts framing the analysis are derived from a conceptual framework developed for the broader research project on the political economy of agricultural policy in Africa this case-study contributes to. The broader project aims to analyse how domestic politics determine agricultural policy-making and its outcomes by contrasting political systems across the African continent. Its underlying assumption is that political systems vary markedly across Africa and that this should lead, more or less systematically, to differences in the design and implementation of agricultural policy, given the importance of the agricultural sector to so many people in these countries.

The conceptual framework highlights the importance of at least three concepts in explaining the mechanics of political systems and differences across countries. One is the concept of “political settlement”, that is, the implicit arrangement (informal or formalised, through for example a Constitution) between elites on how to govern the country so as to avoid the threat of civil conflict (Migdal, 1988). It is therefore the result of bargaining between the elites, not only the elite in government, but all those elite groups with sufficient power to pose a threat. The other is the concept of “selectorate”, which is the subset of the electorate that actually decides the outcomes of elections, i.e. those with power/influence to decide the direction of votes (de Mesquita, 2009). In mature democracies the selectorate corresponds to a large proportion of the electorate. Where the selectorate is narrow the incentive for the ruling party/coalition to deliver public goods (which benefit the whole population) is limited and there will be incentives to deliver private goods that benefit exclusively the selectorate. Regional power brokers may correspond to the selectorate. The third is that of “neo-patrimonialism” which translates the occurrence of a legal-rational logic juxtaposed with a patrimonial logic within African states (Van de Walle 2001). The ruling elites use state mechanisms and resources to secure loyalty of clients.

Drawing on these notions, the conceptual framework proposes four stylised types of political systems, depicted

Table 1. Typology of political systems in Africa.

	Transformational	Transfers
Narrow(er) selectorate (may be linked to social or political control)	Developmental patrimonialism	Traditional (“big man” or party) clientelism
Wide(r) selectorate	Programmatic politics	Populism

Source: Poulton (2011) “Understanding the Political Economy of Agricultural Policy Making in Africa: a Conceptual Framework”, FAC working paper.

in Table 1. Populism, for example, results from competition within the elites, forcing one of the competing elite groups to appeal to the wider electorate to weaken opposing elite forces.

The analysis on Mozambique's political economy of agriculture is one of eight case-studies undertaken under this broad framework.¹ It draws on reviews of relevant academic literature and media sources, particularly newspaper, as well as semi-structured interviews with a selection of 17 key informants from government, donors, the private sector and civil society, including academic researchers and experts. Data collection took place in Maputo, between March and June of 2011.

1.4 Structure of the paper

The paper is structured into 5 sections, including this introduction. Section 2 provides an overview of the context, which includes a description of Mozambican agriculture and its performance and of the main stages of agricultural policy. Section 3 describes the configuration of the political system shaped by the political settlement underlying the Peace Agreement and the four multiparty elections held since the end of the war. Section 4 discusses the political dimensions of agricultural governance, looking not only at the formulation and implementation of policies targeting directly the agricultural sector but also at reforms concerning local administration with a bear on agricultural governance and investments. Section 5 concludes and raises issues for further investigation.

2. Background

2.1 General Background

Mozambique is a large country in southern Africa with a population of approximately 22 million inhabitants (according to the NSI, 2007). Despite its wealth of natural resources and agricultural potential, Mozambique is still part of the 20 poorest countries in the world². The long civil war that followed independence in 1975 had devastating consequences on the economy and society.

Recently, the country has been considered by international agencies as one of the success stories in contemporary Africa.³ *This is not only because of political stability but also because of positive macroeconomic performance.* Over the last ten years, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has registered an average growth of 8% per year. However, in 2010, the Human Development Index was still very low, and the country lingered at position 165 out of a ranking of 169 countries (UNDP, 2010).

Over the last decade, economic growth has been largely a result of investments in so-called mega-projects, namely: aluminium smelting by Mozal, the investments of South African oil company SASOL and the Moma heavy sands project. Investment in these three projects has accounted for over 55% of total private investment made during the past 10 years and their combined production

accounts for almost 70% of the gross industrial production of Mozambique (Castel-Branco, 2008). In 2006, Mozal's gross production value (about 2 billion U.S. dollars) was higher than the National State Budget and the total exports of these projects accounted for nearly three-quarters of total national exports (Castel-Branco, 2008).

However, studies show that the contribution of these mega-projects to poverty reduction is rather limited (Burr et al, 2011; Castel-Branco, 2010). Between 1997 and 2002, the poverty rate fell from 69.4% to 54.1%. Between 2002 and 2009, however, no significant advances were made on this area, since the percentage of poor people increased by 0.6% to 54.7%, an increase more denounced in rural areas (MPD, 2010).

2.2 Characterization of the agricultural sector and its performance

In this section the main characteristics of the agricultural sector in Mozambique are analyzed and political and institutional factors relevant to its performance is presented. For this purpose, the potential of the sector is presented first, its weight in the national economy and the constraints that prevented the sector from becoming the engine of the development alluded to by the political elites in power.

Physically, Mozambique is generously endowed with land and water for agricultural purposes. There are about 36 million hectares of arable land (MADER, 2004), which represents a huge agricultural potential. The peasant family sector occupies about 3.2 million hectares and is geographically dispersed and heterogeneous from a cultural, technical and economic point of view (MINAG, 2007). These families farm in plots of land with an average size of 1.1 hectares (ASP, 2005). In 2010, only 14% (equivalent to 4,7 million hectares) of arable land was farmed (SNV, 2010). From the 3.3 million hectares of arable land, only 1.8% were irrigated⁴. Until the 2008/2009 agricultural campaign, food crops took about 70% of cultivated area and the remaining 30% were occupied by agricultural crops meant for exportation such as sugar, cotton, tea and sisal (Falcão & Egas, 2008)

There are significant discrepancies in terms of production, marketing and productivity levels across provinces and districts due to agro-ecological accessibilities and conditions. Food crop production across provinces in the seasons 2008 to 2010 illustrates regional unbalances (Table 2).


According to official data, basic food crop production in the agrarian sector, which accounts for 90% of the total agricultural production (especially maize, sorghum, millet, cassava and sweet potato), has remained stable over the last three decades (MADER 2004; MINAG, 2010). However, Mozambique remains a net importer of agricultural products and rural poverty has increased. It is argued that rural poverty is rooted in a limited development of both agriculture and markets (TIA, 2002). Agriculture currently employs about 80% of the workforce

Table 2. Major food crops production by province

Province	Corn (ha)			Sorghum (ha)			Pearl millet (ha)			Rice		
	2008/09	2009/10	%	2008/9	2009/10	%	2008/09	2009/10	%	2008/09	2009/10	%
Cabo Delg	112 145	128 133	14.3	87 469	92 066	5.3	5 233	5 330	1.8	17 138	17 633	2.9
Niassa	174 064	198 246	13.9	47 905	49 690	3.7	2 559	2 608	1.9	5 704	5 818	2.0
Nampula	142 629	154 312	8.2	151 584	154 677	2.0	9 659	9 866	2.2	40 849	42 050	2.9
Norte	428 838	480 692	12.1	286 958	296 434	3.3	17 451	17 804	2.0	63 691	65 501	2.8
Zambezia	247 256	273 234	10.5	85 754	91 311	6.4	9 456	9 647	2.0	96 481	100 070	3.7
Tete	208 600	230 957	10.7	72 492	72 722	0.3	34 125	34 922	2.3	329	331	0.5
Manica	255 379	267 974	4.9	63 798	68 462	7.3	16 686	17 143	2.7	1 108	1 134	2.4
Sofala	109 673	113 474	3.5	70 896	76 414	7.8	14 076	14 575	3.5	36 430	37 200	2.1
Centro	820 908	885 639	7.9	292 940	308 909	5.4	74 343	76 287	2.6	134 347	138 735	3.3
Inhambane	125 279	127 414	1.7	26 827	28 950	7.9	12 679	13 399	5.7	4 485	4 525	0.9
Gaza	159 520	164 606	3.2	3 666	3 872	5.6	1 352	1 490	10.2	12 782	15 075	17.9
Maputo	77 352	79 692	3.0	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0	2 744	2 756	0.4
Sul	362 152	371 711	2.6	30 493	32 822	7.6	14 031	14 889	6.1	20 011	22 357	11.7
Total Domestic	1.611 898	1 738 042	7.8	610 391	638 165	4.5	105 825	108 980	2.9	218 050	226 593	3.9

Source: MINAG/DNSA/DCAP/DPA, 2010.


(90% of the female and 70% of the male workforces) and accounts for 80% of family sector income, thus being instrumental to poverty reduction. However, the agricultural potential does not translate into revenue generation and rural jobs creation in any tangible way (TIA, 2002). The prices of agricultural commodities and wages in rural areas are unfavourable and are, on average, 30% lower than salaries paid in other sectors of the economy (Mosca, 2011). Since its independence, public and private investment in the smallholder sector has been weak, and the peasantry continues to sell their products to state monopolies while providing cheap labour to large monocultures plantations (Wuyts, 2001). The smallholder dominated agricultural sector has therefore displayed growth rates far below its potential and, with few exceptions, productivity levels remain below levels achieved in the pre-Independence period (Figure 1).



Source: Faostat, 2009.


Nevertheless, if one looks at the sector's performance as a whole, agricultural production has, between 2001 and 2007, increased by over 8%, with the exception of 2005 when production suffered a considerable slump. The drop in agricultural production was caused by drought, cyclones and floods that had a tremendous negative impact in the country (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Agricultural sector growth rates, 2001-2007



Source: Faostat, 2009.

Figure 3. Yield per hectare of selected food crops, 1961-2009




Source: Faostat

This growth in the sector as a whole is mainly the result of the expansion of farmed land and not increasing agricultural productivity. Furthermore, it is the commercial

crops that account for much of this growth. NEPAD data shows that, while production levels of the smallholder sector had grown by only 3% in 2003, cash crop production increased approximately 41% as a result of the large investment in sugar, cotton, cashew nuts, tobacco and tea (NEPAD, 2004). Yields of some of these crops have been rising consistently (Figure 3).

Sugar is the major exception, as the productivity records set during the colonial period still remain unsurpassed (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Yield per sugar hectare, 1961-2009



Source: Faostat

Overall, agriculture continues to fail to meet its potential, especially with regards to reducing rural poverty. A combination of factors has contributed to this under performance. These can be grouped into four categories:

(i) Civil war. Two decades of civil war, which pitted the Frelimo government against the Renamo guerrilla, had a devastating effect on the rural areas and the agricultural sector dynamics, turning approximately 4.7 million people into refugees and forcing about 1.5 million refugees to be abandoned in neighbouring countries and thousands in urban areas (World Bank 2005: 13), where there was no food and no chance to practice family farming (A. Dinermann, 1998).

(ii) Precarious technological and infrastructural conditions. Mozambique is characterized by a low application level of agricultural know-how and technology. The use of farm fertilizers is negligible, which keeps the average farm income at a low level (about 4kg/ha) and puts the country far below the continental average of 10 kg/ha and away from the goals proposed on the 2006 Abuja conference, which mandates fertilizer use in a 50 kg per hectare ration as a decisive measure for sustainable agricultural productivity (Hanlon, 2011). Productivity is also affected by limited access to and absorption of technology and extension services. In addition, the development of agro-ecological zones is constrained by weak infrastructures, both in terms of transport and communication infrastructures and in terms of supply facilities and irrigation structures (MINAG, 2010). The distribution infrastructure is asymmetric across the country and the northern and central areas of the country, endowed with a great agricultural potential, are the most densely populated and where the production bulk of cash crops, including cotton,

tobacco, sesame, sunflower, copra, tea and cashew (IFAD, 2008, MADER 2004, Wuyts 2001).⁵

(iii) Low level of public and private investment in the sector. Investments in the public and private sector experienced a significant decline in recent decades. Public expenditure in agriculture has declined from an average of 24% of total expenditure in the period of 1975 to 1986,⁶ to 10% in 1989 (Castel-Branco, 1994) and 4% in 2008 (GMD, 2009, USAID, 2009), thus placing the country currently below the 10% goal established in the Maputo Declaration of the African Union. Data on private credit for the agricultural sector indicates that, between 2001 and 2008, the credit share fell from 18% to 8% and the sector has fallen from second to fourth place in the national sector ranking (Bank of Mozambique, 2009). Currently, it is estimated that about 60% of private investment in agriculture is focused on sugar and cotton.

(iv) Governance fragility. Weak governance capacity, characterized primarily by a top-down and administratively fragmented structure, coupled with an obsolete management system and poor technical capacity, were for decades important bottlenecks. In addition, the Mozambican state apparatus is still marked by elements of patrimonialism, where appointments and promotions are based on clientelistic ties and not on merit. Some efforts have been made by the government, with donor support, to restructure and modernize the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and professionalize its staff. However, these efforts have, since 2005, when the new President took office, suffered some draw back. *Instability in the political leadership of the agricultural sector has been feature of the new administration: between 2005 and 2010, four ministers have been appointed to lead MINAG.*⁷ Replacement and/or marginalization of competent managers and technicians in favour of less competent ones, at both central and local levels, for ideological and political reasons⁸, has led to the gradual erosion of the Ministry's technical expertise (Mosca, 2011). Policy-making is also noticeably more politicized, with the direct intervention of the Presidency resource allocation decisions within the sector, outside institutionalised planning and consultation processes.

This study examines the political motivations underlying governance of the agricultural sector in detail, and, in particular, the influence of the electoral agenda and the interests of the ruling elites in the formulation and implementation of agriculture policies. Before starting such analysis of the political economy of the agricultural sector, and in order to situate better the discussion, the main stages that agricultural policy has gone through in the post-Independence period are identified.

2.3 Main stages of Mozambique's agricultural policy

Agricultural policy in Mozambique has gone through at least four distinct phases since the declaration of independence in 1975. The first stage, from 1975 to 1986, was dominated by the socialist model of strong state intervention aimed at the social and cultural transformation of the peasants and the fixation of their productive and economic base in cooperatives and state enterprises. This model greatly penalized the smallholder sector, leading to a decline in marketed production and impairing domestic consumption. With most of the agricultural credit allocated to cooperatives and state farms, little support was given to the smallholder sector. Without funding, smallholder production, which comprised two of the main export crops (cotton and cashews) as well as most food crops sold in the domestic market (maize, cassava, rice and peanuts), declined significantly (Pitcher, 2002).

The second phase takes place between 1986/7 and 1992 as was marked by the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme supported by the Bretton Woods institutions. Agricultural policies implemented in this period were not able to create considerable incentives for the dominant smallholder sector to serve as a foundation to leverage the industry. However, they contributed greatly to the recovery of the agricultural development model in the colonial period, consequently sidelining smallholder agriculture (Mosca, 2011; Castel-Branco, 1994).

The third phase took place in the decade following the General Peace Agreement, between 1992 and 2002. In a context of a post-war collapsed state (Zartman, 1995)⁹, the main concern of the ruling elites was to promote cash crops (such as cotton, tobacco, and sugar, which could be a source of government revenue through exports as well as providing an opportunity for rent extraction.

These revitalisation of these crops was driven by privatisation measures adopted during the structural adjustment period and, in particular, the availability of foreign capital willing to invest on them (Mosca, 2011). Although the prioritisation of cash crops had an economic rationale, it also was driven by political motivations. The recovering of these cultures produced new alliances between foreign capital and the elites in power and contributed to the consolidation of Frelimo's power over the economy, the state and rural space, much of which was under Renamo's domination, the main opposition party (Pitcher, 2002). Furthermore, this policy contributed to the settlement in the local economy of demobilized soldiers and thousands of displaced families that began returning to their homelands.

The fourth phase, which begins in 2003 and extends roughly to the present day, coincides with the arrival to power of President Armando Guebuza. With Guebuza, there has been a vigorous promotion of the agricultural sector in the political discourse, focused on food

production and the smallholder sector. The 2007 Green Revolution strategy and the 2008 Food Production Action Plan for Food Production (PAPA) provide an illustration of the paradigm shift in the sector.

This paper focuses specifically on the third and fourth phases, looking at how agricultural policy has been used by the governing elites to, firstly, extract rents from the sector while neglecting the peasantry and then extend and consolidate their political clout across the rural sphere. To understand how agricultural policies have been used by political elites (section 4), one must bear in mind the configuration and dynamics of the political system of Mozambique (section 3).

3. Political settlement, multiparty elections and configuration of the political system

This section analyzes the configuration of the Mozambican political system emerging from the political settlement underlying the General Peace Agreement, as well as the results of multiparty general elections held since then. This analysis provides the basis for understanding the political rationale influencing the Frelimo Government, which has shaped the design and implementation of agricultural policies.

3.1 Political settlement

Mozambique is one of the few countries in sub-Saharan Africa where the transition to democracy was the result of an internal conflict. In fact, the worsening of the civil war in Mozambique and international pressures forced the Maputo regime to approve a Constitution in 1990, which allowed, after signing the General Peace Agreements, to carry out the first free and multiparty elections in 1994.

The signing of the General Peace Agreements was not confined only to the end of hostilities agreement or the constitution of the Supervisory Committee for Peace established by the UN and the two forces that fought the war: the party in power, Frelimo¹⁰, and Renamo, the main opposition party. Two fundamental matters ensured peace and elections in 1994, namely: (i) the signature of a "UN-sponsored secret agreement between Joaquim Chissano¹¹ and Afonso Dhlakama of unknown details" (Rosário, 2009¹²), and (ii) the demobilization strategy for Frelimo and Renamo troops.

Concerning the secret agreement, it is argued that Dhlakama has accepted the role of "eternal leader of the opposition" in Mozambique in return for financial benefits, including \$3 million provided by the United Nations for the transformation of the former Renamo guerrilla movement into a political party (Rosario, 2009). The demobilisation issue was sensitive for political and strategic reasons. In fact, the initial resistance of the two parties in laying their arms aside and call their soldiers

back was directly linked to two factors: on the one hand, mutual distrust, and on the other, the fact that the military dimension still remains an important source of power in a non-institutionalized political environment (Rosario, 2009). The ongoing negotiations between Chissano and Dhlakama on the integration of the Renamo military in the Mozambican Army Forces preserved the peace. However, this issue is still subject to discussion and debate between the Frelimo government and Renamo.

3.2. The political system and relations between the legislative and executive powers

Although the representation system is proportional, the Mozambican political life is dominated by the two main actors of the civil war, Frelimo and Renamo. Furthermore, only Frelimo has been in power since Independence from Portugal. The bipartisanship produced in the 1999 and 2004 elections overrides the development of other political or social movements. Nevertheless, on the 2009 elections, a small political party, the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM), managed to elect nine members onto of the 250-member Parliament. However, in terms of discourse, manifest or policy practices, MDM does not represent an alternative as it does not distinguish itself from the two dominant parties (Chichava, 2010). The recent divisions and internal conflicts for power sharing at the level of MDM leadership and the absence of effort to work with the electorate, mostly urban and from Maputo, show the fragility of this movement in the national political arena. To be seen as an alternative to Frelimo and replace Renamo in the leadership of the opposition in Mozambique, MDM should take over the social basis of Renamo and become a well organized, structured and disciplined political "machine" with well trained and paid militants, able to resist the bribes offered by other parties (ibid). This situation is far from becoming a reality. The internal conflicts in recent months within the MDM parliamentary group and the weak influence it carries on legislative

output show the weakness of this movement in Parliament.

The Mozambican Parliament, or Assembly of the Republic, is the highest legislative body and has the authority to approve programs and Government plans, to produce legislation and perform other roles in the legislative sphere. Although the Constitution grants it this power, the legislative roles assigned to the President of the Republic contribute to the weakening of Parliament. The President holds the power of veto (Article 163 of the Constitution), the power of dissolution of Parliament (Article 159 of the Constitution), and the power to draft "Decree-Laws" (Article 181 of the Constitution).

The existence of an absolute majority of the ruling party in the four legislatures since the Peace Agreements, has shaped the relationship between the legislative and the executive branches of power. Party discipline means that, in general, there are no contradictions between the executive and Frelimo benches in Parliament. The solidarity that prevails between the majority in Parliament and Government has prevented a genuine policy debate, reducing Parliament to a secondary role (Brito et al., 2003). The opposition's minority position in Parliament systematically renders it unable to influence the legislative process, let alone Government's action. The only arena where there is a basis for negotiation between the two main political forces in Parliament is when the constitutional revision is discussed, since this requires a majority vote of two thirds (ibid, 2003). It was on the basis of a Frelimo-Renamo consensus that a revised Constitution was approved in 2004. Recently, differences have been emerging over a constitutional amendment that is currently under consideration. While Frelimo and MDM are aligned towards the constitutional amendment, Renamo is showing signs of resistance to cooperate.

In the following sections, we make the case that electoral results have contributed to the reconfiguration of the domestic political space and the political exploitation of policy in matters concerning agriculture

Table 3. Results of parliamentary and presidential 1994 elections, national and provincial levels

Province	Dhlakama	Chissano	Outros	Frelimo	Renamo	UD	Others
C. Delgado	18.63	67.92	13.44	57.67	22.63	5.83	13.73
Niassa	26.90	56.53	16.53	46.27	32.77	6.19	13.71
Nampula	42.80	37.15	20.05	30.55	48.42	4.49	16.52
Zambezia	47.54	38.38	14.03	31.40	51.98	4.65	11.95
Tete	42.37	40.43	17.1	30.98	49.09	5.90	14.01
Manica	50.42	33.61	15.95	27.06	57.87	4.04	11.03
Sofala	73.48	17.53	8.98	14.21	75.86	1.48	8.27
Inhambane	10.36	78.44	11.19	59.43	12.92	11.72	15.85
Gaza	1.86	94.92	3.22	81.42	2.68	6.87	9.04
Maputo Province	6.17	89.94	3.87	77.32	6.93	5.94	9.49
Maputo City	8.74	87.10	3.98	78.60	8.98	2.81	9.31
Total	33,73	53,30	11.66	44,33	37,78	5.44	12.45

Source: Mazula (1998), Mozambican statistics from the 1994 electoral process, Maputo.

and local governance. Agriculture and the rural sector have become a political priority, leading Frelimo to conceive strategies to seduce the rural electorate.

3.3. First multiparty elections (1994) and the configuration of political forces

The 1994 elections were won by Frelimo with 44% of the votes against Renamo's 38% (Table 3). Two types of divisions that characterize the Mozambican society were confirmed in these elections. On one hand, the rural/urban divide: urban voters voted for Frelimo, while the rural population voted for Renamo¹³. The rural population, mainly from the central and northern regions of the country, consisted of social groups that, for various historical and social reasons, had felt excluded by Frelimo (Cahen, 1997 and Brito, 1995). For example, the socialist project of Frelimo, and in particular the communal villages policy and the opposition to traditional practices such as polygamy and early marriage, was poorly received by rural communities.

Another division concerned ethnic and regional-based party support. In the 1994 elections, Frelimo won in Changana and Maconde areas, whereas Renamo was strongest in areas of Ndau, Sena, Shona and Macua influence. Dhlakama won relative majorities in the two most populous provinces, Zambezia (47.5%) and Nampula (42.8%), as well as in Manica and Tete, and obtained a stable absolute majority in Sofala (73.5%), all provinces in the central region. Chissano won majorities in the southern provinces, namely Gaza (94.9%), Maputo province (89.9%), Inhambane (78.4%) and Maputo city (87.1%), as well as the old bases of the areas liberated of the anti-colonial struggle, namely Cabo Delgado (67.9%) and Niassa (56.5%) in the north (Mazula, 1997). Communities in the south and the far north voted massively for Frelimo and these two regions are predominantly home to the Frelimo elites: the urban and intellectual elite of the south and the military elite of the north.

However, contrary to what many had thought, Renamo's electorate was ethnically less concentrated than Frelimo's (Cahen, 2000). The ethnic concentration of voting was most visible in areas where Frelimo won elections, with support from the Maconde people in the far north and the Machangana in the south (Cahen, 2000). Given the relatively small size of the Maconde ethnic group, the elections revealed Frelimo as essentially a party of the south. In an attempt to expand its influence, Frelimo co-opted the elites of an important association from the North which constituted a threat to the central power, both as a protest movement against the regime and as a potential political force (Rosario, 2009; Chichava, 2008). The elected President, Joaquim Chissano, appointed four prominent leaders of the Association for the Development of the Macua (ASSAN) for high government positions. This association had appeared shortly before the 1994 elections.¹⁴ Frelimo thus began the process of rebuilding the state and society according to its own interests.

The decentralization policy adopted after the elections also contributed to strengthening control over local threats. Law 3/94 provided for the transformation of old districts into urban and rural municipal districts with elected governments. However, given the electoral performance of Renamo in 1994, which had gained more than 50% of the votes in 61 out of 128 districts (with some stabilization in Manica, Zambezia, Nampula, Tete and Sofala), the law was subsequently changed, thanks to a Frelimo parliamentary majority, giving rise to a municipalization model restricted initially to 33 urban locations. Such decentralization policy adopted by Frelimo prevented about two thirds of the population, living outside cities or villages, from taking an active civic role through local elections, leaving them in a kind of "political informality". To date, three municipal elections have been held (1998, 2003 and 2008) and all of them have been overwhelmingly won by Frelimo. Law 3/2008 graduated 10 villages to the status of municipalities, which currently number a total of 43.

Table 4. Results of 1999 parliamentary and presidential elections, national and provinces total

Province	Dhlakama	Chissano	Frelimo	Renamo	UD	Others
C. Delgado	33.5	66.5	62.3	26.9	1.3	9.5
Niassa	56.9	43.0	41.2	47.5	1.2	10.1
Nampula	55.8	44.2	39.2	44.0	2.0	14,8
Zambezia	70.4	29.6	26.1	59.5	1.5	12.9
Tete	59.6	40.4	37.2	49.5	1.6	11.7
Manica	66.0	34.0	32,0	56.9	1.5	9.6
Sofala	79.9	20.1	19,6	71.1	1.2	8.1
Inhambane	28.9	71.1	62,1	20.5	3.0	14.4
Gaza	4.8	95.2	87,4	3.5	0.7	8.4
Maputo Province	9.9	90.1	85.0	9.6	0.7	4.7
Maputo City	13.3	86.7	82.7	13.5	0.5	3.3
Total	47,71	52,29	48,54	38,81	1.3	9.77

Source: STAE. 2002. 1999 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections, Maputo.

3.4. 1999 elections and the growing awareness of the importance of the rural electorate

Despite Frelimo's attempts to co-opt Macua elites, the 1999 election results in the provinces inhabited by large segments of this ethnic group were not favourable to the government party but instead endorsed Renamo and its leader, Afonso Dhlakama (Table 4).

At the national level, Renamo's votes grew from 37.8% to 38.8% of the electorate and Afonso Dhlakama's from 33.7% to 47.7%. In provinces where major population centres of Macua origin are located, Dhlakama improved his election results significantly: from 43.1% to 57.0% in Nampula province, from 47.6% to 71.8% in Zambezia, and from 27.3% to 57.0% in Niassa. Vast segments of the rural population voted for Renamo's leader in order to express their dissatisfaction with the Maputo regime. Although shaken by internal and organizational problems, Renamo was able to use traditional authorities as intermediaries for the political mobilisation of the rural electorate. During this period, Frelimo had not yet made significant strides in its policy of *régulo* recovery (the traditional chieftains) and "to socially open up power", despite some initial efforts (Dinnerman, 1998). Yet, despite the significant recovery of Dhlakama, the elections were won by Frelimo and Joaquim Chissano (with 48.5% and 52.3%, respectively). This victory was challenged by Renamo who accused the election of being fraudulent.¹⁵ Initially, Dhlakama refused to recognize the election results, but later authorized the Renamo members to take their seats in Parliament.

3.5. Agriculture as a power consolidation mechanism within the party

The highly disputed and marginal victory by Chissano in 1999 shook the legitimacy of the leader within the party, eventually preventing him from running for re-election in the following elections. Hélder Muteia, agronomist and a new generation scholar of Frelimo, was the first to be indicated as potential successor to Chissano. Taking advantage of his status as Minister of Agriculture and as a Zambezia native, a province located in the centre of the country, Muteia used agriculture to consolidate and legitimize his position within the party.

The rice production.¹⁶ campaign of 2001, launched a few months before the internal Frelimo elections, can be interpreted as a political point-scoring by the candidate to the leadership of the party in power. The rice campaign was launched in the provinces of Gaza, Sofala, Zambezia, Nampula and Cabo Delgado and aimed to foster rice production and reduce the rice deficit through investments in irrigation infrastructure and the recovery of rice processing plants (Domingo, 2001). Provincial and district seminars were organized, where Muteia and peasant and traditional authorities associations participated to discuss ways to improve productivity and expand smallholder rice production (ibid). According to some interviewees, this campaign continued after 2004

and eventually led to a proposed strategy for development of the rice crop sector in 2005. Its implementation did not produce the desired effects, not only due to the departure in 2005 of a large number of senior Ministry of Agriculture staff, but also because the sector began to be subject to strong political influence. The main agriculture policy priorities defined by the Chissano government were dropped in favour of new ones, namely the production of *jatropha*, a biodiesel crop.¹⁷

The issue of land privatization was another strategy used by Minister Muteia hoping to garner support amidst the new Frelimo elite. The Minister's interview with the pro-government newspaper *Domingo* illustrates this clearly:

"I believe, as a minister, it is time to start discussing the creation of farm land markets, to discuss this and uphold a compatible approach with our reality. Our land law protects the peasant [and according to the debate on this law], there was a consensus between all farmers and civil society that it was best to protect the peasant, but I think the time has arrived to start selling land... (Domingo, July 8, 2001).

However, the second strategy triggered a reaction opposite to that the Minister expected, who ended up being harshly criticized within the party (Hanlon, 2002). At the July 2002 party congress, the following was noted:

"The policy of the Frelimo Party on farm lands is to ensure that the Mozambique people does not lose its most valuable resource -- the land, which holds, besides its economic value, a vital cultural dimension" (Frelimo, 2002)

The theses presented at the Eighth Frelimo Party Congress dealt a harsh blow to Muteia's ambitions. The pressure exerted by this candidate and others of the new generation was not sufficient to impose a candidate of theirs in a party still dominated by veterans of the anti-colonial struggle. The party's internal elections were eventually won by Armando Guebuza, chosen as the lead candidate and a member of the Frelimo leadership since the days of the anti-colonial struggle, known for his organizational capacity as well as his obstinacy.

Guebuza then began a major patronage thrust with religious overtones (Cahen, 2010) with the aim of capturing the rural electorate of the central and northern provinces of the country, until then a main support stronghold for Renamo. Guebuza paid special attention to the party foundations and the district administrators that historically constituted a fundamental link to territory and population control. In the following period, Frelimo's strategy towards the electorate made a sharp turn, visibly manifested in the unfolding of the decentralization policy (an issue discussed in greater detail on section 4).

Table 5. Results of parliamentary and presidential 2004 elections, national and provincial levels

Province	Dhlakama	Guebuza	Frelimo	Renamo	Others
C. Delgado	18.0	77.6	75.6	17,3	7.1
Niassa	28.3	67.3	66.4	27,0	6.6
Nampula	43.9	49.8	48.3	40.0	11.7
Zambezia	56.8	37.5	36.3	52.7	11.0
Tete	22.2	74.2	74,0	21.1	4.9
Manica	47.5	47.4	46,0	45.4	8.6
Sofala	68.5	26.0	25.6	64.9	9.5
Inhambane	10.6	83.6	77.2	9.9	12.9
Gaza	1.8	96.4	94.0	1.7	4.3
M. Prov.	8.6	89.3	85.8	8.8	5.4
M. City	12.9	85.2	81.9	13.6	4.5
Total	31.7	63.7	62.03	29.73	7.86

Source: STAE. 2006. *2004 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections, Maputo.*

3.6. 2004 elections and the Frelimo conquest of the rural electorate

The 2004 elections warranted Guebuza an unquestionable victory and, once again, to Frelimo (Table 5).

These elections proved the effectiveness of Frelimo's strategy to conquer the rural electorate and confirmed Renamo's political weakness, unable to secure support from its rural electorate.

Dhlakama lost more than 53% of his 1999 electorate. Dhlakama's decline was noticeable throughout the country, while the Frelimo candidate suffered only a slight decline in Maputo city and province. While Dhlakama had managed to win over Chissano in six provinces in 1999, he was only able to win three in 2004, and the results fell quite short of the ones achieved previously. With regard to legislative results, Renamo losses were devastating and spread across all provinces, including the populous provinces of Zambezia and Nampula where Renamo was hitherto firmly embedded. According to Sumich and Honwana (2007), the landslide victory of Frelimo in this election was ensured by the systematic use political patronage to secure support from Renamo constituencies, notably within the Northern and Central regions of Mozambique.

This electoral defeat reflected the political weakness of Renamo and its failure to create an institutional apparatus that allowed it to retain its allies against the wealthy patronage of Frelimo's central power (Rosario, 2009). Renamo's inability to propose a truly alternative programme and create a "different political culture" (Martin, 1988) reflects the fragility of its political organization. Renamo has not managed to fulfil its social representation function (Otayek, 1998). Although it was transformed into a political party, the influence of war veterans, who perceive political life as a military matter, is still very strong (Cahen, 2010). The recent statements by Dhlakama and other senior party members, who

advocated the restoration of former military bases and a return to war to oust Frelimo from power, and install a new political order in Mozambique (Notícias, 2011, Canal de Moçambique, 2011) show that Renamo's internal rational is still of a militarized nature. As one author stated, "Renamo is not a party, where initiatives are taken from a base-level, for local problems, and for the intermediate ranks for regional issues, but a party where each member, regardless of their own level, expects guidance" (Cahen, 2010).

4. Discussion: political dimensions of government action in agriculture

4.1. Selective negligence of the agricultural sector in the Chissano era: the sugar case

The first multiparty elections of 1994 confirmed not only the legislative but also the executive power of the Frelimo party, in office since 1975. Frelimo's political and ruling elite continued to hold control over the state without having to make any significant political concessions. This situation allowed it to secure a dominant place in the national economy through participation in privatized companies, thus strengthening its power over the economy and the country (Pitcher, 2002). This strategy of appropriating public resources for the benefit of the elites was also implemented in the agricultural sector, a key area for income generation, particularly with regard to commercial agriculture. Initially, this appropriation was made by granting access rights to land and agricultural credit to the Frelimo elite, contrary to the essence of the Government's agrarian policy drafted in 1995. The Agricultural Policy and its Implementation Strategy have long been the reference instruments for State intervention on agriculture. On paper, the policy aimed to achieve food security, sustainable economic

development and reducing levels of absolute poverty by supporting smallholder agriculture, which held a central role in the income of most of the population (Birgegård, 2006). However, practice showed that commercial farming growth was the real priority of the ruling elites. At the 2002 Coordinating Council, Helder Muteia, the then Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADER), concluded that:

“While farmers are important, priority should be given to promoting the growth of commercial agriculture, as it should aim for an increase in productivity by making use of inputs and better market access.” (Demos, 2002).

The Minister considered that foreign direct investment (FDI) was the main engine of development and that “Government should facilitate this investment by providing land obtaining mechanisms and other opportunities” (Domingo, 2002). From this period onward, smallholder agriculture interests were neglected, and services for small farmers were confined to basic technical assistance on high commercial value crops such as tobacco, cotton, tea, sesame and sugar.¹⁸ The Minister’s position was intrinsically linked to the fact that foreign investment in the sugar industry was, at the time, a successful endeavour, not only in terms of job creation in rural areas, but also by helping to lower sugar import for domestic consumption, which has previously created a large trade deficit (Notícias, August 9, 2000). According to then Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, foreign companies had invested until 2002 more than \$300 million to recover the sugar industry and it was necessary to extend this experience to other crops in order to allow the agricultural sector to play its role as a major driver of development (MADER, 2003).

According to (Burr et al. 2011), however, the support given by the political leadership to the sugar industry rehabilitation resulted from the convergence of a number of elements, including: (i) the specific experience and ability of the national industry players in creating a local bureaucracy that could serve as an liaison between the interests of FDI and the government/state, (ii) the political pragmatism displayed on the 1992 General Peace Agreements, (iii) attributes of an ideological nature, and (iv) government needs to establish bureaucratic and state control over both territory and population. Our analysis will focus on this last point.

The focus on the sugar industry began in 1995 with the approval by the Council of Ministers of the Sugar Sector Development Policy and Strategy. The aim was to achieve the 1972 production levels, when about 325 thousand tons of sugar were produced, 60% of which for export, and the sector was the largest formal workforce employer. The massive exodus of technicians, engineers and other qualified staff at independence and consequent disinvestment in what was seen as a strategic sector forced the state to nationalize the industry. As a result of the divestment and civil war, sugar production declined to about 13 thousand tons in 1992, forcing the country

to rely on imports and smuggling from neighbouring countries (Burr et al., 2011). Sugar imports led to a significant drain of the country’s foreign currency reserves. In the 90s, Mozambique imported between 80 and 100 thousand tons, thus creating a significant trade deficit (Notícias, April 18, 2011).

Four sugar farms were rehabilitated, namely Maragra, Xinavane, Mafambisse and Marromeu. By 2002, these four sugar companies employed nearly 20,000 people and their activities benefited local people and migrant workers (Burr et al., 2011). They also created further job opportunities through the national companies that emerged in the meantime to provide subsidiary services to the sugar farms and mills. (Notícias, July 7, 2003). Their activity therefore had a large impact and produced a multiplier effect in the regions where sugar mills had been established, by imbuing local economies with greater dynamics, thus becoming attracting poles for public and private investment (ibid).

Two of the four rehabilitated sugar farms (Maragra and Xinavane) are situated in the southern region of Mozambique, where, during the 1994 general elections, Frelimo and its candidate had obtained overwhelming majorities of over 95% (Mazula, 1997). The other two (Mafambisse and Marromeu) are located in the central region of Mozambique, strongly controlled by Renamo. During the civil war period, administration was exercised by traditional leaders nominated by Renamo (Pereira, 1999). In light of the General Peace Agreements, which envisaged a dual administration situation, Renamo had appointed Marromeu as its administrator, who held power until after the 1994 elections, when the Frelimo-state administration was in place.

During the electoral campaign for the 1999 elections, the Marromeu factory rehabilitation was used by the Frelimo candidate as propaganda. Joaquim Chissano said:

“Over the next five years, we will work to fight unemployment [...]; we will resume sugar production in Maragra and Marromeu. Nothing should cause us to despair [...]. My voice is raised because I will fulfilled my promises.” (Notícias, 25 October 1999)

The revitalization of Marromeu had become an ace in the sleeve for the Frelimo government, as a way to secure and restore bureaucratic state control over the territory and local populations. The then Frelimo’s secretary-general, Armando Guebuza, rejoiced at the impact of the sugar industry rehabilitation in Marromeu:

“... Operations of the Sena company provided employment to more than 7500 workers, mostly residents in the Marromeu district. In fact, there are improvements in road trafficability with the opening and maintenance of feeder roads, products and goods supply to commercial establishments as well as essential goods, advancements

in the teaching and learning activities, fresh water piping system, 24-hour electricity availability, among others [...]. The fight against absolute poverty in Marromeu is making tremendous positive strides..." (Notícias, August 2, 2003)

By providing employment and ensuring social investments in education and health, transportation and communication, the rehabilitation of the Marromeu sugar company allowed Frelimo to improve its 2003 electoral results and to win the municipal assembly by 50.2% of the votes against Renamo's 49.8%.

In a context where there is only a slight difference between the Party and State realms, and where the presence and capacity of the State is notoriously weak, the choice of Marromeu for rehabilitation was a political and party strategy by Frelimo to implement State bureaucracy and control the population. The political exploitation of this rehabilitation project by foreign capital during the 2008 local elections and the 2009 parliamentary elections allowed the state bureaucrats linked to the Frelimo party to obtain political gains (Canal de Moçambique, 2009). The Frelimo victory in the 2008 local and presidential elections and the 2009 parliamentary election confirms this perspective. In fact, Frelimo and its candidate won the 2008 local elections in Marromeu. For the 2009 general election, Guebuza and Frelimo won over Renamo and Dhlakama with a landslide.

Frelimo's strategy of broadening its rural areas constituencies

The approval of the Local Government Act (LOLE) in 2003 (Law 8/2003) changed the relationship between the central government and the different hierarchy levels of the local government. LOLE introduced the integrated structure principle and eliminated the

consultation devices (local consultative councils)¹⁹ aimed at the integration of local communities in the decision-making process. In 2005, the LOLE Regulation (Decree 11/2005) was approved and the district emerged as the locus of local development. The Supplemental Local Initiative Investment Budget (OILL) was established to finance district development projects. Seven million Meticais were allocated to each district of the country, regardless of its population or needs. According to the official discourse, this fund contributed to finance of 494 thousand farming and small industry projects, as well as to strengthen the monitoring capacity of public funds by local government, created 260 thousand new jobs and, consequently, contributed to poverty reduction (Cuereneia, 2010).

However, recent studies show that the OILL availability to local communities did not produce any tangible results in terms of development of smallholder agriculture or the local small-scale agricultural processing industry (ACS, 2009; Forquilha, 2009, MINAG, 2008). Among the reasons given for its poor performance are the fact that projects financed by the fund were disconnected from the central government plans, especially since the district agriculture offices (SDAE) were not involved in their design and implementation (MINAG, 2008). An illustration of this has been the persistent difficulties in managing and maintaining irrigation schemes, as well as some shortcomings in the use of newly built/rehabilitated dams in the scope of this fund, (MINAG / DNSA, 2009).

The fund has contributed, however, to further Frelimo's reputation in rural areas that were once under the influence of Renamo (Forquilha, 2007), in a context of a dominant party system (Carothers, 2002) where there is a weak distinction between the state and the party spheres. A comparison of election results in the provinces²⁰ of Central and Northern Mozambique in 1999 and 2009 shows that there is a gradual expansion of Frelimo in areas under influence of Renamo (Table 6).

Table 6. Comparison of election results in the 1999-2009 period

Provinces	Frelimo			Renamo		
	J. Chissano	A. Guebuza		A. Dhlakama		
	1999	2004	2009	1999	2004	2009
Niassa	43,0	67,3	82,3	57,0	28,3	12,7
C. Delgado	66,0	77,6	80,8	34,0	18,0	13,4
Nampula	43,0	49,8	66,8	57,0	44,0	27,4
Zambezia	28,2	37,5	54,3	71,8	56,8	38,8
Tete	40,2	74,2	86,0	59,8	2,2	0 8,8
Manica	34,0	47,4	70,4	66,0	7,5	22,2
Sofala	20,0	26,1	51,6	09,9	8,5	22,5

Source: Stae, 2002 & Stae, 2006

double subordination principle and spawned a series of participatory institutions and communitarian

It has been argued that a private appropriation of the State sphere by the ruling party has been taking place

with the use of public resources in the service of the party's agenda (Forquilha, 2011). The use of OILL in promoting agriculture, a sector which provides the livelihood of most rural households, illustrates a neo-patrimonial resource distribution logic based on political party membership. In this sense, OILL has become a tool of political differentiation on a local level, a resource for granting legitimacy to political and administrative elites, and, most likely, an obstacle to the poverty reduction process (Forquilha, 2009). The way resources are distributed to the local level is not intended to create support infrastructures or to strengthen the productive capacity of small peasant families, but to strengthen and consolidate local elite groups with the capacity to produce, expand, and feed major projects taking place in the cities²¹ It also serves to eliminate the persisting local opposition against the ruling party and thus consolidate its hegemonic position at all levels of the state. Local governance legislation and the OILL were also used to capture traditional chieftains.

The "war" of traditional authorities

Although Laws 2/97 and 8/2003 provide for the coordination between municipal governments, local governments and community-level authorities, in compliance with the Constitution of the Republic, the relationship among these institutions and with the central government is far from consolidated. Control and influence over community-level authorities has been the subject of dispute between Frelimo and Renamo. Historically, the alliance with the chieftains, "rightful owners of the land" in rural areas, had been part of Renamo's political tactics for the areas it had occupied during the Civil War period. The recovery of lost land and power exercise by traditional authorities was an important element in the development of local agriculture in traditional ways²² and not in ways that had been imposed by the Frelimo government during the period of socialism (collectivization).

Starting in 1990, and in a situation of pluralism and political competition, the Frelimo government, in an attempt to extend the authority of the state (and the party) to areas formerly occupied by the rebel movement, seeks to appropriate traditional authorities in order to fortify its local alliances. The approval of Decree 15/2000 on community authorities illustrates the importance of such alliance. But the religious and political onslaught of Frelimo towards the achievement of traditional authorities had started earlier, soon after the electoral defeat of Frelimo in rural areas of central and northern Mozambique in the 1994 elections (Cahen, 2010). In October 1995, a government-sponsored meeting in Nampula province gathered all traditional authorities, religious leaders and chiefs in the country with the aim to discuss, in the words of President Chissano, the "state and future of traditional authorities in the new political administration" (Government of Nampula, 1995).

These alliances reflect the use of political patronage, conceived as a strategy for attainment, maintenance and enhancement of political power by employers, and by

customers, for the protection and promotion of their interests (Forquilha, 2007). Some of the traditional authorities have, for example, been involved in the collection of local taxes and management community forests, which has not only contributed to the increase in local revenues but also for their personal income. The strategy for using of traditional authorities as brokers between voters and political parties at the local level seems to have been won by Frelimo, with Renamo failing to retain their clients. Given the socio-political situation, for some traditional leaders, support for Renamo produced little return, not only in material terms but also in political terms. In fact it was the approximation to Frelimo, through the State, which could be most rewarding. Hence the change in political alliances for some important chiefs. In the agricultural domain, one of the most significant examples of the advantages gained by traditional leaders is their inclusion in the process of management and control over land use, as well as their supervisory role on natural resource use based on local customs and traditions (Celestino, 2001).

The Zambezi Valley

Implicit in the broad proposals on agriculture and rural development presented by Frelimo and Guebuza in the election manifesto for the 2004 elections was the Office for the Development of the Zambezi Valley (GPZ) and the political benefits this massive agricultural development project could generate. Created by Council of Ministers Decree 40/95 in August 22, the GPZ occupied an area of 225,000 Km² (about 28% of the Mozambique area), with a population of 3,755,000 inhabitants (25% of the Mozambican population at the time) and 56% of the population in the provinces of Sofala, Manica, Tete and Zambezia. This project aimed to enhance the development of agriculture, forestry, livestock, fisheries and local processing of production destined for the domestic market. The personalized, discretionary and authoritarian management of this project by a war veteran, who used his political influence with central government to override provincial governments, is seen as one of the factors that contributed to the failure of the project (Savana, 2005).

Since 2003, when Guebuza took over the presidency of Frelimo, the GPZ became one of the institutions that received more money from the state. A report produced by NEPAD shows that the total agriculture expenditure between 1998 and 2002, excluding debt service payment, was 5% of the total state budget. In 2003, this figure had risen to 8% due to the inclusion of GPZ in the section on agriculture and rural development (NEPAD, 2004). In 2004, GPZ was awarded approximately 6 million U.S. dollars. The largest share was used for the purchase of tractors, seeds and other agricultural consumables that were distributed to farmers from the districts of Tete (Angónia, Tsangano, Mutarara), Zambezia (Morrumbala, Mopeia, Chinde, Milange, Mocuba, Maganja da Costa, Nicoadala, Inhassunge and Quelimane), Sofala (Gorongosa, Maringuè, Chemba, Caia, Marromeu, Cheringoma and Muanza) and Manica (Báruè, Guro,

Table 7: 1999 and 2004 election results in the districts benefited by actions taken under the GTZ

TETE				
District	Renamo A. Dhlakama 1999	Frelimo J. Chissano 1999	Renamo A. Dhlakama 2004	Frelimo A. Guebuza 2004
Angónia	68,94	20,03	49,62	32,85
Mutarara	74,79	15,27	48,83	35,09
Tsangano	68,73	19,30	13,06	75,23
MANICA				
District	Renamo A. Dhlakama 1999	Frelimo J. Chissano 1999	Renamo A. Dhlakama 2004	Frelimo A. Guebuza 2004
Barué	50,01	40,70	32,47	58,00
Guro	58,78	32,47	29,27	59,33
Macossa	82,07	10,64	68,65	22,40
Tambara	72,50	15,58	44,40	36,52
SOFALA				
District	Renamo A. Dhlakama 1999	Frelimo J. Chissano 1999	Renamo A. Dhlakama 2004	Frelimo A. Guebuza 2004
Caia	81,01	08,62	74,76	14,75
Chemba	82,01	06,45	68,25	16,94
Cheringoma	86,02	08,92	62,86	22,82
Gorongosa	65,68	15,58	23,36	33,06
Marromeu	67,62	23,21	61,03	27,40
Maringué	84,09	04,58	61,01	28,69
Muanza	91,77	04,51	72,76	19,58
ZAMBÉZIA				
District	Renamo A. Dhlakama 1999	Frelimo J. Chissano 1999	Renamo A. Dhlakama 2004	Frelimo A. Guebuza 2004
Chinde	43,18	41,22	42,91	43,85
Inhanssunge	39,54	47,40	34,46	49,36
Mag. da Costa	58,72	23,58	45,67	33,41
Milange	75,29	10,36	66,29	16,15
Mocuba	57,91	30,29	45,18	42,74
Mopeia	61,30	28,71	51,01	35,81
Morrumbala	73,21	15,17	65,62	22,66
Nicoadala	53,32	32,35	46,10	36,58
Quelimane	53,01	39,93	48,04	43,30

Sources: STAE (2002) and STAE (2006)

Tambara and Macossa) before the elections of 2004 (Savana, 2005, STV 2011 and key informant interview).²³ There is a coincidence here. Almost all districts listed as priority had voted massively for Renamo in the 1999 elections (Table 7). This suggests that agriculture was used by the Frelimo government as an instrument to capture the rural Renamo electorate. The 2004 election results confirm this. In the Tete province, of the three districts covered by this project, Angónia, Tsangano and Mutarara and that had always previously (1994-1999) voted for Renamo, Tsangano shifted its support to Frelimo and Angonia and Mutarara continued to vote for Renamo in the presidential elections, but with very weak relative majority.

4.3. Populism in the context of international food price crisis: the case of Food Production Plan

In a context where politics plays a key role in priority setting for agricultural policies and where there is limited debate among key stakeholders, Guebuza's arrival in power in 2005 did not change initially the political rhetoric on the prioritization of the agricultural sector as an engine for development and poverty reduction. However, the global food price crisis in 2007 and the sharp rise in fuel prices led the government to conceive a set of measures aimed at increasing national agricultural production, particularly through the Plan of Action for Food Production, 2008 (PAPA).

The PAPA aimed to eliminate the national deficit for major food crops such as wheat and rice, in order to reduce dependence on imports (CEDIMO, 2009), and cassava, potatoes, oilseeds (sunflower and soybeans), considered vital to the Mozambican household consumption (MINAG, 2009). It has been argued, however, that the program was put in place mainly to raise external funds and consolidate the political space of Guebuza and the ruling elite (Mosca, 2011).

In order to show Government's commitment towards PAPA, the 2008/09 agricultural campaign was officially launched across the country under the very visible leadership of the President and Provincial Governors. The implementation of PAPA has involved rehabilitating small irrigation systems and supplying various agricultural inputs and improved seeds to farmers in selected districts. With the aim of increasing local wheat production, for example, priority districts were selected to benefit from the programme's assistance: Tsangano (Tete), Manica and Sussundenga (Manica), Lichinga, Lago, Sanga and Muembe (Niassa), Xai-Xai (Gaza) and Manhiça (Maputo). Wheat seeds were imported and distributed to selected family farmers, including 874 tonnes for the 2008/09 season and 1860 tonnes for the 2009/10 season (MINAG/DNSA, 2010).

However, the discourse of fostering local wheat production to reduce imports proved to be mainly rhetorical and did not produce any tangible results. On the one hand, the areas chosen lacked the agro-ecological conditions for successful wheat production. On the other

hand, government's management of the process failed to consider post-harvest and marketing issues. In fact, the few farmers who ventured into wheat production in these districts failed to find a domestic market for their produce and have instead turned to Malawi (Savana, 2011). According to MINAG, in 2010 the wheat deficit was still high (469,500 tons)²⁴ and not that significantly lower than the deficit recorded in 2008 (537.113 tons).²⁵

In addition, production indexes for most priority crops have not changed and the introduction of fertilizers has not improved the situation in any significant way. According to MINAG, in 2004 only 2% of farmers used fertilizers. This rose to only 3% with the implementation of PAPA (Eurosis, 2010). Lack of support for the risks that small farmers incur when the state does not guarantee the sale of surplus or non-subsidized fertilizers is one of the reasons behind the failure (ibid).

The choice of priority districts for the implementation of the PAPA reveals, in fact, an electoral motivation. The selected districts²⁶ are those that, despite the efforts of the GPZ (as mentioned above), continued to vote for Renamo in 2004. With the abolition of the GPZ in 2005, it became necessary for the Frelimo government to create mechanisms to continue distributing rents to secure the electorate. The extent to which PAPA will continue to be such mechanism is under question, as difficulties of administrative and financial nature are threatening implementation (MINAG / DNSA, 2009). Provinces and districts lack the funds necessary to ensure the handling and distribution of large amounts of seeds distributed by the programme (ibid, 2009). The funds allocated by the government are insufficient and the programme is highly dependent on aid provided mainly by the World Bank and the European Union.²⁷

According to some authors, such aid will produce perverse political effects as it will help to support the party in power and harm the political competition by increasing the importance of donors in the policy-making process (Brito, 2010; Hanlon and de Renzio, 2007). The biggest political problem posed by international aid is that it tends to reduce the level of "accountability" of government to the citizens, instead focusing on accountability to the donors (Brito, 2010). In an alliance with foreign capital (donors), Frelimo determines agricultural policy according to their interests. While these funds are not released, the PAPA is reduced to being a political project of the ruling elites to increase the dependency of the family sector. According to (Mosca, 2011), PAPA lacks a truly developmentalist motivation, but is used by the elite in power to suit its own political interests and also to attract additional external resources from donors.

It is worth also noting that the PAPA experience also brings to light a change in governance style and in the role of the state in the economy. Recent government policies for agriculture unequivocally reveal a more interventionist state, justified by government as result of the need to achieve concrete results in terms of

production and income generation in priority districts. The direct intervention of the President himself in agricultural policy making through the Open Presidency (intense schedule of visits by the President to districts and local administrative posts) is illustrative. In its last Open Presidency, Guebuza visited 44 district headquarters, 29 administrative positions, 17 towns, five cities and two villages, most of which were former Renamo strongholds during the Civil War. This governance mechanism has raised some controversy, not only for being considered a manifestation of populism by Guebuza with an electoral character, but also because it is thought to encourage a "top-down" governance logic which jeopardizes the development of independent governance institutions at a local level (Leininger, 2011). by Mozambican hands." (Diário de Moçambique, 24 June 2011)

5. Conclusion

This paper aimed to analyse why agriculture in Mozambique has failed to emerge as a driver of development and poverty reduction, despite its untapped potential and the fact that it has been consistently prioritised by political discourse since the Independence. Various factors mentioned throughout the text explain why the sector has as a whole misperformed, with some specific exceptions. This study focused on political economy factors and examined how the policy-making process in agriculture has been constrained by the private interests of ruling elites and Frelimo's electoral agenda.

Peace and political competition have failed to improve the agricultural sector's performance in Mozambique in any significant way. Despite the introduction of free multiparty elections in 1994, today's political context is characterised by a strong dominance of the executive over the legislative system, the blurring between state and the Frelimo-government and the growing political and institutional weakness of the main opposition party. This paper illustrates how in this context, the policies adopted (in agriculture and local governance) have served as a mechanism to pursue the political and economic interests of the ruling elite of Frelimo.

There are differences, however, between the strategies adopted by the two post-war leaders of Frelimo in this process. Chissano's leadership focused on co-opting certain social segments that could threaten government stability (narrow selectorate), leading, in agriculture, to a policy of selective neglect. Guebuza's leadership, by contrast, and especially since 2005, opted for a more populist strategy (broader selectorate), particularly with the rural electorate from the Central and Northern

Mozambique. The introduction of OIIL in 2005 and PAPA in 2008 were the most significant policies adopted under the Guebuza leadership with an impact on agriculture. The Open Presidencies were used as a mechanism to connect the President and Frelimo with the rural electorate.

These policies and mechanisms reinforce the economic dependence of the peasantry on the state and the Frelimo party. The neglect by the Frelimo political elites of the agricultural sector, which provides the livelihood to about 70% of the rural population, is related to their social structure and their historical links to the tertiary sector and complete detachment from the dynamics of rural life and peasant production. The rhetorical focus on agriculture by politicians serves as a mechanism to strengthen and legitimize the political domination of Frelimo's southern elite.

There is however the issue of the sustainability of the existing policy strategy in the medium to long term. Renamo's discontentment is visible and recent public addresses by the Renamo leader threaten to break the "political settlement" which emerged from the Peace Agreements. Dhlakama recently said:

"(...) Chissano was a man committed to dialogue and peace, unlike Guebuza, who is only concerned with personal business. [...] Chissano has always struggled for peace for the people of Mozambique, despite some mistakes that were often the problem of his decision-making government system [...] Guebuza is not concerned with the country's development or political stability or with ensuring peace in Mozambique. [...] Guebuza leaves no room for dialogue on the problems the people of Mozambique is facing ..." (Savana, May 20, 2011)

And, on the threat to political stability:

"We have the necessary military and human means, we have thousands of supporters and we are prepared for this unconventional war [...] The men of my party, especially demobilized soldiers, are just waiting for an order to act." (Canal de Moçambique, March 31, 2011)

Are these threats credible and could they endanger the climate of peace? Or will the expansion of patronage networks in rural areas ensure the continuity of the current elite in power and the perpetuation of peasantry's dependency?

End Notes

- ¹ The other countries are: Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda and Tanzania.
- ² It ranks eighth on the 20 poorest countries in the world and 197th out of 210 in the per capita level of income world ranking (World Bank, 2010).
- ³ Mosca (2011) argues that Mozambique is instrumentally presented as a success story by donors wanting to demonstrate the validity of their work and obtain political gains from it.
- ⁴ Calculations done by the author from data obtained, (MINAG/DNSA, 2010). Preliminary Evaluation Report of the agricultural Campaign 2009/2010, Maputo.
- ⁵ M. M. Wuyts, 2001, also states that during the colonial period, agro-ecology and economic dynamics dictated some regional specialization. Thus, in the northern area, sisal, cotton and tobacco were the dominant crops; in the central region, copra, tea and potatoes, and in the South, sugar and rice. In parallel, there was also a specialization between the two sectors, where food crops were typically produced by the peasant class.
- ⁶ Between 1978 and 1982, only 10% of all agricultural investment was made on small farmers and 90% went to state enterprises, mainly for the purchase of equipment, fertilizers and pesticides (Coughlin, 2006).
- ⁷ Tomas Mandlate (2005-2007); Erasmo Muhate (2007-2007); Soares Nhaca (2008 – 2009) and José Pacheco (2010-2011).
- ⁸ For example, Helder Muteia, Minister of Agriculture of the last Joaquim Chissano administration (1999-2004), may have been removed from the Cabinet for being one of the competitors in the internal elections of the Frelimo party in opposition to current President Armando Guebuza.
- ⁹ Mozambique has emerged from the war in a state of total chaos. Approximately one million people had been killed (25% of the medical staff in rural areas) and many infrastructures had been destroyed. According to Mosca (1999), UNICEF estimated that war-related economic losses between 1980 and 1985, approximated \$5.5 billion - equivalent to three years the value of domestic product. The Government did not control the space outside the capital and communications within the country were made only by airplane. The Army was fragmented and national security depended largely on the Zimbabwean troops who guarded only strategic points.
- ¹⁰ Frelimo was funded in 1962 to fight for independence from Portugal. In 1977, after the Independence, it became a political party with a Marxist-Leninist influence. Renamo is a conservative party that opposed Communism and initially benefited from Ian Smith's Rhodesia support.
- ¹¹ Joaquim Chissano was the second leader of Frelimo and the one who signed the peace agreements, along with Afonso Dhlakama, leader of Renamo until today.
- ¹² Interview made by the author with Aguiar Mazula on May 17, 2009, and with Raul Domingos, 19 June 2011.
- ¹³ According to official statistics in 1994, approximately 65% of the Mozambican population and 80% of the poor population lived in the rural areas.
- ¹⁴ It had been the first time that a civic association was created to bring together the Macuas, the largest and most homogenous ethnic Mozambican group. Its legalization showed that there was a sense of ethnic revitalization between the Macuas.
- ¹⁵ It is speculated that Dhlakama may indeed have won the elections. Many of the ballots of the central and northern provinces, where Renamo held a strong foothold, were not accounted for (Cahen 2000 and Carter Center – www.cartercenter.org).
- ¹⁶ Most of the rice production is done in the central region of the country (62%), followed by the northern region (31%) and the south has only 7% of the total production. According to (Cepagri, 2011), there is a correlation between poverty-stricken areas (center) and rice crops. This shows that a rice crop development strategy was important for reducing poverty in the country.
- ¹⁷ Interview with R. de Sousa, June 11 2011.
- ¹⁸ Interviews with Ragendra de Sousa (June 2011) and Carlos Castel-Branco (July 2011).
- ¹⁹ According to MAE, the number of District Advisory Councils grew from 50 in 2005 to 128 district advisory councils, 389 councils of administrative post, and 1042 local post ensuring
- ²⁰ Interview with Castel-Branco, 2011
- ²¹ Community participation in planning and economic and social development and in the decision-making on the implementation of the investment and local initiative budget. See MAE, MAE Presentation to cooperation partners, Maputo, January 2009
- ²² The use of traditional authorities as agents of the colonial state to organize compulsory crops in regions where there was a strong cash crop production by controlling the distribution and use of land, input distribution, marketing control, created a hostile situation between them and the elite who came to the Frelimo leadership, from 1970 onwards. One reason for the hostility towards the chieftains was related to the Frelimo elite's own socio-historical background, since they mostly came from the urban areas of Lourenço Marques and Maputo and were composed of young educated urban and small urban groups. The Frelimo's elite background was completely opposed to the socio-historical background of most traditional chieftains, most of whom were illiterate and with little contact with the urban world. As an author stated, the native segregation implemented by the colonial regime increased the distance between civilized (white, mestizos and assimilated) and the natives and, consequently, the former knew very little about the world of the latter and vice versa (Geffray: 1988). Moreover, many leaders of Frelimo came from.
- ²³ Interview with Sérgio Vieira.
- ²⁴ MINAG/DNSA, 2010.
- ²⁵ Calculation of the author from MINAG/DNSA/DCAP (2009) Preliminary evaluation of the Plan of Action for the Production of Foods, Maputo. ntos, Maputo
- ²⁶ These districts are: Angónia, Tsangano and Macanga in Tete; Caia, Gorongosa and Maringué in Sofala; Barué in Manica; and Chinde, Maganja da Costa, Milange, Mocuba, Mopeia, Morrumbala and Nicoadala in Zambezia
- ²⁷ The actual weight of international aid is even more important considering that other direct budget supporting measures and many sector projects are funded by bilateral donors, besides the other funds injected by foreign and domestic NGOs. According to J. Hanlon and Renzio, it is likely that there are projects with more than 60 bilateral and multilateral donors, including UN agencies, NGOs and 150 international non-governmental organizations throughout Mozambique. Currently, the majority of aid

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