Political Violence in Pakistan: Myths vs. Realities

Politics violence has long been endemic in Pakistan, but the scale, scope, and geographic distribution of the problem has not been systematically studies. This gap poses problems for both policy and academic research. On the policy side, decision makers lack credible quantitative data with which to weigh the relative costs of politically-motivated violence against the many other challenges facing Pakistan. On the academic side, scholars lack the ability to quantitatively assess the role of violence in Pakistani’s political and economic development since the end of the Zia-ul-Haq era in 1988.

To remedy these gaps we developed incident-level data on political violence in Pakistan from 1988 to the present. These data include a range of details on 27,555 incidents to help:

- Identify broad patterns of violence across multiple actors and types of events for each district and province of Pakistan.
- Bring clarity to policy debates over who suffered which kinds of violence, where, and when.
- Inform basic research in political science, sociology, and South Asian studies.

Core policy-relevant questions which can be more effectively-studies using these data include:

- What are the links between electoral politics and violence?
- How does violence affect economic growth and development?
- How does public opinion respond to militant violence?
- Why do political organisations choose different strategies (normal political contestation, violence) at different times and different places?
Findings

Our initial analysis of the new data reveal four key patterns:

- Balochistan, FATA, and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa were peaceful in absolute terms, relative to the rest of Pakistan, until 2004-5. In per-capita terms these regions were roughly as violent as Sindh, though less violent than Punjab.
- Violence of all types increased dramatically in all three areas from 2004-on. The timing of this increase is inconsistent with narratives that lay blame for recent increases in political violence in either: (a) the spread of madrassas (these were around beforehand and are prevalent in areas that have not seen a surge in violence); (b) U.S. involvement in Afghanistan (which started in 2001, though the war there became more intense from 2005 on); or (c) a national anti-state campaign spurred by a state crackdown following the Lal Masjid siege (that would imply a national increase in violence which we do not see, though could be strategic decision by militants not to bring the war to Punjab and Sindh).
- Levels of sectarian violence in Punjab have been relatively consistent for the last 20 years, there is no recent increase.
- Most of Sindh has been quite peaceful; violence in that province is almost entirely concentrated in Karachi.

Each of these patterns has strong policy implications. The remainder of this section discusses each finding and its implications.

Political Violence pre-2005

Geographically, there appear to be two clear patterns in terms of location and time—when and where violence surged and which types of violent acts, actors and groups were involved. In Sindh and Punjab that are economically more developed, more urban and more populous, compared to other provinces and regions, our data indicate violent activity taken a fairly consistent toll over the last twenty years, with minor spikes in some years. Three types of violent activities—assassinations, terrorist attacks (attacks targeting civilians), and riots/demonstrations have occurred in Punjab and Sindh regularly since 1988. The correlation between provinces in the timing of different kinds of violence is low—the bivariate yearly correlation in casualties per capita from terrorism between Punjab and Sindh, for example, is only .12 and is not statistically significant. The correlation within provinces in the timing of different forms of violence is also fairly low in Punjab and Sindh, with the correlation in annual casualties per-capita ranging from .43 for assassinations and terrorism, to only .20 for militant attacks and riots/demonstrations.

Overall levels of violence between 1988-2005 in Balochistan, FATA, and KPK were low in absolute numbers. In per capita terms, given their smaller populations, these areas were roughly as violent as the more populous provinces. From 1988-2005, per-capita violence in Balochistan lay between that in Sindh and Punjab, FATA
suffered more casualties per capita than Punjab or Sindh, and rates of political violence in KPK were lower than in any other province.

If we break the patterns down by type of attack, we see that while rates of violence changed little within provinces before 2005, there were consistent differences between provinces in the forms political violence took.

Assassinations: Assassinations are relatively rare in all provinces except for Sindh where the rate of per capita assassinations is fully three times as high as in Punjab and more than five times as high as Balochistan or the FATA.

Militant Attacks: Even before the massive increase in violence in FATA since 2005, militant attacks took place at a much higher per-capita rate there than anywhere else, roughly three times as often as in Balochistan and more than 10 times as often as in the other three provinces. Sindh suffered few militant attacks (attacks against the security forces), an average of 9 per year causing 609 casualties, as did Punjab which suffered only 14 per year on average. By comparison, FATA and KPK suffered 38 and 25 militant attacks per year on average. Direct challenges to the state security forces, in other words, were rare in Punjab and Sindh.

Violent Riots/Demonstrations: Riots and demonstrations are an endemic fact of political life in Sindh, averaging 122 per year. On a per-capita basis, however, Sindh, FATA, and Balochistan suffer similar rates of casualties from violent demonstrations. As one might expect given the high rates of sectarian conflict in Balochistan, these events are more deadly there, causing roughly 6.1 casualties per incident as compared to 3.4 in Sindh.

Changes in Balochistan, FATA, and KP

Levels of political violence change for the worse after 2005 in Balochistan, FATA, KP and in Balochistan. In Balochistan, militant and terrorist attacks actually start to pick up in 2002-03, well before the rise of militancy in FATA and KPK. This rise is modest in scale compared to FATA and KP—approximately 4-fold—and is specific to two types of acts of violence—attacks by the state forces and attacks by militants. The timing of the change in trends in Balochistan, pre-dating the increase in FATA and KPK by three years, and the nature of the violence, suggest that it represents a different political dynamic.

FATA has long had the highest overall rate of violence per-capita in Pakistan—prior to 2006 it suffered 4.7 casualties per 100,000 per year, compared to 3.9 per 100,000 in Sindh over that period—with the violence distributed roughly evenly between militant attacks, terrorist attacks, and riots/demonstrations. From 2006 onwards though, FATA saw a massive increase in violence, suffering a 20-fold increase in
annual casualties to a shocking 100 per 100,000 per year. This increase reflects the outlier war between the state and militants in FATA, with the rates of state-initiated and militant attacks both rising more than 12-fold, and is reflected to a lesser extent in other types of violence.

Tragic as the changes in FATA have been, the change in KPK has been even more striking. Before 2005 KPK was the least violent part of Pakistan, suffering only .9 casualties per 100,000 per year from political violence, compared to 3.3 per 100,000 per year in the rest of the country. After 2005, KPK saw a 14-fold increase in casualties from political violence, becoming the second-most violent part of the country. This reversal, going from the least politically-violent region to the second most violent, was driven by the massive 46-fold increase in militant attacks (and concomitant state response) which largely reflects the campaign to contest Swat and Malakand.

To summarize, our data accord with what might be thought of as common-sense observation. Since 2005 there has been some militarization of violent contestation in Balochistan; a war has been fought in the FATA, rending an already violent region more violent; and the previously stable province of KPK has faced high levels of political violence for the first time, albeit in a concentrated manner.

Sectarian Violence in Punjab

Sectarian violence in Punjab, Pakistan’s economic heartland and most-populous province, has been an increasing concern in policy circles since the Lal Masjid siege in (July 3-11, 2007). Contrary to much commentary, our data suggest levels of violence in Punjab have not substantially increased in the last few years. Table 2 highlights the fact that while riots and demonstrations have become more frequent in Punjab since 2005, other forms of political violence have actually become a bit less frequent.

While the absolute numbers have not increased, the toll from militant and terrorist attacks in Punjab has increased dramatically, due almost entirely to the increasing deadliness of such attacks. Since 2005 the average toll per militant attack in Punjab has increased by more than 1000%, while that for terrorist attacks has more than doubled.

Sectarian violence in Punjab has not been abnormally high in recent years in terms of the number of incidents, it was in fact higher in the late 1990s than today. Figure 1 shows the patterns of sectarian attacks over time in Punjab, in terms of both the number of attacks and the number of casualties. While the number of deaths from sectarian violence has been much higher in 2010 than in previous years, sectarian violence in Punjab reached similar levels in 1999.

Distribution of Violence in Sindh
Sindh leads rest of the provinces in assassinations by a wide margin, reporting 4,182 assassinations causing 6,357 casualties. Both casualty figures are much higher than the larger province Punjab. In per capita terms, Sindh has the largest concentration of assassination, even taking into account the recent trend of drone strikes in FATA.

Strikingly, these assassinations as well as other kinds of political violence in Sindh are heavily concentrated in Karachi. Of all the violent incidents in Sindh 63% of them took place in Karachi that includes 70% of assassinations, and 66% of terrorist attacks. Incidents in Karachi are substantially more deadly than in the rest of Sindh; 93% of the casualties in Sindh take place in Karachi. This ethnically-diverse, mega industrial city has long been a centre of contestation among political groups maintaining militant wings. Ethnic violence in Karachi, moreover, often creates cycles of reactive violence by political parties and Sindhi nationalist groups.

Conclusions

- Political violence has been part of the political culture of Punjab and Sindh for decades now. There has not been a fundamental change in the patterns of political violence in the core population centers of Pakistan.
- Riots/demonstrations are far more prevalent phenomenon in Punjab and Sindh than in other two provinces and FATA in absolute terms, but on a per-capita basis the rates of violence are similar.
- The recent increase in violence in FATA, KPK, and somewhat in Balochistan are uncharacteristic of their historical patterns. For the first 15 years of our data collection 1989-2004/5, these regions were no more violent than other parts of Pakistan.
- The clustering of violence varies tremendously across Pakistan. In Sindh, the vast majority of incidents take place in Karachi, there is little reported violence in the interior/rural parts of the province. In contrast, violence in Punjab appears to be much more scattered.

Policy implications

1. It will be useful to study trends in types of violence, and when and where they have taken place to have a nuanced understanding of this challenge. As we have shown in the big trends, we cannot paint the whole country either black or white, but rather will have to look at it more carefully by asking ourselves two questions; why at some periods some regions have been more peaceful than at other times, and why suddenly some pattern of violent political activity began to take shape in some places that had been stable and peaceful for decades. Informed by this type of empirical research, the Pakistan state and foreign states may formulate a focused outlook on political violence and develop appropriate strategies to deal with each type of violence in different regions of the country.
2. There is no clear macro-level relationship between political violence and economic growth and development in Pakistan. Establishing any co-relations between economic growth and violence requires further study.

3. Going by the scale of violence and the years when surges took place, Pakistan doesn’t represent as chaotic a situation as it appears to generally have in the popular media here and abroad. There are many factors that have contributed to the troubled image of Pakistan; political violence has added a bit, and it is just one among many.

Table 1. Population and Mean Annual Violence by Province, 1988-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>Sindh</th>
<th>KPK</th>
<th>Balochistan</th>
<th>FATA</th>
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<tr>
<td>Population (1,000s)</td>
<td>75403</td>
<td>31074</td>
<td>18110</td>
<td>6743</td>
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<td>Assassinations (Casualties/1,000)</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Militant Attacks (Casualties/1,000)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>234</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terrorist Attacks (Casualties/1,000)</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>113</td>
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<tr>
<td>Riots/Demonstrations (Casualties/1,000)</td>
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<td>404</td>
<td>95</td>
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<td>128</td>
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<tr>
<td>State-Initiated (Casualties/1,000)</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>176</td>
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Table 2. Political Violence in Punjab

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<td>Ratio</td>
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<td>Incidents</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Ratio</td>
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### Table 3. Overall Summary Statistics for Violence, 1988-2010

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<th>Variable</th>
<th>Incidents</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Mean / Event</td>
<td>S.D. / Event</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Mean / Event</td>
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<td><strong>Panel A: All Pakistan, 1988-2010</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Panel B: Balochistan, 1988-2010</strong></td>
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Note: Source for all data is a review of the *Dawn*, the largest circulation English-language daily newspaper in Pakistan, for every day from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2010. Totals for “All of Pakistan” include incidents in Gilgit-Baltistan, AJK, and incidents that cannot be geo-located. Category of “All Incidents” includes figures for hard-to-categorize events that do not fit in the other categories.

1 Includes 183 drone attacks.
Figure 1. Sectarian Violence in Punjab

Sectarian Violence in Punjab
1988-2010

Total Incidents per Year

Total Casualties per Year

Figure 2. Trends Across Time

Consequences of Non-State Violence
1988-2010

Balochistan  FATA  KP  Punjab  Sindh

Assassinations

Note: Source for all data is a review the *Dawn*, the largest circulation English-language daily newspaper in Pakistan, for every day from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2010. Coding rules for categories found in codebook in Appendix B.
Figure 3. Trends Across Time – Per-Capitized

Consequences of Non-State Violence
1988-2010

Note: FATA excluded for scaling purposes.
Appendix A: BFRS Codebook

Codebook for BFRS Dataset of Political Violence in Pakistan

Background

The BFRS Dataset of Political Violence in Pakistan contains incident-level data on political violence in Pakistan from January 1988 to December 2010 based on press reporting. Political violence is defined as any publicly reported act that: (1) is aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goals; (2) entails some level of violence or threat of violence—including property violence, as well as violence against people; and (3) intentional – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator. This may include but is not limited to: terrorist attacks, riots, assassinations, and full-scale military operations.

For each incident we record a standard set of variables including:

- Date, time, and location using a standard place-name gazetteer. Events will be geo-coded to the smallest feasible administrative unit given the reporting (e.g. for Quetta district report union council if possible).
- Type of event (terrorist, ethnic riot, violent political demonstration, etc.)
- Number killed and injured
- Party responsible
- Target and method of attack
- Source, including saving .pdf file of source when possible

Because many press reports do not explicitly allow a determination of whether an incident is political, the data include all incidents not positively identified as apolitical. The data include covariates which allow analysts desiring a more stringent inclusion criteria to filter out ambiguous incidents.

Basic Entry Ground Rules

Each day of the major English-language daily in Pakistan, The Dawn, from January 1, 1988, through December 31, 2010, was reviewed by a team operating out of the Lahore University of Management Sciences. A random 10% sample of weeks in that
period was independently coded by a team operating at the University of Chicago. A random sample of 10% of weeks in the sample period was also taken from the Daily Jang, the largest Urdu-language daily in Pakistan.

**EVENT DETAILS**

**Location.** Records the location exactly as given in the newspaper. ‘Location’ refers to the smallest unit given. E.g. if it says the house of Muhammad Ali was attacked, this would show up as “Private Residence of Muhammad Ali”. If the report is more specific than that, e.g. “House number 31-J, Model Town was attacked...” this would show up in the Location field as “House number 31-J, Model Town”. If the report is vague in specifying the location, e.g. if it says “There was a bomb blast in Badian area” then this would show up in the Location field as “Badian area”. The district/tehsil (if mentioned in the report) would be entered using the drop down menus in the respective fields.

In the formal field use the pull-down menus to select the smallest geographic unit possible.

**Town_City.** The name as given in the newspaper.

**Village.** The name as given in the newspaper.

**Province.** The present-day province. With the exception of Malakand, which was an agency until 1970 and now is a part of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP, formerly NWFP), there have been no other major changes in the provincial boundaries of Pakistan.

**District (Reported).** When listed. List the name listed exactly as in the press report. Not all articles will provide district names for events.

**District (Changed).** The present-day district. This can be the proper name for the reported district or can be inferred using the information in the report.
E.g. “…happened in Orangi Town.” Orangi town is a town in the northwest part of Karachi that has suffered a tremendous amount of ethnic violence.). Districts have been reorganized several times since 1947 and we use the mapping as of September 2010. In the Federally Administered Tribal Areas the Agency in which an incident happened is recorded in the District (Changed) field.

**Tehsil.** The present-day tehsils.

**Year.** Year in which the event took place.

**Month.** Month in which the event took place. If it takes place in two months, enter “May, June”

**Day - Start.** The day on which the event was reported to have begun. In some cases, the report does not indicate the day on which the event occurred. In these cases, the day will be coded as one day prior to the publication date of the article from which the event was recorded.

**Day – End** The Day on which the event ended

**Duration.** Count from the beginning of the event to the last day on which violence occurred. If there was a period during which violence subsided for a day or more, this event will be coded as two separate cases. (e.g. June 1-7, June 9-12). For those coding a random sample, if duration is not applicable (i.e. if the even last longer than the week you are coding), enter “99.”

**Number killed/injured.** The number of people reported to have been killed during the event. If there is uncertainty about these numbers, this will be reported in the “notes” field.

**Number killed/injured – high.** This number will reflect discrepancies in the numbers of individuals reported killed or injured, particularly when using information on the same attacks from multiple sources.
Number killed/injured – low. This number will reflect discrepancies in the numbers of individuals reported killed or injured, particularly when using information on the same attacks from multiple sources.

Victims Killed/Injured Adjusted from Later Reports. This number reflects any changes made in the newspaper to the number killed. For example, if an initial article reports that ten people were killed and then a week or two later, the paper reports that 15 were killed. The value in the “adjusted” field reflects this change.

Number Arrested: The number of people reported arrested in relationship to the incident. Where a range is given (e.g. “More than 100 people were arrested following clashes...” use the lower bound given for the range.

EVENT TYPE & CHARACTERISTICS

Event. Each incident of violence is coded as involving one of the following types of violence:

Terrorism. Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)).

For example, the attack on the Data Ganj Baksh shrine is such an example as the victims were primarily intended to be noncombatants. In contrast, an attack on a police check point is not considered to be terrorism even if civilians are harmed in the conduct of the attack provided that the primary target was the check point. This is coded as an attack on police, paramilitary or military target. The intended targets of the attacks is key.

Riot/Violent Political Demonstration: A riot is a violent clash between two or more groups. Neither group can be a state force.

For example, the students of the Lal Masjid versus the police would not be considered a riot, it would be a Violent Political Demonstration. However, if there are two or more clashes around a
single event in which the police are involved, then it would be classified as a riot.

**Violent Political Demonstration:** A violent political demonstration is characterized as mobilization of crowds in response to a political event that at some point becomes violent. Violence may be initiated by the crowd or by the police upon the crowd.

In cases where a group of protesters clashes with the police, the group that is responsible for mobilization will be coded under ‘Party Responsible’, regardless of who starts the violence. This is because the involvement of the police is already captured in the ‘Intercepted’ and ‘Police Involvement’ fields.

**Assassination:** An attempt (successful or failed) by a non-state entity aimed to kill a specific individual. Targets may include military, political, civil society or civilian state or federal leadership. In some case, there may be a suspected government agency behind the assassination. If so, indicate this in the other field.

Note: This field is used to denote the ‘Event’ when a body is found with bullet wounds or other marks of violence and/or torture. If no further details are given then ‘Event Type’, ‘Reported Cause’ and ‘Party Responsible’ will be ‘Unknown’

**Assassination (Drone attack):** An assassination (failed or successful attempt) carried out using an unmanned aerial vehicle (drone strike).

**Conventional Attacks on Military, Police, Paramilitary and Intelligence:** Incidents that involve a direct conventional attack on a military, police, paramilitary, or intelligence target, such that violence has the potential to be exchanged between the attackers. This includes but is not limited to: attacks against military checkposts, police headquarters, the Federal Investigative Agency (FIA), the ISI. Conventional attacks include ambushes, direct fire, artillery, pitched battle, and troop captures. Conventional tactics are those that would be employed by state forces and are in contrast to “guerilla” tactics described below.

**Guerilla Attacks on Military, Police, Paramilitary and Intelligence:** Incidents that involve a guerilla-like attack (e.g., a car or suicide-bombing, a kidnapping) on a military, police, paramilitary, or intelligence target. Guerilla attacks employ tactics that conventional forces do not. For example, guerilla attacks will employ road-side bombs, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide attacks (e.g. on a checkpoint), car bombs and the like.
Military, Paramilitary or Police Attack on non-state combatants: Violence initiated by state (federal or provincial) combatants against combatant non-state, sub-national groups, or clandestine agents.

For example, these may be brief episodes such as the Pakistan Army and Police assault on the Lal Masjid OR they may be sustained as the ongoing army offensive in South Waziristan or the Frontier Corps in Aurakzai.

Military, Paramilitary or Police – Selective Violence: Violence initiated by state (federal or provincial) combatants against civilians.

These may include incidents where a newspaper reports that a political activist is picked up by the intelligence services and detained and beaten overnight (e.g. “Advocate Ghulam Nabi of the Peshawer High Court was allegedly picked up by personnel of an intelligence agency in three vehicles near the NWFP assembly, and released after a severe overnight thrashing. He is associated with Jamaat-i-Islami and a critic of the army and intelligence agencies.” 14 September 2007.)

Threat of Violence: Incidents in which the threat of violence is reported as being used for political purposes.

A typical example is when a spokesman for a banned militant group threatens attacks if certain policy changes were not made, or when a party spokesman threatens violent protest if certain changes are not made. This also includes incidents in which a particular individual is threatened (e.g. “The President of the All Pakistan Clerks Association...alleged that he had received a phone call warning him of an explosion at his house.” 30 May 1991).

Event Type. Most events can be further described as:

Communal: Event occurs between two or more communally identified groups (e.g. Hindu vs. Muslim).

Sectarian: Event occurs between at least two groups defined by their sects (e.g. Ahmediya vs. Sunni). When it was obvious from the context of the event that it was sectarian in nature, it was coded as such.

Ethnic: Event takes place between at least two groups of persons of distinct ethnic identity (e.g. Mohajir vs. Baloch).
**Tribal**: Event takes place between at least two groups that are defined by their tribal affiliations. In the case of tribal clashes there can often be other motives underlying the event. What is reported as a clash between two tribes based on old enmity, might actually be the result of one tribe having affiliations with the provincial/federal government and thus being favored by the latter. In other cases it might be a dispute over land (since tribal boundaries are informal). In these cases the defining feature of each group is the relation of its identity (the tribe) to the government or the land.

**Islamist**: Event takes place if the group(s) are mobilized primarily upon their Muslim-ness. This is usually facilitated by an Islamist political party, a mosque, a specific religious leader. For example, a violent demonstration around the defamation of the Prophet [PBUH] would be an Islamist riot whereas a riot over the price of pyaz is not.

**Political**: Event takes place when political demonstrations or meetings turn violent or when violence is between political parties (e.g. recent MQM vs. PPP violence in Karachi).

**Politico-Economic**: Events in which organized gangs extort money, property and goods from residents of a given area, usually on a regular basis, and where the interaction between the assailants and the victims involves more than just snatch and grab robbery or theft. For example, gangs in Sindh periodically coerce villagers and town residents to give them money in return for providing ‘protection’. What sets this apart from robbery/theft is the systematic attempt to fill the power vacuum left by the absence of state/police authority in a given locality.

**Food and Water**: Event is motivated by shortages of food and/or water, problems with distribution, prices, hoarding, and government subsidies.

**Public Services**: Event is motivated by discontent over public service delivery, such as the lack of electricity, infrastructural problems, and poor public transport.

**Fuel Supply/Price**: Covers violence that stems from discontent over the price or supply of fuel (petrol, diesel, CNG), electricity, or natural gas (locally known as Sui gas). Protests over electricity shortages have also been coded under this category.

**Aggregated Report**: This is not an event type in itself, but is used to ensure that data is not lost due to incomplete or vague reporting. This is specifically used in cases where an overall death/injury toll is stated but it is not broken down by incident. The following are examples of aggregated reports:
If the report claims that the total number of deaths in violence across a location is 50 but the individual incidents only add up to 40, then a final entry in that series was added that has ‘Aggregated Report’ in the Event Type field and the difference (i.e. 10 in this case) in the Number Killed field.

If the report claims that the death toll has risen to 100 after the 4th day of rioting in Karachi but the entries on the code sheet for the 4 days only add up to 90, a new entry will be made that has Aggregated Report in the Event Type field and 10 in the Number Killed field. This will be at the end of the series of all related incidents that have been coded and will require the coder to first add up the total number of deaths that have been entered across the 4 days of violence and calculate the difference.

**Occurred.** Yes, No, or N/A.

This refers to whether the attacks actually occurred. For example, if a man was caught with 1000 lbs of explosives, it is clear that an attack was planned, but it did not occur.

**Successful.** Yes, No, or N/A.

This refers to the whether or not the attacker hit their intended target. For example, this would be coded as “No” when a suicide bomber detonates early.

**Intercepted.** Yes, No, or N/A.

Records whether the attack/attacker was intercepted by police or military forces.

**Reported Cause.** The purpose of this section is to identify general categories under which events can be grouped. This field should report only what is directly referenced in the article from which the event is coded. When a reported cause does not adequately describe the event, it will be coded “other” and the cause will be described in the in the Notes section.
*There are cases in which the article does clearly identity the reported cause, or the coder feels uncertain about the reported cause. In this case, Uncertain Cause will be coded “Yes” and the appropriate Probable Cause will be selected.

When there is more than one cause reported, the causes are mentioned in the “Description” field and prioritized to fill in the relevant fields. This prioritization is based on the sources given. E.g. If official sources and eye-witnesses differ on the reported cause, then we use the official source to fill in the sheet and add the eye-witness account to the description, in addition to the official report. For example, when the newspaper quotes figures for number killed/injured/arrested but then goes on to quote, in the same report, different figures that ISPR (or some military or police official) have provided. In such cases information provided by the ISPR will be prioritized.

The following causes are provided in the list:

- Private quarrel between 2 political actors
- Previous Disputes
- Public Rituals/Festivities (Moharram)
- Construction of a Place of worship
- Quarrels over Women (Honor Killings)
- Allegations on unpatriotic Acts
- Attacks on a Place of Worship (going to a shrine, Juma prayers)
- Construction/Attempted Construction (Place of Worship)
- Construction/Attempted Construction (Private Sector)
- Construction/Attempted Construction (Public Sector)
- Desecration of a Religious Site/ Symbol (e.g. facebook, Danish cartoon incident)
- Allegations of Non-Islamic Acts (e.g. Valentine’s Day)
- Economic Interest (Land)
- Economic Interest (Other)
- Legal Demolition/Attempted Legal Demolition (Place of Worship)
- Legal Demolition/Attempted Legal Demolition (Private Sector)
- Legal Demolition/Attempted Legal Demolition (Public Sector)
- Political (Agitation)
- Political (Factional Fighting)
- Political (Other)
- Political (Personal Law): This refers to disputes over what the laws should be regarding personal issues such as appropriate rights for women, inheritances, wedding regulations, etc....
- Political elections (NA)
- Political elections (PA)
- Political elections (LG)
- Previous Violence (communal)
- Previous violence (ethnic)
- Previous violence (sectarian)
- Previous violence (political)
- Previous violence (other)
- Protest against police action/inaction
- Protest against government action/inaction
- Reaction to military operations
- Violent exchanges across the Line of Control
- Targeting militants and terrorists
- Reaction to the government's support for U.S. Military and NATO forces fighting in Afghanistan
- Reaction to government action/inaction in Baluchistan
- Afghan Soviet War
- Unknown
- Other

Uncertain Cause: Yes, No, N/A

If the article clearly states the cause of the event, then this will be coded as “No.” In some cases the coder will have knowledge about the event or the context in which the event occurred. If the coder inferred the cause of the event, then this will be coded “Yes” and the Probable Cause field below will be filled in.

Probable Cause. Because each coder handled consecutive periods they developed substantial subject-matter expertise. When the Reported Cause is ambiguous and the coder is able to infer the cause of the event from this expertise (e.g. when an event is part of a long-running campaign over a particular issue in one location) then this field will be coded to reflect the inference made about the cause of the event. The list of causes is the same list as the Reported Cause field.

Police Involvement. Yes, No
In some cases, the police will get involved. If this is the case, indicate this with the pull down menu. This will be coded as “yes” if the police perpetrated the attacks, retaliated violently to an attack, or intervened by using force in a clash between other groups. This will be coded as “no” if they were victims of a guerrilla attack (e.g. a suicide bomber attacked a military checkpost, but if the police intercepted the suicide bomber and preemptively shot him, then it would be “yes.”)

**Party Responsible.** Reports the party responsible for the incident and is reported from the press report. Where an informed reader was able to clearly infer a party responsible (e.g. when a report on the third day of ethnic violence in Karachi refers to “militias”, that inference is recorded). This inference is necessary as press reports in Pakistan often omit contextual information that would be clear to a regular reader and is thus understood by experienced coders.

We record the following categories for **Party Responsible:**

*Civil Society Group / Campaign Group* – Groups that exist for a particular political cause but are: (a) not part of a political party; and (b) not organized along occupational lines. (E.g. “Left-wing political activists and civil society members… lodge a symbolic demonstration against the military operation in Balochistan. The demonstration was organized by Balochistan Solidarity Front (BSF).” 10 September 2006.)

*Foreign Party* – Any force endorsed by a state or group of states other than Pakistan. The geographical location of the perpetrator is not an indicator. (E.g. “A US drone hit a non-functional school rented to a militant outfit named Al-Bader.” 13 September 2008.) We divide foreign party into four parties responsible:

- United States
- India
- Afghanistan
- Multilateral (e.g. NATO)

*Gang* – Armed groups involved in activities that would normally be affiliated with violent crime. (E.g. “An armed gang of land-grabbers attacked the workers of Arif Abdul Qadir Textile Mill and took over the property after injuring several workers who resisted.” 10 January 1998.) In Pakistan such incidents often relate to systematic banditry, which is a challenge to state authority, and are included.
**Informal Group** – No reported affiliation to an established political organization and the use of violence does not meet the criteria for militancy. Includes ad hoc groups that use violence, or threaten to use violence in reference to a specific event as well as incidents where the motivation for the event is unreported. We divide the informal group category into three types of groups:

- **Informal Group (Ethnic)** - Where the group acts on the perceived interests of an identified ethnic group. (E.g. “Baloch youths in Hub beat up Urdu speaking factory workers on the main Hub Road….were protesting against the murders of their community members in Karachi.” 29 June 1995.)
- **Informal Group (Islamist/Sectarian)** – Where the group acts on the perceived interests of Islam or a particular sect within Islam or another religion. (E.g. “2 people were injured in a clash between two groups of Christians at the Annual meeting of the Lahore Churches Council.” 28 April 1991.)
- **Informal Group (Other)** – Where the identity and the political aim of the group is not known but the nature of the incident does not meet the standards for militancy. (E.g. “Residents set fire to a public transport company bus after it hit and injured a boy. 28 July 2003.)

**Intelligence Agency** – Rarely identified by name in reports. Reports usually list “an intelligence agency.”

**Militants** – Organized armed groups that use violence against civilians and the state in pursuit of pre-defined political goals. Militant groups use violence in ways that have two elements: (a) pre-determined and planned; and (b) uses weapons and tactics attributed to sustained conventional or guerilla warfare and not to spontaneous violence. Includes lower-level violence attributed to militant group. We divide the militant category into three types of groups:

- **Militants (Ethnic)** – Where the stated or implied political aim is safeguarding the perceived interests of a defined ethnic group against alleged suppression or atrocities. Includes explicitly secessionist groups as well as groups using violence to cause change within the existing governance structures of the Pakistani state (e.g. BLA, BRA, SLF, SPLF). (E.g. “A rocket was fired at the Ghori Nullah checkpost in Dera Bugti. Balochistan Liberation Army has claimed responsibility of the attack.” 17 March 2006.)
- **Militants (Islamist/Sectarian)** – Where the stated or implied political aim of the group is the establishment of an Islamic system if

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2 Some groups shift over time from a separatist agenda to advocating change within Pakistan. These are coded throughout as separatist.
punishment to deter perceived un-Islamic acts (e.g. anti-Shia militants). (E.g. “An explosive-laden car was detonated very close to a police checkpoint….TTP spokesman Azam Tariq claimed responsibility for the attack...” 29 April 2010.)

- **Militants (Other)** – Where the identity and the political aim of the group is not known, but the nature of the incident allows us to infer that the group involved is militant in nature as defined above (e.g. “A high-intensity bomb...”).

**Military/Paramilitary** – Official armed forces of Pakistan, e.g. Air Force, Army, Navy. Named paramilitary forces including the Frontier Corps, Rangers, and various provincial levies.

**Police** – Official police organization, including municipal police and Federal Investigation Agency.

**Political Party** – Party leadership, party members, party activists, party supporters. Includes clashes within one party (“11 people were injured in clash between supporters or former PPP minister...and MNA...” March 21, 2011). Coded as such when press report notes affiliates of a specific political party being responsible.

**Professional Union/Alliance** – All incidents attributed to people of a particular occupational category. Includes both formal/registered unions and temporary/informal alliances formed for specific causes. Examples include coordinated protests by clerks, doctors, teachers, shopkeepers, lawyers, and others. (E.g. “Scores of traders and shopkeepers staged a demonstration to protest against power outages...” 8 September 2010.)

**Religious Party** – Political groups organized around religion, both Christianity and Islam. This includes only groups that are affiliated with an organized religious party such as ASS. Does NOT include militant religious outfits such as the SSP and LJ who would be coded as ‘Militants (Islamist/Sectarian).’

**Student Group** – Groups of students, including student unions and university student councils that are endorsed by a political/sectarian/ethnic or communal group. Includes temporary committees formed by students e.g. Student Action Committee (SAC) during the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. Does not include incidents that are of either: (a) a personal nature; or (b) strictly limited to academic concerns such as exam grading standards. (E.g. “The students of a local degree college ransacked the Wapda office in protest over the unscheduled and prolonged spells of loadshedding in the area.” 7 January 2003.)
Tribal group – The group responsible is acting primarily out of affiliation or obligation to a named tribal group. This category includes both events attributed to organized tribal military formations (e.g. “A convoy of 70 vehicles was attacked and looted by Bugti tribesmen...” 1 January 2000) and those attributed loosely to a tribe (e.g. “Rival transporters from the warring tribes of Jakhrani and Mari clashed...” 4 January 1998).

Unaffiliated Individual – When the individual is not affiliated with any known social, political or religious group. This has most frequently been used in honor killing cases where the assailants are usually family members or relatives. (E.g. “A man axed his sister to death over honour. 4 August 2001.”)

Unknown – Used for incidents in which there is no information on who is responsible (individual vs. group), or where the report does not allow one to distinguish whether the group has any affiliation. Also used for incidents without any details on the nature of the violence. This includes events that may be criminal or political, but the report does not allow one to distinguish. This category thus captures a large number of events that are likely to be criminal in nature.

**Note that incidents in which the party responsible is not reported in any meaningful way that involve clear attacks on the state and its agents that meet the criteria for militant attack are coded as “Militants (Unknown).” (E.g. “A man, Mohammad Akhtar, was found shot dead in Taiser Town. 29 July 2009.”)

Other – All incidents that cannot be classified as above.

Military, paramilitary involvement. Records whether military and/or paramilitary forces were involved. Coded as “yes” if the military/paramilitary forces perpetrated the attacks, retaliated violently to an attack, or intervened by using force in a clash between other groups. Coded as “no” if they were victims of a guerrilla attack (E.g. a suicide bomber attacked a military checkpost. If police intercepted the suicide bomber and preemptively shot him, then it would be “yes.”).

**SOURCE INFORMATION**

Publication. Records the source of the report, including the edition and section.
**Title.** Records the title of the article. Many articles contain information on multiple incidents.

**Source Dates.** Records the date of the press report. For incidents described on more than one enter using the day-month-year format as follows “01-MAR-93, 24-JUL-93”.

**Page:** Records pages on which the article appears separated by a semi-colon.

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**ADDITIONAL DETAILS**

**Description.** A brief two or three sentence description of the incident. This information includes additional information used in making the probable cause determination.

**Notes.** A brief description of any questions about the incident, uncertainty about the consequences, or other information useful for putting the incident in context.

**Coding Issues.** Provides the following standardized codes to reflect uncertainty in the coding process, primarily in cases when two options could apply.

- Problem identifying event.
- Problem identifying event type.
- Problem with reported cause.
- Problem with party responsible. For example when the report contains some information but is not conclusive.
- Unclear if the event should be included. Used for events that are clearly identified as criminal in nature.
- Uncertain location. Used when incident was reported on a border or when location information in the press report appears to be incorrect or conflicts with other sources.
APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL NOTES

The Pakistan Taliban. A range of groups have been broadly characterized since 2008 or so as being ‘Taliban’, TTP, TNSM, etc. There are many incidents that can be attributed to these groups based on contextual knowledge, however the original press reports on these incidents rarely record the specific group involved, rather they refer to “…an attack by miscreants today in...”. We record these incidents as being attributable to Militants (Islamist/Sectarian) when the incident report specifically identifies such a group as being responsible.

APPENDIX B: KNOWN BIASES

As with any effort to collect incident-level information, there is a range of potential biases in these data. We record those incidents here to allow those using these data to make considered decisions about further coding and robustness checks, taking into account the subject-matter expertise of our coding team to the maximum extent possible.

- In the FATA and parts of Karachi the press are not particularly independent. This often meant that parties responsible were not reported, only implied, out of fear of retribution. During the mid-1990s, for example, there was an intense campaign by the state against militias affiliated with the MQM party, which was then known as the Mohajir Qaumi Movement reflecting its ethnic identity. A typical report from that period, for example, states that “The ongoing 'terrorism' continued as armed youths that were being chased by the police took refuge in a private school...” (1 December 1995). To the informed reader at the time it would have been clear this incident related to a clash between state forces and MQM activists.
- In the FATA and KP regions the media is often lacking information on casualties. Details on events in FATA and KP are often limited to second-hand reporting based on official press briefing. Reports often describe different casualty figures given by local independent sources. The official number is recorded in the data and the _Low or _High variables are only reported when a specific number is given.
- In the 1990s the party responsible is often not reported, for example “members of a specific ethnic group” is sometimes used when referring to violence in Karachi. We coded only based on what was explicitly in the news report and incorporate the contextual knowledge in the probable cause field.
Press reporting from FATA and KP increased substantially once the war in Afghanistan started, which means there was inevitably an increase in the proportion of violent incidents in these regions that makes it into the data.

When high-casualty events happen, other smaller events that would not normally make it into the national press, are often reported.

**APPENDIX C: Missing Dates**

There are a few missing dates from the archives in both Pakistan and the United States.

**APPENDIX C: GROUP CODINGS**

This appendix lists specific groups, which appear repeatedly in the data, provides an acronym for each, and reports how each group was coded under *Party Responsible*. Future revisions will provide brief summaries of each group. In general where a group’s mode of political action changes, we code them as being the most violent type of group they were during the period (E.g. the JKLF starts out conducting mostly militant attacks and then shifts into political activity. We code them as Militants (Ethnic) throughout.). The following list specifies groups coded under each category.

**Militants (Islamist/Sectarian)**

- ‘Arab Militants’
- ASWJ - Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (formerly SSP)
- Al-Qaeda
- Ansar-ul-Islam
- Asian Tigers
- Baitullah Mehsud Group (TTP)
- Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group (alliance with Baitullah Mehsud of TTP)
- Hafiz Saeed (TTP)
- Hakimullah Mehsud Group (TTP)
- Hizb-i-Islami (Hikmatyar group)
- Hizbul Mujahideen
- Islambouli Brigades of Al-Qaeda
- Islami Tehrik
- Jaish-i-Islami
- Jaish-i-Muhammad
- Jamat Ul Tawheed Wal Jihad
- Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD)
- Jundallah
- Karwan-i-Mohammad Bin Musli-ma Al Farooq-i-Azam
- Lal Masjid Brigade
- LI: Lashkar-e-Islam
- LJ: Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
- LeT: Lashkar-e-Tayyaba
- Taliban or Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP): Taliban groups have often been identified based on the area that they operate in, e.g. Mohmand Taliban or Malakand Taliban.
- Mujahideen Islam Buraq
- Mujahideen-i-Khalq Organisation
- Mullah Toofan Group (TTP)
- Sipah-i-Muhammad or Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP)
- SSP: Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (Also known as ASWJ)
- Tanzim Ittehad-i-Ulema Bara
- Tariq Afridi Group (TTP)
- TJP: Tehrik-i-Jafaria Pakistan -(Also called Islami Tehrik Pakistan)
- TNFJ: Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqah-i-Jafria
- TNS or TNSM: Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi
- TTP: Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

Tribal Group

- Abdullahzai
- Adezai Qaumi Lashkar
- Astrand tribe
- Bangash
- Banglani
- Bhutto tribe
- Bozdar
- Brohi tribe
- Bugi
- Buledo
- Buriro
- Chachar
- Chandio tribe
- Channa
- Chauutra
- Dawar
- Deera
- Dhar pali
- Dinhani
- Domki
- Ghetto
- Jafar
- Jagirani
- Jallali
- Jamali
- Jat
- Jatak
- Jatoi
- Kaleri
- Khankhel tribe
- Khaskhel
- Khokhar
- Khoso
- Lakho
- Lashari
- Lashari
- Machi
- Magsi
- Mahar
- Mandokhel
- Mangal
- Manhar
- Marri tribe
- Mashori
- Mashtikhel tribal lashkar
- Masoozai
- Mastoi
- Mehsud
- Mirani
- Mohammad Hasni tribe
- Mughari Tribe
- Murri tribe
- Narejo
- Naunari
- Oghahi
- Oghani
- Patafi
- Qaisarani
- Qambrani
- Rajper
- Sabzoi
- Sahak
- Salarzai Lashkar
- Samakzai
• Shaikh
• Shodazai
• Sinhani
• Smazai
• Solangi
• Sooho
• Talpur
• Tanzim-i-Ittehad-i-Ulema Qabali
• Teghani
• Tori
• Ujjian
• Umranli
• Unnar Tribe
• Wazir
• Zardari tribe

**Militants (Ethnic)**

- BLA: Baloch Liberation Army
- BLUF: Baloch Liberation United Front
- BNM: Baloch National Movement
- BRA: Baloch Republican Army
- JKL: Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front
- Mullah Abdul Salam 'Rockety' group
- National Liberation Movement
- SLA: Sindhudesh Liberation Army
- SLF: Sindh Liberation Front
- SLM: Sindh Liberation Movement
- SNLF: Sindh National Liberation Front
- SNLM: Sindh National Liberation Movement

**Religious Parties**

- Anjuman Sipah-i-Sahaba (ASS)
- Dawat-i-Islami
- JAH: Jamiat Ahle-Hadith
- JI: Jamaat-e-Islami
- JUI: Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam
- JUI-F: Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (Fazal)
- JUI-N: Jamiat-e-Uleam-e-Islam (Noorani)
- JUP: Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan
- MMA: Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
- MYC: Milli Yekjehti Council – A consortium of religious parties.
- Nifaz Fiqh Jafria
- PADC: Pakistan Afghanistan Defense Council
- Pakistan Christian National Party
- PIF: Pakistan Islamic Front
- Shabab-i-Milli
- ST: Sunni Tehrik

**Political Parties:**

- AML: Awami Muslim League
- ANP: Awami National Party
- APDM: All Pakistan Democratic Movement
- ARD: Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy
- AT: Awami Tehrik
- BNM: Baloch National Movement
- BNP-Mengal: Baloch National Party
- BRP: Baloch Republican Party
- IJI: Islami Jamhoori Ittehad
- Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz
- JSMM: Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz
- JSQM: Jeay Sindh Quami Mahaz
- JSTPP: Jeay Sindh Talaq Pasand Party
- MQM: Muttahida Quami Movement (Party members are sometimes referred to as ‘Haq Parast’ in newspaper reports)
- MQM-H: Mohajir Quami Movement - Haqqi
- MRD: Movement for the Restoration of Democracy.
- NPP: National People’s Party
- PDA: People’s Democratic Alliance
- PML-F: Pakistan Muslim League – Functional
- PML-J: Pakistan Muslim League – Junejo
- PML-N: Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz
- PML-Q: Pakistan Muslim League - Quaid
- PNP: Pakistan National Party
- PPI: Punjabi Pakhtun Ittehad
- PPP: Pakistan Peoples Party
- PPP-SB: Pakistan People’s Party – Shaheed Bhutto
- PTI: Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf
- SNA: Sindh National Alliance
- TI: Tehrik-i-Istaqlal

**Student Groups:**

- APMSO: All Pakistan Muttahida Students Organization
- ATI: Anjuman Talib-e-Islam
- BSO-A: Baloch Students Organization (BSO-A)
• Federal Students Federation
• DSF: Democratic Students Federation
• IJT: Islami Jamiat-e-Tuleba
• ISF: Insaaf Students Federation
• ISO: Imamia Students Organization
• JSO: Jafria Students Organization
• JSSF: Jeay Sindh Student Federation
• JSTPSF: Jeay Sindh Taraki Pasand Students Federation
• JTA: Jamiat Talaba-i-Arabia
• MSF: Muslim Students Federation
• NSSF: New Sindhi Students Federation
• NSSO: New Sindhi Students Organization
• PESA: Pujabi Engineering Students Association
• PKSF: Pukhtoon Students Federation
• PPASA: Pakistan Progressive Students Alliance
• PSA: Punjabi Students Association
• PSF: People’s Students Federation
• PYF: Progressive Youth Front
• SPSA: Sindh Punjabi Students Association
• SPWF: Sindh People’s Student Federation
• SSF: Seraiki Students Federation
• SST: Sindhi Shagird Tehrik
• STPSF: Sindh Taraki Pasand Students Federation
• Youth Force (of Jamiat Ahle-Hadith)

Civil Society Group/Campaign Group:
• All Faiths Spiritual Movement
• Awam Dost Nazim
• Baloch Voice
• Balochistan Solidarity Front
• Bijarani group
• Christian Youth Force
• Citizen’s action committee
• Hazara Tehrik
• International Muslims Organisation
• Jamaat Ashaat Al Towhid wa Sunnah
• Khattak Ittehad Nazims
• Khushal Pakistan panel
• RAWA
• Save Rivers Committee
• Sindhani Tehrik
• Sindhu Desh
Appendix E: List of Paramilitary Forces

The following are counted as paramilitary forces in our coding:

- **Pakistan National Guard**: The National Guard are charged with air defense and comprises the Mujahid Force, the Janbaz Force, and locally recruited militia. Also included are the National Cadet Corps and the Women's Guard.

- **Pakistan Rangers**: The Rangers are headquartered in Lahore, Punjab and in Karachi, Sindh. This force has a border security role on the international borders of Punjab and Sindh and perform internal security duties as an extension of the Army. This force is organised on a provincial level but are subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior and are commanded by seconded army generals.

- **Mehran Force**: The Mehran Force, based in the Sindh province and performing the same function as the Punjab-based Rangers, became the Pakistan Rangers (Sindh) in 1995. A force of 25,000 men is divided into "wings" of approximately 800 men each.

- **Frontier Corps**: The Frontier Corps, based in Peshawar, North West Frontier Province and Quetta, Balochistan is responsible for protecting the western border regions. The force is responsible to both the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions and to Army Headquarters. The Force comprises fourteen units based in the North-West Frontier and thirteen units based in Balochistan. Some of the local units have a long history such as the Chitral Scouts, the Khyber Rifles, Swat Levies, the Kurram Militia, the Tochi Scouts, the South Waziristan Scouts, the Zhob Militia, and the Gilgit Scouts. These histories date back to Colonial times and many of the regiments have distinguished combat records, e.g. the Khyber Rifles. These regiments can be "regularized" i.e attached to regular Army as necessary. Khyber Rifles was in fact regularized during the 1965 war and fought with distinction in Kashmir.

- **Maritime Security Agency**: The 2,500-strong Maritime Security Agency, headquartered in Karachi, is a coast guard and is responsible for patrolling Pakistan's territorial waters. The MSA is equipped with a former Pakistan Navy destroyer, two coastal patrol craft and four oceanic patrol craft.
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