

A review of the evidence informing DFID’s “Building Peaceful States and Societies” practice paper¹

Paper 2: Responding to public expectations

William Evans
DFID Research & Evidence Division

July 2012

This literature overview was produced by the UK Department for International Development’s Research & Evidence Division. The interpretation of the evidence expressed in this report is entirely that of the named author. The review does not necessarily represent the views of DFID as an institution. This is not a policy document, and is not intended to represent DFID’s policy position.

¹ DFID’s Research & Evidence Division produces or commissions four types of evidence ‘product’. These are: Rapid Reviews, Literature Reviews, Evidence Papers and Systematic Reviews. The current paper is a Literature Review, but one that limits itself principally to reviewing literature cited in DFID’s 2010 “Building Peaceful States and Societies” Practice Paper.

NOT POLICY

NOT POLICY

SECTION I: INTRODUCTION

Summary

1. This paper is one of four exploring and analysing the evidence that underpins DFID's 2010 "Building Peaceful States & Societies" Practice Paper, referred to hereafter as the 'PB/SB (Peace-Building/State-Building) framework'. Taking each of the PB/SB framework's four guiding objectives, it appraises and synthesises the research evidence cited in that framework to offer an assessment on the degree to which the core concepts and propositions are 'evidence based'. In some cases, it introduces additional evidence to place core concepts in their wider context. The paper was commissioned by DFID's Fragile States & Conflict Group, and is intended to contribute to ongoing efforts to refine DFID policy on fragile and conflict-affected states and ensure that it is evidence based.
2. Although the four key objectives of the PB/SB framework are interdependent, for practical purposes, this series of papers addresses each separately. The current paper considers PB/SB framework Objective 4, "Respond to public expectations". Other papers will consider the evidence supporting Objective 2, "Support inclusive political settlements", Objective 3, "Develop core state functions", and the over-arching Objective 1, "Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility, and build conflict resolution mechanisms."

Key findings

3. The PB/SB framework is inadequately supported by clear, direct reference to the research evidence base. Where references are provided, they tend to be to a relatively small number of conceptual or theoretical studies, or indeed to normative institutional literature. There is a wider research base to which the PB/SB could refer;
4. Even so, the wider research base relating to public expectations (jobs, services, 'voice') is itself problematic. It is comprised of a large number of conceptual or theoretical studies, and the empirical studies that are available are themselves vulnerable to critique given debate and contestation regarding the definition of major concepts, and the most appropriate ways to 'measure' these concepts;
5. This notwithstanding, the current study offers the following analysis of the evidence:
 - 5.1. Popular expectations matter for state legitimacy and stability, though they do not do so in a linear, deterministic manner. Unemployment, underemployment, poor working conditions, low income and paucity of services may be considered as causes of conflict either through 'opportunity cost' mechanisms, or popular grievance mechanisms. Either way, states ignore these phenomena at an entirely unpredictable risk to state integrity;
 - 5.2. The delivery of public services would appear to have the potential to confer legitimacy on the service provider (whether that be a state or non-state provider). However, as important as the provision of services themselves is the manner in which they are delivered, with participatory approaches for design and delivery appearing to offer greater opportunity for legitimacy-building and state-building;
 - 5.3. The evidence relating to growth, jobs and instability is comparatively richer than that concerning service delivery, but is more contested. There is some persuasive (though not definitive) quantitative evidence to suggest links between low growth, income shocks and

NOT POLICY

instability, and between youth bulges, unemployment and instability. However, at present, there is very little evidence to show how employment creation programmes in post-conflict states can reduce propensity to violent conflict;

- 5.4. A variety of research based on experimental research designs and project evaluations offers some encouraging (though not particularly extensive) evidence of the impact of civil society activities on the responsiveness of the state to public expectations. Rigorous studies have demonstrated the positive impact of civil society on boosting accountability, and improving the the state delivery of services. However, there is comparatively little research that explores the ability of civil society to prise open narrow political settlements, or have make significant changes to state/society relations in undemocratic or semi-autocratic regimes.

Method

6. The method adopted to produce this paper has involved (a) a collation of the bibliographical references used to inform the PB/SB framework, and the “States in Development” DFID discussion paper (Whaites, 2008) which informed it; (b) the identification of the core principles and assumptions that constitute PB/SB framework Objective 4; (c) the classification and re-evaluation of the sources and references cited in the PB/SB; (d) the consideration of a small number of additional sources of evidence where appropriate; (e) building on the above, an analysis of the degree to which Objective 4 of the PB/SB is evidence-based.
7. The classification and re-evaluation of sources has been conducted with reference to a specific appraisal form, developed with DFID research partners.² The appraisal form is reproduced in Annex ‘A’. A basic summary of its key characteristics is offered below.
8. The appraisal form makes a basic distinction between publications which are:
 - 8.1. **Empirical works**, where the authors gather real world data (either quantitative or qualitative in nature) and analyse it using a clearly-described method;
 - 8.2. **Systematic Reviews**, a rigorous review publication, which uses systematic search strategies to source literature, employs transparent selection criteria to screen out research which is not empirically-based, and synthesises the remainder;
 - 8.3. **Theoretical, hypothetical enquiries**, or papers which more generally survey, **review or synthesise other literature** (without explicitly evaluating its quality).
9. In the current study, papers assessed as being empirical works are then evaluated according to (a) the data-gathering process, (b) the transparency of analytical methods used to evaluate the data, (c) the way in which conclusions are drawn from the data, and (d) the researcher’s consideration of potential weaknesses in his/her approach.
10. On the basis of the grading systems described, I offer judgements about the type of research cited by the PB/SB framework. The following key is used to designate the type of research cited, and is typically accompanied by a written commentary on the quality of the evidence:
 - 10.1. **E**: Empirical study
 - 10.2. **QT**: Quantitative
 - 10.3. **QL**: Qualitative
 - 10.4. **SR**: Systematic Review

² The evidence grading form is the result of collaboration with the LSE-led “Justice & Security Research Programme Consortium”. It is reproduced at Annex ‘A’.

NOT POLICY

- 10.5. **C/R**: Conceptual or theoretical paper, or a non-systematic review of other literature.
- 10.6. **N/R**: In some instances, research papers which have not been fully reviewed in the course of the current study are also cited, and designated [N/R].
- 10.7. * **[asterisk]**: Where additional research, not identified during the initial collation of references used for Whaites (2008) or the PB/SB framework, has been consulted, it is marked with an asterisk. In the absence of an asterisk, readers can assume that publications were used in the drafting of Whaites (2008) or the PB/SB framework.
11. The classification of research in this way provides some general guidance about its suitability for use in different contexts. For example, the findings of empirical studies and systematic reviews (where they can be shown to have been conducted robustly) are more suitable for demonstrating the likely efficacy of a particular aid instrument than are theoretical, conceptual and general review literature. Yet the theoretical and conceptual papers remain valuable, and unlike a systematic review, the current study does not include or exclude studies on the basis of the methodology through which they were generated: instead, it synthesises their findings, whilst offering a comment about their general character.

Scope and limitations

12. Classed among the Research & Evidence Division's³ family of evidence products (which include rapid reviews, literature reviews, evidence papers and systematic reviews), the current paper stands as a literature review. It was not conceived to consider the quality of *all* available research relating to specific PB/SB framework objectives. It *principally* considers the quality and consistency of the research actually cited by the PB/SB framework or the "States in Development" discussion paper (Whaites, 2008) that heavily informed it (see bibliography). As such, it does not claim to be, and should not be considered a systematic review.
13. Additional sources (besides those used in DFID, 2010 and Whaites, 2008) were gathered following consultation with the PB/SB's authors, through discussions with current policy advisers and selected academic contacts, and with the use of SciVerse Scopus⁴, the abstract and citation database of peer-reviewed literature. Nevertheless, the partial, and incomplete nature of the current literature search is acknowledged.

SECTION II: ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE UNDERPINNING PB/SB FRAMEWORK OBJECTIVE 4

Context

14. The first part of the current review places Objective 4, "Respond to public expectations" in the wider context of the PB/SB framework.
15. Overall, the PB/SB framework argues for an integrated treatment for building peaceful states and societies, one which draws on distinct bodies of peace-building and state-building research and practice.
16. At the highest level, the framework assumes the following theory of change:
- 16.1. Strengthen state-society relations, in order to...>>

³ A part of DFID's Policy & Research Directorate.

⁴ SciVerse Scopus is "the world's largest abstract and citation database of peer-reviewed literature."
See: <http://www.info.sciverse.com/scopus/about>

NOT POLICY

- 16.2. >>...address conflict and fragility dynamics, in order to...>>
- 16.3. >>...create environments which permit the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and the elimination of poverty.
17. More specifically, the framework views the bolstering of state-society relations as dependent upon achieving the following high-level state-building and peace-building objectives:
- 17.1. Objective 1: Addressing the causes and effects of conflict and fragility, and building conflict resolution mechanisms;
- 17.2. Objective 2: Supporting inclusive political settlements and processes;
- 17.3. Objective 3: Developing core state functions;
- 17.4. **Objective 4:** Responding to public expectations.
18. In the subsequent sections of this report, the evidence used to support Objective 4 is considered.

Overview of Objective 4: Respond to public expectations

19. The following section considers the core assumptions and concepts that constitute PB/SB Objective 4, which is summarised in the executive summary of the framework as follows:
- 19.1. *Respond to public expectations:* States need to be seen to meet public expectations in order to maintain legitimacy and stability. International actors should be careful not to make assumptions about the expectations of different groups in society, and must recognise that public goods are often delivered in ways that maintain an exclusionary political settlement. Public expectations that are high in many fragile contexts include jobs and growth, delivery of basic services (including security and justice), human rights and democratic processes. (DFID, 2010, p. 7).
20. The main body of the PB/SB framework also makes the following general claims: “States need to be seen to meet public expectations in order to maintain legitimacy and stability.” (p. 32, para. 73); “Expectations may range from jobs and inclusive growth to provision of public services. There may also be expectations about the quality of governance, such as an open political system with fair elections, free media, freedom of information and association, and protection of other human rights.” (p. 32, para 74). None of these claims is supported in the PB/SB framework by clear reference to research evidence.

The PB/SB on basic services

21. On the subject of service provision, the PB/SB framework asserts that “Service delivery can help improve state-society relations, but if handled poorly, can sow discord and discrimination...” (p. 34, para. 80). No research evidence is cited in the PB/SB for this claim.

The PB/SB on inclusive growth and job creation

22. With specific regard to the subject of growth and job creation, the PB/SB framework makes the following claims: “The development of a healthy, diverse private sector is essential for jobs and tax revenues... The state can play a central role in providing the infrastructure and regulations

NOT POLICY

NOT POLICY

for market development...” This statement is supported by reference to the World Development Reports of 1997, *The State in a Changing World*, and 2002, *Building Institutions for Markets*.

23. In particular, the PB/SB draws a link between the generation of employment and increased stability: “Inclusive growth that supports job creation can play a key role in diffusing possible conflict. Growth must be equitable, and in the short term the focus should be on vulnerable groups” (p. 33, para. 79). No research evidence is cited in the PB/SB framework for this claim.
24. The following sections of this paper explore the degree to which these various claims are evidence based.

Theories underpinning the PB/SB

25. Integral to the logic of Objective 4 of the PB/SB, ‘Respond to public expectations’, is social contract theory. Taken together, the works of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau form the basis of the idea that stable state-society relations are based on reciprocated obligations, with society recognising the authority of government so long as government offers basic public goods (such as security of person and property). In effect, the notion that delivering services and providing jobs are the responsibilities of government is merely an extension of social contract theory, early examples of which saw the obligations of government to its people as being rather more modest.
26. Brinkerhoff and others (2012 [E, QT, QL]*) describe the centrality of such theory to current state-building and peace-building discourse as follows: “a viable social contract - defined as balancing citizens’ expectations and state capacity and political will to respond – contributes to stability and resilience.” A state that fails to respond to public expectations runs the risk of potentially violent opposition.
27. Several fields of academic literature can be drawn upon to explore whether the logic of social contract theory is applicable to contemporary development contexts. This includes the literature relating to the role of service delivery and job creation in boosting state legitimacy and reducing instability, and also the empowerment and accountability literature which explores state/society relationships in more general terms.

State instability as a function of popular grievance

28. The degree to which popular grievance is a potential driver of conflict is a strand of a much wider body of research seeking to explore the relative importance of various causes of conflict. Since this subject will be covered in a subsequent paper, considering the PB/SB Objective 1, “Address the causes and effects of conflict & fragility...”, only a rapid overview is offered here.
29. On the one hand, the econometric analyses of Collier & Hoeffler (1998 [E, QT]*, 2004 [E, QT]*) concludes that “the political and social variables that are most obviously related to grievances [have] little explanatory power” for the onset of conflict (2004, p. 563), in a thesis which argued that it was ‘greed’ rather than popular grievance which was salient. Even subsequent refinements of the analysis (Collier and others, 2006 [E, QT]*) still concluded that conflict would occur where it was most feasible, rather than where popular motivation was greatest.
30. On the other hand, in a study that considers both quantitative, econometric research, and qualitative case studies, Stewart and others (2008 [E, QT, QL]) consider the importance of so-called ‘horizontal inequalities’ as a grievance-inducing driver of conflict, and conclude that indeed conflict is more likely where political and socio-economic inequalities are greater (or perceived to be greater) across distinct social or cultural groups. This work, then, places much greater emphasis on the salience of popular discontent as a driver of conflict.

NOT POLICY

NOT POLICY

31. It is unwise to dismiss popular grievance or opinion as a possible driver of conflict.

Service delivery and state legitimacy

32. The PB/SB framework asserts that “Building legitimacy is a primary requirement for peace, security, and resilience over the long term” (p. 16, box 2); that “States need to be seen to meet public expectations in order to maintain legitimacy and stability” (p. 32, para. 73); that “Expectations may range from jobs and inclusive growth to provision of public services” (p. 32, para 74); and that “service delivery [being one of these public expectations] can help improve state-society relations, but if handled poorly, can sow discord and discrimination...” (p. 34, para 80).
33. The principal research cited in the PB/SB framework regarding the bolstering of state legitimacy, OECD (2010 [C/R])⁵ and Papagianni (2008 [C/R]), is review literature. Both are extensively referenced, and make some use of illustrative case studies, but neither presents primary empirical results. They make a number of assertions and claims that require further scrutiny.
34. OECD (2010 [C/R]) helpfully characterises four sources of legitimacy, namely institutionally-sourced legitimacy (i.e. the rules [formal or informal] that determine how the state operates, the common agreement of which is a source of legitimacy); output/performance or ‘practical’ legitimacy (i.e. how ‘well’ the state performs in its delivery of services); shared beliefs legitimacy (i.e. legitimacy conferred because the state resembles those that it governs) and international legitimacy (i.e. when external powers formally recognise and/or support a state) (p. 8). Recognising that the sources of legitimacy are multiple, the paper argues that the perceived source of legitimacy will vary according to location, according to socio-economic status, and according to the demands of the individual or the community at any given time (p. 32-37). Most clearly, the paper argues that one-dimensional notions of legitimacy, focussing only on Western, formal notions of the concept (principally ‘institutionally-sourced legitimacy’), are inadequate to explain the dynamics of state formation in development contexts. Where the OECD paper observes these forces of legitimacy at work in certain countries, it does so only in a fairly general, descriptive manner. On the issue of most interest in the current enquiry, namely whether or not a state’s improved performance in delivering services generates measurable, observable gains in legitimacy, it does not offer credible empirical evidence.
35. Papagianni (2008 [C/R]) asserts that “a state-building process is most likely to generate legitimacy for the state when it is inclusive of all major political forces and open to the participation of the public but also places a priority on maintaining public order and delivering services” (p. 50). The paper goes on to argue that “economic inequalities and the inability of states to offer tangible social and economic benefits challenge [states’] legitimacy”, and that “service delivery and public order breed patience among the population, allowing people to develop long-term horizons and to consider investing in peaceful activities” (p. 55). Although the author claims that his approach is based on empirical observations (with reference to Benin, Zambia and Niger amongst other countries), these observations are made at a fairly cursory level. Given the apparent shortcomings of Papagianni (2008) and OECD (2010) as sources of robust evidence, further consideration of the wider evidence base linking legitimacy to service delivery is merited.
36. A general observation is that a great deal of the literature on this subject remains indebted to the social contract theory of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. Francois & Sud (2006 [C/R]*) is typical of the literature in that it assumes that the process of state-building and state

⁵ The paper actually cited by the PB/SB is NORAD (2009), *The Legitimacy of the State in Fragile Situations*, prepared for OECD DAC, and subsequently published as OECD DAC (2010), *The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations – Unpacking Complexity*. This second paper was reviewed for the current survey.

NOT POLICY

NOT POLICY

legitimation is largely contingent upon the ability of the state to provide security and basic services on behalf of its people, but provides no empirics demonstrating this mechanism at work.

37. Van den Walle & Scott (2011 [C/R]*) consider the delivery of public services as an “inherently political issue that has been used for political ends throughout history” (p. 7). They argue that “[p]ublic services are what makes the state visible to its citizens – citizens’ direct line to government” (p. 9), and refer to the growth of public service provision in eighteenth and nineteenth century European states as an example of this increasing visibility. In particular, Van den Walle & Scott use their broad survey to demonstrate how “service provision has been used in European history as a state tool for penetration (territorial consolidation and the integration of peripheries), for standardisation (homogenisation of the population and its experiences) and for accommodation (including pacification, buying loyalty and powerbrokering)” (p.13). Overall, their analysis argues for greater consideration of the political aspects of service provision, particularly as a means of mitigating against grievances emerging from (Stewart’s 2008) “horizontal inequalities.” Whilst the paper is itself firmly grounded in the existing literature, it offers few empirics beyond some general reference to historical examples of the social contract/service delivery/state-building nexus at work.
38. Batley & Mcloughlin (2010 [C/R]*) focus on the apparent “tensions between the imperative to provide basic services to the population urgently, by any means, and the imperative to prioritise state-building.” They substantiate the point with reference to a mix of institutional and grey literature, as well as Ghani and others’ (2005 [N/R]) observations in Afghanistan that non-state provision of public services impacts negatively on the accountability, legitimacy and sovereignty of the state. (see p. 131-132). Their general assertion that non-state provision of services may undermine state legitimacy, like many other papers, owes much to social contract theory, rather than empirics. The rest of Batley & Mcloughlin’s paper takes the position that where states have particularly weak institutional and organisational capacity, some reliance on non-state actors is inevitable (indeed they cite estimates that the majority of service provision in developing countries, both fragile and non-fragile, comes from non-state actors [see p. 133]). They consider the ways in which the potentially negative impact of such solutions can be minimized, and conclude that state engagement with non-state provision should be tailored according to state capacity (i.e the state should scale up its engagement with non-state service providers [from basic dialogue through to direct contracting out of service delivery] as its own capacity to manage such relationships builds (see p. 147).
39. Since the waging of the ‘War on Terror’ and the consequent interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, a number of studies have sought to explore the relationship between service delivery and stability in these contexts.
40. Howell & Lind’s (2009 [C/R]*) general review of aid to reconstruction in Afghanistan since 2001, claims that decades of international external interference in Afghanistan contributed to the emergence of a classic ‘rentier state’, where political elites were insulated from society, incapable of fulfilling service delivery responsibilities. In effect, Howell & Lind’s survey describes (albeit in a fairly superficial manner) a state unable to raise its ‘visibility’ to society (to use the language of Van den Walle & Scott).
41. Palmer and others’ survey of the contracting out of health service provision in Afghanistan (2006, [E, QL]) does not provide concrete empirics regarding the impact on state legitimacy of the provision of health services through international and local NGOs, but does assert that “decentralisation [of health services] to local providers means that fragmentation is virtually inevitable.”
42. Weatherill (2011 [E, QL]*) reviews the UK stabilisation approach in Sangin (Helmand Province, Afghanistan) between 2009 and early 2011, based on his own first hand experiences and

NOT POLICY

NOT POLICY

observations as a Stabilisation Adviser in the district. The approach, adopted in collaboration with the local district governor, sought to deliver public services, protect the population, and build trust in order to build longer-term stability. Specifically, the UK District Stabilisation Team (DST) focussed on the delivery of health and education services, and small infrastructure projects through the local district governor in a deliberate attempt to confer legitimacy on the Afghan government. A District Development Shura (DDS) was established in order to listen to, and respond to the needs of civilians, with more than 200 small and medium-sized infrastructure projects having been supported in the study survey period. Weatherill asserts that responses to popular expectations helped to align the 'local area' Taliban with the Afghan national government, and drive a wedge between them and the 'out-of-area' Taliban. According to his analysis, this approach resulted in the departure of two 'shadow' district governors from the Sangin district, and the offering of a truce in December 2010 by the Taliban of the Upper Sangin Valley. Despite the suggestive nature of Weatherill's analysis, this case study and observational research of the impact of service delivery remains evidentially weak.

43. Brinkerhoff and others (2012 [C/R; E; QT]*) complement a survey of the relevant literature with a cross-sectional analysis of the effects of water provision on state legitimacy in Iraq. The study uses 2010 survey data from 9 provinces in Iraq⁶, using 'satisfaction with service continuity' as an indicator of the perceived quality of service provision, and 'willingness to pay' as a proxy for trust in the state (with trust in the state itself being a surrogate for state legitimacy). Brinkerhoff's final analysis argues that the data provides some "provisional evidence of [an] association between service delivery and trust, and its contribution to legitimation." However, Brinkerhoff acknowledges that the results of the analysis are probably no more than "suggestive", and that the relationship between service delivery and state legitimation is complex, typically iterative and non-linear. He also notes that there are typically a number of socio-political and historical factors that are likely to affect the extent to which national and provincial government is considered legitimate (even when delivering services), and that such historical factors are likely to be particularly acute in conflict-affected states. His overall conclusion is that "nascent governments can build legitimacy by improving service delivery, however gains are contingent and often fragile."
44. Elsewhere, Brinkerhoff & Johnson (2009 [E, QL]*) draw on unstructured observation, case study analysis and OECD-DAC guidance to support the contention that "all states need to fulfil three core governance functions: security, effective and efficient delivery of basic public goods and services, and managing political participation and accountability," and the related proposition that "[i]n cases of large-scale, country-wide conflict that results in replacement of the previous regime, successful performance in these three functions is necessary in order for the newly formed state to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens." Specifically, they suggest that the experience of governance reform in Iraq offers some support for the proposition that decentralisation can improve service delivery and in turn boost state legitimacy. Although Brinkerhoff & Johnson (2009) offer a few examples of how over-centralized governance regimes (amongst them Sierra Leone) have contributed to state instability through their failure to adequately manage both core and periphery demands, their counter-point (that decentralization programmes in have the potential to reinforce state legitimacy through fast and efficient service delivery to deprived communities) is inadequately supported by empirics.
45. Grynkewich (2008 [C/R; E; QL]*) adopts a case study approach (albeit a relatively superficial survey of the cases) to explore the impact on state legitimacy of the provision of social services by non-state actors. Grynkewich advocates for 'displacement' strategies on the part of recognised governments, in which they would shut down the social welfare activities of non-state actors, whilst reaping legitimacy benefits by (re-)establishing government-supported welfare schemes. He notes three examples of non-state actors' and organizations' ability to gain

⁶ The study used a random sampling, or quasi-random sampling technique to analyse 2356 respondents out of a total population of 16479 in nine localities within the nine provinces.

NOT POLICY

NOT POLICY

recruits and secure legitimacy both through challenging the government's monopoly on the use of force, *and* through their provision of social welfare services. These examples are the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas' successful challenge to the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, and the growing influence of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Grynkewich's study provides no robust empirics to demonstrate the effect of service provision on legitimacy.

46. The delivery of educational services is the focus of Kirk (2007 [C/R]*). She argues that both the failure to provide educational services, *or* the provision of education in discriminatory ways can undermine social cohesion and contribute to instability, and refers to the various assertions that "where educational opportunities are denied to the population, the risks of instability to high" (p. 188). However, her provision of qualitative or quantitative evidence to support this claim is limited. Kirk also asserts that the mobilisation of ethnicity through education is a widespread phenomenon throughout the developing world. To substantiate this point, she cites the work of Bush & Salterelli (2000 [N/R]), who draw on examples of Kurdish exclusion in Turkish schools, and the separation of Tutsi and Hutu children in Rwandan schools as examples of conflict-inducing educational practices. Also relevant is the work of Spink (2005 [N/R]) who describes the potential for education being used as a vehicle for intolerance and division in Afghanistan owing to a failure to address the character (as well as the fundamental provision) of education in the aftermath of the 2001 ousting of the Taliban. Notably, Kirk's analysis also considers in some detail the opportunities and risks for gender inequality posed by service delivery, and education in particular, noting that access to education for girls in fragile states is lower than it is for boys.⁷ Overall, however, Kirk's paper tends to draw heavily on normative, institutional literature and policy papers, rather than empirical studies. It offers no strong evidence demonstrating causal relationships between education and (in)stability and/or state legitimacy.
47. Conventional social contract theory explanations for state-building are nevertheless subject to challenge. At a relatively conceptual level, Fitzsimmons (2008, [C/R]*) explores the contingencies affecting service delivery and its impact on state legitimacy. Surveying the literature on counterinsurgency and the causes of conflict, he observes that notions of identity (see 'shared beliefs legitimacy', above), mean that legitimacy may depend on the *identity* of the governor, rather than their effectiveness in governing. This analysis cautions against assumptions that service delivery alone will be able to dampen the sources of instability.
48. Moreover, more obviously empirical studies show that at present, the evidence to substantiate the (intuitively compelling) logic of social contract theory remains quite limited.
49. Drawing on aggregate measures of governance and Afrobarometer public opinion surveys from sub-Saharan Africa, Bratton & Chang (2006 [E, QL]*) argue that state infrastructure and the delivery of welfare services have a comparatively limited impact on the emergence of new democracies as compared to the establishment of the rule of law.
50. Levi and others (2009 [E, QT]*) use data from the Afrobarometer survey to demonstrate that (a) perceptions of the trustworthiness of the state correlate with acceptance of state authority and that (b) service performance contributes to value-based legitimacy (i.e. citizens attitudes, perceptions and expectations of the state). Nevertheless, their data also suggests that administrative competence and procedural justice have much greater impacts on acceptance of state authority than does service provision.
51. Stel and others (2012 [E, QL]*) apply a non-experimental and qualitative research design to assess the outcomes of twelve service delivery programmes implemented in Burundi, DR Congo, Nepal and the Palestinian Territories. The service delivery programmes they assess are so-called

⁷ According to the Gender-related Development Index (itself drawn from the Human Development Report, 2005).

NOT POLICY

NOT POLICY

'Multi-Stakeholder Processes' (MSPs), defined as delivery mechanisms that are driven jointly by some combination of the state, civil society organisations, community based organisations, the private sector, and donor-funded non-governmental organisations. The study, which does not provide any control cases (i.e. it does not survey alternative delivery mechanisms such as 'state only', 'NGO only', or indeed the complete absence of service delivery) bases its conclusions on qualitative analysis of primary and secondary programme documentation, plus the conduct of interviews and focus groups among the implementing and recipient communities.

52. Overall, the study finds that only 4 of the 12 MSPs surveyed made a positive contribution to state legitimacy. Seven MSPs had no impact, and one MSP had a negative impact (p. 48). The report observes that where service delivery appears to have had an impact on legitimacy, it has done so not only through successfully delivering services, but more specifically because of the particular inclusion and consultative mechanisms of certain MSPs. This is to say that there does not appear to be a mechanistic and automatic relationship between service delivery and state legitimacy, but rather that it is the way in which service delivery is designed and implemented that appears important (p. 11, 48-49). Specifically, the way in which programme decision-making and implementation roles are allocated, communications, and programme accountability all appear to determine how the provision of services may confer legitimacy on the state (p. 18).
53. PAC (2011 [C/R]*) considers the potential and actual impacts of service delivery on state-building and peace-building, with particular reference to the education, health, sanitation and water sectors. This study is not a systematic review, and as such does not provide a clear indication of the nature of the research it cites, and the reliability of the findings it reports. At the very general level, the study concludes that "service delivery, depending on *how* it is undertaken (exclusively versus inclusively, by which type of provider, and to which groups of people) can contribute either positively, negatively or neutrally to wider state-building and peace-building processes" (p. 44). But the study also observes that "[t]he exact conditions under which [service delivery's] positive [state-building] contributions can be assured are not clearly outlined in the literature... with several logical assumptions and hypotheses made, but a lack of comprehensive evidence" (p. 44). This lack of evidence is a consequence of the fact that (a) where studies consider the relative merits of different service delivery models, they often do so without consideration of the implications for service provider legitimacy, and (b) the obvious difficulties in measuring the nebulous concept of 'legitimacy' itself.
54. The other conclusions of the PAC (2011 [C/R]*) study are that citizen expectations of the state may vary by sector (i.e. citizens typically seem to expect more from the state in the provision of education than they do in the provision of water and sanitation); that there remains a lack of clear evidence of the legitimacy implications of non-state service provision; that inclusiveness in service provision seems to be important for legitimacy, and that the most efficient mechanism for delivering basic services may not be the optimal means for building state legitimacy (p. 47). Overall, the review is more useful in highlighting areas for additional research than it is in providing clear evidence for particular interventions.
55. An ambitious (though technically not 'systematic') review of the evidence by ODI (2012 [C/R]*) is also sceptical about the current availability of reliable evidence regarding the relationship between service delivery and legitimacy in fragile states. Adopting a robust method for the sourcing, screening and synthesis of the key literature, the paper concludes that "there is extremely limited evidence on the impact of service delivery on state-citizen relations and state legitimacy" (p. 77).
56. Finally, we consider Gordon and others (2010 [C/R]*), who borrow from the systematic review methodology in a study considering the impact of health service delivery programmes on counter-insurgency, peace-building and stabilisation-type outcomes. The paper cites more than 250 studies, commenting on their empirical quality. Taking an objective view of the evidence,

NOT POLICY

NOT POLICY

the paper observes that whilst there is strong evidence that the provision of health services can form an important pillar of humanitarian-oriented ceasefires, the literature is unable to present evidence of healthcare provision contributing to broader peace processes. A representative selection of the paper's findings merit repeating:

- 56.1. "The peer reviewed literature does not appear to provide systematic analyses of the extent to which health system strengthening contributes to broader processes of state building and peace consolidation. The evidence base is credible in theory but is generally anecdotal, shaped by author bias and has not been subject to systematic research... There is no credible evidence that military health 'hearts and minds' interventions have a positive impact on beneficiary community attitudes. In part this is due to the lack of empirical research." (Gordon and others [2010, C/R]*, p. 10).
- 56.2. "There is no data that is able to demonstrate empirically that government or government funded health programmes are able to improve community perceptions of the legitimacy of the government." (Gordon and others [2010, C/R]*, p. 13).
- 56.3. Health programmes may help to grow social capital, but "there appears to be no proof within the peer reviewed literature that this social capital can serve as a bulwark against conflict drivers." (Gordon and others [2010, C/R]*, p. 65).
- 56.4. "This study has been unable to identify systematic evidence that... health interventions were significant factors in creating conditions under which conflict could be resolved (as opposed to temporarily mitigated)." (Gordon and others [2010, C/R]*, p. 66).
57. Overall, then, the current (and non-systematic) review of the literature on the link between service delivery, legitimacy and peace-building and state-building suggests the evidence is weak and inconclusive. It is true that this weakness need not necessarily imply that links do not exist. However, at present, these links have not been demonstrated with great consistency or confidence. Perhaps the most intriguing finding is the idea that particular modalities for service delivery (such as inclusive, consultative and participatory mechanisms) might offer greater hope for fostering peace and building states. Even this finding, however, requires further exploration.

The evidence on inclusive growth, job creation and stability

58. As previously noted, the PB/SB draws links between growth, job creation and greater stability. However, it does not reference the extensive, and contested academic debate on this subject, citing only two World Development Reports (rather than academic papers themselves).
59. Given that the growth/stability debate will receive greater coverage in discussion of PB/SB Objective 1, "Addressing the causes and effects of conflict and fragility, and building conflict resolution mechanisms", the focus in the following sections is on job creation (employment) and stability. Nevertheless, some consideration of the growth/stability nexus is offered.
60. The debate concerning growth, job creation and instability is neatly summarised by Miaari and others (2011 [E, QT]*, p. 4): "Research on the relationship between economic conditions and political violence largely focuses on testing the following hypothesis: that poor economic conditions (e.g. low levels of income or high levels of unemployment) lower the opportunity cost of involvement in political violence and breed frustration, despair and instability, all of which make it easier to garner support for – and motivate active participation in – political violence."
61. Two major issues are raised in Miaari's summary. The first is the assumed link between poor economic opportunities and higher levels of popular grievance, and the second is the relationship between growth and higher levels of employment.

NOT POLICY

NOT POLICY

The value of 'grievance' as a concept

62. Miaari's summary of the literature is useful in the sense that it immediately takes the reader beyond the now outdated greed/grievance characterisation of conflict drivers. Nevertheless, some consideration of this characterisation is merited.
63. Early iterations of the econometric analyses of Collier & Hoeffler (1998 [E, QT]*, 2004 [E, QT]*) concluded that "the political and social variables that are most obviously related to grievances [have] little explanatory power" for the onset of conflict (2004, p. 563), in a thesis which argued that it was 'greed' rather than popular grievance which was salient. Although Collier & Hoeffler made deliberate attempts to go 'beyond greed and grievance' in subsequent analyses, even later iterations of their work (Collier and others, 2006 [E, QT]*) still concluded that conflict would occur where it was most feasible, rather than where popular motivation was greatest. Perhaps the most significant conceptual weakness in Collier & Hoeffler's early work was the tendency to identify income deprivation as a 'greed' factor rather than a 'grievance' factor.
64. The work of Frances Stewart and her collaborators, however, saw the debate in rather more nuanced terms, recognizing that income deprivation and joblessness could be simultaneously 'opportunity cost' type and grievance type drivers of unrest (2008 [E, QT, QL]*). Summarising the findings of a variety of quantitative (econometric) and qualitative (case study) analyses, Stewart and others (2008 [E, QT, QL]*) conclude that the probability of conflict rises where socioeconomic horizontal inequalities (HIs) are greater, and where socioeconomic and political inequalities are high and run in the same direction. Given that unemployment is likely to be a factor of socioeconomic deprivation, Stewart's analysis implies that unavailability of jobs is likely to be a conflict driver. In Stewart's 2000 analysis (C/R)* she identifies government bias in the allocation of jobs and in service delivery as discriminatory tactics likely to contribute to popular discontent.

Linkages between growth and job creation

65. It is largely beyond the scope of the current review to explore the extensive literature relating to the linkages between growth and job creation. Even so, it should be noted that there remain some considerable uncertainties regarding the nature of the relationship, and directions of causality: is a labour intensive (i.e. job creating) economy a necessary precondition for growth, or is a growing economy a prerequisite for job creation? This uncertainty has implications for the nature of conflict prevention/mitigation strategies.
66. Fields (2011 [C/R]*) surveys the international evidence and claims to identify evidence of co-linearity between economic growth and labour market conditions. He concludes that three patterns emerge. "First, those developing countries that have achieved the highest rates of economic growth tend to have achieved the highest rates of real wage growth. Second, countries that have achieved rapid economic growth have also seen a growth in manufacturing and service employment (relatively high-paying sectors of the economy) and a reduction in agricultural employment (a relatively low-paying sector). And third, real wages tend to rise faster when exports grow."
67. Consideration of the link between growth and job creation (and the potential weaknesses in the evidence for that link) is important given the considerable body of research which has been carried out to explore the growth/stability nexus. It is particularly important given that 'growth' and 'jobs' are often considered as more or less the same thing: note Miaari's characterisation of "poor economic conditions" as either "low levels of income or high levels of unemployment" (Miaari, 2011 [E, QT]*), and Collier and others' assertion that "growth implies job creation" (Collier and others, 2006 [E, QT]*). Notwithstanding the considerable difficulties with this

NOT POLICY

NOT POLICY

characterisation, Fields' survey demonstrates that there is some merit in considering growth and job creation in parallel.

Growth and stability

68. Whilst several iterations (particularly the early versions) of Collier & Hoeffler's work on the causes of conflict have been widely critiqued, their work (and indeed a wider body of scholarship on the same subject) provides some highly suggestive findings relating to the roles of income and growth on conflict. In discussing the causes of conflict, and on the basis of a cross-sectional, 'large-n' econometric method, Collier and others (2009 [E, QT]*) find that "economics matter: namely the level, growth and structure of income." Specifically, they observe that the risk of conflict in a country of 'average' income level is 4.2 per cent, but that a reduction by half in per capita income raises the risk of conflict to 5.3 per cent. They also note that Fearon & Laitin's quantitative study finds the same effect (2003 [N/R]). Collier and others instrument for (i.e. isolate) the income variable as part of robustness checks and find that the result holds. In addition, Collier and others (2009 [E, QT]*) find that the growth rate in the five years prior to the onset of conflict in countries experiencing civil war averages -0.5 per cent, whilst peaceful countries experience growth rates averaging 2 per cent over the same period. Collier's research suggests that raising the growth rate by one percentage point reduces propensity to conflict from a 'typical' 4.6 per cent to 4 per cent, and notes that a similar finding is observed by Miguel and others (2004 [N/R]) in an Africa-only study, who instrument for income growth with rainfall levels.
69. Considering the discrete, but related concept of 'Complex Humanitarian Emergencies', Auvinen & Nafziger (1999 [E, QT]*) also employ a number of advanced statistical techniques to explore the links between growth and warfare. They find that "stagnation and decline in real GDP, a high ratio of military expenditures to national income, a tradition of violent conflict, high income inequality, and slow growth in average food production are sources of emergency." (p. 267).
70. However, Bazzi & Blattmann (2011 [E, QT]*) interrogate the apparently robust link between income and the onset of conflict, and specifically the apparent impact of income shocks on propensity to conflict. They use commodity prices as an instrument for income levels, and find little evidence that income shocks cause conflict, or indeed that rises in commodity prices are more likely to make the state an attractive "prize" for capture through violent contestation. Bazzi & Blattmann argue that their results cast significant doubt (without entirely refuting) the significant body of research that assumes straightforward linkages between income levels and conflict.

Job creation and stability

71. Next, the current analysis turns more specifically to the relationship between job creation (as opposed to growth) and stability.
72. Date-Bah (2003 [C/R]*) describes high levels of unemployment, poverty and social exclusion as structural factors that may act as contributory causes to the outbreak of war, while conceding that these factors "rarely directly cause the outbreak of an armed conflict" (p. 4). Krishnamurty (2003 [C/R]*) stresses the importance of focussing on labour markets in post-conflict states, writing: "[i]t cannot be emphasized enough that employment is one of the immediate needs of a post-conflict situation and providing immediate work opportunities must be an integral part of the humanitarian response to the post-conflict situation to contribute to human security" (p.60). Whilst Krishnamurty's review provides a useful overview of the potential role of livelihoods programmes, training initiatives, and public works programmes in post-conflict settings, and discussion of the humanitarian benefits of such programmes, his is not an empirical study, and provides no firm evidence to justify the contention that employment is important to mitigate for fragility.

NOT POLICY

NOT POLICY

73. However, there are considerable difficulties in attempting more empirical studies of the links between unemployment and instability. Perhaps most important is the paucity of data relating to unemployment, and issues relating to the concept and meaning of employment. For example, Fields (2011 [C/R]*) notes that the terms 'labo[u]r market', 'employment' and 'unemployment' have quite different meanings in the developing and developed world, meaning that the ILO's 'unemployment rate' is a poor indicator of the proportion of a population who are 'at work'. Conceptual differences are likely to explain why unemployment rates are technically lower in the developing world than they are in the European Union, for example. Fields notes that "what the developing countries have is an employment problem – that is poverty among those who work – rather than an unemployment problem." Given this analysis (and Fields goes on to explore a number of aspects in which labour markets in developing countries are quite different from those in the developed world), it is wise to be sceptical of research that draws on unemployment rates.
74. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler's work falls squarely into this category of analysis. Their own analytical framework and conclusions have been revised considerably since their initial publication of results in 1998, but later iterations of the work (using enhanced data and employing additional statistical robustness checks) still claim to find strong links between growth rates, unemployment and civil war (see above). They find that increasing national growth rates by one percentage point reduces the risk of conflict by 0.6%, and offer an interpretation that "growth implies job creation which reduces the pool of labour likely to be targeted [for recruitment] by rebels" (Collier and others, 2006 [E, QT]*, p. 10). Collier and his collaborators use a 'youth bulge' measure (the proportion of young men aged 15-29 as a percentage of the total population) as a surrogate for unemployment (Collier and others, 2009, [E, QT]*, p. 27). The validity of this measure is open to question. However, Korenman & Neumark do find that countries with a large youth cohort experience higher unemployment rates (1997 [N/A]).
75. Urdal (2006 [E, QT]*) adopts a cross-country logistic regression design to show how youth bulges potentially increase both opportunities and motives for political violence (in the form of internal armed conflict, 1950-2000) and terrorism and rioting (1984-1995). The analysis finds robust statistical correlations between youth bulges and each of these three forms of violence, and provides data to show that a 1 per cent increase in youth bulge is correlated with a 4 per cent increase in propensity to political violence. Although Urdal's model does not find youth bulges interacting specifically with economic hardship in such a way as to increase propensity to conflict, he observes that he has only a modest metric for youth unemployment rates, and that a better measure might more satisfactorily explore the relationship (p. 620).
76. Building on the previous work of Urdal, Cincotta & Leahy (2006/7 [E, QT]*) conduct quantitative analysis exploring the linkages between demographics (youth bulges), countries with previous history of civil conflict, and outbreaks of new conflict. They find that 24 per cent of countries with 60 per cent (or more) of their population aged 30 (or below) experienced a civil conflict in the 1970s, 80s or 90s, and predict that states with similar demographic balances are more likely to be subject to episodes of violent conflict. They also find that 86 per cent of countries which experienced a new outbreak of conflict in the survey period had age structures in which 60 per cent or more of the population were aged 30 years old or less.
77. Focussing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Miaari and others (2011 [E, QT]*) set out to test opportunity cost explanations for violent conflict by studying the effects of Israel's imposition of severe employment restrictions on Palestinians following the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000. In an apparently rigorous statistical study, they "find robust evidence that [Palestinian] localities that suffered from a sharper drop in employment opportunities were more heavily involved in the conflict" (p. 1), and that "a one percentage point decrease in the employment rate of males ages 20-49 led to a 0.12% increase in the number of fatalities."

NOT POLICY

NOT POLICY

78. In addition to these quantitative studies, there are also many more case study research studies of a qualitative, historical and observational nature. For example, Sharma (2005 [E, QL]*) considers the issue of failed development, socioeconomic deprivation (including unemployment) and fragility through a case study of Nepal. He argues that the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, and resultant internal conflict was not caused by either political suppression nor ethnic or religious tension, and is best explained by a 'development failure' and by socioeconomic injustices against the poor. To substantiate the point, Sharma observes that by the mid-1990s, the unemployment rate in Nepal had reached 17%, whilst 32% of the economically active population was underemployed. Poverty rates were significantly higher in rural as compared to urban areas, and Sharma concludes that in the circumstances, this made it "easy for the Maoists to mobilize disadvantaged youth from the rural and remote areas in their fight against the political system."
79. On the basis of four hundred interviews conducted with youths in four local government areas in Delta State, Nigeria, Osagie and others (2010 [E, QL]*) find the deprivation of the proceeds of oil exploration to people local to the area was the most significant 'self reported' cause of conflict in the area, though the study does not consider unemployment rates in particular.
80. However, overall, the research and evidence supporting the link between unemployment and political violence is mixed and contested, both amongst the quantitative and qualitative literatures. The range of studies which have analysed employment and conflict across multiple countries have not produced consistent results. Miaari and others (p. 4) observe that multiple studies either "find that better economic conditions are associated... with less violence (e.g. Blomberg et. al, 2004 [N/R], Tavares, 2004 [N/R]), the same level of violence (e.g. Abadie, 2006 [N/R]; Krueger & Laitin, 2008 [N/R]), or even more violence (e.g. Berman and others, 2009 [E, QT]*)."
81. The Berman and others study (2009 [E, QT]*), for example, considering links between insurgency and unemployment in both Iraq and the Philippines finds "a robust negative correlation between unemployment and attacks against government and allied forces and no significant relationship between unemployment and the rate of insurgent attacks that kill civilians" (p. 1). One potential explanation for this is that as employment becomes scarcer, potential insurgent recruits are more likely to accept payment from counter-insurgents to inform on rebel fighters, so making counter-insurgent efforts to crack down on rebel activity more effective.
82. In research based on their expedition of nearly 500 interviews with Liberian former fighters, Boas & Hatloy (2008 [E, QL]*) argue that contrary to perceived wisdom, combatants did not go to war as a result of unemployment, underemployment or idleness. Instead, most went to school, worked and lived with their families close to the fighting. Boas & Hatloy's explanation for their motivation for joining armed groups lies in perceptions of the insecure environment that they and their families faced.
83. Moreover, a systematic review of the evidence on the impact of employment creation on stability (and poverty reduction) in fragile states (Holmes and others, 2012 [SR]) reveals the very limited availability of 'robust' evidence on this subject. The study differentiates between emergency employment creation, long-term employment creation and self-employment as potential contributors to increased stability and poverty reduction in fragile states. However, it only identified research relating to emergency employment creation (seven studies), and only one of these addressed impacts on stability (Ofem & Ojayi, 2008 [N/R]). Ofem & Ojayi's study, based on a survey of 200 youths from 10 communities in Nigeria, adopts a probit regression model to explore the impact of employment opportunities and income on conflict resolution. It finds a positive, but not significant effect (for both variables), and Holmes and others describe this as a study of only "limited technical robustness."

NOT POLICY

NOT POLICY

84. Lastly, we consider the findings of Cramer (2010 [C/R]*) whose non-systematic literature review of a very significant number of studies exploring this issue finds that “[t]here are no grounds empirically for the commonly made claims that there is a strong, automatic causal connection from unemployment, underemployment, or low productivity employment to violence and war” (p. 1). Instead, the paper argues that other factors, such as labour and employment conditions and types of employment may be of greater import. This analysis is informed by a suspicion of economics-informed research designs which privilege rational choice and methodological individualism (i.e. that men and women are consistently motivated to do things principally by making logical choices based on the promise of material gain) as well as the profound gaps in availability and coding of data relating to employment in conflict-affected states.
85. Overall, the evidence base is, once again, very mixed. As usual, we should be careful not to confuse an absence of reliable evidence for a link with a demonstration that this link doesn’t exist. As is often the case, the current evidence effectively argues for a more nuanced, context-specific analysis of specific situations.

Mechanisms for responding to public expectations

86. Where the previous sections of this paper have considered the nature of popular expectations of the state (in particular, service provision and jobs), this final section considers the mechanisms through which popular expectations are expressed, and the channels through which state and society may communicate.
87. Consideration of the mechanisms by which state and society interact has multiple entry points. Some of these have already been discussed in a previous treatment of political settlements and democracy, which noted the high global demand for democracy, the reduced chance of violent conflict within established democracies, but also the elevated propensity to violent conflict during the emergence of democracy. Moreover, this study observed the apparent shortcomings of standard, Western notions of democracy itself in opening up those narrow political settlements which principally serve elite interests (Evans, 2012 [C/R]*).
88. However, formal democracy represents just one mechanism through which popular expectations are expressed. There are other processes through which popular expectations might reasonably be expected to have an impact on the performance, consolidation and stability of the state. In the following sections, we consider civil society, citizen engagement (CE) programmes, and the more specific sub-category of transparency and accountability initiatives (TAIs). The following paragraphs draw heavily on content written for another DFID evidence product (DFID 2012 [C/R]*).

Civil society

89. There is no single agreed definition of civil society. For convenience, the current review draws upon an explanation offered by Hyden and others: “Civil society sits between the family and the state. It is made up of associational life that reflects the extent to which citizens share their personal grievances and demands with others. It is the arena where private becomes public; the social becomes political. In the political process... it is where values are formed and expressed. It is also where interests are articulated in public... [N]ot everything that happens in civil society creates responses by state institutions. Nor do we rule out the possibility that policies may be initiated within the latter rather than civil society. The extent to which civil society is an integral part of policy-making, however is an important factor in national development. How it relates to state institutions matters” (Hyden and others, 2003)*.
90. Notions of civil society are also related to the concept of informal or ‘social institutions’: the norms and shared perceptions that shape human interaction. A significant body of literature

NOT POLICY

NOT POLICY

argues that countries and regions with greater associational life, trust and inter-group cohesion tend to have better service delivery, financial accountability and adherence to democratic norms (Putnam, 1993*; Coffé & Geys, 2005*). The World Bank's work on indices of social indicators finds multiple linkages between social institutions and broader aspects of human development. For example, interpersonal trust and norms of non-discrimination against ethnic, religious and caste minorities are found to be proximate determinants of economic growth, while countries with higher civic engagement and stronger norms of equality and fairness towards women are found to achieve significantly higher levels of income per capita in the long run (Foa, 2008).

91. Moreover, social institutions appear to have particularly important effects on gender equality and related development outcomes. There is a growing body of evidence which links gender equality with higher growth and better human development outcomes (Jones & others, 2010*; World Bank, 2012*). For example, it has been estimated that in the absence of gender discriminatory social institutions, household income in Africa could increase by up to 25 per cent (Ward and others, 2010*).
92. The following sections of the paper explore the evidence for the role of civil society, empowerment and accountability in influencing the state/society relations. This analysis specifically considers the way in which states recognise, and respond to public expectations. It explores the findings of some synthesis studies and meta-analyses, and also the results of experimental research designs. Overall, the evidence suggests that (a) where states demonstrate some appetite for citizen engagement and popular participation, such mechanisms can play an important role in boosting state responsiveness, but also that (b) civil society and popular 'voice' may be insufficient in themselves to 'open up' states without an appetite for citizen engagement and popular participation, or with otherwise narrow political settlements.

Synthesis studies: assessing the impact of civil society on development outcomes

93. Gaventa & Barrett's meta-analysis of 100 research case studies considers some 830 outcomes of citizen engagement and participation interventions (Gaventa & Barrett, 2010 [C/R; E, QL]*). Its findings are considered at some length here because their paper represents a relatively comprehensive review of the field. However, the nature of this evidence must be noted. Gaventa & Barrett's is a primarily qualitative assessment of data, much of it drawn from the records of citizen engagement and participation projects. Though it is a valuable resource, it ought not to be considered robust evidence in and of itself.
94. Coding outcomes in four broad areas (construction of citizenship; practices of citizen participation; responsive & accountable states; inclusive and cohesive societies), their survey finds 75 per cent of all outcomes from citizen engagement and participation interventions to be positive, with a generally even distribution of positive and negative outcomes across the four categories.
95. Where they consider the impact of citizen engagement activities on the responsiveness and accountability of states, Gaventa & Barrett specifically ask "does citizen engagement contribute to more responsive states, which in turn are able to meet development needs, and guarantee and uphold democratic rights?" In response, they find that more than 70 per cent of citizen engagement initiatives produced positive outcomes. Their analysis suggests that citizen mobilisation or engagement has in some cases led to national level policy changes, as occurred in Brazil, Mexico, Chile, South Africa and the Philippines. Moreover, in many more cases, citizen mobilisation has made concrete contributions to improved development outcomes and service delivery in the areas of health, food & livelihoods, the provision of water and housing and education.

NOT POLICY

NOT POLICY

96. The Gaventa & Barrett analysis also suggests that there is some evidence that citizen engagement initiatives produce important gains in citizens' ability to claim rights. Sometimes these gains come in the form of securing greater use of services and legal or constitutional rights to which individuals are already legally entitled. In other cases, the gains are made in the form of the amendment or extension of legal, economic or political rights owing to the expression of citizen 'voice'. More generally, Gaventa & Barrett observe the impact of citizen mobilisation initiatives on the "creation of new institutional mechanisms", such as spaces for the debate of public policy, increased governmental publication of information, and more regular platforms for state consultation with citizens.
97. Notwithstanding these observations, it is important to note Gaventa & Barrett's own recognition of a non-negligible proportion of cases where greater citizen engagement and efforts to claim rights has resulted in either states' blanket refusal to accede to popular demands, or indeed state-backed reprisals against claimants.
98. Of particular note to the current analysis, the Gaventa & Barrett analysis also considers the hypothesis that positive outcomes from citizen engagement processes are only possible in states which have already achieved higher levels of democracy. Their analysis of positive outcomes even in weak democracies and fragile states does not permit the confirmation of this hypothesis. Overall, they claim that their findings have significant (and supportive) implications for donors and activists seeking to build citizenship and governance through citizen engagement interventions, even in non-democratic environments.
99. In the related, but distinct field of transparency and accountability initiatives (TAIs), McGee & Gaventa (2011 [C/R]*) find that TAIs can create opportunities for citizens and states to interact constructively, categorizing impacts in five kinds of outcome: (a) better budget utilisation; (b) improved service delivery; (c) greater state responsiveness to citizens' needs; (d) the creation of spaces for citizen engagement; (e) the empowerment of local voices.
100. Included amongst the positive impacts observed in McGee & Gaventa's synthesis study is evidence of the positive impact of citizen report cards on local service delivery, of participatory budgeting on public services and more efficient public expenditure, and of freedom of information requests affecting the responsiveness of public officials. However, McGee & Gaventa carefully caveat their findings. They note that the impact of TAIs appears to be greater in some areas (service delivery and budgetary management) than in others (freedom of information). Moreover, they observe that impact assessments of TAIs remain relatively few in number, and that there has been more success in monitoring the outputs of TAIs than of their outcomes and impacts. The context specificity of the findings they present also mean that they may not be replicable in different settings. Overall, Gaventa & McGee offer clear warnings about drawing hasty conclusions from their study.
101. An additional, striking observation of McGee and Gaventa's study of TAIs, and one that stands in contrast to the Gaventa & Barrett (2011, see above) findings on citizen engagement is that "the review revealed little evidence of impact of TAIs in non-democratic settings" They note that in regimes "lacking the essential freedoms of association, voice or media, citizen-led TAIs do not have the same prospects for success as in societies where these conditions exist."
102. Rocha Menocal and Sharma⁸ evaluate the impact of donor-led citizens' voice and accountability (CVA) initiatives, based on a literature review of 90 donor interventions. They identify some limited and isolated positive effects of CVA initiatives, namely intermediate changes in the behaviour and practices of public officials. They also find some evidence of CVA interventions

⁸ This review was based on a literature review of 90 donor interventions, an evaluation framework piloted in two countries and a further five country case studies. The pilot and country case studies were based on a limited number of interventions and do not offer an exhaustive assessment of the subject.

NOT POLICY

NOT POLICY

contributing to legislative reforms. However, their review concludes that donor expectations of CVA initiatives on poverty reduction and the achievement of the MDG goals have typically been unreasonably high.

Single studies

103. Beyond the more general surveys outlined above, a recent (2011) DFID rapid review of the evidence for empowerment and accountability interventions identified a number of studies exploring how civil society might provide development benefits across four domains. These were: service delivery; governance outcomes; political transformation; and citizen confidence, capability and access to assets. Several of the studies relating to these domains are considered here.

Single studies: civil society and service delivery

104. In a quasi-experimental study of 121 rural water systems in 49 countries, Narayan (1995) finds that the proportion of water systems in good condition, overall economic benefits, percentages of the target population reached, and environmental benefits all rose with popular participation in projects. Isham and others (1995 [E, QT]*) conduct additional econometric tests on Narayan's data to confirm a 'strong association between project performance and beneficiary participation.'
105. Using an experimental research design, Pandey and others (2010 [E, QT]*) find that a community-based information campaign aimed at raising accountability and school performance in three Indian states had a positive impact, with substantial effects on teacher presence and effort, and modest impact on pupil learning.
106. Comparing the effects of two citizen report card (CRC) interventions on service delivery (in Uganda and India), Khemani (2008*) finds that whilst CRCs had the effect of improving health delivery and outcomes in the Ugandan case, they had no effect on improving education outcomes in Uttar Pradesh.

Single studies: civil society and governance outcomes

107. Olken (2007 [E, QT]*) uses an experimental method to investigate the effects of participation on missing expenditures from public projects in Indonesia. He finds that whilst intensifying government audit practices reduced missing expenditures, greater public attendance at project meetings had no significant effect on corrupt practices.
108. On the basis of a randomized field experiment in Brazil, Ferraz & Finan (2008 [E, QT]*) find evidence that publicly disseminating information relating to politicians' corrupt practices (as identified through audits conducted on their expenditure of federal funds) had a significant, and negative impact on their re-election prospects, suggesting that better-informed electorates are more likely to hold public officials to account.
109. Collier & Vicente's experimental design (2008 [E, QT]*) explores the effect of an information and anti-intimidation campaign in six Nigerian states, aimed at changing behaviours during election time. Using data from perception surveys and independent data sources, they find that the campaign reduced electoral violence, increased voter turnout, and reduced votes for political leaders most closely associated with pre-election violence.

Civil society for more responsive states: conclusions

110. The evidence relating to the impacts of citizen engagement on improved development outcomes is mixed, but provides grounds for cautious optimism. Although the outcomes of civil

NOT POLICY

society initiatives will be highly context specific, the previous analysis suggests that such initiatives at the very least have the potential to deliver more effective and more inclusive outcomes. The availability of evidence to this effect from research based on experimental designs further strengthens the case. However, this analysis has also raised questions about the ability of civil society initiatives to have a significant impact in non-democratic environments, or in states where the political settlement is generally exclusive. Insofar as the current review identifies gaps in the research base, the issue of how far civil society can transform political settlements and state/society relations more generally appears to be one of the most major areas of uncertainty.

SECTION III: CONCLUSIONS

Conclusions based on a sample of the evidence

111. This paper has drawn out the key statements and propositions made by the PB/SB with regards the role of public expectations in fragile and conflict-affected states. It has considered the evidence cited by the PB/SB in support of these statements, and undertaken a limited investigation of additional sources of evidence. The current paper is not a systematic review of the evidence, but does sketch some of the principal areas of contestation and debate across the evidence base.
112. A first observation is that the PB/SB itself is inadequately supported by clear, direct reference to the research evidence base. Where references are provided, they tend to be to a relatively small number of conceptual or theoretical studies, or indeed to normative institutional literature. There is a wider research base to which the PB/SB could refer.
113. That said, this wider research base is itself somewhat problematic. First, a large proportion of the relevant research itself appears to be conceptual or theoretical in nature, rather than demonstrably empirical. Second, where apparently robust empirical studies *have* been conducted, they are vulnerable to a number of critiques. For example, the definition of major concepts, such as 'fragility', 'instability', 'legitimacy' and 'employment', is subject to interpretation and contestation. In quantitative studies (particularly 'large-n' studies), this raises doubts about the metrics that are selected to interrogate these concepts and the interrelationships between them. Qualitative studies, and particularly single case study qualitative studies, for their part, are vulnerable to questions relating to external validity (i.e. generalizability) in different contexts. In addition, there is a relative lack of studies based on experimental designs, which are better equipped to counter some of the standard criticisms levelled against other research designs. In short, even if the PB/SB did refer to the wider evidence base, it would find that base to be contested in almost every area. Overall, the evidence relating to 'responding to public expectations' is at worst weak, and at best mixed (i.e. the research is more rigorous, but produces contradictory findings).
114. As such, the following conclusions must themselves be considered with caution.
115. First, popular expectations seem to matter for state legitimacy and stability, even if the ways in which they matter are highly complex. Whether we consider unemployment, underemployment, poor working conditions, low income and a paucity of basic services as popular 'grievances' against the state, or as factors that reduce the 'opportunity cost' for conflict, the contested evidence nevertheless suggests that the fulfilment of popular expectations are important for sustainable, peaceful state/society relations. Needless to say, these factors are unlikely to act as causes of conflict in a linear, deterministic manner.

NOT POLICY

116. Turning specifically to the role of service delivery in boosting state legitimacy and stability, we find that the evidence is weak, given that an apparently high proportion of research is conceptual and theoretical in nature, rather than demonstrably empirical. Where empirical studies have been conducted, their results suggest that service delivery has the potential to boost the legitimacy of the service provider (whether that provider is a state or non-state actor), but also that the manner in which services are delivered is likely to be important: there is some evidence of moderate quality that services designed and delivered through participatory mechanisms are likely to have greater legitimacy (and by implication stability) benefits.
117. With regards growth, jobs, and instability the evidence may be said to be slightly more rigorous, but perhaps even more contradictory and contested. Several studies offer persuasive findings regarding a causal link between low growth (or income shocks) and violent conflict. Other studies demonstrate correlation between youth bulges and unemployment, and, in turn, with propensity to violent conflict. Some rigorous case study analyses explore the direct links between unemployment and conflict, and return mixed results. Overall, there is very little evidence to show that job creation *interventions* have served to reduce the risk of instability. Once again, the least controversial finding is that there appears to be no particular regularity in the relationship between employment availability and political violence. The existing research suggests that the terms and conditions of employment, rather than its (un)availability may be the most important factors in societal discord and violence.
118. On the subject of the mechanisms through which popular expectations may be expressed, and their relative effect on state/society relations and development outcomes more generally, the current analysis offers generally encouraging findings. The quality of the research base remains weak-to-moderate, but there are a small number of experimental studies appearing to demonstrate the potential of citizen engagement, transparency and accountability initiatives having effects on the way that states and public officials behave. Moreover, a mixture of quasi-experimental and non-experimental studies also appear to demonstrate the potential for civil society initiatives to open up new spaces for state/society dialogue and institutional change. However, the greatest uncertainty in the evidence relates to the extent to which civil society and popular 'voice' has the potential to open up such spaces in undemocratic or semi-authoritarian regimes, or in states with otherwise narrow political settlements.
119. Overall, the implications of these findings for the PB/SB are simply that the evidence base for the framework is currently weak-to-moderate. In many cases, there appears to be sufficient research evidence to suggest that, for example, service delivery interventions, job creation or civil society *may* be effective for the promotion of peaceful states and societies. It is wise to remember that a lack of evidence is not the same as evidence of no effect. Nevertheless, the size and quality of the current evidence base should not be overestimated.

NOT POLICY

Bibliography

- Abadie, A. (2006). "Poverty, Political Freedom, and the roots of Terrorism", *American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings*, 96(2), pp. 50-56.
- Bannerjee, A., Duflo, E., Glennerster, R., Banerji, R. & Khemani, S. (2010). "Pitfalls of Participatory Programs: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation of Education in India." *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 2(1), 1-30.
- Batley, R. & Mcloughlin, C. (2010). "Engagement with Non-State Service Providers in Fragile States: Reconciling State-Building and Service Delivery." *Development Policy Review*, 28(2), 131-154.
- Bazzi, S. & Blattmann, C. (2011). "Economic Shocks and Conflict: the (Absence of?) Evidence from Commodity Prices." Center for Global Development, Working Paper 274, December 2011.
- Berman, E. (2009). *Radical, Religious and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
- Berman, E., Felter, J. Shapiro, J.N., Callen, M. (2009). "Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in Iraq and the Philippines." Working Paper 15547, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
- Bjorkmann, M. & Svensson, J. (2007). "Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment of a Community-based Monitoring Project in Uganda." Centre for Economic Policy Research, London.
- Blomberg, S.B., Hess, G.D., and Weerapana, A. (2004). "Economic Conditions and Terrorism", *European Journal of Political Economy*, 20, pp. 463-478.
- Boas, M. & Hatloy, A. (2008). "Getting In, Getting Out: Militia Membership and Prospects for Re-Integration in Post-War Liberia." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 46(1), 33-56.
- Bratton, M., & Chang, E.C.C. (2006). "State Building and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa. Forwards, Backwards or Together?" *Comparative Political Studies*, 39(9), 1059-1083.
- Brinkerhoff, D.W. & Johnson, R.W. (2009). "Decentralized local governance in fragile states: learning from Iraq." *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 75(4), 585-607.
- Brinkerhoff, D. W., Wetterberg, A. & Dunn, S. (2012). "Service Delivery and Legitimacy in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: Evidence from water services in Iraq." *Public Management Review*, 14(2), 273-293.
- Bush, K. & Saltarelli, D. (eds) (2000). *The two faces of education in ethnic conflict: towards a peacebuilding education for children* (Florence, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre).
- Cincotta, R., Engelman, R. and Anastasion, D. (2003). "The Security Demographic: Population and Civil Conflict after the Cold War." Population Action International, Washington, DC.
- Cincotta, R.P. and Leahy, E. (2006/2007). "Population Age Structure and the Risk of Civil Conflict: a Metric." *Environment Change & Security Project Report*, 12, 55-58.
- Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (1998). "On Economic Causes of Civil War", *Oxford Economic Papers*, Volume 50, Issue 4, pp. 563-573.

NOT POLICY

Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). "Greed and grievance in civil war", *Oxford Economic Papers*, Volume 56, Issue 4, pp. 563-595.

Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. & Rohner, D. (2006). "Beyond Greed & Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War." Centre for the Study of African Economies. WPS/2006-10.

Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. and Rohner, D. (2009). "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers*, 61(1), 1-27. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1311720> or <http://dx.doi.org/gpn029>

Collier, P. and Vicente, P.C. (2008). "Votes and violence: evidence from a field experiment in Nigeria." Households in Conflict Network, Working Papers Series.

Date-Bah, E. (2003). 'Introduction.' In: Date-Bah, E. (ed.) (2003). *Jobs after War. A Critical Challenge in the Peace and Reconstruction Puzzle*. International Labour Office: Geneva.

DFID (2012). "The research evidence relating to a 'golden thread' of international development: a rapid review." DFID Rapid Review, written by GOSAC, GRD, CHASE and RED Departments, April/May 2012.

Evans, W. (2012). A review of the evidence informing "Building Peaceful States & Societies – DFID Practice Paper. Paper 1: Inclusive Political Settlements."

Fearon, J., and D. Laitin. (2003). "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War", *American Political Science Review*, 97, 75-90.

Ferraz, C. & F. Finan. (2008). "Exposing corrupt politicians: the effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral outcomes." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May 2008.

Fields, G. S. (2011). *Poverty and low earnings in the developing world* [Electronic version]. Retrieved 23 June 2012, from Cornell University, ILR School site: <http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/workingpapers/152>

Fitzsimmons, M. (2008). "Hard Hearts and Open Minds? Governance, Identity and the Intellectual Foundations of Counterinsurgency Strategy." *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 31(3), 337-365.

Foa, R. (2008). *Social Institutions and Human Development*. Social Development Working Papers, 006 (July 2008).

Francois, M. & Sud, I. (2006). "Promoting Stability and Development in Fragile and Failed States." *Development Policy Review*, 24(2), 141-160.

Gaventa, J. & Barrett, G. (2010) "So What Difference Does it Make? Mapping the Outcomes of Citizen Engagement". Citizenship, Participation and Accountability Development Research Centre. Working Paper, Vol., 2010, No. 347. Institute of Development Studies.

Ghani, A., Lockhart, C. and Carnahan, M. (2005). *Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State-Building*. London: Overseas Development Institute.

Goetz, A. & Jenkins, R. (2005). *Reinventing Accountability*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gordon, S., Baker, A., Duten, A. & Garner, P. (2010). "Study exploring the evidence relating health and conflict interventions and outcomes." Commissioned by the UK Cross-Government Group on Health & Conflict.

NOT POLICY

NOT POLICY

- Grynkewich, A.W. (2008). "Welfare as Warfare: How Violent Non-State Groups Use Social Services to Attack the State." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 31(4), 350-370.
- Howell, J. & Lind, J. (2009). "Manufacturing Civil Society and the Limits of Legitimacy: Aid, Security and Civil Society after 9/11 in Afghanistan." *European Journal of Development Research*, 21, 718-736.
- Hyden, G., Court, J. & Mease, K. (2003). "Civil Society and Governance in 16 Developing Countries." World Governance Survey Discussion Paper 4. London: ODI.
- Isham, J., Narayan, D. and L. Pritchett (1995). "Does Participation Improve Performance? Establishing Causality with Subjective Data". *The World Bank Economic Review*, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 175-200.
- Jones and others (2010). 'Stemming Girls Chronic Poverty.' Chronic Poverty Research Centre. Report funded by DFID.
- Khemani, S. (2008). "Does Community Monitoring Improve Public Services? Diverging evidence from Uganda and India." Research Brief, September 16, 2008. Human Development and Public Services Research, World Bank, Washington, D.C.
- Kirk, J. (2007). "Education and fragile states." *Globalisation, Societies and Education*, 5(2), 181-200.
- Korenman, S. & Neumark, D. (1997). "Cohort Crowding and Youth Labor Markets: A Cross-National Analysis, Working Paper 6031." Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Krishnamurty, J. (2003). 'The Labour Market and Conflict.' Chapter 3, in: Date-Bah, E. (ed.) (2003). *Jobs after War. A Critical Challenge in the Peace and Reconstruction Puzzle*. International Labour Office: Geneva.
- Krueger, A.B., and Laitin, D.D. (2008). "Kto Kogo?: A Cross-Country Study of the Origins and Targets of Terrorism", in P. Keefer and N. Loayza (eds.), *Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness*. Cambridge University Press and the World Bank, New York.
- Levi, M., Sacks, A. and Tyler, T. (2009) "Conceptualizing Legitimacy, Measuring Legitimizing Beliefs." *American Behavioral Scientist*, 53(3), 354-75.
- McMillan, M.S. & Rodrik, D. (2011). "Globalization, Structural Change and Productivity Growth." *NBER Working Paper No. 17143*, June 2011.
- McGee, R., and Gaventa, J. (2010). "Review of Impact & Effectiveness of Transparency and Accountability Initiatives: Synthesis Report". Paper prepared for the Transparency & Accountability Initiative Workshop, October 14-15, 2010. Institute of Development Studies.
- McGee, R., and Gaventa, J. (2011). "Shifting Power? Assessing the Impact of Transparency and Accountability Initiatives". Citizenship, Participation and Accountability Development Research Centre. Working Paper, Vol. 2011, No. 383. Institute of Development Studies.
- Miaari, S., Zussman, A., & Zussman, B. (2011). "Employment Restrictions and Political Violence in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict." Discussion Paper Series 2012.04.
- Miguel, E., S. Satyanath, and E. Sergenti. (2004). "Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach", *Journal of Political Economy*, 112: 725-53.

NOT POLICY

NOT POLICY

Narayan, D. (1995). "The Contribution of People's Participation: Evidence from 121 Rural Water Supply Projects." ESD Occasional Paper Series 1. World Bank, Environmentally Sustainable Development Department, Washington, D.C.

ODI (2012). "Social Protection and Basic Services in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations: Global Evidence Paper". Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, ODI: London. Unpublished preliminary research programme output.

Holmes, R., McCord, A., Hagen-Zanker, J., Bergh, G. & Zanker, F. (2012). "The evidence on the impact of employment creation on stability and poverty reduction in fragile states." Systematic Review. Overseas Development Institute. Publication pending.

OECD DAC (2010), *The State's Legitimacy in Fragile Situations – Unpacking Complexity*. 'Conflict & Fragility' series, OECD Publishing.

Ofem, N.I., & Ajayi A.R. (2008). "Effects of youth empowerment strategies on conflict resolutions in the Niger Delta of Nigeria: Evidence from Cross River State." *Journal of Agriculture and Rural Development* 6 (1,2): 139-146.

Olken, B. (2007). "Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia." *Journal of Political Economy*, 115(2).

Osagie, J., Funmilayo, A., Adegoke, F., Samuel, E. (2010). "Causes of conflicts in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria as expressed by the youth in Delta State." *Procedia – Social and Behavioural Sciences*, 5, 82-89.

Palmer, N., Strong, L., Wali, A. & Sondorp, E. (2006). "Contracting out health services in fragile states." *British Medical Journal* (International Ed.), 25 March 2006, vol. 332.

Pandey, P., Goyal, S. and Sundararaman, V. (2009). "Community Participation in Public Schools: Impact of Information Campaigns in three Indian states." *Education Economics*, 17(3).

Papagianni, K. (2008) 'Participation and State Legitimation', in C. Call with V. Wyeth (eds.) *Building States to Build Peace*, Lynne Rienner, USA.

Practical Action Consulting (PAC), CfBT Education Trust, Save the Children, (2011). "State-Building, Peace-Building and Service Delivery in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: Literature Review".

Putnam, R. (1993). *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton University Press; Coffé, H. & Geys, B. (2005). "Institutional Performance And Social Capital: An Application To The Local Government Level." *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 27(5).

Rocha Menocal, A. and Sharma, B. (2008). *Joint Evaluation of Citizen's Voice and Accountability: Synthesis Report*. London: DFID.

Spink, J. (2005). "Education and politics in Afghanistan: the importance of an education system in peacebuilding and reconstruction." *Journal of Peace Education*, 2(2), 195–207.

Sharma, K. (2005). "The political economy of civil war in Nepal." *World Development*, 34(7), 1237-1253.

Stel, N., de Boer, D., & Hilhorst, D. (2012). "Multi-Stakeholder Processes, Service Delivery and State Institutions: Service Provision and the Legitimacy of State Institutions in Situations of Conflict & Fragility. Experiences from Burundi, DR Congo, Nepal and the Palestinian Territories. Synthesis Report." Peace Security & Development Network, No. 00030.

NOT POLICY

NOT POLICY

Stewart, F. (2000). "Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities." *Oxford Development Studies*, 28(3), 245-262.

Stewart, F., Brown, G.K. & Langer, A. (2008). 'Major Findings and Conclusions on the relationship between horizontal inequalities and conflict.' Chapter 13 in: Stewart, F. (ed.). *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

Urdal, H. (2004). "The Devil in the Demographics: The Effect of Youth Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict, 1950-2000." *Social Development Papers* 14, World Bank, Washington, DC.

Urdal, H. (2006). "A clash of generations? Youth bulges and political violence." *International Studies Quarterly*, 50, 607-629.

Van de Walle, S. & Scott, Z. (2011). "The political role of service delivery in state-building: exploring the relevance of European history for developing countries." *Development Policy Review*, 29(1): 5-21.

Ward, J., Lee, B., Baptist, S. & Jackson, H. (2010). 'Evidence for Action: Gender Equality and Economic Growth.' Vivid Economics and Chatham House. Report funded by DFID.

Weatherill, P. (2011). "Note from the field: Targeting the Centre of Gravity." *The RUSI Journal*, 156(4), 90-98.

World Bank (2011). *World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

Whaites, A. (2008). *States in Development – A DFID Discussion Paper*.

Combined Government Social Research Service // LSE Justice & Security RPC approach to grading evidence – abbreviated

The following section reproduces those questions that form the basis of the evidence grading template used to inform the current study. These questions draw from (but do not completely replicate) the UK Government Social Research Service's "[Rapid Evidence Assessment](#)" toolkit. They have been adapted by the London School of Economics' "Justice & Security Research Programme Consortia" for the purposes of a set of Evidence Papers produced in 2011-2012.

The full grading template (an xls. spreadsheet, enabling the calculation of evidence quality scores on the basis of the responses provided) features the following sections:

TYPE OF DATA/INFORMATION

1. How much original evidence data/information does the research paper contain?
 - 1.1. Roughly how much of the work being assessed presents empirical data/information rather than theory, hypothesis or (non-systematic) reviews of other literature?
 - 50% or more?
 - Between 10% and 50%
 - 10% or less.
2. What are the main categories of empirical data/information that the work uses/presents?
 - 2.1. Quantitative, using existing dataset
 - 2.2. Quantitative, gathering own data
 - 2.3. Qualitative, interview based
 - 2.4. Qualitative, ethnographic/participatory observation
 - 2.5. Other primary sources.

QUALITY OF THE METHODOLOGY

3. With reference to the category of empirical data/information selected above, indicate whether you strongly disagree (score = 0), disagree (score = 1), agree (score = 2), or strongly agree (score = 3) with each of the following statements:

For quantitative studies:

- 3.1. **Validity:** the indicators used accurately capture the phenomenon the author is aiming to draw conclusions about (i.e. does the test measure the thing it sets out to measure?)
- 3.2. **Transparency:** the process of compiling the data is transparent. The author provides the source of his/her data and describes how data is collected by a third party.
- 3.3. **Acknowledgement of bias:** potential biases in the data are acknowledged. Data are not missing at random, and where data is missing, explanations are offered.
- 3.4. **Conceptual relationships:** the author distinguishes between associations and correlations (on the one hand) and causation on the other. Where causation is claimed, the author

NOT POLICY

credibly demonstrates the direction of causality (i.e. addresses 'reverse causality' issues). Robustness checks (e.g. sensitivity analysis) are conducted.

- 3.5. **Conclusions:** the conclusions offered are supported by the data. The author considers whether the findings only apply to the specific data presented, or whether or not they can be applied to other cases.

For qualitative studies (including ethnographic/participatory observation, and other primary sources, such as archives, government documents, reports, photographs etc.):

- 3.6. **Validity:** the information collected is adequately representative of the population/group that the research aims to draw conclusions about.
- 3.7. **Transparency:** where data is gathered through interviews, the method for interviewing is clear (i.e. questions sets are presented), the time over which the interviews were conducted is stated, and the number of interviewees consulted is stated.
- 3.8. **Acknowledgement of bias:** potential interview biases are acknowledged and limited/controlled for. E.g. the way in which the respondent may be influenced by the characteristics of the interviewer, or is affected by perceived gains to be made through answering in a particular way.
- 3.9. **Conclusions:** the study shows that the findings are reflective of a good proportion of the interviews.
- 3.10. **Consideration of wider context:** the analysis is contextualised in a broader literature/history. The degree to which findings can be generalised across contexts is considered.

Scores from these different questions can be aggregated to provide an overall score for the credibility of empirical findings. Such a scoring framework cannot be applied to work which is merely conceptual in character.

APPRAISER COMMENTS AND JUDGEMENT

4. In comparison to other literature you have reviewed, how insightful do you consider this work to be in terms of the **data/information** it presents?
 - 4.1. The work presents no new significant data/information
 - 4.2. The work presents some new data/information
 - 4.3. The work presents a considerable amount of data/information
5. In comparison to other literature you have reviewed, how insightful do you consider this work to be in terms of **analysis** presented?
 - 5.1. Offers no significant new analysis/insight
 - 5.2. Offers some new analysis/insight
 - 5.3. Offers a considerable amount of new analysis/insight

The grading template also contains a large 'free text' field for the appraiser to record comments and observations on the research, covering both the methodology employed, and the substantive arguments of the research.

NOT POLICY