Final 1 February 2013

Type of Review: Project Completion Review

Project Title: Interim Support to Education Programme (INSTEP) DFID Kenya

Date started: **December 2010** **Date review undertaken: October 2012**

Output Description	Scale	Outcome Description
Outputs substantially exceeded expectation	A++	Outcome substantially exceeded expectation
Outputs moderately exceeded expectation	A+	Outcome moderately exceeded expectation
Outputs met expectation	A	Outcome met expectation
Outputs moderately did not meet expectation	B	Outcome moderately did not meet expectation
Outputs substantially did not meet expectation	C	Outcome substantially did not meet expectation

Introduction and Context

What support did the UK provide?

The INSTEP programme was approved in December 2010 with an original budget of £9 million**,** provisionally divided between three main components: textbooks for low-cost private schools in slum areas (£3m), building accountability (£3m), and promoting innovation, with a strong focus on improving access and quality in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) (£3m).

- Under the textbook component, textbooks and reference materials were procured by Charles Kendall and Partners Ltd. Support for this component was increased to £5.07 million to allow for a greater number of beneficiary schools and because text books were more expensive than originally estimated due to inflation. In addition, the Kenya Independent Schools Association (KISA) was supported to carry out monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities (£60K) in recipient schools. The additional funding for this component was initially met by reducing the allocation to the accountability component.
- Under the accountability component, support was provided for: an Education Accountability Fund (£400K), the advance publication of school grants (£30K), and a survey of children out of school (£120K), plus annual and completion reviews of the INSTEP programme (£20K), and the business case design for the follow-up programme, the Kenya Essential Education Programme (KEEP) (£50K).
- Under the innovation component, support was provided for: multi-grade schools (implemented by the Aga Khan Foundation – £1.42m), televised education programmes called Know Zone for primary-school age children (implemented by Mediae – £870K), and a scholarship programme (implemented by Equity Foundation – £700K).

Although INSTEP was intended to run for only one year, a cost extension to December 2012 was approved in June 2011. The total cost of INSTEP was increased to £11.2 million, with the additional funding going to the Education Accountability Fund (£1.64m more, making the total £2.04 million), the creation of an integrated database for education (a new allocation of £620K, implemented by the World Bank) and scholarships (£200K more, making a total of £900K).

What were the expected results?

The goal (impact) of the INSTEP was to contribute to keeping Kenya on track to meet MDGs 2 and 3, as indicated by progress in the primary school net enrolment rate (PNER) and the primary school completion rate (PCR).

There was one purpose (outcome): improved access, quality and accountability in both state and low-cost private education systems in Kenya, as measured by three indicators:

- the primary gross enrolment rate in the urban slums;
- the primary gross enrolment rate in the arid lands; and
- average rates of teacher absenteeism.

There were three outputs to be delivered to achieve the planned outcome:

- improved access and quality in private schools in urban slums;
- improved access and quality in state schools in arid lands; and
- improved accountability and financial management.

What was the context in which UK support was provided?

In September 2009, the Kenyan Ministry of Finance unexpectedly announced the discovery of financial mis-management and fraud in the Kenya Education Sector Support Programme (KESSP). DFID Kenya immediately suspended – and later terminated – its support to KESSP which considerably strained relations with the Ministry of Education. The INSTEP was rapidly designed as a temporary measure to bridge the gap between the termination of support to KESSP and the launch of DFID's new long-term programme of support to education in Kenya, the Kenya Essential Education Programme. Its focus on underserved areas, especially urban slums and the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands, and the growing low-cost private education sector was intended to build the foundations for a new DFID education programme.

Despite the challenging circumstances and relative speed with which it was conceived, the INSTEP shows a good balance between some "quick wins" (especially through the provision of textbooks to low-cost private schools in slum areas) and building for the future (through the creation of new partnerships, and work to influence the education reform agenda).

In addition, at the time of INSTEP design, Kenya was undergoing major reforms and developments, including: planning for implementation of the country's new constitution; preparing for the devolution of many powers to new counties; enhanced attention to accountability (partly due to KESSP financial mismanagement); and preparations for national elections in March 2013. The latter, in particular, will be a major watershed for Kenya, with the formation of a new government, the change of key personnel, the probable merging of the two existing education ministries, and the provision of services by the new counties. All of these had, and continue to have, major implications for the education sector. They are compounded by the implications of shutting down KESSP; the heavy pressure and fast timetable for the authorities to revise and reform key education policies and legislation; a tendency for the Development Partners (DPs) in the education sector to become fragmented; and an associated falling back from a comprehensive sector approach.

Section A: Detailed Output Scoring

Output 1: Improved access and quality in private schools in urban slums

Output 1: Final Score C: Output substantially did not meet expectation.

Indicator	Baseline (2009)	Target (2011)	Progress	Rating
Children in slum schools benefitting from DFID-funded textbooks	0	100%	Data concerning the number of children enrolled is not available.	B - Moderately did not meet expectation (see justification below)
In-year drop-out rates in slum schools	Not available	0% (2015)	Drop out data is not available.	C – Substantially did not meet expectation
Slum schools registered with MOE	55% (2010)	70% (2011)	56% (2011)	C- Substantially did not meet expectation

(i) First indicator: Children in slum schools benefitting from textbooks.

There is no doubt that a great deal was achieved in a short period of time through the provision of textbooks to low-cost private schools in slum areas. About 2.6 million books were procured and delivered to 1,100 schools in less than 6 months with nearly 300,000 children benefiting. Most of the books received by the schools were the ones requested (and any deviations were quite small, arising from some consolidation of titles by the procurement agency in order to rationalize the orders from the publishers). As a result, there was a significant increase in book availability in recipient schools and the books appear to be well used. An evaluation report on the textbook distribution programme, produced by the Kenya Independent Schools Association (KISA), suggests that the performance of pupils in beneficiary schools improved subsequent to receipt and use of the textbooks, especially in lower primary classes.

Despite these achievements, the target for this indicator - 100% of children in low-cost private schools in slum areas benefitting from DFID-funded textbooks - was not met. Data concerning overall enrolments in low-cost private schools in slum areas is not available and it is therefore not possible to calculate the proportion of children who benefitted from DFID-funded textbooks. However, since only 88% of the schools registered with the Kenya Independent Schools Association (KISA) received textbooks (1100 schools out of the 1250 schools registered), it is clear that the target cannot have been met.

The target was ambitious and a number of factors complicate its *genuine* achievement. First, books were only delivered to schools registered with KISA, whereas there is at least one other association of private schools in the urban slums, the National Association of Complementary Schools. Second, even with an exclusive focus on KISA-registered schools, the number of schools registered with KISA has grown rapidly to a current high of 1,710. These issues alone would have made it extremely challenging for the project to achieve a target of all children in low-cost private schools in slum areas today benefitting from DFID-funded textbooks. However, given that the budget agreed for textbooks did not take into account a potential growth in the number of low-cost private schools or schools registered with organisations other than KISA, success against this indicator has been measured against the number of schools registered with KISA at the time of project approval. Given also that enrolment data is not available for all low-cost private schools in slum areas, success has been assessed against the number of schools which received textbooks rather than the number of beneficiary children as a proportion of overall enrolments. 88% of KISA-registered schools received textbooks. The project therefore moderately did not meet expectations.

The score for this indicator is B.

(ii) Second indicator: In-year drop-out rates in slum schools.

There is no baseline value in the logframe, no target for 2011, and no reliable data available on in-year dropout rates for schools in slum areas therefore this precise indicator cannot be assessed. It is, however, an important indicator. For many years, it was believed that only about one third of children in slum areas were going to school. It is now understood that only one third of children in slum areas attend *state* schools but that a far greater proportion attend private institutions. A survey into out-of-school children[1] funded and commissioned under the INSTEP concluded that there was only 0.2% non-enrolment in Nairobi slums and only 3% of children "ever drop out". Absenteeism rates are worse but even these appear to be falling. A monitoring and evaluation exercise carried out by KISA in the schools which received DFID-funded textbooks found that the total rate of absenteeism was 9.9% for girls and 9.3% for boys in January 2011 decreasing to 9.0% for girls and 8.3% for boys in May 2011. While both surveys do not relate to all urban slum areas in Kenya and are based on sample surveys, they are suggestive of much higher enrolment figures in slum areas than previously understood and represent valuable new data.

Interviews with Ministry of Education officials revealed a lack of awareness of the textbook distribution programme, resentment against a perceived lack of collaboration, and widespread resistance to the idea that low-cost private schools have a role to play in achieving quality Education for All in Kenya.. This suggests that any new programme of support to low-cost private schools will need to focus on greater collaboration with the Ministry of Education to support a greater enabling environment for the low-cost private schools sector.

There is a question also around whether textbooks could have had a significant impact on dropout rates. Since low-cost private schools in urban areas typically do not buy textbooks for pupils, the assumption underlying this activity would appear to be that the provision of textbooks would eliminate the need for households to procure textbooks themselves which would in turn free up resources for school fees and lead to greater attendance by pupils. Since several studies in Kenya have established that the key determinant of school dropout is cost there is evidence to support this assumption. However, textbooks are only one of the many costs both direct (e.g. uniforms) and indirect (e.g lost labour) that households bear in relation to education and there was no attempt to quantify the impact of this intervention on attendance (which would be a very difficult exercise anyway).Given, therefore, that it is not possible to demonstrate that dropout rates in slums have diminished nor to prove that DFID-funded textbooks would have likely caused such an effect, it is impossible to conclude the target for this indicator was met or indeed to determine progress of any kind.

[1] Out of School Children Survey – Kenya, ToshibaMax Ltd, 2012

The score for this indicator is therefore C.

Third indicator: Slum schools registered with MOE.

The logframe establishes that 55% of low-cost private schools were registered with MoE in 2010 and sets a target of 70% for 2011. There are problems with assessing performance against this indicator. First, 1,250 schools had registered with KISA by 2009 while only 500 had registered with MoE. This represents 40% of those registered with KISA. The baseline was therefore inaccurate. In addition, as outlined above, many more schools may have been registered with other private school organisations, and the number of schools registered with KISA has continued to grow. As a result, the project target of 70% of current slum schools registered with MoE was ambitious if not unrealistic. By 2011, MoE had registered 700 schools (56% of the 1250 schools registered with KISA in 2010 and only 41% of the 1,710 schools registered with KISA in 2012). The target has therefore not been met, although against the actual baseline (40%) reasonable progress has been made. This said, MoE will need to make major efforts to register more than 1000 existing low-cost private schools and for this reason – as well as the figures shown - it is assessed that this activity substantially did not meet expectation.

The score for this indicator is C.

Final score.

The scores for the three indicators for the first output of the INSTEP are respectively B, C and C, which would suggest an overall average of C if roughly equal weights are given to each of these indicators. Outside of these indicators, however, there is cause to believe that access to private schools in urban slums has indeed improved. The number of low-cost private schools registered with KISA has increased by 30% (from 1,250 to 1,710) in around two years, although it is impossible to determine whether these are start-ups (new enrolments) or existing schools which have chosen to register (no additional enrolments). Recent studies also suggest that quality in low-cost private schools in urban slums is at least as good as state schools and, in some cases, better. It is not possible to determine the extent to which DFID-funded textbooks have contributed to these trends. On the basis of incomplete data for the selected indicators, an overall score of more than C is difficult to justify.

The overall score for this output is therefore C.

Impact Weighting: 30%
Revised since last Annual Review? N

Risk: Medium
Revised since last Annual Review? N

Output 2: Improved access and quality in state schools in arid lands

Output 2: Final Score A: Output met expectation.

Original Indicator	Revised Indicator (2011)	Baseline (2010)	Target (2012)	Progress (2012)	Rating
Additional multi-grade school places created	Number of children benefitting from DFID-funded alternative teaching methods	0	111,000 children	116,000 children	A - Met expectation
Teachers trained in multi-grade instruction	Number of teachers trained in alternative teaching methods through DFID funding	0	886 teachers	999 teachers	A+ - Moderately exceeded expectation
Number of children benefitting from DFID-funded scholarships	As original indicator	0	600 children (400 girls; 200 boys)	599 Children	A – Met expectation

(i) First indicator: Number of children benefitting from alternative teaching practices (funded by DFID)

In July 2011, a revised logframe was agreed between DFID and the implementing partner, Aga Khan Foundation. This established the new performance indicators outlined in the table above. Alternative teaching methods was agreed to include multi-grade teaching and learning approaches, and Reading To Learn methodologies. These have been implemented in North-East Province (NEP) and in Coast Province, which cover large tracts of Arid and Semi-Arid Lands. 116,000 children have benefitted from these teaching methods, almost 5% more than the target of 111,000. The target was therefore met.

The score for this indicator is A.

(ii) Second indicator: Teachers trained in alternative teaching methods

999 teachers were trained, 12% more than the target of 886. The target was thus moderately exceeded.

The score for this indicator is A+.

(iii) Third indicator: Number of children benefitting from scholarships.

The target for this indicator is 600. 599 children from urban slums and the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands are receiving scholarships. The target was therefore met.

The score for this indicator is A.

Final result:

The scores for the three indicators for the second output of the project are A, A+ and A based on the revised logframe. This implies an average score for this output of A. While it is important to recognise the success achieved by the Aga Khan Foundation and Equity Bank programmes, going forward it is will be equally important to understand how these and other interventions can be taken to scale to improve education service delivery across all state schools in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands. Critical to this objective will be effective collaboration with the Ministry of Education to ensure appropriate understanding and ownership of programme objectives and activities. To date, Ministry of Education officials have had little interaction with the Aga Khan Foundation programme. Nevertheless, output indicators met their targets.

The overall score for this output is therefore A.

Impact Weighting: 25%
Revised since last Annual Review? N

Risk: Medium
Revised since last Annual Review? N

Output 3: Improved accountability and financial management

Output 3: Final Score B: Output moderately did not meet expectation.

Indicator	Baseline (2010)	Target (2011)	Progress	Rating
School management committees with advance notice of MOE grants	Not available	95%	65% (Uwezo Annual Learning Assessment Report)	C - Substantially did not meet expectation
Schools with established trust funds	12 schools	500 Schools	32 trusts established	C - Substantially did not meet expectation
Implementation of agreed actions from 2009 extended forensic audit	0%	50% of agreed actions	Limited evidence to assess and score.	B - Moderately did not meet expectation
Proportion of teachers managed by schools	11.8%	20% (2011)	22.6% in 2011 (Uwezo Report, 2011)	A+ - Moderately exceeded expectation

(i) First indicator: School management committees with advance notice of MOE grants.

The target for this indicator was 95%. The 2011 Uwezo Annual Learning Assessment Report indicates that about 65% of schools are receiving the required information. The target was not achieved. It is not clear why the Ministry of Education, despite offers of technical assistance from DFID Kenya, has been slow to make progress on this important activity. Going forward, the new National Integrated Education Management Information System will play an important role in providing publicly-available information on school financing. The database will bring together data from the Ministry of Education, the Teachers' Service Commission and the Kenya National Examinations Council to provide a comprehensive picture of what is happening in education in Kenya in an accessible and publicly available manner.

The score for this indicator is C.

(ii) Second indicator: Schools with established trust funds.

The target for this indicator was 500. It was originally intended that Equity Bank would be funded to support the establishment of trust funds. However, it was not possible to develop and fund this programme for reasons related to the availability of appropriate DFID funding mechanisms. In its place, a grant was provided to the Kenya Wildlife Services to establish 32 trust funds through the Education Accountability Fund, which is a part of DFID Kenya's broader Drivers of Accountability Programme. 32 trusts were indeed established. Despite this, the very modest scale of achievement and the fact that the logframe, against which this review must score, was not revised to reflect the significantly reduced outputs lead to the conclusion that the indicator was not met.

The score for this indicator is thus C.

(iii) Third indicator: Implementation of agreed actions from 2009 extended forensic audit

The target for the implementation of the recommendations was 50%. This is a very difficult indicator to assess and score for the following reasons:

- It is a significant task in itself. The audit report has 79 recommendations and it would be necessary to triangulate and verify the data in order to be confident about the progress made;
- A team with separate financial management, information systems and audit expertise would be needed to make a fully impartial and independent assessment; and
- It would be necessary to "weight" the audit recommendations in order to make a meaningful judgement on genuine progress in improving financial management.

The following should be viewed as a preliminary judgement on progress made**,** based on the (sometimes anecdotal) information collected in this review. In understanding the scoring process, the following should be borne in mind.

- Many of the audit's recommendations (e.g. the effective implementation of new guidelines for financial management at the school level) cannot be assessed without additional information and field visits.
- Much of the information and data used was obtained from MOE staff. This raises the question of independence of view, although the findings were corroborated by the Internal Audit Office of the Ministry of Finance.
- It is difficult to establish the extent to which the INSTEP has in any way driven progress against implementation of audit recommendations. It was not designed to achieve this specific objective, although activities under Output 3 were expected to contribute to increased transparency and accountability at the school level.

The review found that significant progress had been made on some of the key recommendations in the audit report as highlighted below

- There have been some prosecutions of MOE staff and some cases are still in court (with uncertainty as to their outcome).
- All reimbursements owed to DPs have been made.
- Key finance and accounting staff in the MOE have been sacked or moved and new staff appointed.
- Changes have been made to some key MOE accounting procedures:

    - Money for training activities now goes straight to the institutions (through use of Local Purchase Orders instead of cash).

    - There are new templates and procedures/safeguards now being used in the MOE, including with a reduction in the maximum size of imprests.

    - Directors have been made clearly responsible for the funds handled by their officials within their respective department.

    - There is a new Chart of Accounts in use.
- The "database" for school grants has apparently been strengthened. According to the MOE Chief Accountant, the Free Primary Education database is now "very secure", while the database for secondary schools is "not yet fully secure".
- For the disbursement of funds to schools, funds now go directly to school accounts from the Central Bank.
- The investigation into the "missing" K Sh. 1.9 billion from KESSP continues.
- Work has been launched to establish unique identification numbers for all schools.
- The MOE Internal Audit Unit has been strengthened.
- Some progress has been made with the implementation of the IFMIS in the education sector. Some modules are in full use, including the plan-to-budget module, the accounts module, and the reporting module; other modules are in partial use, such as the procurement module; while others have not yet been operationalised, such as the human resources module.

There will soon be a comprehensive review of financial management and governance in the sector, to be undertaken by the World Bank, and this should provide an independent judgement on progress achieved. In the present circumstances, it is not possible to conclude irrefutably from the information available that the indicator target has been *fully* met. However, it is clear that significant steps forward have been made in implementing some of the important recommendations from the forensic audit, and that "travel is in the right direction".

The most likely and appropriate conclusion at this stage is that the output moderately did not meet expectation.

The score for this indicator is therefore B.

(iv) Fourth indicator: Proportion of teachers managed by schools.

The target for this indicator is 20%. Through the Education Accountability Fund (EAF), DFID aimed to support activities that would encourage the decentralisation of teacher management from the Teachers Service Commission (TSC) to schools to strengthen school level accountability and improve learning outcomes. The EAF provided grants a range of non-state actors to facilitate their engagement with policy makers on teacher reforms. These actors fed substantially into the finalisation of the TSC bill, which has a strong focus on implementing more robust mechanisms for teacher quality management. The TSC Bill is now law. This is a significant achievement but has not contributed to progress against the indicator.
Nevertheless, according to the Uwezo Report, 2011, the proportion of teachers managed by schools has increased from 11.8% in 2010 to 22.6% in 2011. This is a significant and rapid increase which merits recognition. The target was exceeded.

The score for this indicator is A+.

Final results:

The scores for the four indicators for the third output of the project are respectively C, C, B and A+. Taken together, this would suggest an overall average score for this output of B. The output itself is far-reaching and of great importance for the sector. Progress towards greater transparency and financial management will, inter alia, depend on the effective implementation of the recommendations of the 2009 forensic audit meaning that greatest weight should be given to the third indicator (which scored B). Since there appears to be a genuine commitment in GoK to taking these recommendations forward and some progress in doing so, an overall score of B is deemed appropriate.

Impact Weighting: 45%

Revised since last Annual Review? N

Risk: Medium
Revised since last Annual Review? N

Section B: Results and Value for Money.

1. Achievement and Results

1.1 Has the logframe been changed since the last review?

The logframe was changed in July 2011 with respect to the Aga Khan Foundation programme. A more comprehensive revision of the entire logframe was also drafted in early 2012, but was never submitted for formal approval. Not having updated the logframe to populate baselines and targets, fully reflect programme activities and realistically reflect what could be achieved over a relatively short timeframe has made this review difficult and possibly lowered the final score given.

1.2 Final Outputs score and description: B. Outputs moderately did not meet expectation.

In summary, the INSTEP was modestly successful in influencing policy and laying foundations for the future both for a new DFID programme and for progress in the sector more broadly. The project's achievements include the following (note some of the points below have not previously been raised as they relate to elements of the programme that were not reflected in the logframe):

- There was an appropriate focus on the under-served areas of the country, especially the urban slums and the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands and the often-neglected wildlife conservation areas.
- The INSTEP supported a major initiative with the private sector through collaboration with the Kenya Independent Schools Association and textbook distribution to low-cost private schools in urban slums. The rapid growth in this sector coupled with the challenges associated with expanding state provision of education mean that this will be an important focus for DFID and other Development Partners in the short- to medium-term.
- Other strategic partnerships were also developed, for example, with the Elimu Yetu Coalition, and there appears to have been some important impact on the evolving reform process (for example, through discussions around the Education Bill and the new Teachers Service Commission Act, 2012).
- Funds were well and quickly used on the procurement and distribution of textbooks (50% of total spending), and the textbooks seem to have had a positive impact on learning by pupils in the slum schools.
- There were also direct benefits from the INSTEP through scholarships and the Know Zone programmes (where there is some clear evidence of impact). However, the research results on the Aga Khan Foundation programme (funded by the Hewlett Foundation) do not suggest significant benefits (at least yet) from its Reading To Learn programme (in contrast to the emerging results from the parallel Research Triangle International programme which DFID will fund under the new education programme).
- There were some interesting pilots and results relating to new or improved teaching methodologies (including multi-grade). Innovations included the focus of the Know Zone programmes on standard 6 pupils and the development of systems for SMS feedback.
- There was an important extension of earlier accountability initiatives (including through the National Taxpayers Association, World Vision and school trusts etc). The accountability grants are going in the right direction (through the pilots and influence on policy development), even if it is too early to see many specific results.
- The project helped with the mainstreaming of Special Needs Education and the enactment of a Disability Bill.
- An important start has been made to the development of an integrated database; and, if fully implemented in the future, this could have a major positive effect on accountability in the sector.

However, the INSTEP faced two major challenges.

- First, it is difficult to tell a clear story around results. Some baseline information is missing; some output targets are over-ambitious; others inaccurate; and a number poorly linked to actual project activities (making it difficult to understand how progress was intended to happen). There are also very serious concerns about the accuracy of the data from the Education Management Information System for two main reasons. First, EMIS data is revised on a regular basis with little transparency around the rational for such revisions. As a result, multiple data sets are available for a given school year. Second, “national” data is often based on limited data returns from school and county officials.

- Second, implementation was delayed. The textbook component was done quickly in the first year, but many other activities suffered significant delays, in particular the allocation of grants under the Education Accountability Fund, some of which were only awarded in April 2011. As a result, a number of activities will continue beyond the one-year INSTEP extension.

The scores and weights for the three outputs are respectively:

Output 1 (30%) C

Output 2 (25%) A

Output 3 (45%) B

The overall and final score for the project is B. This represents both an average of the three output scores and captures the score of the most significantly weighted output. It is also a fair representation of the project’s overall achievements. While a small number of components were largely successful, very many others missed their targets. Notably, the only output to meet expectations only did so following a substantial revision of that component’s indicators late into project implementation.

1.3 Direct feedback from beneficiaries

In undertaking this PCR, field trips were made to (i) two schools in the large Kibera slum, Nairobi and (ii) a school in the Coast. In addition, while in Mombasa, discussions were held with (i) teachers from North Eastern Province who travelled to Mombasa to meet with the PCR team, and (ii) government officials and county staff who had also gathered for a discussion with DFID and the PCR team. The main conclusion from the discussions in Kibera was that the textbooks provided by DFID were appreciated, and that they were contributing to improved teaching and learning. At a school in the Coast, it was possible to view alternative teaching approaches in use, and specifically the Reading To Learn strategy. The latter seemed to be popular with both teachers and pupils, and there was informal feedback of its positive impact. Teachers explained how they were using multi-grade teaching, and commented on its possibilities and constraints.

Implementing partners

Meetings were held with almost all implementing partners. In general, feedback was positive for each of the three components of the project.

1.4 Overall Outcome score and description:

Outcome: Improved access, quality and accountability in both state and low-cost private education systems in Kenya

Overall outcome score and description: C: Outcome substantially did not meet expectation.

Indicator	Baseline (%)	Target % (2011)	Progress % (2012)	Rating
Primary gross enrolment rate in urban slums.	N/A	N/A	N/A	C Substantially did not meet expectation
Primary gross enrolment rate in arid lands.	**45.5** Girls: 39 Boys: 52 (2007, EMIS)	**59.5** Girls: 53 Boys: 66 (EMIS)	**39.5** (EMIS) Disaggregated data not available	C Substantially did not meet expectation
Average rates of teacher absenteeism.	**13** (2011, UWEZO)	**10**	**11** (2012, UWEZO)	B Moderately did not meet expectation

(i) First indicator: Primary gross enrolment rate in urban slums.

No target was specified for this indicator in the logframe, nor was baseline information provided. This makes a judgement on performance impossible. However, both the 2009 census report and the DFID-funded out-of-school report found very high rates of school enrolment in urban slums, with the majority enrolled in low-cost private schools. The available evidence, therefore, suggests high rates of primary gross enrolment in urban slums. Despite this, with no target against which to assess expectation, and with weak evidence to indicate that the provision of textbooks alone could significantly impact on enrolment rates, it is assessed that this indictor was not met.

The score for this indicator is therefore C

(ii) Second indicator: Primary gross enrolment rate in arid lands.

The baseline and targets for this indicator are derived from the four districts of Wajir, Mandera, Turkana and Marsabit. INSTEP activities, however, did not take place in all of these districts. It is not clear how short-term project activities were intended to change enrolment rates in non-participating districts. Even in participating districts, teacher training activities focussed on children already enrolled in classrooms so it is not clear which INSTEP activities could have contributed towards improved enrolment.

Nevertheless, 2012 data from the EMIS provides an average primary gross enrolment rate of 39.5% for the four districts. This is a disappointing decline from an already very low baseline. The expectation of the project was substantially not met.

Score: C

(iii) Third indicator: Average rates of teacher absenteeism.

The target for this indicator is 10%. Although evidence for teacher absenteeism is sparse, the Uwezo annual surveys, based on large, representative samples do reveal that absenteeism has diminished from 13% in 2011 to 11% in 2012. The target was, therefore, not quite met but the trend appears to be in the right direction.

The INSTEP anticipated that decentralising teacher management from the Teachers Service Commission to school level would result in reduced rates of absenteeism. It was expected that enhanced accountability of teachers to School Management Committees would facilitate close monitoring of attendance and speed up the resolution of teacher disciplinary cases. Only one fifth of teachers are managed at the school level and no data exists to demonstrate whether this arrangement has improved teacher performance.

The National Taxpayers Association (NTA) received a grant of £275,000 through DAI to enhance governance and accountability in the education sector in Kenya through School Report Cards. NTA have engaged with 2,500 schools out of a total of 23,000 public primary schools across the country to enhance citizens' monitoring of education service delivery through School Report Cards. While this is a positive development, with only around 11% of primary schools in the country participating, considerable progress will be required before a national impact can be expected.

Despite the limitations of these interventions, evidence suggests that progress has been made in reducing average rates of teacher absenteeism and it is therefore assessed that the project's expectations were only moderately not met.

Score: B

Final result: C

Scores for Outcome Indicators 1, 2 and 3 are C, C and B respectively. Across all three indicators, it is difficult to trace a line of sight from project activities to anticipated outcomes and to determine meaningful contribution. In fact, given the short timeframe of project activities, their narrow geographic focus, relatively small budget and the lack of close collaboration with MoE, it is not unreasonable to speculate that progress at the outcome level cannot be significantly attributed to DFID-funded activities. This said, as evidenced in earlier sections, the INSTEP did make some tangible differences to education in low-cost private schools in slum areas and laid the foundations for the Kenya Essential Education Programme. However, progress against the outcome indicators has been limited. Although enrolment rates in urban slums appear high, there is no national data to confirm this. Enrolment rates in the four specified arid districts have dropped and teacher absenteeism rates remain high. Given these facts, it is difficult to assess that the INSTEP met its expectations in relation to outcomes.

1.5 Impact and Sustainability

Impact and Sustainability				
Goal: Kenya on track to meet MDGs 2 & 3				
Indicator	**Baseline % (2009)**	**Target % (2011)**	**Progress % (2011)**	
Primary school net enrolment rate	**92.9** Girls: 92.1 Boys: 93.6	**94.5** Girls: 94 Boys: 95	**95.7** Girls: 95.5 Boys: 95.9	
Primary school completion rate	**83.2** Girls: 78.2 Boys: 88.3	**84.5** Girls: 80 Boys: 89	**80.3** Girls: 78.6 Boys: 81.9	

Data Source: EMIS

(i) First indicator: Primary school net enrolment rate.

The target for the first indicator was a national enrolment rate of 94% for girls and 95% for boys. According to the EMIS, the rates were 95.5% for girls and 95.9% for boys. Both targets were therefore exceeded although, as outlined above, there are concerns around the quality of the EMIS.

(ii) Second indicator: Primary school completion rate (PCR)

The baseline for this indicator was 78.2% for girls and 88.3% for boys. The targets were 80% for girls and 89% for boys. The latest figures (for 2011) from the MOE show that the respective PCRs for girls and boys were 78.6% and 81.9%. This suggests that the PCR for girls increased marginally but did not reach the target. However, for boys there was a significant decline in the PCR rate. There is no obvious explanation for this decline nor is there a clear reason for the sudden and significant difference in performance between girls and boys.

2. Costs and timescale

2.1 Was the project completed within budget / expected costs: Yes

There was a cost extension in January 2012 to £11.2 million, and this included a particularly big increase in the budget for the accountability grants. The table shows the spending position as at October 2012. There is an unspent balance of 11.6% (£1.3 million out of £11.2 million).

Account Code (T)	Total Project Budget	Actual Spend	

			Project budget left to spend
Mediae - Knowzone	870,000.00	840,000.00	30,000.00
Education Accountability Fund	2,040,000.00	2,040,000.00	0.00
Equity Group Foundation Scholarships	920,000.00	840,000.00	80,000.00
Procurement of text books	5,070,000.00	5,060,000.00	10,000.00
Innovative approaches to improve education	1,420,000.00	790,000.00	630,000.00
National Integrated Education Management Information System	620,000.00	620,000.00	0.00
Other – incl M&E KISA	290,000.00	280,000.00	10,000.00
Interim Support to Education Programme (Total)	**11,230,000.00**	**10,470,000.00**	**760,000.00**

2.2 Key cost drivers

The key cost driver for the INSTEP was the textbooks which accounted for 47% of the total spend (£2.07 million more than originally estimated as a result of inflation). The cost of the integrated data base rose to £619K in response to the inability of the World Bank to co-fund this programme as originally anticipated.

2.3 Was the project completed within the expected timescale: No.

The INSTEP experienced significant delays although the textbook component was implemented to schedule. Delays were at least in part caused by capacity gaps in the DFID Kenya Education Team, who were required to spend considerable time on issues related to the KESSP fraud.

Grants from the Education Accountability Fund started in the second year of the project with an agreed end date of 2014.

3. Evidence and Evaluation

3.1 Assess any changes in evidence and what this meant for the project.

The INSTEP has generated some important information for education planning in the sector. This includes: information from the monitoring and evaluation by KISA of low-cost private schools; forthcoming data from the Know Zone programme on learning by standard 6 pupils; and new research by AKF into the effectiveness of multi-grade teaching and learning and other teaching methodologies.

3.2 Set out what plans are in place for an evaluation.

NA

4. Risk

4.1 Risk Rating (overall project risk): Medium

Did the Risk Rating change over the life of the project? No

4.2 Risk funds not used for purposes intended

There is no evidence of mis-use of INSTEP funds.

4.3 Climate and Environment Impact

NA

5. Value for Money

5.1 Performance on VfM measures

Overall, there are grounds for arguing that INSTEP provided reasonable Value For Money, certainly with regards to investments in textbooks, which accounted for nearly 50% of project investments and which were delivered efficiently and met a genuine and pressing need.

In terms of *economy*, and against the background of the KESSP fraud experience, the strategy for textbook procurement appears to have been appropriate[2]. For the textbook component, DFID allocated a sum of money for the procurement and supply of textbooks. KISA had the role of identifying the recipient schools, establishing their enrolment numbers and number of grades, and building the information into a database to be used for the textbook procurement. KISA were also responsible for establishing the titles and quantities of books to be supplied to each school. Only titles listed in the MOE's Orange Book (which sets out MoE-approved titles) were selected. Based on KISA's database on the schools and their list of titles/quantities, the total quantity of each title to be procured was established; and the relevant publishers were informed of their titles to be bought and the quantities required. In most cases this involved the publisher undertaking a reprint. At the same time, about 20 booksellers were selected across the country to distribute the textbooks. The booksellers were invited to grant their best discount rate. In general terms, bookseller discounts were in the range 10% to 20% (based on the Orange Book approved prices). Schools to be supplied were allocated to the booksellers according to location and region. The booksellers ordered books from the publishers, supplied the schools, and obtained signed delivery notes (which were returned for vetting and approval). Once approved, the bookseller was paid in full, usually within 30/45 days of submitting their invoice.

There were some disadvantages to this approach. First, the short time frame was unrealistic and caused strains for data collection and procedures. Second, the method employed by KISA in building the database lacked adequate management controls. Third, only a small number of booksellers were utilised, which hinders the development of the main body of booksellers. Fourth, there was not adequate printing capacity to handle the simultaneous reprinting of 80-100 titles.

However, there were also some important advantages to this approach. First, it is now known what additional discount is likely to be forthcoming from booksellers. Second, the selected

[2] This analysis borrows heavily from communications with Charles Bayley and Keith Burchell of Charles Kendall Partners Ltd.

booksellers were in control of the supply process and could not be dictated to by head teachers looking for or demanding deals. The selected booksellers "bought into" the concept of books for the low-cost private schools and were determined to see the project succeed. Third, booksellers were paid promptly, as were all the publishers. According to the implementing agencies used, many of the booksellers and publishers praised the approach taken, claiming that the majority of loop holes, which have bedevilled textbook distributions in Kenya, had been blocked.

Whether or not the INSTEP approach to textbook procurement should be repeated in the longer term is an open question. The alternative approach earlier used by the MOE with grants being given to schools may have advantages through greater school and parental empowerment. But given the experience of the KESSP and some dubious practices around textbook procurement in the past, it does seem that the INSTEP approach was appropriate and good value for money in the current circumstances.

In contrast to the textbooks, where the prices paid were competitive, the scholarships provided through the Wings To Fly programme have high unit costs. Under Wings to Fly, each scholar receives between $5,000-8,000 for a 4-year secondary education course to cover tuition, fees, uniforms, pocket money and transport. No full cost analysis has been done, but scholars' support is pegged on school fee statements**.** A scholarship programme (for girls) run by UNICEF costs $1,000 dollars per year ($ 4,000 for the 4 years). However, the Wings to Fly programme includes mentoring and leadership activities so cannot be compared with the UNICEF programme which does not. This said, there is scope to re-assess the Wings to Fly scholarship levels.

In terms of *efficiency*, the INSTEP also provided reasonable Value for Money. The Education Accountability Fund is built upon the on-going Drivers of Accountability Programme, run by DAI. The Aga Khan Foundation programme was also an extension of an existing programme. Scholarships were provided through the on-going multi-donor funded Equity Bank programme. It is further expected that the overhead unit costs for the Wings to Fly programme will come down over time as the number of scholarships increases.

In terms of *effectiveness*, the Kenya Independent Schools Association evaluation of the textbook programme concluded that recipient schools achieved improved test scores although these conclusions are based on a small sample.

5.2 Commercial Improvement and Value for Money

NA

5.3 Role of project partners

Under INSTEP effective partnerships were developed with the World Bank around the integrated database, and with USAID around Reading To Learn approaches. With some exceptions (such as the National Taxpayers Association scorecards), there was marginal collaboration with MOE on the INSTEP, at least at more senior levels. At the level of implementing partners, the Aga Khan Foundation delivered tangible (if modest) results on the ground but did so in relative isolation from the Ministry of Education at the national level limiting their influence over national policies. Equity Bank has proven effective in bringing partners, including the Ministry of Education, together around a shared set of objectives although there are clearly different incentives for the various partners (corporate social responsibility vs core development mandates) and some questions around whether Equity Bank contributions are sufficient. DAI have provided a valuable and effective service in managing the Education Accountability Fund and this has allowed for a more harmonised approach to governance and accountability in DFID Kenya. In addition, the DFIDK Education Team have benefitted from the additional technical capacity provided to them by DAI.

5.4 Did the project represent Value for Money : Y

Although the INSTEP did not fully meet its ambitious expectations, it made solid investments in textbooks, built strategic relationships with key partners and laid the foundations for further investments under the new DFID education programme. Some investments - Know Zone, the integrated database, and the Education Accountability Fund - are longer term dividends which are likely to continue to deliver results. Given the context in which the INSTEP was designed and delivered – a difficult relationship between the Ministry of Education and its Development Partners, uncertainty around the ultimate outcomes of the fiduciary audit of the KESSP. and the need for rapid implementation – the project found a reasonable balance between economy, efficiency and effectiveness and delivered some tangible (textbooks) and potentially transformational (the integrated database) results and represents therefore reasonable value for money.

6. Conditionality

6.1 Update on specific conditions
NA

7. Conclusions

In summary, the INSTEP was modestly successful in delivering genuine results on the ground and in influencing policy and laying foundations for the future both for a new DFID programme and for progress in the sector more broadly. The focus on low-cost private schools was strategic – these have a meaningful role to play in getting all children into school in Kenya – and the geographic emphasis on the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands was an appropriate concentration of limited resources. Data remains a significant challenge to progress in the sector and for this reason DFID's investments in the new database will be potentially ground breaking. The lack of scale in some investments, in particular scholarships and the Aga Khan Foundation programme, mean that their longer term impact may be minimal but it will be important to focus on what lessons can be learned for national policies. Although the INSTEP worked *despite* the lack of effective engagement with the Ministry of Education, the effectiveness of future DFID investments in the sector will depend on DFID's ability to develop a closer and more influential relationship with the Ministry.

Although many lessons have been learned from the INSTEP, three stand out.

1. The original INSTEP logframe and design were both over-ambitious. This lies at least in part at the heart of the INSTEP's failure to fully deliver on expectations. The logframe lacked rigour in assessing what data was available and robust.

2. Revisions to the programme and its logframe were not officially captured and approved. This allowed confusion to grow around expected results.

3. The contribution of project activities to project outputs was not clear. Greater realism about potential project results would have facilitated a more realistic assessment of whether the project was successful.

8. Review Process

The review was carried out by an independent team of two consultants, employing methodology that involved gathering of evidence from beneficiaries during field visits, from implementing partners, and from GOK, as well as collecting data to inform the assessment of progress. It took 28 days to complete the assignment. The DFID Kenya team edited the draft report and determined the scores recorded here. The independent consultants had given a more positive review, taking account of varied data linked to the programme, but it was felt that this could not be justified given DFID's requirements to base reviews very clearly on the logframe. The overall score for project outputs (B) remained the same under both the consultants' original review and the later review by DFID Kenya. The outcome score was revised down by DFID Kenya from the B originally provided by the consultants to a C in response to new data provided by the Ministry of Education on gross enrolment rates in the arid lands.