

# INDEPENDENT EVALUATION AND STRATEGIC REVIEW OF THE SOUTH ASIA FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY INITIATIVE (SAFANSI)

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## ACRONYMS

AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
BRLP	Bihar Rural Livelihoods Project
CPS	Country Partnership Strategy
DFID	Department for International Development
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FNS	Food and Nutrition Security
GAIN	Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition
GHI	Global Hunger Index
ICDS	Integrated Child Development Services
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IMR	Infant Mortality Rate
IYCF	Infant and Young Child Feeding
LANSA	Leveraging Agriculture for Nutrition in South Asia
LBW	Low Birth Weight
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MMR	Maternal Mortality Rate
MNCH	Maternal, Newborn and Child Health
MSSRF	MS Swaminathan Research Foundation
NRLM	National Rural Livelihoods Programme
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
RCT	Randomised Control Trials
REACH	Renewed Effort Against Child Hunger and under-nutrition
SAFANSI	South Asia Food and Nutrition Security Initiative
SAR	South Asia Region
SUN	Scaling Up Nutrition
TAC	Technical Advisory Committee
TOC	Theory of Change
WASH	Water Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Program

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## Table of Contents

ACRONYMS .....	2
Executive Summary .....	7
Background .....	7
The South Asia Food and Nutrition Security Initiative (SAFANSI): what it does and why .....	7
Nature of the Evaluation .....	7
Results to date.....	8
The Theory of Change underpinning SAFANSI and the Results Framework .....	9
Relevance.....	10
Effectiveness .....	10
Efficiency and Value for Money.....	11
Broader development principles.....	11
Key Conclusions and Recommendations.....	12
Chapter One: Background to the Evaluation and Approach Taken .....	15
SAFANSI: a brief overview .....	15
Purpose of the evaluation, method and approach, and launch of the evaluation process.....	16
Strengths, and limitations, of the evaluation process .....	19
Chapter Two: the SAFANSI approach, the Theory of Change, and the Results Framework .....	20
The importance – but limitations – of a sound Theory of Change.....	20
SAFANSI’s Theory of Change .....	20
What the SAFANSI Theory of Change got right .....	21
What the Theory of Change, and subsequent design, did not get right .....	23
What the Theory of Change needs to now consider in the light of experience to date.....	25
Implications of the Theory of Change for the Results Framework .....	28
Chapter Three: Is SAFANSI still relevant? .....	31
Continued relevance of FNS at the global level .....	31
Continued relevance within South Asia.....	33
At the regional level .....	33
At the country level .....	34
The relevance of this to SAFANSI .....	35
Chapter Four: Effectiveness .....	36
Effectiveness of SAFANSI in influencing development partners’ approach to FNS .....	36
Within the World Bank .....	36
Within bilateral agencies .....	39
Within other multilateral agencies and other organisations .....	40

The importance of country context.....	41
Early examples of progress down the results chain at the country level.....	41
Examples of no progress, and / or absence of expected activity .....	44
Some definitional issues .....	45
Regional approaches within the World Bank.....	46
The Technical Advisory Committee: a missed opportunity for two way regional knowledge sharing and advocacy at the regional level.....	47
Demand and Supply side problems at the country level.....	47
Future options, including possible SAARC initiatives on FNS .....	49
Chapter Five: Efficiency and Value for Money .....	50
Allocative efficiency between countries.....	51
Allocative efficiency between the “three pillars” .....	51
Allocative efficiency between sectors.....	52
Financial size and financial management of the SAFANSI Trust Fund.....	53
Chapter Six: Other Aspects of Development Effectiveness .....	55
Targeting of poverty, the vulnerable, and the socially excluded .....	55
Gender mainstreaming .....	55
Risk and Risk Management .....	55
Sustainability .....	56
Innovation and responsiveness versus fragmentation.....	56
Paris Declaration principles .....	56
Governance .....	56
Chapter Seven: Main Conclusion, Options for the Future, and Summary of Recommendations .....	57
Duration.....	57
Size of a future SAFANSI and possible cost implications.....	58
Having a more proactive and directed funding stream .....	58
Opening SAFANSI to more proposals from outside the World Bank .....	59
Engaging AusAID and other development partners .....	60
Recommendations for the coming year.....	60
Annex 1: Terms of Reference .....	81
SAFANSI – South Asia Food and Nutrition Security Initiative .....	81
Terms of Reference for Evaluation and Strategic Review (‘E and SR TORs’) .....	81
Annex 2: Summary of the SAFANSI pipeline of activities.....	90
Annex 3 List of People Interviewed .....	95
Annex 4: The Evolution of Thinking About Nutrition Concepts Relevant to the SAFANSI approach ...	99

Introduction.....	99
Background .....	99
The last 5 years .....	100
Summary of recent shifts in food and nutrition that impact on SAFANSI .....	103
Conclusions .....	104
Annex 5: The Evolution of Thinking about Political Economy and Influencing Policy.....	107
Hunger And Nutrition Commitment Index - HANCI.....	111
Annex 6: The Application of Political Economy Analysis: Implications for SAFANSI and its Development Partners.....	113
Annex 7: Illustrative Mapping of SAFANSI and other related FNS activities in South Asia .....	116
Annex 8: Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey: latest findings relevant to FNS.....	128
Annex 9: Analysis of World Bank Project Appraisal Documents (PADS).....	130
Main findings .....	131
Annex 10: Case study of SAFANSI activity within the Social Observatory Project in Bihar, India. ....	136
Annex 11: SAFANSI and the Nutrition Action Framework in Afghanistan.....	139
Annex 12: SAARC and Food and Nutrition Security.....	141
Annex 13: SAFANSI Application Form.....	143
Annex 14: Flow Chart of a SAFANSI Application .....	153
Annex 15: SAFANSI Financial Grants Analysis.....	155
Annex 16: Analysis of SAFANSI Expenditure by the Three Pillars of “Analysis”, “Advocacy” and “Capacity Building” .....	159
Introduction.....	159
Methodology .....	160
Analysis .....	160
Annex 17: Glossary and Definitions .....	168
Annex 18: India’s Budgetary Commitment to Tackling Under-Nutrition .....	172
Annex 19: Concordance between the specific questions raised in the TORs and the response in the main Evaluation Report .....	174

# Executive Summary

## Background

### The South Asia Food and Nutrition Security Initiative (SAFANSI): what it does and why

**The South Asia Food and Nutrition Security Initiative (SAFANSI) was established to help improve food and nutrition security (FNS) in South Asia, home to the largest number of poor people in the world.** SAFANSI particularly sought to address the “South Asia Enigma”: chronic and widespread under-nutrition in South Asia coexisting with sustained rapid economic growth. The rationale underlying SAFANSI was that a greater understanding and engagement with the political economy<sup>1</sup> of FNS was needed to improve public policy. With that in mind, SAFANSI was built on three “pillars”: analysis, advocacy and capacity building. A strong theme running through SAFANSI was that more evidence based and multi-sectoral approaches – for example integrating FNS into agriculture and rural development programs - would be effective and efficient ways of improving the lives of the poor.

**SAFANSI was established in March 2010 as a multi donor Trust Fund administered by the World Bank.** SAFANSI has a budget of \$ 13.3 million (all figures in this report are in United States dollars unless otherwise stated), currently financed by DFID and AusAID. SAFANSI currently supports 31 activities throughout the seven<sup>2</sup> countries of South Asia in which it operates. Most activities are small in value: the median size of a SAFANSI activity is \$ 175,000 due to the fact that most SAFANSI activities are pilots and trials using new and innovative approaches. SAFANSI activities occur at the community, district, provincial and regional levels. Details of the current portfolio are in Annex One. Most, but not all, activities are designed and implemented by the World Bank. SAFANSI was always intended to be a catalyst: generating innovative and more evidence-based approaches, including randomised control trials, to FNS which could then influence the environment for policy making and budget allocations of governments and other stakeholders in the region. The current first phase of SAFANSI expires on 31 March 2014. The original design envisaged the possibility of a subsequent phase, depending upon progress to date.

## Nature of the Evaluation

**This Independent Evaluation focuses on the extent to which SAFANSI is likely to achieve its goals and objectives.** This Evaluation takes place almost three years after SAFANSI was established. Sufficient time has therefore elapsed to judge if the SAFANSI model of engagement is relevant to ongoing and future challenges of FNS at the national, sub-national, and regional level. It is also sufficient time to identify and assess the evidence as to whether SAFANSI is likely to be effective; efficient; consistent with good development practice; represent good value for money; that the Theory of Change underlying SAFANSI is valid; and that the program is operating as intended. Two years of actual operations, after a (predictably) slow start, have allowed some results to start to become apparent at the outcome level, including influencing upstream policy. However three years is insufficient time to expect results at the level of impact, particularly anthropometric results such as reduced stunting. The Evaluation itself involved document and literature

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<sup>1</sup> The OECD DAC defines political economy as follows: “Political economy analysis is concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time”. Further details are available at <http://www.oecd.org/development/governance-development/politiceconomyanalysis.htm>.

<sup>2</sup> In alphabetical order: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.

reviews; interviews with over 100 key stakeholders; and field visits to Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan in February 2013. Further details on the nature, scope, and approach of the Evaluation are in Chapter One.

## Main Findings

The key messages of this report are summarised in the box below

### **The key messages of this report**

**SAFANSI is well on track to achieve its purpose; substantive outputs and outcomes are starting to emerge from the short period of its operations; and SAFANSI exhibits good principles of development effectiveness in its management and operations.** SAFANSI is relevant: Food and Nutrition Security (FNS) remain large problems in South Asia and are unlikely to get resolved by themselves without specific interventions. SAFANSI work is demonstrably targeted at the poorest and most vulnerable, especially women and the socially excluded. Analytical work under SAFANSI is of a uniformly high and rigorous standard, and is starting to influence broader policy formulation. Many activities are innovative. SAFANSI is engaging effectively in fragile and conflict affected environments including Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan. Multi-sectoral approaches are being institutionalised within the World Bank South Asia Division, largely attributable to SAFANSI financing. Operations are efficient and provide value for money.

**There is a strong case for extending SAFANSI beyond its current phase** which currently ends 31 March 2014. A modest increase in the budget is warranted. Addressing political economy issues – which SAFANSI does – always takes time. A longer time frame of around five to ten years is therefore warranted for any subsequent phase.

**However further improvements are needed.** The Results Framework is too input and activity focused, and therefore fails to capture how SAFANSI is influencing outcomes and ultimately making a contribution to FNS impact. SAFANSI – and more importantly its analytical knowledge products – lack visibility amongst key decision makers. Some strategic area known to improve FNS notably girls' education and sanitation, are not attracting enough support. The Technical Advisory Committee is not fulfilling its potential, either in terms of guiding future strategic directions, or being a proactive advocate for FNS.

## Results to date

**While it is too early to expect higher level 'results' and impact at this stage, there is emerging evidence that the SAFANSI is acting as the catalyst for influencing larger scale programs.** Most programs started in 2012 so it is too early to expect outcomes and impact at this stage. This is especially so given that SAFANSI deals with complex political economy challenges, and several nutritional outcomes such as reduced stunting take many years to become apparent, and even then are subject to numerous confounding factors. However case studies undertaken as part of this evaluation show that SAFANSI was, or is currently, instrumental in influencing broader policies of Governments in South Asia. A Government food for work program in Nepal is being changed to improve the nutritional status of poorer women. SAFANSI activities in India are likely to influence the direction of the world's largest anti-poverty rural development program (Annex 10). SAFANSI was a key catalyst and coordinator of essential technical inputs when Pakistan devolved strategic policy and planning to the provinces. The ensuing policy notes for Government provide a well-integrated and evidence based approach to FNS. SAFANSI supported the development of a Nutrition



Action Framework in Afghanistan that was technically sound, evidence based, and attracted the political support of the Second Vice President (Annex 11).

The following sections now summarise the key findings, in the order that they appear in the report.

## **The Theory of Change underpinning SAFANSI and the Results Framework**

**The Evaluation finds that the (implicit) Theory of Change underpinning SAFANSI got most things right; failed to get a few things right; and that experience to date requires a rethink on some other issues.** The underlying Theory of Change (TOC) for SAFANSI got most things right. This includes recognition that better analysis and evidence was a necessary - but by no means sufficient - condition for change; the consequent need for an explicit political economy approach; the role of SAFANSI as a small niche player that could be a catalyst; and, on balance, the choice of the World Bank as the main partner. However events have also shown that the underlying TOC did not get some other things right. The three (now four) year time span of SAFANSI's first phase was always going to be too short. More importantly, it was in conflict with the SAFANSI TOC that interventions would take longer than more traditional project approaches. Events have also shown that a wide-spread "domestic stewardship platform" has not eventuated, and may not. Events to date also suggest a rethink is required on some themes implicit in the TOC. For example, has the TOC put too much store in strengthening upstream planning and policy making, when the real constraints in South Asia are the well-known problems of lack of effective implementation? Should there be three separate TOCs, one each for interventions at the community, national, and regional level, given the challenges of trying to have a unified TOC across all three levels? Is there actually a clear TOC underpinning the regional approach? Chapter Two elaborates.

**The Evaluation also finds that the Theory of Change is poorly linked to the overarching Results Framework which is too focused on inputs and activities, and which does not adequately "roll up" indicators and results from individual activities into a coherent, strategic, story.** The weak, input focused, and passive results framework used by SAFANSI makes identification of results more difficult than it should be. The Results Framework has avoided the usual problem of having unrealistically ambitious outcome and impact indicators. But in an effort to avoiding over-ambition and over-shooting, the Results Framework is now under-shooting. Indicators too often simply measure the number of reports produced, conferences attended, or people trained with very little follow up or critical assessment as to whether those activities led to any change. The 'so what?' question therefore cannot be answered easily. Stopping the performance indicators at the activity and output level forces insights into the results chain to stop at that level too: outcomes, let alone impacts, are harder to trace and discern. Furthermore, individual project activities, some of which have more meaningful indicators, do not roll up in a systematic way to a higher level aggregation of strategic change and "results". The lack of more meaningful indicators has an indirect, downstream, adverse effect on efficiency and value for money, as scarce resources then have to be used explaining what 'results' are being achieved. In a related vein, the Annual Report is too descriptive and lacks robust analysis of progress towards outcomes and impact. Nor does the Annual Report link activities and strategies to SAFANSI budget allocations. It is not possible to see if overall SAFANSI resources are broadly aligned with SAFANSI's strategic goals or "three pillars". Chapter Two elaborates and provides specific recommendations on indicators.

## Relevance

**There is compelling evidence that SAFANSI's vision and approach are still – perhaps even increasingly – relevant to the development needs of South Asia, and therefore globally.** South Asia is still the centre of gravity of world poverty: 418 million people will live below the \$1.25 poverty line in South Asia in 2015, more than in all of Sub-Saharan Africa. Many of those poor – especially women – work in the agriculture sector but are both food-insecure and under-nourished. 336 million people are routinely hungry in South Asia, undermining global achievement of MDG 1 (and further undermining progress on other MDGs). The region has the largest number of stunted and wasted children worldwide, and over half (52%) of children in Afghanistan are stunted. Two out of the five child deaths that happen every minute in South Asia could be prevented by ensuring adequate diet and feeding practices. There is a stubborn disconnect between, on the one hand, economic growth, increased agricultural production, and falling fertility and reduced child deaths and, on the one hand, lack of progress on Food Security and Nutrition (FNS). This disconnect – the “South Asia enigma” - has existed for decades and is not self-correcting. Government intervention is therefore needed. Chapter Three elaborates.

**The Evaluation finds SAFANSI is well positioned to play a relevant, albeit catalytic and niche, role in filling two critical gaps to date in responding to these FNS challenges:** The need for more evidence-based policies and programs, and facilitating multi-sectoral approaches to FNS. SAFANSI does this through its emphasis on not just analysis, but advocacy and capacity building. The choice of the World Bank to implement SAFANSI has the potential to enhance the leverage of SAFANSI. The Evaluation finds that, despite the reservations of some, the World Bank has the convening power; substantial analytical and financial resources; access to key Ministries, and links to large scale programs that enhance the relevance of SAFANSI. The Evaluation finds the vast majority of SAFANSI activities are relevant to the needs of poor, food-insecure, under-nourished communities, including especially women, children, and the socially excluded. Specific case studies from India and Nepal substantiate these findings (Chapter Four). SAFANSI is potentially relevant to knowledge sharing at the broader regional level, and other international initiatives such as Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN). That is because SAFANSI is one of the few South Asia regional programs focused on FNS that takes an explicit political economy approach to influencing policy and programs. The regional approach offers DFID and the World Bank insights into common problems and solutions for FNS across the South Asia region, as well as some economies of scale in operations. However expectations about the possible impact of a regional approach amongst the countries themselves need to be realistic. The Evaluation found that the demand for, and supply of, knowledge sharing on FNS across, and within, South Asia is generally weak particularly amongst senior government officials: key target groups for SAFANSI. Genuine knowledge sharing at the regional level will be a long term effort. Chapter Three elaborates.

## Effectiveness

**There is very good evidence to show that SAFANSI has been the critical factor in fostering a more coherent, evidence-based, multi-sectoral approach to FNS within the World Bank South Asia Department.** Evidence of the FNS problems, and subsequent leadership from the World Bank Vice President for South Asia, put FNS onto the future work program agenda of that part of the Bank. But the World Bank has a history of “unfunded mandates” that fail to get traction due to budget and personnel constraints, and institutional disincentives. There is clear evidence that SAFANSI provided the critical access to small but essential and flexible seed money not otherwise available so as to undertake applied research or programs on FNS. Several senior Bank staff saw SAFANSI as creating “space” (in reality, money) to work on FNS, doing analytical or lending work that could not be otherwise resourced from within the Bank. SAFANSI was well

designed in terms of Bank culture and incentives: the right processes and right people and shrewd institutional location within the Bank. There is however little evidence to conclude that multi-sectoral approaches to FNS indicators have now been integrated into the results frameworks of major Bank projects in sectors such as education, gender, agriculture or water and sanitation. Chapter Four elaborates.

**There is more mixed and partial evidence to show that SAFANSI is achieving results at the regional, country and community level.** The main reason for this is the short duration that SAFANSI has actually been in operation: less than two years in most cases. Furthermore, its relatively small budget means that SAFANSI can also only ever be catalytic, and that takes time. (The SAFANSI budget is just 0.02% of the World Bank's own overall budget, and even smaller when compared to Government's own total expenditure in South Asia). Shifting policies and anthropometric indicators also takes time. And it is very clear that country context matters. The Evaluation found specific examples of promising progress down the SAFANSI results chain in Afghanistan, India, Pakistan and Nepal. Chapter Four, and the associated Annexes, provide five specific and detailed case studies from these countries that illustrate what SAFANSI is achieving. However country dynamics meant SAFANSI was getting less traction in Bangladesh. There is also less evidence to show that SAFANSI is achieving its objective of genuinely regional approaches to FNS challenges. Indeed, the Evaluation encountered a widespread indifference and often firm resistance among senior government officials to the possibility of regional approaches or knowledge sharing, although there was more preparedness to learn from others in the region amongst academics, think tanks, and NGOs. There are problems on the demand side, and the supply side, of knowledge sharing at a regional level. Chapter Four elaborates.

## **Efficiency and Value for Money**

**The Evaluation finds program management of SAFANSI to be generally efficient, delivering value for money.** Technical efficiency ("doing things the right way") is generally good. The transaction costs associated with applying for, and giving, quality assurance checks for Bank executed SAFANSI proposals are generally low, particularly compared to the alternatives. There is, however, an argument for an even quicker response mechanism to take advantage of suddenly emerging windows of opportunity that can suddenly arise to influence policy makers through 'just in time' policy notes. Transaction costs rise after implementation because basic questions then keep being asked about strategic 'results' that the results framework cannot answer and follow up is needed. Slow disbursement at the beginning of SAFANSI, and now a slowdown in applications due to some uncertainty over SAFANSI's future, undermine program technical efficiency to a degree. Both problems should have been anticipated in advance at the design stage. More broadly, value for money occurs because most activities are Bank executed and so use Bank procurement rules. Allocative efficiency ("doing the right things") is harder to assess. Expenditure allocation by country is reasonable, with India, Nepal and Bangladesh the largest three recipients of SAFANSI funding by value. It is difficult to draw meaningful conclusions about whether "enough" money is going to each of the three SAFANSI pillars - analysis; advocacy and capacity building – partly due to data problems and the overlaps involved. Chapter Five elaborates.

## **Broader development principles**

**The Evaluation finds that SAFANSI exhibits good practice development principles, including a clear poverty focus, mainstreaming of gender, satisfactory risk management and recognition of *Paris Declaration* principles.** There is very strong evidence to show that SAFANSI has a clear poverty focus which clearly targets the poor, vulnerable and socially excluded. Gender mainstreaming is particularly good. There is

strong evidence to show that SAFANSI has not simply targeted vulnerable and poor women: it has sought to actively include women – and males – as part of the community decision making process. Program risk, and fiduciary risk, are managed well. Governance arrangements generally appear to work reasonably well, although the Technical Advisory Committee needs revitalising (or abandoning). It is too early to draw any conclusions about sustainability, but there are some promising signs. There is good evidence to show that SAFANSI is innovative and responsive, with little or no evidence to suggest it is simply a “slush fund” with lots of fragmented activities. SAFANSI is broadly consistent with the principles of the *Paris Declaration On Aid Effectiveness* and its successor declarations. Chapter Six elaborates.

## Key Conclusions and Recommendations

**The main headline conclusion is that SAFANSI, despite being a small, new, niche player with a portfolio of “work in progress” is a developmentally effective instrument likely to achieve its main goals, and should be maintained after March 2014, but over a longer period and in an improved form.** What immediate deficiencies it has - including a weak and disappointing results framework, a lack of visibility for its knowledge products, a Technical Advisory Committee that is not working to full potential – can all be fixed at relatively little cost.

**The Evaluation makes twenty specific recommendations.** These are listed below in the order in which they appear in this Report, and quoting the original text. The specific paragraph number where that recommendation is quoted is also shown so that the context and justification can be understood. The twenty specific recommendations are as follows:

1. “If SAFANSI wishes to track its influence right through the results chain, then it should consider monitoring the actual *implementation* of policies (Paragraph 2.15 refers).  
2.18
2. The Evaluation therefore recommends that consideration be given to having more differentiated Theory of Change (TOC)s: a separate TOC for approaches and changes expected at the household level; another for approaches and changes expected at the national and sub-national level; and a third at the regional level.  
2.19
3. The Evaluation recommends that consideration be given to linking the TOC to rising problems of obesity and Non-communicable diseases, noting that under-nutrition in the mother can predispose her children to such increasing problems that also undermine development.  
2.21
4. The Evaluation recommends that, as the regional approach is one of the defining characteristics of SAFANSI, it should have a more explicit TOC.  
2.25
5. The Evaluation therefore recommends that the SAFANSI Results Framework be expanded – and resourced – to better capture how the inputs, activities and outputs from SAFANSI are actually being used subsequently.  
2.26
6. The Evaluation recommends that the results framework synthesise the more strategic findings and developments emerging from individual activities, perhaps by thematic groupings such as ‘community level lessons improving FNS’ that can be captured at the strategic level.  
2.26

7. The Evaluation recommends the Annual Report be shortened; made more strategic; include more strategic analysis of financial expenditure; and be merged with, or otherwise made to avoid duplication with, other documents such as the Annual Donor Report. 2.27
8. Consideration should also be given to what SAFANSI can reasonably claim as “impact”. 2.28
9. The Evaluation therefore recommends that the Bank track the extent to which genuine (not token) FNS sensitive indicators appear in the results frameworks of South Asia PADS over time, particularly in key sectors such as agriculture, gender, and water and sanitation. 4.9
10. The Evaluation therefore recommends that SAFANSI develop an engagement strategy with other multilateral and UN agencies with which it is already working so as to increase its profile and opportunities for sharing knowledge products and influencing their programs and policies. This engagement strategy should also particularly be extended to the Asian Development Bank, sharing SAFANSI knowledge products and insights that might influence the design and implementation of the ADB’s own large lending portfolio in South Asia in areas such as water and sanitation, education, and rural development. The engagement strategy should also extend to large NGOs and foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 4.12
11. Consideration should therefore be given to ways of reinvigorating the TAC as a vehicle for region wide (and global) knowledge sharing and advocacy. Without wishing to have another layer of advice, or increase administrative costs, consideration could also be given to setting up a ‘shadow’ TAC of young, energetic, mid – career, (and female) opinion leaders who can ‘make things happen’ to supplement the work of the TAC on a more regular basis. 4.26
12. If SAFANSI is extended beyond March 2014 consideration should be given to recruiting one locally hired person in each of the SAFANSI countries whose job it is to be a ‘knowledge broker’. 4.32
13. Comments were made that it would be particularly useful to have a fast track process to allow “just in time” small seed money approved in a few days so as to take up suddenly opening windows of opportunity to influence debates and thinking within SAFANSI countries. This suggestion warrants further consideration within the Bank. 5.2
14. SAFANSI should be now extended, preferably for a further ten year period, provided at least three changes are made to improve its overall effectiveness (strengthen the results framework; increase the visibility of SAFANSI knowledge products and insights; either revitalise the TAC or abolish it). 7.2
15. The SAFANSI budget does not necessarily need to be expanded significantly, but there is a need to better resource independent evaluation of outcomes, and to improve visibility and knowledge-management. 7.3
16. While SAFANSI should continue to be essentially demand driven, consideration could be given to a more ‘directed’ funding stream supporting known, potentially high impact, interventions to support gender, girls’ education, and sanitation. 7.4
17. There are arguments for, and against, opening SAFANSI to more applications from outside the Bank itself: a compromise would be to more systematically capture knowledge gaps by local stakeholders.

18. AusAID should consider using its high profile and strategic commitment to maternal and child health to co-finance or otherwise support SAFANSI activities, even if it is no longer a formal member of the Trust Fund. 7.7

19. Whatever the outcome, it is important to make a decision – and announce it – as soon as possible in coming months: the current uncertainty is undermining SAFANSI operations. The *predictability* of funding is now more important than the actual quantum. 7.10

20. A work program for the remaining year will then depend upon what decisions are made, but strengthening the results framework, and increasing the visibility of SAFANSI are priorities in any event. 7.11

Paragraphs 7.13 to 7.17 of this Report then takes each of the abovementioned recommendations and regroups them into one of five different categories: (i) strategic, priority and urgent recommendations to DFID; (ii) useful but not urgent recommendations to DFID; (iii) strategic, priority and urgent recommendations to the World Bank; (iv) useful but not urgent recommendations to the World Bank; and (v) recommendation to AusAID. Within each of those five groupings, the recommendations are then listed in descending order of priority, with the most important recommendation listed first.

# Chapter One: Background to the Evaluation and Approach Taken

## SAFANSI: a brief overview

**1.1 Despite economic growth, problems of food and nutrition security<sup>3</sup> (FNS) have been a pervasive and stubborn characteristic of much of South Asia.** Traditional approaches that view FNS as essentially involving technical interventions under the responsibility of the Ministry of Health, or Ministry of Agriculture, or the automatic by-product of economic growth and agricultural productivity improvement, have not produced the widespread, deep, or sustained improvements in FNS seen in other regions. There is a growing international consensus that addressing the underlying political economy aspects of under-nutrition, and encouraging a more multi-sectoral approach, will generate more effective, efficient and equitable outcomes. Food price increases since 2008 and their impact on nutrition and food insecurity have underlined the importance of urgent action. Analytical reports, including a series on nutrition published in *The Lancet* in 2008 (Black R; Bhutta Z) added to the momentum for urgent and more effective action on nutrition.

### Box 1.1: “South Asia Enigma”: Where is the enigma?

During the Evaluation field visits, an experienced senior public health nutritionist in Bangladesh challenged the widespread use of the term “South Asia Enigma” to describe low levels of food and nutrition security despite decades of economic growth.

“Where is the enigma?” she asked. “An enigma is something that is mysterious or difficult to understand. But there is nothing mysterious or difficult to understand about under-nutrition when young, anaemic, girls have low levels of education; ‘eat last and least’ at home; marry young; then have low birth weight babies at age 15 or below; and do not have access to proper sanitation or health services. All this has been known for decades. Where is the ‘enigma’ in that?”

**1.2 The South Asia Food and Nutrition Security Initiative (SAFANSI) was established to address the “South Asia Enigma”.** This is a phenomenon of rapid economic growth being accompanied by reductions in absolute and relative levels of poverty, but little progress in reducing food insecurity and under-nutrition. SAFANSI aims to be a catalyst, increasing the commitment of Governments and their development partners to more effective and integrated, multi-sectoral, food and nutrition-related policies and investments in South Asia. It has three pillars: analysis, advocacy, and capacity building. Further details on SAFANSI’s origins, goals, operations and activities are available in the Annual Reports (World Bank 2012 (a) and World Bank 2011 (b)).

**1.3 SAFANSI operates through a multi-donor Trust Fund first established by DFID and managed by the World Bank.** DFID contributed £ 4.6 million (\$ 7.3 million<sup>4</sup>) to SAFANSI. AusAID subsequently joined SAFANSI in May 2011 with a contribution of AU\$ 8.5 million (\$ 9.0 million) giving SAFANSI a total budget at the end of 2012 of \$ 13,349,748.<sup>5</sup> SAFANSI currently has 31 activities in its portfolio, some of which are regional in scope, while others are specific to the seven SAFANSI eligible countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka). A summary of the SAFANSI portfolio is in Annex One. SAFANSI started on 15 March 2010 and had an inception phase running from April to September 2010. The original SAFANSI Business Case envisaged that SAFANSI was the first phase of a potential ten year program. SAFANSI under Phase One was originally intended to run until 30 June 2013, but parties to the Trust Fund have agreed to a no-cost extension until 31 March 2014. The

<sup>3</sup> This and other key terms are defined in the Glossary, which is available at Annex 17.

<sup>4</sup> All \$ figures are United States current dollars unless otherwise specified.

<sup>5</sup> \$2.8 million of AusAID’s original budget allocation to SAFANSI was assigned to a special earmarked program within SAFANSI for activities in Nepal called SUNITA.

European Commission (EC) is considering several alternative possibilities to reducing under-nutrition in South Asia: joining SAFANSI is one possibility being considered.

## **Purpose of the evaluation, method and approach, and launch of the evaluation process**

**1.4 The Terms of Reference (TORs) cover 40 specific questions or points for consideration under 7 broad headings: relevance; effectiveness; efficiency; impact; sustainability; coverage; coherence and coordination.** The Terms of Reference are available in Annex One. Section 3 of the TORs makes it clear that the recipients and key audience for the Evaluation are “DFID Asia Regional Team and AusAID. Findings of the evaluation will be shared with the World Bank and ECDG Europe-Aid Development and Co-operation Directorate-General, Unit H2.”

**1.5 In November 2012 DFID, in consultation with AusAID, appointed a small team<sup>6</sup> identified by Oxford Policy Management Limited to undertake the evaluation.** The Team Leader had discussions with key personnel in AusAID, DFID, EC, and the World Bank in Canberra, London, Brussels and Washington during November. The Evaluation Team then submitted an Inception Report to DFID and AusAID in December 2012. In that Inception Report, the Evaluation Team noted that the following, quoted directly from the TORs, are to form the central spine of the Evaluation:

“The main objective of this evaluation is to generate results and lessons from SAFANSI on what has been achieved so far, progress on the path to impact<sup>7</sup> and identify lessons for a possible second phase; recommendations for any adjustments in programme strategy in the remaining programme period to March 2014 and answers to questions on the likely outcomes of a continued programme. The evaluation will also provide accountability to donors and countries in the South Asia region.

The work involves an evaluation of DFID and AusAID’s support to SAFANSI (2010 – 2012) to assess the progress and achievements, test the theory of change (including the validity of assumptions) and draw out any emerging lessons, best practice, and knowledge gaps relevant to a further phase of support.”

**1.6 The overall status and nature of the Evaluation was canvassed in the Inception Report,** In essence, the Evaluation Team proposed a mixed methods (quantitative <sup>8</sup>and qualitative) process evaluation<sup>9</sup> combined with identification of strategic issues, as the most appropriate way of responding to the TORs. This

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<sup>6</sup> In alphabetical order by surname: Ian Anderson (Team Leader); Professor Ian Darnton-Hill AO; Ms Sourovi De, OPML; and Dr Martin Greeley, IDS. Mr Tomas Lievens of OPML was Project Manager. CVs of the team are available from DFID on request. The core Evaluation Team were supported by OPML Country Coordinators in the field. Mr Tomas Lievens was the Project Manager responsible for quality assurance within OPML.

<sup>7</sup> Noting that SAFANSI is under implementation until March 2014, and that some of the intermediate results at this stage of the project cycle include inter-sectoral capacities, platforms and networks that will be employed in the next phase of activities.

<sup>8</sup> The quantitative component involves the classifying and counting of changes in World Bank documentation, and the financial analysis described below. The qualitative component involves the structured interviews, case studies, and document review.

<sup>9</sup> The latest World Bank report on Impact Evaluation (*Impact Evaluation in Practice (2011)*) defines a process evaluation as one which will “focus on how a program is implemented and operates, assessing whether it conforms to its original design, and documenting its development and operation”. This is similar to DFID’s definition of a process evaluation as set out in DFID’s *Guidance on Evaluation and Review for DFID Staff*. The Evaluation Team recognise that the evaluation also calls for a Strategic Review.



would be consistent with DFID's definition of 'formative evaluation', 'interim evaluation review' and 'output to purpose review'.<sup>10</sup> The Inception Report noted it was not possible to undertake a full Impact Evaluation at this point because SAFANSI had been in existence for less than three years: higher order impacts such as reduced stunting and institutionalisation of improved decision-making take many more years to become apparent and representative country level data are most likely not available to cover the same period of implementation as SAFANSI. Even then, such higher level impacts are subject to multiple confounding factors. Nor is it likely that the evaluation can undertake a formal 'attribution analysis' up to the outcome and impact stage due to both the relatively short period of SAFANSI engagement to date, and the lack of clear comparison groups and counterfactuals. The Inception Report noted that because of the importance of political economy and institutional incentive issues dealt with by SAFANSI, the Evaluation Team would pay particular attention to DFID's *How To Note (Version 2) Monitoring and Evaluation and Learning From Influencing Efforts*.

**1.7 The Inception Report proposed to use five instruments to evaluate SAFANSI:** a desk review of World Bank documents to see if, where and how FNS themes had been integrated into project designs and strategic documents ; a financial analysis to test if financial allocations were aligned with strategic goals; several systematically<sup>11</sup> identified in-depth case studies that would be representative of sectors and countries in the region; structured interviews with key informants (including submission of a model questionnaire in the Inception Report); and a critical review of major, recent, documentation.

**1.8 The systematic sampling frame in the Inception Report identified a priority, and representative, set of SAFANSI activities<sup>12</sup> worthy of more in-depth field analysis in five countries:** Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan. Security considerations and likely delays in obtaining visas meant the Evaluation Team reluctantly excluded Afghanistan as a field visit per se. Instead, the Team recommended interviews via Videocon while in the region. The Evaluation Team also considered Videocon interviews with officials from Bhutan and Sri Lanka, rather than field visits, noting the relatively low number of activities in those two countries.

**1.9** The Inception Report, which also included a work plan, and timelines, and confirmed that the consultants had no conflict of interest, was approved by DFID and AusAID in January 2013 and the Evaluation Team left for field visits in early February 2013. With the agreement of all key stakeholders, the EC appointed a consultant to join the Evaluation Team with his own TORs, reporting to the EC. OPML provided, and

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<sup>10</sup> DFID *Guidance on Evaluation and Review for DFID Staff*.

<sup>11</sup> The screening criteria for identifying in depth case studies was as follows: reasonable balance of activities across each of the three pillars; reasonable geographical spread (no one country to dominate, and should include at least one multi-country/regional activity); sufficient time elapsed and activity to have occurred to have something tangible to evaluate; materiality (ie large value expenditures would *prima facie* be a basis for case study), scalability and leverage (include larger programs by value, or those likely to leverage larger policy / institutional / financial resources); cross cutting issues: all development partners (AusAID, DFID, EC, and World Bank) have an interest in gender, poverty and environmental issues; donor specific interest (AusAID and DFID have special interests in fragile, conflict, and post-conflict settings. EC has a particular interest in interventions to improve current low birth weight outcomes); practicality: ability to interview key personnel, safety concerns etc.

<sup>12</sup> Afghanistan: Supporting High Level Task Force on Food and Nutrition Security (TF098874); Bangladesh: Multisectoral Simulation Tool for Scaling Up Nutrition (TF 098429); India: Social Observatory in the National Rural Livelihoods Mission (TF 011993); Nepal: Supporting Nepal's High Level Task Force on Food and Nutrition Security in the National Planning Commission (TF 098873); Pakistan: Enhancing National Commitment for an Evidenced Based and Gender Sensitive MultiSectoral Response to the Food and Nutrition Security Challenge (TF 012245); Multicountry: South Asia Development Marketplace on Nutrition (TF 097620)

funded, local national consultants in each of the countries visited. These local national consultants were highly trained (doctors of medicine and/or Ph Ds) and accompanied the core team to every interview, contributing insights, and preparing some of the box texts and Annexes.

**1.10 In hindsight, the structured interviews in-country were the most valuable and insightful part of the evaluation.** That is due to the fact that a large pool (over 100 – see Annex 3) of well-informed people were interviewed, from a wide range of sectors and organisations, the vast majority of whom were candid and constructive in their comments. The financial analysis turned out to be less instructive than the Evaluation Team had hoped for. The original intention was to analyse the allocation of funding to countries and sectors, so as to see if financial resources were being allocated in a way that was broadly aligned to the three strategic pillars (analysis, advocacy, capacity building) of SAFANSI or if SAFANSI had become simply a ‘slush fund’, providing financial support to a fragmented and incoherent package of small activities on a simply ‘first come first served’ basis, with little regard to overarching strategic directions. The Evaluation Team considers the goal of that financial analysis to be still relevant to SAFANSI (and indeed virtually all similar aid funded Trust Funds and response mechanisms). While the analysis was undertaken, and is available in Annex 15, the Evaluation Team recognises the findings have to be treated with caution. That is mainly because it proved very difficult to have meaningful coding of financial allocations under each of the three “pillars” when so often the activity in question overlapped all three. In a sense, that is a good thing: it means there is complementarity and an avoidance of ‘silo’ approaches under the three pillars.

**1.11 There were no major changes to the approach from the original, approved, Inception Report methodology and workplan, and any inherent biases were managed as well as could be.** All of the five instruments identified in the Inception Report were able to be pursued and followed through in the way envisaged. The vast majority of people the Evaluation Team asked to interview made themselves available. The Evaluation Team was able to take advantage of senior officers from DFID, AusAID and the World Bank being in New Delhi to have a joint meeting with the Evaluation Team early in the field visit, which enabled the Evaluation Team to directly question the financiers and managers of SAFANSI in a joint session. It was unfortunate that timing constraints did not allow more opportunities for assessing the operations of similar FNS interventions being pursued by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, GAIN, IFPRI, and / or USAID, as that could have provided a useful ‘compare and contrast’ exercise and counterfactual. Time limitations also prevented the Evaluation Team from interviewing those NGO and other external applicants to SAFANSI who had *not* been successful in applying for funding: it would have been useful to hear of their perceptions. The Evaluation Team were conscious throughout the exercise that World Bank staff may have an (intentional or unintended) bias to comment favourably on SAFANSI activities they were managing and relied upon for financing. This risk was managed by triangulating interviews (interviewing other stakeholders familiar with the activity outside of the World Bank) as much as possible. There was a pleasing and ready consensus amongst the Evaluation Team members about the findings, and no disagreement on any matter of substance. This reflected both the complementarity of disciplines of the team (a development economist / evaluator; a political scientist; an international expert on nutrition; and an OPML research assistant as the core team, as well as OPML local national consultants in each of the field countries visited) as well as the goodwill and professionalism of the members themselves.

**1.12 Draft findings were shared with DFID, AusAID and the World Bank; factual corrections made; and points highlighted further.** In the last week of the field mission, a video conference was held in Islamabad to update DFID in London on the main initial findings, and timelines for completing the report. A draft report was submitted to DFID, via OPML, on 21 March 2013. DFID requested some presentational changes (including lifting the profile of the key messages; consolidating the annexes into one report rather than having two volumes) and to aligning the report with DFID printing and publishing guidelines. DFID also

forwarded some comments from the World Bank correcting some minor factual mistakes. AusAID also provided some comments, including about their own proposed activities in Pakistan and how they related to SAFANSI. All of the comments received were able to be accommodated, as none altered the independent findings or conclusions of the Evaluation Team. A revised version was submitted to DFID, via OPML, on 4 April 2013.

## **Strengths, and limitations, of the evaluation process**

**1.13 The Evaluation has several strengths.** The Team were able to interview more than 100 people with a wide range of backgrounds, including three current or previous Secretaries of Departments: names and titles of those interviewed are in Annex Three. The Team visited four<sup>13</sup> of the seven SAFANSI countries over a period of 18 days, and interviewed officials working in six<sup>14</sup> of them. The team made field visits to Bihar and Tamil Nadu to the largest SAFANSI project (the Social Observatory) spending the equivalent of eight person-days interviewing people directly implementing or affected by SAFANSI on the ground. The Team was given access to all relevant documentation and financial statements. The Team was able to meet with a wide range of stakeholders beyond DFID and World Bank, including Government officials, NGOs, INGOs, research institutions, complementary programs including LANSA, and UN organisations (FAO, UNICEF and WFP). When interviewing over 100 people from a range of organisations, it is difficult to make any definitive statement about which stakeholder group carried the most weight and influence in terms of drawing conclusions about SAFANSI. The Evaluation Team noted that World Bank staff interviewed were uniformly knowledgeable, articulate, well-prepared, and systematic in their responses. But they were also candid and clear about potential weaknesses in SAFANSI, and not “defensive” or evasive, which added to their credibility. The Evaluation Team also took very seriously the comments – or in some cases the *lack of comment* – from senior and other officials and stakeholders in the countries concerned. These stakeholders were similarly credible.

**1.14 But there are inevitable limitations to an evaluation of this nature.** SAFANSI has only been operating officially since March 2010, with its inception phase being completed in September 2010: a little over two years ago. Only two<sup>15</sup> SAFANSI activities mobilised in 2010. The field evaluation found that many SAFANSI activities were initiated less than two years ago and were still mid-stream. Activity of less than two years is clearly not long enough to generate measurable outcomes or impact on FNS. That is especially the case given SAFANSI’s explicit acknowledgement in its original design that political economy approaches take longer than usual to show “results”. Many of the intended outcomes and impacts – be they changes in policies and budgets or changes in anthropometric outcomes such as reduced stunting – take longer to occur and are subject to numerous confounding influences. Time limitations mean the Evaluation Team could only visit four of the seven countries served and examine only a representative sample of SAFANSI activities in any depth. Despite best efforts, scheduling conflicts meant it was possible to interview only two members of the Technical Advisory Committee. However the Evaluation Team believes it has been able to meet the TORs fully, and is confident its findings can be substantiated.

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<sup>13</sup> In alphabetical order: Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan

<sup>14</sup> Video interviews were held with World Bank officials working on Bhutan, and a DFID official in Afghanistan. Despite best efforts, it was not possible for logistical reasons to secure a video conference with Government officials in Afghanistan.

<sup>15</sup> TF 097620 *Evaluating and Learning from Innovative Community Approaches* and TF 098429 *Multisectoral Simulation Tool for Scaling Up Nutrition*. TF 098394 *Trust Fund Administration* was also established that year.

## Chapter Two: the SAFANSI approach, the Theory of Change, and the Results Framework

2.1 This Chapter summarises what the designers of SAFANSI originally envisaged the likely results of SAFANSI to be, based upon their own Theory of Change (TOC) and the choices made in the original design. The chapter links the TOC to the SAFANSI results framework.

### Theory of Change: What is it?

#### The importance – but limitations – of a sound Theory of Change

2.2 **The TOC approach is a potentially important tool in development planning, but it has its limitations.** A TOC seeks to explain how aid interventions achieve, or at least contribute to, desired outcomes and impacts. Done well, a TOC approach builds on the traditional log-frame approach, but holds the promise of being more analytical, and less contract-focused, than earlier simplistic and mechanical log-frames (Vogel 2012). TOC approaches are one of a number of design and evaluation tools gaining in popularity (Bamberger et al 2012). Several organisations, including DFID and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation take TOC approaches increasingly seriously. DFID's latest *How To note on Evaluating Influence* states that "A robust TOC should lie at the heart of development interventions and their evaluation. (Evaluating) Influence is no different". DFID goes on to say that its corporate approach to TOC has three components: context analysis, hypothesis of change, and assessment of the evidence of the hypotheses" (DFID 2013). This Evaluation agrees that a good TOC can critically assess the validity and degree of actual connectedness between the links in a chain of causality. On the other hand, a TOC is only a means to an end – clearer thinking about development interventions – and is not an end in itself. The neatness and tidiness of boxes and flow diagrams can abstract and distract from the reality of inevitable "messiness" that is the reality of development.

#### SAFANSI's Theory of Change

2.3 **It is important to understand the TOC underpinning SAFANSI, and its links to the results framework.** This is partly because DFID, AusAID and the World Bank do take "results" - and learning about the process of achieving results – seriously. It is also important to understand the original TOC and expectations about SAFANSI so as to draw valid evaluation findings. More specifically, it is unreasonable to judge SAFANSI now on grounds that were not part of the original design and TOC. (Having said that, it is reasonable – and expected – that this Evaluation should make observations about how the underlying TOC may now need to change in the light of experience gained).

2.4 **SAFANSI has a relatively sophisticated TOC, but one which has not been explicitly or concisely stated as such.** The contextual setting, evidence base, 'problem statement', options for interventions, underlying assumptions and statements about why the interventions should yield value for money results are all set out in detail in DFID's original SAFANSI Business Case. The components of the TOC are extensive and widely scattered, so are not repeated here. Nor has this Evaluation sought to retrospectively articulate what was in the minds of the original designers of SAFANSI into one single, explicit, concise TOC. Instead, the Evaluation Team has assessed what it understands to be the main building blocks of the SAFANSI TOC. The assessment groups findings under three headings: what the SAFANSI TOC got right; what it did not get right; and what needs further future consideration in any extension of SAFANSI that might be agreed upon.

## What the SAFANSI Theory of Change got right

**2.5 SAFANSI correctly assumes that better evidence and analysis is a necessary – but by no means sufficient – precondition for influencing larger upstream policies and programs.** The Evaluation field visits found numerous examples to confirm that good evidence can change policies and programs. For example, there was constant referencing of *The Lancet* 2008 series on nutrition (see the “References” section at the end of this Report) from a wide range of stakeholders in every country of the field visit. Many informed observers also noted how the facts and statistics about long term under-nutrition amongst large populations entering camps in the wake of the Pakistan floods were also a wake- up call to Government and development partners. On the other hand, it is also clear that analysis and evidence by itself – no matter how compelling – may have little or no impact. The countries in South Asia have known that absolute and relative levels of FNS are much worse than their GDPs or per capita income would predict, but little has happened. Numerous and high quality analytical reports over the decades have pointed to the weaknesses in India’s Public Distribution System and similar schemes: inertia and vested interests have blocked change. SAFANSI correctly and explicitly rejected simply generating analysis and evidence (see the Economic Analysis in the original business case).

**2.6 SAFANSI therefore correctly opted for an explicit political economy approach<sup>16</sup>.** Improving policies is always hard. It is particularly challenging in South Asia where three SAFANSI countries are classified as conflict affected situations (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nepal) or have recently emerged from conflict (Sri Lanka); where populations and development needs are vast; and where sudden, almost tectonic, shifts in the political landscape can occur (Pakistan’s 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment abolished most central ministries, and devolved power to provinces in a matter of months; Nepal has had constitutional challenges). The political environment varies greatly between, and within, the countries of South Asia. International thinking about political economy approaches to FNS, and nutrition more broadly, is also constantly changing. There has even been an evolution in thinking in the short timeframe of SAFANSI’s existence. (As part of this Evaluation, a literature review on the evolution of thinking about FNS, and political economy approaches to FNS, have been prepared and are available in Annex 4 and 5 respectively.) To help inform the thinking about political economy approaches, SAFANSI also commissioned a specific study (TF 010794 *Developing a Framework For Applied Political Economy Analysis of Food and Nutrition Security in South Asia*). A specific assessment of that work, and its possible programming implications for SAFANSI and other development partners, is at Annex 6.

**2.7 SAFANSI then correctly identified “analysis, advocacy and capacity building” as three interlinked pillars as the main vehicle for political economy: with “analysis” turning out to be a particularly strong pillar.** As Chapter Four and its related Annexes make clear, the quality, relevance, and rigour of World Bank commissioned analysis has been of a uniformly high standard. Some of the data and analysis generated under SAFANSI is already starting to challenge existing facts including mistakes in existing Census data as well as providing an alternative to deliberately bogus other statistics data<sup>17</sup> or approaches. The focus on capacity building was also an intelligent and strategically correct decision. The

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<sup>16</sup> As noted in footnote one where the term is first used, the OECD DAC defines political economy as follows: “Political economy analysis is concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time.”

<sup>17</sup> One previous Secretary of a major Department in South Asia remarked that incentive structures meant that local officials felt they would be punished for presenting adverse trends, and rewarded for presenting favourable statistics, so they manufactured statistical results. When challenged, the officials claimed these were simply “anticipated statistics”.

Evaluation field visits encountered numerous examples of a fundamental lack of basic capacity<sup>18</sup> to generate, and/ or use correctly good quality evidence to plan and respond to FNS challenges. This in turn undermines domestic political ownership and institutional sustainability of FNS. The approach envisaged in the original Business Case of a focus on ‘learning by doing’ is also correct: the Evaluation encountered several examples where local stakeholders had made step-wise changes in approaches to FNS through their engagement with SAFANSI. (Chapter Four and its associated Annexes elaborates). An explicit focus on advocacy was also an essential ingredient in the TOC, but has had more mixed results (see Chapter Four).

**2.8 SAFANSI could only ever be a very small, niche, catalytic player, and the quantum of financing was therefore “about right”.** Lack of financing per se was never the root cause of the “South Asia enigma”. SAFANSI’s TOC therefore correctly assumed that it was the lack of political will and / or available workable solutions that were the key binding constraint to better FNS outcomes. Once that point was accepted, SAFANSI could only ever be a niche player, aiming to shape the upstream policies and programs of Governments in the region. Doubling, tripling, or quadrupling the financial resources available to SAFANSI would not have made much difference – and certainly exacerbated the challenge of timely disbursement - in a region as large as South Asia where Government’s own budgetary commitments are central to achieve scale and sustainability. While there is no “right” amount, the Evaluation concludes the sum of \$ 13.3 million<sup>19</sup> pledged to SAFANSI was “about right” to support the envisaged program of activities at the time.

**2.9 The choice of the World Bank to manage the SAFANSI activities was – on balance – the best available decision and the one most consistent with the underlying TOC.** Many initiatives seek to elevate the political commitment and multi-sectoral approaches to FNS in South Asia. This is clear from the illustrative mapping of main FNS activities in Annex 7. Choosing to partner with the World Bank was the best approach to getting visibility and traction within that crowded field. More importantly, choosing to partner with the World Bank was – on balance – the decision most consistent with the “analysis, advocacy, and capacity” pillars inherent in the original TOC. That is because the World Bank:

- Demonstrably had expertise – and credibility<sup>20</sup> - in generating rigorous and reputable analysis
- Had unequalled access to key Ministries of Finance and Planning as well as other line Ministries
- Has strong convening power with respect to key stakeholders including development partners and the private sector
- Supports its own policy dialogue with large (often \$ 1 billion or more) program loans in virtually all the sectors that should be involved in FNS
- Has an institutional capacity for a region wide focus on South Asia as well as globally

Each of those characteristics is consistent with the underlying TOC for SAFANSI. No other institution or agency could offer that as a package, including the then emerging high profile *Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN)* initiative<sup>21</sup>.

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<sup>18</sup> One theme that came up in a number of countries was the almost total absence of well qualified public health nutritionists. The Evaluation Team was told ‘nutrition’ was seen as a by-product of low profile home economics courses. In the absence of qualified public health nutritionists, agencies had employed medical doctors. They had done so very reluctantly given the predilection of many doctors to medicalise approaches to nutrition. There was also clearly a lack of capacity in economics and costings, strategic planning, communications and political science.

<sup>19</sup> \$16.2 million if the AusAID supported SUNITA program in Nepal is included.

<sup>20</sup> One senior person not associated with the World Bank and interviewed said “Yes, evidence matters. But who’s evidence? Like it or not, the World Bank’s evidence is usually pretty strong”.

**2.10 Having said that, the tying of SAFANSI so closely to the World Bank has some risks that were not explicitly acknowledged in the underlying TOC at the time.** For example, the World Bank's flagship *World Development Report (WDR) 2008*, with its central theme of "Agriculture for Development" acknowledged that it had neglected rural development, home to around 80% of the world's poor, for too long. And despite the thematic focus on "Agriculture for Development" that particular WDR had only minor passing references to under-nutrition, most of which then related to HIV-AIDS patients in Sub-Saharan Africa, virtually ignoring the FNS problems of South Asia even as recently as 2008. (Of course some, but not all, other multilateral and bilateral development partners were recognising that they had not been paying sufficient attention to agriculture, or the links between agriculture and nutrition at that time too). SAFANSI activities can also become collateral damage to any broader relationship issues between the World Bank and partner Governments. The Evaluation found some government officials also still nursed real - or perceived - grievances about certain previous World Bank programs.

### **What the Theory of Change, and subsequent design, did not get right**

**2.11 The initial three year (now four year) time frame for SAFANSI was too short and in contrast to the underlying TOC.** The original Business Case envisaged that SAFANSI was the first phase of a longer term program, potentially up to ten years. But the Business Case also acknowledged that political economy approaches were inherently difficult and took more time than usual to get traction. It therefore should have been more obvious at the time that a small program like SAFANSI needed a longer duration than three (now four) years predictable life span. That is especially so given that the original documents and implicit TOC acknowledged that SAFANSI was seeking to facilitate inter-sectoral approaches in an historically neglected area such as FNS; in a region as complex as South Asia; based partly on a regional approach to knowledge – sharing and capacity building in a region like South Asia where regional approaches have been generally unsuccessful. Even if the first three year period was, at the time, seen to be appropriate as a scoping exercise to generate 'proof of concept' of the three pillars approach, and /or essentially a phase one lead in to a subsequent second and longer phase, the analysis and philosophy inherent in the original TOC would have argued for a more explicit and predictably longer period of SAFANSI engagement. The relatively short (initial) three year period also had consequences for slow disbursement (see paragraph 5.15 of this report). A five year period for Phase One, with an expectation of a further five years in phase two subject to performance, would have been more in keeping with SAFANSI's own acknowledgement that political economy issues are complex and take time. New programs always take time to be understood and then mobilised:

**2.12 The TOC and risk matrix also envisaged a group of stakeholders, all pushing in one direction to mobilise political and policy change for FNS, as well as a multi-donor trust fund: the former has not happened and the latter is now problematic.** The original Risk and Mitigation matrix<sup>22</sup> states confidently that the risk to any waning political support by Governments will only be "moderate" because SAFANSI will be:

- "creating a wide public alliance (Citizens' Alliance) of prominent opinion leaders and decision makers, who will work to enlarge both political will and political space for FNS-related actions
- program will involve multiple donors and development partners to form a common, broad front on the issue".

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<sup>21</sup> While SUN is a welcome initiative, it is not as consistent with the underlying TOC as is the World Bank. SUN is a global initiative rather than regional; several major countries in South Asia are yet to join it including India; and SUN does not necessarily bring its own large financial resources to the table that could be used as a vehicle for policy dialogue.

<sup>22</sup> Available at Section VI of D'ID 's original SAFANSI Business Case

**2.13 In the event, and unsurprisingly, neither of these abovementioned conditions set out in the risk management matrix, and implicit in the TOC, materialised.** There is no “wide public alliance” to speak of. It is clear from the field visits that small – and sometimes quite large – community based self-help groups being supported by SAFANSI are starting to have their voices heard at local level. There is no widespread “domestic stewardship platform” of civil society engagement as envisaged under SAFANSI. (This, incidentally, is a jargon term hard enough to understand to those with English as the mother tongue, but impenetrable to the vast majority in South Asia with English as a second or third language. It should be dropped as a term, and a less inflated plain English alternative used). In any event, even if there was a “wide public alliance” or “domestic stewardship platform”, it was always an unduly optimistic assumption inherent in the TOC and risk matrix that Governments in South Asia would be responsive to pressure from their own domestic public, or development partners, on an issue such as FNS. A cursory knowledge of the history of South Asia politics, or the decades long acceptance of food insecurity, stunting, and low birth weight, meant this should have been known at the time. Nor is there a multi-donor Trust Fund except in name: AusAID - the only other member of the Trust Fund – has announced its decision not to continue participating<sup>23</sup> in SAFANSI after March 2014, and the EU has yet to make a decision. This, again, was a predictable situation given the usual fate of most single issue “Multi donor” Trust Funds in the World Bank or ADB, but one that was part of the original and underpinning TOC of SAFANSI.

**2.14 The TOC sometimes appear to stop short at changes in policies, whereas the real challenges lay in actual implementation.** Many knowledge products being produced under SAFANSI are of high quality and are likely to be relevant to policy makers. Some are already starting to influence government policy documents and government orders in Pakistan and India (see Chapter Four). However experience in South Asia, and most developing countries, is that the formulation of better policies and programs is only the first – and sometimes the easiest, but too often the last –step down a results chain. Experience across Asia and across the decades suggests it is the incomplete *implementation* of programs that is the real challenge. The failure to actually implement good policies and programs results from well-known structural problems: budgetary shortfalls, vested interests, political interference, etc. Against that background, it was not particularly clear from the field visits that SAFANSI activities and the underlying TOC were necessarily focused on the often formidable challenges of actual downstream implementation.

**2.15 In some cases there appeared to be an implicit assumption that good analysis, advocacy, and capacity building, having influenced policy and policy documents, would then be accompanied by effective implementation.** The Evaluation therefore **recommends** that if SAFANSI wishes to track its influence right through the results chain, then it should consider monitoring the actual *implementation* of policies such as the new Government Orders in India (Chapter Four). In another example, it would also be useful to track the actual implementation of policy change expected to arise from the *Multisectoral Simulation Tool*. This new analytical tool is – deservedly – receiving praise and profile for its innovative approach to identifying the actual drivers of under-nutrition in specific geographical circumstances. However the field visit to Bangladesh raised the question as to whether local government authorities, to whom the tool was initially targeting, had the constitutional and legislative authority to then do anything about the findings. Lobbying national policy makers, who did have the power to implement change, would add another step in the results chain.

**2.16 The Evaluation also finds a major disconnect between the quite sophisticated TOC and the overarching Results Management for SAFANSI, resulting in a broken feedback loop for strategic**

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<sup>23</sup> Due to a change in strategic priorities for South Asia. AusAID’s decision not to continue is not a reflection on SAFANSI as such.



**learning and mid-course management of SAFANSI activities.** Although not stated explicitly in the Business Case, it is implied that the relatively sophisticated and evidence focused TOC would be complemented by an equally sophisticated Results Management Framework that would provide feedback loops and internal learning. This, in turn, would allow mid-course corrections and fine tuning of the underlying TOC. This is not possible under the current input and activity focused Results Framework, for reasons discussed in paragraphs 2.22 onwards below.

## **What the Theory of Change needs to now consider in the light of experience to date**

**2.17 The Evaluation also concludes that there are some things that fall between the original TOC getting right, and not right, which need careful consideration in any longer term continuation of SAFANSI.** These are canvassed below. They are posed as questions, as they will require further consultation with key stakeholders, and are dependent upon overarching decisions about the future direction and duration of SAFANSI.

**2.18 The SAFANSI TOC seeks to encompass FNS improvements at the household, national, and even regional level: is this span too great, and would it be better to have more differentiated TOCs?** The underlying TOC sees SAFANSI working to improve FNS practices down at the individual community and household level. But the TOC also sees SAFANSI working upstream to improve national FNS policies and programs of governments. And the TOC also requires SAFANSI to work at the level of the South Asia region as a whole. (This is broadly compatible with the UNICEF nutrition framework, and approaches that identify the ‘immediate, basic and underlying’ causes of under-nutrition). As a result, there are activities at all three levels: household and community; national; and regional. Those implementing SAFANSI believe that these three different levels do relate to each other and come together in a TOC for the whole program. But is it likely that changes in national programs, even if implemented, could actually reach, let alone affect, household behaviour? Some will: government policies on food prices, investments in rural infrastructure, changes to large programs such as India’s Public Distribution System clearly affect most households. But many villages in South Asia have only passing and intermittent engagement with local, state or national governments, let alone region wide approaches. Assuming that changes in upstream programs are actually implemented, will they reach down to the village level? As Chart One, generated by a SAFANSI activity in Pakistan shows, there is a strong association between stunting levels and the availability of soap in the household. Yet the capacity of Government to influence purchases – and then the regular use – of soap at the individual household level is obviously limited. The Evaluation therefore concludes that one single unified TOC, with a results chain that extends from changes in Government policies all the way through to individual households is too long and extended to be valid. **The Evaluation therefore recommends that consideration be given to having more differentiated TOCs: a separate TOC for approaches and changes expected at the household level; another for approaches and changes expected at the national and sub-national level; and a third at the regional level<sup>24</sup>.** Indeed, such differentiation might be critical for SAFANSI in future years. For example, understanding why past multi-sectoral initiatives on malnutrition in different countries in the region have withered might be a valuable comparative exercise informing country-level TOCs. Similarly understanding


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<sup>24</sup> One suggestion made during the course of the Evaluation was that each activity has its own TOC, which then links up to an overarching TOC for the program as a whole. In principle, this makes sense: all activities supported by SAFANSI should have an explicit statement of key assumptions and linkages. On the other hand, this could be taken too far, and become an administratively burdensome and inefficient bureaucratic exercise if individuals felt they had to prepare elaborate and sophisticated TOC, especially for a program with 31 activities, the median value of which is just \$ 175,000, and whose main purpose is often to test out a hypothesis. The Evaluation Team therefore do not recommend having highly specific, prescriptive, TOCSs for each activity.

why, in different countries, there are very different attitudes towards the strengthening international agenda around malnutrition might effectively inform the development of a more cohesive regional agenda.

**Chart 2:1: Stunting in Pakistan and availability of soap in the household: What is the role of Government?**

Source: Government of Punjab (2013)



**2.19 Does the TOC need to have a more explicit articulation of the link between under-nutrition and obesity / the rise of Non-communicable diseases?** SAFANSI understandably focuses on food insecurity and under-nutrition. But there are close biological, and programmatic, links between FNS and the rise of obesity and Non-communicable diseases such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease in South Asia, and globally. Malnourished women can set in train lifelong metabolic disorders of infants *in utero* that then result in increased risk of obesity and acquiring Non-communicable diseases. Barker notes that increased blood pressure and risk of hypertension in adults have been found to be strongly related inversely with placental and birth weight (low weight babies then having higher blood pressure as adults) which he links to maternal nutrition and *in utero* growth faltering (Barker 1990). More recent studies find that “lower birth weight seems to be associated with later risk for central obesity, which also confers increased cardiovascular risk” (Oken and Gillman 2012). They further find that “several studies now indicate that the highest risk for cardiovascular outcomes is associated with the phenotype of lower birth weight and higher Body Mass Index in childhood or adulthood”.

**2.20 These findings are particularly relevant to South Asia where rates (and therefore numbers) of low birth weight babies are high, especially amongst the poorest quintiles.** Maternal under-nutrition predispose her own child to metabolic disorders and expensive to treat diseases like diabetes. Maternal under-nutrition and consequent low birth weight could also have broader macroeconomic effects: Abegunde and colleagues (Abegunde 2007) examined 23 low and middle income countries and estimated \$84 billion of economic production would be lost from heart disease, stroke, and diabetes between 2006 and 2015. India

would lose the most at \$16.6 billion cumulative GDP loss by 2015.<sup>25</sup> Punjab in Pakistan now has more overweight and obese women than under-weight, sometimes even within the same family. SAFANSI's TOC is based on the importance of breaking down vertical silos and taking a more multi-sectoral approach: in focusing on under-nutrition has it overlooked the obvious links and synergies to being overweight and obese? Community level nutrition programs provide an excellent opportunity to address both under-nutrition and obesity in a cost-effective and efficient way. Without wishing to complicate the TOC, the Evaluation recommends that **consideration be given to linking the TOC to rising problems of obesity and Non-communicable diseases.**

**2.21 Is there a TOC for the regional approach?** It is not clear how the regional approach fits into the overall SAFANSI TOC. The original Business Case highlights the commonality of FNS challenges in South Asia, summarised in the “South Asia Enigma” concept. It also recognises there is a regional public good aspect to evidence that is generated in South Asia from SAFANSI and potentially applicable to all countries. In theory, this should also provide efficiencies and economies of scale, if key local stakeholders were disposed to learn from each other (although this is not the case in practice amongst government officials: see Chapter Four). Against that background, the subsequent design of the SAFANSI program is clearly regional / multi-country. But there does not appear to be any explicit TOC as to why a regional / multi-country approach is being used, or what is actually intended or expected. Is the regional / multi-country approach a means to an end (and if so what specific end, and what is the TOC leading to that end) or an end in itself? What is the balance of importance between regional versus national / community level within SAFANSI? The Evaluation found that Government officials were reluctant – even resistant - to learning anything from other country's experience in the region, but that this nationalistic approach was less common amongst academics and NGOs (Chapter Four elaborates). Would a TOC based on working more with NGOs and academics therefore be more appropriate, at least in the short to medium term? It is not possible for this Evaluation to try and answer these questions. They can only be answered, and a more specific regional TOC developed, once stakeholders have decided for themselves the future directions of SAFANSI. **The Evaluation recommends that, as the regional approach is one of the defining characteristics of SAFANSI, it should have a more explicit TOC.**

#### Box 2.1 Lessons about the causal chain from the Bangladesh Integrated Nutrition Program

“Analysis of the causal chain from BINP inputs to child anthropometric outcomes shows the following:

- **There is a weak link in the chain**, as behavioural change communication has been excessively focused on mothers, who are often not the main decision makers for all nutrition-related practices
- **There is a substantial knowledge-practice gap**, whereby women do not turn the advice they receive into practice (economic resource and time constraints are a major reason for this).
- The impact on pregnancy weight gain is too small to have a substantial impact on birth weight. This situation is common in other programs; the mother's pre-pregnancy nutritional status is a more important factor in low birth weight than pregnancy weight gain and might therefore have been a better focus for the project.”

Source: World Bank (2005)

**2.22 What should be the relative balance between food security and under-nutrition?** Clearly, the two are linked in multiple and complex ways. Not surprisingly, many now refer to food and nutritional security as

a single term. On the other hand it was very noticeable during the field visits that most of those interviewed focused their points on nutrition. Indeed, food security per se was rarely mentioned. This might be because food stocks are generally high. The situation would presumably revert to a focus on food security in the event

<sup>25</sup> Of course, many factors contribute to premature diseases such as heart disease and diabetes, including use of tobacco. However changing diets and more sedentary lifestyles is one of the recognised causes of heart disease and diabetes in Asia. India now has more diabetes patients than any other country in the world.

of a drought, flooding or food price spikes. But the impression that food security per se is not currently high on the political agenda does have implications for the political economy tactics and approach inherent in everything SAFANSI is meant to do, and therefore in turn the TOC.

## Implications of the Theory of Change for the Results Framework

### Box 2.2

#### Addressing the “so what?” question in the Results Framework

It is valid, and consistent with its Theory of Change, for SAFANSI to support workshops, conferences, documents produced and training sessions on FNS. It is also valid – as SAFANSI does – to track and record the number of those events. But none of those indicators address the “so what” question: did anything happen after the conference, training, or report?

SAFANSI should be resourced to have independent, follow up reviews three to six months after a conference, workshop, training or finalisation of a policy paper. A random sample of key participants could then be surveyed about what – if anything – had changed since the original activity. Questions could include (and the answers become indicators of outcomes and potential for impact):

- What are the top three most important and specific things you learnt at the conference / workshop / training / report?
- How have you specifically used that in your work since then?
- What specific evidence is there that FNS policy or programs may have changed as a result of that original activity / report?
- What political economy or other barriers are now preventing those insights being scaled up?

**2.23 The Evaluation concludes that while the Theory of Change underlying SAFANSI is, on balance, still valid, there is a pronounced disconnect with SAFANSI’s overarching Results Framework.** More specifically, while the original Business Case and (implicit) TOC of SAFANSI are directed towards outcomes and impact, the overarching Results Framework for SAFANSI is very inputs and activity focused. For example, the Results Indicators for the SAFANSI program as a whole measure the number of consultations and workshops organized; the number of advocacy events carried out; the number of senior policy makers and opinion leaders sensitised or trained. These are all input indicators. Counting them says nothing to address the all-important “so what?” question. With few exceptions (the IFPRI conference and the Development Marketplace) there was no follow up to see if participants at conferences learnt anything new, intended to do anything, or had done anything. With the exception of the training of journalists – a particularly innovative and politically savvy intervention under SAFANSI – there appears to be no independent follow up to see if training and sensitising had actually led to any changes. Counting the number of national level planning documents and strategies that SAFANSI has influenced is arguably a more valid step down the results chain, as that captures tangible outputs. But the question still needs to be asked if policy documents and government orders are then actually implemented in practice (paragraphs 2.14 – 2.15 above).

**2.24 It could be argued that testing and capturing what had happened as a result of SAFANSI supported conferences and training is beyond the direct actual control of SAFANSI,** so should not be measured. Perhaps the input and activity focus of the Results Framework arose because those managing SAFANSI understandably wanted to be accountable only for those things they could control. And in doing so, the Results Framework did avoid the most common problem: overly ambitious objectives. Yet stopping the performance indicators at the activity and output level forces the results chain to stop at that level too; the SAFANSI results framework does capture “the number of major public programs tested / evaluated for impact on FNS outcomes” but this is only one of 15 more input oriented indicators. Testing the “so what” question more systematically will enable SAFANSI management to see if activities

are gaining traction, and moving new ideas down the results chain to those who need them. **The Evaluation**

therefore recommends that the Results Framework be expanded – and resourced – to better capture how the inputs and outputs from SAFANSI are actually being used. Box 5.2 provides some indicative suggestions.

**2.25 Nor do the existing indicators capture quality or timing dimensions.** The Evaluation finds the quality of SAFANSI analytical products to be uniformly high (Chapter Four). Yet there are no measures of quality in the result framework. Nor is there a particularly meaningful time frame attached to the results framework. The results framework does track the increase in number of reports published and conferences held over the years 2010 to 2013. But there is no statement in the TOC, or the Results Framework, to suggest even a range of time periods when SAFANSI expects to start showing downstream ‘results’ and impact. Not having a valid – or in this case a particularly meaningful – time period in which to assess progress down the results chain is one of the problems identified in the analysis by Forti (2012) entitled *Six Theory of Change Pitfalls To Avoid*.

**2.26 The “results” indicators at the individual activity level do not “roll up” to form a coherent story at the overarching SAFANSI program level.** Many of the SAFANSI activities inspected during the field visit are in the process of capturing informative and rigorous indicators at the activity level. This includes capturing the impact from Randomised Control Trials; measurement of changes in women’s empowerment; changes in the quantity, quality, and price of food from “fair price” shops; and so on. But it is very hard to see how these useful and informative indicators roll up to give a strategic overview of SAFANSI progress at the overall program level. **The Evaluation recommends that the results framework synthesise the more strategic findings and developments emerging from individual activities, perhaps by thematic groupings such as “community level lessons improving FNS” that can be captured at the strategic level.**

**2.27 The focus on inputs in the Results Framework means the Annual Report is not a strategically useful document, lacking financial analysis, and duplicates much of the Annual Donor Report.** The Annual Report is largely a descriptive, rather than an analytical or strategic, document. It is not particularly helpful to know, for example, that a side-meeting of a few hours was held at the World Bank with an official (page 22 of the 2011 Annual Report); who attended a particular conference (page 19 of the 2012 Annual Report) or that SAFANSI staff attended a two day workshop (page 25 of the 2012 Annual Report). A stronger results framework would enable a shorter, but more meaningful Annual Report. Nor does the Annual Report provide useful insight into strategic financial management: which countries, and what particular problems, are receiving most SAFANSI funding. The Annual Report also duplicates much of the Annual Donor Report. General reviews of SAFANSI have ended up simply counting the number of activity level outputs, and therefore concluding that “capacity building” can be rated more highly at a programmatic level than analytic outputs under SAFANSI. Counting activities is not a particularly strong way of making such judgements. It also delivers a very different finding than the general impression gained by the Evaluation Team’s field visits, which tended to judge the quality of analytical work the strongest pillar within SAFANSI. Consideration should be given to aligning the Annual Report cycle so that it coincides with the Annual Work Program Cycle. This would help to avoid duplication of reporting and would allow a review of the previous year’s program to lead directly into a needs assessment and work program for the following year. **The Evaluation recommends the Annual Report be shortened, made more strategic, and merged with or otherwise made to avoid duplication with other documents such as the Annual Donor Report.**

**2.28 Consideration should also be given to what SAFANSI can reasonably claim as “impact”.** This is clearly a complex area. For some small scale pilot activities – Vitamin A supplementation, school deworming programs, promotion of breastfeeding, promotion of hand-washing with soap – the chain of causality is sufficiently short, and the scientific evidence sufficiently strong, for some degree of causality to be established

in reductions of, say, underweight and wasting, especially if SAFANSI interventions were part of a Randomised Control Trial. For other interventions – including reductions in stunting – the length of time before results could be measured, and the numerous confounding factors, would make claiming causality much more difficult. Some key drivers of poor nutrition – including deeply ingrained cultural practices such as early age of marriage for girls and the consequent risk of having low birth weight babies – may not be enabled to change for decades. Furthermore, it needs to be recalled that in virtually all cases, SAFANSI provides small scale catalytic funding to generate and disseminate evidence and does not, itself, actually implement large scale programs. That is the proper role of Governments. SAFANSI can therefore claim a *contribution* to ultimate impact provided it clear that SAFANSI analysis, advocacy, and capacity building helped shape larger programs. But SAFANSI can rarely be in a position to claim direct causality (or be accountable for) population level outcomes, especially in the large and populous countries of South Asia. Even where direct attribution might be valid, SAFANSI will need to be careful in claiming “results” as that may undermine domestic political ownership of FNS reforms: the antithesis of SAFANSI principles. What SAFANSI *could* do, as a part of its political economy approach is emulate the type of study in part two of the SAFANSI commissioned study by Reich and Balarajan (2012) on the ICDS. But the focus should be on examples of successful policy and operational changes with demonstrated impact. SAFANSI could commission this type of ‘policy narrative’ research on how such success can be understood through a political economy lens; and, above all, on how learning from such success can become part of SAFANSI communications strategy.

## Chapter Three: Is SAFANSI still relevant?


This chapter assesses section one of the TORs which seeks evidence that SAFANSI is consonant with and relevant to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donors.

### Continued relevance of FNS at the global level

3.1 **FNS remains relevant globally because hunger and under-nutrition measures remain key – and lagging – indicators of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).** The MDG 1 target<sup>26</sup> for reducing poverty was achieved - globally at least - in 2010. However as Chart 3.1 from the latest *Global Monitoring Report* shows (World Bank 2012 c) reductions in income poverty have not been accompanied by reductions in the associated MDG 1 target<sup>27</sup> for hunger. And as the bars on the right hand side of the chart show, South Asia has made least progress with the region as a whole either “off track” or “seriously off track” to achieving the MDG targets for hunger.

**Chart 3.1: progress in reducing income poverty have not been accompanied by progress in reducing hunger, especially in South Asia**

Source: World Bank 2012 c<sup>28</sup>



3.2 **Under-nutrition also undermines achievement of other MDGs.** Under-nutrition is associated with one third of under-five year old deaths, thereby undermining progress in MDG 4 (reducing child deaths). Maternal under-nutrition is a common, but potentially serious, condition for both the mother and her infant, undermining progress in MDG 5 (reducing maternal mortality) and possibly setting in train inter-generational problems of nutrition and metabolic disorders (Black R 2008, Bhutta Z 2008; Bryce J). Under-nutrition also undermines achievements in MDG 2 (education) MDG 3 (gender equality) and MDG 6 (reduction in disease)

<sup>26</sup> To reduce by half, between 1990 and 2015 the proportion of people living below \$1.25 a day.

<sup>27</sup> To reduce by half, between 1990 and 2015 the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.

<sup>28</sup> This graphic is taken directly from World Bank documents. The Evaluation Team understands that the graphic is currently being reviewed and may change



(SCN 2004). Importantly, recent research by Victora et al (2008) find that under-nutrition also has negative feedback loops in terms of reducing income level poverty too (MDG 1). Stunting, underweight and wasting levels are worse than in many sub-Saharan countries (WHO 2012). As has been repeatedly observed, the high levels of underweight, stunting and wasting have generally shown little improvement at scale over the last two decades in most South Asian countries, and certainly not in line with improved income growth (MI/WB 2012). Annex 8 provides a further discussion about the links between under-nutrition and poverty.

**3.3 FNS is also relevant as it continues to be an important part of thinking about international development, and is increasingly being seen as the other side of the coin to the rise of obesity and non-communicable diseases.** International thinking about FNS has evolved over time, including even since SAFANSI was conceived, but the importance of FNS has never left the international agenda for development. More specifically, and as detailed further in Annex 3, food and nutrition security is a high international, and increasingly national priority. The links between FNS and maternal, newborn and child health are increasingly recognised (Masset et al. 2011, Smith et al. 2011). All member States of the World Health Assembly recently endorsed a comprehensive implementation on maternal, infant and young child nutrition, identifying targets and priority actions in health and other sectors, a time frame, and indicators for monitoring (WHO 2012). The Scaling-Up Nutrition (SUN) movement is gaining international momentum and profile: 33 countries have now committed to increased action on food and nutrition security, often at the highest Governmental level and the UN Secretary-General has appointed a special representative on food and nutrition security (SUN 2013).

**3.4 There is growing recognition of the co-existence of under-nutrition and inappropriate nutrition leading to obesity and Non-communicable diseases** - the 'double burden of malnutrition', often within the same communities (Gillespie & Haddad 2003, Nabarro 2010, WHO 2012) (Oken and Gillman 2003), (Barker 1990). This is happening even in poorer communities. In the Pakistan province of Baluchistan, there are now more overweight women by body mass index (22.4%) than underweight (22.1%) (NNS 2011). It is increasingly recognised that the rise of obesity and non-communicable diseases (NCDs) impose large health, social and economic costs on society: one recent estimate finds that India would lose an estimated \$16.6 billion cumulative GDP in current dollars between 2006 and 2015 if progress is not made in reducing NCDs (Abegunde D et al 2007).

**3.5 Looking forwards, it is clear that FNS will remain on the international development agenda, with the UK chaired Nutrition Event linked to the UK Presidency of the G8 Summit in June 2013 being just one example.** Hunger still affects around 868 million people globally, and is directly or indirectly responsible for around 2.3 million child deaths globally. Not surprisingly, therefore, a recent editorial in *The Lancet* concludes that "There is simply no more urgent agenda for world leaders in 2013 than the alleviation of hunger" (The Lancet 2013). That same editorial in *The Lancet* notes the *Enough food for everyone If* initiative, and that the UK is chairing the Nutrition Event linked to the UK Presidency of the G8 Summit in June 2013. There are numerous other examples of where FNS have recently or soon will be on the international agenda. These include the UN Committee on World Food Security that took place at FAO in Rome in October 2012 and the Special Meeting on Food Security and Nutrition at the UN (ECOSOC) during February 2013. The UNSCN has recently (January 2013) completed an online discussion on Hunger, Food and Nutrition Security in the Post-2015 agenda. FAO and WFP are co-chairing this thematic consultation together with the other Rome-based agencies, IFAD and Bioversity International, and with support from the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Food Security and Nutrition. Contributing partners within the UN include UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNIDO, and UNDESA. Officials from FAO, WFP and IFAD in Rome have urged that in line with the UN Secretary-General's Zero Hunger Challenge that Food and Nutrition Security should be the top development goal as priorities are set beyond 2015 (FAO 2012)



## Continued relevance within South Asia

### At the regional level

**3.6 South Asia is still the centre of gravity of world poverty, with most of the poor having direct links to agriculture.** The latest *Global Monitoring Report*, which focuses on food prices, nutrition and the MDGs, estimates there were 570 million people living below the \$1.25 poverty line<sup>29</sup> in South Asia in 2008<sup>30</sup>, 176 million more than the 394 million in Sub Saharan Africa. The *Global Monitoring Report* further estimates that, while the *rates* of poverty will continue to be higher in Sub Saharan Africa than in South Asia by 2015<sup>31</sup>, the *absolute numbers* of those in extreme poverty will still be much larger in South Asia. More specifically, it estimates that there will be 418 million people below the \$1.25 a day poverty line in South Asia compared to 397 million in Sub Saharan Africa (World Bank 2012 c). There are clear links between poverty numbers and agriculture when around 80% of the poor work or live in rural settings.

**3.7 There is overwhelming evidence that FNS still remains a central and substantive development challenge in the South Asia region as a whole, thereby undermining progress globally.** This is clear from the latest statistics at the regional level. This is shown in Table 3.1 below. More specifically, the Joint UNICEF/WHO/WB child under-nutrition estimates recently released for the South Asia region (including India) show an average figure of 37% of all children under five years of age are stunted, 31% are underweight and 15% suffer from severe wasting (UNICEF/WHO/WB 2012). (These terms are defined in the Glossary). There are considerable ranges, with Afghanistan being the most severe for stunting rates in the world. In order of magnitude, the prevalence of underweight children has been estimated to be: for Nepal 48 per cent among children under 5 years, in India 43 per cent, in Bangladesh 41 per cent, in Pakistan 38 per cent and in Sri Lanka 29 per cent (WB/MI 2012).

**Table 3.1 Key Indicators of under-nutrition in South Asia**

Country	Low Weight*	Birth Children	Underweight Children 0-5*	Stunting Children 0-5*	Wasting Children 0-5*
Afghanistan	n/a	33	59	9	
Bangladesh	22	41	43	17	
India	28	43	48	20	
Nepal	21	39	49	13	
Pakistan	32	31	42	14	
Sri Lanka	18	22	18	15	

\*UNICEF: Tracking Progress on Child and Maternal Nutrition, November 2009

<sup>29</sup> In 2005 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms. In essence, the PPP approach seeks to avoid the distortions arising from using market based exchange rates using the US dollar or other currencies. PPP approaches also seek to take account of often lower prices in developing countries for some goods and services, which then affect the actual purchasing power of incomes.

<sup>30</sup> Latest year available, but coincidentally the year when SAFANSI was first being developed).

<sup>31</sup> 41% in Sub Saharan Africa compared to 23.9 % in South Asia by 2015.

## At the country level

3.8 **There is also overwhelming evidence that FNS remains a central and substantive development challenge at the individual country level.** The following provides a glimpse of the FNS situation in each of the countries (listed in alphabetical order) supported by SAFANSI:

- **Afghanistan** has the highest rates of stunting in the world<sup>32</sup> at 59.3% (2004), an increase since the previous figure in 1997 of 53.2% (WHO 2013). It is estimated that, overall, malnutrition in Afghanistan decreases GDP by 2-3 per cent per year (Government of Afghanistan 2012)
- **Bangladesh**, where over a fifth (21.6%) of all newborns in Bangladesh are underweight. Of particular concern is the 17.5% wasting rate in 2007 – well above the WHO cut-off point for declaring a “national emergency” more commonly associated with Africa. There are twice as many stunted children in the poorest quintile of the population than in the richest quintile (SCF 2012). Latest figures from the Demographic and Health Survey are analysed in Annex 9
- **Bhutan** is showing encouraging progress with reducing stunting, although like the rest of the South Asia countries is still far too high (for Bhutan this is 33.5% down from 47.7% in 1999). 80% of children under 5 years are anaemic (2003) (WHO 2013). Remarkably, 40% of over-15 year olds in Bhutan suffer from obesity (World Bank 2012 f)
- **India** will not meet the MDG One goals for under-nutrition until 2043 on current rates of progress. In the meantime other large countries like China and Brazil are on track to reducing under-nutrition by 2015 (Kadiyala 2011). A sobering pair of Indian statistics exposing the frailties of middle income status, show that ‘although there are 61 billionaires, in India 217 million people will go to bed hungry tonight’ (Ghosh 2013)
- **Nepal** Although there has been some small improvement since 1996, a quarter (24.4%) of women are undernourished (BMI<18.5) and 42.4% of pregnant women are anaemic. Both have negative consequences for the mother herself and for her children (WHO 2013). Again, stunting rates are a high 40.5% although there has been some steady progress since 2001 when the figure was 57.1%. According to the multi-sectoral nutrition plan ‘ensuring food security for an estimated 3.5 million of the population in food deficit areas *throughout the year* is an uphill task’ and a serious one since it represents well over 10% of the population
- **Pakistan** In 2011, nationally 43% of children under 5 years of age – around 10 million children - were stunted and 14.6% were wasted. Nearly a third (31.6%) are born underweight (WHO 2013). Around one third of children in the provinces of FATA and Baluchistan are *severely* stunted. (Government of Pakistan and UNICEF (2012)
- **Sri Lanka** has generally made good progress in public health. However estimates of wasting for under-fives of 15% (UNICEF 2011) and stunting of 17% suggesting that more can be done

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<sup>32</sup> UNICEF, using different data sources, estimates that Ethiopia has the highest rates of stunting in the world, at 64%. However UNICEF still estimates that over half (52%) of children in Afghanistan are stunted. Further details available at <http://www.unicef.org/pon00/leaguetos1.htm>

## **The relevance of this to SAFANSI**

**3.9 These challenges are directly relevant to the SAFANSI mandate.** This Chapter shows the challenges of FNS – especially under-nutrition – are especially severe and stubborn in South Asia: SAFANSI is focused on South Asia. Large but differing FNS challenges occur in each of the countries of South Asia: SAFANSI operates in all of them. FNS interacts with poverty and gender: Chapter six provides the evidence to show SAFANSI is focused on the poorer regions and communities and has mainstreamed gender issues into its approaches. The challenges of FNS are clearly not going to be resolved by themselves. Given the decades of slow progress in improving FNS, in the face of economic growth, it is reasonable to conclude that there are both market failures and government failures. New ways of doing business, including through catalytic support from development partners, is needed to accelerate progress: SAFANSI is a multi-donor Trust Fund that aims to provide analysis, advocacy and capacity building in a political economy environment. Given its relatively small size, SAFANSI could never hope to solve the challenges of FNS in South Asia. However the Evaluation Team concludes that the goal and vision of SAFANSI is not only still relevant to these FNS challenges, but that SAFANSI was a long overdue initiative.

## Chapter Four: Effectiveness

### SAFANSI objectives

4.1 This Chapter assesses the effectiveness of SAFANSI, with “effectiveness” being described in the TORs as “a measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives”. Against that background, it is worth recalling the goal and objectives of SAFANSI (at the time using the acronym SAFNSI) as stated in the original design:

36. The long term **goal**<sup>33</sup> of SAFNSI (sic) is to **improve food and nutritional outcomes across SAR in line with MDG1c targets**<sup>34</sup>. Given the “action deficit” in SAR, this can be achieved only through the adoption of more effective and integrated policies and programs (and relevant behavioral changes at the community and family level). Tactically, SAFNSI is targeted at helping enhance FNS-related actions of governments, non-state actors and development partners.

37. Towards this end, the **development objective** of SAFNSI is to increase commitment of governments and development partners in the SAR to more effective and integrated FNS-related policies and investments. An expected **outcome** of the Initiative is stronger emphasis and accountability for action on FNS-related outcomes in development plans and country strategies, and follow-through in terms of more effective policies, institutional arrangements and programs/projects. Key performance indicators are given in the Results Framework....

4.2 Chapters One and Two have explained why it is unrealistic to expect many clear cut “results” in the form of outcomes, let alone large scale impact, at this stage. This includes the short and (predictable) slow start to SAFANSI operations (in effect, only two years’ worth of operations); the weak results framework at the program level; and the complexity of establishing attribution, let alone causality, in the complex political economy environment in which SAFANSI operates. Nevertheless, it is important to identify those situations where there has been movement down the results chain, based on SAFANSI’s original design.

### Effectiveness of SAFANSI in influencing development partners’ approach to FNS

4.3 While the focus of SAFANSI was always intended to be on influencing Government policy and programs, SAFANSI also explicitly envisaged having an influence on the approaches taken by *development partners* as well. SAFANSI Results Indicator Two, for example, counts “the number of development partners’ strategies with an integrated, cross sector approach to FNS”.

### Within the World Bank

4.4 There is very clear evidence that SAFANSI was the critical factor in enabling FNS and multi-sectoral approaches to become more institutionalised within the South Asia Department of the World Bank. Virtually all interviews conducted with the World Bank staff, either in Washington or the field, confirmed that SAFANSI was the critical factor in mobilising and then starting to institutionalise a higher profile and more

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<sup>33</sup> Expected longer term impacts if project interventions succeed in producing expected demand-side behavioural response from governments and development partners.

<sup>34</sup> **Target 1c: Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger:** 1.8 Prevalence of underweight children under-five years of age 1.9 Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption

inter-sectoral approach to FNS issues within the South Asia Department of the Bank. All Bank staff recounted how Vice President Isabel Guerrero had exhibited top down leadership in recognising that under-nutrition was a priority development challenge in the South Asia region as a whole. She had made it clear that, based on the evidence of under-nutrition in South Asia, a more coherent approach from within the Bank's own South Asia region was needed. But the Bank has seen many such "unfunded mandates" come and go. What made the difference on this occasion was that SAFANSI eased the critical binding constraint within the Bank: the inability to access uncommitted financing due to the tight operational budget ("Bank Budget" or BB). This was especially true for those Task Team Leaders seeking to work on and fund what was then seen as a new and potentially high risk area such as inter-sectoral approaches to FNS. Several senior Bank staff saw SAFANSI as creating 'space' (in reality, money) to work on FNS, thereby reducing the risk of doing analytical or lending work that could not be resourced from the Bank Budget<sup>35</sup>, and which would therefore be opposed by their managers. A common statement from Bank staff in Washington and the field during interviews was along the lines that "even though the funding amounts were small, it was the *predictable* availability of financing for FNS through SAFANSI that reduced risk for managers in the Bank and allowed things to be done that would not have otherwise happened".

**4.5 Process, and people, helped get traction within the Bank.** Bank staff also confirmed the location of a small SAFANSI secretariat within the Agriculture and Rural Development area, rather than the "Health Nutrition and Population" was a shrewd move. It encouraged rural development specialists to see SAFANSI as an integral part of their own Agriculture and Rural Development unit, thereby helping to break down the traditional image of nutrition being something belonging to "health" portfolio. In the same way, nutritionists and health professionals in the World Bank advised during interviews that the locating of SAFANSI in the Agriculture and Rural Development, rather than the "health" or Human Development area, encouraged them to move out of their traditional comfort zones and see nutrition more through the lens of agriculture and rural development. Processes for accessing SAFANSI funds were not seen as unduly onerous or transaction heavy. Two or three very credible – but also 'user friendly' - staff with particularly good interpersonal and team building skills were assigned to a small SAFANSI secretariat: a critical factor in any organisation but particularly so given the Bank culture.

**4.6 As a consequence, 31 FNS activities have been supported by the Bank across a range of countries, sectors, and themes** (see Annex 2). When asked what they would have done in the absence of SAFANSI, virtually every Task Team Leader replied they would not have undertaken a FNS activity ("it would have been far too time consuming – and risky – to hunt for the financing from Bank Budget") and turned to some other priority that was usually not FNS. Others who were committed to FNS said they would have had to access existing or future project funding, and in so doing reduce other activities within the project. The Evaluation finds that high quality, SAFANSI funded, applied research, is in the process of influencing World Bank funded projects. This, in turn, is then intended to influence very large national programs. Research under the SAFANSI supported Social Observatory is intended to influence the existing \$7 billion Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act program and the Integrated Child Development Scheme (covering around 8 million pregnant and lactating women and 40 million children), both of which are supported by larger World Bank projects (see Annex 10) The Evaluation Team heard that SAFANSI is also starting to influence the \$ 1 billion Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund at the margin: shifting expenditure under the health

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<sup>35</sup> It could be argued that if the World Bank was truly committed to FNS then it should have invested more of its "own" in-house institutional resources to funding it, rather than relying on development partners. This is only partly true. The Bank has relatively limited internal (ie "Bank Budget") resources to begin with. This partly reflects the requirement of development partners, including the UK and Australia, for the Bank to have a lean internal budget.

component from isolated one-off purchases of equipment to adopting a more community based approach to nutrition.

**4.7 However the process of institutionalisation within the Bank is not yet complete.** The Bank has produced a Regional Assistance Strategy for Nutrition in South Asia, and there are regular joint meetings between the Sector Manager for Health, Nutrition and Population as well as the Sector Manager for Agriculture and Rural Development. There is emerging evidence that nutrition is being explicitly referred to in the Bank's overarching Country Program Strategies: a key document for Bank strategic priorities, planning and resource allocation. The Bank advises for example that "nutrition" is specifically referred to 27 times in the current draft India Country Partnership Strategy. However it remains to be seen <sup>36</sup> if FNS is then going to be reflected in the actual results framework of Country Partnership Strategies (CPS): a key determinant of where resources are ultimately allocated.

**4.8 There is also little evidence at this stage to suggest increased inter-sectoral approaches and FNS sensitive indicators are being explicitly incorporated into most World Bank South Asia project designs or results frameworks.** It is reasonable to expect that, over time, any increased institutional commitment to raising the profile of FNS, and encouraging more inter-sectoral approaches to FNS, would then be reflected in World Bank Project Appraisal Documents (PADs). It would be particularly hoped that FNS sensitive indicators were becoming increasingly and explicitly included in the results frameworks of PADs on the basis that "what gets measured gets done". To test this hypothesis the Evaluation examined 182 PADS covering agriculture, rural development, water supply and sanitation, education, social protection, and gender. The method, scope, search criteria, and detailed findings are in Annex Nine. In essence, the aim was to see if there was any emerging evidence suggesting PADS in the South Asia department of the Bank were incorporating FNS indicators more systematically in the three years after SAFANSI's establishment compared to the three years prior to its establishment. The analysis also sought to see if the South Asia Department of the Bank was now incorporating FNS indicators more systematically in its PADs than other regional areas with FNS challenges such as Sub-Saharan Africa. The key findings are that:

- None of the 23 water and sanitation projects, 6 agriculture projects, or 4 gender projects supported by the South Asia Department had a FNS indicator in the Project Development Objective, or in the projects results framework, in the three years before, or after, SAFANSI's establishment. (It should be noted that the Bank states that nutrition is often mentioned in the descriptive narrative text of the PAD and that "only the most important deliverables are placed in the project results framework". The Evaluation Team accepts that explanation, and agrees that results indicators should be kept to a manageable number of strategic issues within Bank control. But the Evaluation Team stands by its view that explicit inclusion of FNS indicators in the results framework itself where that is a key part of an activity would be good evidence of institutionalising FNS into Bank operations.
- The number of FNS indicators had fallen in "rural development" projects since SAFANSI had been established (from 3 out of 14 projects in South Asia having FNS indicators in the three years prior to SAFANSI's establishment to none out of 7 projects in the three years after SAFANSI's establishment. There was a slight rise in FNS indicators in education projects over those periods but the numbers are too small to be meaningful.

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<sup>36</sup> The CPS for India, for example, is currently under negotiation and is therefore confidential. It is not clear if FNS and inter-sectoral approaches will be reflected in the final CPS.

- There are numerous references to the importance of FNS in the narrative text of PADs, especially those in the agriculture and rural development sectors. But this is not subsequently reflected in indicators to be tracked in the PAD's results framework.
- There is no discernible trend between the inclusion of FNS indicators in the South Asia Department and those in the Sub Saharan Africa Department.

**4.9 The absence of explicit FNS sensitive indicators in key sectors such as agriculture, gender, water and sanitation, and the reduced number of FNS sensitive indicators in rural development is a potential problem.** It can be argued that the analysis undertaken in Annex Nine is both simplistic (the use of word searches) and unrealistic (there are long lead times involved in preparing PADS) so it is too soon to expect changes. This Evaluation acknowledges such concerns. On the other hand, even this somewhat crude and simplistic approach does raise some important questions. For example, why is it that three years after the establishment of SAFANSI, and six years after FNS was on the agenda internationally and within the World Bank, are there still no indicators for FNS in 33 different projects in the agriculture, gender, and water and sanitation sectors when these sectors are important drivers of FNS? And why have the number of FNS indicators in rural development fallen to zero out of seven projects since SAFANSI was established? Part of the explanation is the lead times involved: project preparation normally takes 12-18 months to complete before the project document becomes public, and so has not had a chance to influence earlier documents. Another part of the explanation from the Bank is that nutrition is referred to frequently in the narrative text of project design documents but that only the most important deliverables are then placed in the PAD Results Framework. The Evaluation Team accepts those explanations and also recognises the dilution of focus that occurs when too many indicators get added to a Results Framework. On the other hand, it is also clear that “what gets measured gets done: or at least gets management attention”<sup>37</sup>: if FNS is truly to be taken seriously in the Bank there should be some genuine (not token) FNS indicators appearing in PADs. **The Evaluation therefore recommends that the Bank track the extent to which genuine (not token) FNS sensitive indicators appear in the results frameworks of South Asia PADS over time, particularly in key sectors such as agriculture, gender, and water and sanitation.**

## **Within bilateral agencies**

**4.10 There is reasonable evidence to suggest SAFANSI is influencing DFID approaches to FNS – more so in London than in the field.** Interviews with several senior DFID officials in London confirmed all had heard of SAFANSI and most were aware of at least one or two activities it had supported. The most commonly cited SAFANSI activities in London were the Multisectoral Simulation Tool For Scaling Up Nutrition; the Social Observatory in India; and South Asia Gender and Nutrition Mapping. The situation was different in the field, albeit with a smaller sample: knowledge of DFID’s policy towards FNS was well understood but SAFANSI itself was usually not recognised as a DFID funded activity. As “branding” and “attaching flags” to SAFANSI was – prudently – never an objective of DFID, this is understandable. Of more concern however was the lack of knowledge of SAFANSI’s own knowledge products currently in, or already emerging from, the research pipeline that could help staff shape their own FNS programs. The Evaluation concludes that DFID is best placed to know how to improve internal communication within its organisation and so does not make a specific recommendation on this.

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<sup>37</sup> An approach taken seriously within the World Bank, to its credit.

**4.11 There is little evidence to suggest SAFANSI is influencing AusAID, a financial contributor to SAFANSI.** As with DFID, the visibility and awareness of SAFANSI was generally higher in headquarters (in this case Canberra) than in the field. While AusAID staff in New Delhi were very familiar with the program, others were not. Nor does it appear that SAFANSI itself has been proactively bringing its emerging knowledge products and insights to the attention of AusAID staff. In Pakistan, for example, AusAID has been designing over the last 15 months a \$ 40 million Trust Fund called the *Pakistan Partnership For Improved Nutrition*. The aim of this new Trust Fund is to strengthen the links between improved nutrition and maternal, newborn and child health. The Evaluation Team sighted an AusAID design preparation document for this Trust Fund and confirmed that the design explicitly - and frequently - anticipates in writing a close relationship and complementarity with SAFANSI at both a strategic and programmatic level. However the Evaluation Team could find no explicit evidence that existing SAFANSI supported research and pilots in nutrition, even if at an early stage, had directly informed the direction and design of the *Pakistan Partnership For Improved Nutrition* Trust Fund at this stage. AusAID has a recent *Improving Food Security Thematic Strategy* but this mentions nutrition only twice in 19 pages. AusAID state that this Strategy will soon have a stronger focus on nutrition outcomes, especially given the expected arrival of a new Principal Specialist (Food Security). AusAID is currently developing a corporate strategy on nutrition, which senior AusAID officials say will be consonant with SAFANSI principles including evidence, advocacy, capacity building and inter-sectoral approaches. The Evaluation Team did not have the time or resources to interview other bilaterals such as USAID.

#### **Within other multilateral agencies and other organisations**

**4.12 There is mixed evidence about SAFANSI influencing other multilateral agencies, and no indication of influence on the large Asian Development Bank portfolio.** On the one hand, UNICEF, WHO, and FAO were uniformly complimentary about the role of SAFANSI / World Bank personnel in coordinating the policy notes for Provinces in Pakistan. On the other hand, almost all other FAO, WFP, UNICEF and WHO staff based in and interviewed in other countries of South Asia were unaware of SAFANSI or its knowledge products<sup>38</sup>. Large foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation also support work on FNS in South Asia. Nor was there any evidence that SAFANSI is shaping the designs and implementation of large water and sanitation, education, social protection or other related sectors supported by other development partners such as the Asian Development Bank. This would seem to be a missed opportunity for leverage, bearing in mind the relatively large concessional financing footprint of ADB operations: a total of \$21.7 billion approved financing in Asia as a whole, and a cumulative total to date of 24 projects worth \$2.3 billion in water and sanitation alone in India. NGOs working on FNS that were interviewed were generally not aware of SAFANSI or its products. **The Evaluation therefore recommends that SAFANSI develop an engagement strategy with other multilateral and UN agencies with which it is already working so as to increase its profile and opportunities for sharing knowledge products and influencing their programs and policies. This engagement strategy should also particularly be extended to the Asian Development Bank, sharing SAFANSI knowledge products and insights that might influence the design and implementation of the ADB's own large lending portfolio in South Asia in areas such as water and sanitation education, and rural development. The engagement strategy should also extend to large NGOs and foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.**

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<sup>38</sup> WFP and UNICEF in Nepal are an exception here and were informed of, engaged with and supportive of the leadership coming through SAFANSI-funded initiatives.



## Effectiveness of SAFANSI in influencing FNS approaches at the country level

### The importance of country context

4.13 **The Evaluation notes at the outset the critical importance of country context in evaluating the effectiveness of SAFANSI.** The field visits confirm the dangers of making generalisations about the effectiveness of the SAFANSI program as whole when the country context differs so much between - and within - the countries of the region. For example, and as discussed below, SAFANSI is starting to get traction within countries as varied as Afghanistan, India, Nepal and Pakistan. In Bhutan and Sri Lanka there appears to be less progress, perhaps<sup>39</sup> partly reflecting the smaller number of SAFANSI activities there (one activity in Bhutan and two in Sri Lanka).

4.14 **But SAFANSI gaining traction within several countries was in contrast to the Bangladesh country context.** The Evaluation concludes that while the relevance and quality of SAFANSI funded activities<sup>40</sup> in Bangladesh were uniformly high, and appeared to gaining traction at the local and community level, SAFANSI was not getting traction at the senior levels of Government. Part of this reflects the low visibility of SAFANSI: most senior officials were not aware of it or its products. Some senior officials expressed doubts about any form of external assistance, be it multilateral or bilateral, SAFANSI related or not, claiming that external development assistance could undermine a carefully built up domestic consensus and sense of domestic ownership of FNS approaches. Recent academic research suggests there may also be underlying structural factors within the Bangladesh political economy which manifest themselves in oscillating views about bilateral and multilateral development partners as the two major political parties enter or exit Government (Taylor L 2003). The Evaluation Team concludes that Bangladesh is an obviously important country in terms of FNS, and that SAFANSI should continue to find ways to engage with senior Government officials. SAFANSI is built on the need for astute political economy assessments and judgements, so should continue to use such approaches in the local context, even if that then involves slower progress than originally envisaged.

### Early examples of progress down the results chain at the country level

4.15 **While it is too early to expect significant “outcomes” at this stage, and unrealistic to expect direct “impact” even over the medium term, there are now some clear signs of good progress down the results chain under SAFANSI.** As noted in Chapters one and two, several factors combine to mean that it is too early to expect significant outcomes at this stage: most activities only commenced less than two years ago; the activity size is small; the operating environment complex and slow; and there are numerous confounding factors in any outcomes and impacts that may arise. Nevertheless, based on first hand<sup>41</sup> field inspections by the Evaluation Team, the following case studies provide evidence of traction at the country level.

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<sup>39</sup> It is not clear what is cause and effect here. The low number of activities in Bhutan and Sri Lanka may reflect a particularly difficult political economy environment which has seen little opportunities for SAFANSI activities and traction. Or it could be that the smaller populations, and World Bank lending programs, to these countries has resulted in them having limited activities. The Evaluation did not have the time to explore the issue.

<sup>40</sup> The Evaluation Team interviewed several people, inside and outside the World Bank, about TF0984 (*Multisectoral Simulation Tool for Scaling Up Nutrition*) and TF 099422 (*Impact Assessment of Bangladesh CCT Pilot through Local Governments*)

<sup>41</sup> Telephone and other interviews in the case of the Afghanistan example.

4.16 The **Nepal Rural Livelihoods Project demonstrates how good analysis and evidence can improve the program design of larger inter-sectoral programs to increase the FNS benefits of poor women.** That case study illustrates four key principles originally expected from SAFANSI:

- **Clearly targeted** at improving the nutritional status of very poor women living in poverty –targeting includes preferential recruitment of women from poor and lower castes. Data from one of the baseline surveys (RCIW) showed that 94% of participants had less than six months food availability from their own sources. SAFANSI funded research also helped show that targeting those households with the most number of under-five year old children was a more effective targeting strategy than hitherto. (However the research also noted such households had multiple demands on their time as well, especially for mothers still breastfeeding infants).

#### Box 4.1

##### The “Social Observatory”: influencing the world’s largest poverty reduction program.

The India National Rural Livelihoods Mission (NRLM and recently renamed Aajeevika) is the single biggest poverty reduction programme in the world with a budget of over US\$8.5 billion including US\$ 1 billion from the World Bank. The NRLM operates in the poorest blocks of the 13 poorest states in India and is targeting 350 million poor people.

SAFANSI is supporting the program through a “Social Observatory” – in essence a series of rigorous, applied, social research techniques to better measure and understand the process of change in anti poverty measures. SAFANSI has supported randomised control trials; sophisticated analysis of how gender affects household decision making; and strengthened management information systems including alignment and reconciliation of project records with national census data to facilitate benchmarking of progress. Further details in Annex 10

- **Uses high quality, evidence based, policy relevant research** that generated unexpected findings that are central to the nutritional status (and ultimately earning capacity) of the women: some women might have a nutritional *deficit* because of the amount of physical exertion they were engaged in getting to the work site and then doing physical labour.

- **Engages somewhat unlikely multi-sectoral Government agencies in Nepal.** The Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development and the Ministry of Physical Planning, Works and Transport **Management were involved in this instance, rather than the more obvious** Ministry candidates such as the Ministry of Agriculture.

- **The results of the SAFANSI activity have good prospects of now changing the design of the Government’s overall program for food for work.**

4.17 The **Social Observatory for Rural Food and Nutrition Security in India also illustrates the intended principles of SAFANSI.** The details of this case study are available in Annex 10. The SAFANSI principles that this activity illustrates includes the following:

- **Strong targeting of poverty, gender mainstreaming, the socially excluded and FNS.** Bihar is one of the poorest states in

India -a recent review of the PDS found that 70% of rural households reported having to skip meals because of poverty. Within Bihar the communities targeted in the Livelihoods programme are amongst the poorest. Most of the activities involve very poor women’s self-help groups, and / or tribal and other excluded minorities.

- **Analytical rigour, innovative research techniques, and real time monitoring.** Field trials use a range of analytical techniques including randomised control trials and innovative behavioural economics testing – in the appropriate circumstances. Mobile phones are used to monitor key

indicators in real time, and identify problem areas. Indicators are used to measure progress in women's empowerment over time.

- **Policy relevant generation of evidence.** Research results are leading to some self-help groups already acquiring management of otherwise poorly performing or defunct 'fair price' shops under the large PDS scheme. Innovative, subtle, yet rigorous research shows that men, and a woman's mother in law, are the more strategic targets for FNS messages in the short term, as they make the key decisions about food purchases.
- **Integrated approach to analysis, advocacy and capacity building.** Large local NGOs are having step-wise improvements in analysis and evidence generation through a 'learning by doing' approach supported by SAFANSI.
- **Scope for sustainable scaling up results at the state and even national level, although analytical gaps in strategic planning could be a binding constraint where SAFANSI itself could be helpful.** The JEEViKA program inspected during the field visit is a large quasi government program already well linked into delivering large Bihar state government programs. Data and evidence from the Social Observatory has the potential to help shape large programs such as the Public Distribution System and Integrated Child Development Scheme. (However while SAFANSI has generated new and more reliable data for making basic *program* decisions, senior managers now lack *strategic* information on which to plan State wide scaling up).

4.18 **The development of FNS policy planning documents in four provinces of Pakistan is another example illustrating SAFANSI principles.** The details of SAFANSI activity TF 012245 (*Enhancing National Commitment for an Evidence Based and Gender Sensitive Multi-Sectoral Response to the Food and Nutrition Security Challenge In Pakistan*). Key points to note from this activity are:

- **The scale of the original challenge.** In 2010 the Government of Pakistan decided to devolve responsibility for planning and budgeting health (and other services) to the Provinces. The central Department of Health was abolished. Provinces in Pakistan – including Punjab with a population of 81 million – which had not traditionally been responsible for such higher level strategic planning and resource allocation were now required to do so urgently.
- **SAFANSI activities provided a critical role in coordinating multi-donor engagement, and generating policy relevant notes.** All development partners, including UNICEF, WHO, FAO and the bilaterals independently confirmed that it was the convening power of the World Bank; the credibility and collaborative style of the World Bank Task Team Leader; and the financing from SAFANSI that were the critical factors in coordinating the inputs between the numerous agencies from government and its development partners.
- **There is clear documentary evidence that subsequent strategic policies elevated the role of nutrition.** The Evaluation Team examined the *Planning Commission One* documents for Sindh and other provinces – the most important document for strategic planning and budgetary requests – and found extensive evidence of a more prominent and sophisticated approach (e.g. links to maternal health, not seen as simply a food feeding program) to FNS. SAFANSI supported policy notes provided much of the background for these Planning Documents. (Unfortunately, there is not much evidence to

suggest the policy notes supported by SAFANSI had been able to bring a more nutrition sensitive approach to Planning Commission documents in other sectors such as Agriculture).

- **The recently approved Nutrition Policy Guidance Notes for Punjab** particularly illustrate what SAFANSI is meant to be doing: evidence based, gender focused, inter-sectoral approaches, placing FNS high on the policy agenda and linked to policy recommendations for inter-sectoral action. They provide documentary evidence that FNS issues can be placed in the centre of the development agenda.

#### 4.19 **The development of a Nutrition Action Framework in Afghanistan, now the responsibility of the Second Vice President, is an example of SAFANSI engagement in a complex, fragile, and conflict affected environment.**

The burdens of under-nutrition and the complexity of the operating environment in Afghanistan are obvious. Amongst other things, Afghanistan has the highest stunting rates in the world, with over half the under-five year old population stunted. Against that background, it was encouraging to see progress down the results chain supported by SAFANSI. Details of SAFANSI activity TF 098874 (*Supporting Afghanistan's High Level Task Force on Food and Nutrition Security*) are in Annex 11. Key points to note from that Annex are:

##### Box 4.2

##### **A nutrition focus amongst line ministries in Afghanistan**

Over half of children under 5 years of age in Afghanistan are stunted: one of the highest rates of stunting in the world.

SAFANSI has helped five key Ministries - the Ministries of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock; Commerce and Industry; Education; Public Health; and Rehabilitation and Rural Development – develop actions within their sectoral responsibilities to improve nutrition outcomes. The resultant Nutrition Action Framework was welcomed at the highest Government levels and overall leadership for tracking its implementation has been assumed by the Second Vice-President. Further details in Annex 10

- SAFANSI supported the appointment of five sector specialists to work with national counterparts in five Ministries with inter-sectoral implications for FNS: Ministries of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock; Commerce and Industry; Education; Public Health; and Rehabilitation and Rural Development.

- This in turn led to the development of the Nutrition Action Framework for the country, with each Ministry agreeing to implementation steps and nutrition outcomes (although only the Ministry of Health provided specific targets and indicators).

- The Nutrition Action Framework has been supported by, and is now the responsibility of, the Second Vice President of Afghanistan.

- While actual implementation of these policies is now the key and crucial step, the high level political buy-in from the Second Vice President; the institutional and bureaucratic buy-in from five separate Ministries; and the follow on technical assistance work being provided to the Ministries by SAFANSI suggests this activity has progressed a long way down the results chain, and prospects for achieving tangible change and outcomes appear reasonably good in such a complex environment.

#### **Examples of no progress, and / or absence of expected activity**

4.20 **The evaluation identified activities that are not proceeding well.** The 2012 Annual Report of SAFANSI (World Bank 2012a) expresses the hope (page 60) that SAFANSI could help raise the profile of nutrition amongst high level policy makers in both Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. While the Annual Report makes a sober assessment of the actual likelihood of progress, it could be argued that the time has come to

recognise neither of these activities hold much prospects for success. It would be useful to understand the specific political economy reasons why these efforts appeared to have stalled. Observers in Dhaka outside of the World Bank also claimed that earlier World Bank efforts to support the National Nutrition Council – an essentially stillborn body – had always been a lost cause given its institutional location and well known lack of political commitment.

**4.21 The evaluation also noticed a surprising lack of SAFANSI activity at the country level dealing with sanitation, and/or girls’ education.** As noted in Chapters Two and Three, improved sanitation and girls’ education are arguably two of the most strategic inter-sectoral drivers of nutrition outcomes globally, and especially in South Asia. Yet the field visits found little evidence – apart from some excellent analysis and references in the *Punjab Pakistan Nutrition Policy Guidance Notes* that SAFANSI was engaging actively, or substantively in those areas. Nor was there evidence that SAFANSI was proactively and systematically seeking to shape large Government or World Bank projects in the education and or water and sanitation sectors.

**4.22 It should also be noted that there appears to be little<sup>42</sup> if any SAFANSI activity addressing environmental degradation per se, climate change, or food wastage and post-harvest losses.** This is despite the fact that these were explicitly cited as areas of expected SAFANSI engagement over time in the original Business Case design document<sup>43</sup>. The Evaluation Team believes these issues should be retained as core parts of SAFANSI, given that each of them – including especially environmental degradation – are likely to affect agricultural productivity and therefore FNS, and each of them are likely to have a disproportionately large adverse impact on the poor and vulnerable.

## Effectiveness at the Regional Level

### Some definitional issues

**4.23 An important part of the original SAFANSI design and rationale is the regional approach to FNS in South Asia.** The original design documents note the concentration of FNS challenges in the South Asia region; the particular characteristic of the “South Asia Enigma”; and the need and potential opportunities for learning from each other across the region. There are various references<sup>44</sup> to what might be meant by region wide issues and approaches in the original design. However there is no single, explicit, explanation or

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<sup>42</sup> Post harvest losses are discussed in the Government of Punjab, Pakistan, *Nutrition Policy Guidance Notes*.

<sup>43</sup> SAFANSI Business Case

<sup>44</sup> For example see references to regional approaches that are now highlighted in bold text from the original SAFANSI Business Case. That document states “the long term goal of SAFANSI is to *improve food and nutritional outcomes across South Asia Region (SAR) in line with MDG1c targets*. Given the “**action deficit**” in SAR, this can be achieved only through the adoption of more effective and integrated policies and programs (and relevant behavioral changes at the community and family level). Tactically, SAFANSI is targeted at helping enhance FNS-related actions of governments, non state actors and development partners..... *Principles of SAFANSI*: The initiative will seek to: (a) promote political leadership and stewardship for FNS outcomes b) ensure nutrition outcomes are central to **regional** and country food security policy and programming c) promote an inter-disciplinary, inter-ministerial and cross-sectoral approach; (d) build strong partnership among various institutions/players working on nutrition, safety nets and food security; (e) add value to existing country and **regional efforts**; (f) **encourage coherence and coordination among countries** and among development agencies on what needs to be done; (g) focus on actionable research (what works and does not); (h) focus on **building South Asian regional capacity**; and (i) prioritize action to tackle gender inequality and social exclusion.

definition as to whether SAFANSI is to be a “regional” program; a “multi-country” approach within a geographically specified region; or involve a “multi-bi” approach. Nor is there any explicit discussion about the balance of expected SAFANSI activities between “regional approaches” versus country activities.

**4.24 The Evaluation is not in a position to resolve any definitional issues about “regional approaches”, but does offer some observations.** It is not appropriate for the Evaluation Team to define or recommend ‘regional’ or multi-country approaches. Amongst other things, DFID, AusAID and the World Bank have their own definitions which are then linked to their own internal financing rules and definitions. However the Evaluation would offer the following observations concerning terminology and classifications:

- FNS challenges in South Asia are not ‘transboundary’ issues in the same way as infectious diseases, environmental pollution, and water management are.
- The similarity of FNS challenges across South Asia suggest that knowledge and evidence could be considered a ‘regional public good’. There are also potential economies of scale in researching similar FNS issues across a range of countries.
- Cross border regional (and global) trade and investment in food and foodstuffs, and region wide regulations about food, are usually considered to be part of a more clear cut definition of regional economic integration. International and regional trade in food has implications for food security.
- “Regional” approaches – however defined – can sometimes be useful to bilateral development partners, as it enables them to still maintain a presence and entry points for engagement in fast growing countries such as India when a traditional bilateral “aid” program is no longer appropriate.

## **Regional approaches within the World Bank**

**4.25 There is reasonable evidence to show that a more regional approach is now being instituted within the South Asia Department of the World Bank itself.** The World Bank now has its own Regional Assistance Strategy for FNS within the South Asia Department of the World Bank (although the field visits suggest there is variable understanding about it within the region amongst Bank staff). A number of Bank staff cover more than one country within the South Asia Region, and this has facilitated the transfer of experiences from one country to another (approaches to mobilise political commitment in Nepal were subsequently applied successfully in Afghanistan). Importantly, 9 of the 31 activities currently in the SAFANSI portfolio are specifically designated as South Asia Regional activities<sup>45</sup>. Three of the more high profile of these are TF 098748 (“IFPRI Conference on Leveraging Agriculture for Improving Nutrition and Health”); TF 097620 (“South Asia Development Marketplace on Nutrition”) and TF 010381 (“South Asia Gender and Nutrition Mapping”). Less known, but nevertheless useful, is the training of nutritionists from across the South Asia region at Mahido University, Thailand.

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<sup>45</sup> Details are in the first nine listed activities in Annex2.

## **The Technical Advisory Committee: a missed opportunity for two way regional knowledge sharing and advocacy at the regional level**

**4.26 The Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) is a missed opportunity for two way regional knowledge sharing.** The TAC is a group of seven eminent experts and opinion leaders<sup>46</sup> from the South Asia region. It was intended “to provide guidance and advice to help the (SAFANSI) program achieve its strategic goals” (World Bank Annual Report 2011). The TAC should have been an opportunity to hear from the eminent experts from across the region what they saw as priorities for regional action. To some extent that has happened: the inaugural meeting of the TAC in 2011 emphasised the need for a life cycle approach to FNS and the need for a multi-sectoral action plan for the region. But the TAC could also have been an opportunity to expose these opinion leaders to the evidence and insights being generated by SAFANSI in other countries in South Asia, which they would then know how to disseminate in ways that got traction.

**4.27 The reality is that the TAC is not an active agent for strategic messaging, either from the region into SAFANSI programming, or from SAFANSI activities back out to the region.** This is partly because the logistical difficulties in getting eminent and busy people together in person means it has been hard to get the TAC to meet regularly. In any extension of SAFANSI, consideration should therefore be given to ways of reinvigorating the TAC as a vehicle for region wide (and global) knowledge sharing and advocacy. Without wishing to have another layer of advice, or increase administration costs, consideration could also be given to setting up a “shadow” TAC of young, energetic, mid-career, and female<sup>47</sup> opinion leaders drawn from across the region who are also in positions of authority and can “make things happen” to supplement the work of the TAC on a more regular basis. This next generation of opinion leaders could bring fresh insight into emerging ‘over the horizon’ issues of FNS to SAFANSI thinking, as well as being strong advocates for spreading SAFANSI knowledge products and insights back into their communities and across the region. Another alternative might be to use civil society advocacy networks to push for greater attention to FNS issues.

**4.28 The TAC is also a missed opportunity for influencing larger international debates about the importance of FNS in South Asia.** The focus of international negotiations on development is now moving to the architecture of a post MDG 2015 world. It is very clear that various interest groups are actively staking out territory and seeking to set the agenda on what should be the focus areas post 2015. Within the area of health, some are making the case for increased attention on Non-communicable diseases (Alleyne G et al 2013). Others focus on maternal health. To the extent that negotiations for a post 2015 MDG world set global strategic targets and indicators that are then taken seriously by the international community, it is important to be part of that debate. The TAC could have used the combined credibility and profile of its members to push for greater commitments on FNS, ensuring any targets and indicators were consistent with the unique environment of South Asia. There is no evidence that they did.

## **Demand and Supply side problems at the country level**

**4.29 The Evaluation found strong demand side barriers to regional approaches, including knowledge sharing, at least amongst senior levels of the public sector.** Some officials spoke favourably of the regional knowledge sharing from the SAFANSI supported IFPRI conference<sup>48</sup>. But this was more the exception to the rule. Instead, the field visits found a uniformly consistent view across all government officials, in all countries, that they had little if anything to learn from other country’s experience. Several interviewees

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<sup>46</sup> Names and CVs are available at page 7 and 8 of the SAFANSI Annual Report 2011.

<sup>47</sup> The current TAC is noticeably male, although two of the original seven members were female.

<sup>48</sup> *IFPRI Conference on Leveraging Agriculture for Improving Nutrition and Health*. TF 098748.

insisted it was difficult enough to get knowledge sharing between the states and provinces *within* a single country, let alone between the countries of South Asia. Part of this may be bravado and a sense of nationalism and patriotism. But the reluctance – even hostility – to learning from others in the region was very clear and quite explicit. The older, more senior, male, officials were particularly dismissive of regional knowledge-sharing. In contrast it was noticeable from the Evaluation Team’s field visits that younger, female, mid-career professionals working in NGOs were positively eager to learn from others’ experiences from across the South Asia region and beyond. This impression is also consistent with secondary reports of the enthusiastic knowledge sharing that occurred amongst NGOs during the SAFANSI supported South Asia Development Market Place. There is anecdotal evidence that academics in the South Asia region are more prepared to take knowledge sharing across the region more seriously.

**4.30 But there are also supply side barriers for those who do wish to learn from regional experiences because SAFANSI – and its products – lack visibility.** The most common reaction encountered during field visit interviews was that even an experienced person working directly in FNS in South Asia had never heard of SAFANSI. In itself, this is not necessarily a problem, especially as DFID and AusAID had wisely chosen not to “badge” or “brand” SAFANSI for its own sake. But more worrying is that few people outside of the World Bank knew of SAFANSI knowledge products. And those outside the World Bank who were connected to one SAFANSI activity were almost always unaware of other similar SAFANSI products, even it had direct relevance to the work they were engaged in (for example, how to design and interpret a Randomised Control Trial on FNS). Several people, upon hearing about SAFANSI, asked how they could access it, either for financing or for accessing very specific knowledge products. The current SAFANSI web site is not particularly useful in answering either of those questions.

**4.31 There are reasons for this lack of visibility, but more now does need to be done at the country level.** World Bank staff explained that the Bank had deliberately held back from aggressively promoting SAFANSI activities and knowledge products until it had a critical mass of substantive and serious “results” to actually promote. This was a prudent and sensible decision at the time. However as insights and “results” are now starting to emerge the time will soon come when those managing SAFANSI will need to more proactively promote it, and particularly its knowledge products. This will need to be resourced properly. It cannot be done by the small number of staff directly working on SAFANSI now.

**4.32 If SAFANSI is extended beyond 31 March 2014<sup>49</sup>, consideration should be given to recruiting one locally hired person in each of the SAFANSI countries whose job it is to act as a “knowledge broker”.** More specifically these individuals should become World Bank local staff so that they can be fully aware of what stage various SAFANSI activities are at in their country; have access to World Bank project documents related to SAFANSI; and have good, quick and reliable access to SAFANSI Secretariat support staff in Washington DC. They should have good inter-personal and advocacy skills so that they can proactively take emerging knowledge across to those in Government and other agencies which need such insights at that time. The knowledge brokers should also be fully familiar with the SAFANSI programs in other countries of the region, so that they can link up those working on similar themes (technical approaches to undertaking RCTs for example).

**4.33 A suggestion has been made that perhaps NGOs, academics, or ‘citizen alliances’ could perhaps fulfil – or at least complement – the role of dissemination of SAFANSI products.** The Evaluation Team does not favour this option. It is unlikely to be as effective as using in-house locally recruited World Bank staff, since

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<sup>49</sup> The deadline for disbursements will then be end September 2014, thereby allowing a six months period for settling of accounts of ongoing activities.



the World Bank has much greater convening power and access to key Ministries of Finance and Ministries of Planning than NGOs, or “citizen alliances”. It is also unlikely to be efficient: locally recruited in-house World Bank staff will, after an initial training period and clearances, have access to the World Bank email and SAFANSI related data sets, so be able to identify what is coming through the SAFANSI pipeline in real time. NGOs and other external groups will always “not know what they do not know” and be approaching Task Team Leaders for updates. This would involve double-handling of information and the risk that outside personnel might inadvertently misrepresent the Bank’s analytical work, policies and programs when seeking to disseminate SAFANSI products.

### **Future options, including possible SAARC initiatives on FNS**

4.34 **During the course of field visits, the Evaluation Team learnt of a possible South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) initiative on FNS.** This is potentially relevant to any future work that might be agreed upon for SAFANSI. On the one hand, political challenges within the region means SAARC is not generally perceived as an especially strong or vibrant organisation. Nor is it one that has shown much interest in FNS. On the other hand, SAARC is a regional body, so may have some level of political and regional ‘ownership’ as an organisation. Any effective, regional, approaches that SAARC can generate on FNS should be encouraged. What the Evaluation Team learned about the SAARC initiative based on discussions during the field visits is summarised in Annex 12.

## Chapter Five: Efficiency and Value for Money

**5.1 This chapter assesses efficiency and value for money.** The TORs describe efficiency as ‘measures the outputs and outcomes – qualitative and quantitative – in relation to the inputs. It is an economic term which signifies that the aid uses the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results’. The Evaluation looked at technical efficiency (“doing things right”) and allocative efficiency (“doing the right things”).

### Technical Efficiency

**5.2 There is good evidence to show that SAFANSI exhibits technical efficiency (“doing things right”) at the early activity approval stages.** That is because SAFANSI has relatively low transaction costs within the Bank, at least up until the approval stage, compared to the alternatives. The application form itself for SAFANSI funding is concise and clear (a copy is at Annex 13). The approval process involves a number of steps, but these are judged necessary for quality assurance including technical rigour and compatibility with the Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy for the country concerned. The flow chart of processing a SAFANSI application is set out in Annex 14. These steps are not generally seen by Bank staff, or the Evaluation Team, as being overly bureaucratic or onerous. Indeed, numerous Bank staff independently confirmed that seeking SAFANSI approvals involved less transaction costs than the labour intensive, and risky/uncertain, process of seeking funding for innovative funding for multi-sectoral approaches elsewhere within the Bank’s system. While agreeing that the SAFANSI approval processes involved low transaction costs, comments were made that it would be particularly useful to have a fast track process to allow “just in time” small seed money approved in a few days so as to take up suddenly opening windows of opportunity to influence debates and thinking within SAFANSI countries. This suggestion warrants further consideration within the Bank. The Evaluation Team notes that transaction and processing costs were higher when processing recipient executed grants such as the Development Market Place Grants. However it is hard to see a more efficient alternative than outsourcing the processing to the Micronutrient Initiative, given the large number of applications received. General overhead costs associated with SAFANSI appear to be in line with standard Bank procedures for Trust Funds.

**5.3 There is some evidence to suggest that technical efficiency starts to fall away after activities are mobilised.** That is partly because, as discussed in Chapter Two, the Results Framework generates mainly process indicators (number of papers produced, conferences supported, people trained). Nor does the overarching Results Framework roll up the more useful indicators from the individual activity level in a real time fashion. Thus, those looking for more strategic and meaningful indicators of progress need to initiate a resource intensive process of querying individual Task Team Leaders and documents. Bank staff note that they tend to have more email traffic asking for information about SAFANSI than from other Trust Funds. This is a positive reflection of the interest shown by the partners to the Trust Fund. But Bank staff note that many of the questions could have been answered much more quickly and efficiently had the partners made it clearer at the outset what their particular interests were in the first place. The inability of the Results Framework to generate meaningful insight into progress, or “roll up” indicators from the individual activity level in a strategic way, means the SAFANSI Annual Report has to be largely researched and written as an additional, stand alone, exercise absorbing staff time, rather than something that can be largely generated from the Results Framework.

## Allocative Efficiency

5.4 **It is more difficult to assess allocative efficiency (“doing the right things”).** That is because there is no objective or “right” answer as to how much of SAFANSI’s resources should be allocated to individual countries or regional programs; how much should be allocated to particular themes and sectors (for example water and sanitation versus road infrastructure); or how much should be broadly allocated to each of the three “pillars”: analysis, advocacy, and capacity building. These points are discussed below.

### Allocative efficiency between countries

5.5 **There appears to be a reasonable spread of activities between the countries of the South Asia region, and to regional activities per se.** SAFANSI is a relatively new program, and one which is meant to be demand driven (at least by Task Team Leaders within the World Bank). It is therefore not reasonable to expect a neat or formula driven allocation of activities, or funding, to individual countries based on their size, poverty levels, food insecurity or under-nutrition levels. Nevertheless the Evaluation did analyse the allocation of activities, and funding, by individual country as well as how much went to regional programs. A detailed financial expenditure analysis is in Annex 18. It shows that, amongst other things, around one third (35%) of expenditure goes to “regional” activities. India, Nepal and Bangladesh are the three largest recipients of SAFANSI expenditure, attracting 26%, 15% and 12% respectively. Sri Lanka attracts the lowest share of expenditure: 1%. Given that there are no “right” allocations in a demand driven approach like SAFANSI, these figures seem broadly reasonable. However it could be noted that Afghanistan currently receives only 4% of direct country (ie non-regional) SAFANSI expenditure. Given the particular burden of FNS issues in Afghanistan, this might appear a little low. On the other hand, there are obviously formidable security and other challenges of trying to operate in Afghanistan.

### Allocative efficiency between the “three pillars”

5.6 **There also appears to be a reasonable spread of expenditure between the three “pillars”: analysis, advocacy, and capacity building.** Again, there is no “right” allocation of funding between the three pillars. And there is – and in fact should be – a high degree of overlap and complementarity between the three pillars. (One World Bank official correctly commented that analysis, advocacy and capacity building are more correctly viewed as three different sides to the one pillar). Having said that, the three pillars were a central part of the original SAFANSI design. And the allocation of resources reveals what the ‘real’ strategic priorities are of a program. The Evaluation therefore sought to understand what share of total expenditure went to each of the three pillars, and if one pillar was getting a disproportionate share of funding, while others were being neglected. The analysis is in Annex 16. Drawing on World Bank data, the analysis shows that there is a roughly even spread of activities by number: 25 activities were primarily flagged as pillar one (“building evidence and analysis”) by the Task Team Leaders proposing an activity; 26 activities were flagged under pillar two (“improving awareness and advocacy”) and 20 were flagged as pillar three (“strengthening capacity”).<sup>50</sup> In broad terms, expenditure tended to follow this pattern. However these results should be treated with caution given the overlaps between the three pillars, and subjectivity in deciding what was the main focus between the three.

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<sup>50</sup> Numbers exceed the total number of SAFANSI activities because Task Team Leaders – sensibly – identify more than one pillar when applying for SAFANSI funding.

### Box 5.1 The Three Pillars: Analysis, Advocacy and Capacity Building in the SAFANSI Social Observatory Project, India

The Evaluation Team inspected the SAFANSI supported Social Observatory Project in Bihar and Tamil Nadu in India .

#### *Analysis*

The Social Observatory has a strong focus on building evidence and analysis (**pillar one**). It does this through application of the most modern and rigorous approaches to undertaking Randomised Control Trials and qualitative analysis.

#### *Capacity Building*

Local stakeholders, including large well established NGOs doing community survey work for Government, confirmed their institutional capacity to now undertake more valid and rigorous social surveys and analysis had increased through a “learning by doing” process supported by SAFANSI (pillar three).

#### *Advocacy and Influence*

The quality and reliability of the data being generated had led to poorly run food ration shops (PDS) now being managed by local self-help groups, with comparative data being monitored on the availability, price, and quality of basic food supplies for poor people. The longer term aim is to use the Social Observatory to influence and shape FNS and other interventions in some of the world’s largest development programs including the India National Rural Development Mission.

Further details at Annex 16

## Allocative efficiency between sectors

**5.7 It is unclear if SAFANSI is allocating its scarce resources to the most urgent and strategic research and advocacy needs in South Asia: the limited focus on sanitation, and girls’ education raises some concerns.** It is not surprising that SAFANSI activities cover a wide range of themes and sectors. SAFANSI is meant to be demand driven (albeit, in practice, filtered through World Bank Task Team Leaders) and FNS issues in South Asia are complex and numerous. However what is surprising is the apparent absence of activities on multi sectoral approaches focusing on sanitation, and girls’ education, given the particularly powerful influences those two sectors have on under-nutrition, as noted by (Haddad (2013), Spears (2012) and Smith (2011)). Had the TAC been more active, they could have shed light on this apparent lack of engagement with such critical sectors, and other possible gaps in the strategic directions of SAFANSI. The Evaluation **recommends that the apparent lack of traction with two strategic responses to under-nutrition in South Asia - girls’ education, and sanitation – be critically assessed and, if necessary, a special “call for proposals” be made under SAFANSI to facilitate better engagement.**

**5.8 There is some evidence to suggest SAFANSI is not yet attracting a critical mass of activities in activities originally envisaged for SAFANSI including food security per se since most SAFANSI activities have a strong nutrition focus.** It is not clear why this is, especially when food security was an important part of the original design brief for SAFANSI and reflected in DFID’s SAFANSI Business Case. The lack of focus on food security per se is, however, consistent with the discussions during the Evaluation Team’s field visits in South Asia: nutrition was the dominant focus of respondents’ comments, with food security attracting only passing mention. It is worth noting that food wastage (including post- harvest losses), as well as climate change and environmental stress, were also part of the envisaged work of SAFANSI at the time of the original SAFANSI Business Case. They do not appear to have attracted much, if any, attention.

## Value for money

**5.9 The main way in which SAFANSI achieves value for money<sup>51</sup> is that it uses World Bank purchasing and procurement guidelines.** The large majority of SAFANSI activities are World Bank executed

<sup>51</sup> Value for money is a related and complementary concept to technical and allocative efficiency. Far from simply using a least cost approach, value for money involves maximising the benefits over the full life cycle of an initial expenditure, and takes into account quality of outputs.

activities, initiated and managed by World Bank Task Team Leaders. This means Bank procurement procedures are used, which is then *prima facie* evidence of seeking value for money. The Evaluation understands that the standard overhead fee for the World Bank to manage a Trust Fund is applied to SAFANSI. Where external activities were supported, such as the Development Market Place, processing of the large number of applications was outsourced to the Micronutrient Initiative. Anecdotal evidence from a range of World Bank staff suggest that this approach, while relatively expensive, was good value for money as Micronutrient Initiative shortlisted and selected well, and provided a great deal of capacity building to NGOs on project design.

**5.10 The quality control of proposals and programs under SAFANSI appears sound, and this supports value for money.** Bank executed SAFANSI proposals go through three major quality control steps, each assessing the proposal from different perspectives (see Annex 14). As already noted, these steps appear reasonable and not particularly onerous or bureaucratic. One notional test of the quality of proposals is to see how high the acceptance bar is set: what proportion of proposals is approved and what proportion is rejected. Bank staff explained they had deliberately chosen not to formally reject proposals under SAFANSI as this could discourage future applications from other sectors. Instead of formally rejecting proposals, the SAFANSI secretariat sought to help proponents re-work proposals in ways that could then make them more eligible for SAFANSI approval. The Evaluation sees this as a sensible approach. Externally sourced proposals, such as the Development Market Place, are very competitive, attracting hundreds of initial applications. Only high quality proposals get to the final stage of approval.

**5.11 To the extent that SAFANSI can influence and leverage larger Government programs, and “crowd in” resources at the margin to support FNS, then it enhances its own value for money.** Task Team Leaders within SAFANSI clearly wish to use seed money from SAFANSI activities to leverage up larger national programs. These include the Social Observatory activity in India (see Box 4.1) and efforts to use SAFANSI applied research to influence more FNS sensitive and inter-sectoral approaches in the large Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund<sup>52</sup>.

## **Financial size and financial management of the SAFANSI Trust Fund**

**5.12** The quantum of money available to SAFANSI, and financial management practices, are also relevant to any consideration of efficiency and value for money.

**5.13 The Evaluation finds that the original allocation of \$ 13.3 million<sup>53</sup> to SAFANSI was a reasonable size.** It is clear that SAFANSI will always be a very small niche activity within the World Bank: it is less than 1% of the total Trust Funds operated by the Bank; 0.02% of the Bank’s \$ 46.9 billion global program lending and credits in 2011 (latest year available) and even smaller when compared to the large expenditure by Governments and size of economies in the South Asia region. Doubling or tripling the size of SAFANSI would still make it a relatively very small, niche, activity that can only ever be catalytic. There can be no science to designing a new scheme like SAFANSI but \$13.3 million would seem “about right”.

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<sup>52</sup> To date, PPAF has cumulatively financed over 4.7 million microcredit loans, completed 25,000 health, education, water and infrastructure projects, conducted over 11,500 training events and developed a grassroots network of over 297,000 community organizations. PPAF’s coverage has simultaneously increased to include 129 districts through 99 partner organizations across all provinces and regions. (<http://www.ppaf.org.pk/CEOCorner.aspx>). It has a program of over \$1 billion.

<sup>53</sup> \$16.2 million if the AusAID funding to the SUNITA program in Nepal is included.

**5.14 However it should have been anticipated at the time that disbursements would be very slow at the beginning, and a longer period of three years was required.** SAFANSI was a new Trust Fund; seeking to encourage Task Team Leaders to move out of their comfort zones and finance applied research in the relatively new area of inter-sectoral policy; in a regional context; using political economy analysis; in the highly complex environment of South Asia; with a particularly lean funding for in-house World Bank secretariat support (basically one full time, experienced, senior Bank official, and one specifically recruited Bank officer to serve as full time Secretariat). The designers of SAFANSI should be congratulated for taking on such a challenge. But decades of experience from development financing should have made it obvious that such an approach would have a very slow start, and that the expenditure and disbursement curve would be gradual and back loaded. And this is indeed what then happened: only three activities became activated in 2010; twelve were activated in 2011; and fifteen were activated in 2012. It should have also been obvious at the time that three years (now four) was far too short a period to disburse the funds fully. A five to seven year period (preferably ten) would have been more realistic.

**5.15 Paradoxically, the uncertainty over the future of SAFANSI is slowing down approvals and disbursements even further: the *predictability* of SAFANSI funding is now more important than the *quantum*.** Interviews with Bank staff during the course of the Evaluation confirm that the uncertain future of SAFANSI after 31 March 2014<sup>54</sup> means that several Task Team Leaders are now reluctant to put in a proposal to SAFANSI that would need to operate beyond that date. That is because no-one can at this stage predict what future funding levels – if any – will be after 31 March 2014. Task Team Leaders are particularly reluctant to go through the process of trying to identify and hire international or local staff to support a planned multi-year SAFANSI activity when it is not necessarily clear that SAFANSI will be continuing, and if it is at what level of funding. It is clear that the predictability of funding for SAFANSI is now a more important factor influencing future applications for SAFANSI activities than the quantum of money available to SAFANSI. The Evaluation therefore recommends that, whatever decision is made about the future of SAFANSI after March 2014, that the decision be announced as soon as possible, to remove uncertainty (see Chapter 7).

**5.16 SAFANSI involves a large number of very small activities, but this does not necessarily mean it is a “slush fund” facility supporting fragmentation of effort.** SAFANSI supports 31 activities (Annex 2). The financial analysis undertaken by the Evaluation, and available in Annex 15, shows that the mean size of a SAFANSI activity is \$ 219,500. The median size of a SAFANSI activity is \$175,000. Current international development thinking has tended to move away from umbrella financing schemes that support small activities, seeing them as too often leading to fragmentation of effort for unsustainable activities and turning the scheme into a ‘slush fund. SAFANSI has avoided that so far by having generally high quality proposals that are always seen as being catalytic. The analysis in Chapter Four suggests that a number of SAFANSI activities have the potential to leverage up larger programs.

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<sup>54</sup> There is then a six month window to settle accounts of then ongoing activities.

## Chapter Six: Other Aspects of Development Effectiveness

6.1 Preceding Chapters assessed SAFANSI under the major headings of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and value for money. This chapter assesses SAFANSI on other important aspects of development effectiveness.

### Targeting of poverty, the vulnerable, and the socially excluded

6.2 **There is very strong evidence to show that SAFANSI has a clear poverty focus, targeting the poor, vulnerable and socially excluded.** At the highest level, SAFANSI targets South Asia, still the centre of gravity of world poverty, with an estimated 418 million people living below the \$1.25 a day poverty line in 2015, compared to 397 million in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2012c). Within South Asia, the program targets the poorest states and provinces, including Bihar in India. Within those States, it then targets some of the poorest and most vulnerable communities including tribal communities and those in conflict (TF 012122 *Improving Food Security in Tribal and Conflict Affected Areas*); large pockets of high poverty (TF 012676 *Community Managed Food and Nutrition Security Initiatives in High Poverty States*). SAFANSI also demonstrably targets those on the very margins of society including the highly vulnerable and socially excluded children of sex workers in Bangladesh (*Development Market Place: Comprehensive Nutrition Care for Extremely Vulnerable Infants and Young Children*).

### Gender mainstreaming

6.3 **There is equally good evidence to show that SAFANSI has not simply targeted vulnerable and poor women: it has sought to include women – and males – as part of the community decision making process.** There are numerous SAFANSI activities with women at the core of the work: TF 010381 (*South Asia Gender and Nutrition Mapping*); TF 011910 (*Global Conference on Women in Agriculture*). Virtually all of the several activities involving Randomised Control Trials, Conditional Cash Transfers, also involve women, infants, and / or young feeding practices. But all activities examined by the Evaluation Team also found that women were not simply passive recipients or targets: they were active participants in the ongoing design, monitoring and management of activities. Importantly, several SAFANSI activities examined – including the field inspection of the Social Observatory in Bihar, India - had decided that the key to improving women's empowerment and nutrition outcomes was to have specialised and culturally appropriate interventions with men.

### Risk and Risk Management

6.4 **Program risk and fiduciary risk are managed well.** Multi-sectoral approaches to hitherto low priority areas such as FNS are inherently complex and therefore risky. SAFANSI also seeks to operate regionally, including three fragile and conflict affected countries or situations (Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nepal). SAFANSI's flexible and innovative approach is therefore appropriate to the inherently risky environment. Indeed, pursuing nutrition or food specific approaches through traditional stand-alone project modalities arguably carries a much higher risk of failure over time. The pressure on partners, especially the bilaterals, to spend money and show 'quick wins' and "impact" is a potential risk to the more nuanced, subtle and longer term political economy approach inherent in SAFANSI. Fiduciary risk management occurs because most activities are Bank executed and so follow Bank procurement rules.



## Sustainability

6.5 **It is too early to draw any conclusions about sustainability, but there are some promising signs.** The original SAFANSI Business Case<sup>55</sup> stressed that taking a political economy approach to FNS would be a long term process. The Inception Phase of SAFANSI went from April to September 2010 so SAFANSI has had only a little over two years-worth of activity. It is far too early to expect sustainability of its activities. However there are some promising signs. For example several activities, such as the Social Observatory activity inspected during the field visits, explicitly aim to embed the more evidence based and rational approaches supported by a SAFANSI activity into larger, existing, well- funded and potentially long running programs such as the India National Rural Livelihoods Program.

## Innovation and responsiveness versus fragmentation

6.6 **There is good evidence to show that SAFANSI is innovative and responsive, and little or no evidence to suggest it is a “slush fund” with lots of fragmented activities.** SAFANSI is essentially a demand – driven facility, albeit one largely driven by demand of World Bank Task Team Leaders. Many of the activities are innovative including high profile activities such as TF 098429 (*Multisectoral Simulation Tool for Scaling Up Nutrition*) through to small and lesser known activities such as the Development Market Place supported activity *Nutrition For Migrant Children Living On Construction Sites*. The Evaluation Team looked critically to see if the SAFANSI portfolio was becoming a “slush fund” of small, fragmented, unconnected, activities. There is little or no evidence to suggest that. The Evaluation Team concluded this was because the various screening and quality assurance steps used to assess SAFANSI activities (see Annex 16) do what they are meant to do, and encourage only those proposals that are consistent with SAFANSI objectives and individual country strategies. If SAFANSI was to be opened wider to other applicants, the risks start to increase of SAFANSI becoming a slush fund (see discussion in Chapter Seven).

## Paris Declaration principles

6.7 **SAFANSI is broadly consistent with the principles of the *Paris Declaration On Aid Effectiveness* and its successor declarations.** There was evidence in Bihar that SAFANSI was using government systems and that there was joint monitoring with government of certain activities. It was clear from field visits that the World Bank/SAFANSI had used its convening power in Pakistan to coordinate the inputs of all the major development partners, including UNICEF, WHO, FAO, when working with provincial government line agencies to produce policy planning notes. Other aspects of *Paris Declaration* principles appeared satisfactory as well.

## Governance

6.8 **Governance within SAFANSI appears satisfactory.** Strategic management occurs through liaison with DFID and AusAID, and through a formal annual reporting back mechanism. The Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) has not lived up to expectations of providing strategic guidance, as noted elsewhere in Chapter Four, due to the logistical difficulties of having such senior people to meet at the one time. Internal governance procedures appear satisfactory: SAFANSI application and financing procedures were shown to the Evaluation Team, and appear to be clear, well documented, and followed.

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<sup>55</sup> SAFANSI Business Case



## Chapter Seven: Main Conclusion, Options for the Future, and Summary of Recommendations

### Main conclusion

**7.1 The main conclusion of this Evaluation is that SAFANSI should be extended into a second, but longer, phase two.** The Evaluation Team did consider other alternatives consistent with the emphasis on FNS. These included merging SAFANSI with LANSA; providing funding support to SUN instead of SAFANSI; or using the financing that would otherwise go to SAFANSI to support high powered 'loan buy-downs'<sup>56</sup> with the World Bank in critical areas for FNS such as girls' education, gender, and sanitation. However none of those alternatives had all the key elements of the original vision of SAFANSI, which remain valid. Most importantly, all the available evidence assessed in this Evaluation confirms SAFANSI is on track to filling its niche, but important role; has good prospects of being developmentally effective for its size; and has deficiencies such as low visibility and a weak results framework that can be relatively easily addressed at low cost. The preceding Chapters provide evidence and arguments that, on balance, SAFANSI is relevant, effective, efficient, provides value for money, and exhibits other aspects of development effectiveness.

### Specific options and recommendations for SAFANSI in phase 2 over the longer term

#### Duration

**7.2 SAFANSI should be now extended, preferably for a further ten year period, provided at least three changes are made to improve its overall effectiveness.** As discussed in Chapter Two, political economy approaches, especially in the complex environment of multi-sectoral approaches to FNS in South Asia, will inevitably take time. While there is nothing scientific about a ten year period, such a period would give a duration of engagement – and the necessary *predictability* - to have more appropriate engagement strategies. Of course, any such extension should be conditional on some key improvements being made to the SAFANSI approach. First, as canvassed in this Evaluation, it would be essential that the results framework is changed to make it more outcome and less input and 'activity' focused. SAFANSI should be resourced to have independent follow up of how its products and activities are – or are not – gaining traction. Second, SAFANSI must also increase the visibility of its knowledge products amongst stakeholders, in ways that are useful and usable to them. This is likely to require the placement of in-country focal points specifically accountable for acting as knowledge brokers between SAFANSI activities, and promoting SAFANSI knowledge products to targeted decision makers. Third, the Technical Advisory Committee is a potentially powerful vehicle for shaping the future strategic directions of SAFANSI, and simultaneously acting as an advocacy group for FNS within and across the South Asia region and beyond. But it is not working in the way it was envisaged. It should either be revitalised, or abolished. Other recommendations contained in this Evaluation, and also discussed below, are not essential to the reinvigoration of SAFANSI, but could also be considered. It is recognised that DFID and other stakeholders may have some internal administrative obstacles to overcome in committing future financing to a ten year period. However there should be ways of

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<sup>56</sup> In essence, 'loan buy downs' would involve an agreement by DFID and/or AusAID to use their grant aid to pay off the interest component of an IBRD/IDA credit, in retrospect, provided key outcome and performance indicators were met. The power of a loan buy down approach is that it aligns incentives of all parties to achieve outcomes (not just inputs); provides high leverage to the financing provided; and is only triggered on the prior and actual achievement of specified outputs and outcomes.

giving in principle undertakings and political statements that allow SAFANSI to now plan and operate over a longer time scale.

## **Size of a future SAFANSI and possible cost implications**

**7.3 The SAFANSI budget does not necessarily need to be expanded significantly, but there is a need to better resource independent evaluation of outcomes, and to improve visibility and knowledge-management.** As discussed in Chapter Two, money is not the binding constraint to addressing FNS challenges in South Asia: political commitment, knowledge, and implementation are. Increasing SAFANSI's budget even ten times would not necessarily make ten times the impact, given its niche role in a crowded market. Continuing SAFANSI pro rata annual funding at around current levels, adjusted for inflation, or increasing by around 5% per year would be one option to consider. A relatively modest and slow increase in funding would then likely be associated with increased competition for SAFANSI funding (and presumably even higher quality proposals) as SAFANSI became better known. Whatever the final figure, it would however be important to properly resource and fund the deployment of independent<sup>57</sup>, locally recruited, personnel to follow up on the actual outcomes of conferences and training. It is also important to fund and resource the appointment of local 'focal points' in each of the SAFANSI countries, who would be accountable for more proactive knowledge sharing and knowledge management across and within South Asia. These focal points would need to be Bank staff, as they would need full time and continuous access to the Bank's pipeline of SAFANSI activities, and related Bank documents and procedures.

## **Having a more proactive and directed funding stream**


**7.4 While SAFANSI should continue to be essentially demand driven, consideration could be given to a more 'directed' funding stream supporting known, potentially high impact, interventions to support gender, girls' education, and sanitation.** SAFANSI is currently demand driven, at least in terms of the choices made by Task Team Leaders within the World Bank. The Evaluation finds that the variety and quality of the overall SAFANSI portfolio is such that this approach is working well, and surprisingly innovative and demand driven activities are being supported. (Chapter Four elaborates). Yet there could be an argument for SAFANSI also being more directive – or at least encouraging – to fund those interventions known to have high impact on FNS. Sanitation and hygiene are clearly correlated with nutrition outcomes. And girls' education and female empowerment are also clearly associated with improved FNS outcomes, as well as other developmental benefits. This is apparent in Chart 7.1 below, reproduced from a recently published policy guidance note in Pakistan directly supported by SAFANSI. The recently evaluated CARE approach in Bangladesh, which also focused on gender and gender empowerment, states that “stunting prevalence among project participants fell by an unusually large 16 percentage points over a three-and-a-half year period during which stunting was stagnant in Bangladesh as a whole and even increasing for some time due to a major food price crisis and adverse weather conditions” (Smith et al 2011). In practice, a certain percentage of the SAFANSI funding pool, say around 30%) could be set aside to finance inter-sectoral FNS activities in the World Bank's own large projects on girls' education, or sanitation, neither of which appear to be getting the attention they arguably deserve. Alternatively, SAFANSI could consider a special “call for proposals” in another round of the Development Marketplace, focused on a single theme such as innovative solutions for linking sanitation, hygiene and FNS.

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<sup>57</sup> That is, not directly employed by the Bank as there would then be a perception of a conflict of interest in undertaking independent monitoring and evaluation.

**Chart 7.1 Child stunting and mother’s education in Punjab, Pakistan**

Source: Government of Punjab (2013)



**Opening SAFANSI to more proposals from outside the World Bank**

7.5 There are arguments for, and against, opening SAFANSI to more applications from outside the Bank itself: a recommended compromise would be to more systematically capture knowledge gaps by local stakeholder, giving them a more direct voice in SAFANSI’s forward research agenda. Most SAFANSI activities are generated and implemented by Task Team Leaders within the World Bank. The main vehicle for external stakeholders to access SAFANSI financing is through the *Development Market Place* competitive rounds. The main argument in favour of allowing external groups to be given more direct access to SAFANSI is that it could encourage greater local ownership and engagement in FNS by government, academic, NGO and possibly even private sector agencies. Done well, this could mobilise a wider range of organisations around a coherent FNS theme, and so help to build more integrated approaches and broad based political buy in. This might be particularly relevant in Bangladesh where there is a need for better two-way engagement between senior government officials and the SAFANSI program. The main argument against opening SAFANSI more to outside stakeholders is the possible loss of coherence and focus, with SAFANSI evolving into a funder of a wide variety of small activities not linked to larger World Bank programs. The administrative cost to ensure quality control and manage fiduciary risk of outside sourced small activities could also outweigh the benefits.

7.6 A compromise to give more direct “voice” to the needs of local stakeholders, rather than have this filtered through Task Team Leaders, would be to systematically survey key local stakeholders on what is the key, tangible, gap in their data or understanding that is hindering them from making better decisions about FNS. This could be done by the new and additional SAFANSI focal points in country, recommended as part of this Evaluation. The findings could then be aggregated and form the basis of a thematic round under the Development Marketplace, and/or highlighted to Sector Managers and Task Team Leaders within the World

Bank to help shape the future research activities. Such an approach would help make SAFANSI more responsive, and be seen to be more responsive, to the needs and 'voice' of local stakeholders.

## **Engaging AusAID and other development partners**

**7.7 AusAID should consider using its high profile and strategic commitment to maternal and child health to co-finance or otherwise support SAFANSI activities, even if it is no longer a formal member of the Trust Fund.** AusAID is currently part of the SAFANSI Trust Fund. But it has decided not to continue its participation beyond March 2014 when the current SAFANSI arrangements end. AusAID officials state this is due to change in overall strategic directions when engaging in South Asia and is not a reflection on SAFANSI, or the importance of FNS, per se. The Evaluation concludes this should not inhibit AusAID from identifying some creative and innovative ways of supporting the FNS outcomes being pursued by SAFANSI. Indeed, as the Australian Government places improving maternal and child health amongst the top of its development priorities, South Asia is the centre of gravity for maternal and under-five deaths, and around one third of those are generally attributed to under-nutrition, it would be strange if AusAID now disengaged from SAFANSI entirely.

**7.8** AusAID advises that malnutrition (both under-nutrition and over-nutrition) is also an emerging priority within the organisation and that it has established a new multi-sector Task Force to address these issues, including in advance of Australia hosting the G20 in 2014. AusAID and the World Bank found creative, but entirely accountable and responsible, mechanisms to finance SAFANSI activities in Nepal (the "SUNITA" activity). AusAID is currently designing a large activity with FNS and maternal health implications in Pakistan via a Trust Fund with the World Bank. There are therefore opportunities for synergies and possibly co-financing between AusAID and SAFANSI.

**7.9 Once decisions are made about this Evaluation and the future of SAFANSI, DFID and the World Bank should promote SAFANSI to other bilateral and other agencies, as well as foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (which also works on FNS in South Asia).** Based on the findings of this independent Evaluation, there is a good case for encouraging broader participation in the multi donor Trust Fund supporting SAFANSI. As noted in this Evaluation, the challenge of FNS is still substantial and relevant in international development; the underlying approach of analysis, advocacy and capacity building is appropriate to the political economy challenges of FNS; the choice of the World Bank as manager of the program was a good one given its convening power and access to key Ministries like Ministries of Finance and Planning in South Asia; the quality of analytical products is high; activities are focused on the poor, including women; and overall program management is efficient and provides value for money. Even if other agencies decide not to formally join the multi-donor Trust Fund, there are still opportunities for collaboration and co-financing short of actual full membership of the SAFANSI Trust Fund that should be explored.

## **Recommendations for the coming year**

**7.10 Whatever the outcome, it is important to make a decision – and announce it – as soon as possible in the coming months: the current uncertainty and lack of predictability is undermining SAFANSI operations.** The original SAFANSI design envisaged – but certainly did not require – a second phase. The decision by AusAID not to continue in the SAFANSI Trust Fund beyond the current timetable to March 2014 has not sent a particularly encouraging signal about the future of SAFANSI, even though that decision was taken for much broader strategic reasons. There is therefore some considerable uncertainty amongst Bank staff as to whether they could or should develop new SAFANSI proposals, or extend the

contracts of existing staff. This general uncertainty has, in turn, the consequence of further slowing down the SAFANSI financial disbursement profile. It is therefore important that a decision about SAFANSI's future is made as soon as possible, and then announced promptly.

**7.11 A work program for the remaining year will then depend upon what decisions are made, but strengthening the results framework, and increasing the visibility of SAFANSI are priorities in any event.** Stakeholders need to decide if they will accept the recommendation for an extended period, possibly up to a ten year extension of SAFANSI. If they do, that will require some detailed longer term planning and costing. If stakeholders reject that recommendation and opt for a shorter period of, say, five years, that will require a different sort of planning and costing. If other choices are made – having a more directed and proactive funding stream, or opening SAFANSI more to external stakeholders - then that too will require planning and costing. However whatever choices are made – even to allow SAFANSI to lapse at the end of March 2014<sup>58</sup> - it would be important to start more detailed work on strengthening the results framework conceptually. It would also be useful to appoint and fund independent, local, consultants to do the follow up surveys on what were the tangible outcomes and results three to six months after a SAFANSI financed conference, workshop, training, or publication. It would also be important to appoint and fund SAFANSI focal points in country whose primary responsibility is to act as knowledge brokers and 'introduction agencies' putting people into contact with each other who are working on similar SAFANSI related challenges.

## Summary of Recommendations Made in this Evaluation Report

**7.12 This section lists the twenty specific recommendations made in this Evaluation.** In this paragraph, the recommendations are listed in the sequence and order that they appear in the Report. The relevant paragraph is also shown, so that the context and justification can be quickly accessed. Paragraph 7.13 onwards then takes the same recommendations but regroups them according to the main target audience – DFID, AusAID, or World Bank – with an indication of priorities and possible timing.

1. If SAFANSI wishes to track its influence right through the results chain, then it should consider monitoring the actual *implementation* of policies (Paragraph 2.15 refers). 2.18
2. The Evaluation therefore recommends that consideration be given to having more differentiated TOCs: a separate TOC for approaches and changes expected at the household level; another for approaches and changes expected at the national and sub-national level; and a third at the regional level. 2.18
3. The Evaluation recommends that consideration be given to linking the TOC to rising problems of obesity and Non-communicable diseases, noting that under-nutrition in the mother can predispose her children to such problems. 2.19
4. The Evaluation recommends that, as the regional approach is one of the defining characteristics of SAFANSI, it should have a more explicit TOC. 2.21
5. The Evaluation therefore recommends that the SAFANSI Results Framework be expanded – and resourced – to better capture how the inputs and outputs from SAFANSI are actually being used.

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<sup>58</sup> This is certainly not a recommendation of the Evaluation Team. It would, amongst other things, cause reputational damage to the AusAID, DFID and the World Bank in the region for having allowed a program to lapse when most of its activities were only part way through completion.

6. The Evaluation recommends that the results framework synthesise the more strategic findings and developments emerging from individual activities, perhaps by thematic groupings such as ‘community level lessons improving FNS’ that can be captured at the strategic level. 2.26
7. The Evaluation recommends the Annual Report be shortened, made more strategic, include more strategic analysis of financial expenditure, and be merged with, or otherwise made to avoid duplication with, other documents such as the Annual Donor Report. 2.27
8. Consideration should also be given to what SAFANSI can reasonably claim as “impact”. 2.28
9. The Evaluation therefore recommends that the Bank track the extent to which genuine (not token) FNS sensitive indicators appear in the results frameworks of South Asia PADS over time, particularly in key sectors such as agriculture, gender, and water and sanitation. 4.9
10. The Evaluation therefore recommends that SAFANSI develop an engagement strategy with other multilateral and UN agencies with which it is already working so as to increase its profile and opportunities for sharing knowledge products and influencing their programs and policies. This engagement strategy should also particularly be extended to the Asian Development Bank, sharing SAFANSI knowledge products and insights that might influence the design and implementation of the ADB’s own large lending portfolio in South Asia in areas such as water and sanitation education, and rural development. The engagement strategy should also extend to large NGOs and foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 4.12
11. Consideration should therefore be given to ways of reinvigorating the TAC as a vehicle for region wide (and global) knowledge sharing and advocacy. Without wishing to have another layer of advice, or increase administrative costs, consideration could also be given to setting up a ‘shadow’ TAC of young, energetic, mid – career, (and female) opinion leaders who can ‘make things happen’ to supplement the work of the TAC on a more regular basis. 4.26
12. If SAFANSI is extended beyond March 2014 consideration should be given to recruiting one locally hired person in each of the SAFANSI countries whose job it is to be a ‘knowledge broker’. 4.32
13. Comments were made that it would be particularly useful to have a fast track process to allow “just in time” small seed money approved in a few days so as to take up suddenly opening windows of opportunity to influence debates and thinking within SAFANSI countries. This suggestion warrants further consideration within the Bank. 5.2
14. SAFANSI should be now extended, preferably for a further ten year period, provided at least three changes are made to improve its overall effectiveness (strengthen the results framework; increase the visibility of SAFANSI knowledge products and insights; either revitalise the TAC or abolish it). 7.2
15. The SAFANSI budget does not necessarily need to be expanded significantly, but there is a need to better resource independent evaluation of outcomes, and to improve visibility and knowledge-management. 7.3

16. While SAFANSI should continue to be essentially demand driven, consideration could be given to a more 'directed' funding stream supporting known, potentially high impact, interventions to support gender, girls' education, and sanitation. 7.4
17. There are arguments for, and against, opening SAFANSI to more applications from outside the Bank itself: a compromise would be to more systematically capture knowledge gaps by local stakeholders. 7.6
18. AusAID should consider using its high profile and strategic commitment to maternal and child health to co-finance or otherwise support SAFANSI activities, even if it is no longer a formal member of the Trust Fund. 7.7
19. Whatever the outcome, it is important to make a decision – and announce it – as soon as possible in the coming months: the current uncertainty is undermining SAFANSI operations. The *predictability* of funding is now more important than the actual quantum. 7.10
20. A work program for the remaining year will then depend upon what decisions are made, but strengthening the results framework, and increasing the visibility of SAFANSI are priorities in any event. 7.11

**7.13 This paragraph now groups together recommendations to DFID that are substantive, strategic, priorities that should be decided early.** The activities are grouped in descending order of priority, most important first. The Evaluation Team recognises that while the primary locus for decision making of these recommendations is with DFID, DFID will need to consult closely with the World Bank in the actual implementation of the recommendations that are adopted. That is particularly the case where implementation of the recommendations has financial, staff resourcing, or other managerial implications.

SAFANSI should be now extended, preferably for a further ten year period, provided at least three changes are made to improve its overall effectiveness (strengthen the results framework; increase the visibility of SAFANSI knowledge products and insights; either revitalise the TAC or abolish it). (Recommendation 14: paragraph 7.2)

Whatever the outcome, it is important to make a decision – and announce it – as soon as possible in the coming months: the current uncertainty is undermining SAFANSI operations. The predictability of funding is now more important than the actual quantum. (Recommendation 19: paragraph 7.10)

A work program for the remaining year will then depend upon what decisions are made, but strengthening the results framework, and increasing the visibility of SAFANSI are priorities in any event (Recommendation 20: paragraph 7.11)

Consideration should also be given to what SAFANSI can reasonably claim as “impact” (Recommendation 8: paragraph 2.28 refers)

The SAFANSI budget does not necessarily need to be expanded significantly, but there is a need to better resource independent evaluation of outcomes, and to improve visibility and knowledge-management (Recommendation 15: paragraph 7.3)

The Evaluation therefore recommends that the SAFANSI Results Framework be expanded – and resourced – to better capture how the inputs and outputs from SAFANSI are actually being used (Recommendation 5: paragraph 2.25 refers)

**7.14 This paragraph now groups together recommendations to DFID that would be useful to consider but are not critical or urgent.** As with paragraph 7.13, the recommendations are listed in descending order of priority, with the most important listed first. Again, acceptance of these recommendations would require consultation with the World Bank especially when financial and/or staff and management implications arise.

The Evaluation therefore recommends that consideration be given to having more differentiated TOCs: a separate TOC for approaches and changes expected at the household level; another for approaches and changes expected at the national and sub-national level; and a third at the regional level. (Recommendation 2: paragraph 2.18 refers)

The Evaluation recommends that, as the regional approach is one of the defining characteristics of SAFANSI, it should have a more explicit TOC. (Recommendation 4: paragraph 2.21 refers)



The Evaluation recommends that consideration be given to linking the TOC to rising problems of obesity and Non-communicable diseases, noting that under-nutrition in the mother can predispose her children to such problems. (Recommendation 3: paragraph 2.19 refers)

**7.15 This paragraph groups together recommendations to the World Bank that are substantive, strategic, priorities that should be decided early.** They are listed in descending order of priority, most important first. It is clear that the World Bank would need to liaise with DFID and any other future Trust Fund members about the actual implementation of these recommendations, especially if there are any budgetary or resourcing implications.

If SAFANSI wishes to track its influence right through the results chain, then it should consider monitoring the actual implementation of policies (Recommendation 1: paragraph 2.15 refers).

If SAFANSI is extended beyond March 2014 consideration should be given to recruiting one locally hired person in each of the SAFANSI countries whose job it is to be a ‘knowledge broker’.  
(Recommendation 12: paragraph 4.32)

The Evaluation therefore recommends that the Bank track the extent to which genuine (not token) FNS sensitive indicators appear in the results frameworks of South Asia PADS over time, particularly in key sectors such as agriculture, gender, and water and sanitation (Recommendation 9: paragraph 4.9 refers)

The Evaluation recommends that the results framework synthesise the more strategic findings and developments emerging from individual activities, perhaps by thematic groupings such as ‘community level lessons improving FNS’ that can be captured at the strategic level (Recommendation 6: paragraph 2.26)

**7.16 This paragraph groups together recommendations to the World Bank that would be useful to consider but are not critical or urgent.** The recommendations are listed in descending order of priority, most important first.

While SAFANSI should continue to be essentially demand driven, consideration could be given to a more ‘directed’ funding stream supporting known, potentially high impact, interventions to support gender, girls’ education, and sanitation (Recommendation 16: paragraph 7.4)

The Evaluation recommends the Annual Report be shortened, made more strategic, include more strategic analysis of financial expenditure, and be merged with, or otherwise made to avoid duplication with, other documents such as the Annual Donor Report (Recommendation 7: paragraph 2.27 refers)

The Evaluation therefore recommends that SAFANSI develop an engagement strategy with other multilateral and UN agencies with which it is already working so as to increase its profile and opportunities for sharing knowledge products and influencing their programs and policies. This engagement strategy should also particularly be extended to the Asian Development Bank, sharing SAFANSI knowledge products and insights that might influence the design and implementation of the ADB’s own large lending portfolio in South Asia in areas such as water and sanitation education, and

rural development. The engagement strategy should also extend to large NGOs and foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. (Recommendation 10: paragraph 4.12 refers)

Consideration should therefore be given to ways of reinvigorating the TAC as a vehicle for region wide (and global) knowledge sharing and advocacy. Without wishing to have another layer of advice, or increase administrative costs, consideration could also be given to setting up a 'shadow' TAC of young, energetic, mid – career, (and female) opinion leaders who can 'make things happen" to supplement the work of the TAC on a more regular basis (Recommendation 11: paragraph 4.26 refers)

Comments were made that it would be particularly useful to have a fast track process to allow "just in time" small seed money approved in a few days so as to take up suddenly opening windows of opportunity to influence debates and thinking within SAFANSI countries. This suggestion warrants further consideration within the Bank. (Recommendation 13: paragraph 5.2 refers)

There are arguments for, and against, opening SAFANSI to more applications from outside the Bank itself: a compromise would be to more systematically capture knowledge gaps by local stakeholders (Recommendation 17: paragraph 7.6)

#### **7.17 This paragraph contains the recommendation to AusAID**

AusAID should consider using its high profile and strategic commitment to maternal and child health to co-finance or otherwise support SAFANSI activities, even if it is no longer a formal member of the Trust Fund (Recommendation 18: paragraph 7.7)

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## Annex 1: Terms of Reference

### SAFANSI – South Asia Food and Nutrition Security Initiative

#### Terms of Reference for Evaluation and Strategic Review ('E and SR TORs')

##### 1. Introduction

Across South Asia, the availability of and access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life remains a key challenge, especially for poor people. Addressing the problem of food and nutrition security requires action on multiple fronts both within countries and across the region. The South Asia Food and Nutrition Security Initiative SAFANSI is designed to foster this multi-sectoral and regional approach.

In this first phase, the UK is providing £4.6m (US\$7.5m) from 2010 to 2013<sup>59</sup> to the World Bank through a Multi-donor Trust Fund to increase the commitment of governments in South Asia and development partners, such as donors, the UN and NGOs, to tackle undernutrition in South Asia. In May 2011, AusAID committed a further US\$5.77m. SAFANSI focuses on integrating food and nutrition interventions into a range of sectors, including health, education, water and sanitation and social protection.

SAFANSI takes a three-pronged approach to achieve its objective: first, by improving the evidence for and analysis of the most effective ways to achieve FNS outcomes in South Asia; secondly by raising awareness of FNS-related challenges and advocating for action, amongst relevant stakeholders; and thirdly by strengthening regional and in-country policy and programming capacity to achieve FNS outcomes.

##### 2. Purpose and objectives of the Evaluation

The objective of this consultancy is to evaluate DFID's and AusAID's support to tackle undernutrition and improve food and nutrition security (FNS) in South Asia through support of SAFANSI. To achieve this, the consultancy will evaluate progress and achievements so far in the first phase of the SAFANSI programme. If appropriate, this will feed into a design and appraisal process and donor business cases<sup>60</sup> that set out the rationale for and scope of initial EC support and further AusAID and DFID support.

The consultant team ('the Team') appointed will be expected to work in close collaboration with DFID, AusAID, EC and the World Bank and with high level South Asian stakeholders and development partners (for example, the SAFANSI Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) governments, donors, UN agencies, NGOs and think tanks).

##### 3. The Recipients

DFID Asia Regional Team and AusAID. Findings of the evaluation will be shared with the World Bank and ECDG Europe-Aid Development and Co-operation Directorate-General, Unit H2.

##### 4. Scope of Work

The work involves an evaluation of DFID and AusAID's support to SAFANSI (2010 – 2012) to assess the progress and achievements, test the theory of change (including the validity of assumptions) and draw out any emerging lessons, best practice, and knowledge gaps relevant to a further phase of support. Given that the a key objective of SAFANSI is the fostering of an integrated and multi-sectoral approach to food and nutrition security, assessment of SAFANSI progress in this direction will also constitute an important part of this assessment.

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<sup>59</sup> Donors have agreed in principle to a one year no cost extension to March 2014

<sup>60</sup> E.g. DFID and AusAID business cases and EC Identification and Action Fiches

This work will be undertaken in two phases, an inception phase and an implementation phase. There will be a break between these two phases to assess and approve the inception report and to confirm risk mitigation measures for the agreed country visits in the region.

The skill and knowledge sets to be covered by the Team are: programme evaluation, multi-sectoral approaches to food and nutrition and experience of work at a high level in South Asian countries. Within these fields the supplier will be required to supply expertise on political economy; institutional development; poverty, social development and gender, operational understanding of food and nutrition related interventions on the ground, regional issues, and value for money assessments.

The Team will be required to access knowledge in these and related areas at the national, regional and global level. Inclusion in the Team of consultants from within the region with strong contextual knowledge is encouraged. The supplier services are expected to identify, contract and manage the consultant Team to undertake the evaluation.

The timing of this work is determined by: the timetable set by the EC for the possible preparation of its Action Fiche (preferably by the end of 2012) for support to SAFANSI. AusAID and DFID are each expecting to agree a one year no-cost extension to the project to March 2014.

## **5. Deliverables**

### **5.1. Expected Outputs**

The expected output for the inception phase is:

- An inception report detailing approach, methodology, timetable (including a programme of country visits and visit locations).

The expected outputs from the implementation phase are:

- A concise evaluation of SAFANSI's first 2.5 years of operation in a reporting format to be agreed with the recipient including an overall assessment of SAFANSI to enable cross-sectoral collaboration in the area food and nutrition security in S Asia
- A power point presentation summarising preliminary findings for sharing with key stakeholders
- Clear summaries of key results and lessons for the purposes of the donors' own internal dissemination and reporting and identify potential results, which can be used as baselines for the possible next phase of support. This should include a one page summary of results for internal and external audiences.
- Issues and recommendations for the remaining 12 months of operation of SAFANSI

## **6. Scope and Methodology**

**6.1 Evaluation of First Phase of Funding of SAFANSI** - the main objective of this evaluation is to generate results and lessons from SAFANSI on what has been achieved so far, progress on the path to impact<sup>61</sup> and identify lessons for a possible second phase; recommendations for any adjustments in programme strategy in the remaining programme period to March 2014 and answers to questions on the likely outcomes of a continued programme. The evaluation will also provide accountability to donors and countries in the S Asia region.

This will inform the design factors (structure, scale and scope) for a possible future phase of support. The reference point for the evaluation will be the current LogFrame for SAFANSI (but with attention also paid to various capacities engendered, as in foot note 3). The Team will review the outputs produced by SAFANSI

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<sup>61</sup> Noting that SAFANSI is under implementation until March 2014, and that some of the intermediate results at this stage of the project cycle include inter-sectoral capacities, platforms and networks that will be employed in the next phase of activities.

funding by the World Bank (WB) and its partners and interview key South Asian stakeholders and key donors. To ensure a rigorous approach, the Team will undertake systematic collation of literature and a simple sampling frame for the selection of interviewees. The focus of the enquiry among stakeholders will be to assess and better understand their incentives, motivations and constraints associated with their participation in SAFANSI and their assessment of how SAFANSI is on the path to achieve its goals.

An indicative approach with relevant questions, following the evaluation criteria defined under DFID's own evaluation policy, is outlined below. The evaluation should provide clear evidence against these evaluation criteria.

**i. Relevance** (*Extent to which the aid activity is consonant with and relevant to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donors*)

- To what extent were SAFANSI objectives and approaches framed to be relevant to the initial and developing operating context (political, social (including gender), environmental and economic)?
- Is the intervention (theory of change) consistent with donors' aims and objectives and existing evidence of 'what works' in policy influencing?<sup>62</sup>
- Are the original goals and scope still appropriate?
- Are the original expected results well-defined, discrete and attainable?

**ii. Effectiveness** (*A measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives*).

- How well is the theory of change working? Do any further process issues need to be considered?
- How appropriate were the programme management and governance arrangements, given the nature of the SAFANSI approach?
- Have the programme's governance structures worked well, and facilitated the achievement of objectives?
- Have the outputs been of good quality?<sup>63</sup>
- Given this evaluation is taking place prior to the completion of the programme, what are other aspects of SAFANSI processes and outputs should be assessed and noted?
- How successful has SAFANSI been at influencing and framing debates, through: choice of tasks, engagement strategies; the timing and approach to communications; use of political opportunities based on political economy analysis (PEA)?
- How effective is the current log-frame as a tool to: measure results (quantitative and qualitative) at all levels; make explicit the assumptions underpinning the programme; and communicate ambition?
- To what extent has SAFANSI influenced / evaluated major public programmes? How has SAFANSI influenced these programmes?

**iii. Efficiency** (*Measures the outputs and outcomes -- qualitative and quantitative -- in relation to the inputs. It is an economic term which signifies that the aid uses the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results*)

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<sup>62</sup> The Team should also refer to DFID's draft How to Note 'Monitoring, Evaluating and Learning from Influencing Efforts'.

<sup>63</sup> For each output a set of a specific questions should be answered for example Under the evidence and analysis output:

- the range and selection of outputs produced
- process used in introducing the outputs (supply versus demand driven)
- success in introducing and implementing outputs
- reasons for non-adoption of some outputs
- Decision-maker use of the information generated by outputs (timeliness, quality, linking with decision-making processes etc)

- Has the allocation of funds across different countries and activities been efficient?
- Does the project represent good value for money<sup>64</sup>? To what extent has it been able to leverage more resources for FNS?
- Could outcomes have been achieved in a more cost effective manner?
- Is the multi-donor trust fund an appropriate size of investment? Looking ahead, what size should it be to respond efficiently to demand? What level of investment should be made through other instruments and channels (e.g. civil society, other regional/ multi-country and country)<sup>65</sup>?
- Should the scope of investment in SAFANSI be broadened to achieve more impact?

**iv. Impact** *(The positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended)*

- How far has SAFANSI progressed down the results chain envisaged in the theory of change and captured in the log frame?
- Where has SAFANSI added value to existing processes?
- How have the donors added value? How have donors' bilateral funding on nutrition activities been complementary and/ or added value?
- To what extent has SAFANSI directly contributed to changes in national and donor policy, plans, interventions and programmes? How has this contribution been measured?
- Is it at all possible to directly attribute any changes in child nutrition indicators (at the 'impact level') to SAFANSI given the timeframe that SAFANSI has been operating?
- To what extent is it appropriate for the original aim of supporting implementation within FNS programmes to be diluted to the 'preparation' of programmes?

**v. Sustainability** *(Concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. Interventions need to be environmentally and institutionally as well as financially sustainable. Any assessment of sustainability should cover the concept of ownership)*

- The evaluation could usefully consider:
  - o Sustainability of interest (including awareness and knowledge) in FNS.
  - o Sustainability of commitment to a multi-sectoral approach to FNS among governments and development partners<sup>66</sup>
  - o Whether SAFANSI as currently conceived and implemented is appropriate to emerging challenges in FNS in S Asia
- To what extent will the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) be able to contribute to Domestic Stewardship Platforms without donor support?

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<sup>64</sup> Defining value for money in a project of this kind is inherently difficult. It may be useful to look at a range of different measures, during upon DFID's "How to" note on Cost-Benefit Analysis.

<sup>65</sup> Taking into account other regional programmes such as: DFID's research programme LANSA (Leveraging Agriculture for Nutrition in South Asia) and the EC's regional Maternal and Young Child Nutrition Security in Asia programme

<sup>66</sup> For example: Mainstreaming multi-sectoral FNS into development partner plans budgets, and operations; Changes in policy as a result of programme activities

**vi. Coverage** (Which groups are included in/excluded from a programme, and the differential impact on those included and excluded. Related concepts include equity (including gender equity and disability and social exclusion)

- To what extent has SAFANSI engaged with relevant stakeholders, fora and processes?
- To what extent has SAFANSI directly addressed gender, discrimination and extreme poverty concerns in the choice of partners and programmes to support?
- 
- Which additional stakeholders should be considered for a possible second phase?

**vii. Coherence and Coordination** (Refers to the need to assess other policies and programmes which affect the intervention being evaluated, for example agricultural and climate change policies and programmes, as well as the intervention or policy itself)

- Has SAFANSI taken sufficient note of wider policies and programmes that affect FNS interventions (including those of both recipient and donor countries)?
- Is SAFANSI engaging in the right way with the right stakeholders?
- A quick assessment of harmonization with other aid agencies, and alignment with country priorities and systems (including the SUN -Scaling up Nutrition - movement and the US's 'Feed the Future').
- What role can Domestic Stewardship Platforms play?

## 6.2 Process and Timing:

- The evaluation will be carried out over an xx day period by the Team.
- There will be initial meetings with DFID and AusAID leads and with WB on method (e.g. desk review, questionnaires, stakeholder meetings, country visits etc), timing and clarity on expected deliverables.
- Presentation of draft findings at a workshop in the region with a selection of stakeholders (consider including at least one from each country).
- Present draft evaluation report within 4 days of the above workshop and final report by end November, including a work-plan for the possible design of the next phase.

## 7. Reporting

The supplier will submit reports in English (electronic copy) following the timetable set out in the table below. Reports will be submitted in draft to the lead DFID Adviser who will share them with partners for review before finalisation.

## 8. Time Frame

The contract will start on 19<sup>th</sup> November 2012.

Activities	Timeline	Deliverables
Inception phase for SAFANSI Evaluation	Contract commences on 19 <sup>th</sup> November	An inception report detailing approach, methodology, timetable (including a programme of country visits and visit locations).
Implementation of SAFANSI	Implementation to start	A concise evaluation of SAFANSI's first 2.5

Activities	Timeline	Deliverables
evaluation	<p>on approval of the inception report and confirmation of risk mitigation measures for the agreed country visits in the region</p> <p>Evaluation complete 31 January</p> <p>Presentation of draft findings at a workshop in the region (in late Jan – date tbc) with a selection of stakeholders, including at least one from each country</p> <p>Present draft evaluation report within 4 days of the above workshop and final report following WB, DFID and AusAID comments by early February</p>	<p>years of operation in a reporting format to be agreed with the recipient, including an overall assessment of SAFANSI to enable cross-sectoral collaboration in the area of food and nutrition security in S Asia</p> <p>A power point presentation summarising preliminary findings for sharing with key stakeholders</p> <p>Clear summaries of key results and lessons for the purposes of the donors' own internal dissemination and reporting and identify potential results, which can be used as baselines for the possible next phase of support. This should include a one page summary of results for internal and external audiences.</p> <p>Issues and recommendations for the remaining 12 months of operation of SAFANSI and, as appropriate, beyond</p>

## 9. Co-ordination and Management

The supplier will work closely with and report to Lizzie Smith, Senior Regional Health Adviser, Asia Regional Team at DFID and Ben Hart, Policy and Partnerships Manager. DFID's Programme Manager (Mike Lewing) will be the point of contact for all contractual issues.

Key stakeholders include: AusAID (Gopal Menon and Jill Bell) and EC (Maria Paris-Ketting) and the World Bank who are responsible for the management and delivery of SAFANSI. At the World Bank: (Task Team Leader: Animesh Srivastava; Simeon Ehui, Sector Manager Sustainable Development SAR), and Julie McLaughlin, Sector Manager (Health Population and Nutrition SAR): and Sustainable Development Sector Director SAR: Jack Stein.

The Team will be responsible for all logistical arrangements. The Team will be responsible for the timely delivery of the outputs. The Team will also be responsible for notifying DFID of any problems affecting delivery and for recommending ways of addressing them.

The supplier will comply with DFID's Duty of Care policy. (See Annex A)

## 10. Background

Across South Asia, the availability of and access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life remains a key challenge, especially for poor people.

Despite strong economic growth in some South Asian countries, MDG 1c (reducing by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger) is severely off-track. The region has the world's highest numbers of undernourished people (estimated at over 300m) and the highest rates of child malnutrition (46% of under-

fives are underweight). Hunger and malnutrition are both a cause and a consequence of poverty; they limit the potential for active and healthy lives, economic growth and perpetuate poverty between generations.

There is too little attention paid to the links between food availability, access and nutrition; this is underpinned by low levels of political will and awareness of effective food and nutrition security policies and strategies as well as new technologies.

In addition to inadequate national-level responses there is a gap in regional co-operation among governments, civil society, researchers and development partners working on food and nutrition security on for example on knowledge sharing and the use of new agricultural and nutritional technologies.

The food price crisis of 2008, increased awareness at a high political level of the 'curse of malnutrition' combined with global policy and donor attention on the issue of food and nutrition security (for example through the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement) provides a window of opportunity for action in the region. Members of the newly-formed SUN Lead Group come from both India and Bangladesh and include the Prime Minister of Bangladesh.

Addressing the problem of food and nutrition security requires action on multiple fronts both within countries and across the region. However, in the past, food and nutrition security issues have been addressed in a siloed manner, with no or little cross-sectoral collaboration. Government and donors' engagement for FNS have been limited and disconnected. Despite the resources nominally allocated, this may be an important reason for limited successes on the ground and for the perpetuation of the "South Asia enigma". SAFANSI is designed to foster this multi-sectoral and regional approach. In the design phase it was recognised that SAFANSI was aiming to be transformational and therefore expected to be a long term and inclusive initiative.

In this first phase, the UK is providing £4.6m (US\$7.5m) from 2010 to 2013 to the World Bank through a Multi-donor Trust Fund to increase the commitment of governments in South Asia and development partners, such as donors, the UN and NGOs, to tackle undernutrition in South Asia. In May 2011, AusAID committed a further US\$5.77m. SAFANSI focuses on integrating food and nutrition interventions into a range of sectors, including health, education, water and sanitation and social protection.

By the end of the project in 2013<sup>67</sup> across 7 countries in the World Bank's South Asia Region SAFANSI is expecting to be indirectly or directly linked to the delivery of:

- 12 national-level planning or policy documents emphasizing an integrated and coordinated (cross sector) approach to food and nutrition security
- 9 development partner country strategies with an integrated, cross sector approach to food and nutrition security
- 11 integrated food and nutrition security country programs or operations in place

which in turn are expected to have an indirect or direct nutritional impact on specific populations in countries in South Asia as measured by MDC target 1c) which is to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.

SAFANSI takes a three-pronged approach to achieve its objective: first, by improving the evidence for and analysis of the most effective ways to achieve FNS outcomes in South Asia; secondly by raising awareness of FNS-related challenges and advocating for action, amongst relevant stakeholders; and thirdly by strengthening regional and in-country policy and programming capacity to achieve FNS outcomes.

Commissioned tasks and funded activities each contribute specifically to one or more of the three SAFANSI categories listed above (evidence, advocacy and/or capacity building), as well as complementing or contributing to the relevant World Bank Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and the Bank's Regional Assistance Strategy (RAS) on Nutrition.

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<sup>67</sup> Donors are currently considering a one year no-cost extension

## Progress on outputs

During 2011, the second year of SAFANSI, awareness of SAFANSI and the importance of tackling undernutrition as a policy priority increased within the South Asia Region of the World Bank, leading to increased levels of SAFANSI funded activity and increased outputs. Sectoral advisers, country offices and other staff in the region responded to internal 'Calls for Proposals' and a significant number of new activities was initiated. For example, 12 new activities were initiated in the second half of 2011 and are now under way.

This is also evidence that SAFANSI is being effective at promoting and supporting a multi-sectoral approach to nutrition within the Bank itself, as well as in countries in the region as well as regionally. In due course this is very likely to translate into integrated and multi-sectoral FNS Bank operations in the region.

Many of the activities funded by SAFANSI initiating inter-sectoral collaboration, building partnerships, dialogue to raise awareness and finding the right opportunities for effective advocacy work. As a result, the implementation path of SAFANSI tasks has not always been unpredictable. In some cases, slower than expected delivery (for example, in the development of national multi-sectoral plans) helped better to ensure full participation of the relevant line ministries.

Some activities (e.g. Gender Mapping and preparation of the Political Economy Analysis framework) which are core to SAFANSI have taken longer than expected to produce. Finding the appropriate set of skills and expertise both within the Bank and /or of key consultants has been a challenge and therefore follow on work (for example, context specific Political Economy Analysis) has been delayed.

At the time of program formulation, the complex technical and managerial demands that SAFANSI's diverse, inter-sectoral programs would generate was not anticipated adequately. This is being addressed through a further (fulltime) post at a senior advisory level dedicated to SAFANSI. Learning from experience, in addition SAFANSI is in process of expanding its capacity to track the links between SAFANSI outputs and outcomes and improving communication of SAFANSI analysis and evidence of effective interventions.

## Progress on outcomes

SAFANSI outputs are beginning to lead, directly or indirectly to 'increased commitment of governments and development partners in South Asia Region for more effective and integrated food security and nutrition actions'.

For example,

- SAFANSI funding has contributed directly towards the development of two national multi-sectoral plans to tackle under nutrition: the *Afghanistan Action Framework* on nutrition and the *Nepal Nutrition Plan of Action*. (Outcome indicator 1)
- Four development partners: UNICEF, the International Food Policy Research Institute, the World Food Programme and UN Renewed Efforts Against Hunger and Undernutrition (REACH) are adopting a multi-sectoral approach in their policies and programmes (Outcome indicator 2)
- Measurement of Outcome Indicator 3 poses some methodological challenges. The indicator definition implies that an operation or programme is under implementation. In the time scale of SAFANSI it is only possible for SAFANSI's work to lead to the preparation of an operation, rather than the implementation of an integrated FNS operation. By the former definition, SAFANSI has already been linked to the preparation of eight programmes, one in Bangladesh, two each in Nepal, two in Afghanistan and three in Pakistan.

In addition, the Bank reports that, in conjunction with the RAS, SAFANSI has been an effective vehicle within its South Asia Region for raising the issue of under nutrition up its own policy agenda. SAFANSI is managed jointly by both the 'Human Development' and 'Sustainable Development' directorates of the World Bank. This arrangement has been instrumental in fostering a multi-sectoral approach to nutrition in the Bank's approach to its own policies and operations



## **Duty of Care**

The Supplier is responsible for the safety and well-being of their Personnel (as defined in Section 2 of the Contract) and Third Parties affected by their activities under this contract, including appropriate security arrangements. They will also be responsible for the provision of suitable security arrangements for their domestic and business property.

DFID will share available information with the Supplier on security status and developments in-country where appropriate. DFID will provide the following:

- All Supplier Personnel will be offered a security briefing by the British Embassy/DFID on arrival. All such Personnel must register with their respective Embassies to ensure that they are included in emergency procedures.
- A copy of the DFID visitor notes (and a further copy each time these are updated), which the Supplier may use to brief their Personnel on arrival.

The Supplier is responsible for ensuring appropriate safety and security briefings for all of their Personnel working under this contract and ensuring that their Personnel register and receive briefing as outlined above. Travel advice is also available on the FCO website and the Supplier must ensure they (and their Personnel) are up to date with the latest position.

This Procurement may require the Supplier to operate in a seismically active zone and is considered at high risk of earthquakes. Minor tremors are not uncommon. Earthquakes are impossible to predict and can result in major devastation and loss of life. There are several websites focusing on earthquakes, including:

<http://geology.about.com/library/bl/maps/blworldindex.htm>. The Supplier should be comfortable working in such an environment and should be capable of deploying to any areas required within the region in order to deliver the Contract (subject to travel clearance being granted).

This Procurement may also require the Supplier to operate in conflict-affected areas and parts of it are highly insecure. Travel to many zones within the region will be subject to travel clearance from the UK government in advance. The security situation is volatile and subject to change at short notice. The Supplier should be comfortable working in such an environment and should be capable of deploying to any areas required within the region in order to deliver the Contract (subject to travel clearance being granted).

The Supplier is responsible for ensuring that appropriate arrangements, processes and procedures are in place for their Personnel, taking into account the environment they will be working in and the level of risk involved in delivery of the Contract (such as working in dangerous, fragile and hostile environments etc.). The Supplier must ensure their Personnel receive the required level of security training or complete a UK government approved hostile environment training course prior to deployment, whichever is more appropriate.

## Annex 2: Summary of the SAFANSI pipeline of activities

TF number	Activity	Grant Amount in \$US	Funds Allocated in \$US	Funds Disbursed in \$US	Funds yet to be disbursed	Date activated	Disbursement deadline	Comment
<b>Afghanistan</b>								
<b>TF098874</b>	Afghanistan South Asia Food & Nutritional Security Initiative (SAFANSI) Program	270,000	190,000	142,110	25	30-Jan-11	28-Jun-13	also known as "Supporting Afghanistan's High Level Task Force on Food & Nutritional Security"
<b>Bangladesh</b>								
<b>TF098429</b>	Multisectoral Simulation Tool for Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) in Bangladesh	175,000	160,000	149,946	6	25-Nov-10	31-May-13	
<b>TF099422</b>	Impact Assessment of Bangladesh CCT Pilot through Local Governments for Human Development	200,000	200,000	106,188	47	04-Apr-11	28-Jun-13	
<b>TF011841</b>	P131982 SAFANSI: South Asia Food & Nutrition Security Initiative	230,000	215,000	2,650	99	20-Feb-12	31-Jul-13	also known as "Assessment of the relation between mortality & morbidity due to diarrhoeal diseases & sanitation "
<b>TF099707</b>	Modifiable Adequacy of Food, Health and Care to Nutrition Outcomes	125,000	125,000	72,201	42	16-May-11	31-Jul-13	Focus on Bangladesh
	Raising the Profile of Nutrition as							Bangladesh

	an Agenda for High Level Policy Makers <sup>68</sup>							
<b>Bhutan</b>								
<b>TF012082</b>	Bhutan National Nutrition Assessment	148,200	148,200	49,732	66	26-Mar-12	31-Jul-13	Also known as "Nutritional Assessment & Capacity Building in Bhutan"

<b>India</b>								
<b>TF number</b>	<b>Activity</b>	<b>Grant Amount in \$US</b>	<b>Funds Allocated in \$US</b>	<b>Funds Disbursed in \$US</b>	<b>Funds yet to be disbursed</b>	<b>Date activated</b>	<b>Disbursement deadline</b>	<b>Comment</b>
<b>TF011993</b>	Social Observatory for the National Rural Livelihoods Mission: Food Security & Nutrition Focus	1,000,000	600,000	234,720	61	15-Mar-12	31-Jul-13	
<b>TF012081</b>	Multi-sectoral Nutrition Actions in Bihar	160,600	160,600	4,811	97	26-Mar-12	29-Jul-13	also known as "Multi-sectoral Partnership for Nutrition: A Pilot in Bihar"
<b>TF012122</b>	Improving Food Security in Tribal & Conflict-affected Areas	250,000	250,000	29,810	88	02-Apr-12	30-Sep-13	
<b>TF012676</b>	Community Managed Food & Nutrition Security Initiatives in High Poverty States	250,000	150,000	0	100	27-Jun-12	31-Jul-13	
<b>Pakistan</b>								

<sup>68</sup> The grant was cancelled in light of political economy challenges although SAFANSI staff continue to engage with counterparts in the hope that talks might be revived.

<b>TF099154</b>	Pakistan: Engaging Planning Commission , Agriculture and Water Ministries on Food	0	3,233	3,233	0	02-Mar-11	30-Oct-11	Closed; also known as "Pakistan Roundtable Discussion on Agriculture and Water: Introducing Food & Nutrition Security to Government Planning"
<b>TF012245</b>	Pakistan South Asia Food & Nutrition Security Initiative (SAFANSI) Program	100,000	100,000	50,965	49	23-Apr-12	20-Jun-13	also known as "Enhancing National Commitment for an Evidence-based & Gender-sensitive Multi-sectoral Response to the Food & Nutritional Security Challenge in Pakistan"
<b>TF011848</b>	Child Nutritional Outcomes & Community Health Service Provision (Rural Pakistan)	185,200	185,200	53,672	71	17-Feb-12	31-Jul-13	

Nepal								
TF number	Activity	Grant Amount \$US	Funds Allocated \$US	Funds Disbursed \$US	Funds yet to be disbursed	Date activated	Disbursement deadline	Comment
<b>TF010274</b>	Food & Nutrition Security Thematic Report (NLSS)	135,000	135,000	95,231	29	03-Aug-11	30-Apr-13	part of Scaling Up Nutrition Initiative Technical Assistance (SUNITA)
<b>TF012123</b>	Nepal: Evaluating the Nutritional Impacts of Food Security & Nutrition Program	202,000	123,000	18,208	85	02-Apr-12	31-Jul-13	

<b>TF012285</b>	Community-based behaviour Change for Nutrition Improvement	75,000	75,000	0	100	23-May-12	19-Aug-13	part of Scaling Up Nutrition Initiative Technical Assistance (SUNITA)
<b>TF012286</b>	Nepal - Review of Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) Program	50,000	50,000	6,647	87	23-May-12	30-Apr-13	part of Scaling Up Nutrition Initiative Technical Assistance (SUNITA)
<b>TF013189</b>	District Profiles of Determinants of Food Insecurity & Malnutrition in Nepal	80,000	80,000	0	100	25-Sep-12	15-May-13	part of Scaling Up Nutrition Initiative Technical Assistance (SUNITA)
<b>TF098873</b>	Nepal South Asia Food & Nutrition Security Initiative (SAFANSI) Program	430,000	196,750	134,136	32	30-Jan-11	28-Jun-13	
<b>Sri Lanka</b>								
<b>TF011712</b>	Visualising the 'Invisible' Epidemic of Undernutrition in Sri Lanka	65,000	55,000	11,007	80	03-Feb-12	31-May-13	

<b>South Asia Region</b>								
<b>TF number</b>	<b>Activity</b>	<b>Grant Amount \$US</b>	<b>Funds Allocated \$US</b>	<b>Funds Disbursed \$US</b>	<b>Funds yet to be disbursed</b>	<b>Date activated</b>	<b>Disbursement deadline</b>	<b>Comment</b>
<b>TF010381</b>	Mapping of Gender & Nutrition in South Asia	162,212	162,212	126,920	22	11-Aug-11	28-Jun-13	
<b>TF010794</b>	Developing a Framework for Applied Political Economy Analysis of Food & Nutrition	90,000	90,000	61,014	32	19-Oct-11	30-Apr-13	Focus on India
<b>TF011469</b>	South Asia Food & Nutrition Security Initiative: Linking Measures of Food Security with Nutritional Outcomes in South Asia	159,000	107,000	53,132	50	27-Dec-11	31-Jul-13	
<b>TF011910</b>	Global Conference on Women in Agriculture	90,000	90,000	25,652	71	01-Mar-12	30-Dec-12	

<b>TF013549</b>	Strengthening Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) Capacity in South Asia Region	479,225	0	0	#DIV/0!	Not available	30-Sep-13	Pending; Recipient-executed
<b>TF013556</b>	Supervision of Grant to Breastfeeding Promotion Network of India	61,000	61,000	0	100	07-Nov-12	31-Jul-13	
<b>TF097620</b>	Evaluating and Learning from Innovative Community Approaches to Improving Child	453,507	453,507	436,733	4	19-Aug-10	31-Oct-12	South Asia Development Marketplace on Nutrition
<b>TF098748</b>	Global Policy Consultation & International Conference on Leveraging Agriculture	200,000	200,000	200,000	0	01-Mar-11	31-Dec-12	Recipient executed; also known as "IFPRI Conference on Leveraging Agriculture for Improving Nutrition and Health"
<b>TF099039</b>	Cross-sectoral Approaches to Food Security and Nutrition	0	49,878	49,878	0	17-Feb-11	31-Jul-12	Closed; also known as "Learning from Global Success Stories"
<b>TF098394</b>	South Asia Food & Nutrition Security Initiative TF Administration	310,000	310,000	309,926	0	23-Nov-10	31-Jul-13	SAFANSI Secretariat
<b>TF098925</b>	South Asia Food & Nutrition Security Initiative (SAFANSI) Program Management	229,538	229,538	212,250	8	02-Feb-11	31-Jul-13	SAFANSI Secretariat
Note: Unless otherwise stated, grant projects are "active" and "bank executed"								

## Annex 3 List of People Interviewed

<b>AusAID Canberra</b>
Director, South Asia Regional Program
Health Program Officer,
Country Manager, India and South Asia Regional Programs, AusAID, Australian High Commission, New Delhi
Principal Advisor, Health
Manager, South and West Asia Regional
Assistant Director General, South Asia
<b>Bangladesh</b>
Nutrition Adviser, DFID, Dhaka
Nutritionist, National Food Policy Capacity Strengthening Programme, FAO
Secretary, Ministry of Food
N/a
Deputy Program Manager, National Nutrition Services, and Member Secretary, Technical Sub committee, Nutrition Policy 2013.
Chief, Nutrition Section, UNICEF, Dhaka
Program Manager, National Nutrition Services, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.
Technical Adviser/Acting Country Director, Helen Keller International
Senior Analyst, Helen Keller International
<b>DFID, London</b>
Senior Social Development Adviser, Asia Regional Team
Policy and Partnership Manager, Asia Regional Team
Nutrition Adviser, DFID Pakistan
Head of Food and Nutrition Security Team
Senior Livelihoods Adviser, Research and Evidence Division
Head and Senior Economic Advisor, Asia Regional Team
Senior Regional Health Adviser, Asia Regional Team
Senior Nutrition Adviser, Food and Nutrition Security Team
<b>European Commission, Directorate General for Development and Cooperation, Brussels</b>
Policy Officer, Rural Development, Food Security, Nutrition

Head of Sector, Rural Development, Food Security, Nutrition
Program Officer, Asia Regional Programmes
Head of Sector, Geographical Coordination Central Asia, Middle East/Gulf, Asia Regional Programmes
<b>India</b>
<i>Bihar Rural Livelihoods Project (BRLP) "Jeevika"</i>
Livelihoods Specialist, Jeevika
Young Professional M and E
Consultant, Jeevika
Chief Executive Officer cum State Mission Director, Jeevika
University of Arizona
State Project Manager, Jeevika
Young Professional M and E
Social Development Specialist, Jeevika
<i>CGIAR:</i>
Director, Research Program on Agriculture for Nutrition and Health
<i>M.S. Swaminathan Foundation (Chennai)</i>
Executive Director, MSSRF
Director, Food security
CEO, LANSa
Project Manager, LANSa
<i>Pudhu Vaazhvu (Tamil Nadu)</i>
Additional Project Director
<i>Individuals</i>
Research Fellow, IFPRI
National Advisory Council Member; previously Secretary, Planning Commission, and Secretary, Rural Development.
Centre for Equity Studies, Special Commissioner of the Supreme Court, National Advisory Council Member
<b>Nepal</b>
Retired recently as Deputy Executive Director of UNICEF
Health Adviser, DFID, Kathmandu
Chief of Nutrition, UNICEF Nepal
Nutrition Specialist, Helen Keller International
Chief, Nutrition Section, Department of Health Services, MoHP, Teku
Project Director, Nepal Ag. and FS Project
Social Protection Specialist, World Bank Kathmandu
Ex Government of Nepal (MoHP) and World Bank
Dept. Of Paediatrics, Institute of Medicine, Kathmandu



Nutrition Specialist, WFP
<b>Pakistan</b>
Chief Health, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan
Previous Deputy Director General, Nutrition Wing, Ministry of Health.
Deputy Representative, UNICEF Pakistan
Nutritionist / Gender Focal Person, FAO.
Nutrition Adviser, World Health Organisation
Senior Nutrition Chief (retired)
FAO Representative, Pakistan
Assistant Chief Nutritionist, Planning Commission
Country Director, Micronutrient Initiative, Pakistan
Senior Nutrition Manager, UNICEF Pakistan
Director, Food Security and Livelihood, Save The Children Pakistan.
First Secretary (Development Cooperation) AusAID, Australian High Commission, Islamabad
Senior Health Adviser, AusAID, Australian High Commission, Islamabad
Nutrition Officer, World Food Programme
Senior Nutrition Chief, Planning Commission
Director, Health and Nutrition, Save The Children Pakistan
Senior Health Specialist, DFID, Pakistan
<b>World Bank</b>
Sector Manager, Social Development, South Asia
Senior Rural Development Specialist
Sector Manager, Agriculture, Irrigation and Natural Resources, South Asia,
Senior Nutrition Specialist, Anchor Unit, Health Nutrition and Population.
Operations Officer, Health Nutrition and Population, South Asia
Lead Economist, Agriculture, Irrigation and Natural Resources, South Asia.
Operations Analyst, Health Nutrition and Population, South Asia Region
Senior Economist, Agriculture and Environment.
Senior Nutrition Specialist, South Asia.
Consultant, Agriculture, Irrigation and Natural Resources, South Asia
Senior Health Specialist, Pakistan
Senior Rural Development Specialist, Rural Development and Livelihood Support, South Asia
Sector Manager, Health Nutrition and Population, South Asia

Senior Health Specialist, World Bank Pakistan
Lead Economist, Poverty Reduction and Equity
Senior Nutrition Specialist, Health Nutrition and Population, South Asia
Senior Health Specialist
Lead Poverty Specialist, Economic Policy and Poverty, South Asia
Economist. DECPI
Lead Economist, Development Economics Research Group
Nutrition Specialist, Human Development Network.
Senior Health Specialist, World Bank, Islamabad
ET Consultant, Social Development, South Asia
Lead Rural Development Specialist, Rural development and Livelihood Support, South Asia
Senior Economist, Social Protection Team, Dhaka
Lead Health Specialist, Health Nutrition and Population, West / Central Africa
Senior Agricultural Economist, Agriculture, Irrigation and Natural Resources, South Asia
Senior Social Development Specialist, Social Development, South Asia
Consultant, Social Protection Unit, Dhaka.
Lead Health Specialist, Health Nutrition and Population, South Asia
Rural Development Specialist, Agriculture and Rural Development Unit, South Asia Sustainable Development Department

## Annex 4: The Evolution of Thinking About Nutrition Concepts Relevant to the SAFANSI approach

### Introduction

This short paper updates and summarizes trends in international thinking about nutrition over the last five to six years since 2007. It is intended to supplement the evaluation of the World Bank SAFANSI-funded projects in South Asian countries and aims to address two important questions. Firstly, how has international thinking about nutrition changed since the 2007-2008 food price spike, when SAFANSI was being designed? Question two: What does this mean for governments in the region and development partners like DFID?

### Background

*Not only is the persistence of widespread undernourishment in South Asia — more than in all other regions in the world — quite extraordinary, so is the silence with which it is tolerated, not to mention the smugness with which it is sometimes dismissed.* (Amartya Sen, 1998)

South Asia has some of the highest levels of undernutrition in the world, characterized by dietary energy/calorie deficits and deficiencies of essential micronutrients and the consequent negative outcomes on growth and development (WB/MI 2012). In some of the larger South Asian countries, underweight and stunting rates are higher than those of Sub Saharan Africa (33 to 41 per cent as compared to 11 to 30 per cent, respectively) (WB/MI 2012).

Of the recent earlier events that have led to where the South Asian countries are now in terms of the nutritional status of their populations, probably the most important was the 'Green Revolution' that addressed the frequent famines that were occurring last century and well before then, especially in India. In doing this, the dramatic changes sought were largely successful (Gillespie et al. 2011) but this was seen as a food security success and the impact on nutritional status not much commented on, and maybe why, despite a reduction over the years, levels of maternal undernutrition and childhood stunting have both remained stubbornly high. In South Asia generally, there has been some real progress towards the MDG1 target three (with indicators of food sufficiency and number of underweight children under 5 years) and less so with the health-related MDGs such as MDG4 (Child Survival) and especially MDG5 (Maternal Mortality). This relative lack of progress has been seen in some of the South Asian countries, most notably India, where there has been impressive recent economic growth, although the very poor have often not been part of the rising affluence. This has been described as the 'Asian enigma' and attributed to a variety of factors but especially intra-country inequities and gender issues related to the very secondary role of women and especially young girls, and to poor literacy, especially of females (Ramalingaswami, Jonsson, Rohde 1996).

The Joint UNICEF/WHO/WB child undernutrition estimates recently released for the South Asia region (including India) show an average figure of 37% of all children under five years of age are stunted, 31% are underweight and 15% suffer from severe wasting (UNICEF/WHO/WB 2012). Between the countries of South Asia there are considerable ranges with Afghanistan being the most severe. In order of magnitude, the prevalence of underweight children has been estimated to be: for Nepal 48 per cent among children under 5 years, in India 43 per cent, in Bangladesh 41 per cent, in Pakistan 38 per cent and in Sri Lanka 29 per cent (from WB/MI 2012) (see Figures 1 and 2 based on earlier figures). These high levels of undernutrition are now well-recognized to be directly related to adverse effects on physical growth, cognitive development and human capital formation, as well as the direct and indirect association with over a third of all child deaths (Black et al. 2008) and even national economic performance (Victora et al. 2008).

As has been noted time and time again, undernutrition disproportionately affects women in South Asia (Ramalingaswami, Jonsson, Rohde 1996, Smith et al. 2011, WHO/MI 2012). It has also been noted, that "Puzzle States" in India remain, such as Gujarat, Kerala and Punjab where, despite high agricultural growth

and high literacy rates, very high rates of undernutrition persist. At the household level, adequate income does not seem to guarantee adequate nutrition; as even among the richest quintiles in several South Asian countries, 64% of preschool children are iron deficient and 26% are underweight (Gautam 2013). These apparent anomalies have been attributed to the lower status and greater neglect of girls and women, and the poorer hygiene and sanitation in South Asia.

The World Health Organization's (WHO) global database on Body Mass Indices estimates that over one third of adult women in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan are underweight, and the prevalence of iron deficiency anemia ranges between 55 and 81 per cent across the region. Besides limiting their own health and productivity, undernourished women also have an increased likelihood of adverse pregnancy, including maternal death, and birth outcomes, including an increased likelihood of delivering babies with low birthweight. This, in itself, leads to the inter-generational transmission of malnutrition through low-birth weight, inadequate breastfeeding, poorer health and nutrition of adolescent girls and pregnant women, all of which made Asian children more vulnerable to infection and undernutrition (Ramalingaswami, Jonsson, Rohde 1996).

Such infants are likely to grow up to be underweight and stunted children and adolescents (and in turn give birth to low weight infants). It is this vicious cycle, amongst other outcomes, that SAFANSI hopes to interrupt. However, how to actually do this safely is a source of debate e.g. the debate over antenatal micronutrients which undoubtedly do have an impact on birthweight but may have other negative effects.

In summary, the prevalence of child undernutrition in the region, estimated at over 46% of children in the age group 0-5 years, is much higher than in Sub-Saharan Africa (26%); the rates in Bangladesh and India are almost double those of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan are among the 36 countries in the world which account for 90% of the global child malnutrition burden (Black et al. 2008). Currently, no South Asian country is likely to achieve any of the relevant MDGs that require successful nutrition change such as MDG 1, which has its third target as halving, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger as measured by the percentage of underweight children under five years, as well as those of MDGs 4 and 5 (World Bank 1996).

## **The last 5 years**

### ***New developments and new information***

The factor that was seen as most important (by sectors outside of nutrition and health) was the global food prices increase starting in 2007, along with the concurrent Global Financial crisis. These alarming and unprecedented increases in food prices particularly affected the urban poor in food-importing countries, and were responsible for domestic unrest. The related food riots in many low- and middle-income countries certainly caught the attention of policy-makers in a way that the on-going but appalling figures for undernutrition of women and children had long not. The experience of affected countries, especially if food-importing, has made many countries (and some Agencies e.g. FAO and WB) re-assess the advantages of a larger degree of self-sufficiency (partly because food-exporting countries such as India closed the door to international and regional trade) (FAO 2008, WB 2012). Importantly, in terms of the current context, the results were seen largely in terms of 'food security' and the suggested approaches to addressing the problem were seen in terms of conventional approaches to food insecurity. There was a considerable effort from some of the UN Agencies, NGOs and parts of Academia to alert the international community that the solutions to the problem should address 'food *and* nutrition insecurity', and this appears to have been largely accepted. Food and nutrition insecurity has been broadly defined as that condition that exists in the absence of an available, accessible and nutritionally adequate food supply and the presence of mitigating conditions (Raiten NICHD/NIH 2012).

Fortuitously, around the same time, the medical journal 'Lancet' published five papers addressing maternal and young child undernutrition in poor and middle-income countries. The five papers, which are widely accepted to have been seminal in causing a large degree of agreement in the international nutrition sector, started off by laying out the immensity of the problem and the negative outcomes in terms of growth,

development and infant and young child mortality (Black et al. 2008), and then demonstrated the long-term negative impacts (Victora et al. 2008), while the third paper reviewed all the evidence for existing nutrition-related programmes and interventions, and their effectiveness (Bhutta et al. 2008).

It has also been known for some decades now, and was re-enforced by the second Lancet paper as above, that addressing the causes of undernutrition in South Asia (and elsewhere) is particularly important because it is constraining productivity, economic growth and progress in poverty reduction. A child who is undernourished during its first two years of life is less likely to complete school and, as an adult, will earn, on average, a 10 to 17 per cent lower income than adults who were well nourished as children. This was essentially the basis, building on much previous work and experience that led to the '1000 days' emphasis, discussed below.

The fourth of the Lancet papers noted that many of the approaches suggested by the evidence base, were often being pursued in countries but frequently with very poor coverage or countrywide application (Bryce et al. 2008). On the other hand, some interventions that are commonly pursued were described as unlikely to have nutrition outcomes (although they may have important other benefits e.g. school – feeding and increased attendance and retention of girls at school).

Another important factor that has led to increasing attention to programme interventions with nutrition impact (especially by donors) has been the successful experience of some programmes in terms of coverage, likely leading to improvements in child survival, and in many countries, levels of underweight children (although somewhat distorted by very large countries such as China). The success in rolling-out micronutrient programmes, even in low-income countries, has attracted the support of several major donors, while at the same time there has been a relative lack of success in reducing anaemia in women and young children (as least by supplementation but perhaps not with fortification).

And finally, the fifth paper described the large number of agencies and sectors involved in nutrition programmes, their frequent dysfunction and lack of coordination and their competition for limited funds. A criticism of the Lancet series was its decision not to address food security issues (or social/cultural interventions) but there is now increasing recognition (if not necessarily a lot of effective action yet) that, for far too long, the sectors of Public Health Nutrition and Agriculture have not been communicating, let alone coordinating interventions. Agriculture had largely addressed food security (and cash cropping) and has not seen their responsibility as addressing nutritional aspects. There has been a real shift in this, although not necessarily being played out yet in national programmes. Nevertheless the idea of a multisectoral approach is now largely accepted and is the basis for many of the SAFANSI-funded projects.

It is perhaps surprising that it has taken so long, but programmes have also not much reflected the role of women either, although their critical role has been recognized for a long time, and especially not in agriculture programmes, with home gardening efforts by HKI and others being an exception, and more recently, biofortification efforts. Over a decade ago in 2000, IFPRI had identified the four major factors of a child's nutritional status as being (i) food availability and accessibility; (ii) mother's level of education; (iii) women's status relative to men in that society; and, (iv) the care and health environment (Smith & Haddad 2000). These have largely been confirmed to a greater or lesser extent depending on the society and have to a large degree been accepted by donors and Agencies, although most nutrition programmes still usually do not aim to change social values. A recent exception has been the Bangladesh experience with CARE and the SHOUHARDO Project which had a much larger than usual impact on reducing levels of stunting (4.5 percentage point per year in 6-24 month old very disadvantaged children (Smith et al. 2011) by addressing social issues such as women's empowerment, as well as supplementation (and then by cogently arguing why the former had been critical to the process). In the literature at least, the importance of such issues is now accepted whole-heartedly, although in the SAFANSI countries, policies and effective programmes addressing female gender and with a specific pro-poor approach have not been especially successful, often because of poor targeting (Patel 2012).

Other changes have included that there is a perception among donors, and others, that the nutrition sector is in a different 'space' than it was over five years ago. This is partly because of greater consensus and

evidence on what should be done as described above, and the resulting greater resources available now. Another major factor has been the recognition (in virtually all countries – the USA being an anomaly here) that the environment is under severe stress as evidenced by global warming, and concerns with water availability with diminishing water levels and the effect on crops - and the potential for conflict. All these factors affecting food and nutrition insecurity such as reductions in both crop and household horticultural outputs, with the overall effect predicted to be negative, especially on the poor (Gillespie et al. 2012).

Another factor concentrating policy makers' attention (as this change has tended to affected them more than deficiencies which affect poor women and children most), has been the rapid emergence of overweight and obesity and the related noncommunicable diseases of diabetes and various cardiovascular diseases - what has been called 'the colliding epidemics of infectious and NCDs in the same populations and increasingly in the same individuals' (Raiten 2012). In all but the most food insecure countries, it is now the poor in many of the low and middle-income countries that are bearing the brunt of these diseases. The financial implications are enormous of this 'double burden of malnutrition', usually on top of already over-extended and poorly functioning health systems.

### ***Resulting new approaches to food and nutrition insecurity***

Reactions to the factors above have been delayed of course, but on the whole, positive in terms of increased intention to introduce and utilize in policies and programmes addressing food and nutrition insecurity. One of the outcomes has been the recognition that addressing food security alone (as was done as the food prices sky-rocketed) is not necessarily the same as addressing nutrition security, especially for the poor, and hence requires a different, and more multi-sectoral (beyond just shifting food supplies) approach. Another has been one factor in the increased emphasis on 'pro-poor' programmes. It has been observed that programmes addressing the health-related MDGs might improve the average outcomes and progress towards achieving the goals but without changing the outcomes and status of the very poor (Gwatkin 2002).

An important initiative of the increased consensus is the Global SUN movement (Scaling-Up Nutrition), which now has something like 95 signed-on partners from countries, UN partners, and Academic and Civil Society Organizations and 5 public-private partnerships. At least 33 countries have joined the 'Movement' as it is now being called, with 28 having established platforms convened by Government, and 20 having updated and budgeted nutrition plans (SUN 2012). The website states that 11 of these are reducing stunting by 2% a year (SUN 2012). It is a potentially very important factor if it gets traction at country programme level. One iteration of SUN that is being used a lot for advocacy, is 'the 1000 days window of opportunity', implying the importance of both maternal nutrition – the pregnancy from conception on, and the first two years of life of the child when interventions need to be made to be most effective. A more recent trend has been recognizing that adolescent girls also need to be more explicitly targeted, including by the WB's

Gender and Development Group and the Health, Nutrition and Population Team, in collaboration with the International Centre for Research on Women amongst others. This emphasis by SUN on the first '1000 days' has been widely picked up and there is a new, relative unanimity to this approach. While this puts increased attention on maternal nutrition and reducing the risk of LBW/IUGR, maternal morbidity/mortality and safe delivery, it builds on the existing 'dyad' approaches to infant and young child feeding which have received the majority of attention in the past, some would say sometimes to the relative exclusion of the mother.

The much improved agreement in the scientific nutrition sector, and the consequent efforts such as the Scaling-Up Nutrition (SUN) Initiative and a '1000 days' have given countries and donors some incentive to invest more in 'nutrition-impact' interventions and policies, and especially attempts (often the first time since the 1992 FAO/WHO ICN in Rome) to support the development of Integrated, multi-sectoral national Nutrition Strategies e.g. in Afghanistan with the Nutrition Action Framework and in Nepal.

A more recent development, endorsed by 159 Member States of the WHO (at the 2012 World Health Assembly) urges countries and their development partners to invest more heavily in programmes that would have nutrition outcomes. They have developed evidenced-based targets and a three-pronged approach:

A maternal, infant and child undernutrition framework that basically divides into:

- i. direct nutrition interventions
- ii health interventions with nutrition outcomes
- iii. other sector interventions with clear (but sometimes distant) nutrition outcomes.

This has built on the earlier SCN (Standing Committee on Nutrition of the UN Agencies) and SUN approach of 'nutrition-specific' and 'nutrition-sensitive' interventions and programmes. It is likely both approaches will be picked-up in many national strategies at the urging of both SUN movement partners and WHO.

The excellent update of 'The neglected crisis of undernutrition: evidence for action' by DFID suggests we can even be more recent, and the degree to which some of the shifts are being mainstreamed. Reflecting these shifts, the basis of the SAFANSI project is said to aim to be more cross-sectoral. The effectiveness of such a cross-sectoral approach and the challenges, when attempted even narrowly e.g. by UN Agencies are somewhat uncharted areas. How effective the World Bank is in institutionalizing specific activities, and how they are measuring this, suggest this should be an important focus.

Besides the changes in the nutrition sector, especially the emphasis on the need for a multi-sectoral approach, there appears to have been a shift in food security economic approaches since the price increases, which will have an impact on how national programmes are designed. As the World Bank says in its most recent Global Economic Prospects, 'long term structural reforms that ensure their citizens have enough to eat' are needed (WB 2012). This has been part of a shift from the false division between food insecurity and nutrition security with obvious implications for how they might be tackled. This is an important part of any multisectoral approach and one that broadens, as does the WHA scope, what Heady has called 'Turning economic growth into nutrition-sensitive growth' basically saying again, that economic growth can occur without an improvement in nutrition outcomes and that in the long-run, the economic impacts of reducing stunting (amongst other things) will not be achieved without this nutrition-specific approach. This was part of the broader IFPRI-organized 2020 Conference 'Leveraging agriculture for improving nutrition and health' two years ago in Delhi (which was in itself a SAFANSI investment) again reflecting the increasing recent attention the theme is attracting. Part of this may also be the considerably greater attention to the environment and the concept of sustainable diets 'with low environmental impacts that contribute to food and nutrition security and to healthy life for present and are protective and respectful of biodiversity and ecosystems, culturally acceptable, accessible, economically fair and affordable; nutritionally adequate, safe and healthy; while optimizing natural and human resources' (FAO/Bioversity International, 2012).

One of the important outcomes of the Lancet series was the recommendation to use stunting as the main outcome variable of nutrition programmes (Black et al. 2008) - even allowing for the fact that height has been infrequently measured at the community clinic level. But it is a better predictor of future outcomes and reflects better the combined insult to children of undernutrition and a high disease load. As approximately half of stunting takes place in the foetus before birth, this also draws increased attention to the mother whose nutritional status and dietary intake during the pregnancy is critical to the birthweight of the neonate, including in analyses done in India (Mamidi et al. 2010). However, this is likely to be a final impact, so programmes should also be measuring 'nutrition outputs and outcomes' as well (although reduction in rates may be more rapidly achieved than generally thought if social and gender factors are also addressed e.g. the SHOUHARDO experience mentioned above in Bangladesh). The adoption of recommendations to adopt stunting as the measure for both 'direct' and 'indirect' nutrition programmes has obvious planning and measuring implications.

## **Summary of recent shifts in food and nutrition that impact on SAFANSI**

- The increasing recognition that to reduce stunting levels, it will be necessary to address other sectors e.g. women's issues, agriculture and so on but that that evidence base needs strengthening (Gillespie et al. 2012).

- Recent research on exactly how to break the intergenerational cycle of low birthweight and stunting (and urgent more work on supplementation, including with multimicronutrients, is needed on how to do this safely for both mother and neonate).
- The attention to addressing the first 1000 days more explicitly includes maternal nutrition and recognizes the fact that the most cost-effective interventions need to happen in the first two years of life.
- The increasing attention to breaking societal patterns of poor undernutrition by addressing adolescent girls (which needs to include such issues as adolescent marriages, and school retention).
- To achieve multi-sectoral action (and accountability) there appears to be a need to have nutrition indicators for interventions done by other sectors such as agriculture, health women's affairs etc. that have not necessarily been seen as 'nutrition interventions' until recently. As noted, WHO at the World Health Assembly in 2012 identified three sets of interventions, both direct, indirect, and those by other sectors besides Nutrition and Health, that could be expected to have nutrition outcomes (WHO 2012).
- It is increasingly recognized (and has informed the SAFANSI process) is the now convincing, if still incomplete evidence, that it is more effective, and more cost-effective, to target inequity and disadvantaged minorities, as the impact is larger (Carrera et al. 2012) – the pro-poor approach for nutrition. Part of another Lancet series, the evidence base for many of the interventions to be used in addressing child mortality and stunting in an equity approach has been reviewed (Chopra et al. 2012). Two of the countries in the review were from SAFANSI countries and the model suggested the quality-based approach would be effective in these countries (Carrera et al. 2012).
- More evidence on conditional cash transfers in a South Asian context is needed but seems likely to be a successful nutrition intervention if carefully targeted and monitored.

## Conclusions

The two questions posed at the beginning were: Firstly, how has international thinking about nutrition changed since the 2007-2008 food price spike, when SAFANSI was being designed? Question two: What does this mean for governments in the region and development partners like DFID?

From the above brief review, *question one* was hopefully addressed in the text. And for *question two* 'what does it mean for countries in the Region and donors', the question could be addressed briefly as follows.

The positive and wider-ranging implications for reducing undernutrition (particularly stunting), especially in the South Asian Nations covered by the SAFANSI Initiative of the World Bank are becoming increasingly clear, and to have an increasingly strong evidence base but cannot be 'business-as-usual' in these countries.

From the above, and from a food and nutrition security aspect, programmes in South Asia should now be addressing the following, or at least be based on some commonly agreed-to positions, and part of the evaluation should to address how these are being addressed in SAFANSI programmes by countries and in the 'SAFANSI Model'?


1. Food and nutrition security both need to be addressed and measured (e.g. nutrition indicators for agricultural/horticultural, educational and other programmes).
2. Public health nutrition outcomes need to be addressed by multisectoral interventions (such as the recent WHO approach of nutrition interventions, health interventions having nutrition outcomes, and other sector interventions with nutrition outcomes such as agriculture, gender, finance, education and so on).
3. A known set of interventions should be scaled-up and applied more widely, especially in the first 1000 days – and this evidence base for doing this is largely available.
4. More attention to breaking the cycle of stunting and underweight leading to low birthweight infants by addressing female adolescent health and nutrition and their cultural determinants.
5. A targeted approach to those most disadvantaged should be rigorously followed as it will also be most cost-effective – more evidence is needed on stunting outcomes by addressing social constraints such as female gender disadvantage (especially in the South Asian context).



6. Increasing understanding of the above approaches in all sectors and increased capacity to carry them out should be high priorities in most countries.
7. Donors and other partners will need to be clear in their approaches, and consistent with the newly emerging approach – more broadly implemented but with a more target focus.

**Figure 1: South Asia Has the Highest Prevalence of Underweight Children in the World**


(South Asian Regional Assistance Strategy for Nutrition. 2011-2016)



**Figure 2: Undernutrition rates in South Asia**

Country	Low Birth Weight*	Under weight Children 0-5*	Stunting Children 0-5*	Wasting Children 0-5*
Afghanistan	n/a	33	59	9
Bangladesh	22	41	43	17
India	28	43	48	20
Nepal	21	39	49	13
Pakistan	32	31	42	14
Sri Lanka	18	22	18	15

\*UNICEF: Tracking Progress on Child and Maternal Nutrition, November 2009



## Annex 5: The Evolution of Thinking about Political Economy and Influencing Policy

SAFANSI have provided support for research outputs on the political economy of food and nutrition security (see Annex 6 for a discussion). Part One of this body of work, (Reich and Balarajan 2012) includes a useful annex on Political Economy Analysis for Food and Nutrition Security, which summarises some key contributions from 1975 to 2012. In October 2012 DFID also produced a substantive paper<sup>69</sup> that summarises recent developments, since the Lancet series, including a chapter on “the implementation progress, the international architecture and the wider ‘enabling environment’ for undernutrition reduction”.

Reich and Balarajan also report results from two World Bank-supported nutrition governance studies. The first of these is an eight country African study. From this study, Natalicchio and Mulder-Sibanda (2010) summarise reasons for a low priority being given to malnutrition. “Elements of power, nature of the problem, institutional placement, donor behaviour, and poor results have combined over time”<sup>70</sup> This is a very summary but reasonable reflection of the wider literature on the difficulties in promoting undernutrition within the policy making and budget agenda. The second set of results is from a five country study, including Bangladesh, which examined policy processes around 1) national commitment, 2) agenda setting, 3) policy formulation, and 4) implementation. The authors (Pelletier *et al*)<sup>71</sup> identify a common theme across all four processes: a core need for enhancement of **Strategic Capacity** within the nutrition community, particularly the “capacity to broker agreements, resolve conflicts, build relationships, respond to recurring challenges and opportunities, and undertake strategic communications.”

Rather than reproducing these analyses this annex focuses on locating SAFANSI within these developments. We argue, briefly, first that SAFANSI has been sensitive to this political economy agenda, and specifically to the need for enhancing strategic capacity, in a formulaic but still effective way, and then flag three specific concerns that may be relevant to future emphases within SAFANSI. In summary, SAFANSI work does build effectively on recent developments in the political economy of nutrition but there are new challenges in helping the international community maintain coherence on domestic policy formation.

The main report of this evaluation (paragraphs 4.7-4.9) has underlined the existence of apparent problems in getting nutrition indicators included even within World Bank projects in the relevant sectors. There is a concern that, despite SAFANSI efforts, the ‘verticals’ as WB staff refer to them remain stubbornly inflexible even within the human development network. Yet, the SAFANSI-supported approaches the evaluation team observed in India (Annex 11), Nepal (Annex 10) and Pakistan<sup>72</sup> suggest that SAFANSI has managed to enjoy some success at country-level by leveraging its learning into large domestic programmes. The Indian success is through the National Rural Livelihoods Mission rather than through promoting a genuine multisectoral approach but in Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan this has been an agenda which SAFANSI and development partners have pursued. It has involved supporting the development of multisectoral nutrition action plans through central coordinating bodies (Planning Commissions) and then promoting sector specific responses

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<sup>69</sup> “An update of ‘The Neglected Crisis of Undernutrition: Evidence for Action’ DFID October 2012.

<sup>70</sup> Natalicchio, Marcela, and Menno Mulder-Sibanda. 2010. “Making Nutrition a Development Priority in Africa: What Does it Take?” Submitted to *Journal of Development Studies*.

<sup>71</sup> Pelletier, David L., Edward A. Frongillo, Suzanne Gervais, Lesli Hoey, Purnima Menon, Tien Ngo, Rebecca J. Stoltzfus, A M. Shamsir Ahmed, and Tahmeed Ahmed. 2012. “Nutrition Agenda Setting, Policy Formulation and Implementation: Lessons from the Mainstreaming Nutrition Initiative.” *Health Policy and Planning* 27(1):19-31.

<sup>72</sup> The core approach adopted for Afghanistan seems very similar but the team focused primarily on the countries included in field visits.

either through large projects, supported in part with WB-financed investments, or through line budgets. The processes followed have been structured to promote domestic engagement; WB staff described an 18-month process in Afghanistan for what they saw as effectively a four-month task but it was taken slowly to accommodate the concern to get all the key stakeholders engaged. In Nepal, where external support is proportionately large, the process has extended to the development of coordinating and advocacy bodies. In Pakistan, the processes have extended to Provincial-level. Without claiming sufficiency, this approach could fairly be described as the development of strategic capacity as described above. There is also evidence of strategic communications and development of a shared vision for example through the report of the nutrition governance workshop held in Pakistan. This one page report is included as an appendix here because it provides a useful summary of what the development of strategic capacity entails.

This progress with an avowedly political economy approach is impressive but there are concerns. A fundamental concern with this current emphasis on nutrition multisectoralism is whether lessons from previous failed attempts to promote this agenda have been learnt. There is no evidence to suggest that there has been any coherent attempt to investigate lessons. Rather the logic of the current approach is couched in terms of the continuance of a longer-term strategy to promote, but influence, domestic ownership of the policy agenda. A World Bank study on political economy of policy reform suggested “This has grown out of the move away from the rather rigid policy conditionalities associated with the structural adjustment era and towards a new development approach that emphasizes the need for reform processes to be underpinned by a sufficient level of commitment within the country concerned to be sustainable over the longer term” (World Bank 2008).<sup>73</sup> This World Bank analysis extends beyond the Paris principles and tries to unravel what domestic political processes are needed to promote policy reform. SAFANSI has clearly adopted this political economy perspective to domestic processes and that may be reason enough to believe that it will be sustainable. At least some of the regional experts interviewed were not convinced<sup>74</sup>.

Secondly, as Reich and Balarajan argue for India, it is not at all clear that the strengthening international focus on undernutrition necessarily has traction in domestic agendas. For example, so far neither India nor Pakistan have joined the Sun movement. Other international initiatives such as the three rounds of the Copenhagen Consensus and the deliberations (FAO 2012) over nutrition and the Post-2015 development agenda have certainly been of international importance but again it is by no means clear just how much influence they have in empowering the nutrition agenda in S. Asia.<sup>75</sup> These concerns raise questions over development partner strategies and suggest that a stronger focus on domestic rather than international nutrition governance may be appropriate.

Other international initiatives such as the Hunger and Nutrition Commitment Index –see Summary in Appendix—are explicitly intended to support domestic advocacy and capacity building efforts. Reich and Balarajan in their SAFANSI paper also present a political commitment index that combines stakeholder analysis with metrics of commitment and opportunity. These indices may ultimately have more traction domestically but they are still evolving with work to be done on their composition and presentation. A problem

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<sup>73</sup> The Political Economy of Policy Reform: Issues and Implications for Policy Dialogue and Development Operations” World Bank, Social Development Department, November 2008.

<sup>74</sup> The interview with one SAFANSI TAC member was insightful on why the 1996 paper on the S. Asian Enigma by Ramalingaswami *et al* did not result in greater sustainable commitment to addressing malnutrition focusing on invisibility, lack of ownership, lack of urgency even if acknowledged to be important and donor sectoralism.

<sup>75</sup> Similarly the May 2012 agreement by Ministers of Health attending the World Health Assembly (WHA) on six new global undernutrition targets to be achieved by 2025, including a target to reduce stunting by 40%” (DFID 2012) are unlikely to be reflected in domestic policy and budget without stronger domestic constituencies.

is that there are now several of these indices emerging that address hunger or nutrition and they are not necessarily delivering harmonious messages about priorities within (or between) countries.

A third concern that came out of the Reich and Balarajan political economy review of the ICDS was the evidence of important differences in opinion regarding the role of the private sector. Most development partners see an automatic role for the private sector, emphasising what it is already doing on health provision for example and seeing enormous opportunity for a wider role in addressing malnutrition. But this view is certainly not shared always in S. Asia –notably in India and Bangladesh- especially when it is perceived to be an agenda which gets disproportionate support from external agencies. Yet, ‘business as a development actor’ is a growing agenda in international development discourse and this may ultimately undermine influencing ability with key domestic stakeholders whose constituencies in civil society are sensitive to concerns over ‘rights v profits’.

## Appendix to Annex Five

### POLITICAL ECONOMY OF UNDER-NUTRITION

Aga Khan University & Institute of Development Studies Sussex

Funded by DFID

National Dissemination, 10 January 2013, Islamabad

### SUMMARY OF DELIBERATIONS

Momentum has been built for nutrition but has to be sharpened and sustained. A bidirectional approach will be needed aimed at securing both political and programmatic commitment. Political championing at the highest level is needed to establish nutrition as a development agenda across sectors. This necessitates a bipartisan adoption across party lines to avoid the danger of marginalization of nutrition if it remains tied to a single party's agenda. For it to happen, the case for nutrition needs to be well presented to politicians and the executive bureaucracy through well-targeted advocacy.

Policy dialogues can be strategically supported by refining roles between national and provincial governments. While nutrition should not be a vertically driven subject and have a strong provincial strategic home, there need to be connects with federal overarching budgetary frameworks and with federally retained structures such as the Ministry of Food Security and BISP.

Adoption of a nutrition lens is needed in sectoral planning across key sectors such as Poverty, Food, Agriculture, Health, Education and Disaster Management. This would require identification and adoption of nutrition indicators in relevant sectors and a cross-sectoral nutrition framework to ensure sustainability.

Operationally, a structural home for nutrition is needed in each of the provinces to mainstream nutrition as a subject across different sectors. Planning through such central convening agents should encourage joint initiatives across sectors using well-defined interventions, common beneficiaries and co-option across sectors. Given the past low performance with pooled multi-sectoral funding initiatives such as SAP, such joint nutrition initiatives can be implemented through separate sectoral budgetary lines but must be accompanied by strong coordination and joint M&E Frameworks to monitor interim progress on nutrition. Funding has a role for placement of strategic incentives for nutrition. Donor funding maybe used to increase state allocations while both state and donor funding modalities must be carefully chosen to catalyze an evidence based culture at both planning and local implementation levels, and movement of nutrition from development to operational budgets.

In moving ahead strategic coordination forums are needed with the non-state sector. Advocacy coalitions with CSOs, experts and media must be set up and segmentally target policymakers, implementers and community. Nutrition also requires investment in community mobilization networks at sub-district and local levels for absorption of nutrition outreach activities.

The deliberations were concluded with support pledged by the Pakistan People's Party representative MNA Madam Azra Fazal Pechuho for up-scaling of nutrition as a crosscutting development agenda and leveraging across party lines.

## **Hunger and Nutrition Commitment Index - HANCI<sup>76</sup>**

**HANCI measures and ranks governments' political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition on an annual basis**

- Across 21 donor countries
- Across 40-50 developing countries for global advocacy (using secondary data)
- Within 7 developing countries for national advocacy (using primary + secondary data)
- In India, we develop a country specific index that compares commitment levels across States (using secondary and primary data).

### **Supports advocacy by civil society and constructive dialogue with governments**

- Measuring political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition will help to build greater commitment and to promote uptake of appropriate measures
- HANCI can be used by individual organizations and advocacy coalitions, to demand better government action, at: Global, National and Subnational level (States, Provinces, etc)
- HANCI brings greater transparency to government action and inaction
- Detailed analysis (primary data) enables constructive dialogues with governments –praise governments where they do well
- HANCI has been proposed for inclusion in the accountability toolbox for use by SUN country civil society platforms in UK Prime Minister's Hunger Summit (August 2012)
- IDS is exploring a collaboration with ONE and Save the Children for their use of HANCI in international campaigns

### **Develops partnerships and builds capacity to enhance political commitments to reduce hunger and undernutrition**

- Supporting civil society organizations and advocacy coalitions to effectively use HANCI for their campaigning purposes
- Working with local communities to amplify their voices, and assess their perspectives on what greater political commitment by their governments should look like
- Feeding back research findings and working with local knowledge intermediaries

### **How HANCI assesses political commitment:**

- Scores and ranks governments performance on policies and programmes (3 indicators); public spending (3) and development of legal frameworks (3) – (this analytical framework is currently being revised)
- This secondary data is complemented with primary data in 7 countries (Malawi, Ethiopia, Zambia, Bangladesh, Nepal, India, and Tanzania).
- Expert perception surveys assess the functioning of administrative processes aiming to address hunger and nutrition in these countries. This assesses e.g. nutrition coordination, policy learning, credible incentives for good performance, etc.
- The surveys are conducted with 40-50 experts from government, academia, civil society, donors, and media in each country (or Indian State).

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<sup>76</sup> HANCI is supported by Irish Aid, DFID and Oxfam India. For more details, please contact: Dr. Dolf te Lintelo, Fellow, [d.telintelo@ids.ac.uk](mailto:d.telintelo@ids.ac.uk) or Karine Gatellier, nutrition convenor, [k.gatellier@ids.ac.uk](mailto:k.gatellier@ids.ac.uk) Institute of Development Studies, UK.

- In India, secondary data is collected for country specific indicators and therewith speaks extremely well to local context and policymakers.



## Annex 6: The Application of Political Economy Analysis: Implications for SAFANSI and its Development Partners

SAFANSI commissioned Michael Reich and Yarlini Balarajan at Harvard University to write an analytic paper on political economy analysis for food and nutrition security. Reich and Balarajan's (2012)<sup>77</sup> paper has three loosely linked<sup>78</sup> components:<sup>79</sup>

- *A Review of Political Economy Analysis for Food and Nutrition Security*
- *An Illustrative Case: Application of the Political Economy Framework to India's Integrated Child Development Services Program*
- *A Rapid Assessment Tool for Measuring Political Commitment and Opportunity to Advance Food and Nutrition Security Policies*

In part one, the authors contextualise their study and outline a quite general overarching approach to framing political economy analyses, including FNS. They are careful to acknowledge this is just one approach possible. Elements<sup>80</sup> of this framework are then used in part two –an in-depth political economy analysis of the Indian Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS)- and part three, introducing a rapid assessment tool for measuring political commitment to FNS. The framework is elaborated in some detail in these two approaches. Whilst their implicit theory of change uses different language it is essentially consistent –supporting e.g. the role of evidence and advocacy- with the theory of change informing SAFANSI.

The authors are highly credible and they link theoretical literature on political economy to applied political economy analysis in each part of their paper. The three parts are however quite different and underline the diversity of methods that fall under the general description of political economy analysis.

The evaluation questions centre on what utility this work is providing to the sector and to SAFANSI and on what implications there may be for future SAFANSI work. During country visits, when this body of work was discussed, there was concern expressed that it was not clear what the operational implications<sup>81</sup> for SAFANSI might be. We share those concerns.

The part one review stresses the diversity of approaches used in political economy and provides some introduction to their application in FNS policy processes. It underlines both the importance of understanding political economy issues in specific contexts as well as the qualitative and interpretative nature of such endeavour, putting a premium on the use of specialist knowledge. The authors advocate adopting a common framework (theirs) so that some of the 'messiness' of political economy analysis is removed. It has four steps:

Step 1: Describe the study objectives and policy context

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<sup>77</sup> Reich, Michael R., and Yarlini Balarajan. 2012. *Political Economy Analysis for Food and Nutrition Security*. Washington, DC: World Bank and SAFANSI.

<sup>78</sup> The linkage is through the framework for political economy analysis presented in part one, which describes the policy process in four stages: agenda setting, policy design, policy adoption, and, implementation. Parts two and three of their paper develop political economy approaches to the first of these stages, agenda setting.

<sup>79</sup> The first two of these were supported by SAFANSI.

<sup>80</sup> They include the use of dedicated software designed to provide more rigorous political economy analysis with a focus on stakeholders. It is not clear whether WB TTLs would focus more on political economy because of the opportunities thus provided for some form of quantitative analysis.

<sup>81</sup> There was a World Bank meeting planned for early March to review these questions.

- Step 2: Select stage of the policy cycle for analysis
- Step 3: Analyze political dynamics to assess political feasibility
- Step 4: Assess or design political strategies

This framework is at such a high level of abstraction that it will do little to ensure coherence of approach across different contexts. Clearly, the substance of analysis using this approach is in steps three and four but the analysis of ‘political dynamics’ and ‘political strategies’ do not lend themselves easily to a common approach -though the authors do offer some specific guidance building on the theoretical literature. Moreover, the examples they provide in parts two and three are at the ‘agenda setting’ stage of the policy process and do not address policy design, adoption and implementation for which the political economy challenges are different. With the growth in literature on S. Asian malnutrition, and the wider understanding today of the complexity of the challenges, it is not clear that this very broad framework will help to generate fresh insights and, critically, an action agenda.

Taking the example of their analysis (part two) of the much-studied ICDS, it would be difficult to claim their six conclusions provide any fresh insights into ICDS, at least for most of the key stakeholders in India, and the authors acknowledge this. Arguably, their substantive contribution to SAFANSI through this case study is in the elaboration of their framework, and an approach to data collection, that can be applied in other contexts. The authors state though that the in-depth political economy analysis, such as they provide for the agenda setting of ICDS reform, would normally require training in political science and this is clearly a potential obstacle to the use of this analytical approach.

Nevertheless, we believe that the policy narrative approach of the ICDS study is of potential significance in two ways that are of immediate relevance to SAFANSI.

First, is the opportunity to use this approach to analyse examples of *successful* policy reform rather than perceived failure such as the continuing impasse over implementation reform for the ICDS despite substantial increase in the budget for the programme. These examples might include policy areas where SAFANSI has been active but would not be primarily designed to highlight SAFANSI itself; rather the concern would be to demonstrate what coalition of stakeholders was able to effect change and to use the rich analytical framework provided by Reich and Balarajan to understand how successful policy reform happened. Positive examples, given the continuing nature of malnutrition in S. Asia, are likely to be much narrower than the ICDS study and might include examples at state- (in India) or provincial (Pakistan) -level or at sub-sector level such as the case of public works in Nepal discussed in annex ten.

Secondly, a specific concern with the current commitment to multisectoral approaches is whether it has characteristics that will enable the approach to be sustained longer than previous multisectoral approaches that have been championed in the past in all countries of the region. Much of the impetus that SAFANSI has generated has come through its support to the development of multisectoral approaches. These have failed in the past. Nepal, for example, is now on its fourth multisectoral nutrition plan.<sup>82</sup> What went wrong before and what may be different this time around? These are political economy questions –types of policy ethnography- that SAFANSI would do well to investigate and might be the most productive way of utilising the Reich and Balarajan framework.

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<sup>82</sup> Interview with Dr. Tirtha Ranna, Kathmandu, February 15<sup>th</sup> 2013.

The third part of their analysis is an approach to measuring political commitment, an approach we have discussed in the preceding annex. The key concern here is whether such approaches have any domestic political traction and what would need to be done to ensure that they do. Whilst there has been much attention to the idea of 'naming and shaming' the fact is that these initiatives, at least to date, do not resonate in domestic policy processes, especially in those countries that have little or no dependence on aid. Even though the approach adopted in their paper, compared to similar initiatives, is less focused on international comparison and more on domestic stakeholders and current evidence of commitment, it would require domestic 'stewardship' from key stakeholders to provide any effective influence. At this point there is no evidence this is likely and it probably is not a priority for SAFANSI.

## Annex 7: Illustrative Mapping of SAFANSI and other related FNS activities in South Asia

There are many hundreds of FNS activities being undertaken in South Asia. It is not possible or cost-effective to try and identify them all. The following, however, provides a summary of SAFANSI activities in South Asia and an illustrative mapping of other FNS related activities. It is an illustrative list and is not intended to be comprehensive or exhaustive.

			Sectoral coverage											
Programmes (by country)	Grant objective	Development Partners (other than DfID and AusAID for SAFANSI activities)	FNS	Gender	Social exclusion	Maternal health	Child health	Health, gen.	Education	Agriculture	Rural/Local Dev.	Geographic focus	PEA & Gov.	Other
SAFANSI activities in Afghanistan														
Supporting Afghanistan's High Level Task Force on Food and Nutrition Security (SASHN)	To support the preparation of a national multi-sectoral action framework for food and nutrition security in Afghanistan and six technical assistance activities that form the "Afghanistan SAFANSI Nutrition Solutions Series"	USAID, EC, UNICEF, WFP, FAO, WHO, MI, GAIN, CIDA	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.		.	Commerce & Industry
Care for Afghan Families/"Baby Friendly Village" (SAR DM)	To implement the BPHS and EPHS; support proper child feeding; and raise urgency around chronic malnutrition	WB, USAID, MoE, MoP	.	.		.	.	.						
Non-SAFANSI activities														
School feeding programmes/"A-biscuit-a-day"	To improve school enrolment and access to education through school meals	WFP, DfID	.				.		.					
Relief Food Assistance to Tackle Food Security Challenges	To use food assistance in line with WFP Strategic Plan and UNDAF 2010–13. The activities are linked to MDGs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7.	WFP, USAID, JICA	.	.		.	.		.		.	.		

UN Joint Programme Feeding the Children of Afghanistan Together	To support an integrated package of nutrition and food security interventions at the community level	FAO, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, UNIDO	.	.		.	.		.	.				
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Programmes (by country)	Grant objective	Development Partners	FNS	Gender	Social exclusion	Maternal health	Child health	Health, gen.	Education	Agriculture	Rural/Local Dev.	Geographic focus	PEA & Governance	Other
<b>SAFANSI activities in Bangladesh</b>														
Multisectoral Simulation Tool for Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) in Bangladesh (SASEP)	To develop a Multisectoral Simulation Tool that can take stock of how current/potential investments in different programs could impact nutritional outcomes in aggregate	UN REACH, BRAC	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
SAFANSI Modifiable Adequacy (SAFANSI MA) Analysis in Bangladesh (SASEP)	To support the government choose an appropriate mix and scale of their interventions that most effectively reduces malnutrition	WB, BRAC, IFPRI	.					.					.	Care
Assessment of Bangladesh CCT Pilot through Local Governments for Human Development (SASSP)	To provide recommendations on the effectiveness of program design of CCTs for improving school enrolment, attendance and child nutrition, etc.	WB (LGD), MoHFW,					.		.				.	CCT

Assessment of the relation between mortality and morbidity due to diarrheal diseases and sanitation coverage in Bangladesh (TWISA)	To uncover why increased sanitation coverage does not reduce diarrheal disease incidence in Bangladesh.		.	.			.	.							WASH
Raising the Profile of Nutrition as an Agenda for High Level Policy Makers in Bangladesh (SASHN)	Using advocacy based work to raise the interest in an FNS agenda so that results of such advocacy can lead to greater demand for Technical Assistance in FNS	WB, UN REACH	.												
<b>Non-SAFANSI initiatives in Bangladesh</b>															
Bangladesh - Health Nutrition and Population Sector Program	To increase access & use of quality hospitals, and nutritional services	WB, MoHFW	.			.	.	.	.				.		
UN Joint programme on Protecting and Promoting Food Security and Nutrition for Families and Children in Bangladesh	To reduce low birth weight & malnutrition in children in 6-59 months & acute malnutrition in pregnant & lactating women	WFP, UNICEF, FAO	.			.	.					.			
Food Security Nutritional Surveillance Project	To develop a robust national surveillance system to be relied on for floods, food price rises, etc.	Helen Keller Institute, EU, BRAC, B'desh Bureau of Statistics	.	.				.		.					Disaster risk management

Programmes (by country)	Grant objective	Development Partners	FNS	Gender	Social exclusion	Maternal health	Child health	Health, gen.	Education	Agriculture	Rural/Local Dev.	Geographic focus	PEA & Governance	Other
<b>SAFANSI initiatives in Bhutan</b>														
Nutrition Assessment and Capacity Building in Bhutan (SASHN)	To generate evidence and create awareness among Bhutanese policymakers to invest in public delivery system to address malnutrition in the first 1000 days	WB, RGoB, UNICEF, WHO, FAO, WFP	.	.		.	.		.	.		.	.	Service delivery
<b>Non-SAFANSI initiatives in Bhutan</b>														
UNICEF–MoE School WASH Survey	To produce sufficient evidence to raise awareness at both government and practitioner levels of the issues related to water	UNICEF, MoH	.	.					.					

Programmes (by country)	Grant objective	Development Partners	FNS	Gender	Social exclusion	Maternal health	Child health	Health, gen.	Education	Agriculture	Rural/Local Dev.	Geographic focus	PEA & Governance	Other
<b>SAFANSI activities in India</b>														
Multisectoral Simulation Tool for Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) in India (SASEP)	To develop a Multisectoral Simulation Tool that can take stock of how current/potential investments in different programs could impact nutritional outcomes in aggregate	WB, PHFI, IFPRI, UN REACH	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		
SAFANSI Modifiable Adequacy (SAFANSI MA) Analysis in India (SASEP)	To support the government choose an appropriate mix and scale of their interventions that most effectively reduces malnutrition	WB, PHFI, IFPRI,	•					•					•	Care
Community Managed Food and Nutrition Security Initiatives in High Poverty States in India (SASDA)	To strengthen institutional capacities of the National Rural Livelihoods Project and assist in setting up TA architecture for FNS themes		•					•			•		•	
Improving Food Security in Tribal and Conflict-affected Areas of India (SASDS)	To strengthen the capacity of government to deliver effective food and nutrition security interventions in conflict-affected areas		•	•	•							•	•	Service delivery
<b>SAFANSI activities in India</b>														



Improving Food and Nutrition Monitoring and Accountability in Rajasthan, India (SASSP)	To improve monitoring of FNS at the local level and increase use of FNS information for accountability, policy and program implementation	Local admn. including RDP, DoWCW, DoP	.						.	.			.	.	
Social Observatory for Rural Food and Nutrition Security in the National Rural Livelihoods Mission in India (DECRG)	To change the culture of project M&E through the identification of integrated and gender-smart pathways for improvement of FNS	State and national ministries of RD, and other ministries	.	.					.		.	.		.	Capacity building, M&E
Multi-sectoral Partnership for Nutrition: A pilot in Bihar (SASHN)	To improve nutritional outcomes in a specified geographical area through incorporation of nutrition actions in WB operations across several sectors	WB, ministries	.										.		
<b>Non-SAFANSI activities in India</b>															
The Agriculture-Nutrition Disconnect in India (TANDI)	To identify agricultural policy strategies for reducing malnutrition in India	Gates Foundation, IFPRI	.	.		.	.			.					
Partnerships and Opportunities to Strengthen and Harmonize Actions for Nutrition in India (POSHAN)	To synthesise the evidence base on nutrition for action in India	Gates Foundation, IFPRI, IDS, PHFI	.	.		.	.			.					
Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) Systems Strengthening & Nutrition Improvement Program (ISSNIP)	To improve child nutritional outcomes in India institutional and systems strengthening, community mobilization, convergent nutrition action	WB, GoI	.	.		.	.		.					.	

Programmes (by country)	Grant objective	Development Partners	FNS	Gender	Social exclusion	Maternal health	Child health	Health, gen.	Education	Agriculture	Rural/Local Dev.	Geographic focus	PEA Governance	Other
<b>SAFANSI activities in Nepal</b>														
Supporting Nepal's High Level Task Force on Food and Nutrition Security (SASHN)	To support the preparation of a national multi-sectoral action framework for food and nutrition security in Nepal	WB, MoAC, MoHP	.	.	.			.	.	.	.	.	.	MPPW, MoCS
Nepal's Scaling Up Nutrition Initiative Technical Assistance (SUNITA)	To support analysis of FNS data produced under the Nepal Living Standards Survey III	NPC, CBS, WB, WFP, UNICEF	.				.	.						
Nutrition in Health Sectoral Review	To identify nutrition interventions that need to be strengthened, scaled up and recommend as comprehensive program as part of Nepal Health Sector Plan II	MOHP ,WB	.		.	.	.	.						
Trend Analysis and Review of IYCF Program	To review existing situation and program on IYCF and identify the Gaps	MoHP, WB	.											
<b>Non-SAFANSI activities in Nepal</b>														

Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF)	To reduce extreme forms of poverty in programme districts by promoting a community based demand driven approach using rigorous social mobilisation techniques, bringing poor at the centre of development	Government of Nepal, World Bank, IFAD	.	.	.					.	.	.		.	
First 1000 Days Project	To enable Nepal to improve the nutritional status of pregnant women and children under the age of 2	WB, MoLD	.			.	.					.			
Support to Safe Motherhood Programme (SSMP)	To make motherhood safer for all women across the country and to ensure the health and survival of their babies	DfID, MoHP	.	.	.	.	.					.	.		
Integrated Nutrition Programme (Suaahara)	To improve and sustain the health and well-being of Nepali people	USAID, UNICEF, WPF, WHO, and the World Bank	.		.	.	.			.	.				
Feed the Future	To reduce hunger and poverty while improving nutrition in Nepal	Windrock, MoHP, MoA, NPCS	.			.	.	.	.	.	.	.			
The Global Agriculture and Food Security project (GAFSP)	To enhance HH food and nutrition security through farm productivity and non-farm intervention and improved capacity for food utilisation	UNICEF, REACH, WHO, WFP	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.				

Programmes (by country)	Grant objective	Development Partners	FNS	Gender	Social exclusion	Maternal health	Child health	Health, gen.	Education	Agriculture	Rural/Local Dev.	Geographic focus	PEA & Governance	Other
<b>SAFANSI activities in Pakistan</b>														
Pakistan Roundtable Discussion on Agriculture and Water: introducing food and nutrition security to Government Planning (SASDA)	To mainstream the food and nutrition security (FNS) agenda into the development planning process for agriculture and rural development in Pakistan	WB, GoP	.							.	.		.	Water; Food procurement
Enhancing Provincial Commitment for an Evidence-based and Gender-sensitive Multi-sectoral Response to the Food and Nutrition Security Challenge in Pakistan (SASHN)	To support preparation of provincial policy guidance notes that outline the current status of FNS in each province, the main causes of lack of FNS and options for action	WB, SC, MI, WHO, UNICEF	.	.				.		.	.	.	.	
Child Nutritional Outcomes and Community Based Health Service Provision: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment in Rural Pakistan (PREM/DECRG)	To improve child nutritional and health outcomes through the involvement of women in community based health provision.	PPAF, NRSP, WB	.	.			.	.						

## Non-SAFANSI activities in Pakistan

Community Rehabilitation Infrastructure Support Program (CRISP)	To support construction of infrastructure to develop Pakistan's rural communities and villages	USAID, GoP	.											
Pakistan Lady Health Worker (LHW) Programme	To scale up community-level human resources for health in rural areas and urban slums	MoH, WHO, DfID	.	.		.	.					.		
Awareness of Nutrition through Primary Healthcare and Nutrition Education	To integrate nutrition with primary health & social sector for awareness and nutritional improvements	GoP (National Nutrition Programme)	.	.	.			.	.		.			
Pakistan's Zero Hunger Programme	To reduce lack of FNS by interventions like stimulus programmes to expand farm outputs & market access	Ministry of National Food Security and Research												
Health Promotion and Nutrition Programme	To increase knowledge and practices for health promotion, and improving nutritional status	One UN	.			.	.	.	.					

Programmes (by country)	Grant objective	Development Partners	FNS	Gender	Social exclusion	Maternal health	Child health	Health, gen.	Education	Agriculture	Rural/Local Dev.	Geographic focus	PEA & Governance	Other
<b>SAFANSI Multi-country programmes</b>														
South Asia Gender and Nutrition Mapping (SASDS)	To provide evidence to government and development partners on gender-sensitive cross-sectoral policies and strategies that address undernutrition in South Asia	WB, UNICEF, FAO, WFP, WHO, USAID	.	.		.	.						.	.
IFPRI Conference on Leveraging Agriculture for Improving Nutrition and Health (SASDA)	To inform multi-sectoral policy approaches in order to leverage agriculture's impact on nutrition and health outcomes.	IFPRI	.					.		.				
Developing a Framework for Applied Political Economy Analysis of Food and Nutrition Security Issues in South Asia (SASHN)	To develop an applied political economy framework to understand and promote FNS programs across the seven countries in SAR		.										.	
Learning from Global Success Stories (SASDA)	To facilitate South-South learning by extracting lessons from other regions and transfer to SAR	WB, govt. agencies	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	

Linking Measures of Food Security with Nutritional Outcomes in South Asia (PRMPR, SASEP)	To fill the acutely perceived knowledge gap on the relationship between FNS through a greater coordination of these twin agendas	FAO, WB,	.	.										
<b>Non-SAFANSI Multi-country programmes</b>														
Leveraging Agriculture for Nutrition in South Asia (LANSA)	An RPC to generate evidence on how agricultural growth in SA might become more pro-nutrition	MSSRF (India), BRAC (B'desh), IDS, IFPRI, LCIRAH	.	.				.		.				
Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN)	To implement evidence-based interventions & nutrition goals across sectors	DfID, USAID, UNICEF, WB, EC, CIDA, etc.	.	.		.	.	.		.	.			
Tackling The Neglected Crisis of Undernutrition ( <i>alias</i> Transform Nutrition)	To strengthen the content & use of evidence to accelerate undernutrition reduction	DfID, IFPRI, IDS, ICDDR, PHFI, SC-UK, Nairobi Univ.	.	.		.	.			.			.	
UN Renewed Effort Against Child Hunger and undernutrition (REACH)	To scale-up proven and effective interventions addressing child undernutrition	FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, WHO	.	.		.	.							
Various initiatives by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Canada	To identify low FNS hotspots and their root causes despite rich biodiversity. Focusses on research, advocacy and dissemination.	Government of Canada	.	.	.			.		.				

## Annex 8: Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey: latest findings relevant to FNS.

The Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey (BDHS) results have just been released and show some encouraging trends and other areas where increased progress will need to be made to reach MDG1 target 3 on underweight. Assessing trends is complicated by the fact that up until 2004 NCHS standards were used and then WHO growth standards. Nevertheless, it is clear considerable progress has been made in underweight and stunting since 1985 with little shift on wasting. There was little improvement during the mid 2000s.

In 1985 (using NCHS standards) underweight was at 71% of young children 6-59 months of age, stunting at 68% and wasting at 15%. By 2004 (but using WHO standards) underweight was 43%, with stunting and wasting at 51% and 15% respectively. Clearly, with just over half of all young children stunted, there was considerable concern, especially as the long-term developmental effects of stunting were becoming clearer and widely accepted in scientific and public health nutrition sectors.

By 2011 (the most recent BDHS figures) underweight was down to 36 % (HPHSDP and MDG target is 33%), stunting reduced to 41% and wasting about the same at 16%. While the improvement is impressive, it still means over 40% of the young child population is stunted, with all the long-term impacts this implies. Not least, in a country with increasing levels of diabetes and hypertension, allied with high (over a third at 36%) numbers of low birth weight, the impact of future non-communicable diseases incidence. Stunting levels increase with age, suggesting that interventions are not happening in the first two years of life, and that high levels of infectious diseases, and undernutrition continue throughout early life.

Young women e.g. have high levels of underweight and iron-deficiency anaemia. A recent study found that the low intakes of 11 micronutrients by young children and women in rural Bangladesh is primarily due to low food intake and limited diversity. Although there is some evidence of increasing diversity, nearly 70% of dietary energy, on average, comes from cereals. In times of financial stress, the poorer population generally maintains their rice intake but reduce diversity, especially of foods that provide micronutrients (BRAC/HKI/BBS 2011). While diets are gradually becoming more diverse, this is largely due to increased accessibility through poverty reduction and remittances, as domestic food production has not adjusted at the same speed and remains dominated by rice production (NFPCSP 2012).

Rural populations of under 5-yearold children are worse off than urban children (50% underweight c.f. 35%), although there are increasing concerns about urbanized poor and undernutrition. While wealth results in better nutrition (at least in terms of undernutrition but probably not in terms of emerging NCDs), even children in the top 5<sup>th</sup> percentile 26% are stunted (c.f. 54% I lowest 5<sup>th</sup> percentile (and 12% are wasted) (BDHS 2012). Higher levels of LBW (where up to half of stunting will have already taken place) are seen rural mothers (37:29%).

In terms of what can be done, mother's education is critical. The fifth percentile most educated has 29% of their young children with moderate/severe Stunting c.f. 73% nationally and underweight prevalence is 22% to 64%. As the LBW by gender is not so different (M:F 33%:38%) it suggests the disadvantage is to the mother during pregnancy. Given the high levels of early marriage, delayed marriage and attention to adolescent girls' nutrition, including micronutrients, is way overdue. Other areas that need addressing from these BDHS figures are exclusive breastfeeding (currently about 40% at four months) and other good breastfeeding practices and complementary feeding practices after 6 months.

It is not that there is a lack of information, or knowledge, about what to do, but there is an urgent need for both direct nutrition interventions and nutrition-sensitive interventions like female education.



**References:**

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## Annex 9: Analysis of World Bank Project Appraisal Documents (PADS)

### Purpose of the analysis

This section involves a systematic desk review of relevant World Bank project appraisal documents (PADs). The goal is to identify, through documentary evidence, the extent to which, in actual numbers, World Bank project designs reflect the more multi-sectoral, upstream, politically “savvy” approaches to reducing undernutrition envisaged by SAFANSI. The proposed process will involve the following steps.

First, key World Bank Project Appraisal Documents (PADs) dealing with multi-sectoral approaches to nutrition will be examined. More specifically, those PADs coded for “agriculture”, “rural development”, and “water and sanitation” “education” “social protection” and “gender” in 2007, 2008 and 2009 (ie before and after the food price increases of 2008, but before SAFANSI came into force) in the South Asia region will be identified from the World Bank website. An electronic word search will then identify which of those projects refer to “nutrition” and “undernutrition” in the body of the PAD and – importantly<sup>83</sup> – if any nutrition-related indicators are captured in the Results and Monitoring Framework, either at the Program Development Objectives level, or at the Intermediate Results level<sup>84</sup>. This process will then be repeated for the period 2010, 2011, and 2012.

Our hypothesis will be that, while recognising the lead times of 12-18 months for project preparation, if the World Bank was chosen as a potentially powerful agent for stimulating multi-sectoral approaches towards nutrition, then there should be *some* evidence emerging that the World Bank itself is adopting more integrated approaches in its own large programs, hopefully as a result of SAFANSI. While increasing references to nutrition, and nutrition indicators, in agriculture and other related PADs could not necessarily be attributed to SAFANSI effectiveness, the converse is true: a complete absence of any nutrition discussion/indicators in South Asia PADs dealing with agriculture and rural development, education, water and sanitation, gender and social protection in the last few years would raise questions about SAFANSI’s profile and impact within the Bank, even allowing for a lagged effect of SAFANSI operations.<sup>85</sup> This is, in effect, a simple ‘before and after’ test of SAFANSI.

The second aspect of the desk review involves a comparison of PADS covering agriculture, rural development, water and sanitation, education, gender, and social protection in South Asia over the period 2010 – 2012, and comparing them to those in the same sector in Sub-Saharan Africa: another region with significant under-nutrition. The working hypothesis is that there is a *prima facie* case to suggest SAFANSI is acting as a catalyst for more integrated approaches to nutrition within the Bank if South Asia PADs have more explicit references, and specific indicators, related to nutrition than is the case in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is, in effect, a simple ‘with and without’ SAFANSI test. We considered the option of also comparing recent Sub-Saharan references in 2010-2012 to the pre 2008 period (a “difference-in-difference” test). However that would significantly expand the work load, time that we judged better spent analysing the SAFANSI case studies themselves.

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<sup>83</sup> Because “what gets measured gets done”.

<sup>84</sup> Trials indicate this approach of electronically searching PADS for specific references to nutrition, including in the monitoring and evaluation indicators, is entirely feasible, quick and free of direct costs.

<sup>85</sup> Project designs and PADS have quite long gestation periods, often around 18 months to 2 years, so there will be a lagged effect of SAFANSI influence.

While any results from this desk review should be assessed with caution<sup>86</sup> such a comparison could generate some useful insights about the extent to which SAFANSI is having any influence on the World Bank's own internal core business (i.e. project lending and analytical work). This can then be used to confirm and triangulate statements made in SAFANSI's own Annual Reports about where it believes it has had influence.

## Method and approach

a) The researcher searched for project appraisal documents (PADs) of WB for the following: agriculture, rural development, water supply and sanitation, education, social protection, gender (the concerned search page on the WB website is: <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/topic>)

b) The date filter was set for 1/1/2007 to 12/31/2012 (1 January 2007 to 31 December 2012). This covers three years before SAFANSI (2007, '08, '09) and three years after (2010, '11, '12)

c) Document-type filter was set strictly to: Project Appraisal Document (PADs)

d) Countries and regions filter was set to: Africa, South Asia, India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Bhutan

e) Language of documents filter was set to: English

On this basis, the researcher received 182 PAD search results for the various topics, years, and regions. Then the following three indicators in each of these PADs were looked at:

- Does the title/abstract/other general bodies of text in the PAD contain terms like “food security”, “nutrition”, “undernutrition” etc.? Even if any one of these terms is mentioned in a little depth, the researcher scored it as a positive.
- Does the M&E results framework for the project development objective (PDO) has FNS related metrics/indicators? Here the selection criteria were very strict. The researcher noticed a lot of PADS had PDO metrics which talked merely of increasing yield and/or production quantum as an objective without any discussion on FNS. Thus, unless one saw an explicit mention of FNS and related issues in PDO metrics, they were given a zero score.
- And finally, does the M&E results framework for the intermediate results have FNS related metrics/indicators? Same as above — here too a strict criteria was used.

## Main findings

**There is little or no evidence at this stage to suggest increased inter-sectoral approaches and FNS sensitive indicators are being explicitly incorporated into World Bank South Asia project designs or results frameworks.** It is reasonable to expect that, over time, any increased institutional commitment to raising the profile of FNS, and encouraging more intersectoral approaches to FNS, would then be reflected in World Bank Project Appraisal Documents (PADs). It would be particularly hoped that FNS sensitive indicators were becoming increasingly, and explicitly, included in the Project Development Objectives and the Monitoring and Evaluating results frameworks of PADs ("what gets measured gets done").

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<sup>86</sup> The sample size is quite small; there is a lagged effect in designing PADs that may only be emerging now; there does not exist a perfect counterfactual situation for comparison; and there could be spill-over effects from the South Asia efforts on nutrition to those working in Washington on Sub-Saharan Africa.

To test this, the Evaluation examined 182 PADS covering agriculture, rural development, water supply and sanitation, education, social protection, and gender.

The key findings are that:

- None of the 23 water and sanitation projects, 6 agriculture projects, or 4 gender projects supported by the South Asia Department had a FNS indicator in the Project Development Objective, or in the projects results framework, in the three years before, or after, SAFANSI's establishment.
- The number of FNS indicators had fallen in "rural development" projects since SAFANSI had been established (from 3 out of 14 projects in South Asia having FNS indicators in the three years prior to SAFANSI's establishment to none out of 7 projects in the three years after SAFANSI's establishment. There was a slight rise in FNS indicators in education projects over those periods but the numbers are too small to be meaningful.
- There are numerous references to the importance of FNS in the narrative text of PADs, especially those in the agriculture and rural development sectors. But this is not subsequently reflected in indicators to be tracked in the PAD's results framework
- There is no discernible trend between the inclusion of FNS indicators in the South Asia Department and those in the Sub Saharan Africa Department

## Conclusion

**The absence of explicit FNS sensitive indicators in key sectors such as agriculture, gender, water and sanitation, and the reduced number of FNS sensitive indicators in rural development is a potential warning sign.** It can be argued that the analysis undertaken here is both simplistic (the use of word searches) and unrealistic (there are long lead times involved in preparing PADS so it is too soon to expect changes). This Evaluation acknowledges such concerns.

On the other hand, even this somewhat crude and simplistic approach does raise some important questions. For example, why is it that three years after the establishment of SAFANSI, and six years after FNS was on the agenda internationally and within the World Bank, are there still no indicators for FNS in 33 different projects in the agriculture, gender, and water and sanitation sectors when these sectors are important drivers of FNS? And why have the number of FNS indicators in rural development fallen to zero out of seven projects since SAFANSI was established?

## Analysis of World Bank Project Appraisal Documents (PADs)

		2007	2008	2009	Total (3 years pre SAFANSI)	2010	2011	2012	Total (3 years post SAFANSI)	Total
<b>Region</b>	<b>"Agriculture"</b>									
SA	Total	0	0	2	2	1	1	2	4	6
SSA	Total	4	0	2	6	1	2	1	4	10
SA	"nutrition", "undernutrition", "food and nutritional security" appears in title/keywords/abstract	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	2
SSA	"nutrition", "undernutrition", "food and nutritional security" appears in title/keywords/abstract	2	0	2	4	1	2	1	4	8
SA	Nutrition or FNS related indicators part of M&E and results framework of project development objective	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
SSA	Nutrition or FNS related indicators part of M&E and results framework of project development objective	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SA	Nutrition or FNS related indicators part of M&E in intermediate results	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SSA	Nutrition or FNS related indicators part of M&E in intermediate results	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	<b>"Rural development"</b>									
SA	Total	6	4	4	14	1	2	4	7	21
SSA	Total	2	0	0	2	1	1	1	3	5
SA	"nutrition", "undernutrition", "food and nutritional security" appears in title/keywords/abstract	3	4	3	10	1	2	0	3	13
SSA	"nutrition", "undernutrition", "food and nutritional security" appears in title/keywords/abstract	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	4	4
SA	Nutrition or FNS related indicators part of M&E and results framework of project development objective	0	1	1	2	0	0	1	1	3
SSA	Nutrition or FNS related indicators part of M&E and results framework of project development objective	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SA	Nutrition or FNS related indicators part of M&E in intermediate results	0	2	1	3		0	0	0	3
SSA	Nutrition or FNS related indicators part of M&E in intermediate results	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	<b>"Water and sanitation"</b>									
SA	Total	7	5	1	13	3	4	3	10	23
SSA	Total	1	0	2	3	0	0	1	1	4

SA	"nutrition", "undernutrition", "food and nutritional security" appears in title/keywords/abstract	3	4	0	7	1	2	2	5	12
SSA	"nutrition", "undernutrition", "food and nutritional security" appears in title/keywords/abstract	1	0	2	3	0	0	1	1	4
SA	Nutrition or FNS related indicators part of M&E and results framework of project development objective	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SSA	Nutrition or FNS related indicators part of M&E and results framework of project development objective	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SA	Nutrition or FNS related indicators part of M&E in intermediate results	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SSA	Nutrition or FNS related indicators part of M&E in intermediate results	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>"Education"</b>										
SA	Total	2	2	5	9	3	6	4	13	22
SSA	Total	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	2
SA	"nutrition", "undernutrition", "food and nutritional security" appears in title/keywords/abstract	0	2	3	5	0	0	5	5	10
SSA	"nutrition", "undernutrition", "food and nutritional security" appears in title/keywords/abstract	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1
SA	Nutrition or FNS related indicators part of M&E and results framework of project development objective	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	2	3
SSA	Nutrition or FNS related indicators part of M&E and results framework of project development objective	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SA	Nutrition or FNS related indicators part of M&E in intermediate results	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	2	3
SSA	Nutrition or FNS related indicators part of M&E in intermediate results	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>"Social protection"</b>										
SA	Total	1	0	1	2	2	1	1	4	6
SSA	Total	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	2
SA	"nutrition", "undernutrition", "food and nutritional security" appears in title/keywords/abstract	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	3	4
SSA	"nutrition", "undernutrition", "food and nutritional security" appears in title/keywords/abstract	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SA	Nutrition or FNS related indicators part of M&E and results framework of project development objective	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
SSA	Nutrition or FNS related indicators part of M&E and results framework of project development objective	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SA	Nutrition or FNS related indicators part of M&E in intermediate results	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
SSA	Nutrition or FNS related indicators part of M&E in intermediate results	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>"Gender"</b>										
SA	Total	1	0	1	2	2	0	0	2	4

SSA	Total	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
SA	"nutrition", "undernutrition", "food and nutritional security" appears in title/keywords/abstract	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	2
SSA	"nutrition", "undernutrition", "food and nutritional security" appears in title/keywords/abstract	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SA	Nutrition or FNS related indicators part of M&E and results framework of project development objective	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
SSA	Nutrition or FNS related indicators part of M&E and results framework of project development objective	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SA	Nutrition or FNS related indicators part of M&E in intermediate results	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SSA	Nutrition or FNS related indicators part of M&E in intermediate results	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

## Annex 10: Case study of SAFANSI activity within the Social Observatory Project in Bihar, India.

The largest single research activity funded by SAFANSI to date, at US\$1m, is the Social Observatory, which is a research and learning resource for the World Bank assisted a set of livelihoods projects in India including the National Rural Livelihoods Mission (NRLM and recently renamed Aajeevika). The NRLM operates in the poorest blocks of the 13 poorest states in India and is targeting 350 million poor people. The NRLM is the new Indian flagship programme on poverty reduction and is the single biggest poverty reduction programme in the world with a budget of over US\$8.5 billion including one billion from the World Bank.

The Social Observatory is working with livelihoods programmes in most of the implementing states including with JEEViKA<sup>87</sup>, the Bihar Rural Livelihoods Programme. JEEViKA started in 2006 and is now implementing a huge expansion to the state-level with substantial federal government funding through the NRLM. Bihar is one of the poorest Indian states with over 57% of its 2.2 million families living below the poverty line. A recent review of the Public Distribution System found that 70% of rural households reported having to skip meals because of poverty.

JEEViKA is working through women to reduce poverty and strengthen food security in these households by improving access to credit, encouraging stable livelihoods and engendering social change. It has a wide-ranging brief: activities include Bank Linkages (microfinance), Nutrition and Health, Disability, Food Security, Education Scholarships, Handicrafts, Sustainable Agriculture and Crop Intensification. It operates through Self-Help Groups (SHGs); each group has 10-15 women and groups are federated into village organizations (VO) 10-15 SHGs per VO. The programme is ambitious seeking to strengthen livelihoods and food security using a participatory approach that brings about sustainable improvement in lives and, more ambitiously, in the way in which communities engage with and benefit from the state services they are entitled to. FNS is integral to the programme concept.

The Social Observatory is a research and learning resource for the programme. It describes itself as providing ‘Data-driven learning-by-doing in a project that requires an enormous amount of contextual understanding, innovation, experimentation and learning from failure to be effective’. Because the research team are working closely with programme implementers there is recognition that the Social Observatory is an almost unique opportunity to bring about positive change in programme implementation thereby improving the lives of a very large number of the poorest people. Support to JEEViKA has five core components:

1. Quantitative evaluation (with randomized roll-out of the project)
2. Qualitative evaluation—in depth study of 10 villages over two years
3. Experiments to assess impact on psychological & sociological outcomes
4. Process evaluation to track implementation challenges in a rolling sample
5. Improving quality of the management information system (MIS) database with user-friendly dashboards

The research effort is already beginning to yield results even though it is still at an early stage.

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<sup>87</sup> Members of the Evaluation team visited the JEEVIKA offices in Patna on February 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> 2013.



- **Targeting strategy.** Within Bihar, the communities targeted in the JEEViKA programme are amongst the poorest but there was evidence that there were problems of exclusion errors in programme targeting, particularly relating to women from scheduled castes or tribes. An important contribution of the Social Observatory was to reconcile project records with the national census in order to identify where omissions were happening. This alignment of their MIS with the census was identified as a key step by the programme managers and gave them confidence that their targeting strategies were now good.
- **Analytical rigour.** The field visits allowed the team to engage extensively with the researchers employed by SAFANSI and discuss their methods in some detail. The project is using a range of analytical techniques including randomised control trials, detailed qualitative assessment of specific interventions and innovative behavioural research. The researchers are consciously seeking to provide 'best practice' in their selection of methods and attention to developments in the literature. A particular but important example of this rigor in the quantitative research was the effort made to address the absence of a proper baseline for evaluating impacts to date. The Social Observatory researchers carefully applied propensity score matching techniques to identify the most reliable basis for measuring impact of the JEEViKA program from 2008 to 2010. An impact evaluation of JEEViKA, that uses a randomized control trial method, is also under implementation<sup>88</sup>. The baseline for this impact evaluation was completed in 2011, and the end line will be implemented at the close of the project. This baseline was also used in subsequent analytical work, including the qualitative and behavioural research.

The qualitative research is designed to understand the social and political processes behind the changes through the programme and to identify the catalysts and challenges affecting such interventions. The research is open-ended and will focus on specific interventions through a series of studies that will assess how interventions actually function:

- Process of economic change
- Process of social change
- Process of political change
- Role of inequality in influencing change
- Gender Dynamics of the intervention and potential backlash by men

An important element of the research is cutting-edge behavioural studies –psychology-based field-experiments to assess women's:

- self-confidence
- ability to work with persons with higher social status
- bargaining power in the household
- access to social networks to obtain information
- the lenses through which they view the world

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<sup>88</sup> This impact evaluation covers 9000 households from 16 blocks and 7 districts

The research is poised to make a major contribution to our understanding of change processes and what types of interventions can trigger sustainable changes in behaviour and attitudes that are at the heart of improving FNS in S. Asia.

- **Integrated approach to analysis, advocacy and capacity building.** The researchers working in the Social Observatory in Bihar work closely with the monitoring and information system of JEEViKA. They take on a variety of topics looking at specific aspects of project implementation and promoting step-wise improvements through a 'learning by doing' approach. The Social Observatory team worked with JEEViKA to design monitoring formats, which are used to collect data for a variety of interventions. Formats have also been developed for Community Nutrition Care Centres. These formats are the first step in building a monitoring system that will provide systematic feedback on project implementation. When implemented, this system will provide regular feedback on implementation progress, and pinpoint problems as they arise. JEEViKA also intends to use mobile phones to monitor key indicators in real time, and identify problem areas in the near future.
- **Policy relevant generation of evidence.** The JEEViKA program is implemented through a large quasi-government programme and operationalized through partnerships with NGOs. Some of these – such as Pradan - have very substantial programmes in several states and learning has wide potential impact. One example of this is the adoption by many of them of the 'system of crop intensification' that has made significant difference to rice and wheat yields already in Bihar and is now being applied to other crops.

As a part of its activities, it is also engaging with delivery of services from other large government programmes. This means that data and evidence from the Social Observatory has the potential to help reform of these programmes. Indeed, through the engagement of their SHGs in the delivery of programmes such as the Public Distribution System and the Integrated Child Development Scheme, which are currently being piloted or are under discussion, JEEViKA is already building on research results generated through the Social Observatory. These interventions are obviously critical from an FNS perspective and offer some hope that fundamental improvements can become realistic for programmes that many had considered to be beyond redemption.

## Annex 11: SAFANSI and the Nutrition Action Framework in Afghanistan.

### Context

In a Subcontinent with high levels of stunting, underweight and wasting, as well as significant micronutrient deficiencies, Afghanistan has the unfortunate distinction of having the highest stunting levels in the world, with over half of the under 5 population being stunted. It is widely recognized by the Government and Development Partners that something needs to be urgently done, as the future development of the young population and country will be negatively affected by such high levels of stunting.

Because the country faces considerable challenges in terms of geography, gender, food and nutrition insecurity, social issues and security issues, a fresh approach was needed to address the high levels of maternal and young child undernutrition. At the same time, there is now technical consensus on a series of evidence based 'direct nutrition' interventions delivered either through the Nutrition or Health Sectors that will have a causal impact on nutrition outcomes. There is considerable consensus that there is a 'window of opportunity' in the first 1,000 days (from conception to two years of age) that needs to be targeted, and in societies such as Afghanistan, to adolescent girls. At the same time, there is increasing recognition on what the S.U.N. (Scaling-Up Nutrition) Movement calls 'nutrition-sensitive' interventions in other sectors, that will have nutrition outcomes, such as in Agriculture, Education, Women Affairs, Rural Development and Commerce and the Private Sector.

### SAFANSI's contribution

The SAFANSI contribution to the process in Afghanistan was to identify a strategy for the above multisectoral approach. Five international sector specialists were recruited to work closely with national counterparts in five Ministries and development partners to develop concept papers: the Ministries of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, of Commerce and Industry, of Education, of Public Health and of Rehabilitation and Rural Development. Each paper was presented in a public meeting of relevant stakeholders for further input, and then finalized as a chapter. A further consultant then edited and finalized a document that was then further opened to comment and discussion by national stakeholders and development partners. Although, it took almost a year to get traction on this in all the Ministries, the final result was strong national ownership of an impressive Nutrition Action Framework for the country.

Each of the Five Ministries has agreed to a series of implementable steps, within their sectoral responsibilities but with clearly identified nutrition outcomes (although only Health provided targets and indicators). The resultant Nutrition Action Framework was welcomed at the highest Government levels and overall leadership for tracking its implementation has been assumed by the Second Vice-President.

Besides the publication of a multi-sectoral framework by the five Ministries that will benefit the whole country, specific actions are underway in every sector with SAFANSI-supported technical assistance except Commerce and Industry (which was already overseeing the fortification efforts going in the country with support from GAIN and the Micronutrient Initiative). In total there are six follow-on SAFANSI-supported TA tasks with related papers under preparation. One will explore how to make the National Solidarity Programme, which covers the whole country, more nutrition-sensitive. Others include the Female Youth Employment Initiative with Education<sup>89</sup>, cash transfers and nutrition, child and infant feeding, iron/folic acid supplementation, and national livestock and horticultural efforts directed at nutrition outcomes. In part due to the higher profile which nutrition now has in Afghanistan as a result of the NAF process, the next phase of World Bank support for the Health Sector (which is combined

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<sup>89</sup> Although this activity will not be part of the SAFANSI portfolio.

with EU financing and will cover two thirds of the provinces in Afghanistan) has a strong focus on nutrition.

This significant outcome would have been unlikely to come to fruition without the flexible funding opportunities of the SAFANSI Initiative, certainly in the timeframe in which it was completed. The effort also required considerable convening power, starting with a meeting to discuss stunting with the Minister of Finance, through individual meetings with the most senior officials from each Ministry (either the Minister or Deputy Minister) to seek their support to be part of the NAF and culminating in a meeting with the Second Vice President to seek his support to lead the coordination of the implementation of the NAF. The World Bank was uniquely positioned to lead this effort.. Implementation of the NAF can be expected to have long-lasting and important impacts on the health and development of children, improved health and nutrition of mothers, and economic benefits to the whole country.

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## Annex 12: SAARC and Food and Nutrition Security

### **The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)**

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) established in 1985, is now an association of the eight countries of South Asia (including Afghanistan<sup>90</sup>, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka). The SAARC Secretariat is based in Kathmandu, Nepal, but SAARC centres with specific functions in support of regional cooperation are positioned across the region.

#### **SAARC and Food Security**

A Food Security Reserve for SAARC was established in 1988 with the objective of building a food buffer stock to reduce the risk of food insecurity especially following natural disasters. Although the reserve had limited success in addressing the food security concerns of the region, it resulted in the formation of a Food Security Bank in 2007, which acts as a food security reserve in normal times as well as emergencies and plans to foster inter-country partnerships and collaboration to resolve regional food shortages.

During the Fifteenth SAARC Summit held in Colombo in 2008, the eight member states resolved to ensure region-wide food security. Member states have taken up the issue of food security as a cross-cutting theme in their development plans. A training course on “Food Security Situation in South Asia: Problems and Prospects” was held in Islamabad in October 2012 for SAARC countries.<sup>91</sup>

#### **SAARC and Nutrition**

Nutrition was first raised as a concern through the Malé declaration at the ninth SAARC Summit in 1997. At this summit, the Heads of State or Government agreed to launch an Initiative on Nutrition aimed at promoting the availability of food of essential nutritional value to individual household and evolving policies for supplementing and fortifying essential micro-nutrients, deficiencies of which have affected the well being of the most vulnerable sections of the population, particularly women and children<sup>92</sup>.

The Second Meeting of the SAARC Health Ministers mandated the Technical Committee on Health and Population Activities (TCHPA) to prepare guidelines for Basic Healthcare Services, Nutrition, Safe Drinking Water, Sanitation and Hygiene particularly in rural and marginalised areas and amongst the worst affected households. The Third Meeting of the SAARC Health Ministers in Dhaka from 25-26 April 2006 reiterated this initiative. In addition, article VII of the SAARC Social Charter indicates that State Parties agree to extend all possible support to reduce low birth weight, malnutrition, anaemia amongst women and children, infant, child and maternal morbidity and mortality rates, through the intergenerational life cycle approach.

<sup>90</sup> Afghanistan only joined SAARC in 2007

<sup>91</sup> Mittal, Surabhi, Sethi, D., Food Security in South Asia: Issues and Opportunities, ICRIER Working Paper No. 240 (September 2009)

<sup>92</sup> SAARC, Statements and Declarations of SAARC: Summits of the Heads of State or Government (1985-2010)

A background note on nutrition<sup>93</sup> was then considered by the senior officials meeting preceding the Fourth Meeting of the SAARC Health Ministers in the Maldives from 10-11 April 2012. The note acknowledges that “nutrition has been a staggering problem in many South Asian countries for decades” with stunting (47%), underweight (42%) and wasting (19%) rates still more than double those in neighbouring East Asia and Pacific regions noting that it affects poor households disproportionately.

The background note recognises that the degree of the problem requires a need for a multi-sectoral approach and concerted action across the region. In particular it identifies salt iodisation, infant and young child feeding and polio vaccinations as requiring a regional approach. The note recommends that a regional strategy be developed in support of national strategies with the specific aim of reducing stunting through actions for nutrition which would benefit from cross border collaboration.

A consultant has been appointed to develop SAARC Regional Guidelines for Action on Nutrition. The consultant will assess the situation of nutrition in member countries, capture best practices in the region and obtain consensus on the way forward. The final guidelines will be submitted to the SAARC Health Ministers’ meeting in May 2013

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<sup>93</sup> Background Note on Scaling up Actions to Reduce Malnutrition for consideration by the Senior Officials Meeting preceding the Fourth Meeting of the SAARC Health Ministers (Maldives, 10-11 April 2012)

## Annex 13: SAFANSI Application Form

### SOUTH ASIA FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY INITIATIVE BANK-EXECUTED GRANT APPLICATION TEMPLATE

Task Team Leader: \_\_\_\_\_ Implementing Unit: \_\_\_\_\_

Proposal Title: \_\_\_\_\_

#### PART A: PROPOSAL

##### Grant Details:

<b>Proposed Grant Amount<sup>94</sup>:</b>			
<b>Proposed Grant Start Date<sup>95</sup>:</b>		<b>Proposed Grant End Date</b> <i>(no later than 3/31/2013)<sup>96</sup>:</i>	
<b>Linked Project Information<sup>97</sup></b>	<b>Project Code:</b>		
	<b>Project Name:</b>		
	<b>Project Closing Date<sup>3</sup>:</b>		

##### Clearances<sup>98</sup>:

<b>i. Sector Manager:</b>		<b>Date of Clearance:</b>	
<b>ii. TTL of Linked Projects</b> (if applicable) <sup>99</sup>		<b>Date of Clearance:</b>	
<b>iii. Confirmation of Principle of Additionality<sup>100</sup></b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Applicant	<input type="checkbox"/> TTL of Linked Project (if applicable)	

##### SAFANSI Pillars<sup>101</sup> (check as relevant)

<b>SAFANSI Pillar 1</b>	Better Evidence and Analysis	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>SAFANSI Pillar 2</b>	Improved Awareness and Advocacy	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>SAFANSI Pillar 3</b>	Strengthened Institutional Capacity	<input type="checkbox"/>

##### Sectors and Themes (check all relevant)

Agriculture & Rural Development	<input type="checkbox"/>	Economic Policy	<input type="checkbox"/>	Social Protection	<input type="checkbox"/>
Health, Nutrition, Population	<input type="checkbox"/>	Gender	<input type="checkbox"/>	Water & Sanitation	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (specify)	<input type="checkbox"/>	Other (specify)	<input type="checkbox"/>	Other (specify)	<input type="checkbox"/>

<sup>94</sup> See Application Instruction 4. regarding grant caps

<sup>95</sup> Please allow for up to 2 months from date of application submission for SAFANSI processing.

<sup>96</sup> See Application Instruction 2.A

<sup>97</sup> Please provide if available. See Application Instruction 2.A - 2.B

<sup>98</sup> See Application Instruction 3.A - 3.C

<sup>99</sup> See Application Instruction 3.C

<sup>100</sup> See Application Instruction 5.B

<sup>101</sup> See Application Instruction 1.D

**Country Coverage<sup>102</sup>** (check as relevant)

<input type="checkbox"/> Afghanistan	<input type="checkbox"/> Bangladesh	<input type="checkbox"/> Bhutan	<input type="checkbox"/> India
<input type="checkbox"/> Nepal	<input type="checkbox"/> Pakistan	<input type="checkbox"/> Sri Lanka	<input type="checkbox"/> SAR Regional

**PART B: PROJECT (“GRANT PROPOSAL”) DETAILS**

*(This part of application template has been adapted from the standard PCN format.)*

**1. Project/Grant Proposal Description:**

**a. Country Context**

**b. Sectoral/Institutional Context and Relationship to CAS**

**c. Description of relevant literature/similar activities conducted previously.**

**2. Project Development Objective (PDO):**

**a. Project Development Objective:**

**b. Links to the SAFANSI Strategy & SAFANSI Project Development Objectives<sup>103</sup>:**

**3. Project Concept<sup>104</sup> (Please Number/Name Components):**

**4. Implementation Arrangements<sup>105</sup>:**

**5. Project Risks<sup>106</sup> (Check and Explain)**

<input type="checkbox"/> Negligible/Low	<input type="checkbox"/> Moderate	<input type="checkbox"/> Substantial	<input type="checkbox"/> High
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**6. Innovative Features/Value Addition of this Project:**

**7. Final Deliverables Schedule<sup>107</sup>:**

Component	Deliverable	Description	Delivery Date

**8. Grant Monitoring<sup>108</sup>:**

**a. Intermediate Outputs/Milestone Dates:**

**b. Key Results<sup>109</sup>:**

<sup>102</sup> See Application Instructions 3.B

<sup>103</sup> Consult [SAFANSI Program Note](#)

<sup>104</sup> See Application Instruction 2.H

<sup>105</sup> See Application Instruction 2.D

<sup>106</sup> See Application Instruction 2.E

<sup>107</sup> See Application Instruction 2.G & 5.A. Add/Delete Rows as necessary.

<sup>108</sup> See Application Instruction 2.C



c. Project Link to [SAFANSI Results Indicators](#)<sup>110</sup>:

Relevant Project Component	Expected Results	Indicators	Target Value	Means of Verification	Date Expected
	<b>PDO:</b> Increased commitment of governments & development partners in SAR for more effective and integrated food security & nutrition actions	No. of Government planning or policy documents emphasizing an integrated and coordinated (cross sector) approach to FNS			
		No. of development partners' country strategies with an integrated, cross sector approach to FNS			
		No. of integrated FNS country programs/operations in place			
		[Make your own indicator.]			
	<b>Pillar 1:</b> Improved Evidence and Analysis on the most effective ways to achieve FNS outcomes in South Asia	No. of FNS-related case studies documented and disseminated using sex and other disaggregated data			
		No. of FNS-related Policy and Issues Briefs published and circulated.			
		No. of major public programs tested/evaluated for impact on FNS outcomes.			
		No. of programming guidance notes prepared			
		[Make your own indicator.]			
	<b>Pillar 2:</b> Improved Awareness of FNS-related challenges, and advocacy for action, amongst relevant stakeholders	No. of high-profile senior policy makers and opinion leaders sensitized/ "trained"			
		No. of regional, national and other prominent consultations and workshops organized			
		No. of advocacy events carried out			
		No. of changes relating to FNS agenda/policies enabled/supported			
		[Make your own indicator.]			
	<b>Pillar 3:</b> Strengthened regional and in-country	No. of country or regional policy networks/forums/platforms supported to advance the FNS agenda			
		No. of South-South training/capacity building visits to re-orient and improve			

<sup>109</sup> See Application Instruction 2.C.iii

<sup>110</sup> See Application Instruction 2.C.iv

	policy and programming capacity in relevant areas to achieve FNS outcomes	FNS programs			
		No. of service delivery mechanisms analyzed and identified for up-scaling			
		No. of community-level alliances for promoting FNS outcomes supported			
		[Make your own indicator.]			

**9. Budget <sup>111</sup>:**

- a. Confirmed Bank Budget and/or Co-Financing Sources:**
- b. Co-Financing Amount (including currency unit):**
- c. Fill out SAFANSI ([Form 1A](#)) and enclose when submitting this application**

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<sup>111</sup> See Application Instruction 6

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**Submit completed SAFANSI Grant Application Template (Form 1.0), SAFANSI Budget Template (Form 1A/B), and all relevant clearances to the SAFANSI Secretariat at:<sup>112</sup>**

**[Safansi@worldbank.org](mailto:Safansi@worldbank.org)**

**Copy**

**The subject line of all emails submitted as part of the application should read:**

**[“\[TTL’s name\]: SAFANSI Proposal: \[Country\]: \[Title of Proposal\]”](#)**

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<sup>112</sup> See Application Instruction 7

# **South Asia Food and Nutrition Security Initiative**

## **Grant Application**

### ***Instructions***

*If you have any questions, please consult these instructions, the SAFANSI [Operations Manual](#), the relevant Bank guidelines, or email the [SAFANSI Secretariat](#) for clarification.*

1. Please consult the [SAFANSI Program Note](#) for a full description of this initiative to determine if the task proposal is fully in line with SAFANSI's objectives and approaches. The program is outlined in brief below:
  - a. **SAFANSI Approach:** SAFANSI was formed to address the South Asian Enigma—how chronic malnutrition remains intractable despite high economic growth—by fostering cross-cutting actions that will lead to measurable improvements in food and nutrition security. To this end, SAFANSI seeks to enable stakeholder platforms that can operationalize cross-sectoral action and enable more effective domestic stewardship of the food and nutrition security agenda.
  - b. **SAFANSI Principles:** SAFANSI will base its actions on the principles identified as being crucial for program success, including: (a) promoting **political leadership and stewardship** for FNS outcomes; (b) ensuring **nutrition outcomes** are central to regional and country food security policy and programming; (c) promoting an inter-disciplinary, inter-ministerial and **cross-sectoral** approach; (d) building **strong partnership** among various players working on nutrition, safety nets, and food security; (e) adding value to **existing country and regional efforts**; (f) encouraging coherence and **coordination** among countries and among development agencies on necessary actions; (g) focusing on **actionable research** (what works and what does not); and (i) **prioritizing gender inequality and social exclusion** to tackle food and nutrition insecurity.
  - c. **SAFANSI Objective:** The ultimate objective of SAFANSI is to increase the commitment of governments and development partners to more effective and integrated food and nutrition-related policies and investments.
  - d. **SAFANSI Pillars:** SAFANSI has identified three pillars that form the core of the SAFANSI strategy. These actionable areas will be the supporting pillars of SAFANSI's objective. Although it is not necessary for grant applications to focus on all pillars, all financed activities must pertain to at least one of these three core pillars:
    - i. **Analysis:** improving evidence and analysis on the most effective ways to achieve FNS outcomes in SAR
    - ii. **Advocacy:** improving awareness of FNS-related challenges, and advocacy for action amongst relevant stakeholders
    - iii. **Capacity Building:** strengthening regional and in-country policy and programming capacity to achieve FNS outcomes
2. **Application Instructions:** Fill out the entire application where applicable and consult these instructions, the SAFANSI [Operations Manual](#), and any other relevant Bank guidelines.
  - a. Please note that the closing date of your proposal should be no later than 3/31/2013. Additionally, the project/AAA to which the Child Trust Fund is linked must be active for the duration of the Child TF, i.e. the project closing date cannot be before the grant closing date of the Child TF. The TTL of the Child TF is

responsible for any changes to the project/AAA to which the Child TF is linked, including following up with TACT and RM, and informing the SAFANSI Secretariat of such change. Any discrepancies arising from failing to follow these guidelines will require that the TTL of the Child TF be responsible for following up with the appropriate units (TACT, RM).

- b. All child trust funds must be linked to a project or AAA. The Sector must make the appropriate determination on whether to link the approved proposal to an existing task or create a new AIS upon approval of SAFANSI funds. If linking to an existing task the Sector is responsible for managing *additional* quality assurance processes if needed for the proposal, and approve of its quality. Quality assurance for new tasks should be managed through standard Bank procedures when creating an AIS. If linking to a task code for which the applicant is not the TTL, the applicant must first clear this with the concerned TTL to verify that s/he is willing to act as the official TTL of the child TF by submitting the Grant Funding Request (GFR) and periodic TF reports. If not linking the proposal to an existing task, you do not need to indicate the code at this stage of the application process. However, if the proposal is approved, you will need to provide this information in the GFR.
- c. SAFANSI is obligated to report on a number of indicators as listed in the table under [Question 8](#) of this application. Grant recipients will be required to track as many of these indicators as is relevant for their project<sup>113</sup>. Weak or insufficient indicators may cause delay/rejection in the processing of an otherwise worthy proposal. Although it is not necessary to have projects that track all SAFANSI indicators, please ensure that your proposal tracks **all relevant** SAFANSI indicators. Applications that use/track *Gender* disaggregated FNS data will be given favorable consideration. Please be sure to keep track of these indicators if/when moving to project implementation because they will be asked for in the bi-annual GRM report.
  - i. In order to complete the results table in question 8, place the relevant project component(s) next to the pillar and indicator which it addresses. The same project components may impact several indicators. Likewise an indicator can be impacted by more than one component. Please also fill out the expected numeric target value, the means of verification (i.e. deliverable, headcount, third party verification, etc.), and earliest date that the target value can be expected. Add clarification where necessary.
  - ii. The applicant is strongly encouraged to come up with project indicators specific to the application proposal/sectors of operation. These should be filled in the row under the pillar, which they most closely address. Add/delete relevant rows as necessary.
  - iii. Briefly describe the results framework for your proposal. Also indicate how the proposal would relate to SAFANSI objectives & indicators specified in Question 8.C)
  - iv. With reference to the standard SAFANSI Results Indicators, please indicate which of these are expected to be impacted by your project/grant proposal, and provide relevant details. If a deliverable from Question 7 is noted in a

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<sup>113</sup> SAFANSI also reserves the right to ask TTLs to track new indicators as developed by SAFANSI.

target value, then under “Means of verification” please specify the deliverable referred to in that table.

- d. Please describe all implementation arrangements planned and Key Partners involved. Please also include any arrangements for monitoring and quality assurance review of outputs for the completed activities. Please specify if there is Government Demand/Involvement in this activity.
  - e. Describe any significant risks or environmental/safeguard issues related to this Grant? Are there any potential conflicts of interest for the Bank/SAFANSI? How will these risks/conflicts be monitored and managed? If linked to a Bank lending project describe the extent to which these issues covered in the ISDS for the project supported by the Grant?
  - f. In order to complete this application, proposals must be accompanied by a complete SAFANSI Excel Budget Template: SAFANSI Form 1A for Bank-executed proposals and SAFANSI Form 1B for Recipient Executed proposals.
  - g. The “Deliverables” listed here should be Distinct and Final outputs (not processes). Draft deliverables and milestones in progress should be listed under Question 8.A. These should generally be Reports, Workshops (including workshop reports), Tool Kits, etc. These deliverables listed here should be accounted for in the Results Indicators Table for Question for 8.C, although the Results Indicators table is expected to have other indicators not specified in this Delivery Schedule section (i.e. # of participants at workshop, etc).
  - h. Describe the project, including a list of components and activities to be financed under each. Please be sure to distinguish clearly between SAFANSI financed activities and those activities financed by other financing sources, included project BB, if applicable.
3. **Clearances:** As part of this application, the proposal must obtain endorsement from:
- a. The Sector Manager must first confirm and approve the sectoral quality of the proposal, *prior to submission* to SAFANSI.
  - b. CMU or Regional Clearance (as is appropriate to the project code to which the GFR will be linked) must be obtained after SAFANSI approval but prior to GFR submission.
  - c. Linked Tasks: If the proposal will be linked/to an existing project or AAA, the TTL of the task (if different from TTL of the grant proposal) must send confirmation of his/her support for the proposal prior to submission to SAFANSI. The TTL of the child TF and the TTL of the project/task shall be held jointly responsible for delivery and quality of the proposal.
4. **Grant Caps:** Normally SAFANSI grants under the regular program typically range from US \$50,000 to US \$250,000. Under exceptional circumstances and after prior clearance by the SAFANSI Secretariat, a grant proposal of more than US \$250,000 may be submitted for consideration. For grant that exceed the ceiling amount, SAFANSI Secretariat may request the Review Committee to verify the validity and viability of proposed activities and that their costing follows a disciplined process.

5. **Bank Procedures:** All proposals funded from the South Asia Food and Nutrition Security Initiative Trust Fund are subject to standard World Bank policies and procedures per OP/BP 14.40 – Trust Funds and VPU guidelines. AAA including Economic and Sector Work and non-lending TA should follow standard Bank procedures and VPU guidelines for AAA.

a. **Quality Assurance:** Projects/activities financed under SAFANSI are subject to the same quality assurance mechanisms as normal IDA operations and AAA whereby the Task Team Leaders and Sector Managers are ultimately responsible for the quality of funded projects and the use of resources for their intended purposes. Operations financed by SAFANSI should be processed under the relevant Bank operational policies and internal Bank guidelines will apply. The TTL will be responsible for ensuring that the evidence of quality assurance (i.e. Minutes of the Concept Note review and Minutes of the AAA report review meeting) is presented to SAFANSI immediately after they become available.

b. **Principle of Additionality:** In order to achieve a genuine impact, the appropriations of these approved funds may not replace BB or other equivalent structural expenditure by the Bank. In more concrete terms, SAFANSI's Principle of Additionality, states that if the proposed activity is linked to ongoing Bank work (i.e. if the proposed activity is not a completely new and independent activity), then assistance from SAFANSI can only be a complementary resource contributing to the financing of a given task in order to scale up the project either by size, content or geographic scope. SAFANSI TTLs must guarantee additional activities (and not merely substitute BB funds), which lead to an added value that otherwise would not have been achieved without the SAFANSI funding. This means in general that the project must meet one of these criteria: (i) the project would not proceed without support from SAFANSI; (ii) the project will be allowed to proceed more quickly; or (iii) the project will proceed at a higher level of quality. The applicants must confirm that one of these criteria is met. Furthermore, from criterion (iii) the assurance of a higher degree of "quality" comes also another principle, regarding the value for money spent in the project: "quality" must be taken into account not only in regards to the results of the project, but also as regards the efficient use of the goods and services purchased for the project. Please confirm with your Sector Manager, TTL of linked projects (if applicable), and any other concerned parties that this activity satisfies the SAFANSI *Principle of Additionality*.

6. **Budget Guidelines:** Please ensure that your applications are accompanied by a budget proposal. These should be prepared in line with the Eligible Expenditure Categories for Bank-Executed grants as specified below and in the [Bank-Executed Budget Template \(Form 1A\)](#). Financing may be disbursed in tranches and will be communicated by SAFANSI upon proposal approval. The tranche disbursement schedule should be reflected in the planned transfer schedule section of the GFR.

**a. Eligible Bank-Executed Expenditure Categories**

- i. **Associated Overheads** (Postage, Telephone, Cables, Freight, Fax, Data Communications, Telex)
  - a. If this exceeds 5% of total requested amount, the team should provide justification for this higher than average costs.
- ii. **Consultant Fees** (STCs, ETCs, Lump Sum Consultant, Consultants' Contract)
  - a. Please specify if international or local consultant


- iii. **Contractual Services** (Advisory Management, Training External, Miscellaneous Service)
- iv. **Equipment Costs Lease**
  - a. Equipment *Purchase* is not an eligible expenditure.
- v. **Media & Workshop Costs** (Video Conference, Press Conf/Meetings, General Supplies, Contract Printing, Other Publishing Costs, Printing Supplies, Printing Service-Chargeback)
  - a. Generally should not exceed USD \$10,000 per workshop unless additional justification is made.
- vi. **Staff Costs** (World Bank Group Staff)
  - a. If this exceeds 20% of total requested amount, the team should provide justification for this higher than average costs.
- vii. **Travel expenses** (Airfare, Subsistence, Other; Applies to regular Bank staff and ETCs/STCs working on the task.)


7. **Submission:** All application materials **MUST** be submitted to the SAFANSI Service Account at [safansi@worldbank.org](mailto:safansi@worldbank.org) copying the SAFANSI Program Manager

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## Annex 14: Flow Chart of a SAFANSI Application






## Annex 15: SAFANSI Financial Grants Analysis

The mean value of SAFANSI grants amounts across 32 grant activities is: **US\$219,499**.

The corresponding **median** is **US\$175,000**. Given mean amount is larger than the median, this is a typical case of a **positively skewed distribution** of grant amounts, meaning thereby that a **large number of small grant amount activities** exist while a **few large grant activities** exist. This is clearly testified by figures 1.1 and 1.2 below).


- Distribution of grants by size (in US\$)



- Distribution of grants by size (in US\$)

Grant size (in US\$)	Distribution of grants by size (US\$)
<100K	8
100-200K	10
200-300K	7
300-400K	1
400-500K	3
500-600K	0
600-700K	0
700-800K	0
800-900K	0
900K-1 mn	0
>=1mn	1
Total	30


- SAFANSI: Rank order of grant activities (by size of grant)



Legend	
Afghanistan	
Bangladesh	
Bhutan	
India	
Nepal	
Pakistan	
Sri Lanka	
South Asia multi-country	
TF number	Grant value in US\$
TF012286	50,000
TF013556	61,000
TF011712	65,000

TF012285	75,000
TF013189	80,000
TF010794	90,000
TF011910	90,000
TF012245	100,000
TF099707	125,000
TF010274	135,000
TF012082	148,200
TF011469	159,000
TF012081	160,600
TF010381	162,212
TF098429	175,000
TF011848	185,200
TF099422	200,000
TF098748	200,000
TF012123	202,000
TF098925	229,538
TF011841	230,000
TF012122	250,000
TF012676	250,000
TF098874	270,000
TF098394	310,000
TF098873	430,000
TF097620	453,507
TF013549	479,225
TF011993	1,000,000

- Grant amount by country in US\$



Country	Grant amount in US\$	Per cent of total
Afghanistan	270000	4
Bangladesh	730000	12
Bhutan	148200	2
India	1660600	26
Pakistan	285200	5
Nepal	972000	15
Sri Lanka	65000	1
South Asia Region	2234482	35
Total	6365482	100

1.2 Figure 1.3 plots the grant amounts by SAFANSI countries. The figure is self-explanatory: **35% of the initiative's grants are attributed to pan-South Asia programmes which do not have a single country focus.** This is followed by **India, Nepal Bangladesh.** It should be noted that the figure above does not adjust for population or size of countries under study.

## REFERENCES

DFID (2012) *SAFANSI Trust Fund Portfolio for UK-Department for International Development*. London, UK.

## Annex 16: Analysis of SAFANSI Expenditure by the Three Pillars of “Analysis”, “Advocacy” and “Capacity Building”

### Introduction

- 1.1 The purpose of this annex is to estimate the allocation of SAFANSI’s financial expenditure according to its “three pillars”, and see if any one particular pillar is attracting a disproportionate share of resources.
- 1.2 By way of background, SAFANSI has been conceptualised on the basis of three pillars that form the core of its strategy. In SAFANSI’s design, these “actionable thrust areas” will be the supporting pillars of the programme’s objective. The “three pillars” of SAFANSI are analysis, advocacy, and capacity building (please refer to 0 below).

**Figure 1.1: The “three pillars” of SAFANSI**



Source: SAFANSI Annual Report 2012

1.3 There is nothing in the SAFANSI documentation to say that any one particular pillar should have priority over the other, or that there is any predetermined share of expenditure expected to go to any or all of the three pillars. It is also clear from the documentation that each of the pillars support and complement each other, and that there would therefore be an overlap between the three.

1.4 How budgets are allocated in practice says a lot about the ‘real’ priorities and strategic directions of any programme. Ideally, there is some broad alignment between the stated areas of focus, and a programme’s budget allocation. It is therefore useful to examine – to the extent possible – which, if any, of the three pillars attracts most resources under SAFANSI; if there are any pillars that would seem to have a noticeably low share of funding; and if so why.

1.5 There are clearly important limitations to this exercise. As noted, there was no *a priori* target set for allocations to the pillars so it is not reasonable to impose fixed shares retrospectively. Much of the SAFANSI programming is also demand-driven, so higher shares to certain pillars may simply reflect perceived needs. There is also a high degree of subjectivity in aligning any particular activity against any particular pillar, or group of pillars. Having said that, the Evaluation Team considered it worthwhile to make some effort at

estimating the broad trends in financial allocations to see if there were any glaring disconnects between the stated importance of the three pillars, and the actual budget allocations.

## Methodology


2.1 The process followed for classifying grant activities by pillar was based on descriptions of grant activities as mentioned in the SAFANSI Annual Report 2012.

2.2 The evaluator read the grant descriptions closely and, on that basis, estimated their classification under one or more of the three pillars. Seven different categories were used for this exercise: analysis, advocacy; capacity building; analysis & advocacy; analysis & capacity building; advocacy & capacity building; and a final category for grant activities which combine all three pillars. A residual category included activities that—for the lack of a clear description or a description at all—could not be classified under any of the seven categories.

## Analysis

3.1 Applying the above methodology on SAFANSI Annual Report 2012, we can see that out of a total of 31 grant activities/areas identified, 15 described their main focus as the *all three* pillar. In fact, this pillar far outscored the remaining 6 single and grouped pillars. On the lower end, *capacity building* and *advocacy & capacity building* pillars had no activities classified under them, while we were unable to classify 1 grant activity (TF013556). (Please refer to 0 below).

**Figure 1.2: SAFANSI grant activities by "pillars"**




Source: SAFANSI Annual Report 2012; OPM's own analysis

3.2 We then plotted the total financial expenditure (i.e. grant amount per activity, in US\$) incurred on activities classified under each pillar. It was not surprising to see that the *all three* pillar again assumes 65% of the total financial expenditure. However, the *analysis* pillar (which was higher in terms of number of grant activities than analysis and capacity building)



is outscored by the combined *analysis & capacity building*. This means that though there are more number of activities under *analysis*, these are of lower grant value than *analysis & capacity building*. Approximately 1% of the financial expenditures on grant activities could not be classified under any pillar (Please see 0 below).

**Figure 1.3: SAFANSI financial expenditure by "pillars"**



Source: SAFANSI Annual Report 2012; OPM's own analysis

Tables 1.1 and 1.2 below lay out the data (both summary and detailed) underlying the graphs above.

**Table 1.1: Summary of SAFANSI financial expenditure by pillar—Part 1**

Pillar	No. of activities	Grant amount (US\$)	% of total expenditure
Analysis	5	340,000	6
Advocacy	2	155,000	3
Capacity building	0	0	0
Analysis & advocacy	6	916,000	15
Advocacy & capacity building	0	0	0
Analysis & capacity building	2	653,507	11
All three	15	3,929,975	65
Difficult to classify	1	61,000	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>6,055,482</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: SAFANSI Annual Report 2012; OPM's own analysis

**Table 1.2: Summary of SAFANSI financial expenditure by grant activity and pillar—Part 2**

TF number	Activity	Grant Amount in \$US	Analysis	Advocacy	Capacity Building	Not possible to classify
<b>Afghanistan</b>						
TF098874	Afghanistan South Asia Food & Nutritional Security Initiative (SAFANSI) Program	270,000	✓	✓	✓	
<b>Bangladesh</b>						
TF098429	Multisectoral Simulation Tool for Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) in Bangladesh	175,000	✓	✓	✓	
TF099422	Impact Assessment of Bangladesh CCT Pilot through Local Governments for Human Development	200,000	✓		✓	
TF011841	P131982 SAFANSI: South Asia Food & Nutrition Security Initiative	230,000	✓	✓		
TF099707	Modifiable Adequacy of Food, Health and Care to Nutrition Outcomes	125,000	✓	✓		

Bhutan			Analysis	Advocacy	Capacity Building	Not possible to classify
TF012082	Bhutan National Nutrition Assessment & Capacity Building	148,200	✓	✓	✓	
India						
TF011993	Social Observatory for the National Rural Livelihoods Mission: Food Security & Nutrition Focus	1,000,000	✓	✓	✓	
TF012081	Multi-sectoral Nutrition Actions in Bihar	160,600	✓	✓	✓	
TF012122	Improving Food Security in Tribal & Conflict-affected Areas	250,000	✓	✓	✓	
TF012676	Community Managed Food & Nutrition Security Initiatives in High Poverty States	250,000	✓	✓	✓	
TF014041	Strengthening Agricultural Education and Policy Making for Food and Nutrition Security in India	Not known	✓	✓	✓	

Pakistan			Analysis	Advocacy	Capacity Building	Not possible to classify
TF099154	Pakistan: Engaging Planning Commission, Agriculture and Water Ministries on Food	0	✓	✓		
TF012245	Pakistan South Asia Food & Nutrition Security Initiative (SAFANSI) Program	100,000	✓	✓	✓	
TF011848	Child Nutritional Outcomes and Community Based Health Service Provision: Evidence from a Randomised Field Experiment in Rural Pakistan	185,200	✓	✓	✓	
Nepal						
TF010274	Food & Nutrition Security Thematic Report (NLSS)	135,000	✓			
TF012123	Nepal: Evaluating the Nutritional Impacts of Food Security & Nutrition Program	202,000	✓	✓		
TF012285	Community-based behaviour Change for Nutrition Improvement	75,000	✓			
TF012286	Nepal - Review of Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) Program	50,000	✓			

Nepal			Analysis	Advocacy	Capacity Building	Not possible to classify
TF013189	District Profiles of Determinants of Food Insecurity & Malnutrition in Nepal	80,000	✓			
TF098873	Nepal South Asia Food & Nutrition Security Initiative (SAFANSI) Program	430,000	✓	✓	✓	
Sri Lanka						
TF011712	Visualising the 'Invisible' Epidemic of Undernutrition in Sri Lanka	65,000		✓		
South Asia Region						
TF010381	Mapping of Gender & Nutrition in South Asia	162,212	✓	✓	✓	
TF010794	Developing a Framework for Applied Political Economy Analysis of Food & Nutrition	90,000	✓	✓	✓	

South Asia Region			Analysis	Advocacy	Capacity Building	Not possible to classify
TF011469	South Asia Food & Nutrition Security Initiative: Linking Measures of Food Security with Nutritional Outcomes in South Asia	159,000	✓	✓		
TF011910	Global Conference on Women in Agriculture	90,000		✓		
TF013549	Strengthening Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) Capacity in South Asia Region	479,225	✓	✓	✓	
TF013556	Supervision of Grant to Breastfeeding Promotion Network of India	61,000				✓
TF097620	Evaluating and Learning from Innovative Community Approaches to Improving Child	453,507	✓		✓	
TF098748	Global Policy Consultation & International Conference on Leveraging Agriculture	200,000	✓	✓		

TF099039	Cross-sectoral Approaches to Food Security and Nutrition	Not known	✓			
TF098394	South Asia Food & Nutrition Security Initiative TF Administration	310,000	Not applicable			
TF098925	South Asia Food & Nutrition Security Initiative (SAFANSI) Program Management	229,538	✓	✓	✓	
<b>Total</b>		<b>6,055,482</b>	23	26	18	1

Note: Unless otherwise stated, grant projects are "active" and "bank executed"

Source: SAFANSI Annual Report 2012; OPM's own analysis

## Annex 17: Glossary and Definitions

### Food and Nutrition Security definitions used in SAFANSI evaluation document

These have somewhat bedevilled the sector by either being confusing, changing over time, or unreliable, but there is increasing harmonization. As has been noted e.g. by Maxwell and Smith (1992) food security is a flexible concept as reflected in the many attempts at definition in research and policy usage. Even a decade ago, they note that there were about 200 definitions in published writings. Now that Food and nutrition security are increasingly being used together, the definition has become perhaps more complex but there is a certain understanding that 'food security' does not necessarily mean 'nutrition security' e.g. the consumption within households in most South Asian countries disadvantages the female (FSNSP 2011). Consequently, it is better to use 'food and nutrition security' as most agencies and countries involved in the S.U.N. process are increasingly doing.

**BMI (body mass index):** BMI is the most commonly used indicator to measure undernutrition and overnutrition in adults and adolescents. Body Mass Index (BMI = weight in Kg divided by height in metres squared) greater than 25 defines overweight, and for obesity >30. It is now apparent that different ethnicities have different percent body fat at the same BMI which is of considerable significance in South Asian countries and leaves adults at greater risk of developing NCDs such as hypertension and type 2 diabetes.

**Food security:** The World Food Summit in 1996 defined food security as the situation 'when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for a an active and healthy life' (FAO 1996). At the subsequent World Food Summit of Food Security in 2009, this definition was reconfirmed, and the concept was extended and specified by adding that the 'four pillars of food security are availability, access, utilization, and stability' and stated that 'the nutritional dimension is integral to the concept' (FAO 2009).

**Food and nutrition security:** Food and nutrition security should reflect both the importance of sustainability through time and the household level of scale (rather than population level): 'A household is food secure when it has access to the food needed for a healthy life for all its members (adequate in terms of quality, quantity, safety, and cultural acceptability), and when it is not at undue risk of losing such access' (cited in Hammond & Dubé 2012).

**Hunger** refers to "the discomfort associated with lack of food. FAO defines food deprivation, or '**undernourishment**', specifically as the consumption of fewer than about 1,800 kilocalories a day – the minimum that most people require to live a healthy and productive life" (IFPRI 2012). The measurement of 'undernourishment' is quite imprecise because of methodological issues used in its calculation but is useful for ranking countries. IFPRI, and others, use the term 'hunger' as that based on the Global Hunger Index (GHI), which is calculated on the proportion of undernourished children, proportion of underweight children, and child mortality rate' (IFPRI 2012).

**Low birthweight (LBW):** Low birth weight (LBW) - Any child born under 2.5g- and indicates that the mother is severely malnourished (quantity and quality of food) and/or in poor health. It represents a risk factor for future undernutrition for the child. Usually refers to intrauterine growth retardation due to inadequate antenatal nutrition of the mother, including micronutrient malnutrition. It includes purposefully 'eating down' to achieve a smaller baby with presumed easier and safer delivery in disadvantaged environments. Due to difficulties in



diagnosis outside of larger hospitals, also usually includes premature babies who also usually have low birthweight.

**Malnutrition** is particularly used for **the double burden of malnutrition** meaning the co-existence of **undernutrition** and **overnutrition** (increasingly in the same communities, and increasingly affecting disadvantaged populations). Low intakes of micronutrients may also be part of malnutrition and the term '**micronutrient malnutrition**' is often used, although uncommonly occurs solely by itself and may also occur with overnutrition. Confusingly **malnutrition** is often used to mean undernutrition, largely for historical reasons, and it would be preferable if the correct usage makes it clear whether it is undernutrition, or overnutrition, or both, that is meant. Even in 1976, malnutrition was defined as 'a chronic condition which is a consequence of over- or under-consumption of any or several essential macro- or micronutrients relative to the individual physiological and pathological requirements. Four forms of malnutrition can be distinguished: Protein-energy (or protein-calorie) malnutrition, micronutrient malnutrition (that is, dietary mineral and vitamin deficiencies), secondary malnutrition (that is, malnutrition primarily caused by illness or disease), and overnutrition' (Mayer 1976).

**Micronutrient malnutrition** is a term used for one or more vitamin and mineral/trace element deficiency of public health significance. The commonest are iron, iodine and vitamin D, along with folate, zinc, vitamin D and maybe vitamin B12.

**Nutrition security** exists when 'food security is combined with a sanitary environment, adequate health services and proper care and feeding practices to ensure a healthy life for all household members' (WHO 2010).

**Nutrition surveillance systems** are data collection systems which, on an on-going basis, systematically collect, analyze, interpret and disseminate data on food- and nutrition-related outcomes using anthropometric indices for use in the planning, implementation and evaluation of nutrition action programmes (WHO 2010).

**One thousand Days (1,000):** Identified as an advocacy approach after the 2008 Lancet Series on Maternal and Young Child Undernutrition identified the importance of intrauterine growth and the first two years of life in the development of stunting. It is thus critical to deliver interventions before pregnancy, during pregnancy or in the first two years of a child's life. <http://www.thousanddays.org/>

**Overweight/obesity:** Children under 5 years of age are considered overweight when their weight-for-height >2SD of WHO child growth standards, and obese when >3SD. For adults, Body Mass Index (BMI = weight in kilograms divided by height in metres squared) greater than 25 and for obesity >30.

**REACH: ending child hunger and undernutrition.** One of the development partners of SAFANSI it is a joint UN efforts (Renewed Efforts Against Child Hunger), focusing at the Country-level and encouraging evidence-based and multisectoral interventions that will have an impact on undernutrition. Coordinates UN actions (FAO, UNICEF, WFP, WHO) with Governments at country level implementation. <http://www.reachpartnership.org/>

**SD (standard deviation):** A statistical term used in the definitions of stunting, underweight and wasting where -2SD usually signifies the moderate condition, and -3SD, a severe state. WHO then has prevalence levels based on the levels of undernutrition found using these measures at which there is a public health problem and therefore urgency of action.

**Stunting:** Height-for-Age  $<-2SD$  (as above) according to the WHO child growth standards median. The WHO cut-off for a public health problem is when  $\geq 20\%$  of the under five year old population affected. Also known as low height-for-age, chronic malnutrition or growth retardation and reflects also general deprivation and poverty.

**S.U.N. 'Scaling up Nutrition'** is a global movement that is a coalition of governments, donors, civil society, business and UN organizations fostering growing commitment amongst country governments and development partners. In the South Asia region Bangladesh and Nepal are members. SUN was launched in 2010, with the adoption of the SUN Framework and Road Map, and has grown rapidly. The SUN Strategy 2012-2015 and accompanying revised Road Map 2012 establish a three-year plan to significantly reduce under-nutrition in participating countries. In September 2012 the SUN Movement was comprised of 30 SUN countries and continues to expand. It is a country-driven Movement and builds on the progress achieved in country. An important part of its approach is the window of opportunity of the first 1,000 days. Its recommended implementation strategy is two-pronged:

1. Rapid scaling up of **specific nutrition interventions of proven effectiveness**; and
2. Implementation of sectoral strategies that are **nutrition-sensitive** (i.e. responsive to the nutritional needs of individuals, households and societies).

<http://scalingupnutrition.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/SUN-MOVEMENT-STRATEGY-ENG.pdf>

**Undernutrition** can apply to anyone but is used most often with children under 5 years of age where it is defined by height and weight and sometimes (more for screening) mid-upper arm circumference. Properly nourished women of reproductive age are critical both for their own health and well-being but also for the health, well-being and development of their children. Undernutrition for women is usually defined as  $BMI < 18.5$ . Undernutrition is further categorized by **stunting, wasting, and underweight**. **Undernutrition** has been further defined as going 'beyond calories and signifies deficiencies in any or all of the following: [dietary] energy, protein, or essential vitamins and minerals...and is the result of inadequate intake of food in terms of either quantity or quality, or poor utilization of nutrients due to infections or other illnesses, inadequate access to health services, or a combination of these factors' (IFPRI 2012). Importantly, in terms of multisectoral approaches to addressing food and nutrition insecurity it was noted by IFPRI (2012) that these 'factors are in turn caused by household food insecurity; inadequate maternal health or childcare practices; or inadequate access to health services, safe water, and sanitation (IFPRI 2012).

**Underweight:** Weight-for-Age  $<-2SD$  or low weight-for-age. Severe is  $<-3SD$ . Most commonly used as weight is commonly measured in clinics but height is often not measured. Nevertheless stunting (height-for-age) is now considered the preferable indicator as reflects the child's social and ill-health environment, reflects 'chronic undernutrition' and is a better predictor of negative outcomes for the child. It is also the indicator for the third target of MDG 1 to reduce underweight by half (WHO).

**Wasting:** Weight-for-Height  $<-2SD$  (moderate) and  $<-3SD$  (severe). This is the low weight-for-height ('acute malnutrition') seen in disasters and famines. Wasting describes a substantial weight loss in children, usually due to acute starvation and/or severe disease. The same causes are responsible for low mid up-per arm circumference (**MUAC**) which is often used as a screening tool for intervention of **SAM (severe acute malnutrition)** which is life threatening. Due to the simpler and faster assessment procedure, this indicator is a useful marker/screening indicator for under nutrition in emergency situations.

**W.H.O.** (World Health Organization of the United Nations System). The Sixty-fifth World Health Assembly endorsed a resolution in which Member States endorsed a **comprehensive implementation plan on maternal, infant and young child nutrition**, identifying targets and priority actions in health and other sectors, a time frame and indicators for monitoring. Other UN Agencies with important supporting roles to countries in addressing food and nutrition security are **FAO, UNICEF and WFP**.

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## Annex 18: India's Budgetary Commitment to Tackling Under-Nutrition

A substantial evidence base asserts that in the past decade children's malnutrition rates have been persistently high. To illustrate, the national averages of child anthropometric indicators from the National Family Health Surveys (NFHS) conducted in 2005-06 (NFHS-3) showed that almost 40% of children under the age of three are stunted and 50% are underweight. Malnutrition levels in India are considerably higher than those in many sub-Saharan African countries (HDR, 2010).

The Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) is one of world's largest community based outreach programmes designed to address the multidimensional causes of under-nutrition. Currently it reaches out to approximately 80 million young children from three to six years age group, 37 million young children under three years of age and 18 million pregnant and lactating mothers through 1.3 million operational Anganwadi centres. ICDS centres provide monthly dry rations to pregnant women, lactating mothers and child under three years of age and pre-school education and daily hot cooked meals for children in the age group three- six years. Enhancing the overall impact of ICDS on child outcomes is a major challenge due to its severe constraints in flexibility of monetary resources and availability and quality of human resources.

Restructuring and strengthening of ICDS was recommended as a key priority in India's last five year plan by the Planning commission, the Prime Minister's National Council for India's Nutrition Challenges, the Draft comprehensive ICDS Restructuring proposal by Inter-Ministerial Group and the National Advisory Council.

However, whilst there is increasing political and policy acknowledgements towards tackling the severe child malnutrition problem there is lack of funds for the program and variable effectiveness of fund utilisation.

ICDS fund outlay during years 2002- 2007 (10<sup>th</sup> five year plan period) was approximately Rs. 104 billion. During the eleventh five year, outlay recommended for ICDS during the period 2007-2012 rose to Rs. 424 billion. However, the total actual budget allocation made during the period was only Rs. 393 billion. Though the increase in hike is more than three and half times from 10<sup>th</sup> to 11<sup>th</sup> five year plan period, it was not adequate to meet the increase in program needs due to increase in number of centres to achieve universalization, high rate of inflation and salary increase of Anganwadi staff. Even with the salary hike, Anganwadi workers earn only one third of national minimum wages requirements.

The Current five year plan (12<sup>th</sup> five year plan) for the period 2012-2017 has allocated Rs. 1257 billion for ICDS. However, the last annual union budget (2012-2013) had allocated Rs. 158.5 billion and claimed an increase of 58 per cent over budgetary allocation from the previous year -Rs. 103.3 billion (which was also the last year of 11<sup>th</sup> plan). But only in 2012-2013 the government has actually started paying the increased wages for Anganwadi workers.

The latest annual budget has only allocated an increase of Rs. 18.5 billion from the previous year and it's not clear that will that have any room to accommodate inflation and improved expenditure towards non-wage bill of ICDS program. The latest budget has announced Rs. 3 billion allocation for a multi-sectoral programme that was announced last year, but a detailed implementation plan is awaited.

Moreover, in states where the food grains for supplementary nutrition are procured from open market by Angwandi workers suffer the food price inflation the most. Until today, in many states the market price of food grains is almost double than the stipulated food grain price at which monthly funds has been allocated for the purchase food grains by Angwandi workers. In a few states where the grains are procured through Public Distribution System outlets, supplementary nutrition distribution suffers delays in availability of grains, poor quality of grains etc.

Though levels of fund utilisation under the ICDS are high, the quality of utilisation is variable, because of the complex cost and responsibility sharing arrangements between state and central governments, deficiencies in planning, bottlenecks in financial reporting and fund utilisation and systemic weakness in implantation, planning, monitoring, reporting and training.

## Annex 19: Concordance between the specific questions raised in the TORs and the response in the main Evaluation Report

The purpose of this concordance is to show where each of the specific questions raised in the TORs have been addressed in the main Evaluation Report. The text below is a direct extract from the TORs. Beside each major theme or specific question is the chapter or paragraph that mainly addresses that issue, highlighted in red text.

**i. Relevance** (*Extent to which the aid activity is consonant with and relevant to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donors*) Chapter Three

- To what extent were SAFANSI objectives and approaches framed to be relevant to the initial and developing operating context (political, social (including gender), environmental and economic)? Chapter Three
- Is the intervention (theory of change) consistent with donors' aims and objectives and existing evidence of 'what works' in policy influencing?<sup>114</sup> Chapter Two and Annex 5
- Are the original goals and scope still appropriate? Chapter Three and especially paragraph 3.9
- Are the original expected results well-defined, discrete and attainable? Chapter Two and especially paragraphs 2.23 onwards.

**ii. Effectiveness** (*A measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives*).Chapter Four

- How well is the theory of change working? Do any further process issues need to be considered? Chapter Two and especially paragraphs 2.5 onwards
- How appropriate were the programme management and governance arrangements, given the nature of the SAFANSI approach? Chapter Six
- Have the programme's governance structures worked well, and facilitated the achievement of objectives? Chapter Six
- Have the outputs been of good quality? <sup>115</sup> Chapter Five and Chapter Six, and Annex 11
- Given this evaluation is taking place prior to the completion of the programme, what are other aspects of SAFANSI processes and outputs should be assessed and noted? Chapter 7
- How successful has SAFANSI been at influencing and framing debates, through: choice of tasks, engagement strategies; the timing and approach to communications; use of

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<sup>114</sup> The Team should also refer to DFID's draft How to Note 'Monitoring, Evaluating and Learning from Influencing Efforts'.

<sup>115</sup> For each output a set of a specific questions should be answered for example Under the evidence and analysis output:

- the range and selection of outputs produced
- process used in introducing the outputs (supply versus demand driven)
- success in introducing and implementing outputs
- reasons for non-adoption of some outputs
- Decision-maker use of the information generated by outputs (timeliness, quality, linking with decision-making processes etc)



political opportunities based on political economy analysis (PEA)? [Chapter 4, Annex 5, and Annex 9 – 12 inclusive.](#)

- How effective is the current log-frame as a tool to: measure results (quantitative and qualitative) at all levels; make explicit the assumptions underpinning the programme; and communicate ambition? [Chapter Two](#)
- To what extent has SAFANSI influenced / evaluated major public programmes? How has SAFANSI influenced these programmes? [Chapter 4 and Annex 9 – 12 inclusive](#)

**iii. Efficiency** (*Measures the outputs and outcomes -- qualitative and quantitative -- in relation to the inputs. It is an economic term which signifies that the aid uses the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results*) [Chapter Five](#)

- Has the allocation of funds across different countries and activities been efficient? [Chapter Five](#)
- Does the project represent good value for money<sup>116</sup>? To what extent has it been able to leverage more resources for FNS? [Chapter Five](#)
- Could outcomes have been achieved in a more cost effective manner? [Chapter Five](#)
- Is the multi-donor trust fund an appropriate size of investment? Looking ahead, what size should it be to respond efficiently to demand? What level of investment should be made through other instruments and channels (e.g. civil society, other regional/ multi-country and country)<sup>117</sup>? [Chapter Five](#)
- Should the scope of investment in SAFANSI be broadened to achieve more impact? [Chapter Seven](#)

**iv. Impact** (*The positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended*)

- How far has SAFANSI progressed down the results chain envisaged in the theory of change and captured in the log frame? [Chapter Two](#)
- Where has SAFANSI added value to existing processes? [Chapter Two, Four and Seven](#)
- How have the donors added value? How have donors' bilateral funding on nutrition activities been complementary and/ or added value? [Chapter Four](#)
- To what extent has SAFANSI directly contributed to changes in national and donor policy, plans, interventions and programmes? How has this contribution been measured? [Chapter Four especially paragraph 4.10 onwards.](#)
- Is it at all possible to directly attribute any changes in child nutrition indicators (at the 'impact level') to SAFANSI given the timeframe that SAFANSI has been operating? [Paragraph 1.7; paragraph 2.23 onwards, and especially paragraph 2.28](#)

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<sup>116</sup> Defining value for money in a project of this kind is inherently difficult. It may be useful to look at a range of different measures, during upon DFID's "How to" note on Cost-Benefit Analysis.

<sup>117</sup> Taking into account other regional programmes such as: DFID's research programme LANSA (Leveraging Agriculture for Nutrition in South Asia) and the EC's regional Maternal and Young Child Nutrition Security in Asia programme

- To what extent is it appropriate for the original aim of supporting implementation within FNS programmes to be diluted to the 'preparation' of programmes? **Chapter Two (but it is also not very clear what this question is actually asking)**

**v. Sustainability** (*Concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. Interventions need to be environmentally and institutionally as well as financially sustainable. Any assessment of sustainability should cover the concept of ownership*) **Chapter Six**

- The evaluation could usefully consider:
  - o Sustainability of interest (including awareness and knowledge) in FNS. **Chapter Four**
  - o Sustainability of commitment to a multi-sectoral approach to FNS among governments and development partners<sup>118</sup> **Chapter Four**
  - o Whether SAFANSI as currently conceived and implemented is appropriate to emerging challenges in FNS in S Asia **Chapter Three**
- To what extent will the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) be able to contribute to Domestic Stewardship Platforms without donor support? **Chapter Three and Chapter Seven**

**vi. Coverage** (*Which groups are included in/excluded from a programme, and the differential impact on those included and excluded. Related concepts include equity (including gender equity and disability and social exclusion)*) **Chapter Four, Six and Seven**

- To what extent has SAFANSI engaged with relevant stakeholders, fora and processes? **Chapter Four, Six and Seven**
- To what extent has SAFANSI directly addressed gender, discrimination and extreme poverty concerns in the choice of partners and programmes to support? **Chapter Six**
- 
- Which additional stakeholders should be considered for a possible second phase? **Chapter Seven**

**vii. Coherence and Coordination** (*Refers to the need to assess other policies and programmes which affect the intervention being evaluated, for example agricultural and climate change policies and programmes, as well as the intervention or policy itself*) **Chapter Two, Three and Six**

- Has SAFANSI taken sufficient note of wider policies and programmes that affect FNS interventions (including those of both recipient and donor countries)? **Chapter Four and Six**
- Is SAFANSI engaging in the right way with the right stakeholders? **Chapter Four, Six and Seven**
- A quick assessment of harmonization with other aid agencies, and alignment with country priorities and systems (including the SUN -Scaling up Nutrition - movement and the US's 'Feed the Future'). **Chapter Six**

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<sup>118</sup> For example: Mainstreaming multi-sectoral FNS into development partner plans, budgets, and operations; Changes in policy as a result of programme activities



- What role can Domestic Stewardship Platforms play? Chapter Two and especially paragraph 2.13