

Helpdesk Research Report

Social inclusion in productive safety net programmes

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Question

What has worked in achieving social inclusion in labour-intensive productive safety net programmes in the agricultural sector? Consider analysis, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Where possible, draw on evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa.

Contents

1. Overview
2. Evidence base
3. Cross-cutting thematic findings
4. Group-specific interventions
5. Country case study: Ethiopia
6. References

1. Overview

Productive safety nets (PSNs, also described as 'public works', 'cash-for-work' or 'food-for-work') exist across all regions, with South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa being dominant (Subbarao et al. 2012, 40). This report focuses on productive safety nets programmes (PSNPs) in Sub-Saharan Africa, in the agricultural sector, whose main goal is generating employment through labour-intensive works. It examines an issue that has been less studied in PSNPs: what has worked and failed to work to achieve social inclusion?

Evidence is scattered and quite limited, with a heavy slant towards Ethiopia as a case study due to its well-established PSNP. Overall, multi-country literature offers the following findings:

- **Lessons for projects, programmes and policies:**
 - **Community participation:** beneficiary outreach is a key activity. Participatory targeting, project selection and monitoring are useful channels, though attention needs to be paid to exclusion, corruption or elite capture.
 - **Selection of participants:** each type of targeting can have positive or negative impacts on social inclusion; an informed combination of mechanisms tailored to context is useful.
 - **Types of public works:** supporting broader types of works helps include people who cannot take part in demanding or time-consuming physical labour.
 - **Implementation:** key lessons include addressing women and men’s different experiences, strengthening staff skills and participatory design; training staff; maximising linkages between social protection and other programmes for empowerment, capacity and skills; supporting rigorous monitoring and evaluation; and resources for anti-discrimination work.
 - **Transforming political economy and social relations:** several strategies can help avoid political capture, including clarity and transparency, a complaints mechanism and external oversight. In addition, tailored programme measures can counter unequal power and resources inside households, e.g. individual entitlements for women.
 - **Evidence, monitoring and evaluation (M&E):** This is understudied. Capacity-building, community involvement and high-quality light evaluations are useful.
 - **Policy:** policies must take an equity-based approach. PSNPs can improve social inclusion and equality in low-income crisis or fragile contexts.
- **Interventions for specific groups:**
 - **Women and children:** policy choices can address gendered economic and social risks in PSNPs. Entry points in design include quotas, the organisation of worksites (especially childcare) and the adjustment of wage modalities. In targeting, households should be disaggregated by individual.
 - **Other groups:** specific programming solutions emerge from experience with regard to youth (e.g. skills training), persons with disabilities (e.g. social assistance and empowerment), and pastoralists (e.g. accounting for the need for mobility).

A **country case study is provided on Ethiopia**, the most evaluated case by far on PSNPs, with findings the World Bank states are replicable (2010, 2-3). The case provides lessons learned in terms of: interventions for specific groups (with regard to gender, HIV/AIDS, pastoralists); participation and selection (the politics of inclusion, the selection of participants, participation, graduation); and monitoring and evaluation.

2. Evidence base

There is a large body of literature on PSNPs in low- and middle-income countries – with a large majority of references about Ethiopia¹. However, within that literature, **discussions of how to achieve social inclusion in PSNPs are generally scattered, limited and indirect** (an observation confirmed in Andrews & Kryeziu 2013, and comments from three experts). Social inclusion is mostly addressed as part of other

¹ More broadly, there is growing literature on social inclusion and equality in social protection in low- and middle-income countries (particularly regarding class, gender, childhood, disabilities, health and specific ethnic or political groups). This body of knowledge offers important insights for mainstreaming social inclusion into PSNPs, though this report cannot draw out the implications due to timeframe constraints.

considerations about PSNPs, such as targeting and accountability (expert comment). Discussions of social inclusion as a goal, a process, a result or an impact are limited and usually associated with specific considerations such as food security. (Andrews & Kryeziu 2013, 15). Most studies look at poverty and/or gender, with less input on other forms of exclusion (e.g. health and ability levels, age, migration).

Evidence tends to be suggestive, with little demonstration of causal relations between an activity and social inclusion, either within a programme or as an effect of it (observation confirmed by Andrews & Kryeziu 2013, 1, and expert comment). Specific guidance on how to mainstream social inclusion in programming is limited, and stages of the programme cycle are covered unevenly (monitoring and evaluation for social inclusion seems to be undercovered). There are **empirical gaps** about programme features that may lead to the exclusion of vulnerable groups, such as work norms that cause undue burdens on a household or social stigmas around safety nets (Andrews & Kryeziu 2013, 16).

The relevant body of knowledge **largely rests on reviews of country-and place-specific case studies and experience**, constructed through original research, comparisons or syntheses (observation confirmed by Andrews & Kryeziu 2013, 1). No systematic cross-country reviews are available on how to achieve social protection in PSNPs. Further, on Sub-Saharan Africa, **knowledge mainly derives from experiences with the extensive Ethiopia PSNP**, with a few other countries studied. This makes for rich, in-depth insights, but also means that generalising findings may require caution.

Because few authors have specialised in social inclusion in PSNs, evidence comes from a **small number of frequently cited sources** on the subject, a large majority of them based in Western institutions. There are frequent overlap and repetitions between sources, with the same references often cited repeatedly. This helpdesk report therefore draws heavily from a few syntheses of evidence (Andrews & Kryeziu 2013; Holmes & Jones 2009; Subbarao et al. 2012; World Bank 2010) and signposts additional references.

Most of the relevant literature comes from **practitioner and policy sources** (with a number of evaluation and impact reports), rather than academic sources. Research on social inclusion in PSNPs has been **rigorous**, built upon both quantitative and qualitative studies of documented experience using a variety of methods and data. **Findings tend to be consistent**, with large areas of agreement amongst authors.

3. Cross-cutting thematic findings²

Lessons for projects and programmes

Community participation

Targeted beneficiary outreach to excluded groups is fundamental: it ‘maximizes targeting efficiency, helps reach the poorest’ (including the most vulnerable such as illiterate or indigenous people), and improves transparency and accountability (Subbarao et al. 2012, 137). Sound outreach may empower potential beneficiaries through comprehensive information on their entitlements and responsibilities, and bolster confidence in PSNPs in post-conflict situations (*ibidem*). Literacy levels, cultural and ethnicity differences, and accessibility to remote areas must be taken into account (*idem*, 139).

Involvement in targeting, project selection and monitoring enables PSNP participants to respond to the needs of the poor thanks to their local knowledge (Subbarao et al. 2012, 56, 77). However, ‘the very

² The syntheses used in this section often cite: McCord & Slater (2009); Del Ninno, Subbarao & Milazzo (2009).

weaknesses, poor access to information, and low level of education of the very poor' lead to their exclusion from such involvement – especially if they are women (*idem*, 155). Strong sensitisation to women's concerns and constraints is required before community participation (*idem*, 155-156). Conversely, the informational advantages that participation provides may lead to corruption or capture by local elites, especially in highly unequal societies with low accountability (Subbarao et al. 2012, 58).

Participatory design should therefore rest on a context-specific **analysis of community structure and social dynamics** to enhance community involvement and outcomes (Subbarao et al. 2012, 58). For example, in Cambodia's public works programme, communities now select beneficiaries using both criteria from programme managers and a national system for targeting households ('ID Poor'). Previously, although eligibility criteria were well established, 'there was room for discretion' due to the lack of a formal ranking of beneficiaries (*ibidem*). Another useful mechanism, where data are available, is community targeting combined with proxy means test: the 'community selects the eligible households, which are then ranked based on income' (Giannozzi & Khan 2011, cited in Subbarao et al. 2012, 58-59). Even where community participation leads to a generally fair targeting, 'additional objective criteria or guidance might further improve targeting outcomes' (Subbarao et al. 2012, 59).

Selection of participants

A **combination of targeting mechanisms** is generally used (Subbarao et al. 2012, 50).

Subbarao et al. argue that the 'cornerstone' is **self-selection through wage rates** 'low enough to attract only those in need of temporary work, but high enough to provide a meaningful level of transfer' (2012). This discourages the non-poor from participation, generally reducing inclusion errors; but it does not ensure that all of the poor participate, i.e. does not eliminate exclusion errors (*idem*, 70).

Geographic targeting 'is most appropriate when the poor are disproportionately located in a specific region, and/or when a specific region in a country is hit by a major shock such as a drought or a flood' (Subbarao et al. 2012, 70). It may be politically difficult, however, to exclude the poor in a region with low poverty, while including non-poor people in a region with a high concentration of poverty (*ibidem*). The 'only way to counter' such issues is to build a strong data case for geographic targeting (*idem*, 85).

Administrative targeting, categorical targeting (to address particular vulnerabilities beyond poverty, e.g. for youth, women, ex-combatants, refugees), **community targeting, and proxy means testing** can also help ensure social inclusion (*idem*, 75-78).

Types of public works

Public works generally involve demanding or time-consuming physical labour (Holmes & Jones 2009, 7-10). This tends to exclude some women (especially around childbirth), elderly men and women, the chronically ill, those with disabilities and households headed by single adults, especially by women (Holmes and Jones 2009, 10; expert comment). It also tends to exclude '(hopefully) child-headed households' (expert comment)³. Criteria for project selection can include the potential for participation of women, youth and persons with disabilities (Subbarao et al. 2012, 59).

Thinking more broadly about different public works, such as childcare or community-based healthcare, offers opportunities to include less physically challenging components into PSNPs (Holmes & Jones 2009,

³ For a detailed exploration of the impact of the Ethiopian PSNP on girls and boys, see: Woldehanna (2010).

7-10). At the same time, interventions should not exacerbate ‘women’s time poverty’, but rather provide them with income-generating opportunities suited to their skills and life-cycle stage (*idem*, 10).

Implementation

Programmes need to tackle potential blockages in implementation (Holmes and Jones 2009, 9-11), by:

- Addressing the ‘distinct and often unequal **experiences of men and women in the labour market**’ and ensuring provisions for equality are implemented (equal pay, childcare provision).
- **Strengthening staff skills and women’ and men’s participation** in design and evaluation.
- **Training staff** in gender awareness and gender analysis.
- **Maximising linkages between social protection and activities aimed at building empowerment, capacity and skills.** For example, birth registration, health insurance membership and non-involvement in child labour can be a conditionality in conditional cash transfers.
- **Supporting rigorous M&E**, underpinned by a baseline with sex-disaggregated data. For example, a centralised database can help monitor participants’ well-being.
- Ensuring adequate **human and financial resources** to implement anti-discrimination legislation.

Transforming political economy and social relations

Political economy and values can affect programme objectives, scope, beneficiaries, budget, design and implementation (Subbarao et al. 2012, 83). **Strategies to avoid political capture** are (*idem*, 84-87):

- **Complete clarity and transparency** in selecting: areas (with criteria that can be supported by data); beneficiaries (with rules on selection); projects (with criteria supporting targeted groups).
- Strict adherence to **procurement** guidelines in bidding for materials.
- Clear and transparent **wage-setting** principles.
- Having a **complaints**-handling process in place.
- **External oversight** of the programme, preferably including social audits.

Corruption, which can undermine social inclusion, can be stemmed through clarity of institutional responsibilities, alignment of incentives, collection and disclosure of programme information, administrative and legal sanctions, and proper financial management and accounting (*idem*, 148-151).

Given the unequal **distribution of power and resources inside households and communities**, Holmes and Jones (2009, 11) advocate measures to strengthen individuals’ resources and status, such as:

- **Responding to ‘the diversity of family arrangements’** with individual entitlements, for example ‘to female-headed sub-units of male-headed extended families’ in polygamous relationships.
- **Targeting transfers.** For example, conditional transfers can develop children’s ‘human capital’.
- **Considering life-cycle vulnerabilities**, by directly supporting pregnant and lactating women and elderly persons who cannot engage in some work activities.
- **Sensitisation**, to inform households about entitlements so as to reduce conflict over transfers.

Monitoring and evaluation

Indicators are not always collected, especially where implementation **capacity** is very low (Subbarao et al. 2012, 167). PSNPs need to ensure gender-related monitoring, evaluation and learning, with gender- and age-disaggregated data (Holmes et al. 2011, 268). If implementation is delegated to local governments, their capacity for monitoring and supervision must be built up (*idem*, 84). Subbarao et al. (2012, 56-59) find that community participation is not frequently enlisted in monitoring and evaluation. Yet involving communities and beneficiaries through grievance reporting, monitoring and redress is very useful, including to avoid error, fraud and corruption (*idem*, 147; for details, 154-156). Effective two-way **communications** can also facilitate ‘public dialogue and social awareness’ (*idem*, 139).

High-quality light evaluations may be a valuable alternative under capacity constraints, particularly if complemented by administrative records (Subbarao et al. 2012, 187-188). In Liberia, the agency implementing the PSNP used stakeholder capacity, ‘an efficient way to overcome’ some of the constraints (*idem*, 187). Communities undertook monitoring activities through facilitators, and the programme conducted quantitative and qualitative light evaluations (*ibidem*).

Lessons for policy

Holmes and Jones (2009, 9) explain that ‘an **equity-based approach to social protection**’ requires a dynamic, coordinated institutional approach. Agencies responsible for livelihoods, basic and social services, and the enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation have to work together. Local institutions need to be strengthened to implement equitable policies and programmes, and long-term funding must be committed. A strategy for scaling up interventions towards equity must be in place (*ibidem*).

Reviewing experiences with PSNPs in low- and middle-income countries, Andrews and Kryeziu (2013, 3) note that, **in post-conflict settings**, interventions may especially be useful for at-risk ethnic groups, disaffected communities and disenfranchised youth. For example, Liberia and Sierra Leone scaled up their public works schemes in response to the 2007-2008 food crisis (*idem*, 14). Flexibility at the community level proved vital in rationing participation and correctly allocating beneficiaries. The experience also demonstrated the importance of existing institutional mechanisms to support public works operations in a crisis. Third parties were key, for payments (EcoBank in Liberia) and community-level facilitation (in Sierra Leone). In terms of adjustments, targeting would need to improve and programmes would have to be tailored for the most vulnerable, such as youth and women (*idem*, 14; Subbarao et al. 2012, 38).

4. Group-specific interventions

Women and children⁴

Policy and design

Andrews and Kryeziu (2013, 9) note that there can be **barriers to women’s participation** and public works can add to their household burden and pressure them to enter the labour force. **Policy choices are key** in addressing the gendered dimensions of economic and social risks, for instance in ‘facilitating a better balance between care-giving and productive work’ through greater accessible and affordable

⁴ Regarding gender mainstreaming in PSNPs, details, good practices and tools are available from: Holmes & Jones (2010); Holmes et al. (2011).

childcare and promoting men's involvement in care-work (Holmes & Jones 2009, 9). Gender-sensitivity in policy and programme design must be strengthened, as women's agency, advocacy and representation in policy and programming (Holmes et al. 2011, 267-268).

Gender objectives need to be reflected in **design**, to encourage female participation (Andrews & Kryeziu 2013, 9, 13, 16; Subbarao et al. 2012, 123-125). This is possible with a combination of simple measures, to develop in consultation with women, such as (*ibidem*):

- Introducing **quotas** for women's recruitment.
- **Organising the work sites well**: locating projects close to beneficiaries' home, providing rest areas protected from the sun, toilet facilities, and child care on site, 'preferably run by women experienced in child care and paid as workers' (Subbarao et al. 2012, 121)⁵. Holmes and Jones add that childcare can be offered on work sites, in villages or through mobile crèches (2009, 10).
- **Adjusting wage modalities** to suit women's preferences and need for flexibility (piece wages rather than daily wages). Work norms and associated payments for piece wage rates must be determined carefully; otherwise, women 'can be exploited into working long hours with very low compensation', especially with contractors. Subbarao et al. (2012, 81) warn that setting piece wage rates is difficult because the required labour input for each activity is not standardized.

In **implementation**, interaction between communities and implementers must be better used to promote gender equality, and investments need to be made in staff's and participant's capacity to plan and implement for gender equality (Holmes et al. 2011, 268).

Selecting participants

Holmes and Jones (2009, 10) note that **viewing the household as a unit can exacerbate intra-household inequalities**. For example, female-headed households (FHHs) sometimes depend on 'larger families or their natal or marital homes'. Women occupy different positions in polygamous households. The household head may not distribute an asset such as cash equally. In light of this, the authors argue that individual entitlements can enable women to claim their rights. Transfers 'to the female-headed sub-units of male-headed polygamous families can also ensure a more egalitarian distribution' (*ibidem*). Where a PSN forms the 'core of national social protection – as in rural Ethiopia', cash transfers can also be made to single-headed households without adult labour (expert comment). However, some programmes exacerbate **gendered labour market discrimination** (Holmes & Jones 2009, 7). For example, PSNPs in Ethiopia and India have achieved high participation from women partly through low payment rates.

Other groups

An emerging trend in public works is to target **youth** (Andrews & Kryeziu 2013, 10). South Africa's Employment Public Works Program provides training beyond the skills acquired on the job. For example, youth employed as manual labourers may be trained in building skills, if there is demand for these in the labour market. All training may result in some certification (*ibid.*; Subbarao et al. 2012, 17). The Sierra Leone Cash for Work Project targeted unemployed youth and involved youth groups to set up worksites and form small contractor groups (Andrews & Kryeziu 2013, 10). The subsequent Youth Employment

⁵ For details on worksite amenities, safety, transportation and equipment, see Subbarao et al. 2012, 121-122.

Project also addresses ‘very low-skill unemployed or underemployed poor youth’, and provides skills training to some individuals interested in being small works contractors (*ibidem*).

Holmes and Jones (2009, 8) commend social protection systems, such as Ethiopia’s PSNP, that identify **people with disabilities** as a specific beneficiary category, in recognition of the specific economic and social vulnerabilities they face. However, in some contexts, social assistance does not necessarily meet their needs (such as more inclusive services) and, rather than being empowering, reinforces ‘perceptions that they are unable to work and are dependent upon care’ (*ibidem*).

It is unclear to what extent programmes integrate **pastoralist communities’** divergent livelihoods strategies, especially the importance of mobility (Holmes & Jones 2009, 9).

5. Country case study: Ethiopia

Key features and relevance

The Ethiopian programme is the largest PSN programme in Sub-Saharan Africa (‘outside much richer South Africa’), with an annual coverage of between 6 and 7.8 million people in 319 districts (expert comment)⁶. It is also **one of the world’s most intensely evaluated** public works programmes (Subbarao et al. 2012, 8). In terms of components (Subbarao et al. 2012, 31-48; World Bank 2010, 15), the PSNP provides food or cash transfers to chronically food insecure households through:

- **Labour-intensive public works** for households with able-bodied adults who have available labour.
- **Direct support**, i.e. unconditional transfer, for households who cannot provide labour to public works and have no other means of support (e.g. orphans, pregnant and nursing mothers, persons with disabilities, the elderly, chronically ill individuals and FHHs that are labour-poor).

The World Bank emphasises that lessons from the Ethiopian case are **replicable and ‘applicable to several contexts’** (2010, 2-3), as the PSNP constitutes a large-scale safety net in a low-income setting, in drought-prone areas, with a shift from food aid to cash, and with productive and pro-growth impacts. The following sections refer mostly to the World Bank synthesis (2010); other references make similar points: Andrews & Kryeziu 2013; Subbarao et al. 2012.

Interventions for specific groups

*Mainstreaming gender*⁷

A 2008 gender study on the PSNP, cited by the World Bank (2010) indicates that there had been progress, but unevenly so across *woredas* (districts) and the components of the gender approach (82). The PSNP implementation manual provides ‘a **strong institutional framework** for promoting gender equity’ (*ibidem*). Still, Holmes and Jones concluded in 2011 that the ‘PSNP payment modality is not contributing significantly to women’s economic empowerment’ (cited in Subbarao et al. 2012, 125). In 2008, payments kept being disbursed to the head of the households even if women did the bulk of the work (*ibidem*).

⁶ Another insightful country case is Liberia. See: Subbarao et al. (2012, 311-328).

⁷ Regarding gender mainstreaming in the Ethiopian PSNP, details and good practices are available from: Berhane et al. (2011); Holmes et al. (2011); Jones, Woldehanna & Tafere (2010).

With regard to **participation** (World Bank 2010, 82), women and women's organisations 'tend to be well represented in PSNP decision-making structures at lower levels, while building alliances with the Women's Affairs Ministry at Federal and regional levels' has been more difficult. However, women are less likely to participate in PSNP meetings than men, sometimes have difficulties expressing their opinions in targeting forums, and are more likely to use non-PSNP complaint mechanisms (*idem*, 82, 87).

In terms of **responding to women's reproductive labour** (World Bank 2010, 82), shifting pregnant women from Public Works to Direct Support had improved. On the other hand, men and women mostly did the same work, for the same number of hours. Recently divorced women frequently faced difficulties re-registering (*ibidem*). In the case of polygamous family structures, a lack of guidance in the implementation manual till 2009 had resulted in different targeting practices across areas (*ibidem*). Child care facilities remained unevenly distributed (Andrews & Kryeziu 2013, 9).

Provisions for projects that could **reduce women's work burden** – such as fuel wood lots or water points, and working on private land owned by female-headed households – had generally not been implemented (World Bank 2010, 82-83). However, many women 'felt that participating in public works had improved their standing' and community respect for them (*idem*, 83). Some reported that men had taken on more domestic work (*ibidem*). The PSNP had also reduced the need for women to travel for work opportunities (Andrews & Kryeziu 2013, 9): with the minimum benefit range, teenage girls and young women had less need to work as domestic employees in towns, where they are often subject to abuse (*ibidem*).

Mainstreaming issues related to HIV and AIDS

A 2009 study (cited in the World Bank 2010, 83) concluded that the PSNP is 'not increasing the vulnerability of beneficiaries to HIV and AIDS'. Some elements have the potential to increase risk, such as travels to food collection points (which often requires people to spend the night there), and the increased movement of programme staff. However, **social norms and the programme design 'suggest that such risks will be low'** (*ibid.*). For example, beneficiaries travel in groups to distribution sites, while cash transfers 'eliminate the need to travel in the long-term' (*ibid.*).

Programme for pastoralists

Sabates-Wheeler, Lind and Hoddinott (2013), using a mixed methods study, warn that designs meant for agrarian areas '**cannot easily be transplanted into pastoral areas**' (abstract). Differences in distributional channels modify the impact, for example through 'practices of sharing within mutual support networks' and 'the role of informal authority structures in targeting and appeals decisions' (*ibidem*).

A pilot programme set up in 2006 for pastoral groups in the lowlands proved challenging to set up, but demonstrated that a safety net is effective in 'supporting chronically food insecure pastoral households' (World Bank 2010, 83-84). Pastoral communities mobilised easily for public works relevant to their livelihoods (*ibidem*). However, **targeting needs to account for differences in social structures and cohesion**. Community-based targeting is 'the most appropriate for cohesive pastoral groups, but may be less appropriate in peri-urban areas' (*ibidem*). Many former pastoralists, one of the poorest groups, reside in urban or peri-urban areas, beyond PSNP reach (*ibidem*).

Participation and selection

The politics of inclusion

Examining the link between policies on state land ownership and the PSN, Lavers (2013) argues that **including the rural poor in the PSNP addresses ‘the symptoms** of poverty, rather than structural causes of insecurity’ (482). The PSNP is used to prop up failing agricultural policies and limit urban migration for the purpose of political stability (*idem*, 481-482). Safety net programmes that seek to lift people out of poverty need to be **situated in ‘the socioeconomic context which generates insecurity’** (*idem*, 482).

Selecting participants

Geographic and administrative targeting was successfully combined with community-based selection to identify the poorest households (Andrews & Kryeziu 2013, 5; World Bank 2010, 50-57, 88-89). Community-based targeting has led to **more participatory and accountable targeting processes** (World Bank 2010, 87). Communities are better able to respond to unfair practices and targeting mistakes, while avoiding distrust or conflict towards beneficiaries (Andrews and Kryeziu 2013, 5; World Bank 2010, 87).

Categories who could be excluded by physical labour can receive direct support transfers; these have amounted to 15-20 per cent of the beneficiaries (expert comment)⁸. This ‘works reasonably well, though there is some confusion and variation between regions and districts’ on moving women from the public works to the direct support lists (expert comment; also World Bank 2010, 80). However, by 2009, light work or community activities for Direct Support beneficiaries (e.g. childcare) had not been implemented anywhere (World Bank 2010, 81). This suggests that implementation was administratively complex and not a priority for the Ministry in charge (*ibidem*).

The targeting criteria for direct support had to be complemented with other mechanisms, such as an integrated beneficiary list and a labour cap, to **protect individuals within households** (World Bank 2010, 85). The cap does not seem to have been upheld (*idem*, 80). In many areas, women’s work ‘is transferred to other able-bodied individuals, which can create resentment towards the women’ (*ibidem*).

Participation

After staff received **training in community-based watershed management (CBWM)**, participation in the selection of public works increased amongst both male- and female-headed households in all regions and among households of all poverty levels (World Bank 2010, 72-73). Subbarao et al. (2012, 215-216) explain that the CBWM is a participatory approach recognised internationally as appropriate ‘for developing a pipeline of projects’, many with a focus on soil and water conservation. Project selection ‘depends on the participation of community members’ who live in the microwatershed, including poor households (*idem*, 216). To ensure sustainability, all projects define ‘owners’, i.e. people or groups with rights of use who have the obligation to maintain and manage the asset after completion (*ibidem*). Based on experience, it is critical to ensure ‘a common understanding between community asset owners and *woreda* government service providers’ about what the support for owners will be after the handover (*idem*, 217).

⁸ The 2010 PSNP implementation manual defines such groups as: people who are too young to qualify for public works, i.e. 16 years of age and under; people who are too old to qualify; physically or mentally disabled people; and people who are temporarily unable to work, including women from the sixth month of pregnancy; lactating mothers in the first ten months after birth; and people who are sick (expert comment).

The positive effects of the training in CBWM on participation has led to ‘significant institutional strengthening in local participatory planning’ (World Bank 2010, 75)⁹. **Tailored support remains needed** for the participation of women, the elderly, Direct Support beneficiaries and other marginalised groups, who generally have lesser access to information and resources (*idem*, 80-81, 91). Strong support for participation ‘can take time and needs to be monitored’ externally (*idem*, 91).

Graduation

As of 2011, there has been ‘**relatively little graduation**’ (Berhane et al. 2011, 212). Factors affecting sustainable graduation include (*idem*, 213):

- Full family targeting versus partial family targeting. Full family targeting means that all members of eligible PSNP households are listed as clients (*idem*, 87). The goal is ‘to provide a transfer for every household member and prevent dilution of transfers’ (*ibidem*).
- ‘The level of household and community assets, particularly land’.
- Price changes.
- Environmental shocks.

Government strategy to promote graduation grew from a focus on households with available labour and land to the inclusion of non-farm activities, in order to respond to the **needs of rural youth**, who generally have no land (World Bank 2010, 100-101). Moving households – particularly **the very poor** – towards food security requires a range of complementary measures (*idem*, 101).

Monitoring and evaluation

There is very little data on social inclusion in M&E. The PSNP faced ‘**multiple operational and logistical obstacles**, due to difficult access and the lack of an organized system for collecting timely information’ (Subbarao et al. 2012, 166). Monitoring implementation of gender principles and policy requires ‘more specific indicators, including ones relating to youth, children, and cultural factors’ (*idem*, 230).

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⁹ A detailed case study on project selection is available in: Subbarao et al. 2012, 213-232.

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Key websites

- Gender & Development – Special issue on Social protection: <http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/cgde20/19/2>
- GSDRC – Topic guides (see topic guides on social protection and on social inclusion): <http://www.gsdr.org/go/topic-guides>
- IFPRI – Evaluating Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Nets Programme: <http://www.ifpri.org/book-745/node/9129>
- ODI – Gender, vulnerability and social protection: <http://www.odi.org.uk/projects/1020-gender-vulnerability-social-protection>
- World Bank – Public works: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALPROTECTION/EXTSAFETYNETSANDTRANSFERS/0,,contentMDK:22190226~menuPK:1551727~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:282761~isCURL:Y,00.html>

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