Helpdesk Research Report: Conflict and Stabilisation in Mali and the Sahel region

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**Query:** Identify relevant literature for policymakers and practitioners on conflict and stabilisation in Mali and the Sahel region. Where possible identify studies which relate to insurgencies in Mali and the Sahel region. Summarise lessons learned and practical recommendations for action.

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1. Introduction

There is a wide and disparate literature on Mali and the drivers of conflict in that country and the broader region. This report draws on the most salient literature currently available to highlight lessons learned and any practical recommendations, and to identify the key conflict drivers and contextual factors relating to political economy and governance. The situation in Mali is still very fluid and material used in this report reflects the state of knowledge at the time of this report being written.
2. Practical Recommendations

The following practical recommendations were identified from the literature reviewed:

- **Burden-sharing and a multi-tiered approach**: Several authors recommend an approach which builds on the strengths of different actors:
  - *International Crisis Group (ICG) (2012a) suggests the following*: the Malian government must define a global strategy; Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) should work with the African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN); the UN should produce a credible roadmap and implement (with the AU and ECOWAS) reconciliation with the Malian army; and the European Union (EU) and the US should help re-establish Malian defence forces and stabilise the country through aid. (See ICG 2012b for a more detailed explanation.)
  - *Vines (2013) suggests the following*: France needs to embark on a full offensive; ECOWAS needs to prepare for deployment and long-term support; the AU and other international actors should sanction intervention; and the Malian army needs to be better trained.

- **Development projects**: Melly (2012) argues that with many locals resentful of Sharia, the law of the gun and the destruction of centuries of heritage by Ansar Eddine militants, the Northern Mali population could be attracted by the prospect of stable administration, regular salaries and development projects. This could exert pressure on the rebels to negotiate and open up an end to the conflict.

- **Support livelihoods**: Goita (2011) argues that governments must protect livelihoods and create economic opportunities so as to maintain the divisions that historically have separated indigenous Sahelian communities from Salafist terrorist groups. Abdalla (2009) argues for better initiatives to integrate Tuareg concerns over land and livelihood opportunities through inclusive political engagement.

- **Incrementally weaken criminal networks**: Lacher (2012) argues that external actors should help incrementally weaken the criminal networks in Mali’s north by developing a coherent international approach to help strengthen regional cooperation. With local people having few alternative income sources, taking strong steps to break up criminal networks, rather than an incremental approach, could do more harm than good.

- **Form a common position on ransom payments**: The African Union has called for prohibition of ransom payments to terrorist groups; Algeria refuses to pay such ransoms; and Mali has no national consensus (Sidibé 2012). Lacher (2012) suggests a common global approach to limiting ransom payments.

- **Support Malian anti-terrorism and development initiatives**: External partners should support the Malian government through joint anti-terrorism and development policies aiming to strengthen the state’s operational capacity to deliver security and development in the region (Sidibé 2012).

- **Make use of traditional mechanisms**: Local communities should be encouraged to work alongside state actors in the development and securitisation of Northern Mali by
employing traditional conflict-management mechanisms, such as inter-community and inter-clan solidarity systems (Sidibé 2012).

- **Keep in mind historical tensions:** An ECOWAS deployment with a significant Hausa component may worsen conflict due to historical tensions between the Hausa and Tuareg ethnic groups (Pryce 2012).

- **Religious leadership to counter Islamist terrorism:** Sidibé (2012) suggests that religious leadership could work to counter jihadist doctrinal teaching.

### 3. Conflict Drivers and Key Factors

This section identifies key conflict drivers, as well as political economy, regional and governance factors.

#### 3.1 Islamist terrorism and kidnapping

Sidibé (2012) outlines the origin of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In September 2006, four Islamist groups from the Sahel region, as well as other small Islamist groups from countries such as Mauritania, Mali and Niger, built an alliance with Al Qaeda and renamed themselves as AQIM. The four groups were:

- the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat – GSPC)
- the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (Groupe Islamique Combattant au Maroc – GICM)
- the Libyan Islamic Combatant Group (Groupe Islamique Combattant Libyen – GICL)
- the Tunisian Islamic Combatant Group (Groupe Islamique Combattant en Tunisie – GICT).

AQIM and its founding groups supplied fighters to combat areas such as Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan between 2004 and 2006. They went on to establish a central command unit in the Sahel with a view to expanding AQIM’s scope for action. They currently train Jihadists from neighbouring countries, Europe and elsewhere. Sidibé (2012) notes that the GSPC’s change of name came with a change of strategy, placing their activities in the Sahel within the broader thrust of international terrorism.

Pham (2011) notes how prior to the establishment of AQIM, the founding group’s fighters made up a significant percentage of the foreign fighters in the al Qaeda-led insurgency in Iraq. This helped to build trust networks between al Qaeda central and the Maghreb-based groups, and in turn assisted the 2007 formal affiliation of the GSPC and other groups with al Qaeda.

As of 2012, the movement was made up of up to 800 fighters scattered across the Sahel (Sidibé 2012). It is divided into several sub-groups which are highly mobile and can move rapidly from one country to another to evade security services. AQIM mainly recruits from amongst the Tuaregs, Arabs, and Moors but also from sub-Saharan Africa. Elements of AQIM have become increasingly present in cities of Northern Mali.

Sidibé (2012) highlights how jihadist doctrine is preached in some mosques and how some religious gatherings play the role of a catalyst in the conversion of unemployed young people.
These terrorist groups use various forms of trafficking to acquire vehicles, weapons and effective means of communication. AQIM profits from the shipments of cocaine from Latin America to Western countries. Kidnappings of Western nationals have also become an important source of financing. It is reported that 90 per cent of AQIM resources emanate from ransoms paid in return for the release of hostages.

It is notable that, while in Mali there is no national consensus on the issue of ransom payments, Algeria adopts a hard line and refuses to engage in ransom negotiations. The African Union has called for a prohibition of ransom payments to terrorist groups (Sidibé 2012).

Goita (2011) argues that AQIM is seeking to bridge the divisions that have historically separated Sahelian communities from Salafist terrorist groups. In addition to strengthening ties with regional criminal networks, AQIM are simultaneously deepening connections with local communities.

Figure 1. Map of major attacks by AQIM 2003-2012

Source: Sidibé (2012)
The influence and connection with other Islamist groups is uncertain. There are reports that a leader from the Nigerian Islamist group Boko Haram has found his way into Mali, and that Boko Haram fighters are training alongside al-Shabab. The latter is a jihadist group that last year aligned itself officially with al-Qaeda (Pantucci 2013). On the other hand, Donnelly (2012) has maintained that while informal relationships may already exist, Boko Haram and its affiliates remain largely Nigerian. She argues that the conflation of Nigerian groups with AQIM is unhelpful at best and damaging at worst.

A report from Maplecroft (2012) highlights the establishment of two new terrorist groups - Ansar Eddin and the Mouvement Unicité et Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO). Ansar Eddin has held large parts of the north since 2012 and has been imposing its version of Islamic law (Pantucci 2013). MUJAO is a group loosely affiliated with AQIM that claims to have carried out kidnappings of foreigners near Tindouf, Algeria (Maplecroft 2012). The Maplecroft (2012) report argues that the development of these splinter groups supports the view that AQIM is itself struggling to retain organisational coherence in North Africa.

### 3.2 Trafficking: arms, drugs, cigarettes, and vehicles

Sidibé (2012) argues that the Sahel has become the sanctuary of choice for criminal networks and terrorist groups in search for bases from which they can secure financing and plan attacks.

Arms trafficking networks encompass the Sahel and include the Mano River countries - Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Sidibé (2012) traces the development of arms trafficking to the multiple recent conflicts in West Africa and in countries such as Chad, the Sudan, and Somalia. The supply chain is diversified, with northern routes bordering Algeria and Niger and other routes through Mauritania. The availability of small arms has worked to exacerbate insecurity in the north of Mali as almost every inhabitant carries a small arm, because they are cheap. Armed robbery of cattle is common and happens frequently as populations easily turn to weapons to settle intercommunity disputes.

A transnational network of drugs trafficking is well established in the north of Mali. Local tribal groups seem to sanction the development of drug trafficking and people involved in trafficking are well known. Complicity exists between the traffickers and certain populations, which may include some local state officials and civil servants. Other transnational actors involved in drugs trafficking include Sahraouis of the Polisario Front, Mauritanian ‘businessmen’, elements of AQIM, Algerians, Moroccans, Lebanese businessmen in the Canary Islands and on mainland Spain, Galicians and other international networks. Generally, drug trafficking networks are organised in such a way that one team gets the merchandise from Latin America to the north of Mali, and then a second team forwards it to Europe.

Cigarette trafficking is another lucrative activity, with well-known brands sold at half the market price flooding the main cities of Mali. There are also trafficked cars coming from Europe via Morocco, particularly luxury cars and 4X4 vehicles, as well as attacks on cars used for official business in the region and those belonging to local NGOs.

### 3.3 Tuareg rebellions against the Mali government

Tuaregs represent 1.7 per cent of the national population. They are most prominent in the Kidal region in northern Mali and are the second largest community in the Timbuktu and Gao
regions that are towards the north of Mali (Sidibé 2012). In an analysis of the impact of persecution and conflict on the demography of the Malian Tuaregs, Randall (2005) concludes that they the Tuaregs have sought to reinforce their identity. Over time, there has been an approach towards reinforcing marriage rules, fertility and other conventions, so as to construct communities that are both visible and unambiguously Tuareg.

The Tuareg rebellions against the Mali government started in the 1960s and developed during the 1990s (Sidibé 2012). These attempts to challenge state authority relate to the marginalisation of Tuareg and Arab nomadic communities living in the north of Mali. These movements have launched a series of attacks against government forces.

Successive Malian regimes have dealt differently with rebel movements in the north of the country. Between 1962 and 1964, the government of Modibo Keita dealt with the rebellion through military repression, as did the regime of General Moussa Traore in 1990. The authorities that presided over the democratic transition of 1991 chose instead to recognise the rebel movements. The CTSP (Comité de Transition pour le Salut du Peuple) started negotiations with the rebellion under the auspices of Algerian mediation in order to find a political solution to the issue. Former President Alpha Oumar Konaré, who won the 1992 elections, carried on with the mediation process leading to the signing of a peace treaty (Pacte national) between the government and the rebels.

Keita (1998) argues that following the 1990 insurgency there had been strong national reconciliation in Mali. The government continued a national commitment to political and economic reform in the expectation that this ultimately would attenuate many of the sources of grievance in Mali. Part of that reform involved the decentralisation of power, which provided local communities with much more say in their own affairs. Nomads in northern Mali were made to feel more secure by the reduction of government military presence in the north, and by the incorporation of large numbers of former rebels into Mali’s security forces and civil service. Most importantly, there were strenuous (and successful) national efforts to use the military as a key instrument in nonviolent conflict resolution in the north, in particular by integrating Tuareg combatants into the Malian military.

Pringle (2006) comments that Mali’s record of democratisation had been among the best in Africa. African villagers could find political expression at the national level and poverty had not been an inherent barrier to democratisation. Although satisfaction levels remained generally high, there still was a desire for more rapid progress toward improved quality of life. Arguably, economic growth would have ensured long-term democratic success.

Despite the effective decentralisation and peace process, the Tuareg rebellion re-emerged on 23 May 2006 (Sidibé 2012). Following what had been a long period of peace, some Tuareg officers attacked units of the national army in Kidal and Ménaka and took their weapons and ammunition. They then declared a new rebellion against the government of Mali, which they accused of breaching the terms of the 1996 Treaty.

Sidibé (2012) argues that the recurrence of the crisis can be explained by the lack of developmental vision for the region, as well as weak state presence, especially in the region of Kidal. However, Melly (2012) argues that Mali’s democratic governments of the past two decades have made a genuine attempt to acknowledge local grievances in the north and resolve crises through negotiation and investment in public services. During the last two years of his tenure as President, Touré developed a new strategy for the north, seeking to combine development projects with a reinforced army presence. Some locals did however resent the
army presence. Melly also notes that the army were prevented from confronting Islamist groups.

Abdalla (2009) highlights factors such as migration, extractive industry investments, and disputes over land tenure. She argues that these factors have for decades complicated dynamics within Tuareg communities and their relations with governments in the Sahel. She argues for better initiatives to integrate Tuareg concerns over land and livelihood opportunities through inclusive political engagement.

3.4 Neighbouring countries: Algeria and Libya

Sidibé (2012) argues that the Tuareg issue has always been exploited by neighbouring countries, such as Algeria and Libya (while under Qadafi). There has been regional positioning in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel, with each actor seeking to appear pivotal in the fight against AQIM. In placing themselves as the true regional leader in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel, each state tries to build close links with Western powers and support for their regime. Colonel Qadafi had presented himself as an advocate and defender of the Tuareg cause, encouraging them to claim their autonomy. Elements of the 1990’s rebellion were former fighters from the Libyan Islamic legion who fought in Chad, Palestine, Lebanon and Nicaragua, before coming back with weapons and ammunition to carry out the rebellion.

Melly (2012) highlights how several thousand Malian Tuareg fighters who had served in Colonel Muammar Qaddafi’s forces returned home during and after the Libyan Civil War, equipped with heavy weapons. They managed to transform a fitful Tuareg campaign over northern development and other grievances into a highly militarised separatist movement. Melly also notes that the Libyan regime’s disintegration flooded Saharan countries with cheap weaponry, giving AQIM and its allies an opportunity to reinforce their arsenals.

Algeria has used the Tuareg rebel movements to fight against Islamist groups in the Sahel (Sidibé 2012). Many former rebels offered their services to fight against AQIM and join a specialised unit, which was supposed to maintain security in northern Mali. Sidibé (2012) stresses that Algerian support for the Tuareg is part of Algeria’s rivalry with Libya. Some have posited the Tuareg attacks of 23 May 2006 were planned and orchestrated by Algeria (Sidibé 2012). Others argue that AQIM fighters are mostly Algerian in origin even though they hide out in the north of Mali (Melly 2012).

3.5 Weak Malian state and the 2012 coup d’état

Sidibé (2012) argues that the weakness of state security structures in the north has impeded effective approaches in the fight against criminal and terrorist threats. There is a weak presence of armed and security forces in Northern Mali. At the same time, peace treaties signed with the rebels demand the reduction of military presence in the north. In any case, it has been difficult for the Malian army to assign security personnel to the region because of its difficult geographic and climatic conditions.

Melly (2012) argues that the Malian State has been hollowed out. Former President Amadou Toumani Touré had a populist leadership style but was an ineffective manager who increasingly failed to deliver public services. For example, the government would artificially inflate cereal output numbers, and subsidised fertiliser failed to reach many farmers at the
village level for whom it was intended. The money from drugs became an increasingly influential factor in the capital Bamako with drug money reaching the highest levels of the state. There were allegations of links between some of the country’s most prominent figures and known traffickers.

While the government was benefitting from corruption money, soldiers were sent to the Sahara war short of weapons, equipment and even salaries. Melly (2012) argues that it was the troops’ anger at these conditions that boiled over on March 22 2012, driving President Touré from power in a military coup. Though the political class were united in condemnation, few ordinary citizens felt moved to join protests against the coup.

Other factors had added to the disillusionment of the military with Touré. Rebels had murdered captive Malian soldiers in late January 2012, and mobile phone pictures of the carnage reached Bamako. Television coverage of Touré’s awkward encounter with the embittered relatives of the dead troops was a blow to the image of a national leader once admired for his role in deposing the dictator Moussa Traoré in 1991 and opening the path to democracy (Melly 2012).

Currently, the Malian military is singularly ill-equipped to respond to the well-armed and motivated jihadist threat from northern Mali (Vines 2013). Lacher (2012) argues that the right approach would be concentrating on capacity building in the judicial and security sector. Donors should focus more on political engagement, encouraging strategies that make the political accommodation of influential players contingent upon their disengagement from the illicit economy and commitment to containing drug and weapons smuggling. Lacher (2012) acknowledges that this will be especially difficult in Mali, where the government will have to strike deals with local forces, including temporary alliances with at least some of north Mali’s criminal networks, to gain back control of the territory.

3.6 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

Regional leaders in ECOWAS have used diplomacy, sanctions and a plan for military intervention to restore order in Mali. ECOWAS’ ability to restore order is complicated by the fact that the regional organisation is seen as an ally of the political establishment and of the overthrown President (Melly 2012).

Pryce (2012) argues that should ECOWAS deploy a stabilisation force to Mali, it would very likely consist predominantly of Nigerian personnel. He notes that Nigeria has been reluctant to contribute sufficient troops to the ECOWAS’ interventions in the past, such as in Cote d’Ivoire. Furthermore as 29% of Nigeria’s population is ethnically Hausa, a deployment may consist of a significant Hausa component. This may make deployment significantly more difficult due to the historical tension between the Tuareg and the Hausa. In the 19th and 20th century Tuareg groups had resisted both French colonial rule and what was perceived to be an increasing cultural dominance by the Hausa in the region. An ECOWAS mission may be seen as an attempt to extend Nigerian influence or to facilitate the assimilation of the Tuareg into the broader Hausa culture (Pryce 2012).

Vines (2013) acknowledges that ECOWAS lacks the capacity to conduct warfare in terrain like that of northern Mali but argues that they need to start deploying their forces. So far there has been a 2012 UN Security Council-backed plan to deploy 3,000 troops in 2013 and ECOWAS has been trying to seek accommodation with a number of the Islamist groups in the north. ECOWAS has so far only planned for military action after training of the Malian army
and scheduled elections. In the longer-term ECOWAS will need to provide peace support operations in an effort to build confidence for many years to come (Vines 2013).

3.7 The African Union, the International Community and a multi-tiered response

Vines (2013) argues for a strong burden-sharing approach involving domestic, regional and international actors. There is now an opportunity for the AU to rebuild its relationships with North African states and with key external partners such as France, the EU, NATO and others. Previous AU opposition to intervention in Libya's civil war in 2011 had soured relationships with North African states. Unlike on Libya in 2011, the AU has supported international action on Mali.

A solution to the crisis will need to be multi-tiered (Vines 2013). Mali needs a credible elected government following last years' coup, and control over the north must be restored through international intervention. There is an immediate need for united African backing for French-led efforts to create an effective military buffer and stop Islamist fighters’ attempts to move south. Neighbouring Algeria's active support for military action is essential and ECOWAS needs to start deploying its forces. The EU mission of 250 military trainers to aid Mali's military needs to be authorised urgently. In the longer-term ECOWAS will have to provide peace support operations in an effort to build confidence for many years to come. France needs to embark on a full offensive and complete military action finishing only when Bamako is able to re-establish credible government and security in the north, with ongoing French military backing if need be.

A policy briefing from ICG (2012a) likewise argues for a number of responses from different actors. The report argues that the president and the prime minister should help the government define a global strategy to resolve the crisis. ECOWAS leaders should recognise the limitations of the organisation in mediating the crisis and planning a military mission in Mali, and thus work closely with the AU and the UN, which are better equipped to respond to challenges. The UN Security Council and member states represented at the high-level meeting on the Sahel should provide support to the Secretary-General to appoint a special representative of the Secretary-General for the Sahel and provide him with the necessary means to achieve his mission. This must focus on reconciling the positions of ECOWAS member states, regional players (Algeria, Mauritania, Niger and Mali) and Western countries.

The UN should boost its presence in Mali to help the transitional government withstand the economic and social crisis, produce a credible roadmap for the restoration of territorial integrity and the organisation of transparent elections as soon as possible (ICG 2012a). It should uphold the rule of law by gathering detailed information on human rights violations committed. It should implement, together with the AU and ECOWAS, a mission to facilitate reconciliation within the Malian army to prevent another military coup with unpredictable consequences.

Mali’s foreign partners, in particular the European Union and the US, should support efforts to re-establish Malian defence and security forces by enhancing their unity, discipline and efficiency so that they can ensure security in the south, represent a credible threat to armed groups in the north and participate in operations against terrorist groups (ICG 2012a). They should help stabilise the Malian economy and employment through a rapid resumption of foreign aid. They should respond favourably to the request for urgent humanitarian assistance to civilian populations affected by the crisis in Mali and the entire Sahel region.
4. References

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5. Additional Information

Suggested websites:

Mali: Resources on the 2012-2013 Conflict: http://africa.berkeley.edu/Outreach/Mali.php

Tuareg bibliography: http://checkthis.com/sxmp

Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR)  

Suggested citation:  

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