Helpdesk Research Report

Community activism in Jordan

Evie Browne

11.06.2013

Question

Identify a selection of current examples of community activism in Jordan. What trends in community organising and participation have been noted by observers, particularly since the Arab Spring?

Contents

1. Overview

There is a **strong evidence base on political forms of community activism**, particularly since the Arab Spring. This rapid report assesses the available literature on political activism for any insights into community activism and participation, as there is a dearth of evidence on community activism directly. The report describes **the key issues, actors and methods used in Jordanian protests 2010-2013**, supported with descriptions of other types of community activism where possible.

The research for this review shows that there is not much literature on different forms of community participation and organising in Jordan. Much of the general literature on community activism examines politics rather than society. The **recent literature focuses on the political protests occurring since 2010**. Other forms of community activism, such as interactions with MPs, petitions, debates, or the local governance structures which enable these, are lacking in the literature. There is a strong tradition of community development projects in Jordan[1], but these do not usually make an explicit connection to governance or forms of organising. The literature on community development is not highly relevant to

---
[1] Expert comments

this query. The exception to this is **women's rights, where there is a reasonable amount of evidence** on civil society activism prior to the Arab Spring. While there are a few studies on rural areas, most of the literature examines events in Amman.

The literature reviewed for this report is **remarkably consistent**. Authors have almost **no disagreements on the content and form of the protests and on the responses to them**. There is a clear consensus among both Jordanian and external commentators. There is somewhat more news commentary than scholarly work[2], though this may be due to the recentness of events; certainly there is enough peer-reviewed literature to be confident of the events discussed.

Several themes are intertwined in the protests and demonstrations, without clear demarcations between them (Adely, 2012). The focus of the protests has been around **corruption, transparency and democracy**. There have been persistent protests calling for democratic reform and better public services and jobs (Zawahri, 2012, p268), starting as early as 2006 with labour conditions strikes (Adely, 2012). Citizens have been calling for action on a number of issues of economic conditions and labour rights, including employment and water, as well as demanding an end to endemic corruption. Communities have also been calling for political reform and democratisation, both with reference to the monarchy and ethnicity. The literature presents a clear message that the Jordanian protests differed from other 'Arab Spring' countries, in that **Jordanians have not called for regime change** (Al-Nammari, 2013; Hamid and Freer, 2011; Muasher, 2013; Ryan, 2011; Susser, 2011; Tobin, 2012). **There are no clear divides between economic and political grievances, and protests are not restricted to particular social or ethnic identity groups**.

This report first provides an overview of trends in community organising and participation in Jordan. It then presents the economic and political issues communities have organised activism about. The issues are presented separately for ease of reading, but are interrelated. The final section briefly reviews activism on women's rights in Jordan.

2. Trends in community organising and participation

Dynamics

The protests have been largely peaceful but unsuccessful in claiming real change. They have centred on improving governance, democracy and addressing poor socio-economic conditions, not on overthrowing the regime. All strata of society have been involved.

The **majority of protesters in 2010 and 2011 were not part of a partisan group**, although most were ethnically East Jordanian (Ryan, 2011, p564). It is important to note that the **majority of Amman residents chose not to protest**, partly because they had found from past experience that protest was not a particularly effective means of reform (Tobin, 2012, p101). Some demonstrations started with particular groups, especially the Muslim Brotherhood and professional associations, but as protests gathered momentum and supporters, identity politics lessened as the groups merged (Ryan, 2011, p571). The protests are not particularly marked by demographic identity (Hamid and Freer, 2011, p2). Opposition groups have disproportionately Palestinian memberships, which contributes to the impression of a loyalist/opposition divide along ethnic lines. However, the primary motivation for protesting was political-economic and not ethnic (Hamid and Freer, 2011, p2).

---

[2] Expert comments

The main actors involved that can be identified as part of a particular group or identity, rather than non-partisan citizens, are as follows. In the first political protests of 2011, which attracted 3,500 people each, the demonstrations are believed to have been led by **members of the Muslim Brotherhood, trade unions and smaller Arab nationalist and leftist political parties** (Susser, 2011; Tobin, 2012). The Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political arm of the Brotherhood, was considered by some to spearhead the protests, as it was the most organised opposition group (Susser, 2011). The Islamist-led demonstrations included both East Jordanians and Palestinians of different social classes (Ryan, 2011, p571). Most of the West Amman '*shabab*' (youth) movements of middle class and higher were East Jordanian. In the south of the country, the protesters were mostly East Jordanians, but in cities with sizeable Palestinian populations, Palestinians joined the demonstrations (Ryan, 2011, p570). Tobin (2012, p98) argues that the **Palestinian population was reluctant to engage in protests** for a combination of three reasons. In part, they felt this would lack legitimacy without East Jordanian support. They also did not want to endanger their precarious status within Jordan. Finally, they did not see the Arab Spring as 'their war' – they were not poor or oppressed like citizens in Libya and Tunisia.

In the first half of 2011, **teachers** demanded and gained the right to form a union; **journalists** demonstrated against the control of the media; and **students** protested government control in universities (Susser, 2011). Jordan Labor Watch recorded 829 **worker protests** in 2011, and 560 in the first half of 2012 (Adely, 2012).

The movements also created **new community organisations**, often claiming to represent the younger generation: Jordanian Campaign for Change (al-hamla al-Urdunniyya lil-taghyir), nicknamed "Jayeen" ("We are coming"); the Youth for Change Movement (harakat shabab min ajl al-taghyir); and the 24th of March Youth Movement (harakat shabab 24 adhar) (Susser, 2011).

The protests were centred in Amman, but did have some broader geographical scope. The **underprivileged rural periphery south of Amman** had been a focus of social unrest for some years and was a starting point for the protests (Susser, 2011). The demonstrations in January 2011 started in Theiban in the south and spread to other southern cities and to Amman (Ryan, 2011, p565). Dhiban, Karak and Ma'an were also centres for the early demonstrations (Susser, 2011). In Amman, the Islamist-organised demonstrations started in the downtown part of the city (near the al-Hussein Mosque) (Ryan, 2011, p571).

Along with public demonstrations and protests, citizens also used **media outlets** to express their discontent. Radio call-in programmes were popular means for Jordanians to complain about corruption, water shortages and unemployment (Zawahri, 2012, p271). In December 2010, ridicule of the parliament's vote of confidence in the government was vented on websites and blogs (Susser, 2011). Throughout 2011, as protests occurred at the rate of one or two a month, the calls for reform were maintained through blogs, social media and multimedia campaigns (Tobin, 2012, p102).

Key factors

Jordan remains **ethnically divided** between East Bankers/East Jordanians and Palestinian Jordanians, mostly refugees from the wars and now Jordanian citizens (Ryan, 2011). Each group has different points of contention: most East Jordanian activists, often young and from the south, are emphasising social justice and economic development, while Palestinian reform activists seek political rights and opportunities (Ryan, 2011, p575). However, grievances about **corruption and democratisation** cut across all demographics (Muasher, 2013), and the 2011 protests were not particularly marked by ethnic division

or difference (Ryan, 2011, p570). East Jordanians' ongoing minority rule over a majority that is of Palestinian origin nonetheless remains a major divide (Hamid and Freer, 2011, p4).

A culture of **clientelism and patronage** remains the norm in Jordan, impacting community activism. A pilot community-based urban slum improvement project conducted in Talbiyeh Camp by UNRWA in 2008 provides an insight into the culture of social hierarchy and patronage networks (Al-Nammari, 2013). This evaluation paper shows that the participatory project was considered a threat by local elites, partly because they considered that participants did not have the necessary expertise to contribute and partly because it unsettled their power. Opposition escalated to deliberate vandalism, destruction of projects and the stigmatisation of project supporters. This demonstrates some Jordanians' resistance to institutional change that threatens the status quo or their individual power as patrons. This is symptomatic of a wider anti-democratic culture and a **widespread clientelist approach to all authority figures** (Al-Nammari, 2013, p227). In the rural areas, where tribal connections are strong, access to resources and interactions with formal institutions are usually mediated through kin networks and patronage (Bouziane, 2010, p41). This means **community activism and participation occurs mainly through this route** rather than through democratic processes. Local powerful figures such as traditional leaders, former MPs or rich men often have visible connections to the state apparatus and are the main institution through which public services are negotiated and allocated (Bouziane, 2010, p41).

The **response of the monarchy to public unrest has been piecemeal and superficial**. King Abdullah has made several reforms, ostensibly in response to the protests, but these have primarily involved cabinet reshuffles (five Prime Ministers in two years) and changes to a few laws (Zawahri, 2012, p268). Commentators and communities consider such responses to be inadequate and not meaningful: they do not address the public's underlying grievances (Ryan, 2011), and do not initiate substantive reforms (Tobin, 2012). Tobin (2012, p104) casts this as a non-democratic response – the King responds and rebrands the monarchy by changing the government, but does this by making personal appointments rather than by calling an election. While communities are calling for actual changes, not cosmetic changes in government personnel, the monarchy's response allows it to keep the regime intact while offering the illusion of change (Hamid, 2011). This has fuelled continuing discontent among, and advocacy by, community activists.

3. Community activism on economic issues

Most of the recent protests in Jordan revolve around the socio-economic situation, drawing on long-term issues and unrest. The Arab Spring catalysed these underlying issues and made public protest and dissent possible with less fear of retribution (Zawahri, 2012, p270).

In **2010, Jordan Labor Watch reported over 140 labour actions**, a significant increase over preceding years (Adely, 2012). Before the Arab Spring, teachers and workers in Jordan were protesting against worsening socio-economic conditions. This had included East Bank tribes protesting against rising food prices, unemployment and corruption (Zawahri, 2012, p270). The **rising cost of fuel and utilities, depreciating wages and growing unemployment** were the clearest reasons for the protests (Adely, 2012). **Two large strikes** of port workers and phosphate workers took place in 2009 against job losses and privatisation. They highlighted growing dissatisfaction, particularly around the **lack of the right to form truly independent unions** (Adely, 2012). Worker's rights, wages and right to unionise were key points of mobilisation prior to 2010. In early 2011, protests continued around the same issues (rising food and fuel

prices, inflation and unemployment (Tobin, 2012, p98)). Both public and private sector employees staged sit-ins against the lack of household water and electricity and low wages (Zawahri, 2012, p271).

These difficult circumstances were associated with **privatisation of key public assets** (Adely, 2012). Increasing privatisation has resulted in the decline of the possibility and reliability of government jobs (Ryan, 2011, p569). East Jordanians, who used to dominate in this area, are beginning to feel disenfranchised. In addition, they are feeling displaced as they migrate from the rural south to the urban north in search of work (Ryan, 2011, p569). This has created social tensions with Palestinian Jordanians, who are visibly wealthy in some cities (Ryan, 2011, p569). The protests against privatisation of state enterprises also included some action against corruption (Susser, 2011).

Endemic corruption has consistently been a motivating factor for the protests. By 2010, commentators were concerned over the culture of socially sanctioned corruption throughout all levels of government (Susser, 2011). Corruption has constituted a uniting factor for all citizens, including the majority of protesters who were non-partisan (Muasher, 2013). **Queen Rania has been a target for anti-corruption demonstrators**. She has come under increasing scrutiny for her spending (Hamid, 2011). In February 2011, East Jordanian tribes accused her of corruption and wasting state finances on an extravagant 40th birthday party (Zawahri, 2012, p290). Several prominent figures have been arrested on charges of corruption: a former mayor of Amman; a former head of intelligence; former minister of tourism; business leaders; the King's uncle Walid Kurdi (Zawahri, 2012, p290).

A 2009 national public opinion poll by the International Republican Institute (IRI) reported that **rising living costs were the highest concern for Jordanians,** followed by unemployment, which is estimated to be as high as 30 per cent (Hamid and Freer, 2011, p2). An update in March 2013 found that 59 per cent of respondents felt the country was going in the wrong direction[3], with the top three reasons given as high prices (44 per cent), corruption (18 per cent) and poor economic conditions (10 per cent). Rises in gas and petroleum prices have caused protests in the last six months. In July 2012, only 18 per cent of responses were concerned with price increases, compared with 44 per cent in the March 2013 survey. Economic troubles are usually at the top of the list of people's grievances (Seeley, 2013).

Bouziane (2010, pp45-49) looks at an example of community interaction with the state over economic issues and services, using interviews and participant observation among tribes in 2008-9. In the Palestinian refugee camp Jadl Z, in East Amman, residents avoided expressing their concerns directly to the state, instead preferring to negotiate with the district mayor through informal networks. Local leaders are often members of the camp improvement committee and thus have connections to state actors and resources. From the perspective of state actors, demands are granted in return for social control by these local intermediaries over the potentially dangerous camp community. These relationships are largely personal and do not necessarily conform to the rule of law, but rather rely on good personal connections and influence, and power plays by individuals. This shows how, **during peaceful times, demands on the state are made primarily through informal, patronage-based routes**, rather than formally established routes.

---

[3] Those who felt the country is headed in the right direction cited security and stability as the main reason (50 per cent).

4. Community activism on political reform

Elections and democracy

Some segments of the Jordanian population have been pressing for a more democratic electoral system for several years. The Arab Spring threw this issue into the spotlight and allowed more intensive demands. The King's response (a few constitutional changes and cabinet reshuffles) has been characterised by external academics as superficial and meaningless.

2010 saw a series of demonstrations which called for **proportional representation** and **changes to electoral boundaries to reduce gerrymandering** (Susser, 2011; Tobin, 2012; Zawahri, 2012)**.** Boundaries are in favour of rural, mainly East Jordanian districts, disadvantaging women, religious minorities and urban residents, who are mainly Palestinian (Ryan, 2011, p564). A new law on some of these issues was not meaningful, and the Islamist movement and others boycotted the 2010 elections in response (Muasher, 2013; Ryan, 2011, p564). Since 2010, an independent electoral commission and a constitutional court have been established in reaction to political protest (Muasher, 2013). IRI (2013) viewed them as improving democracy and transparency in Jordan. However, these have not been enough to placate protesters.

The first demand in 2011 was for the **stepping down of the Prime Minister, Samir Rifa'i** (Tobin, 2012, p104). This was in part inspired by the ousting of Ben Ali from Tunisia, and was led by leftists and tribal leaders (Hamid and Freer, 2011, p2). The regime's response is an example of placatory reform. Rifa'i (a third generation Palestinian) is the son of previous PM Zayd Rifa'I and head of a powerful pro-regime family (Ryan, 2011, p571). King Abdullah replaced Rifa'i with Marouf Bakhit, an East Jordanian career military officer (Ryan, 2011, p571), who had previously served as Prime Minister in 2005-7 (Susser, 2011). This superficially addressed the 'problem', but not the nature of governance itself (Ryan, 2011). All that changed was the ethnic identity of the Prime Minister.

From 14 January 2011, Friday protests were held for 12 consecutive weeks (Hamid and Freer, 2011; Susser, 2011). The Muslim Brotherhood and the non-partisan protesters were now **pushing for constitutional reform** which would enable the **Prime Minister to be elected from or by government** rather than appointed by the King (Susser, 2011). Smaller political parties and other groups were not necessarily in favour of this, as the reform would probably give the largest and most powerful party (the Brotherhood) the power to choose the Prime Minister, and would not necessarily serve their own interests (Susser, 2011).

The 24 March *Shabab* Movement was a key moment in the protests. Protests required a permit from government beforehand (Tobin, 2012, p101). This protest defied the permit requirement and established a sit-in at the Ministry of Interior Circle, more closely modelled on the occupation of Tahrir Square than previous Jordanian protests (Susser, 2011; Tobin, 2012). Youth activists, organised through social media, texting, phone calls and direct discussions, **protested for democratic reform, with a patriotic flavour** (Ryan, 2011, p573). The following day, **violence broke out**, either with both sides throwing rocks at each other (Tobin, 2012, p102), or with groups of pro-regime thugs – *bultajiyya* – breaking up the demonstration, using taunting, stone-throwing and violence (Ryan, 2011, p574; Susser, 2011). The government's anti-riot police were also called out (Tobin, 2012, p102). Activists generally believed that these *bultajiyya* were mobilised from rural tribal areas and brought to Amman (Ryan, 2011, p574). The *bultajiyya* viewed demonstrators as subversives, revolutionaries and disloyal to Jordan, despite the clear nationalist symbolism shown in their protests (Ryan, 2011, p574). It is unclear what role, if any, the monarchy played in sending or condoning the *bultajiyya* (Ryan, 2011, p574).

At some point in March 2011, the regime began to respond to the protests with clear signals that legislative reform for elections was permissible to pursue, but that **constitutional reform and changing the King's prerogatives and powers were completely off the table** (Susser, 2011).

The recent elections in January 2013 also saw a **boycott** by the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political arm of the Brotherhood, and other opposition parties. The lack of reform of the gerrymandered and unrepresentative system means the same people are protesting the same systemic issues (Seeley, 2013).

In tribal areas, the dynamics have been rather different. Tribes often put forward their own candidate for elections and members of the same tribe are obliged to vote for him (Gao, 2011, p6). After election, many elected officials are overwhelmed with requests to waive fees and employ family members (Gao, 2011, p7), drawing on the clientelist tradition (Bouziane, 2010). This system has not been called into question by the democratic protests. This shows that the **dynamics outside of Amman may be different** from the capital, and rely much more on personal and kin connections than on democratic principles.

Ethnic divisions

The political situation is exacerbated by pre-existing ethnic tensions. Under the monarchy, East Jordanians hold more political and military power than Palestinians (Ryan, 2011, p567). Palestinians hold a demographic majority in Jordan, and many East Bankers **fear that a transition to full democracy would transfer power** to Palestinian Jordanians (Hamid and Freer, 2011, p5). This ethnic divide affects which issues people choose to act on: **many Palestinians were in support of electoral reform for proportional representation** as this would benefit their representation in Parliament; however, East Bankers were generally strongly opposed to this (Susser, 2011).

Hamid (2011) notes that **Jordanian officials almost unanimously caution against rapid democratisation**, citing the likelihood that the Islamist parties would win a majority, the risk that increased Palestinian political power would undermine national unity, and East Jordanians' strong tribal affiliations. Ethnic tensions are thus seen as a hindrance to democratic reform, despite the broad calls for reform across identity groups.

In Ma'an City, in the rural south of Jordan, the traditional tribal system is a formidable opponent for the state. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the city has been ruled by tribal leaders and powerful local actors, with the state being 'merely present' in the city (Bouziane, 2010, p53). These leaders accept state positions and responsibilities, but use them mainly for their own purposes and dispensing patronage to their clients. The state and leaders are bound in mutual dependency, but on balance this undermines state authority (Bouziane, 2010, p53). The relationship between the state and the tribal leaders is tenuous: tribal leaders hold much power, some of which is sanctioned by the state, but usually operate in their own and their tribe's interests rather than state interests as defined by the regime.

5. Community activism on women's rights

There is a small community of women's activists in Jordan, often supported by external donors. It has been taking slow steps towards – mostly legislative – changes. The literature presented here only refers to work prior to 2010. Tadros (2011, pp18-28) presents three case studies of women's coalitions in Jordan that work towards improving women's rights, drawn from empirical evidence from interviews

with key stakeholders of the organisations. They show how **attempts to improve women's status and rights have had to be very carefully framed** in ways which are not likely to cause offence or a backlash.

- The most successful campaign was the Movement on the **Protection of the Family against Violence**, a campaign to fight domestic violence against women. It has achieved the passing of a law which provides alternatives to incarceration for perpetrators as a means of ensuring better outcomes for the family, and has **successfully opened a public discussion on domestic violence, gained powerful supporters, and changed mindsets**. Its success is attributed to: framing the issue as family safety rather than violence against women; the coalition's strategy of gaining support from MPs before the campaign; gaining public support through real-life stories; and the timing of proposing the legislation soon after a new Parliament was elected.

- Another initiative was unsuccessful. It tried to change the article in Jordanian law which allows honour killings in the case of a woman's adultery. This was tabled in Parliament but opponents vehemently rejected it as an encouragement to licentious behaviour. This attempt did not have popular or organisational backing.

- A women's coalition initially tried to change the law to allow Jordanian women to pass on citizenship to their children if the father was not Jordanian. This also proved too contentious (mainly because of the idea that Jordanian women might marry Palestinian men and start the alternative Palestinian homeland in Jordan through their children). The coalition has had to shift their goal to ensuring socio-economic rights for these mixed-nationality children. This reframing of the issue – from women's rights to children's rights – has been more successful.

Alatiyat and Barari (2010) draw on interviews in 2010 and publicly available documents to review the opposition between women's rights activists and Islamists in Jordan. There are three main points of contention. First, Islamists claim that the ratification and use of the UN Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) instrument imposes a Western cultural imperialism. Second, amendments to the laws on honour killings and women's right to divorce received a re-write from the Supreme Shari'a Judge to make this amenable to an Islamist reading. Third, quotas for women's representation have been a divisive issue across the different branches of Islam in Jordan.

On all three topics there are civil society activists fighting on either side. The **Islamist parties do not have a clear stand on women's rights**: they have only reacted to the women's advancement agenda pushed by women's activists, rather than developed a clear position of their own. On the other hand, women's rights activists tend to use CEDAW as their main instrument, and this 'Western' framework has prompted strong reactions from the Islamists. Alatiyat and Barari identify **no decisive trend on community activism for women's rights,** as there are strong groups on either side of the debate. However, they note that Jordan is changing, as women are increasingly attending university (51 per cent of students are women) and working in formal employment.

6. **References**

Adely, F. (2012) The Emergence of a New Labor Movement in Jordan. *Middle East Report*, 42. Retrieved from: http://www.merip.org/mer/mer264/emergence-new-labor-movement-jordan

Alatiyat, I. and Barari, H. (2010). Liberating Women with Islam? The Islamists and Women's Issues in Jordan. *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 11, 3-4, 359-378. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14690764.2010.546113

Al-Nammari, F. (2013). Participatory urban upgrading and power: Lessons learnt from a pilot project in Jordan. *Habitat International* 39, 224–231. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2013.01.001

Bouziane, M. (2010) The State from Below: Local Governance Practices in Jordan. *Journal of Economic and Social Research*, 12, 1, 33-61, Special issue on Local Governance in the Middle East and North Africa. http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/15260

Gao, E. (2011) *Do the buses run on time? Tribal diversity and public goods in Jordan.* Prepared for delivery at the 2011 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1-4, 2011. Retrieved from: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1902051

Hamid, S. (2011). Jordan's Experiment: Does Top-Down Democratic Reform Work? *The Atlantic,* November 7, 2011. Retrieved from: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/11/jordans-experiment-does-top-down-democratic-reform-work/248000/

Hamid, S. and Freer, C. (2011). *How Stable Is Jordan? King Abdullah's Half-hearted Reforms and the Challenge of the Arab Spring*. Policy Briefing, Brookings Doha Center. Retrieved from: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/jordan%20hamid%20freer/10_jordan_hamid_freer.pdf

IRI (2013). *IRI Jordan Index*. International Republican Institute. Washington, D.C. Retrieved from: http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2013%20April%2010%20IRI%20Jordan%20Index.pdf

Muasher, M. (2013) *Reform in Jordan: After the Vote*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved from: http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/01/28/reform-in-jordan-after-vote/f6fg

Ryan, C. R. (2011). Identity Politics, Reform, and Protest in Jordan. *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 11, 564–578. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-9469.2011.01135.x

Seeley, N. (2013).The Jordanian state buys itself time. *Middle East Research Information Project*, 12 February 2013. Retrieved from: http://www.merip.org/mero/mero021213

Susser, A. (2011). *Jordan 2011: Uneasy Lies the Head*. Middle East Brief 52. Brandeis University Crown Center for Middle East Studies. Retrieved from: http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB52.pdf

Tadros, M. (2011) *Working Politically Behind Red Lines: Structure and agency in a comparative study of women's coalitions in Egypt and Jordan.* Developmental Leadership Program Research Paper 12. Developmental Leadership Program. Retrieved from: http://www.dlprog.org/ftp/download/Public%20Folder/1%20Research%20Papers/Working%20Politically%20Behind%20Red%20Lines.pdf

Tobin, S. A. (2012). Jordan's Arab Spring: The Middle Class and Anti-Revolution. *Middle East Policy*, 19, 96–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2012.00526.x

Zawahri, N.A. (2012). Popular Protests and the Governance of Scarce Fresh Water in Jordan. *The Arab World Geographer/Le Géographe du monde arabe.* 15, 4, 267-301.
http://arabworldgeographer.metapress.com/content/28h6277746xv2578/fulltext.pdf

Key websites

- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – Jordan section:
  http://carnegieendowment.org/regions/?fa=list&id=179

- Middle East Research and Information Project:
  http://www.merip.org/

Expert contributors

Marwan Muasher, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; former foreign minister and former deputy prime minister of Jordan

Hadeel Saadeh, UNDP Jordan

Rana Sabbagh, journalist; Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism; Jordan correspondent for The Times, London; regular columnist for the London-based Arabic newspaper Al-Hayat

Samar Dudin, Ruwwad

Suggested citation

Browne, E. (2013). *Community activism in Jordan* (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 957). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

About this report

This report is based on three days of desk-based research. It was prepared for the UK Government's Department for International Development, © DFID Crown Copyright 2013. This report is licensed under the Open Government Licence (www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence). The views expressed in this report are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of GSDRC, its partner agencies or DFID.

The GSDRC Research Helpdesk provides rapid syntheses of key literature and of expert thinking in response to specific questions on governance, social development, humanitarian and conflict issues. Its concise reports draw on a selection of the best recent literature available and on input from international experts. Each GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report is peer-reviewed by a member of the GSDRC team. Search over 300 reports at www.gsdrc.org/go/research-helpdesk. Contact: helpdesk@gsdrc.org.