The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) Process in Burkina Faso: From False Start to Restart Towards Rural Development?

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April 2014
Introduction

This report is about the adoption of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) by Burkina Faso, and tries to assess if it was a simple means of refreshing the country's agricultural policies or a starting point towards a new rural development policy. Burkina Faso is often praised for its agricultural performance and its capacity to mitigate ecological constraints thanks to the strong commitment of its ruling elite to promote progressive agricultural policies and reforms, as shown in the cotton sector. In this context, Burkina Faso seems to have favourably received the CAADP process. Therefore, one could expect its quick implementation, showing the commitment of the national leadership in favour of this process likely to bring a technical 'added value'. Despite the commitments taken in 2003 by its head of state in Maputo, however, Burkina Faso could only launch the process four years later.

The current research aims at analysing the implementation of the objectives set at Maputo in Burkina Faso, how the CAADP process was rolled out, and the results. The report starts by analysing the existence of political incentives that made possible a number of initiatives for rural development launched by relatively weak institutions. It then shows how Burkina Faso adhered to the CAADP process whose implementation was characterised by an impasse before it restarted through the formulation of a National Programme for the Rural Sector. The report also analyses the driving forces behind this process and identifies the value added springing from the CAADP implementation. Finally we draw lessons for the upcoming agricultural policies. The current case study relies on a document review and discussions with key informants: representatives of donors (Germany, Denmark), decision makers (Permanent Secretary for the Coordination of Sectoral Agriculture Policies), representatives of private sector and civil society.

1. The ambivalences of Burkina’s context: Existence of proactive agricultural policies relatively ineffective

In Burkina Faso the genesis of agricultural policies can be mainly accounted for, from the point of view of political economy, by the existence of incentive political mechanisms (1.1), which made possible a number of initiatives for rural development (1.2). These are developed and implemented by relatively weak institutional mechanisms (1.3).

1.1. Existence of incentive political mechanisms for proactive farming policies

Agricultural development is a major political, economic and social challenge for Burkina Faso. The development of the sector, which employs 80 percent of the working population, has been hampered, among other things, by the serious ecological and climatic constraints that such a landlocked Sahelian country has to face. Moreover, due to these constraints many people in Burkina are urged to migrate. Since the colonial period, the country has been considered as a pool of labour force. Millions of Burkinabé have been attracted to coastal countries like Côte d’Ivoire, and have helped to develop these through agricultural plantations (Kabbanji 2011). Despite the availability of a huge and industrious labour force, Burkina Faso regularly faces food shortages. This is partly due to low productivity caused by the environmental constraints stated above, but also by the poor modernisation of the agricultural sector. In addition, political factors have to be considered, including instalability of political regimes, weak political leadership and lack of consideration for farmers’ needs. The severe consequences of the drought and famine in the 70s led the ruling elite to place greater emphasis to the development of the agricultural sector. This was not enough for the young revolutionary elite who took power on August 4, 1983 (Englebert 1999). They initiated a radical transformation of the rural world under the leadership of Captain Thomas Sankara. The ‘peasant question’ was a strategic issue for the new regime. A land and property reform was carried out in 1984-1985, leading to exclusion of traditional authorities from land management. Indeed, traditional authorities have been considered since the first republic as obstacles to change in the rural world. The revolutionary elite in particular tried to dismantle them without success. Therevolutionary committees, established to mobilise Burkinabé, had greater control over cities than rural areas, which remained under the influence of customs and traditional authorities. The revolutionary elite ultimately failed in making farmers their political base. Meanwhile, they succeeded in alienating the support of the urban lower class, which in many African states had controlled most of the state resources and power since the independence (see Bates 1981).

On October 15, 1987, the regime’s second in command overthrew Captain Sankara in a bloody military coup. Captain Blaise Compaoré, a new president in search of legitimacy, reconciled with civil society and especially the traditional leaders. He conceded the beginning of a democratic process under internal and external pressures. A new constitution was adopted on June 2, 1991, which enshrined the separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers. However, this principle is strongly
challenged by a presidentialist regime. Major decisions are made in restricted political spheres, particularly that of the President of Burkina Faso and his party, the Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP), which controls the other centres of power. The ruling party through its leaders mobilises various political resources to maintain its superpower status. As such, they receive the support of traditional and religious leaders, who are influential political forces in the rural world. Rehabilitation of traditional leaders by the current President of Burkina Faso earned him the loyalty of the majority of these leaders to date. However, traditional leaders are increasingly and actively involved in politics. They stand as candidates for the National Assembly, mostly in favour of CDP. In Parliament or local councils, traditional leaders are quite significantly represented. Many have also used their important land property as leverage to become great businessmen, multiplying their influence further.

Despite the progress achieved in education and the economic performance of Burkina Faso, the great majority of the population is illiterate (74 percent in 2009) and still lives in dire poverty. The country has been the theatre of successive food and nutrition crises in the last ten years, particularly in 2005, 2010 and 2012, largely due to the bad performance of agricultural production (Ministry of Agriculture 2013). According to the results of the 2012 Afrobarometer survey, food insecurity remains the third most important problem that the country faces and that the government should address, after water and health issues. The results of the study show that in rural areas about six out of ten people have faced a shortage of food during the twelve months preceding the survey, against approximately four out of ten people in urban areas. For the whole country, more than half of respondents (54 percent) have experienced lack of food. These data show that food security is not only a concern for rural but also for urban populations. Regarding respondents' opinions on the government's performance in addressing the issue of food security, they seem generally negative. In fact, about seven out of ten respondents have blamed the issue on the government's actions. This negative opinion is more pronounced in urban areas (78 percent) than in rural areas (67 percent). Monetary poverty is mainly found in rural areas where agriculture and livestock prevail. About 43.9 percent of the population live below the poverty threshold. Yet, both the ruling party and President Compaoré have their support in these areas. According to the 2012 Afrobarometer survey, 44 percent of rural respondents who reported feeling close to a political party have mentioned the ruling party, against 26 percent of urban respondents. At first sight, the interests of these rural voters should be reflected in the rural development policies initiated by the government. Actually, as the country is too poor to import cheap food, the government has little choice but to develop the agriculture sector to feed the growing population, unless it is to rely on donors' aid, which is not a viable option.

Rural voters are organised around many farmers’ associations, which comprise support associations, pre-cooperative groups, cooperatives (1,200 shared in over 8,000 villages in Burkina) and umbrella organisations (20). To incorporate their concerns, the government sometimes involves various farmers’ organisations in rural development policy processes and shows openness to social dialogue. But this openness may hide less democratic intentions. Farmers’ organisations are often invited at the last minute to validate policymakers’ choices and to act as participatory window dressing. They are scarcely involved in the initial stages of reflection, and have little opportunity to influence the agenda or organise themselves to consult their grassroots and become a true source of proposals. The government fears that farmers’ organisations will become a counter-power and it tries to control them to prevent this risk. Very often, farmers have no choice but to collaborate to avoid marginalisation by the authorities if they are reluctant to align with their policy. As a consequence, the majority of farmers’ organisations have little influence over agricultural policies. They remain confined in the small world of grassroots communities, and have no effective political weight (Inter-réseau développement rural 2011). But increasingly, one can see the emergence of an independent rural leadership alongside rural elites who have been co-opted by the dominant coalition in power. The effective representativeness of these elites is however questionable. Rural people are still marginalised in policy process. Their participation often comes down to an episodic electoral participation, influenced by corruption. Rural organisations that are involved in the development of agricultural policies are mainly those led by an elite integrated in the dominant coalition in sectors like cotton. The most obvious case is undoubtedly that of the National Union of Cotton Producers of Burkina (UNPCB).

In rural areas, especially in societies with centralised structures, the weight of traditional leaders favours neither the direct exercise by the people of their right to call for government accountability nor the development of agricultural policies as a means of mobilising the electorate of farmers in these societies. These leaders give voting instructions in favour of those in power. Such instructions are followed by the majority of voters, especially in Mossi areas (half of the population is from this ethnic group) where obedience and submission to the chief are taught to people as core values of the society. But with the experience gained from the various elections and the action of farmers’ organisations, NGOs and media, rural populations have become more demanding towards authorities and elected officials. However, their claims for accountability seldom exceed their requests for better redistributions. This is why the development of ‘progressive’ agricultural policies in Burkina Faso has less to do with direct or indirect pressures exerted by the majority of the electorate and farmers’ organisations concerned in
promoting their interests than with voluntarism or leadership of the ruling elites and their own specific interests. In the cotton sector, the two motivating factors are not exclusive. Here, the success relies as much on the lineage social structure in the main production areas and the organisation of the sector, as well as the income that the state and the ruling elites gain from this sector (Kaminski and Serra 2011).

Unlike the rural countryside, cities in Burkina Faso, especially the largest ones, exert increasingly strong pressures on the ruling elites (Loada 2009). Citizens’ critical speeches in the media regarding governance, and protest actions in the streets against the high cost of living, including inflation affecting foodstuff since the global economic crisis of 2007, led the government to respond through various initiatives in agriculture: i) implementation of a development program of the most consumed cereals, namely rice and maize; and ii) creation of propitious conditions for development of animal breeding to increase livestock production through genetic improvement actions, livestock food security, promotion of the dairy industry, modernisation actions in breeding, etc.

The ruling elites tend to grab land for themselves. They invest more and more in the rural private sector, farming, livestock and small processing industries, and particularly in the agri-food sector, which remains embryonic. This sector has since the 1980s experienced the emergence of new types of actors commonly called ‘agro businessmen’; among them politicians but also public and private sector managers, members of military or paramilitary authorities, businessmen and leaders of various associations. These new players operate mainly in the southern half of the country, i.e. areas that are still enjoying fairly abundant forest resources. On the ground, few have managed to optimise returns as they acquired vast areas that remain under-exploited. The weak performance of these agro businessmen, partly due to the lack of support from the government in terms of infrastructure (roads) and input availability at reasonable costs, has raised doubts on their ability to transform Burkina Faso’s agriculture. This has discredited the political discourse that since the early 90s has tended to attribute to smallholder farmers a lack of professionalism and an inability to modernise and therefore to meet the exponentially growing food needs (GRAF, 2011: 67).

1.2. Mixed agricultural performance in Burkina Faso in the light of CAADP targets

The farming performance of Burkina Faso will be appraised, on one hand considering the objective related to the allocation of at least 10 percent of the state budget to the agricultural sector, and on the other hand with regard to the objective related to achieving at least a 6 percent growth rate in the agricultural sector.

1.2.1. Objective of 10 percent budget share: An objective largely achieved at the price of an increased financial dependence on donors

Total public expenditures in the agricultural sector include expenses specific to agriculture and those that are favourable to it (FAO 2012). The former includes measures involving financial transfers to agricultural agents or the agriculture sector as a whole. The latter includes expenses that are not strictly specific to the agriculture sector but have a significant impact on its development. These include expenditures relating to education and health in rural areas, as well as rural infrastructure expenditures regarding among others roads, water, sanitation and energy. Between 2006 and
2010, public expenditures to support the sector of agriculture and food (actual disbursements) increased from about 112bn CFAF to about 134bn CFAF. Since the 1990s, however, budget allocations in the agriculture sector show a downward trend. From an average of 20 percent in the years 1991–1999, the level dropped to 12 percent for the period 2000–2008. Over a shorter period, it went from 16.7 percent to 13 percent between 2006 and 2008 to stabilise at 13.5 percent in 2009 and 2010. This downward trend in amounts allocated to the sector of agriculture could be explained by the country’s orientation towards other sectors such as secondary or tertiary, which may be much more promising. Despite this decline, it is clear that the authorities have continuously allocated to the agricultural sector resources of a higher level than the one recommended by the Maputo Declaration, except in 2009, thus reflecting the importance the government is giving to rural development. If the share of the budget allocated to agriculture has not increased, at least it has not dropped below the 10 percent target, except in 2009. So we can say that the Maputo Declaration has probably prevented the government from excessively reducing the budget share of agriculture.

However, this is not to see the forest for the trees. The analysis of public expenditures on agriculture shows some weaknesses. Besides the downturn in the level of budget allocations, there is a high dependence on donors in Burkina Faso. Indeed, the share of investment financed by foreign agencies reached 80 percent of the total public expenditures in agriculture in 2008 (OECD 2010). Compared to other countries in the sub-region, the investment effort made by the government of Burkina Faso in the agricultural sector remains weak. Investments from domestic resources with a market share are estimated at 11 percent of total expenditures. For comparison, the share of expenditure financed by the state is estimated at 25 percent in Mali, 51 percent in Senegal and 59 percent in Benin (OECD, 2012). The amount of funds injected by donors into the rural sector of Burkina Faso was estimated at 624.17bn CFAF between 2000 and 2008. During the same period, investments absorbed 90 percent of the overall allocation. In 2008, over 200 agricultural projects were being implemented. One of the main challenges is to improve the effectiveness of these investments and the transfer of skills for optimal management of the projects.

Concerning the structure of expenditure in the agricultural sector, we can note that during the period 1991–2008 investments represented on average 86 percent of total agricultural expenditure, with a minimum of 80 percent in 1992 and a maximum of 100 percent in 1995. The vast majority of agricultural investments (86 percent) are carried out by the Ministry in charge of Agriculture, followed by the Ministry in charge of Livestock (eight percent) and finally by the Ministry of the Environment (six percent). The funding distribution in the agricultural sector per sub-sector shows that on average 49 percent of agricultural expenditures are allocated to crop production, 31 percent to water and irrigation facilities, 14 percent to the environment, four percent to livestock, and finally two percent to research. On average, 70 percent of the approved budget for the agriculture sector is executed, reflecting a relatively efficient execution of expenditure in the sector. However, despite this efficiency the growth in the agricultural sector remains below the pursued objective.

1.2.2. Erratic annual growth in the agricultural sector

During the period of 1995–2007, Burkina Faso experienced good macroeconomic performance with an actual growth rate of 6.2 percent on average and a growth rate of actual GDP per capita by 3.2 percent on average. The sector of agriculture, which employs over 80 percent of the labour force, contributes on average 33 percent in forming the GDP. As for agricultural exports, these form more than 90 percent of the total value of exports.
exports. This means that the agriculture sector is the backbone of Burkina Faso’s economic growth. But unlike GDP growth rates, agricultural sector growth was characterised by large fluctuations during the period 1980–2009, relative to the objective of six percent growth set by CAADP.

The sector has indeed experienced a relatively constant average growth trend during the past decades of between four and six percent, with the highest period of growth in the 1990s. If since 2000 the objective of six percent of growth was achieved on several occasions, it is clear that Burkina Faso has been struggling since 2005 to achieve the recommended performance, except in 2009 where it managed to reach six percent. A survey conducted by Burkina Faso, ECOWAS and NEPAD in the context of the review of development efforts in the agricultural sector shows that the current maintenance trends will not allow the country to reach the CAADP growth objective, or even a significant reduction in the poverty rate, by 2015.

One of the reasons accounting for this situation is the weakness of not only the integration of rural producers into markets but also farms yields. The productivity per worker in the sector remains almost stationary, and the growth still depends on climatic factors, particularly rainfall. Access to modern factors of production remains universally low. A study by the Ministry of Agriculture did, however, report an average increase of 2.2 percent of the physical productivity (yield) in the sub-sector of crop production during the period 1990–2006 (Ministry of Agriculture, 2008). This performance is due to the joint efforts of the government and donors for the modernisation of agriculture, as evidenced by the increase in the proportion of households using yoke or motor-driven equipment, from 38.6 percent in 1993 to 60.5 percent in 2006. In addition, there has been an increase in fertilised areas, from 15 percent during the period 1993–1996 to 29 percent in 2006, and also an increase of amounts of fertilisers per hectare, especially for cash crops and cereals (Ministry of Agriculture 2008). Improved seeds, particularly for cotton, rice and maize, have also played an important role. However, this beginning of agricultural modernisation in Burkina Faso remains vulnerable to external shocks and the risk of arable land exhaustion by 2030 because of population growth.

### 1.3. Capacities gap of national institutions in charge of agricultural policies

Despite efforts made by the government of Burkina Faso in streamlining the institutional framework of agricultural policies, it is still quite complex according to a report by the OECD (2012). The implementation of reforms remains difficult, and farmers are not aware of the responsibilities and interactions between institutions in the agricultural sector. These fall to the three Ministries of Agriculture, Water and Fisheries Resources; Environment and Sustainable Development; and Animal Resources. Each of these ministries is organised into general departments, 13 regional departments, 45 provincial departments and support areas or local offices in a variable number.

Moreover, with decentralisation, local authorities (municipalities and regions) exercise powers and responsibilities increasingly important in the...
implementation of actions related to agricultural development as well as the management of natural and land resources. Finally, a Chamber of Agriculture was created, with representation in each of the thirteen regions of the country. These regional chambers established in 2003 and 2004 are supposed to represent the diversity of farmers, protect their interests, promote a market economy in rural areas, and in the medium term, to substitute for the government in efforts to modernise agriculture through the distribution of fertilisers, tractors, ploughs and subsidies. Unfortunately, they lack capacity and resources to become efficient.

One of the main institutions of agricultural policy in Burkina Faso is undoubtedly the Permanent Secretariat for the Coordination of Agricultural Sectoral Policies (SP/CPSA) attached to the Ministry of Agriculture. Established in 2001, the secretariat has among other duties: i) the coordination of the development and working out of agricultural policy; ii) the coordination and monitoring of its implementation; iii) strengthening the partnership between the state and other stakeholders of public and private rural development sectors; iv) support to resource mobilisation; and v) assessment of the overall impact of agricultural sector policies. The Permanent Secretariat is under the authority of the Coordinating Committee of Agricultural Sector Policies (CCPSA) composed of several members, including state representatives (26 members, including 13 ministers and 13 regional governors), the private sector (6 members), civil society (33 members, among them 15 representatives of farmers’ organisations) and donors (3 members) as observers. As can be seen, members representing non-state actors dominate the composition of the committee. However, it is headed by a senior official, the Permanent Secretary for the Coordination of Agricultural Sectoral Policies (SP/CPSA), who is appointed during the Council of Ministers through a decree upon the proposal of the Minister of Agriculture with a technical advisor of the department. Although the CCPSA is composed of several ministers, the relationship between the SP/CPSA and the rest of the Burkina general public administration is far from clear.

Generally, the institutions in charge of agricultural policies suffer from a capacity gap which is rooted in several factors, among which we can name the lack of relevant data and/or data production capacities. Therefore, institutions draft project documents or programs that are cursory or incomplete, with errors of design and allocation. Another major source of capacity gaps is linked to the lack of skills in the areas of forecasts, strategic analysis, ex-ante evaluation related to net benefits of investment options, and monitoring and evaluation of strategies, policies, institutions and adopted texts. Legal instruments such as the legislative and regulatory framework and self-help tools used for funding issues are not always well known or suffer from a lack of information and communication. Finally, the consistency between the various regulatory authorities, transparency vis-à-vis investors and officials’ obligations to be accountable are still major challenges to meet.

The diagnostic analysis of the organisation and operation of the three main departments mentioned above revealed a number of constraints. The main ones are (i) an insufficient staff, (ii) poor capacity of human resources, (iii) inadequate equipment (IT and others) and (iv) lack and irregularity of financial resources, including proper monitoring of activities, statistics collection, processing and dissemination. Moreover, the weak legal and regulatory framework and the poor capacities in terms of planning, monitoring and evaluation are other impediments to achieving objectives. Finally, the required mechanisms to harmoniously manage and operate the whole sector are still incomplete and weak.

The Ministry of Agriculture, mostly concerned with CAADP, was facing organisational challenges according to some donors. Procedures are cumbersome, the laws and regulations governing the sector are difficult to access, and middle grade and junior staff’s skills are poor. All of these shortcomings have resulted in: i) gaps in coordinating the preparation, implementation and capitalisation funding of projects; ii) a multiplicity of interventions leading to a great diversity of methods carried out in projects’ and programs’ implementation, resulting in a lack of consistency and poor performance across the sector; iii) lack of clarity in defining priorities, which does not allow the state to establish rules or principles favourable to the harmonisation of interventions; iv) lack of synergy and complementarity, or even the existence of contradictions in interventions; and v) the challenge for the state to ensure its leadership in front of multiple proposals it has been submitted to.

This results in inefficiency and ineffectiveness of public assistance to development. Given the institutional weaknesses of the three ministries involved in rural development, partners like the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ) have provided technical support to address these within the framework of CAADP. In the same perspective, an institutional analysis of the SP/CPSA was conducted with an emphasis on its capacities to coordinate the process. On this basis, GIZ supported a strategy of capacity building targeting the operational capabilities of the SP/CPSA and also the departments in charge of studies and planning of the three major ministries, because the weaknesses were not conducive to consistency and articulation of the various initiatives regarding policies, including the CAADP process.
Box 1: Organisational analysis of SP/CPSA

Taking into account the tasks assigned to the SP/CPSA and expectations, responsibilities and coordination tasks that this structure should play in the development of the National Programme for the Rural Sector, GIZ provided support in order to achieve an organisational analysis of the Permanent Secretary followed by support for organisational development. Thus, two consultants/facilitators with strong experience in this area have been assigned to this mission.

The assessment of institutional and organisational areas of SP/CPSA, conducted in November and December 2010 through a participatory process, has highlighted a number of weaknesses and shortcomings that were likely to affect its efficiency and performance in coordinating the process of formulating the National Programme for the Rural Sector. In this context, several activities have been planned and implemented in 2011 to support the implementation of recommended measures: revision of the organisation and redesign of tasks assigned to the staff; improving of internal and external communication; training of staff in IT and administrative management; provision of equipment and computer equipment; regular monitoring of the implementation of the action plan and periodical reports; and reactivation of the website of SP/CPSA.

This resulted in the following changes: i) improving of the organisation of work within the SP/CPSA (more pro-active on issues, stronger leadership of the Permanent Secretary, better performance); ii) improving of internal consultation and communication (flow of information, better information on work schedules, more enhanced complementarity); iii) efficient organisation of divisions and revitalisation of the SP/CPSA (assignment of agents in divisions, appointment of officials, definitions of tasks); iv) improving of the pace and work environment; and v) improving of external communication and consultation (with ministries, non-state actors and donors).

2. Chaotic adherence to the CAADP process: From impasse to the process restart

The adherence of Burkina Faso to the CAADP process was not an easy task. The country has indeed struggled to articulate this process with existing policies and strategies. It required a takeover of this process by the political leadership with the support of donors to lift impasses created by bureaucracy. This enabled a restart of the process that brought it in line with existing policies and strategies under the form of a National Program for the Rural Sector (PSNR).

2.1. The beginning of the CAADP process: Difficult legacy of previous initiatives

In the early 1990s, Burkina Faso adopted a structural adjustment policy under which several adjustment programs were implemented in the agricultural sector. These programs contributed to record macroeconomic performance, but failed to improve the living conditions of rural populations in particular. In 2000, the government adopted a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (CSP), a national document of reference for all sectoral policies for development. Additional measures of the fight against poverty were adopted for its review in 2003. The same year, Burkina Faso adopted a National Strategy for Food Security (SNSA) and a Strategy for Rural Development (SDR) consistent with the CSLP. Both strategies were targeting key objectives for 2015, firstly halving the number of people suffering from hunger and malnutrition, and secondly a sustained growth of the rural sector to contribute to the fight against poverty, to enhance food security and to promote sustainable development.

For the implementation of the SDR, three main sectoral programs have been formulated by the three ministries in charge of rural development: i) Investment program in agriculture, water and fisheries resources (PISA); ii) Ten-year Action Program of environment and living framework (PDA-ECV); and iii) Action Programs and investment plan in animal breeding sector (PAPISE). According to the PNSR document (Government of Burkina Faso 2011), the implementation of these three programs enabled progress but failed to significantly transform the rural world. Several gaps were highlighted, particularly low ownership of these programs formulated by the three ministries in charge of rural development. The PNSR document does not provide any information about the reasons for this low ownership. But the lack of genuine participation of the stakeholders, including non-state actors and donors, in the process of the formulation of these programs may be one explanation. Other gaps are the prevalence of a ‘project approach’ among ministries and donors, and insufficient and inefficient use of resources allocated to the agricultural sector. Added to this is institutional instability in the sector as well as across sub-sectors, which is a source of inconsistent programs and poor coordination of interventions (Ibid). The CAADP process was an opportunity to address all of these gaps.

While Burkina Faso committed itself in Maputo in 2003 to adopt the CAADP process, like other African countries, in 2006 and 2007 the government began a process of formulating a Sectoral Program for a Productive Rural Development (PROSDRp) to strengthen the coordination...
of the three development programs under way, adopted for the implementation of the rural development strategy. To this end, a meeting of the Consultation Framework for Rural Development Partners (CCPDR) held on July 4, 2007 adopted a concept note accompanied by a timeline called a ‘roadmap’ for the development of the new sectoral program, which would also be inspired by the program approach in line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. But the design process of PROSDRp would be laced with problems. On the one hand, the drafted roadmap budget did not receive the consent of donors, with the result that planned activities would be conducted depending on the selective will of donors. On the other hand, the methodological note proposed for the drafting of a consistent framework organising interventions in the productive rural sector did not receive the consensus of stakeholders and could not be submitted to the CCPDR for adoption.

Faced with this impediment, another parallel process would be initiated in September 2007 by SP/CPSA. It resulted in the development of a National Program for Agricultural Investments (PNIA) for 2009–2015. The process was supported by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) within the framework of the implementation of the regional agricultural policy (ECOWAP) adopted in January 2005 to operationalise the CAADP process. To this end, a delegation of the ECOWAS Commission led by Commissioner for Agriculture, Environment and Water Resources visited Burkina Faso on 19 to 21 September 2007 in order to launch the PNIA development process. The mission contacted the three ministers in charge of rural development and the main technical departments of these ministries. Thus, the authorities were officially informed on the launching process and its challenges. At the end of the launching mission of the process and given the time constraints, a memo from the Secretary General of the Ministry of Agriculture set up thematic groups in charge of preparing national documents with the technical support of consultants, according to the methodological note proposed by the ECOWAS Commission.

This process happened faster than the PROSDRp development process. Many factors explain this speed. On the one hand, even though the approach was consultative, it was much more controlled by the SP/CPSA and received many resources for its implementation. On the other hand, the persons in charge of the implementation of this issue were deeply committed and received full support from NEPAD under the program of technical development. This assistance consisted of providing an inventory and analysing the strength of technical and financial support to the process regionally (ECOWAS) and throughout the continent (NEPAD). Donors also complained that the PNIA was too ambitious and expensive (more than USS2bn). In addition, they criticised PNIA initiators for having developed it without first conducting a sectoral review. According to an official of the SP/CPSA the donors’ reluctance can be explained differently. He thinks they were unwilling to support the PNIA/CAADP because they were not involved in the process of formulation and wanted to protest against the fait accompli of the Burkinabe officials, who showed their ability to draft quality documents by avoiding donors’ support and relying on the ECOWAS Commission. As evidence, the several meetings held to bring the donors in to amend the documents and make them more confident were unsuccessful. They refused any cooperation, requiring a prior review of the agricultural sector. But beyond these misunderstandings, one may wonder about the motivations of the SP/CPSA to initiate the PNIA development process conjointly with the PROSDRp development one.

Two reasons can be highlighted: i) the impasse or even the deadlock over the PROSDRp process; and ii) the desire to attract the maximum funding resulting from the PNIA/CAADP/ECOWAP process and the inability to refuse, or the trend to accept, any project generating financial resources even though it does not fit with the country’s priorities. Anyway, the Burkinabe officials themselves were divided between those advocating for the PROSDRp development process and those favourable to the PNIA/CAADP. The main argument set forth by the former is
that Burkina Faso has already spent a lot of time, energy and resources to design PROSDRp, considered to be an endogenous program, whereas the CAADP process is seen as an exogenous, top-down process. Burkina Faso has also already met one of the major CAADP objectives, allocating at least ten percent of its budget to agriculture.

Those advocating for the PNIA/CAADP process argue that Burkina Faso cannot but take part in this major process initiated by ECOWAS and NEPAD at the regional and continental level. The country is committed to operationalising it on the national level. Certainly, the goal of spending at least ten percent of budgetary resources on agriculture is already achieved by Burkina Faso, but the country is struggling to meet the growth requirement of Maputo (growth of agricultural value added of six percent). In other words, the commitments taken in terms of making effort regarding budgets is not yet mainstreamed in accelerated growth, as reported in the Evaluation Report of the OECD (2010). Burkina Faso’s adherence to the Maputo process is therefore justified. However, this membership will be entangled with problems as described above, particularly due to the difficulty for Burkina Faso to articulate this process with other initiatives prior to or after Maputo.

2.2. The end of the impasse by the takeover of political leadership: Concept note from the Minister of Agriculture

The Government of Burkina Faso being heavily dependent of donors, their objections to the program of agricultural investments drafted by the SP/CPSA could not be ignored. To avoid blocking, as was the case for PROSDRp, the Minister of Agriculture took the initiative to ask for a joint mission of support from the secretariats of NEPAD and ECOWAS Commission to the process. At the end of the mission, it was proposed to merge the process of PROSDRp with the PNIA/CAADP one. The benefits of such a merging would be improved targeting and better coordination of interventions and funding to improve their impacts, with expected results of improving the capacity of actors and a better absorption of funds, and hence a higher welfare for beneficiaries. A single sector program is more likely to integrate useful synergies and expand opportunities for growth, income generation and employment, to combat poverty and ensure food security. In 2010, a dialogue between the government and donors also concluded on the need for this merging and to have a single process, a single program. The government recognised that the development of two sectoral programs for the same rural sector (PROSPDRp and PNIA) is an inconsistent approach that characterises the development of several public policies in Burkina Faso. Finally the government decided, after a year of deadlock, to enforce the decision to merge the two processes and appointed various stakeholders to reflect on the practical modalities related to the merging.

To this end, the Minister of Agriculture drafted a concept note for the development of the new program in May 2010, with the assistance of a technical assistant from GIZ and an expert in the sectoral program approach. This confirms the influence that donors have on policymaking, particularly in the agriculture sector. The concept note set a number of principles that the new sectoral program should respect, namely: i) the uniqueness of a national program for the rural sector; ii) the leadership of the state and alignment of partners; iii) priority setting at the sector level; iv) coherence, coordination and harmonisation of interventions; v) the integration and articulation of current initiatives at national, sub-regional and continental levels; vi) flexibility to take into account the changing of contexts; vii) the inclusion and participation of stakeholders; and finally viii) good governance, namely transparency of funding, interventions and outcomes, as well as effective and transparent coordination and monitoring. An institutional framework of formulation was set up in the form of a permanent consultation mechanism, responsible for driving the process of formulating the PNSR. The concept note also states the PNSR’s goal, which is to provide orientation based on the SDR, definition of mandates of the three ministries in charge of the rural development (Agriculture, Animal Resources and Environment) and the development of projects, programs and operations so that they meet the needs for economic, social and cultural development of rural stakeholders in Burkina Faso.

One should highlight that finally a new SP/CPSA was appointed in October 2010 by the government. The previous Permanent Secretary seems to have paid for the impasse of the process, which according to some has a new start under the leadership of the Minister of Agriculture and the new Permanent Secretary he appointed.

2.3. Restarting the CAADP process: Development of a National Program for the Rural Sector

The operationalisation of the CAADP process in Burkina Faso will restart with the adoption of the concept note mentioned above and through the development of a roadmap. Conducting a review of the rural sector has enabled the government to set the major areas of intervention of the PNSR, after which an agreement was signed on July 22, 2010 to mark the commitment and adhesion of different groups of stakeholders. The necessary resources to conduct the process were mobilised through a common funding memorandum of agreement signed on October 1, 2010 between the government and its partners. One of the fundamental principles that has guided the development process of PNSR was the effective participation of various stakeholder groups (government, CBOs, donors, professional agricultural organizations and the private sector) to ensure that the program best reflects the concerns and aspirations of all. In order to optimise in particular the participation of non-state actors, different
consultation meetings were initiated specifically for them. The implementation of a participative and inclusive approach has resulted in a certain slowness in the process of developing the PNSR. In addition, this process began experiencing growing slack at some point, due in part to the change of SP/CPSA leadership. Moreover, the three key ministries have each sought to have their separate program, whereas the idea was to set up a sectoral approach. These misconceptions or misunderstandings have also contributed to delaying the process.

At the technical level, the development of PNSR was not made without constraints, including the lack of a methodological handbook for drafting sectoral programs based on a program approach. In the absence of such a handbook and the poor control of this approach by many actors, gaps were identified in the assessing costs of different programs (wait-and-see assessing of additional funding for the implementation of activities); and exaggerated ambitions with no relation to the objectives, means available or likely mobilisation and absorption capacity. This required the organisation of training sessions for different stakeholder groups. Another identified issue was a gap in priority setting, sources of growth and modalities to achieve growth rates with regard to the macroeconomic framework of the Strategy of Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development (SCADD) for the entire rural sector. Finally, delay in procurement was noticed regarding purchases (assets and surveys) due to cumbersome general procedures of public procurement.

The option was made to build PNSR sub-programs around the key mission areas of ministries in charges of the rural sector in order to establish long-term programs. In this sense, following the identification of sub-programs, working groups were set up. The results of this work constituted the raw material for a writing team supervised by the SP/CPSA, who worked to come out with a first version of the PNSR. This was introduced at the first session of the Inter-ministerial Technical Committee on September 2, 2011. Thereafter, consultations continued around this first version. During this process, the team received support from various African and international organisations, which reviewed the document to ensure its quality compared to international requirements. After working on the observations made by stakeholders, the phase of technical validation and adoption was opened. In total, the PNSR is divided into 13 sub-programs resulting from a breakdown of missions entrusted to the three ministries in charge of the sector, gathered around five areas: (i) improving food security and sovereignty; (ii) increasing incomes of rural populations; (iii) sustainable development of natural resources; (iv) improving access to fresh water and living framework; and (v) the development of partnerships among rural actors. An external review made by NEPAD, ECOWAS, FAO and IFPRI in January 2012 generated a positive evaluation (Union africaine, 2012). Finally, a business meeting was held in March 2012.

However, the formulation of the PNSR has resulted in internal policy debates. Some national experts criticised the PNSR, deploring the fact that it does not correspond to the announced merging of PROSDRp and PNIA, insofar as the achievements of both programs (conceptual notes, diagnosis, defined priorities, investments programs, sectoral program approach instead of project approach) were purely and simply abandoned. Their criticism does not focus on the content of the new program, but on the fact that the process was restarted from scratch, instead of capitalising on existing programs. In addition, they add that PNSR coming in the mandates of the three ministries in charge of rural development shows that it really does not rely on the sectoral program approach but rather a juxtaposition of these ministries' program budgets. Indeed, the sub-programs of PNSR were built around the missions and attributions of the three ministries in charge of rural development under the supervision of the SP/CPSA. However, other stakeholders have been involved in order to address their concerns and take into account the lessons learnt from the previous programs.

The implementation of the PNSR will require extra effort in terms of budget allocations from the state. An objective of near 16 percent has been set. However, expectations of donors remain strong. The government has addressed a funding request to them in which it is expected from them an alignment to PNSR and the coverage of financing needs estimated at about 1,200bn CFAF for the period of 2011–2015. A result-oriented management system and the organisation of annual reviews of public expenditure in the sector open to all players are planned by the PNSR to significantly improve the quality of approved investments. But quality will only effectively improve if participants, particularly non-state actors, have sufficient capacity and reliable information to challenge officials’ views. Several mechanisms and tools for follow-up and performance measurement are foreseen by PNSR. They can enhance the quality of the implementation of the program if they are provided with the required resources to operate. But because of their complexity, doubts arise about the ability of the government to set them up before the end of the program period (2011–2015).

Regarding the funding of PNSR, the contribution of the state and local communities is estimated at 31 percent of the total cost of supply of the program, that is to say 379.14bn CFAF over the first five years. This share is almost three times larger than current state contributions (around 11 percent of total expenditures in agriculture). Additional contributions expected from donors represent 30 percent of the overall cost of PNSR, that is to say 370.43bn CFAF, an extra mobilisation of 91.19bn CFAF over 5 years. As far as NGOs and other organisations of civil society are concerned, their contribution is estimated at three percent of budget from 2012, for a total of 31.43bn CFAF. Regarding the contributions expected from the private sector and financing institutions, they will be around seven percent of PNSR funding, that is to say a total of 73.34bn CFAF. The grassroots population or beneficiaries would also contribute to funding the PNSR in different forms according to the principle of responsibility. This contribution will be approximately one percent, that is
to say 1.23bn CFAF from 2012. The funding gap of 364.743bn CFAF would be looked for with external partners (Union africaine, Janvier 2012).

3. **CAADP process driving forces in Burkina Faso**

3.1. **The leadership of the Minister of Agriculture and the Permanent Secretary of CPSA**

In Burkina Faso, the SP/CPSA attached to the Ministry of Agriculture laid out the basis of the CAADP process. This institution implemented the first process which led to the adoption of PNIA/CAADP by avoiding the help of the donors represented in Burkina Faso and relying on ECOWAS experts. However, this process has been conducted in line with the PROSDRp development process. Some donors have viewed this action as a sign of institutional weakness and an illustration of the SP/CPSA’s inability to coordinate the CAADP process consistently with the previous initiatives. This is why a new Permanent Secretary has been appointed and GIZ has provided technical support to the institution. The significant role played by M. Saga Ilboudo, the new SP/CPSA, was highlighted by informants. As a Rural Development Engineer, and after taking his duty in October 2010, he has improved and coordinated the overall work that resulted in the adoption of the PNSR. Several interviewees also stressed the leadership played by Mr Laurent Sedego, the Minister of Agriculture, in resolving the situation when the PNIA/CAADP development process led to an impasse. Several interviewees said that Minister Sedego took the initiative to request technical assistance from ECOWAS and NEPAD to solve the impasse stated above. The two regional institutions therefore suggested the merger of the two processes (PNIA/CAADP and PROSPDRp). The Minister is the one who has proposed the framework paper marking the starting point for the development of the PNSR. A technical assistant from GIZ who performed as a technical advisor to the Minister congratulated him, emphasising his skill, his proficiency in dealing with the issues and his willingness to impose BurkinaBé leadership in the sector. By committing himself to getting the CAADP process out of its impasse, the Minister of Agriculture has allowed Burkina Faso to reconcile with the donors represented in the country. Their reluctance was indeed likely to jeopardise their agreement about the government’s major options, the provision of technical assistance and additional financial resources for the implementation. By revitalising the CAADP process, the Government of Burkina Faso expects that the African Union, NEPAD and ECOWAS will mobilise and provide the necessary financial and technical support to the country.

3.2. **The involvement level of the private sector and civil society**

Over time, authorities have become more open to social dialogue. But this openness can sometimes hide less democratic intentions. Governments find it more difficult to accept dialogue as a challenge on the political register. Very often, farmers’ organisations have no choice but to collaborate and risk being marginalised by the authorities if they appear to protest too much. Very often the dialogue between the central authorities and farmers’ organisations ends with vague compromises, the true decisions being relegated to less participatory bodies. Very often, the way in which farmers’ organisations are consulted determines the sincerity of the authorities’ openness. Their participation is completely different depending on whether they are invited at the last minute to a “validation workshop” to act as participatory window dressing, or are involved in the initial stages of reflection, have an influence on the agenda and can get organised materially to consult with the grassroots and be a true source of proposals. Ultimately, the main condition allowing non-state actors to participate effectively in public policy and transmit a form of change is merely the willingness of the political authorities (Inter-réseaux Développement rural 2011).

In Burkina Faso, many consultation mechanisms exist for the private sector and civil society. The government generally recommends a participatory approach to the development of public policies. The institutionalisation of a state/private sector consultation forum has gained credibility over time because of a better organisation of the private sector. Such is not the case with the consultation mechanisms for civil society organisations (CSOs), whose good functioning is hindered by their relative disorganisation, especially in rural areas. This serves as a pretext for the government to lead the producers’ organisations, as happened in the cotton sector with the National Union of Cotton Producers of Burkina (UNPCB), and to marginalise the existing organisations that it cannot control politically.

Barry (2006) explained the weak capacities of CSOs in influencing the definition of development policies in Burkina Faso by the limited capacities of the government to involve CSOs in the elaboration of development policies in a participatory way. He also noted that influencing policies is a complex, costly and long exercise that does not correspond to the usual methods of CSO interventions. Other factors are constraints on time and financial resources. It turns out, in fact, that the implementation of participatory approaches demands substantial de-concentration and large numbers of meetings with stakeholders at the base. All this requires more time and the mobilisation of significant human resources which many CSOs cannot afford.

Regarding the CAADP process, the framework paper of the Minister of Agriculture set the effective participation of the various stakeholder groups (government, donors, private sector, civil society and organisations of...
agricultural producers) as the first principle of the PNSR development process. Such participatory methods combined with the stakeholders’ learning process partly explains why the PNSR adoption was so slow. Neither the civil society nor the private sector stakeholders are always proactive; they often take a long time before responding to SP/CPSA initiatives. But working at the non-state actors’ pace should be considered the price of an authentically participatory process likely to promote ownership of the programs. On this level, non-state actors have received political support from donors, who insisted that all stakeholders be effectively involved in the process. Mr Issiaka Dao, President of one of the major agricultural organisations, the Confederation Paysanne du Faso (CPF), said the civil society would have been marginalised in favour of ‘technicians’ if the donors had not exerted pressure. Respecting the principle of an inclusive participation is meant to ensure the consideration of the lessons drawn from past experiences and the concerns and aspirations of all. Consultation workshops were held for professional agricultural organisations including the private agricultural sector and other organisations from the civil society, aiming at organised the involvement of non-state actors in the PNSR development process. The CPF will create an alliance with other NGOs, such as the Permanent Secretariat of NGOs (SPONG) and Oxfam, to achieve effective participation in the PNSR development process. Dealing with the farmers’ land grabbing issue is part of Mr Dao’s concerns. Participating in the PNSR development process was an opportunity to value his opinion on the issue, which is the need to protect smallholder farmers.

As usual, the consultative procedures in Burkina Faso gather both the ‘technicians’ of the ministries and non-state actors. The former, namely those from the SP/CPSA, will appoint themselves as volunteers to develop a draft of the program to be submitted to civil society and the private sector for amendment. However, non-state actors have rejected such an approach and have expressed their willingness to be fully involved and available throughout the PNSR development process. For some donors, there is a lack of credibility with certain actors, especially those from civil society, some of which seem to be primarily driven by the per diems distributed at various meetings.

The private sector leaders were less available than their counterparts from civil society, but actively participated in the PNSR debates. The private sector has been able to influence the debates through the technical skills received from GIZ. The latter organised a training session about the program approach for its representatives. Better organised than civil society, the private sector has developed a consultative framework gathering interveners in the agro-silvo-pastoral, fisheries and wildlife sectors. This grouping aims at defending and representing the interests of the rural private sector within the framework of dialogue with the government institutions and/or other partners. In such circumstances, several activities aiming at reinforcing an efficient participation by the rural private sector in the PNSR development and implementation process were led. The Fédération nationale des industries agroalimentaires (National Federation of Agri-food Industries) is one of the private sector representatives. A representative of this organisation confirmed his full participation in the PNSR development process and ensured that the amendments proposed by the federation will be taken into account. The private sector participation in the PNSR development actually goes back to the rural sector review in 2010. During that meeting, the private sector representatives contributed to settling the outlines and identifying the constraints affecting the rural sector. Upon the pact signature under the PNSR development and implementation in July 2010, the National Federation of Agri-food Industries represented the private sector. This organisation was established in November 1991 to promote its members’ interests. In this pact, the rural private sector stakeholders committed themselves to be more professional and to be the driving forces of an accelerated growth. They envisioned contributing more visibly to the PNSR implementation, which aims at turning the rural sector into a modern and competitive sector characterised by food and nutrition security through market-oriented production in a healthy environment with competitive and sustainable processing industries. The private sector is also part of the PNSR steering and policy committee and its interdepartmental technical committee. In such regard, it contributes to defining the conditions to increase productivity, training, supervision, monitoring and evaluation of PNSR. Finally, it contributes to funding the program through business creation.

3.3. The role of ECOWAS and NEPAD in the process

From the start, ECOWAS and NEPAD have provided financial and technical support to the PNIA development process as part of CAADP. This has enabled the SP/CPSA to avoid assistance from the donors present in Burkina Faso. More broadly, ECOWAS’s impulses and political influence were incentive measures for Member States like Burkina Faso. The highest number of countries involved in CAADP is within the ECOWAS region. The regional economic community has itself adopted a regional agricultural policy – ECOWAP – that fit into the CAADP process. As several ECOWAS Member States were already involved in the process, Burkina Faso could not remain on the sidelines for long, risking the loss of foreign funding opportunities. We can therefore say that ECOWAS commitment was an additional reason for Burkina Faso to take part in the process. Burkina Faso is also a member of UEMOA (West African Economic and Monetary Union) that is under French economic and political influence. The dynamic of regional cooperation within UEMOA includes the agriculture sector. Indeed, UEMOA has its own regional agricultural policy adopted in December 2001, before Maputo, and this may have encouraged its members to expand the dynamic of cooperation at the ECOWAS level.

Some donors in Burkina Faso criticised NEPAD and ECOWAS for not being cautious in the support provided
to the PNIA development process. When it became apparent that two parallel processes were under way, both of these institutions should have postponed and analysed the situation. They should have stopped supporting this duplication, even though the onus lay on Burkina Faso. However, these criticisms acknowledge that most of the stakeholders, including those from the regional level, were involved in a learning process synonymous with the possible mistakes. Finally, ECOWAS and NEPAD are to be credited for having jointly helped in solving the impasse in Burkina Faso by forwarding a solution (the merger of the two parallel processes). With the restart of the CAADP process through the PNSR development, NEPAD has continued to express its solicitude, for example its desire to contribute to the roadmap budget. This is how an amendment was made to the Financing Memorandum signed between Burkina Faso and its three partners, namely GIZ, Austrian Development Cooperation (ADC) and Danish Development Cooperation (Danida), to allow entry of NEPAD into the common basket.

3.4. CAADP integration in policies and existing strategies

In the Pact for the PNSR development and implementation signed in July 2010, the government is committed to ensuring effectiveness and complementarities under the implementation of the CAADP and ECOWAP agenda as part of PNISR. The government is committed to carrying out the decision of the Heads of State and Government, namely to allocate at least ten percent of national budgets to the agricultural sector, and endeavours to ensure maximum efficiency of the use of the resources allocated to the rural sector.

In January 2012, a delegation of NEPAD, ECOWAS and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) conducted a post-compact technical review. The review aims at improving the quality of investment programs to make sure all necessary and possible measures are taken to meet the objectives and targets defined in the plan and set out in the ECOWAP/CAADP program. At the end of the mission, the reviewing staff concluded that Burkina Faso’s PNSR perfectly complies with CAADP’s goals, objectives and vision. The reviewing staff congratulated the government for the quality of the sectoral programme preparation process, which successfully integrated the principles of CAADP (Union africaine, Janvier 2012). At the sub-regional level, the PNSR is included in the optimisation process of the common agricultural policies of both ECOWAS (ECOWAP) and UEMOA (PAU), and takes into account the requirements of guideline 06-2009/CM/UEMOA which plans the establishment of program budgets in the UEMOA Member States by 2017.

However, the review report proposed the following recommendations to be considered as principles for improvement of the PNSR implementation: i) an invitation to go on with the comprehensive, interdepartmental and participatory approach of agricultural development both at the national and regional levels during the PNSR implementation; ii) the realisation of the compliance of the various stakeholder groups with the commitments taken in accordance with the Pact along the PNSR implementation; iii) an invitation to continue the common basket experience to fund the PNSR implementation; iv) donors’ representation in the technical committee in charge of the PNSR implementation; v) the establishment of a smaller facilitation unit within the inter-departmental technical committee, in which each stakeholder representation ensures participatory management of the PNSR implementation while respecting the roles and responsibilities of the various existing bodies; and vi) the need for Burkina Faso to further clarify its expectations through the PNSR regarding ECOWAP/CAADP, ECOWAS regional policy and the Regional Investment Program for the agricultural sector, more specifically concerning markets development and trade facilitation issues.

The PNSR development also takes into account the six percent objective for agricultural growth and allocations of at least ten percent of budget to the sector. Indeed, according to the post-compact mission review, an effective implementation of the PNSR sub-sectoral production plan would increase the total GDP, the agricultural GDP and non-agricultural GDP by five percent, 6.2 percent and 4.5 percent per year on average over the period 2011–2015. Although these rates were below the efforts required to meet the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) for reducing poverty by 2015, they are consistent with the CAADP average growth target and the performances required to meet the MDG for reducing poverty by 2020. In addition, the PNSR recommends that allocating 16 percent of the budget is necessary to implement the program. This figure is based on: i) the government’s priorities and visions to meet the SCADD growth objectives (average growth of the value added in the rural sector by 10.7 percent over the period); ii) allocations of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (CDMT) by the economic sector based on the SCADD budgetary framework; and iii) coherence between these policies. Many sectoral studies that resorted to economic models were inspired the PNSR development process. The definition of PNSR objectives has been supported by economic models such as the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) and the computable general equilibrium model (CGE) that the external review confirmed when adjustments were proposed.

3.5. Donors’ attitudes toward CAADP

Since the CAADP process was revitalised through the PNSR development, it has been politically, financially and technically supported by donors. Organised in thematic groups, they participate in consultations under the PNSR with the World Bank as a leader for the rural development/food security work group. These donors meet every month, which allows them to harmonise their positions and stand as one with the government of Burkina Faso. They are represented in the CCPDR (Consultation Framework of Partners for Rural Development), along
with the Administration, the private sector and civil society, allowing them to influence agricultural policy development. In addition, they have established a common basket to fund the PNSR development process. This has been suggested by the post-compact review as a model for other African countries and an experience to follow for the PNSR implementation. On this last point, the government wished to have funding through budget support. But donors were reluctant, saying that conditions were not satisfactory.

Some initially reluctant donors finally joined the process, while others (Germany and Denmark) were deeply engaged in the PNSR. For Germany, the PNSR development process meets one of the ‘framework conditions’ defined by Bonn for sustainable agriculture, namely the establishment of both institutions and suitable sectoral policies. It is in this context that Germany helped Burkina Faso in reviewing the sectoral policies of three key ministries (Agriculture, Animal Resources and Environment) through technical support. This process led to the adoption of the Rural Development Strategy (SDR). With the PNSR adoption, Burkina Faso now has a single strategic document regarding rural development, which aims at promoting an agricultural development oriented towards markets, more specifically towards food self-sufficiency, and which considers coordinating interventions and setting priorities as one of the conditions of aid effectiveness. These are all the changes that are the basis of the German commitment to the PNSR. Other donors are less engaged. However, authorities have exerted some pressure, especially the Minister of Agriculture, for them to be engaged in the PNSR.

Because of their massive involvement in agricultural investments in Burkina Faso (80 percent), donors have some leverage with the government. They would like to see more results and have urged the government to involve non-state actors in policy processes. Thus they support capacity building of these actors to reinforce their ability to negotiate with the government.

4. The value added springing from CAADP implementation

The CAADP process, which led to the PNSR development, was marked by several consultations during which debates were conducted about Burkina Faso’s agricultural aspects and the derived policy priorities. Although not part of the CAADP process, several regional conferences and a national conference were held in 2011 on agriculture and food security issues. At the national conference held from November 24-26, 2011 in Ouagadougou, the Prime Minister underscored the paradox existing in Burkina Faso. Burkinabé agriculture involves 85 percent of the country’s workforce but does not produce adequate resources to feed its population. According to him, the intensification of agricultural activities and the farmers’ access to markets are becoming crucial, as Burkina Faso’s annual growth rate is estimated at three percent with 45 percent of arable lands worked – indeed, overexploited and increasingly exhausted. The Minister of Agriculture highlighted the food deficit caused by the low rainfall. He recalled the measures and actions that the government has already undertaken to make sure food is accessible to the whole population. Donors, through the World Bank representative, have confirmed their commitment to support the government in implementing the conference’s final policies. The representative of farmers and non-state actors pointed out the farmers’ primary concerns, namely the difficulties of funding agricultural activities and marketing agricultural products; the problems relating to climate hazards; and the need for better management of water resources to practice agriculture regardless of seasons. The participants at this general assembly made proposals to turn the rural sector into a modern, professional and competitive sector which will ensure food security and respect the environment. Such proposals focus on sustainable solutions for better use and preservation of natural resources to solve issues of funding, access to inputs and bringing products to markets. Developing adequate technologies and increasing their value was also proposed. Similarly, it was agreed to make the legal framework more conducive to carrying out rural sector activities and therefore ensure better management of food security issues. Finally, the participants proposed the establishment of a committee charged with monitoring the implementation of the reform measures. This committee, headed by the SP/CPSA, includes the representatives of the various stakeholder groups in the rural sector (state, civil society organisations, private sector, technical and financial partners, etc.).

The discussion over modernising and professionalising the agricultural sector continued during the Farmers’15th National Day (JNP) held from April 19-21, 2012. Chaired by the President of Burkina Faso, this meeting convenes annually with participation from producers, the government and the agriculture sector officials. Rural land governance, and more specifically the land grabbing issue, is part of Burkina Faso’s recurrent agricultural problems. The representatives of farmers’ organisations, namely the CPF (Confédération Paysanne du Faso), think that the small-scale farming that feeds the whole country is not to be neglected, even as agri-business has not yet kept its promises of productivity and its areas of development are expanding to the detriment of farmers’ land rights. This is why land rights need to be secured through the simplification of the presently very difficult administrative procedures.

Relying on a study conducted by two lecturers/researchers from CEDRES and funded by the CPF under the development of its PNSR vision, the CPF affirms that small producers using plough-equipped animal driven carts are presently more successful than the great agri-businessmen using modern tractors. Many agri-businessmen have not been able to exploit the hundreds of hectares they have acquired. The CPF chairman said that holding the general assembly over agriculture issues
was the opportunity to valorise family farming, which has been pilloried by agri-business advocates such as the Minister of Agriculture.

The vision developed now considers both kinds of exploitation, family farming as well as agri-business, to the great satisfaction of farmers’ organisations in Burkina Faso. PNSR considers such a vision and integrates it operationally in its sub-programs, policies and strategies, among them the National Policy for Secure Land Rights in Rural Areas (PNSFMR). The land tenure issue is pointed out in Line 3, entitled ‘Sustainable development of natural resources’, and more specifically in sub-programs such as ‘Sustainable management of waters resources and soils and land tenure security in rural areas’ (Line 3.2) and ‘Pastoral resources security and management’ (Line 3.3). Line 2 deals with agri-business issues, ‘Increasing rural populations’ incomes’, particularly in the ‘Promoting agricultural economy’ sub-program. Boosting agricultural business and agri-business activities, one of this sub-program’s major actions aims at improving the business environment (investment codes, tax system, financial systems, training opportunities, etc.) in the sub-sectors of plants, animal and fisheries production. The post-compact review conducted in January 2012 specifically noted the inclusive aspect existing throughout the PNSR development process and enabling the overall stakeholders to actually understand the concept (Union africaine, Janvier 2012).

Initially, the CAADP process was implemented in a non-consensual and accelerated way. This quickly favoured the development of a National Program for Agricultural Investments, which was not adopted because of the donors’ reluctance. The fact that some agents originally misinterpreted CAADP is one source of the difficulties encountered in Burkina Faso. These persons did not know that the process was to be interpreted in a flexible way. But as mentioned above, this obstacle was removed and the process restarted successfully thanks to the commitment of both the staff of the Minister of Agriculture and the Permanent Secretary of the CPSA he appointed. Finally, all the stakeholders were satisfied even if the process was long, indeed hard. It is to be noticed that the PNSR development process was one of mutual learning which led the national party to better understand the process. According to some donors, in spite of the agreements established under the PNSR development process, some high officials are struggling to comply with the new vision and tend to work according to their previous habits, namely by following a project approach. Such is the case with some officials from the Ministry of Environment, on the pretext that some actions are crosscutting and overloading the rural sector. However, some reminders have been given for them to stay in line. The remaining question is if in the future, the policymakers, particularly those in charge of the main institutions intervening in the agricultural sector, the non-state actors and donors will be able to keep such discipline and full compliance to policy priorities established in a consensual way.

As stated by the post-compact review, the CAADP approach creates a positive peer pressure among African governments to develop outstanding strategies and investment plans (Union africaine, Janvier 2012). Burkina Faso, extremely dependent on public assistance for development and convinced of the regional integration benefits as a poor and landlocked country, was involved in the CAADP process late, but with a strong determination once the political leadership decided to restart the blocked process with NEPAD and ECOWAS assistance. A process of peer review is facilitated by the existence at the regional level (both ECOWAS and UEMOA) of regional agricultural policies, regional meetings and technical assistance from the Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (ReSAKSS) in compiling and disseminating information on agricultural performance. This assistance has come from both regional bodies combined with the external review they conducted to strengthen the accountability of the public authorities in charge of the PNSR implementation. On the national level, the participatory approach conducted to develop this program and the establishment of the consultative, steering and monitoring-evaluation systems involving the overall stakeholders will ensure the accountability of each. State actors, non-state actors and donors can call upon one another, ask and account for their individual and collective commitments taken under the PNSR implementation.

As mentioned above, non-state actors took an active part in developing the PNSR. Relying on the talks held with some donors’ representatives who insisted on the non-state actors’ involvement, the private sector representatives’ level of participation was lower than civil society’s. However, problems relating to the civil society actors’ credibility and capacity came up. Therefore some initiatives were taken to build their capacities, including the necessity to form structures and take part effectively in the PNSR process.

Dealing with the monitoring and evaluation of the agricultural policy implementation and the sector performance, it is to be noted that PNSR is currently in its implementation phase. The post-compact review recommended that the implementation be as participatory and inclusive as the program development phase. In this regard, the review recommended that donors be represented in the technical committee charged with implementing the PNSR. A monitoring-evaluation system has been settled, strategically steered by the SP/CPSA. This involves the overall stakeholders (administration, professional organisations, private operators, NGOs, technical and financial partners). The Studies and Planning Directorate (DEP) is in charge of strategically monitoring each ministry. The monitoring and evaluation mechanism will thus incorporate those from DEP and will be decentralised in each region. An annual, a mid-term and a final review are expected from PNSR to prepare its second implementation phase. The post-compact review recommended the sub-sectoral productions plan, the sectoral growth objectives and that of poverty reduction defined in the PNSR be adjusted to the disclosure of simulation results to make them more feasible and compatible with one another. The implementation of the sub-sectoral productions plan set
in the PNSR would lead to reasonable growth rate as a whole, with the exception of special growth expected from rice, corn, sorghum and cash crops (other than cotton). In addition, it specified that this plan will meet the objective of covering the cereals needs as defined in the PNSR and will be in line with the average growth target of the CAADP process and the scenario of meeting the MDG of halving poverty by 2020.

The growth composition under this scenario, MDG1-2020, could serve as a reference to make the PNSR objectives technically easier concerning both cereal and cash crop production. At the end of the review, the key recommendations are as follow: i) complementary elements to be added to the document; ii) continuation of the participatory process; iii) revitalisation of the consultation and communication frameworks; iv) establishment of a common basket for the implementation; v) consideration of gender aspects, decentralisation, private sector, climate change and supporting sectors; vi) use of the current experiences and available technologies; vii) consideration of regional integration issue; viii) good governance and adequate monitoring and evaluation; and ix) strengthening of the institutional, legal and technical frameworks.

The conclusions of the business meeting held in March 2012 led to a general consensus with the stakeholders on the PNSR document. All the partners' different groups committed themselves to supporting the PNSR implementation. The partners have also underscored the program uniqueness aspect, and emphasised the importance of adherence to the reference framework by all actors for simplified and effective governance through its implementation. The amount of the indicative contributions announced has risen to 250,125,416,238 CFAF, corresponding to 68.46 percent of the financing gap. The remaining amount to seek for closing the PNSR funding stands at 115,210,135,762 CFAF. The PNSR total cost is about 1,230bn CFAF for the period 2011–2015, with a financing gap estimated at 365bn CFAF. The partners also agreed on a roadmap for funding and implementing the program.

Regarding the level of technical expertise accessible to the country to highlight its policies, it was previously stressed that institutions responsible for agricultural policy implementation suffer from a lack of capacity. This is why initiatives have been taken to build the capacity of some strategic institutions such as the SP/CPSA. However, capacity building efforts are still needed. The post-compact review recommended an institutional evaluation of all structures both public and private involved in steering and managing the PNIA. It deplored that research partners' expertise has not been exploited during the PNSR development. For unclear reasons, research institutions such as the National Institute for Environment and Agricultural Research (INERA) have been ignored. It was recommended that these partners be involved in order to contribute their expertise but also to create the conditions for strengthening this expertise through continuous training of researchers. Finally, concerning the coordination of assistance to support the agricultural policy, one should remember that the PNSR enabled donors to harmonise their viewpoints and better align their assistance with the PNSR, which constitutes the reference framework for future assistance. For the Ministry of Agriculture, coordinating more than 100 projects, this would be a relief and reduce assistance related to administrative costs. It remains to be seen whether donors at the local level have a power of decision to align to PNSR.

5. Lessons for future agricultural policies

Several lessons can be drawn from the implementation of the CAADP process in Burkina Faso. The first one is that the success of the process implies the existence of a political will, which manifests itself in a political leadership capable of controlling the major issues impacting the country's agricultural policy. At the same time, as Dr Pato Daniel Kaboré, the Executive Director of the Governmental Centre for Economic and Social Policies Analysis pointed out, the disappointing lesson is that the Minister of Agriculture was so decisive in the success of the CAADP process that one can wonder if this was not just a chance to have him there! In other words, individuals rather than institutions can play the key role.

The success of the process also implies the existence of an engine at the donors' level. In Burkina Faso, Denmark and Germany have played this role and subsequently passed on the leadership of the donors' community to the World Bank. Still, we are far from the principles of the Paris Declaration on harmonisation and alignment, for in the field in Burkina Faso, donors' practices do not always obey these principles. Indeed, they do not have the same rhythm in programming and do not all have the same autonomy in decision-making.

As a result, consultation between donors is sometimes difficult. For example, the World Bank and the African Development Bank need the approval of their boards to commit themselves, while Germany for its part has a more decentralised power and greater flexibility. The implementation process should be gradual and inclusive, not just participatory. One can see that donors are pushing for more participation and inclusion of non-governmental stakeholders. In some cases, there is a need to support non-governmental stakeholders in organising and strengthening their capacities to communicate effectively on topics discussed. The patience is needed to move forward with all stakeholders, even though it slows down the process. To do otherwise increases the risk of mistakes, frustration and even impediments from excluded stakeholders, as shown by the example of the development process of the PNIA, which was questioned thereafter. Consultation frameworks gathering the civil society, the private sector, donors and the government have been established to promote dialogue between stakeholders. These actors are also represented in the mechanisms of monitoring.
and management. Means to fund the process are also vital. In Burkina Faso, the development of the PNSR required the establishment of a common basket funded by donors of about 1bn CFAF. Dialogue between donors and the government must be sincere. In some countries, governments require that donors allocate financial resources without giving them the opportunity to discuss with them or ask for accounts regarding the proper use of these resources. Stability of national counterparts is also essential. In Burkina Faso, the same Minister of Agriculture has remained in place since the beginning of the process of PNSR drafting, whereas a German technical advisor we interviewed shared the example of a nearby country – Mauritania – where he recalled knowing 17 Ministers of Agriculture in a stay of eight years. Finally, the coordination body should have strong coordinating capacities. In the case of Burkina Faso, the new Permanent Secretary in charge of the coordination of policies in the agricultural sector was appointed in 2010 and played a key role in the implementation process.

An institutional analysis and a capacity building action plan of the institution were carried out. This is essential for strengthening the national ownership, which implies that the major part of the work be carried out by the officials from national institutions, instead of external consultants. The strengthening of the SP/CPSA’s capacities would allow it to better coordinate the PNSR and SCADD, and to make sure that donors and other national institutions align with the PNSR. It is a major challenge because, as mentioned before, donors are seldom enforcing the principles of the Paris Declaration while other ministries in charge of rural development (Environment and Animal Resources) have maintained their old habits, namely to accept all kinds of proposed projects and funding without ensuring their agreement with the PNSR.

Finally, the implementation of PNSR is a major challenge. This program will only be carried out efficiently if the stakeholders in charge of its implementation are determined and well trained. In this regard, difficulties are foreseen at the regional level since there are only three to four regional institutions with uncertain capacities which will be in charge of the implementation all over the country. The strengthening of their capacities is essential.

Conclusion

CAADP has enabled Burkina Faso to achieve a merging of previous programs through the PNSR, which has been drafted in coherence with the regional agricultural policies of ECOWAS and UEMOA. It has permitted the country, through the PNSR, to federate investment actions in the sector of agriculture and the sub-sectors of crop production, animal resources, water resources, fauna resources and environment.

In the CAADP process, donors have played a key role. In vetoing the parallel process that had been initiated for the adoption of a national program of agricultural investments, they forced the government to rethink its strategy for implementing CAADP and gave to non-state actors an opportunity to raise their voices through a long participatory process. This was also an opportunity to strengthen the capacity of national actors, whether state or non-state.

CAADP has substantially changed agricultural policies and can be credited with raising the need for consistency in all policies at national, sub-regional and regional levels. Its implementation enabled the harmonisation of efforts and led to a single clear strategy defining priorities in the sector of agriculture. This permitted better management of resources allocated by donors, with clearer information on who is paying for what, what are the needs for funding, which aspects are sufficiently funded and which are not. All in all, CAADP has affected change in the vision of agricultural policy in Burkina Faso. The resulting PNSR is not just a repackaging of existing agricultural policies but a meaningful, ambitious and consensual program for donors, state and non-state actors. It remains to be seen whether the incentives put in place in Burkina Faso for a progressive agricultural policy will be sufficient to enable effective implementation of the PNSR.

End Notes

1 US$ 1 = about 475 CFA Francs


3 The Ministry of Animal Resources is now responsible for fisheries in the current government.

4 At institutional level, the creation of a department in charge of agricultural and food forecasts and statistics within the Ministry of Agriculture aims at filing this gap but efforts still need to be made.

5 The CSLP was replaced in 2010 by the SCADD, strategy for accelerated sustainable development targeting among other things agricultural modernization and increased diversification of exports through the promotion of the farming sector: support to local initiatives with the promotion of excellence farming hubs; and connection of agriculture to market to boost productivity.

6 The Paris Declaration, approved on March 2, 2005 is an international agreement to which 100 ministers and donor institution leaders as well as high officials have adhered, committing that the countries and institutions they represent would enhance efforts of harmonization, alignment and result-based management on the achievements of donations for actions likely to be monitored and resort to a set of indicators.
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