



Helpdesk Research Report

Costs of peace processes

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Question

What is the available evidence on the costings of core components of peace processes and the average time commitments that have been committed for international funding of the main components?

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1. Overview

This report provides an overview of evidence on the costings of various core components of peace processes. The rapid review indicated that there is **limited literature available** on this topic¹. The information uncovered by this rapid review focuses mainly on the latter stages of a peace process and the core components of supporting the success of the peace process. These include, for example, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes, dialogue forums, transitional justice, and reconciliation support to women and youth, amongst others. There is little available information about the costs required to set up and run peace process talks and the average time commitments that have been committed for international funding of the main components. Some mention was made of the high cost of flights, hotels and per diems (daily financial allowances) for peace talk attendees (Tieku, 2012).

Experts contacted for this review suggest that costs of peace processes can vary hugely (expert comments) and that there is 'no standard set of core activities behind a peace process' as each process 'needs to be tailored to the requirements of the context and stakeholders' (expert comment).

¹ More information is available on the costs of peace operations which can be found in the latest edition of the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations published by the Center on International Cooperation. <http://cic.nyu.edu/content/annual-review-global-peace-operations-2013>

The report includes case studies of Burundi, Guinea, Nepal, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic.

A number of **key issues** to consider in relation to the cost of peace processes highlighted in the literature and by experts include:

- **Timing and fit-for-purpose financing:** international funding is often slow to react and covers too short a time-frame for a peace process to be effective. Peace processes benefit from flexible, long-term funding.
- **Per diems and other perks:** High per diems and other perks have been found to prolong peace talks. Tackling this issue poses many challenges as changing the current system may cause resentment amongst delegates.

2. Case studies

Burundi

<i>Peace Process: UN Post-Conflict Fund (PBF)²</i>	
Total cost	
Total budget of the PBF:	USD 35 million (Campbell, 2010, p. 6)
Cost of core components	
<u>Average daily per diems during the Arusha talks:</u>	USD 100 (Tieku, 2012, p. 9)
Average total per diems by annum in 1999:	USD 2,542,363 (ibid)
Project ³ : Disarmament ⁴	USD 500,000 (Campbell, 2010, p. 65)
Dialogue forums	USD 3,148,000 (ibid, p. 66)
Transitional justice	USD 1 million (ibid, p. 207).
Anti-corruption	USD 1.5 million (ibid, p. 138).
Women's Project	USD 3 million (ibid, p. 149)
Estimated cost of the Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program ⁵ for Burundi:	USD 90 million ⁶ (Disch et al, 2010, p. 16).

² Support for the consolidation of peace in Burundi through a process that was jointly managed by the UN Integrated Office in Burundi and the Burundian Government. The PBF funded 18 projects in four main areas: Governance and Peace; Strengthening the Rule of Law in the Security Forces; Strengthening Justice and Promoting Human Rights; and Land Issues. Although the original intention was to complete these projects within one year, in actuality they lasted between 16 to 32 months (Campbell, 2010, p. 6, 7).

³ See more PBF projects in (Campbell, 2010, p.63-67, 91-93).

⁴ For a breakdown of the admin expenditures of UNDP for various projects please see p. 63 in Campbell, 2010.

⁵ The Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) was set up to demobilize and reintegrate into civilian life over 360,000 ex-combatants (EXCs) in the greater Great Lakes region. To be eligible for financing each country must be actively involved in the regional peace process. (Disch et al, 2010, p. 11).

⁶ Actual disbursement as of 30 June 2009: USD 61,964,010 (Disch et al, 2010, p. 16).

Guinea

<i>Peace Process: Priority Plan for the Consolidation of Peace 2007-2011</i>	
Total costs	
Total budget first Priority Plan 2007-11:	USD 12.8 million
Amount spent by early 2008:	USD 0.96 million
Amount spent by Jan 2010:	USD 4.3 million
Amount spent by early summer 2010, after the Ouagadougou Accords:	USD 9.1 million
Amount spent by late 2011:	USD 24 million
Cost of core components	
Forums for dialogue	USD 1.92 million
Truth, justice, reconciliation	USD 0.52 million
Capacity of civil society	USD 0.52 million
Citizenship education	USD 0.54 million
Strengthen the security sector	USD 2.95 million
Justice and anti-corruption	USD 0.57 million
Support to youth	USD 4.65 million
Support to women's movement	USD 0.65 million
Coordination of PBF engagement	USD 0.44 million
Support to international mediation	USD 0.63 million
Promotion of inclusive and sustainable dialogue in Guinea	USD 1.2 million
Post-electoral accompaniment	USD 0.45 million
Support to national dialogue in Guinea	USD 0.96 million

Source: Quick, 2012, p. 2, 12, 21, 25

Nepal

<i>Support for the Comprehensive Peace Accord's (CPA) implementation</i>	
Total costs	
Estimated total financial support to the peace process 2006-11:	USD 300-400 million (Particip and Niras, 2013, p. 9).
Donor contributions overall	
<u>Finland's total contribution to the peace process 2005-12:</u> ⁷	USD 8 million (Particip and Niras, 2013, p. 11).
Finland's annual support for peace:	USD 2.2 million (ibid, p. 38).

⁷ Channelled through the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (Particip and Niras, 2013, p. 11).

<u>Denmark's total contribution to the peace process 2003-2011:</u> ⁸	USD 45 million (ibid, p. 10).
Denmark's annual support for peace:	USD 8.6 million (ibid, p. 38).
Peace Support Programme yearly average:	USD 2.9 million (ibid).
Human Rights and Good Governance Programme yearly average:	USD 5.7 million (ibid).
Switzerland's annual support for peace: ⁹	USD 3.7 million (ibid).
DFID's total contribution to peace and security 2007-12:	GBP 53 million (ICAI, 2013, p. 1).
Donor contributions to CPA funds	
<u>The Nepal Peace Trust Fund</u> ¹⁰ :	GBP 132 million (ICAI, 2013, p. 4).
Government of Nepal's contribution:	GBP 86 million (65%) (ibid).
DFID's contribution:	GBP 13 million (10%) (ibid).
Finland's contribution:	Around USD 8 million (Particip and Niras, 2013, p. 11).
<u>The UN's Peace Fund Nepal 2007-10:</u> ¹¹	USD 32.27 million (ODC, 2011, p. 18).
DFID's contribution up to 2012: ¹²	GBP 6.8 million (ICAI, 2013, p. 4).
Norway's contribution up to end 2010:	USD 8,163,494 (ODC, 2011, p. 22).
Denmark's contribution up to end 2010:	USD 2,333,541 (ibid).
Canada's contribution up to end 2010:	USD 2,221,299 (ibid).
Switzerland's contribution up to end 2010:	USD 199,975 (ibid).
UNPBF's contribution up to end 2010:	USD 10,000,000 (ibid).
The Rights, Democracy and Inclusion Fund: ¹³	USD 12 million budget (Particip and Niras, 2013, p. 10).
Cost of core components	
<u>The Nepal Peace Trust Fund projects as of July 2011:</u>	

⁸ Provided through the Human Rights and Good Governance Programme (budget 2003-13: USD 45 million; disbursed by 2011: USD 24 million) and the Peace Support Programme (budget 2007-?: USD 28 million; disbursed by 2011: USD 21 million). (Particip and Niras, 2013, p. 10).

⁹ Integrated into wider development support (Particip and Niras, 2013, p. 38).

¹⁰ Set up in 2007 to support the delivery of the CPA. The fund has four areas of work: management of the Maoist cantonments; compensation for conflict-affected people (CAPs); security and justice; and Constituent Assembly and peacebuilding initiatives. (ICAI, 2013, p. 4)

¹¹ Supports the work of the Nepal Peace Trust Fund. It focusses on areas that require a rapid turnaround, specialised skills or are too politically sensitive for the Government of Nepal. The fund has four areas of work: elections and governance; rights and reconciliation; quick impact projects including de-mining; and reintegration. (ICAI, 2013, p. 4).

¹² A further £20 million (named Peace Support) have been approved by DFID to provide support to these two funds and for election support, from 2012-2015. (ICAI, 2013, p. 4).

¹³ Set up in 2006 for the sustainable reform of political governance in Nepal. (Particip and Niras, 2013, p. 10).

Cluster 1: Cantonment Management and Reintegration/ Rehabilitation of Combatants:	NPR 4,562.01 billion (ODC, 2011, p. 21).
Cluster 2: Conflict Affected People and Communities:	NPR 491.5 billion (ibid).
Cluster 3: Security & Transitional Justice:	NPR 1985.35 billion (ibid).
Cluster 4: Constituency Assembly & Peace Building Initiatives at National and Local Level:	NPR 3456.66 billion (ibid).
The UN's Peace Fund Nepal:	
Cost of UNPFN's Support Office:	USD 150,000 annually (ODC, 2011, p. 23).
Programme and Support for Children and Adolescents formerly Associated with the Maoist army in Nepal	USD 622,969 (ODC, 2011, p. 32).
Support to Female Members of the Maoist army	USD 224,614 (ibid).
Transitional Justice Project	USD 1,999,830 (ibid).
Ensuring recognition of sexual violence as a tool of conflict in the Nepal peace-building process through documentation and provision of comprehensive services to women and girl victims/survivors	USD 2,100,000 (ibid).
Jobs for Peace: 12,500 Youth Employed and Empowered through an Integrated Approach	USD 2,656,000 (ibid).
Fairness and Efficiency in Reparations to Conflict- Affected Persons	USD 1,017,583 (ibid).
Monitoring, Reporting and Response to Conflict- Related Child Rights Violations	USD 1,363,618 (ibid).

Uganda

<i>Peace process: Uganda Peace and Recovery Facility (PRF) 2011-2012</i>	
Total costs	
UN Peacebuilding Fund's contribution to the PRF ¹⁴ :	USD 14 million (Wielders and Amutjojo, 2012, p. 4).
Cost of core components	

¹⁴ The peace building programme was implemented between January 2011 and September 2012 in Acholiland, the region within Northern Uganda most affected by the GoU-LRA conflict (Wielders and Amutjojo, 2012, p. 4).

Estimated cost of the Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program for Uganda:	USD 37.5 million ¹⁵ (Disch et al, 2010, p. 16).
<u>Peacebuilding through justice for all and human rights¹⁶:</u>	USD 5,899,756 (Wielders and Amutjojo, 2012, p. 33).
UNICEF contribution:	USD 3,088,372 (ibid).
OHCHR contribution:	USD 739,447 (ibid).
UNFPA contribution:	USD 620,000 (ibid).
UNDP contribution:	USD 1,451,937 (ibid).
<u>Peace building and enhancing protection systems¹⁷:</u>	
UNICEF contribution:	USD 1.2 million (Wielders and Amutjojo, 2012, p. 41).
UNFPA contribution:	USD 1.3 million (ibid).

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

<i>Peace Process 2010-2013</i>	
Cost of core components	
Estimated cost of the Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program for DRC:	USD 120 million ¹⁸ (Disch et al, 2010, p. 16).
Reintegration for those affected by/involved in the war – Feb 2010-Jul 2011:	USD 15,770,000 (Vinck, 2013, p. 59).
Consolidating peace and creating conditions for reconstruction – Apr 2010-Sep 2011:	USD 1,130,456 (ibid, p. 64).
Capacity building to ensure sustainable peace – Mar 2012-Sep 2013:	USD 3,680,000 (ibid, p. 73).

Central African Republic (CAR)

<i>Peace Process 2008-2012</i>	
Cost of core components	
Estimated cost of the Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program for CAR:	USD 3 million ¹⁹ (Disch et al, p. 16).

¹⁵ Actual disbursement as of 30 June 2009: USD 4,143,066 (Disch et al, 2010, p. 16).

¹⁶ Duration: Estimated – 18 months; Actual – 21 months (Wielders and Amutjojo, 2012, p. 33).

¹⁷ Duration: Estimated – 18 months; Actual – 21 months (Wielders and Amutjojo, 2012, p. 41).

¹⁸ Actual disbursement as of 30 June 2009: USD 225,437,612 (Disch et al, 2010, p. 16).

¹⁹ Actual disbursement as of 30 June 2009: USD 9,727,000 (Disch et al, 2010, p. 16).

DDR for children Nov 2008-Mar 2010:	USD 2 million (Vinck et al, 2012, p. 79).
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3. Key issues to consider

A number of key issues to consider in relation to the costs of peace processes highlighted in the literature and by experts include:

- **Timing and fit-for-purpose financing:** One factor which contributes to the failure of peace processes is the 'lack of fit-for-purpose international financial and human resources' (OECD, 2012, p. 56). International funding for peace processes is often only available for too short a time which makes it difficult to implement peace agreements (OECD, 2012, p. 56). In addition, international funding can be slow to react due to donor constraints (expert comments). One expert suggests that the 'timelines for international funding of peace processes need to go well beyond the first and even the second round of successful elections in fragile and conflict-affected situations' as 'cutting off transition/peace process funding can lead to a reversal in progress towards peace' (expert comments).

Mediation receives a lot less funding than peacekeeping and post-agreement peacebuilding and state building (OECD, 2012, p. 56). For example, the funding of the UN's Department for Political Affairs (DPA) totalled about USD 51 million in 2011, while approved resources for UN peacekeeping were about USD 7.84 billion between July 2011 and June 2012 (OECD, 2012, p. 56). The OECD (2012, p. 56) suggests that this indicates that more investment at the early stages of a peace process is likely to go a long way (expert comment).

- **Per diems and other perks:** A study carried out by Tiekou (2012, p. 4) found that for 'some of the delegates, staying free of charge in five-star hotels and receiving the equivalent of five months' pay in one week of per diems made continued talks more attractive than achieving peace'. For example the delegates of the Seventh Round of the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks claimed not less than a USD 150 daily subsistence allowance²⁰, which was being paid for largely by the Norwegians (Tiekou, 2012, p. 9).

Tackling this issue is complicated as a more modest incentive structure could be perceived as an insult and a punishment for the chief mediators (Tiekou, 2012, p. 13). Creating a two-tier incentive structure could lead to resentment towards the mediation team (Tiekou, 2012, p. 13). In order to tackle this issue a deadline was imposed for the Darfurian peace talks. However the imposition of this deadline has been blamed for the failure of the peace process there (Tiekou, 2012, p. 14). Tiekou (2012, p. 14) suggests that the most 'straightforward way out of the problem is to eliminate overgenerous per diems and other lavish accommodations entirely, but that will require fundamental attitudinal and cultural change at the international level'.

²⁰ Rates were calculated using various percentages above official UN and OAU rates.

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