



## Helpdesk Research Report

# The multilateral system's contribution to peace and security

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## Question

*Literature review: what does recent analysis suggest about the contribution of the multilateral system to international development goals on peace and security<sup>1</sup>?*

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## 1. Overview

The rapid review uncovered very little analysis of the contribution of the multilateral system<sup>2</sup> to international development goals on peace and security, especially around its contribution to early warning and upstream conflict prevention. Much of the literature uncovered was concerned with United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU) cooperation around peacekeeping but did not examine the effectiveness of its contribution. Most of the literature consisted of policy briefs rather than rigorous analysis, although

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<sup>1</sup> The international goals on peace and security relate to the 2011 Building Stability Overseas Strategy published by the UK government and include early warning, crisis prevention and response, and upstream conflict prevention. Early warning relates to how far the multilateral system provides and reacts to dedicated horizon scanning and risk analysis on conflict and instability. Crisis prevention and response relates to whether the multilateral system is able to respond quickly and flexibly to perceived needs around conflict and what dedicated capacity exists for stabilisation tasks. Upstream conflict prevention relates to whether the system generates and shares conflict analysis and how far are approaches to security, justice, jobs, anti-corruption, regulatory reform and economic growth tailored to fragile and conflict affected states contexts.

<sup>2</sup> The multilateral system refers to the interaction of multilateral organisations, rather than analysis of multilateral organisations on an agency-by-agency basis.

some were the result of academic projects looking into UN-EU multilateral cooperation on peace and security.

This report is in an annotated bibliography style and covers material which has been published since 2010.

The literature broadly suggests that:

- As a result of the increasingly complex conflict environments, **individual actors are unable to achieve goals on peace and security by themselves** (Umezawa, 2012; Marcinkowska, 2013; Jaques, 2014).
- **More joint operations are occurring** in order to overcome the challenges posed by complex conflict environments, with **joint multilateral action seen to promote more effective and efficient operations** (Department of Political Affairs - Security Council Affairs Division, 2010-2011; Kingah and Van Langenhove, 2012; Kille and Hendrickson, 2011; Brett, 2013; Umezawa, 2012; Mikulaschek and Romita, 2011; Tardy, 2013; Yamashita, 2012; Marcinkowska, 2013; Jaques, 2014; Pietz, 2013).
- Organisations such as the EU have stated their **commitment to effective multilateralism to address peace and security goals** (Department of Political Affairs - Security Council Affairs Division, 2010-2011; Umezawa, 2012; Smith, 2014; Novosseloff, 2012; Novosseloff, 2011; Tardy, 2013; Fioramonti et al, 2012). The EU also acknowledges the UN as the lead organisation on global peace and security (Umezawa, 2012; Fioramonti et al, 2012).
- **Multilateral cooperation between the UN and regional organisations benefits both parties**, as regional organisations **gain legitimacy** and support from a UN mandate, and the UN gains partners that can fill in gaps in its missions and who often know the context in greater detail (Department of Political Affairs - Security Council Affairs Division, 2010-2011; Kingah and Van Langenhove, 2012; Umezawa, 2012; Smith, 2014; Novosseloff, 2012; Yamashita, 2012; Marcinkowska, 2013; Jaques, 2014).
- EU-UN cooperation in Kosovo, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Mali are held up as successful examples of such cooperation; as well as joint action in Libya between organisations such as the UN, EU and the Arab League (Fioramonti et al, 2012; Marcinkowska, 2013; Pietz, 2013; Madsen and Pietz, 2014).

However, the literature also highlights a number of challenges faced by the multilateral system in contributing to international goals on peace and security. They include:

- While top-level cooperation has become increasingly institutionalised this has **not necessarily translated into effective coordination on the ground** (Tardy with Gowan, 2014; Fioramonti et al, 2012). Despite being hailed as one of the most successful examples of cooperation, the EU-UN action in DRC and Kosovo faced challenges in implementation and coordination (Tardy with Gowan, 2014; Fioramonti et al, 2012).
- **Tensions exist in the relationship between the UN and regional organisations**, especially the African Union (Brett, 2013; Jaques, 2014). There is some suggestion that the EU is selective in its support for multilateral operations and that its lack of personnel in UN peacekeeping operations undermines the sustainability of the relationship (Umezawa, 2012; Novosseloff, 2012; Tardy, 2013; Fioramonti et al, 2012; Pietz, 2013). In addition there are some fears that working with the UN would undermine other organisations efficiency and capability (Kille and Hendrickson, 2011; Novosseloff, 2012; Pietz, 2013). There are some fears that the UN would be negatively impacted by associating with some other multilateral organisations such as NATO, as a result the perceived political nature of some of NATO's actions (Kille and Hendrickson, 2011).

- **Information sharing remains challenging**, especially in relation to sensitive information, (Novosseloff, 2012).
- **Differences in organisations' cultures, interests and planning rules; and inter-institutional rivalry, competition and misunderstanding around mandates and roles, make cooperation and coordination challenging** (Tardy with Gowan, 2014; Kingah and Van Langenhove, 2012; Umezawa, 2012; Mikulaschek and Romita, 2011; Novosseloff, 2012; Novosseloff, 2011; Marcinkowska, 2013; Fioramonti et al, 2012).

Expert analysis also finds that the 'multilateral system still **responds to imminent threats of conflict in a disjointed fashion**, for both bureaucratic and political reasons' (expert comment). It is difficult for the different elements of the system to coordinate common policies and there is a real problem with sharing information (expert comment). The **weaknesses in the system's** overall ability to recognise, review and respond to challenges is reflected in the tendency to respond to rapid crises such as Syria or Ebola with *ad hoc* responses (expert comment).

The **wider multilateral system 'lacks consistent systems and responsible institutions for horizon scanning and risk analysis'** (expert comment). As a result of the **cumbersome nature** of the UN and confused roles and responsibilities, the multilateral system spends a lot of time coordinating itself and **struggles to deploy rapidly** (expert comment). There have been attempts to align around fragility assessments under the New Deal framework, and the UN and World Bank have conducted joint needs assessments (expert comment). One of the experts suggests that the **multilateral system will struggle to adapt to the changing context of global conflict** without mandates and resources from its membership (expert comment).

## 2. The multilateral system's contribution to peace and security

### ***Building EU-UN Coherence in Mission Planning & Mandate Design***

Tardy, T., with Gowan, R. (2014). (Policy Briefing). European Union Institute for Security Studies, Center on International Cooperation: New York University, Center for International Peace Operations

[http://www.zif-](http://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF_Policy_Briefing_Tardy_Gowan_Nov_2014_ENG.pdf)

[berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF\\_Policy\\_Briefing\\_Tardy\\_Gowan\\_Nov\\_2014\\_ENG.pdf](http://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF_Policy_Briefing_Tardy_Gowan_Nov_2014_ENG.pdf)

What progress has been made in planning coordination between the EU and UN and what are the remaining challenges? This policy briefing looks at what has been achieved in the field of planning coordination, the remaining challenges, and provides suggestions for further action, based on conversations with EU and UN staff.

In recent years, relations between the EU and UN have improved after they were strained due to the difficulties of planning and implementing coordinated missions in Chad and Kosovo. Although they interact on the ground, most current EU operations are not deployed in direct support of the UN operations. However, coordination in planning has improved significantly, as a result the increasing professionalisation of the EU's Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) and Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), as well as dedicating staff to inter-institutional cooperation. In the recent Mali and Central African Republic crises the UN and EU have had meetings and exchanged information. Good coordination in planning also appears to be the result of an agreement on the division of tasks at the political level. Tensions have re-emerged where there are disagreements over mandates, such as in Libya.

In addition a number of constraints limit the scope of coordination, including: i) inter-institutional rivalry, competition and misunderstanding around mandates; ii) differences in the two organisations' cultures and planning rules which mean the EU planning process offers less flexibility and makes it difficult to synchronise parallel processes; iii) lack of awareness among staff of UN-EU cooperation and a shortage of staff; and iv) context specific circumstances which require flexibility of response. The author's recommendations include that mandates are clear at the highest political level before planning starts and that planners are trained in EU-UN cooperation and made aware of each other.

***Determinants of a regional organisation's role in peace and security: the African Union and the European Union compared***

Kingah, S., & Van Langenhove, L. (2012). *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 19:2, 201-222.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2012.706890>

What are the factors shaping the influence of regional organisations in the area of international peace and security? This journal article looks at the willingness of the regional organisation to act, the acceptance of its actions, and its capacity to discharge such peace related tasks, with a focus on the African Union (AU) and the EU. It also examines the relationship between regional organisations and the United Nations in international peace and security efforts.

Multilateral regional organisations can collaborate with other regional organisations or within and/or under the umbrella of the UN. The UN has recognised the vital role played by regional organisations in the Libyan and Syrian crises. There have been various UN publications which set out the relationship between regional organisations and the UN, including the *Brahimi Report* which highlighted the importance of better regional capabilities in the area of peace and security. Many of these note the need for a clear division of labour between regional organisations and the UN. At the moment regional organisations are not formally tied to the UN Security Council but the UN Charter provides it with a mandate to authorise enforcement actions through regional bodies. Cooperation between the UN and regional organisations can create greater legitimacy than either of them acting on their own in the area of peace and security.

***NATO and the United Nations: Debates and Trends in Institutional Coordination.***

Kille, K.J., & Hendrickson, R.C. (2011). *Journal of International Organisations Studies*, 2:1, 28-49.

[http://journal-iostudies.org/sites/journal-iostudies.org/files/JIOS201121final\\_4.pdf](http://journal-iostudies.org/sites/journal-iostudies.org/files/JIOS201121final_4.pdf)

How have NATO and the UN cooperated or competed when operating in the same conflict areas? This journal article traces and analyses key developments in NATO's engagement with the UN and considers their future relationship.

NATO and the UN have different political agendas but their efforts to maintain international peace and security have become increasingly intertwined in countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Afghanistan. NATO and the UN are adapting in a manner which increasingly recognises shared missions and purposes. There are a number of debates around whether or not greater coordination between the UN and NATO is a good idea, whether the coordination should be formalised or *ad hoc*, and whether NATO should act as a sub-contracting agent of the UN or as an equal partner. Those arguing for greater cooperation suggest that they need each other to accomplish their goals and that closer institutional coordination will promote more effective and efficient operations. However, others suggest that greater coordination would limit NATO's flexibility and question whether multilateral cooperation is more effective

than groups of states acting as 'coalitions of the willing'. There is some unease over whether cooperation between the two organisations is really helpful, with some suggesting the UN would undermine NATO efficiency and capability, or that associating with NATO would undermine the UN. It is suggested that NATO action requires UN approval to confer legitimacy beyond the European context. However the practical reality is that NATO and the UN have developed a stronger basis of institutional coordination. NATO has emphasised that a 'comprehensive approach' was important to meeting its goals on peace and security and this entailed close cooperation with the UN and its agencies. NATO and the UN signed a 'Joint Declaration on UN/NATO Cooperation' in 2008 which sends an indication to the organisations' staff that coordination and cooperation are desirable and necessary. They hold regular meetings and there is a NATO liaison officer at the UN headquarters and in some field positions to improve communication and coordination between the two organisations.

### ***The Inter-relationship between the African Peace and Security Architecture, the Global Peace and Security Architecture and Regional Initiatives***

Brett, J. (2013). The Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa.

<http://um.dk/en/~media/UM/English-site/Documents/Danida/About-Danida/Danida%20transparency/Documents/Grant%20committee/2013/Ext%20doc/02a%20Annex%20A%20%20APSA%20Study.pdf>

What is the relationship between the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the Global Peace and Security Architecture and regional initiatives on peace and security? This report analyses the progress of African Peace and Security Architecture, the relationship between it, the Global Peace and Security Architecture and regional initiatives. The report makes suggestions about how to strengthen the relationship, especially with Danish support.

The African Peace and Security Architecture comprises of: i) decision-making structures – the Peace and Security Council; ii) an early warning mechanism – the Continental Early Warning System; iii) an integrated response capacity comprising military, police and civilian elements – the African Stand-by Force; iv) a capacity for preventative diplomacy and advice – the Panel of the Wise; and v) a mechanism for making available adequate financing for peace initiatives – the AU Peace Fund. A number of joint initiatives with the UN, as representative of the global peace and security architecture, are emerging. The AU feels that its willingness to take a greater share of the responsibility for resolving African crisis means it deserves access to decision making, financing and other resources. The AU has also taken preventative actions in the form of security sector reform, counter terrorism, post conflict reconstruction and development, maritime security, small arms and light weapons proliferation, and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. As it is in the process of developing its capacities some argue that the UN should give space to African organisations by involving them in decision making and facilitation where relevant. There is increasing cooperation between the AU and the UN and since the rather chaotic reaction to Libya, the cooperation has become progressively more substance-based and focused on how best to respond to concrete crises. However, despite this positive trajectory, there are tensions around the different roles the UN and AU see for themselves. The UN is reluctant to defer to the AU and the AU wants a relationship underpinned by enhanced consultations, collaborative missions and predictable, sustainable and flexible funding for African-led peace operations. The EU is the other significant partner. The EU's Africa Peace Facility is financing both African-led Peace Support Operations and APSA operationalisation.

### ***UN-EU Cooperation in Peace and Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Developments of Structural Relationship***

Umezawa, H. (2012). (UNU-CRIS Working Papers W-2012/9). UNU-CRIS.

<http://www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/workingpapers/W-2012-9.pdf>

What does UN-EC cooperation in peace and security look like? This paper explores the development of UN-EU cooperation in peace and security and its current and future contribution to the maintenance of security in the 21st century.

As a result of the challenges in solving the series of violent crises in the 1990s the UN has sought cooperation with regional organisations, as well as strengthening its own peacekeeping capacity. The EU for example, has taken steps to become an autonomous crisis management body, although with a dedication to 'effective multilateralism'. As a result cooperation between the UN and the EU was stimulated. The EU can provide the UN with the necessary capabilities to fulfil its complex tasks, thus considerably lightening the latter's financial and logistical burden. Despite increasingly playing its own role in peace operations, the EU has always been committed to the primary role of the UN in maintaining international peace and security. There are close communication channels between the two organisations which contribute to a more efficient collaboration among the two organisations, as they not only help to avoid the duplication of resources and facilitate rapid response but also promote practical collaboration among the two organisations even further (such as the joint initiatives in training or planning). So far, however, the relationship remains characterised by a degree of imbalance as a result of the different agendas of the two organisations. The EU has more or less dictated the terms and the pace of cooperation and has not displayed strong willingness to enhance its rapid reaction military support for UN-led peace operations.

Regional organisations need the UN's legitimacy and the UN increasingly depends on the resources of regional organisations. Biennial high-level meetings between the UN and regional organisations have allowed the development of a framework for cooperation based on the comparative advantages of global and regional institutions. They have moved on from just addressing preventing armed conflict and strengthening the foundation of peace to looking at terrorism and other threats and challenges. The principle challenges to making multilateral cooperation more effective were the clarification of roles and the provision of assistance with capacity building, as well as the need for more planned, consistent and reliable arrangements for UN-regional organisational cooperation. While the flexible approach that has been taken so far has made it possible for various types of organisations to cooperate with the UN whenever possible, it has caused certain problems due to its lack of efficiency and/or coherence. The challenge for future inter-organisational cooperation will be how to optimise the potential of each organisation in order to address various problems in the increasingly diversified security environment. However, the more challenging task for both the UN and EU might be how to overcome the obstacles that prohibit internal coordination within each organisation.

### ***Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security***

Department of Political Affairs – Security Council Affairs Division. (2010-2011). (Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 17th Supplement). Department of Political Affairs - Security Council Affairs Division.

[http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2010-2011/Part%20I/2010-2011\\_Cooperation%20UN-RO.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2010-2011/Part%20I/2010-2011_Cooperation%20UN-RO.pdf)

How do the UN and regional and subregional organisations cooperate in maintaining international peace and security? This brief outlines activities undertaken by the Security Council to strengthen relations between the UN and regional organisations, particularly the EU, in the areas of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

Regional and subregional organisations are well positioned to understand the root causes of many conflicts and other security challenges in their respective regions. This has meant they have made important contributions to preventative diplomacy and the peaceful settlement of local disputes. A need for closer cooperation in the fields of early warning, prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding has been recognised by the United Nations. The partnership between the European Union and the United Nations has been recognised by both parties as useful to maintaining international peace and security.

### 3. The multilateral system's contribution to crisis prevention and response

#### ***Conflict Prevention: Toward More Effective Multilateral Strategies***

Mikulaschek, C., & Romita, P. (2011). International Peace Institute

[http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6544~v~Conflict\\_Prevention\\_\\_Toward\\_More\\_Effective\\_Multilateral\\_Strategies.pdf](http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6544~v~Conflict_Prevention__Toward_More_Effective_Multilateral_Strategies.pdf)

How well do multilateral instruments for conflict prevention perform today? What challenges exist in tapping into their full potential, and how can these challenges be addressed? This seminar report presents the results of the discussion of representatives of fifty-seven states and international organisations, as well as independent experts and academics on ways to enhance the effectiveness of multilateral conflict-prevention strategies.

Multilateral conflict prevention has undergone significant change in recent years as a result of more third parties being willing to engage in preventive diplomacy and structural prevention and greater receptiveness by many states facing conflict risks. The fragmentation of resources and mandates has meant that international organisations are increasingly conducting joint programmes or at least collaborating on training and conflict risk assessments. The UN is increasingly eager to collaborate with regional organisations in pursuit of preventative diplomacy and has been providing mediation support to regional organisations rather than leading the initiatives. However, the variation in the effectiveness of this cooperation indicates the difficulty of overcoming fundamental substantive differences between the interests of third-party actors. Achieving coordination and coherence among these numerous third parties is a critical challenge. Challenges to coherence and coordination in conflict prevention include: i) diverging interests and objectives which can lead to disputes over leadership and lack of coordination; ii) competition over mandates and resources; iii) belligerent parties exploiting the different approaches of various institutions; and iv) "donor hedging" where donors fund several international organisations to simultaneously do similar work. The UN system has developed four different bodies designed to promote coordination and coherence within the UN system: the UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee; the Executive Committee on Peace and Security; the Interdepartmental Framework for Coordination on Early Warning and Preventive Action; and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee.

#### ***European Military Capabilities and UN Peace Operations: Strengthening the Partnership***

Smith, A. (2014). (Policy Briefing). European Union Institute for Security Studies, Center for International Peace Operations.

[http://www.zif-](http://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF_Policy_Briefing_Adam_Smith_October_2014_ENG.pdf)

[berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF\\_Policy\\_Briefing\\_Adam\\_Smith\\_October\\_2014\\_ENG.pdf](http://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF_Policy_Briefing_Adam_Smith_October_2014_ENG.pdf)

What level of European military cooperation has there been with the UN? This policy briefing assesses the progress of cooperation between the EU and UN and offers recommendations for opportunities for collaboration in the coming years.

The UN is keen for EU cooperation to bridge key capability gaps, like rapid deployment. The EU has explicitly promoted EU-UN cooperation in peace operations and in June 2014 listed its priorities as supporting the reinforcement of EU-UN operational cooperation in crisis management and to continuously enhance support to UN peacekeeping. Independent EU missions working alongside UN missions, or bridging missions that implement or complement a specific part of the UN's mandate, are now common. The EU has made important contributions to the UN's mission in Mali and supported the African Union in Central African Republic, for example. However the implementation of its 2012 *Plan of Action to enhance EU Common Security and Defence Policy support to UN peacekeeping* has been uneven. Individual states have expressed a strong preference for dealing with the UN directly, rather than the European External Action Service (EEAS) as a go-between. However, this has resulted in no coordinated and little sustained follow-up to engagement around the UN's request for specific capability needs. The UN peacekeeping system is not well designed to support European contributions to UN peacekeeping.

### ***United Nations – European Union cooperation in the field of peacekeeping***

Novosseloff, A. (2012). (GGI Analysis Paper No. 4/2012). Global Governance Institute.  
[http://www.globalgovernance.eu/images/ggi\\_analysis\\_eu\\_un\\_cooperation\\_novosseloff\\_2012.pdf](http://www.globalgovernance.eu/images/ggi_analysis_eu_un_cooperation_novosseloff_2012.pdf)

What is the nature of UN-EU cooperation in the field of peacekeeping? This paper analyses at the historical evolution of the UN-EU partnership, the major elements of its institutionalisation, as well as the successes and tensions that have arisen from joint operations in countries such as Kosovo and Chad. It builds on a previous analysis paper by the same author (see below).

The UN-EU Cooperation on crisis management, peace-building, development, humanitarian relief, political cooperation is one of the most advanced cooperation schemes between the UN and a regional organisation. This cooperation is suggested has done a lot to improve lives. However, despite the UN and the EU having similar objectives and an institutionalised partnership, a wide range of challenges and limitations currently hinder their effective cooperation. Although EU missions often took place in countries where the UN is already engaged, they often acted in parallel with each other rather than coordinating with one another, although this is improving. Their cooperation can add legitimacy to their actions, as in Kosovo for example, where the EU mission could only operate under the UN umbrella. In Chad, it was the other way round, with the EU acting as a bridging force for the UN. However, the handover process was not smooth as a result of differences within the UN and EU planning processes. This made it difficult to synchronise and communicate in sufficient detail about respective efforts. UN-EU cooperation is complicated by a general lack of communication or mutual understanding of the respective structures, working methods and institutional cultures. The lack of a UN system for sharing secured information prevents the EU from sharing confidential information with the UN. Suggested joint crisis management exercises have not taken place. It seems that the two institutions sometimes want to keep and show their own agenda to their constituencies, which is not conducive to inter-institutional cooperation. There are some UN concerns that the EU is too selective about where it does crisis management, leaving the UN to do what others don't want to do. The EU members have reservations about the UN's command and control. Questions arise over whether or not UN-EU cooperation is sustainable if EU member states do not contribute significantly to UN peacekeeping operations.



There are a number of different ways in which the EU and the UN have or could cooperate. They include: i) national contributions to a UN operation; ii) a standalone operation mandated by the UN Security Council; iii) an EU-led operation before a UN take over; iv) an EU-led operation in support of an existing UN operation; v) the EU provides capabilities (logistics, air support, etc.) to the UN; or possibly vi) an EU component of a UN operation; and vii) the UN and EU running a joint operation. Another area of possible cooperation is capacity building or niche support. More could be done to improve the effectiveness and relevance of the UN-EU partnership, including developing common guidelines and training and exchanging lessons learned.

### ***Options for improving EU-UN cooperation in the field of peacekeeping***

Novosseloff, A. (2011). (GGI Analysis Paper No. 3/2011). Brussels: Global Governance Institute.

<http://www.ies.be/files/documents/JMCdepository/Novosseloff,%20Alexandra,%20Options%20for%20improving%20EU-UN%20Cooperation%20in%20the%20Field%20of%20Peacekeeping.pdf>

What are the options for improving EU-UN cooperation in the field of peacekeeping? This analysis paper examines whether the EU and the UN complement or compete with each other in meeting goals on global peace and security.

The EU and the UN have become institutional and operational partners towards effective multilateralism with the support of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This relationship was developed in response to the difficulties faced by the EU and the UN in the Balkans in the early 1990s. The new developments to the ESDP, which has been renamed the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and difficult experiences of cooperation on the ground resulted in a phase of apathy in UN-EU cooperation. While the relationship has proved useful in the context of increasing complexity in crisis management, it has been an uneasy one. They have worked together closely, with varying degrees of success, in the Balkans, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Chad, for example. Working together on the ground led to the formalisation at the institutional level with the 'Joint Declaration on EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management' in 2003. There were to be four areas of cooperation: planning, training, communication, and best practices.

Despite the desire for cooperation, the two organisations have realised that they have different political agendas, objectives, means and institutional procedures which place limits on their cooperation and results. This has meant that in some contexts they have operated in parallel with one another with minimal cooperation, as in Afghanistan for example. However, they have also recently cooperated in Chad and the Central African Republic, for instance. In Chad, the EU was able to act as a bridge to the UN as a result of the Chadian government's reluctance for a UN mission and regular meeting were held to coordinate actions between the UN and EU. However, the handover phase was complicated by differences in the UN and EU planning processes, which is likely to remain a substantial challenge for effective joint action. Problems remain with communication and joint training. Efforts have been made to overcome difficulties in coordination, including the 'Guidelines for joint UN-EU planning applicable to existing UN field missions'.

### ***Partnering in crisis management: Ten years of UN-EU cooperation***

Tardy, T. (2013). (Issue Brief 30). European Union Institute for Security Studies.

[http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief\\_30.pdf](http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_30.pdf)

What is the relationship between the UN and the EU in relation to their cooperation on crisis management? This paper analyses the last ten years of UN-EU cooperation in crisis management and its possibilities and limits.

The UN-EU relationship has become a permanent feature of the crisis management landscape and mutual cooperation has been gradually institutionalised. The UN and EU have similar agendas in relation to global peace and security and are involved in similar activities. They have both recognised the need to improve strategic unity and thereby impact. Their similarities make them more natural seeming partners than cooperation between some other regional organisations. The EU has supported the UN's peace and security related activities through a mixture of financial, political and operational assistance. However, the last ten years of their cooperation have also illustrated the limits of their partnership. They face similar challenges in relation to legitimacy; constraints of fiscal austerity; difficulties in mobilising and rapidly deploy human and material resources; and criticisms over their 'top-down' approach. The UN is also much more active than the EU, which has much greater numbers of operational personnel. This is because the UN goes almost everywhere and can draw on resources from a large pool of (financially) interested countries, while the EU chooses more carefully where it wants to go with its limited and costly resources. These differences have consequences for possible UN-EU cooperation. There is some tension over the West's influence in the mandate-shaping of the operations and the reluctance of European countries to share the burden on the ground. The EU is likely to deploy more bridging missions (as in the DRC in 2003 or Chad in 2008) or operations in parallel with an existing UN operation (as currently in Mali) in the future. Member states need to ensure they do not weaken both the UN and EU as crisis management partners by playing them off against each other.

### ***Peacekeeping cooperation between the United Nations and regional organisations***

Yamashita, H. (2012). *Review of International Studies*, 38, 165-186.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510001221>

How can regional organisations cooperate with the United Nations on peacekeeping? This journal article considers the way in which the UN and regional organisations could cooperate over peacekeeping by looking at the 'subcontracting' and 'partnering' methods of global-regional peacekeeping cooperation. It uses the examples of the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU).

Regional organisations have been increasingly involved in peacekeeping operations. These have often occurred concurrently to UN peacekeeping operations. While there were concerns that this would lead to a division of resources, it seems that regional and UN peacekeeping have thrived together, although there are still concerns over shortfalls in personnel and equipment in some missions. Operational collaboration has been occurring, i.e. mission-to-mission cooperation in a specific conflict situation and as such, it is essentially *ad hoc*. There has been incremental progress in institutionalising global-regional cooperation in peacekeeping. Institutional partnership is different from operational collaboration in that it aims to institutionalise cooperation between the UN and regional organisations in peacekeeping. There are two models of cooperation between the UN and regional organisations, 'subcontracting' and 'partnering'. Subcontracting occurs when regional organisations are responsible for the peacekeeping but are authorised, monitored and directed by the UN Security Council. For the UN, this arrangement can strengthen the credibility of the UN with a lesser operational burden. For regional organisations, the UN authorisation to use force adds clear legality and legitimacy to their actions. However, it is also a clearly hierarchical relationship which puts off regional organisations. Partnering involves the UN and regional organisations forming a network of peacekeeping partners with interconnected capabilities. Regional organisations appreciate its non-hierarchical nature and it helps foster new institutional partnerships with a wide variety of actors. However, such a partnering relationship depends on the organisations' willingness

to enter into an institutional partnership with the UN. The two models are not mutually exclusive. Forms of cooperation between the UN and regional organisations can include: consultations; mutual diplomatic support; mutual operational support; co-deployment of field missions and, joint deployment of a mission. The AU has found the availability of logistic and financial support a useful reason for partnering with the UN, although it has also asserted its independence. The EU appreciates that its mission can be followed on by UN missions and that it can thereby cut short its peacekeeping commitment. In addition, acting 'in support of' the UN gives its actions legitimacy. Despite the emergence of regional peacekeeping, UN peacekeeping remains the world's largest source of peacekeeping missions. Regional organisations also generally defer to the UN Security Council's power to authorise or endorse peacekeeping missions. Regional organisations may provide critical capabilities that the UN did not have but they have also created new demands on the UN in relation to the development of African peacekeeping capacity and the need to carry out follow-on missions to the EU operations. As a result they could end up with more UN peacekeeping which leads to a problem of resources. Therefore managing such cooperation in the future requires a clearer understanding of the role of the UN in the globalisation of peacekeeping.

### ***Peacekeeping in the Mediterranean – ongoing challenge for the international community***

Marcinkowska, P. (2013). 8th Pan-European Conference on International Relations.

[http://www.eisa-net.org/be-](http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/warsaw2013/Marcinkowska_Peacekeeping_Mediterranean.pdf)

[bruga/eisa/files/events/warsaw2013/Marcinkowska\\_Peacekeeping\\_Mediterranean.pdf](http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/warsaw2013/Marcinkowska_Peacekeeping_Mediterranean.pdf)

Does the international community have real instruments to influence change in the Southern Mediterranean region? This working paper analyses the actions of the main international organisations present in the Southern Mediterranean region in relation to peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and the international response to the Arab spring in North Africa.

The Southern Mediterranean presents an interesting case for multilateralism in dealing with peace and security. After the Cold War it was found that ensuring international security could not be achieved by one actor alone. The complicated nature of current crises make them difficult for a single institution to deal with. Therefore, cooperation between at least two organisations, even when some difficulties arise, seems to be necessary for effective peacebuilding. Regional organisations were able to fill a gap in the international security system by offering new tools and mechanism that the UN could not demonstrate - geographic proximity and the deep knowledge of the region. One of the most advanced cooperation relationships is between the UN and the EU, although it has mainly been restricted to the Balkans and sub-Saharan Africa. The UN-EU relationship is complicated due to the lack of mutual understanding of their political decision-making structures. The effectiveness of their relationship depends on the political will for cooperation present on both sides.

A UN resolution gave NATO a mandate for its mission in Libya. The success of this action would not be possible without a support given by Arab League and African Union – in the operational and political aspects. Multilateral actions in the region do not often bring expected results. One of the reasons is that countries usually prefer *ad hoc* multilateralism to institutional one. This is reflected in the EU's inability to promptly decide on the actions towards Libya in 2011. Experiences with peacekeeping in the region also show that the complex nature of the disputes requires an engagement of different types of actors. The UN, EU and NATO can complement each other. Only comprehensive peace operation is likely to have an impact on the situation in the region.

### ***Promoting effective international peace operations in increasingly complex environments***

Jaques, I. (2014). (Conference Report - WP1336). Wilton Park, Center on International Cooperation: New York University.

<https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/WP1336-Report.pdf>

What is the state of UN peacekeeping? This conference report of a meeting held in partnership with the Center for International Cooperation, New York University, summaries the conference's attempt to make a strategic reassessment of UN operations, their political basis, planning, transition, exit and use of force, as well as conditions when the UN should act in structured partnerships to fulfil critical mission capabilities.

In an increasingly complex operating environment it is important to plan a mission well. Regional organisations and international financial institutions can contribute their expertise, and the comparative advantage of organisations respective roles should be considered. Despite continuing efforts, integrating activity across the UN system so that UN actors go beyond working in parallel to undertaking genuinely joined up approaches is hard. Contemporary demands on peace operations make cooperation vital between international, regional, sub-regional and national actors, both governmental and civil society. No single institution can deal with the range of security challenges. Different partners bring different strengths, and working in partnership can also broaden the resource base. Regional organisations are seen as being closer to the ground, and may in some cases bring greater legitimacy. Tensions remain in partnerships between some regional organisations and the UN, in particular the African Union, and among African organisations. Increasingly multiple organisations are working together, and in parallel, addressing distinct, yet interconnected, issues to consolidate stability and build functioning states. This requires dialogue between the organisations involved, clear definition of the respective roles, taking account of comparative advantages, as well as definition of the relationship between organisations, to avoid both duplication and gaps. It is no easy task. Effective peace operations partnerships also need agreement on strategic priorities, a common objective, and a division of labour, using everyone's strengths. There is little appetite for UN involvement in situations of high intensity conflict, where there are greater risks of casualties, and organisations like NATO or the African Union are generally better placed. Conflict prevention is felt to be insufficiently understood and considerably under-resourced at the UN.

### ***The EU and Multilateral Crisis Management: Assessing Cooperation and Coordination with the UN***

Fioramonti, L., Schoeman, M., & Olivier, G. (2012). (MERCURY E-paper No. 19). MERCURY.

[http://mercury.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/user\\_upload/E-paper\\_no\\_19\\_2012.pdf](http://mercury.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/user_upload/E-paper_no_19_2012.pdf)

What does the EU's multilateral crisis management look like in practice? This paper provides a comparative analysis of key missions and diplomatic initiatives in the field of crisis management for the EU. It reveals the contradictions in the multilateral cooperation between the EU and the UN.

Multilateralism is an important part of the EU's foreign policy agenda and as a result the EU strives to support the UN and operate legitimately within its framework and mandate. Greater support for EU-UN cooperation on crisis management arose as a result of the perceived success of Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo where the EU operated in close cooperation with the UN. This contributed to the 2003 *Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management*. Since 2003, cooperation with the UN has become a key component of the EU's approach to crisis management. EU missions have mainly been designed within the framework of UN goals and objectives, and authorised by specific UN Security Council resolutions. Among the most successful cases of close cooperation between the EU and the UN,

are Kosovo and the DRC: two contexts in which the EU-UN cooperation took the form of 'institutional multilateralism', being clearly legitimised by UN institutional procedures. The EU has also supported the AU missions in Sudan and the later hybrid AU-UN mission known as the Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The EU also formed the Libya Contact Group with the UN, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). However, there has been limited cooperation over Libya between the EU and AU for instance, due to differing political goals. On the other hand, the support of the Arab League was an important pre-condition for the EU's engagement in Libya and a reference point for its legitimacy.

However, institutional cooperation at the top-level has not always resulted in good coordination on the ground, thus undermining 'effective multilateralism'. In Kosovo, for example, despite the good and productive relationship between the UN and the EU at headquarters level, differing political interests and approaches had a very negative impact on cooperation and coordination at the field level. Lack of information sharing was a problem in Operation Artemis in the DRC, which was by far one of the most successful cases of EU-UN institutional cooperation in conflict management. Its non-mandated civilian missions in DRC appear to have enjoyed a higher degree of coordination with the UN than both Artemis and EUFOR. In addition, the EU also wishes to carve out an autonomous space for its role in multilateral crisis management, be it through military means or through diplomatic strategies. Another issue is that the multilateral framework is often exploited by certain Member States to legitimise their own bilateral interests in African countries.

### ***The European Union and UN Peacekeeping: Half-time for the EU's Action Plan***

Pietz, T. (2013). (Policy Briefing). Center for International Peace Operations.

[http://www.zif-](http://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF_Policy_Briefing_Tobias_Pietz_Oct_2013_ENG.pdf)

[berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF\\_Policy\\_Briefing\\_Tobias\\_Pietz\\_Oct\\_2013\\_ENG.pdf](http://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF_Policy_Briefing_Tobias_Pietz_Oct_2013_ENG.pdf)

What role does the EU play in UN peacekeeping and how can it support it? This policy brief analyses the relationship between the EU and UN peacekeeping and looks at how the 'Plan of Action to Enhance EU Common Security and Defence Policy Support to UN Peacekeeping' unveiled in summer 2012 can strengthen the EU and UN peace operations.

If the EU and UN are to bring about an effective and lasting stabilisation in the countries they have peace operations in, they must work closely together. The EU's recent missions in South Sudan, the Sahel, Libya, and Somalia operate in parallel to United Nations (UN) peace operations. However, they have tended to be characterised more by autonomy than by complementarity with UN operations. In addition, there is a call for the EU to provide specific capacities and skills to UN peacekeeping missions. The EU has been reluctant to provide troops to UN operations as a result of memories of the failures of UN peacekeepers on the ground in Bosnia and Rwanda and misgivings about the UN's command and control structures. However, many experts suggest that these misgivings are no longer justified. The EU has cooperated with the UN but also operated in parallel to it. For a while they carried out missions on the basis of European regional interests and the wish for greater visibility of the Common Security and Defence Policy rather than defining them in relation to existing or planned UN missions. However in 2013, with EUBAM in Libya and EUTM in Mali, the EU once again mandated missions whose remit inherently involves division of labour with UN missions on the ground. While it is still too early to assess this cooperation, the first ever joint UN/EU pre-deployment assessment mission, which analysed the security sector in Mali, appears to have been a success. If Europe fails to implement the 2012 'Plan of Action to Enhance EU Common Security and Defence Policy Support to UN Peacekeeping' it risks missing an important opportunity to strengthen UN peace operations. The complexity of problems in fragile states demands complementary action by the

United Nations and EU, or at least a well-coordinated division of labour. A clear commitment by the EU, including in the form of additional police or military contingents from its member-states, would strengthen the United Nations as central actor in global crisis management, and ultimately also the EU itself.

## 4. The multilateral system's contribution to upstream conflict prevention

### *EU-UN Cooperation on Justice and Security in Crisis Missions: A Comprehensive Approach?*

Madsen, B., & Pietz, T. (2014). (Policy Briefing). Center for International Peace Operations.

[http://www.zif-](http://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF_Policy_Briefing_Madsen_Pietz_EU_UN_Justice_SSR_Nov_2014_ENG.pdf)

[berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF\\_Policy\\_Briefing\\_Madsen\\_Pietz\\_EU\\_UN\\_Justice\\_SSR\\_Nov\\_2014\\_ENG.pdf](http://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF_Policy_Briefing_Madsen_Pietz_EU_UN_Justice_SSR_Nov_2014_ENG.pdf)

What assistance do the EU and UN provide to justice and security sector reform in crisis and post-crisis contexts? This policy brief looks at what EU-UN cooperation exists on security and justice and highlights the need for complementary and effective justice and security sector reform support in concurrent EU and UN deployments.

There is still no clear joint strategic or operational approach to justice and security sector reform despite its importance to the EU and UN's peace operations. Instead they often deploy parallel missions to the field, with *ad hoc* coordination during the planning phases and on the ground. The EU often focus on selective areas of justice and security sector reform, which makes adequate coordination and complementarity with UN missions even more important. EU-UN coordination in Mali has looked like a good start, and highlight the value of pre-deployment consultations to ensure complementarity between their missions. More needs to be done to understand coordination gaps and meet growing demand through partnerships. Joint activities should be conducted.

## 5. About this report

### Key websites

- EU-UN Peacekeeping Partnerships Initiative:  
<http://www.euun2014.eu/>

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