JUBA UNIVERSITY LECTURES 2014

WE HAVE LIVED TOO LONG TO BE DECEIVED

SOUTH SUDANESE DISCUSS THE LESSONS OF HISTORIC PEACE AGREEMENTS

John Akec • Lam Akol • John Ashworth • Oliver Albino
Paride Taban • David Deng • Julia Duany • Douglas Johnson
Alfred Lokuji • Census Lo-liyong • Don Bosco Malish
Judith McCallum • Naomi Pendle • John Ryle

JUBA UNIVERSITY LECTURES 2014

We Have Lived Too Long to Be Deceived

South Sudanese discuss the lessons of historic peace agreements

JOHN AKEC • LAM AKOL • JOHN ASHWORTH • OLIVER ALBINO
PARIDE TABAN • DAVID DENG • JULIA DUANY • DOUGLAS JOHNSON
ALFRED LOKUJI • CENSUS LO-LIYONG • DON BOSCO MALISH
JUDITH MCCALLUM • NAOMI PENDLE • JOHN RYLE

Published in 2015 by the Rift Valley Institute (RVI)
26 St Luke's Mews, London W11 1DF, United Kingdom.
PO Box 52771, GPO 00100 Nairobi, Kenya.

THE RIFT VALLEY INSTITUTE (RVI)

The Rift Valley Institute (www.riftvalley.net) works in Eastern and Central Africa to bring local knowledge to bear on social, political and economic development.

THE JUBA UNIVERSITY LECTURES 2014

The Juba University Lectures are a collaboration between the Rift Valley Institute and the Center for Peace and Development Studies at the University of Juba. The 2014 lectures were supported by the Danish Institute for International Studies and held in partnership with the South Sudan Law Society. Daniel Watkins and Ellie Hobhouse ran the project on behalf of RVI.

CREDITS

RVI Executive Director: John Ryle
RVI Director of Programmes, Sudan, South Sudan & the Great Lakes: John Moore
RVI Programme Administrator: Ellie Hobhouse
RVI Programme Officer, South Sudan: Becu Thomas
RVI Information & Programme Administrator: Tymon Kiepe
Center for Peace and Development Studies: Leben Moro
Transcription and editing: Daniel Watkins
Design: Lindsay Nash
Illustrations: Beth Watkins

ISBN 978-1-907431-39-5

Cover: Mabior, the white bull, sacrificed by Dinka and Nuer Chiefs, and spiritual leaders to seal the covenant of peace on the final day of the Wunlit Peace Conference in March 1999.

RIGHTS

Copyright © The Rift Valley Institute 2015
Cover Image © Bill Lowrey (NSCC Peacemaking Facilitator) 1999
Text published under Creative Commons license
Attribution-Noncommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Available for free download at www.riftvalley.net
Printed copies available from Amazon and other online retailers, and selected bookstores.

Contents

Introduction 5

1. Addis Ababa Agreement (1972) 8
- John Akec 8
- Douglas Johnson 8
- Alfred Lokuji 11
- Lam Akol 13
- Oliver Batali 17
- Discussion 19

2. Wunlit Conference (1999) 22
- John Ashworth 22
- Naomi Pendle 26
- Judith McCallum 29
- Julia Duany 30
- Paride Taban 32
- Discussion 33

3. Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) 37
- David Deng 37
- Census Lo-liyong 39
- Don Bosco Malish 40
- Douglas Johnson 41
- Discussion 42

Glossary of acronyms, words and phrases 46
Notes on contributors 48

Introduction

In December 2013 a new war began in South Sudan. Peace initiatives over the following eighteen months culminated in an agreement between government and armed opposition, which was signed in August 2015. The agreement came into effect in late 2015, but many uncertainties surround its implementation.

The war that began in 2013 is the third in South Sudan's short post-colonial history. Do previous conflicts and agreements hold useful lessons for the current situation? Historic peace agreements in South Sudan were the subject of a series of public lectures at Juba University in 2014, which were organised by the Rift Valley Institute and the Center for Peace and Development Studies. Three agreements were discussed: the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which brought the first civil war in the South to an end; the Wunlit Conference of 1999, which opened the way for reconciliation of the two factions of the SPLA; and the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which ushered in the process leading to independence for South Sudan in 2011.

Academics, activists, church representatives and others discussed critical questions raised by these three agreements. Why do negotiations succeed or fail? When do opportunities for peace present themselves? What is the role of civil society? And what are the implications of these agreements for the present situation? This publication is based on papers presented over the three evenings of lectures at Juba University and transcripts of the discussions that ensued.

The lectures attracted an audience of several hundred students and members of the public. The speakers included Oliver Albino, one of the last surviving negotiators of the Addis Ababa Agreement, Dr Lam Akol, Chairman of the SPLM-DC (Sudan People's Liberation Movement-Democratic Change) and Emeritus Bishop Paride Taban.

The lecture series was opened by the Vice Chancellor of the University, Dr John Akec, who reminded attendees of the importance of open debate for political process. Dr Douglas Johnson, the distinguished historian of South Sudan, began the session on the 1972 Addis accord with an account of the twelve days of talks

between the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) and the Government of Sudan based on the minutes of the negotiations. The political implications of the agreement were discussed by Dr Lam Akol and RVI Fellow Dr Alfred Sebit Lokuji, Deputy Vice-Chancellor of the University. Oliver Albino described the atmosphere in Addis Ababa and his own role in the negotiations. He described himself modestly as 'having been picked from nowhere because others dropped out.'

The second evening of the lecture series examined the Wunlit Peace and Reconciliation Conference of 1999. The Wunlit meeting brought together customary leaders from the Nuer of Western Upper Nile and the Dinka of the Lakes region, with observers from other areas of the South, signalling an end to eight years of South-on-South violence. The opening speakers were John Ashworth, advisor to the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), whose three decades of experience go back to the years before the second civil war, and Naomi Pendle, a British researcher working on the history of inter-tribal peace meetings and customary law.

The chair of the session on Wunlit, RVI Fellow Dr Leben Moro, Dean of External Affairs at the University, introduced contributions from three other speakers: First, Bishop Paride Taban; then, Dr Judith McCallum, head of Saferworld's Horn of Africa Programme, whose research has focused on the impact of the civil war in South Sudan on community identity; and finally Dr Julia Duany, Vice Chancellor of the John Garang Memorial University, who together with her late husband, Dr Michael Wal Duany, was one of the organising secretariat of the Wunlit conference.

The panellists detailed the logistical difficulties associated with the organisation of a people-to-people peace process and the importance of preparation and implementation. Despite the destructive effect of war on social relations, as detailed by Dr Duany, the success of the community-led dialogue at Wunlit, demonstrated the strength of the metaphor employed by Bishop Paride Taban. 'The politicians are the fish, the civil population the water.'

The discussion on the final evening, chaired by RVI Executive Director John Ryle, focused on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005. The lead speaker was David Deng, Research Director of the South Sudan Law Society, who addressed the question of the limits of the transitional process following the CPA and the unfinished business of peace. The other speakers were Don Bosco Malish, Programme Officer in Juba for the Open Society

Initiative in Eastern Africa (OSIEA); Census Kabang Lo-liyong, an environmental management specialist; and Dr Douglas Johnson.

The discussion pointed to a lack of implementation of key elements of the CPA as the root cause of the current social and political breakdown in South Sudan. In particular, David Deng drew attention to the failure of the government in the transitional period in implementing a process of national reconciliation and healing. The presentations inspired an energetic floor debate, revealing the strength of feeling evoked by the CPA in the context of the present conflict.

The first of many speakers from the floor, the South Sudanese writer Taban Lo-liyong, posed the central question of the current situation: 'After our independence, how do we live together as a nation?'

As South Sudan struggles to find an answer to the current internal conflict, the lectures made it clear that it is necessary to look backwards as well as forwards. The three historic peace agreements examined in the lecture series represent a range of different ways of reaching a political settlement, each with its successes and failures—and each with implications for the future of the country.

1. Addis Ababa Peace Agreement (1972)

Sponsored by the World Council of Churches, the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement was the outcome of talks in Ethiopia between the Nimeiri government and representatives of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). The agreement ended the First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972), established the Southern Region and brought a decade of relative peace. This ended in 1983 with President Nemeiri's abrogation of key elements of the agreement.

John Akec

The taste of freedom

I remember when the Addis Ababa Agreement was signed. I was just a boy, in my third year of primary school. I remember running to the dusty airport in my village in Gogrial to receive General Lagu and Kuol Amum. They addressed us on the airstrip, saying that this agreement was for us, the young generation.

The Addis Ababa Agreement brought autonomy for South Sudan for the first time. It brought a parliament and an executive, which had a very limited budget. For ten years we had a taste of freedom. Really, we were free. The army moved away, the police were moved, and we only had South Sudanese ruling over us.

The Addis Ababa agreement shows us that democracy can only come about when you give people room to debate issues. Politics is to be debated and discussed. Although you may not always see progress being made…

Douglas Johnson

The lessons of the agreement

The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement was both a peace settlement to end fighting in Sudan's first civil war and a political settlement. A political settlement was necessary to be able to bring about an end to the fighting. The negotiations were successful, but in the long term the agreement was not.

The success of the negotiations was based on the fact that both the Government of Sudan and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) were serious about negotiating. Both sides had to overcome internal opposition to the negotiations. There were senior figures in the Sudanese government and army as well as in the Anyanya movement who were opposed to any negotiations taking place, and the leadership had to overcome or even override these objections in order to send delegations to Addis Ababa.

Direct negotiations had been preceded by a series of preliminary indirect talks through intermediaries in the All Africa Council of Churches (AACC) and World Council of Churches (WCC) who went back and forth between the different sides. Also, there were a number of South Sudanese individuals, whom we would now call stakeholders, who were living abroad but were not part of either the government or the exile movement. These people were also brought in to the indirect negotiations.[1]

'Despite opposition within both the government and SSLM, and reservations on both sides, the two delegations were in fact committed to reaching an agreement.'

Unlike the 1965 Round Table Conference, when political parties met for the first time to discuss 'the Southern Problem,' no time limit was set. The WCC informed Abel Alier, then Minister for Southern Affairs, that the SSLM had appointed a delegation for 'negotiations to continue till a solution is found.'[2]

What lessons can be drawn from this summary of the 1972 Addis Ababa talks?

Firstly, despite opposition within both the government and SSLM, and reservations on both sides during the negotiations, the two delegations were in fact committed to reaching an agreement. In other words they entered into negotiations with serious intent, not to play for time.

Secondly, the negotiating delegations were unbalanced, not only in numbers but in expertise. The government side included several representatives from the military, as well as persons with expertise in administration and finance. The SSLM delegation did not have equal representation in those fields, especially for the military and the economy. Lagu had tried to strike a regional balance within southern Sudan, but Bahr el-Ghazal was under-represented. This had a bearing on the balance in the agreement, especially in economic matters.

Thirdly, the moderator's interventions at strategic moments kept the negotiations on track: at times summarising points made in order to move the discussion on; at other times asking the delegations to clarify their positions, refusing to allow discussion to be

1. Abel Alier, *Southern Sudan: Too many agreements dishonoured*, Exeter: Ithaca Press, 1990, 51-92; Joseph Lagu, *Sudan, Odyssey through a State: From ruin to hope*, Omdurman: M.O.B. Center for Sudanese Studies, 2006, 239-47.

2. Alier, *Southern Sudan*, 95.

side-tracked; sometimes breaking for prayer to allow tempers to cool; and finally sharply reminding them that the discussions could end in failure.

Fourth, the role of the Ethiopian government was more indirect. It offered a safe and neutral venue for the talks, Haile Selassie gave his advice only when appealed to, and delivered his opinion diplomatically, but unambiguously. His position as a respected elder statesman of Africa meant that what he said mattered, and there was no recourse to coercion. There is no pan-African statesman of similar stature today.

'When the agreement was published, it was under the rubric, "A Solution for the Southern Problem". This was the fundamental weakness of the mandate of the negotiations.'

Fifth, there were other southern Sudanese 'stakeholders' present as observers, who played no direct role in the formal negotiations, but whose influence would have been felt in informal discussions outside the negotiations.

Sixth, all the texts that were discussed and agreed were drafted by the negotiating delegations in their committees, rather than drafted by an external mediator. However, the brevity of the final document allowed for different interpretations of how it was to be implemented. This is one reason why, in the CPA negotiations, the different protocols were spelled out in great detail.

Seventh, an agreement on the administrative arrangements for the southern region was quickly reached, whereas most of the time was spent arguing about security and the composition of the army. This was a lesson the SPLM/SPLA learned when it insisted on retaining a separate army for the South in the CPA negotiations.

Finally, there was the focus on 'the Southern Problem'. When the agreement was published, it was under the rubric, 'A Solution for the Southern Problem'. This was a fundamental weakness of the mandate of the negotiations. Ezboni Mondiri and Lawrence Wol Wol tried to open up the discussion to include a solution for the whole country, but they were hampered by the fact that the SSLM itself had never made this one of their political goals and the government delegation had not come prepared to discuss a broader solution. Mansour Khalid was reported to have regretted this later, saying that, had they had accepted some federal formula for the whole country, it would have been impossible for Nimeiri to abrogate the agreement later.

Alfred Lokuji

Why the Addis Ababa Agreement could not last

Was the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement of 1972 a substantive engagement between the parties with the aim of pursuing a sustainable peace, or simply a Khartoum government exercise in public relations? If a party to a conflict seeks only to postpone military defeat or to improve its positions in the battlefield, it might be described as buying time. While an unsuccessful peace deal may not necessarily be evidence of buying time, other actions can indicate when there is a failure to meet the necessary conditions for sustainable peace.

My approach is one that might best be described as an autopsy of the Addis Ababa agreement. It is increasingly evident from the brief history of post-colonial independent Sudan—and now South Sudan—that its peace agreements represent strategies to buy time in order to regain military advantage rather than a genuine and sustainable resolution of conflict.

Discourse on the Sudanese conflicts between government and anti-government forces has generally worked on the assumption that putting an end to conflict is not just desirable but possible, regardless of the types of party to the conflict or the type of government in power. In the case of the Addis Ababa agreement little attention has been paid to the strategies Nimeiri used to undermine the agreement.

‘It is increasingly evident … that [Sudanese] peace agreements represent strategies to buy time in order to regain military advantage rather than a genuine and sustainable resolution of conflict.’

Four factors in particular act as predictors of whether a peace is genuine or just buying time: the character of the regime, international partners, style of leadership, and cessation of hostilities. I look at each one in turn.

Was the philosophical or ideological stance of the Nimeiri government democratic or autocratic, dogmatic or pluralistic? A dogmatic socialist ideology seemed to colour all actions of the regime, especially after the establishment of the government party, the Sudanese Socialist Union.

Later on, during the rapprochement with the religious leaders of Sudan—the precursors to the Islamists—religion took the dominant position. With such a stance, based on dogma rather than on equality before the law, conflict with enemies becomes mandatory. And peace overtures become tactical moves.

International partners as observers, arbitrators, facilitators, enforcers and witnesses to a peaceful resolution of conflict are essential if a peace agreement is to be worth the paper it is

written on. The 1947 Juba Conference, for example, though not a peace agreement, would not have been so well-remembered if it were not for the presence of the colonial organizers of that conference.[3]

By contrast, the June 1966 Committee to the Chairman of the Round Table Conference on the South had no outside observer or witness as a signatory. It is no wonder that the conference bore no fruit. Attempts at peace within Sudan by Sudanese alone, to the exclusion of international observers, such as the 1965 Round-table Conference, have never succeeded in bringing about lasting peace.

'The leadership and decision-making style of the leaders of the conflicting parties may matter a great deal.'

The Addis Ababa agreement had witnesses. This was a good start if peace was to be sustained. Unlike the CPA, though, it lacked the economic, legal, and diplomatic wherewithal amongst the witnesses to enforce the agreement and hold the parties accountable, should any of them fail to live up to the terms of the agreement.

The leadership and decision-making style of the leaders of the conflicting parties may matter a great deal.

In the case of Sudan, the first characteristic of the leaders is that they were military men. This is true of General Jaafar Nimeiri and General Joseph Lagu, and was true of General Omar Bashir, Commander Riek Machar in the Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997, and John Garang de Mabior, Commander in Chief and Chairman of the SPLA. An autocratic leader is not beholden to his people or to his military advisers, who may have no say in whether the peace or a ceasefire should be sustained or not.

The other characteristic when we talk of ceasefire, is whether our leaders are genuine. Ceasefires can easily turn out to be mechanisms for a lull in the fighting, to prevent further losses of ground, or to regain strength through the re-stocking of weaponry. There are many more declarations than actual instances of peace. This is the essence of Abel Alier's argument in *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured*.

John Garang warned the Anyanya forces in 1972:

> Any Southerner who holds the mistaken view that Arab Nationalism, now sincere … gives the South local autonomy in good faith, and that this autonomy will be guaranteed by a few phrases scribbled on some sheets of paper … christened 'The Constitution'—that Southerners either suffers from acute historical myopia or else, advocates the treasonable stand of

3. *Minutes of the Juba Conference,* EP/SCR/1.A.5/1, Juba, 21 June 1947.

opportunism, national subjugation, and continual Arab chauvinism and domination. In short, such Southerner calls for surrender in a camouflaged form.[4]

To have positive peace, you level the ground for all citizens to enjoy the political, economic, social, cultural benefits that the nation can afford. That did not happen.

There are people who romanticise the Addis Ababa agreement and the self-government period in South Sudan. But there was a high level of interference from Khartoum at that time, and having the Anyanya forces fully integrated in the national army left the South without any sort of military guarantee. This allowed Khartoum to continue with business as usual.

In 1972, while a Captain in the Anyanya Army, John Garang argued that the Nimeiri regime was entering into negotiations 'just for the purpose of lengthening its own days of breath.'[5] In the agreement, the autonomous government of Southern Sudan would have its own executive, its own legislature. And yet, when Nimeiri did not like the legislature, he dissolved it. Is that true autonomy? Does that tell you that Nimeiri was sincere in establishing an autonomous government for Southern Sudan?

The only reason the Addis Ababa Agreement lasted from 1972 to 1983 is that we in the South had been suffering for so long that we thought there was no way but up. The South had to take it in good faith. It turned out that it was a false hope.

Lam Akol

Necessary conditions for making peace

Peace agreements are not made between friends. Agreements are between people fighting each other, who necessarily don't trust each other. We can assume each side will try to get the most it can from the final settlement. But for any agreement to succeed, at least four conditions must be satisfied.

Firstly, there must be a stalemate in the conflict. Anything that contributes to the war effort must have reached a stalemate, be it military, political, or diplomatic. If not, one of the sides will continue to believe that it can still gain on the battlefield.

Although secret negotiations between Khartoum and Anyanya representatives started as early as May 1971, it was not until after the coup and counter-coup of 1971 that the process crystallised into a genuine search for peaceful settlement. By the second

4. John Garang, Letter from The General Headquarters, Anyanya National Armed Forces, South Sudan, to The Commander in Chief Anyanya National Armed Forces, Leader of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement, Members of the Anyanya SSLM Negotiation Committee, 24 January 1972.
5. Garang, Letter to Anyanya Forces, 24 January 1972.

half of 1971, internal conditions within the Government and the Anyanya combined with external factors to render the search for peace the best option for the two sides.

By 1971, Nimeiri had lost the support of the Soviet Union, Arab socialists and the Eastern Bloc and had begun to look to the West for help. The West was intent on a peaceful settlement in South Sudan, and had set certain parameters for assisting Nimeiri. This had an effect within Sudan. When Nimeiri lost the Communist party's support, he became politically very vulnerable, and began looking for an alliance with the Southern forces.

To the south, the coming to power of Idi Amin in Uganda in 1971 deprived Nimeiri of the support of Obote, who had been ruthless against the Anyanya. Amin's support for the Anyanya movement helped to create a condition of stalemate.

But the push for peace also worked against the Anyanya in that they would lose support from activists and refugees in neighbouring countries, especially Zaire and Uganda. After the signing of the agreement on 27 February, Lagu discovered that these countries were pushing him to sign a peaceful settlement. His back was exposed.

The second condition is this: you must have a facilitator or a mediator who enjoys the trust of and has influence with the parties. In the case of Addis Ababa, this was Burgess Carr.

'You must have a facilitator or a mediator who enjoys the trust of and has influence with the parties.'

The first serious attempt for mediation in the problem of the war in Sudan was made by the Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF), which was affiliated to the Parliamentary Labour Party in Britain. Its Secretary-General, Barbara Haq, was given the responsibility of mediating in the conflict and began to meet with Mading de Garang, on the side of the Southern rebels. But she came to be perceived as actively supporting Joseph Garang and her role came to an abrupt end: Mading would have nothing more to do with the MCF.

In 1971, the WCC and the ACC enjoyed respect and influence on both sides, with the Government and with the Anyanya. On 15 May 1971, they visited Khartoum, they met with Abel Alier, who was the Acting Minister for Southern Affairs, and Abdulgasim Hashim, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. They met later and submitted six points to the Anyanya as the basis of the agreement.

These were taken to Mading de Garang in London, who then communicated with Joseph Lagu. The Government wanted to ascertain if the Anyanya were ready to negotiate within a united Sudan. On 30 October 1971, Joseph Lagu wrote to Mading saying,

'You can now tell the Government that we are ready to negotiate within a united Sudan.' Things began to move quickly.

The third condition for success is that negotiators must enjoy the trust and confidence both of their principals and also of the rank and file of their organisation if they are to deliver what they put their name to in peace agreements.

The question of people to trust as negotiators was a problem for the Anyanya. The SSLM delegation—of which Oliver Albino was a member—was headed by Ezboni Mondiri. Ezboni was effectively dismissed by General Lagu when Lagu came to Addis Ababa in March 1972, intending to re-negotiate the terms of the Agreement. But there was pressure on Lagu to sign the peace agreement. Ultimately, when he went to meet Emperor Haile Selassie to discuss these matters, the only concession he could achieve was that the 6,000 Southerners to be incorporated into the national army should be Anyanya, rather than Southerners. He then signed the agreement.

'The agreement did not fail because of anything intrinsic to the agreement, rather, it failed because of the application.'

The fourth and final necessity is that there must be some common ground to make a peace agreement possible. The Anyanya was calling for a separate South while the government of Sudan wanted a united country. When Lagu agreed that there was room for a settlement within a united Sudan the peace agreement was possible.

For the Anyanya, though, it was not easy to abandon their call for a separate South. Most of the opposition came from this angle. It was not easy either for Nimeiri to sell a ceasefire 'cooling-off period' to the military in the north, nor the concept of sharing power with rebels who had until recently been seen as highwaymen.

The Agreement did not fail because of anything intrinsic to the agreement, rather, it failed because of its application—mostly because the condition of stalemate was changing.

The agreement enjoyed initial success. Nimeiri was serious. He worked hard to see that agreement succeed. For him, it was a guarantee of his survival. Having lost political support from the North, he began to rely on the South. And in many cases, he did things that went beyond the conditions of the agreement. For example, he asked Lagu to nominate 200 soldiers from his army to join his Republican Guard, the force which later helped foil coups in 1975 and 1976 against Nimeiri's regime. Things began to change in 1977 however, when he made the National Reconciliation Agreement with the opposition in the North—Sadiq al Mahdi

and Turabi. From that time onwards, in relation to the south, he became more confrontational.

Yet, from the beginning, there was a lack of pluralism in the implementation of the agreement. The fact that the SSLM did not insist on its own continuation meant everyone joined the SSU, Nimeiri's Sudan Socialist Union. The unity of the South as one entity was threated by the divisions and wrangling among Southern politicians over power in this one party. And then finally, there was a lack of development. Development and peace go together. If you have no development, peace is threatened, and there was no development in the South.

'The agreement was owned by all Southerners. There was no separation between 'liberator' and 'liberated'. It was all Southerners together.'

In a real sense, the Addis Ababa agreement brought peace to South Sudan for 11 years. There were only occasional skirmishes within the army, such as in Akobo, in 1975, or with Joseph Aguet in 1976.

The agreement was owned by all Southerners. There was no separation between 'liberator' and 'liberated'. It was all Southerners together. Except for the army in some areas, you never saw an incident where the Anyanya said, 'We brought the liberation, so we should do the job.' There was also an atmosphere of healthy democracy, as individuals from rival factions within the SSU competed for positions in the Regional Assembly

They managed to form a government from scratch. The interim High Executive Council of 12 Ministers started with one office, one car. In 1974 it was able to build the current Ministries, the houses of the Ministers, and the Assembly. Despite the difficulties of low budgets and constant interference from the central government, they were able also to develop institutions.

Finally, for the first time, Southern Sudanese had a considerable presence in the national army, especially in the officer corps.

As regards the present situation the first lesson is the issue of the supremacy of the political over military. In any liberation movement, it must be the political that directs the military. Otherwise, when weapons are laid down, they don't know what to do next.

The second lesson is that, throughout all the stages of the negotiation, it was the national government of the day that took the initiative. It was the government that gave the delegation of SCC and AACC the six points for the agreement. It was the government that gave a suggestion for the framework for discussion. It was the government that took a blueprint to Addis.

For the agreement to survive, you must have a genuine multi-party democracy and ownership. Everybody felt they were part of the agreement. The Anyanya fought for the Southerners: they brought peace for the Southerners, so it must be the Southerners who enjoy peace.

Those who are qualified should take their qualifications and use them properly. This was one of the things that the Government of the High Executive Council did. They collected Southerners who were in the North and brought them to the South, and gave them positions based on their qualifications. There was no segregation according to whether one had been in the bush or not in the bush, whether one had fought or not. It was based on merit.

Oliver Albino

Making peace in Addis Ababa

John Ryle: Oliver Albino, you are one of the few people who can talk about what it felt like to arrive in Addis Ababa, the imperial capital of Ethiopia in 1972 to negotiate peace. You went, after more than a decade of war and suffering in South Sudan, as the representative of South Sudanese people, to try to end this long period of difficulty in the South. Uncle, I would like you to cast your mind back to February 1972, because I think that was a critical moment. When you arrived in Addis, did you think that these peace talks were going to succeed?

'No I didn't think they would succeed. By then, I had already lived too long to be deceived.'

Oliver Albino: No. I didn't think they would succeed. By then, I had already lived too long to be deceived.

At that time, I was not even supposed to be a member of that delegation, but they were short on numbers. Many of the delegation members had refused to take their seats, and I was one of the people fished out of the waters to become a member.

When I arrived, I was a stranger. I was in a place where I had to ask for guidance—but there was none. I asked how we were going to start—but no one knew. This was perhaps because the whole team had been replaced just as we were called to the negotiating table.

That the agreement was going to succeed was something impressed on me by the presence of Mansour Khalid, and by the confidence he had in Nimeiri's sincerity. As our relations with the North will show, Mansour Khalid became a different man after living long enough with Nimeiri. He has since written books about

Nimeiri's insincerity. My confidence, which I built around Mansour Khalid's confidence in Nimeiri, collapsed with his.

To the best of our ability, we did what we could. There were pressures on the leadership, and the leadership was also putting pressure on us. I was chairman of the political committee. Somebody passed on words from General Lagu. He said he was happy with work done by the Committee for Financial and Economic Affairs, but not by the political committee. We had sold out the South, he said. So I was thrown aside as somebody who had sold out the South. I decided to not go to the conference for three days; those days were spent discussing me.

In the end, Lagu took me aside and told me I was doing fine, but the committee was not. I replied, 'I'm the leader of the committee. How can I be doing fine and the committee not?' Only when the committee as a whole was praised did I return. It was playing games, but it is how it happened.

Douglas Johnson: Dr Lam emphasised the importance of common ground and mentioned also the approach of the Government to Lagu and to Mading de Garang on the issue of starting negotiations on the basis of a united Sudan. Why did the leadership of the SSLM shift their position from total independence of the South, which was understood at that time as being what the Anyanya was for, to accepting other conditions for negotiations? Was this a debate within the leadership? Or was it decided by Lagu and only a few people?

'To the best of our ability, we did what we could. There were pressures on the leadership, and the leadership was also putting pressure on us.'

Oliver Albino: Well at that time, if you said 'federation', people would look around to try to see who had said it. And it's true even now, when you ask, 'What is federation?' If you ask me, I would struggle to explain the idea, even having studied political science. Despite that, you could go deep into any village and find people talking and singing songs about federation. If we shifted from one point to another, people didn't mind—they knew who we were. Particularly in Juba here, people knew, 'Oliver is there, so it's OK.' Whether we shifted from position of unity, or onto something else, the people knew we were aiming for something they would approve. In most cases, this is the principle.

Alfred Lokuji: As you left Addis with this agreement, and you came to establish the Government of South Sudan in the context of unity, what were the concerns that you had about the agreement at the time? Was there anything that really worried you?

Oliver Albino: The one or two worries that we had about the agreement were never spoken. We had hoped at the time to meet our leader, Joseph Lagu, to tell him we were being forced to sign it. We wanted to persuade him to refuse and change the agreement to what we wanted. This was our aim. But we were never so lucky.

'I have sense of pride, though, being one of the few surviving members of the delegation to the Addis agreement.'

Lam Akol: My question is related to the SSLM. Why did they not raise the issue of their continuation as a political party?

Oliver Albino: That was another thing we wanted Joseph Lagu to insist on—the SSLA. It was one of the things we had wanted Lagu to hear. Again, we were not so lucky. I have a sense of pride, though, being one of the few surviving members of the delegation to the Addis Ababa agreement. I was picked from nowhere, because all the other members dropped out.

Lam Akol: Because they wanted separation!

Oliver Albino: I also wanted separation at that time. But I knew that even separation had to be negotiated.

Beny Gideon, South Sudan Human Rights Society for Advocacy: Both parties ratified the agreement in Addis Ababa on 27 March. How did the people accept it? What was the reaction of the people?

Oliver Albino: From what I heard, they were happy. Very happy. Of course, politicians criticised the form of agreement we brought, saying that it had been tampered with and so on, but the ordinary man was happy as long as there was an agreement.

Discussion: The lessons of Addis Ababa



Benjamin Gurogimba: One of the factors that, according to you, Dr Lam, is necessary if an agreement is to be reached is a stalemate. Where are we currently with regards to a stalemate?

Lam Akol: The question of stalemate has many facets. You could have military stalemate, political stalemate, diplomatic stalemate, and so on. My own analysis of the situation at the moment is that there is no military stalemate, and that's why the parties think they can slog it out in the field. But they are facing difficulties in other arenas. So whether they will be wise enough to see that military factors alone will not be able to deliver anything, remains to be seen.

John Ryle: What is the one lesson from the Addis Ababa Agreement, positive or negative, about the agreement, or its implementation, that is important for us to bear in mind for the current peace talks?

Douglas Johnson: I think that the most important thing that we've got to ask is, what is the seriousness of the opposing sides in negotiating? Is there any common ground? Have we reached a point yet where the popular will can be heard and have any impact on the negotiating sides?

Oliver Albino: The difference between the trouble now and the Addis Ababa agreement is that we were making an agreement to change borders. We considered those people as completely alien, as people who could not understand our politics. Those people were different from us, our problem with them was political. Now, although we are the same people, it is politics that has brought the trouble.

'The difference between the trouble now and the Addis Ababa agreement is that we were making an agreement to change borders. We considered those people as completely alien.'

In both cases, the war is political, and we have got to look at it politically. Even if it is tribal, we must look at it politically. If a Nuer takes a spear or a gun and shoots a Dinka, what is his reason? It is not just because one is Dinka and one is Nuer. It is politics.

Do not get hatred into your politics. Many of the things I have seen are driven by hate; the original motives are lost.

Alfred Lokuji: Khartoum and Nimeiri paid a price to buy peace in South Sudan, going through the motions of sharing power. But the idea that we were now a Sudan where all are citizens were equal on every definition of citizenship, was not present in the Sudanese mind. That never happened.

The lesson is that if peace is pinned on the efforts of one person who is willing to make certain sacrifices in order to prolong his regime or his party, the political system has to move fast to get ideas into society. Otherwise, peace will collapse very quickly.

Today, the greatest problem is that we have pinned our problems on individuals. We don't recognise the systemic nature of the problem. We have to think about ways of solving problems as South Sudanese together. Individuals are always going to be willing to pay short-term prices in order to appear to have won in any situation, but these will not be lasting solutions.

Lam Akol: The most remarkable thing about Addis Ababa was the ownership of the agreement by the people of South Sudan. I'm happy that the SSLM did not negotiate itself into the agreement. Negotiating yourself into an agreement is the surest way to disaster.

I hope future agreements will only be about what needs to be done in South Sudan, and don't negotiate individuals, political parties, or groups into the text of the agreement.

2. Wunlit Peace Conference (1999)

A split in the SPLA leadership in 1991 led to inter-tribal violence in many parts of the South. In 1999, the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) organised the Wunlit Peace and Reconciliation Conference, which brought together customary authorities from the Nuer of Western Upper Nile and the Dinka of Bahr al-Ghazal. The resolution of conflict between these communities that was negotiated at Wunlit prepared the ground for the reunification of the SPLA in 2002

John Ashworth

A long-term, grass-roots approach

You could say that the People-to-People process, which culminated in the Wunlit conference, began in 1991. That year, there was a split in the SPLM between Dr John Garang and Dr Riek Machar, which would go on to have terrible consequences. Right from the very beginning, the church began to try to reconcile the two protagonists. We have to say, sadly, that we failed.

'People-to-people peace is not about conferences … People-to-people requires months and indeed years of mobilisation and awareness raising, working with chiefs, elders, and women.'

The people-to-people process began in 1997. After reflection, the churches decided that, as we had already failed to bring together the two doctors, we ought to start at the grassroots.

So in 1998, we brought together a group of Dinka and Nuer chiefs from the West Bank of the Nile. We brought them to Lokichogio, which was a safe place, and that was a key meeting that set the scene for the rest of the people-to-people process. They agreed, 'We can't keep on killing each other; we're going to finish each other.'

After that meeting, they went back to start mobilising the people and start spreading that message amongst their own people. The church also had its own peace mobilisers, with the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), founded by Bishop Paride Taban, leading this process.

One of the very vital parts was exchange visits between chiefs. At that time, for Dinka chiefs to go into a Nuer area, or for Nuer chiefs to go into a Dinka area, was practically suicide. But as a result

of the chiefs' meeting in Lokichogio, they started going to each others' territory, and quite a few people said, 'Now I have seen a chief from the enemy coming safely to my own area. Now I know there is a serious peace process which is going on.'

The first big conference occurred in 1999, and that was the Dinka–Nuer West Bank Peace and Reconciliation Conference, which was held in Wunlit.

The first point I would like to emphasise is that everyone talks about Wunlit, but I've been talking to you about the years before Wunlit. People-to-people peace is not about conferences. Even today you will find many people who are trying to raise money for their peace and reconciliation initiative, telling you it's based on the people-to-people principle. But if it's just a conference, it's not people-to-people.

'There were key moments during the Wunlit meeting, such as the slaughtering of the white bull, Mabior … This was not an easy bull; this was a tough bull. It had been slaughtered as a symbol of peace.'

People-to-people requires months and indeed years of mobilisation and awareness raising, working with chiefs, elders, and women. It's that grassroots process that makes people-to-people, not conferences. The conferences of course are important, but a conference without the prior grassroots process is a complete waste of time and money. We know that because we've seen hundreds of them in South Sudan over the last few years.

Wunlit brought together, in total, about 2,000 people. A new village had to be built in a place that had nothing. Boreholes had to be drilled, an airstrip made, security had to be provided.

There were key moments during the Wunlit meeting, such as the slaughtering of a white bull, Mabior. Mabior fought hard before he was killed, and that was seen as a good sign by the people gathered together. This was not an easy bull; this was a tough bull. It had been slaughtered as a symbol of peace.

A major part of the process was that each side had the chance to tell its story. They talked about 'vomiting out' all the bitterness, hatred and anger, so each side could say what the other side did to them. Then the other side has the chance to say their side of the story. Eventually, people realise it's the same story—what you're doing to us, we are doing to you—and the suffering is on all sides.

From that process, you move on to an agreement of how we go forward. What has to be done to repair the damage and to bring about reconciliation? At Wunlit, peace councils were set up to address new incidents before they got out of hand.

We then moved to the East Bank. We had two conferences: one in 1999 in Waat, one in 2000 in Lilir.

After those meetings, we held a meeting that we called strategic linkages. We brought chiefs and elders and women who had been part of all the other conferences together and asked how it was going, and what we should do next.

The basic message we got from the people there was, 'We have made peace'—particularly on the West Bank more than on the East Bank—'but it is our sons who are still causing the fighting.' And by their 'sons' they meant the two doctors, Dr John and Dr Riek. And they told us, 'If you want to bring reconciliation and peace between us, you've now got to address our sons.'

'A key element of the people-to-people process is the years of patient preparation at the grassroots level. Part of the work of this long preparation is building trust. Telling stories is also very important, and the use of traditional reconciliation mechanisms.'

We didn't jump straight to addressing Dr John and Dr Riek. We went first to a middle level. We had a conference in Kisumu, Kenya, where we took chiefs, elders and women from the grassroots to Kisumu, but we also invited a lot of the commanders, politicians, intellectuals, and others.

At all these conferences, the women's contribution was significant. Over the entire people-to-people process, from Wunlit onwards, a third of the delegates were women. At Kisumu I remember the women told the men, 'If you people keep on fighting, you'll kill yourselves, all of you. And then we women will use the money from the oil to buy white husbands for ourselves.' The women knew how to get the attention of their men!

The basic message from Kisumu, from both Nuer and Dinka communities was, 'We support the liberation struggle, we support Dr John as the leader of the liberation struggle, but Dr John and Dr Riek must reconcile.' Now it wasn't long afterwards, in early 2002, when they did reconcile and Riek came back into the SPLM. We certainly believe that people-to-people process was a major influence in that reconciliation.

I want to mention some of the key elements of the people-to-people process.

The first one is the years of patient preparation at the grassroots. Part of the work of this long preparation is building trust. Telling stories is also very important, and the use of traditional reconciliation mechanisms. I've already mentioned the slaughter of the bull Mabior. There are rich reconciliation mechanisms within the local culture of South Sudan.

Symbolism is very important. This is something that's often forgotten by our Western friends, who are very much focused on techniques, matrices and so on. And that's actually where churches are apt, because symbolism and imagery is very much part of the religious milieu.

Truth-telling—we found this in Wunlit and other conferences, after the people have 'vomited out' the bitterness and the anger, they're telling the truth. The truth has to be on the table if we're going to make peace.

Another very important part is the acknowledgement that the community is the primary actor and the community must be ready to take responsibility. There was a key moment when the chiefs said, 'We cannot just keep on blaming other people. We have to take responsibility for making peace.' Any peace which is imposed from the outside, whether it's by IGAD or the Americans or UNMISS, will fail.

The penultimate measure is a signed agreement that has practical applications. In our cases, these were things like returning stolen cattle, paying compensation for those who had been killed, resolving the issue of abducted women and children, setting up a community border police force, dealing with the fact that communities were going to need humanitarian aid and services to get back to their homes.

That was also one of the failures of the Wunlit process. Afterwards, we went to the international donors and NGOs and said, 'This is a national priority, can you help us with the practical side of helping the people who have made peace?' They replied, 'That's not in our strategic plan', or 'We don't work in that area or sector'. It's a real credit to the people of the West Bank that their peace lasted for so long, given the lack of interest and support from the international community for the hard things that come after the conference.

'Another very important part is the acknowledgement that the community is the primary actor and the community must be ready to take responsibility.'

The last thing we discovered was that we were empowering people. We hadn't set out to empower people, we'd set out to try and make peace. But this grassroots process had empowered people, helping them to take responsibility for themselves, which is what they wanted to do.

Studies say that if you want to make peace, you've got to look at three levels: the grassroots level, the mid-level, and the high-level. What we tried to do in 1991 was reconciliation at the top level. It failed. Dr Riek and Dr Garang were not ready to reconcile.

After some reflection, we went to the grassroots level. With the people-to-people process we worked to bring peace and reconciliation at that lowest level.

Then, we had the strategic linkages conference to evaluate. There, we were told, 'We've done all we can at our level. We've

made peace amongst ourselves at our level. You've now got to go to our sons.'

At Kisumu, we brought the intellectuals, the commanders, the politicians and a whole range of other people together with the grassroots; and this mid-level conference did its work. They came up with a resolution that next the top level must reconcile.

You start with the grassroots, you then move through the middle level, with the grassroots putting pressure on the middle, and the middle puts pressure on the top. We believe this process led to that reconciliation.

Naomi Pendle

A non-government process

The Wunlit conference was a remarkable event. It was somehow able to gather people who didn't trust each other and bring them together, with many people going, scared that they wouldn't return or that they would be killed in the process. The conference did many things to which we must come back again and again to learn lessons.

The proceedings of the Wunlit conference were recorded and transcribed, and are available online.[6] From that resource, I've taken three features that illuminate how the people who participated in the conference understood it. In addition I relate those historical features to the present politics in the region.

First of all, Wunlit was viewed as a non-government process. It's important to understand that in South Sudan, the word 'government' can be defined broadly, beyond the specific central government of the day. The Dinka language, for example, distinguishes between *koc hakuma* and *koc bai*—the people of the government and the people of the home. Each term refers to a sphere of influence. The SPLA, during the Wunlit process, were included in peoples' idea of government. The home, meanwhile, is associated with local government, elders and possibly, chiefs, although they sit somewhere between the two spheres.

In 1991, the divide in the SPLA was seen as a split in the government. But despite being in the government sphere, that competition was nonetheless able to mobilise peoples' home communities to fight.

Many of the ideas of Wunlit concerned the home communities taking back control at the local level. Chiefs responded by saying

6. *Wunlit: Dinka–Nuer West Bank Peace and Reconciliation Conference*, February 1999. Transcript available online at the Sudan Open Archive (www.sudanarchive.net).

that they were in control of war and peace, and if the home wants peace, they can come to that peace irrespective of what's going on in the government.

During Wunlit, it's the chiefs and local leaders who speak, rather than the politicians. Nhial Deng Nhial, then governor of Bahr el-Ghazal, opens the conference by saying they—the SPLA—are going to take the back seat, and that it's for other people—the home—to do the talking.

But at the same time, the SPLA presence was crucial. In order for the conference to take place, Salva Kiir had to give his approval. Civil war within the Western Nuer at the time meant that many Nuer were seeking refuge in Bahr el-Ghazal and there seemed to be obvious benefits for the SPLA in accepting Nuer back. It was therefore an easier time for Kiir to accept peace at 'home'.

It helped that the Bul Nuer, who had a much more distant relationship to the SPLA, weren't at the Wunlit conference. Because the Bul Nuer areas were under the control of Paulino Matip and the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF), they weren't included—suggesting that the 'government wars' at the higher levels still somewhat decided who could have peace with whom.

'The Wunlit conference was a remarkable event. It was somehow able to gather people who didn't trust each other and bring them together, with many people going, scared that they wouldn't return or that they would be killed in the process.'

In some readings, peace meetings are a way of governing between local groups—and therefore the places where the government regulates inter-group relationships.Where you might expect to hear chiefs talk about themselves as the 'home', a number of the older Nuer chiefs at Wunlit referred to the meeting as 'government'. Some leaders in Wunlit even began to question the distinction between home and government. Politicians in South Sudan are still connected to rural, home communities through cattle, wives, and property.

Yet, the relationship between the home and the government spheres is complex. In local memory, the CPA period brought violence back to Wunlit. In 2005, while people were celebrating a peace agreement at the highest government level, Wunlit saw new clashes at the local level.

The second feature of Wunlit is the idea of it as a Nuer–Dinka peace process. Much of the discourse emphasises clashes between Nuer and Dinka, and how they've become progressively more violent over time. Salva Kiir, in his opening comments, describes its purpose as ending the Nuer–Dinka war. Many chiefs talk about how the regulations of war have been broken, blaming Nuer chiefs and Dinka chiefs for that.

Peace conferences are important for 'vomiting out' the truth, and in doing so, setting a narrative of the previous conflict (and possibly future conflicts too). But ethnicity isn't the only element that could have been highlighted. Some people highlight the government–home conflict. Some chiefs even criticise people who describe it as a Nuer–Dinka conflict, putting the blame on a broad idea of 'government'.

The coming of the gun—that is, the coming of the government—was for some to blame for the conflict. Another chief asks 'Chiefs, is this our conflict? No. It is the conflict of the soldiers of Garang and those of Riek.'[7] This was one of the biggest achievements of Wunlit—that there was space to air frustration against the government of the day.

The third feature revolves around the question of whether Wunlit was a peace meeting or a court case. There's a very clear emphasis throughout that it is the former. Awut Deng says, 'It is not a court. This is a peace meeting.'[8] The implication was that this wasn't the time to drag up all past grievances and see if the scales balanced, but that this was a time for coming back together.

'In most court cases, if compensation is paid and an animal is sacrificed, that would come toward the end of the process. At Wunlit, it came at the beginning. Nothing else needed to be said; there definitely didn't need to be compensation of a further judicial process.'

In most court cases, if compensation is paid and an animal is sacrificed, that would come toward the end of the process. At Wunlit, it came at the beginning. Nothing else needed to be said; there definitely didn't need to be compensation or a further judicial process.

Wunlit did, however, produce some very clear recommendations. In particular, it laid the ground for border courts in order to have justice again between Nuer communities. But sadly, in most areas, those courts were never put in place.

Because there was no attempt at Wunlit to arrange compensation, and because of a lack of these border courts, there is a lack of peaceful recourse to justice available to the Dinka and Nuer communities today. This raises questions. If you can't have peaceful justice to redress grievances, does that make violent justice—revenge—more legitimate? Today it's very common for the Dinka to say that they can never have compensation with the Nuer, simply because it's not practical.

Perhaps it wasn't ever going to be possible at Wunlit, but what could Wunlit have done to provide a justice mechanism beyond Wunlit itself?

7. *Wunlit*
8. *Wunlit*

Judith McCallum

Challenges to the people-to-people process

I worked with Pact Sudan for a number of years, and in that time, managed a large people-to-people peace-building programme which started in 2002. In that work and after, I've observed a number of challenges in the people-to-people process.

Firstly, it's time-consuming and not always straightforward.

Secondly comes the issue of inclusivity—of knowing which groups to invite and getting the right balance between groups. How do you ensure that you have the right degree of inclusivity at the different stages of the process?

'These conference come with high expectations … When those expectations are not met, because of a lack of follow-up, they can be a driver of conflict and frustration.'

Thirdly, there is a need for external resources and logistics—it's expensive to fly people around South Sudan—but that necessarily ties you into other agendas and makes you reliant on donors. That was a big challenge—and a distraction.

Ownership of this process is critical. There is the potential for political and donor capture. I've been to many conferences where you can't start the conference until the political leader who's opening it shows up, so you sometimes wait a day or two. While there's a need for the politicians to be there, how important are they to driving the process?

In addition, most of the resolutions are beyond the scope of the local community to implement. I went to a follow-up conference in Wunlit in 2011, and they were still talking about resolutions that hadn't been addressed since the original Wunlit conference in 1999.

Finally, these conferences come with high expectations. Communities come together, they talk, they tell stories, and give rise to high expectations. When those expectations are not met, because of a lack of follow-up, that can be a driver of conflict and frustration.

The idea in peoples' minds today is that peace-building is a conference rather than a long-term process. How do we move the focus back to that process?

A lot of funding is not long-term in South Sudan. That limits a sense of vision. But peace-building as a long-term process needs flexibility, it needs time, it needs you to make changes and perhaps take divergent paths to the final goal. You need to have time for people to talk and share their stories, if healing and reconciliation are to happen. And there need to be very clear responsibilities and timelines for follow up.

There is a focus from donors on results—which is a good thing—but peace-building is very hard to measure. A lot of research has been done to show that Wunlit led to a renewed relationship between the Dinka and the Nuer and eventually to the CPA. But how do you prove that?

In conferences I was involved with, we were always limited to a certain number of participants. In Sudanese culture, you can't turn someone away, but we had these very specific descriptions of who was going to be there. In that situation, how do you keep the community involved?

In one conflict assessment we conducted, one conclusion we had was 'everyone's a victim'. There's a sense in a lot of communities of victimhood and not a sense of responsibility. How do we rebuild ownership and responsibility in our peace-building rather than treat people as victims?

What is the role of government in today's context? Of course the government needs to be there, but there's often a fear of politicisation of the people-to-people process, turning it into a state-building exercise.

Finally, we need to examine and question our ideas of local responsibility and ownership. The role of local leaders and traditional leaders, in the changing context of Sudanese culture, really needs to be examined.

Julia Duany

Telling it like it is

Something has gone wrong, what do we do? We have to come together. People are dying. Children are dying. We are losing our property. We have to bring back that life we have lost.

In the people-to-people peace process at Wunlit, what was it that brought people to negotiation? Dinka were suffering, their cattle were being taken, and the same thing was happening with the Nuer. People were dying, young and old. So this pressure brought them to the understanding that we had to reconcile and restore trust.

My late husband, Wal Duany, was one of the facilitators of Wunlit, along with Bill Lowrey, Dr Nyot Kok and John Luk. You had all these Western-educated lawyers, sitting down, asking how they were going to deal with all the village people and big chiefs. John Luk said, 'Let us just follow the concept of law.' Wal said, 'Luk, are

you talking about the concept of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth? If so, we are going to turn the Nuers and Dinkas into a toothless and eyeless nation.'

The concept of reconciliation is to restore the life of the people. As you go through reconciliation, bring back the person who has strayed from the community and create consensus about the existence of the conflict.

In reconciliation, you have to take responsibility for something you have done wrong. Even the victim, if he has done something wrong, will be the first person to go to the *kuaar muon* (Nuer) or *beny bith* (Dinka), the spiritual elder, and confess, 'I have killed somebody.' Today, this is not happening. You see people going with a gun and mowing people down, and they will look at you as if they have done nothing!

'The achievement of Wunlit was its community, grassroots focus. The communities realised they were killing themselves, so they disengaged with the government—the SPLA. They said, "Enough is enough, we are to going to fight."'

Reconciliation takes transformation of both the victims and the perpetrators. After they have confessed, the spiritual rituals come in, such as the symbolic killing of the bull. They will eat from one bowl and drink from one pot. That is now to say, 'We have to forgive each other.' It is forgiven, but it is not forgotten. It means that you will not repeat it again.

Restoration focuses on the whole society. It will not only be these two people, the victim and the perpetrator, that people will focus on. That's why it takes long—days and days—so that people can reach that restoration of community.

What were the challenges facing Wunlit? One was the reluctance of the SPLA, because the young people from both sides were their fighters. If there is peace, where will they get people who will fight for them?

At this point, the war had broken down social structures, even the idea of local communities protecting human life. Institutions such as the age sets became disorganised and distorted. They became more of a military tool than an age group to defend the community.

The achievement of Wunlit was its community, grassroots focus. The communities realised they were killing themselves, so they disengaged with the government—the SPLA. They said, 'Enough is enough, and we are not going to fight.'

The role of leaders was important. Salva Kiir Mayardit at the time took the initiative, when he was the second man to Dr John, although Dr John declined. The elders who were there talked very strongly to Salva, and in doing so, restored the institution of eldership.

Wunlit also minimised inter-factional fighting, as the communities disengaged after the conference. As a result, leaders were deprived of fighters, the young people were not fighting for them any more. This made the reconciliation of leadership and the reunification of the SPLA possible.

The lessons we learned were the importance of traditional peace process and respect for the institution of elders, for the chiefs, and for the young people. When the young people are guided well by the elders, peace can come. Communities took control of their life. Our communities at that time said, 'No more fighting. Even if Dr Riek or Dr Garang come, we resolved to fight no more.' This broke that fear which was there; the elders spoke up, and the youth listened.

The indigenous peace process is still alive. It can still be revived. Restorative justice brings connectedness, and the whole community is to be restored, to be reformed, as the basis of reconciliation among our people.

Paride Taban

Peace is development

When the war started in 1983 it came first to Torit, where my diocese was and is. When the SPLA took a number of the towns, Bishop Nathanael Garang and I were the only two Bishops who were active in SPLA areas until 1990. That's how the two of us came to found the New Sudan Council of Churches.

We saved a lot of our young people, especially in 1991. When Mengistu was overthrown, we had 20,000 young children running from Ethiopia, and it was the NSCC who helped them. We chartered planes, dropping food in the forest. These people, children, were living on the wheat from over the water. Today, if there is respect for the church, especially for members of the NSCC, it is because of the lives that they saved then.

It was the NSCC which went lobbying all over Europe and America, making ecumenical forums with churches all over the world. We prayed even in the mosque and the synagogue, making friends with all God-loving people. We can say that this war was not won only by guns, but because of many hands put together and hearts put together in prayer.

Even today, the best schools and hospitals in the rural areas are run by the church. Go among the Murle, among the Jie, among

the Kachipo, among the Toposa: the best service comes from the church. We made boarding schools under the trees in the forest; we drilled over a thousand boreholes; we made a government area to be a ghost town, because people ran out behind the SPLA for services.

When today, during war, people stop doing development work, I say these people are also warriors. If you stop providing development to the people who are suffering, you are also making war. Peace is development is peace. Even now, there should be development not only in government areas and also in the opposition areas, in order to quench the anger of the young people. They too need to be served.

'When today, during war, people stop development work, say these people are also warriors. If you stop providing development to the people who are suffering, you are also making war.'

The BBC used to ask me, 'Bishop Taban, are you with the SPLA?' I replied, 'No! The SPLA are with me!' I am not a rebel. The SPLA came and joined me. They are with me. I am there in my place, they came and joined me.

The church didn't surround itself with the gun, but with love and service. We never held a campaign for weapons. Rather, we campaigned for education, for food, for any humanitarian assistance.

Khartoum bombed civilians in order to empty out areas, and people fled as refugees. But the church helped them to survive even in the caves, in the forest, everywhere. If the politicians are fish, the civil population are their water. When the water dries, the fish die. When the water gets hot, the fish also die. So they should be very careful of the population.

Principles for peace

Forgiveness is one measure. Many people say that when you forgive, you're a coward. But it's not true. When you reconcile, when you forgive, you're a brave and courageous person. Forgiveness is strength.

Development is peace. If you want to be with the people, have two hands: one holding God, and the other holding humanity. If you fill your hands with power or with guns, you cannot hold God or humanity.

Discussion: The silence of the elders



Venansio Muludiang, University of Juba: When I look back at what happened in December last year, I was surprised that our political elders kept quiet. The church elders spoke their minds about what

happened, but the elders did not. Now, the question is, how are we going to start the reconciliation process if the elders keep quiet?

Julia Duany: Why are the elders quiet? Our elders are in Juba, and they have become politicised. They are talking about the SPLM, they are not talking about the Bari tradition or the Dinka tradition, about respect or the keeping of humanity or the keeping of our communities. They're not talking about that. They have decided to keep quiet and keep their jobs.

'Why are the elders quiet? Our elder safe in Juba, and they have become politicised … They have decided to keep quiet and keep their jobs.'

I had the same question—'Why are our elders keeping quiet?'—so I took it to some of them. The only one who gave me a reply said 'Julia, there is a wall there. Nothing is going through.' So maybe they have tried in their own way and couldn't make it through; maybe the environment is different from the environment of Wunlit.

But we have not lost Wunlit. We still can do it, through the mobilisation of our people. If we can mobilise, and even you youth can disengage and insist that, 'We are not going to fight any more,' like they did in Wunlit, then I think we can rescue South Sudan. But it's up to you young people to disengage.

Census Lo-liyong: Is it possible that the recent conflicts we've seen have been caused in part by the fact several issues were not dealt with in the name of reconciliation?

Judith McCallum: When I came in 2006 I had a conversation with the Chairman at the time saying, 'Why is the Peace Commission only the Peace Commission? It used to be the Peace and Reconciliation Commission.' I was told, 'Now is not the time for reconciliation,' he said. 'Reconciliation can come when we have security.'

I think that's where the mistake was. We let that dictate our activities, so the focus was on peace and security, but peace without reconciliation. I think if that reconciliation had been done earlier, a lot of these issues would not have festered.

Leben Moro: I'd like to ask our panel to think about the Wunlit process. What is one thing from that process that they regard as being very important taking into account the current situation, where reconciliation is very much needed?

John Ashworth: I think if there is one thing that we get from the whole people-to-people process, it is that it is a grassroots process. Yes, there has to be accountability. But not imposed

by the intellectuals or the elite or the human rights industry. It has to be imposed by the people. We have to ask the people, 'What do you mean by accountability and how it's going to take place?'

The people-to-people process is well named. In any society, in any new situation, in any milieu, we have to go to the people. We have to have a process of consultation, awareness raising, mobilisation and peace making, reconciliation making, among the people.

Naomi Pendle: One thing that was striking about the violence in December 2013 was the speed at which it spread. It started in Juba and then within ten days, it's across a third of the country. This for me raises questions about how people who might be involved in a people-to-people process understand South Sudan? How do they find security? How do they find accountability? Wunlit maybe has some answers to these questions, but it also provokes more questions—how did we get from the peace of Wunlit to the violence we saw in December this last year?

'One thing that was striking about the violence in December 2013 was the speed at which it spread … how did we get from the peace of Wunlit to the violence we saw in December this last year?'

Bishop Paride Taban: It was the church. It was religious people. And these people are still there. We have to carry out this mission to the end. We are not to get afraid or to get frustrated. And we are to be patient. I think it will succeed. In our church, we have prayer every day for South Sudan. That is what we, the believers, have to do. There will be peace. There is a time for everything, even a time for suffering.

Judith McCallum: For me the important aspect was that it was a process. I think the process that was started in Wunlit needed to be continued, and I hope that process can be restarted to focus on that social contact between the communities and whatever politicians are in place. That has to be an on-going process. If it becomes a top-down approach to governance rather than a bottom-up approach to peace, that's where we get sidetracked.

Julia Duany: Sometimes it's very hard just to say what we can really do with Wunlit or what one thing we can take away from it. Even when we talk about traditional restoration and connectedness, justice, there is accountability in it. The person who has done wrong has to accept that he has done wrong. It is now very difficult in the current situation for those who have done wrong to accept that they have done wrong.

I consider that I have done my time, but I don't want to leave my children a mess that we have created. So I will be the first one to apologise, and I will say 'sorry' for the mess we have done. We need to keep South Sudan for our young people.

3. Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005)

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in 2005, was a set of six agreements between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLA) and the Government of Sudan, which brought an end to the Second Sudanese Civil War. The agreement promised a power-sharing arrangement between the SPLA and the National Congress Party (NCP), the establishment of a secular, semi-autonomous South Sudan, equitable division of oil revenue, and a referendum on independence for the South.

David Deng

The CPA and the problem of Sudan

What I admire about the CPA is the extent to which it analysed the problem of Sudan and developed a solution to that problem. The problem consisted of a situation in which the peripheries of Sudan were marginalised and neglected by a small group in Khartoum, and this then contributed to inequalities and led to the conflict. Also, people looked at the crisis of identity in Sudan, and the way that this small minority in Khartoum looked down upon South Sudanese as third, fourth, fifth class citizens, despite the fact that they themselves had African blood.

The solution was a 'One Country, Two Systems' model—the idea that Sudan would be administered as two separate regions. Southern Sudan would be given a degree of regional autonomy, representation in the government and a share in national wealth, elections midway through the interim period that then provided an opportunity for the democratic transformation of the North, and an opportunity to build institutions in the South. Over the six-year interim period, the North was given an opportunity to make unity attractive and to convince South Sudanese of the value of staying united as a country; if that failed, then South Sudanese were given the opportunity to vote in a referendum to secede. That's a very clear analysis of the problem, at least from the perspective of South Sudan.

Did it solve all the problems of the country? Clearly not. But you nevertheless had a targeted approach to solving the problem of conflict in Sudan at the time.

Looking back, I wonder whether our expectations of what the CPA could provide weren't too high. At the time, the agreement was sold as the solution to all the problems of Sudan. People thought, 'after the referendum, everything will be fine. We'll be free of the North and there will be no more problems. We'll be living in prosperity and freedom.'

'The [CPA] was sold as the solution to all the problems of Sudan. People thought, "after the referendum, everything will be fine. We'll be free of the North ad there will be no more problems. We'll be living in prosperity and freedom."'

Clearly, history has shown that this wasn't the case. But the referendum was enough to dissuade large-scale violence at the level that we're seeing now. I think in large part that's due to everyone looking to the referendum as a common goal. At the time, this was enough to dissuade violence.

However, there are some core, fundamental issues that were not addressed. One was constitutional reform. If we look at the way the Transitional Constitution was drafted at the last minute by a small group of people and imposed on the country, it was clear that during this transition after the CPA, there wasn't careful thought given to building the social contract, or to issues of nation-building. Another issue is that of reconciliation, which was put off.

These issues raise an important point about what we can expect from transitions. A peace agreement and a transitional period, however long, are not going to solve all the problems of South Sudan. The point of a peace agreement is to bring enough space for people to have the conversation that they need to have in order to settle these issues and then to have true peace, not merely an absence of violence.

On the issue of reconciliation, there was a window of opportunity in the CPA to address it. Article 1.7 of the power-sharing protocol touched on the issue of reconciliation in the CPA:

> The parties agree to initiate a comprehensive process of national reconciliation and healing throughout the country as part of the peace-building process. Its mechanisms and forms shall be worked out by the Government of National Unity.[9]

Such initiatives could have begun to address the legacies of violence in the country. However, the process was never really fully taken up. As they are currently framed, these processes are not enough to deal with the complexity of the crisis within South Sudan.

9. *Protocol Between the Government of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on Power Sharing*, Naivasha, Kenya, 2004, Article 1.7.

The CPA had this strong analysis of the conflict, but it neglected some of these other key elements.

What does that mean for us in our current context? I think the first thing we have to do is to understand what the problem of South Sudan is.

We can no longer rely on a narrative of marginalisation and neglect, because the groups which are now in Arusha, negotiating a reconciliation, are the very same ones who have been leading the country in a position of power for ten years.

Legacies of violence destabilise a new nation like South Sudan in multiple ways.

Firstly, through a lack of respect for laws of war. As much as we may hate it, war is not illegal. That's why rules have developed to guide how wars are fought, be that under international humanitarian law or under the local, customary laws of the people concerned.

As we learn from the CPA, It's important that our expectations not be set too high but, if we approach it systematically, thoroughly, and honestly, and we make a real effort to address some of these core issues that went unaddressed in the last peace agreement, I think there is a way to build something lasting.

Census Lo-liyong

The role of women

The two agreements that we have already studied highlight the various failures and missed opportunities of the CPA process. When we look at the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement, its successes show the weakness of the CPA: the deal was citizen-led, in contrast to the party-led mechanics we see in the CPA period; people were integrated within the new government based on merit, rather than on their liberator credentials.

Similarly, if we look at the Wunlit peace meeting: It was a traditional-led process, rather than outsider-driven; women were a key aspect of the agreement; truth telling was essential, and communities acknowledged their responsibility for the fighting.

Even though, by the CPA period, the Southern region was far more integrated than it had been, the CPA was an agreement exclusively between two parties. Non-party stakeholders, especially women, had to fight to make their presence known.

Have women benefited from the CPA? The agreement made provision for 25 per cent of all government posts to be held by women. But within that 25 per cent, how many of those posts have been filled based on the competence of those women, in terms of their ability to carry out their duties very well, as opposed to the roles they played in their communities during the liberation period.

For many, their survival in the political realm is based on loyalty. The freedom to put an idea forward simply because it is right does not fully exist yet. When certain issues are brought forward—and not just for the women—they are silenced if not considered as within the party line. This limits the development of South Sudan.

Women have a strong role as peacemakers in South Sudan. Women may marry across tribes; they have a lot of influence and are more aware of various issues. There are women's groups who have gone across to other areas at war and been able to reach other women to understand the full impact of the war.

We have a long way to go in terms of peace, and peace is a long-term process. But grassroots mechanisms must be taken into consideration. It is not just about those who are there putting the agreement together, but those who are in the communities, in the villages, holding the guns, and what future they see for themselves without development.

Don Bosco Malish

The role of donors

What am I looking at? I would like to look at the role of donors and aid programming during the negotiation and the implementation of the CPA.

The donor support that came into this country came in different forms. It arrived as food relief, as medicine, as financial assistance and as technical assistance. Some sections of our government received direct budgetary support—some continue to receive it. And some came in terms of capacity building.

The application of this assistance was reflected in the CPA during the negotiation process and something similar happened during the implementation. Personally, I expected that, during the implementation, the support we received from donors would go towards strengthening the relation between the nation and the state.

The nation—the people—has a relationship with the state. In order to enforce this contract the people need capacity. However, during the implementation of the peace agreement, support to civil society was inadequate, and the agenda for that support was not set by civil society. The agenda was set by somebody else, and civil society was subcontracted to implement it.

Donor funding was welcomed by the state, and it was used to advance the development agenda, while wealth from our natural resources were diverted into private pockets. We know that 192 km of our highway was donated to us—not paid for by our oil revenues. And civil society had no capacity to seek accountability.

Corruption was visible, rampant, and went unchecked. Yet the watchdog of government, civil society, was missing. Aid programming turned out to be very bureaucratic; NGOs were managing the recipients of their grants rather than the grants themselves, more concerned about the processes than the intended outcomes.

We also discovered that we, in our civil society organisations, appeared more legitimate in the eyes of our communities than our government, because we were the ones providing for their needs. There is an effect that I call a substitution effect. When we launch schools, open clinics, and so on, we substituted for the government. This left our people poor, and many of them are now enduring conflicts as a result. Everybody at the local level wants to be a commissioner so that they can profit from that unchecked money.

As we proceed with the on-going negotiations, how do we as civil society and members of our community organise ourselves so that we have a voice in the next round of support that comes to the country? How do we begin informing others so that the aid we receive is needs-driven rather than just supplied? How do we inform the development agenda? For us to do that, we need to protect our space.

'The nation – the people – has a relationship with the state. In order to enforce his contract the people need capacity. however, during the implementation of the peace agreement, support to civil society was inadequate.'

Douglas Johnson

An inadequate agreement

What we have to remember about the CPA is that it was a peace agreement to bring an end to a war, but it was also a political settlement to resolve the long-standing political conflict in Sudan that had remained unresolved since before independence.

The CPA did not, in my view, analyse the political issues in Sudan adequately. It certainly focused on the political issues for the South, but it ignored the political conflict that had long ceased to be a North–South conflict. There were other areas of conflict that were deliberately left out of the CPA. This allowed Khartoum to attempt separate accords with different groups, whether they were regional groups, like the East or Darfur, or political opposition. This enabled them, in effect, to safeguard their position within the CPA while diluting the position of the opposition.

'There was also a lack of preparation for peace within South Sudan—there was no internal reconciliation. '

Was the problem in the provisions of the CPA or its implementation? I think that most of the speakers here have been focusing on the problems of implementation, with which I agree.

The interim period could not overtly prepare for separation and full disengagement, because the framework required that both the government in Khartoum and in Juba pay lip service to the unity of the country. Everybody knew what was going to happen when the referendum took place. The real question was, would the referendum take place? That it did, is the real success of the CPA. There are other problems, however, that remain unresolved.

There wasn't any real preparation for disengagement along the border. South Sudan cannot be fully secure and at peace with itself as long as the border peoples on both sides of the border are not also at peace.

There was also a lack of preparation for peace within South Sudan—there was no internal reconciliation. This was the biggest failure of the Government of South Sudan during the interim period. They should have anticipated, as many people did anticipate, that without internal reconciliation—and not just between the men with guns, but between the different societies—there would be no peace in South Sudan, whatever the result of the referendum.

Others have articulated what needs to be done, and I agree with them. South Sudan can no longer rely on the narrative of marginalisation. It now must look inside itself, into the heart of South Sudan, into the heart of South Sudanese societies, to find out what has gone wrong.



Discussion: The lessons of the past

Taban Lo-liyong: I want to point out that in Kenya, we did not negotiate peace for South Sudan. In Kenya, we ended our journey to nationhood. So it was not that we were fighting for something

which could only be ended by peace. We wanted to be independent, and we got our independence by fighting for it—twice. Of course it ended with the referendum. But that is a different thing altogether.

What we have now is a civil war inside a new nation of South Sudan. So the resolution of this war will be different from all our other resolutions. We are now resolving issues of nationhood within our own nation.

We need to find out who we are and ask whether we want to exist and survive as a nation, realising that we got, through the referendum, a nation of South Sudan. This is what we should concentrate our opinion on. After our independence, how do we live together as a nation?

Christopher Oringa Mark, University of Juba: It was said that the rate of human rights violations and abuse under the CPA was not as high as what we see now. Why do you think, right now, we are seeing so many human rights violations and abuses?

'We need to find out who we are and ask whether we want to exist and survive as a nation … This is what we should concentrate out opinion on. After our independence, how do we live together as a nation? '

David Deng: For the most part, I would say, the referendum had a quieting effect on people. It kept people who actually had quite a lot of hatred for one another together for long enough to make it to the independence that people sought. But once independence is no longer a uniting issue, those same hatreds resurface.

Leo Onek, University of Juba, Associate Professor/Dean: I believe that simplicity is a mark of genius. The Anyanya message of the first civil war was very simple: South Sudanese wanted to be free. Enter the SPLM, and even now, we do not know what their ideology is: a united Sudan, a separate South, a New Sudan? It was very confusing, even to the practitioners!

Census Lo-liyong: I am not an SPLM member. But if you read some of Dr John Garang's speeches, he stated, 'It is easy to make unity attractive, or for us to make a vehicle for separation.' Some of us are still grappling with whether that has been successful.

Douglas Johnson: I think there is a danger of romanticising the Anyanya period. Because, prior to 1970, the Anyanya were fragmented, and they were often fighting each other. We asked Oliver Albino two nights ago, 'Why, when the SSLM claimed to be fighting for separation, did they agree to negotiate on the terms of unity of one nation?' And he said, 'That's because everybody in South

Sudan wanted federation. They were singing songs of federation in the villages.' So it wasn't such a simple matter as you now think.

Also, at the beginning of the Southern Regional Government, there was a big argument about the 'insiders' and the 'outsiders'. Who were getting the jobs? Was it the insiders who had not fought, or the outsiders who had? These problems didn't just start with the SPLM.

Wani Stephen: In comparing the CPA and the peace agreement signed recently, there are still loopholes that remain which give a lot of power to political elites who have caused a lot of injustice in this country. For how long shall we continue seeing such 'peace'?

David Deng: I think the space for discussion about these issues is now ripe in that, in the past, there was really no room to have these kinds of conversations. When people tried to initiate some People-to-People processes after the CPA, they were told by the Government, 'Now isn't the time for reconciliation. What you talk about is peace and security.'

But now we have some room to begin considering these issues. It's important that we take advantage of the momentum that there is now in order to initiate the discussion. Instead, if we shy away and we feel like it's too contentious, we'll miss our opportunity.

John Ryle: What is the one important thing, either from the CPA or from the other peace agreements that have been examined, that you think it's vital to keep in mind, either a negative or a positive, during the current peace discussions. What can be rescued from history?

'I think we need to avoid celebrating our liberators. We need to take them to task. Whatever they agree to should be implemented. There should not be a selective implementation of the agreement.'

Douglas Johnson: I think a popular voice is needed. One thing that Oliver Albino said is that one of the reasons that the SSLM ratified the Addis Ababa agreement was they received comments from the people. It would have been a dereliction of duty for people who claimed to be leaders not to listen to that popular support. We need to hear a popular voice during these current negotiations.

Census Lo-liyong: Many consider this current war an act of revenge between the Dinka and Nuer, without understanding the 62 other tribes who have their own issues with the SPLA or with other groups. This means the solution they are looking for will not work for long.

Don Bosco Malish: I think we need to avoid celebrating our liberators. We need to take them to task. Whatever they agree to

should be implemented. There should not be a selective implementation of the agreement—if they agree to reconcile, it should be a genuine reconciliation, not a question of bringing your enemy closer to control him, but real reconciliation from the heart. Let's take them to task.

We have a future for this country, we have children. I was born in a war, I grew up in a war, my children are growing up in a war. Am I also going to hand them war? That's the question we need to ask ourselves.

David Deng: I think mine is the question of how to take ownership over the peace, and how to help people assume ownership and responsibility. For the CPA, it was easy. We were given the referendum, which everyone could buy into. But now, in any agreement that we see coming, it's not going to have that same gift. It will take a lot more work for people to assume ownership.

'We need to hear a popular voice during these current negotiations.'

An agreement alone is only the beginning. It takes a lot of work for people to do the grassroots mobilisation and conduct frank, candid discussions peacefully in order to turn the silencing of guns into a sustainable, long-term peace.

Glossary of acronyms, words and phrases

AACC	All-African Council of Churches
Anyanya	Southern Sudanese guerrilla separatist movement; lit. 'snake venom'
beny bith	(*Dinka*) spiritual elder or spearmaster
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party
ICC	International Criminal Court
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
koc hakuma	(*Dinka*) people of the government
koc bai	(*Dinka*) people of the home
kuaar muon	(*Nuer*) spiritual elder or earth priest
MCF	Movement for Colonial Freedom
NCP	National Congress Party
NSCC	New Sudan Council of Churches
TMC	Transitional Military Council
SANU	Sudan African National Union
SCC	Sudan Council of Churches
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Army
SPLM-DC	Sudan People's Liberation Movement-Democratic Change
SPLM-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition
SSDF	South Sudan Defence Forces
SSLM	Southern Sudan Liberation Movement

SSPG	Southern Sudan Provisional Government
SSU	Sudanese Socialist Union
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
WCC	World Council of Churches

Notes on contributors

John Akec is Vice-Chancellor of the University of Juba. He was Vice-Chancellor of the University of Bahr-el-Ghazal from 2010 to 2014. He holds a BSc (Hons) in Applied Physics and Electronics from the University of Gezira, an MSc in Systems Engineering from University of Wales, College of Cardiff, and a Doctorate of Manufacturing and Mechanical Engineering from the University of Birmingham.

Lam Akol Ajawin received his PhD in chemical engineering from Imperial College, London and taught at the University of Khartoum. He is the current Chairman of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-Democratic Change (SPLM-DC), which he founded in 2009. Between 2005 and 2007, he served as Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Republic of Sudan. He is the author of *SPLM/SPLA: Inside an African Revolution* (2001), *SPLM/SPLA: The Nasir Declaration* (2003), *Southern Sudan: Colonialism, Resistance and Autonomy* (2007).

John Ashworth has worked in Sudan, South Sudan and the Eastern and Southern African regions for more than 30 years in various fields including humanitarian aid and development, education, justice and peace, and advocacy. He is an advisor to the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC).

Oliver Batali Albino, a South Sudanese politician and author, represented the SSLM in the 1972 Addis Ababa negotiations. He is author of *Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint* (1970) and *Power and Democracy in the Sudan: How Decentralization Hurts* (2006).

David K. Deng is the Research Director for the South Sudan Law Society, a civil society organisation dedicated to promoting the rule of law and respect for human rights in South Sudan.

Julia Duany is a South Sudanese author and civil society activist. With her husband Michael Wal Duany, she was one of the organizing secretariat of the 1999 Wunlit, People-to-People Peace Conference. She and her family fled South Sudan when civil war broke out in 1984. She is Vice-Chancellor of the John Garang Memorial University in Bor.

Douglas H. Johnson is a historian of South Sudan. He was Assistant Director for Archives in the former Southern Regional Government, and worked in various relief programmes during the recent civil war. He was appointed an international expert on the Abyei Boundaries Commission, and is author or editor of numerous books on Sudanese topics.

Alfred Sebit Lokuji is Deputy Vice-Chancellor of the University of Juba, formerly Acting Dean at the College of Community Studies and Rural Development. He earned his PhD at the University of Georgia (USA) and has taught at Dar-es-Salaam University, and at Moi University in Kenya.

Census Lo-liyong is as an environmental management specialist. She earned her bachelor's in Environmental Management from the University of Venda, South Africa in 2004, and a postgraduate degree in Environmental Studies at the University of Witwatersrand. Ms Lo-liyong currently consults on Environmental Management and Development issues as a partner in a consulting firm, Azure Consulting.

Don Bosco Malish is a program officer with OSIEA's South Sudan Program, based in Juba. He has over ten years' experience working with various national and international nongovernmental organizations in South Sudan, and has been a consultant for the Government of South Sudan, The World Bank, and UN. He holds a BSc from Makerere University.

Judith McCallum is the Head of Saferworld's Horn of Africa Programme. She previously worked in Sudan and South Sudan with Humanitarian Dialogue International and with Pact Sudan, most recently as the Country Director for Sudan and South Sudan. She has a PhD in Cultural Geography and a Masters of Environmental Studies from York University, Ontario, Canada.

Naomi Pendle is a British researcher and doctoral candidate at the London School of Economics. Her thesis research concerns the history of inter-tribal peace meetings and local law amongst the Western Nuer and Dinka of contemporary Warrap and Unity States.

John Ryle is co-founder and Executive Director of the Rift Valley Institute and Legrand Ramsey Professor of Anthropology at Bard College, NY. He is author of *Warriors of the White Nile* (1984), an account of the Dinka of Southern Sudan, co-editor of *The Sudan*

Handbook (2011). He is a board member of the Media Development Investment Fund and the Human Rights Watch Africa Division.

Paride Taban is an Emeritus Bishop of the Roman Catholic Church. He was Bishop of Torit from 1983 until 2004 and co-founder of the New Sudan Council of Churches. Since his retirement, he has been leading an effort to make peace in South Sudan, founding the Kuron Peace Village in 2005.

Selected RVI publications

My Mother Will Not Come to Juba: South Sudanese debate the making of the constitution

Debates at Juba University on the new constitution, examining challenges, reasons for delay, and questions of public participation in constitution-making.

Federalism in the history of South Sudanese political thought

This research paper discusses South Sudanese attitudes towards federalism, and the way it was presented from Sudan's independence to today.

The Sudan Handbook

A guide to Sudan and South Sudan and the historical processes that shaped them, written by leading specialists and edited by John Ryle, Justin Willis, Suliman Baldo and Jok Madut Jok.

The Kafia Kingi Enclave: People, politics and history in the north–south boundary zone of western Sudan

First published in 2010, this report tells the story of the people of Kafia Kingi and Raga, and describes the choices they face today.



The National Army and Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo: Untangling the Gordian knot of insecurity

An analysis of armed mobilization, the FARDC, and efforts in demobilization and army reform. Aussi en français.

The Economics of Elections in Somaliland: The financing of political parties and candidates

Examining the 2005 parliamentary and 2012 local council elections, this paper concludes that conceiving of elections solely as exercises in democratic representation, ignores a broader social and economic reality.

Between Somaliland and Puntland: Marginalization, militarization and conflicting political visions

An analysis of the political evolution of Somaliland and Puntland, their competing political visions and those living in between the two polities.

Les Banyamulenge: Insurrection et exclusion dans les montagnes du Sud-Kivu

Ce rapport examine les Banyamulenge, communauté Tutsi congolaise se trouvant au coeur des multiples conflits dans l'est de la RDC. Also available in English.

حينما تصير الحدود الادارية الداخلية حدوداً دوليّة

ركز النقاش الدائر حول السودانيّن، الشمالي والجنوبي، على مسالة أين يمر خط الحدود بينهما. ويفحص التقرير موضوعاً آخر هو: الأثر المحتمل للحدود الجديدة على سكان الاراضي الحدوديّة.

When Boundaries Become Borders *is also available in English.*

RVI books and reports are free to download from **www.riftvalley.net**. Printed copies are available from Amazon and other online retailers, and from selected bookstores.

creative commons

‘NO. I DIDN’T THINK THE PEACE TALKS WOULD SUCCEED. BY THEN, I HAD ALREADY LIVED TOO LONG TO BE DECEIVED. TO THE BEST OF OUR ABILITY, WE DID WHAT WE COULD.’

In December 2013, South Sudan descended into conflict. Peace initiatives over the following eighteen months culminated in an agreement between government and armed opposition, signed in August 2015. While the agreement came into effect in late 2015, many uncertainties surround its implementation. Do previous conflicts and agreements hold useful lessons? Academics, activists and church representatives discussed this topic with an audience of students and members of the public in a series of public lectures at Juba University in 2014. Three evenings of lectures discussed the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, the Wunlit Conference of 1999, and the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The event was the fourth in an annual series, a collaboration between the Center for Peace and Development Studies and the Rift Valley Institute, supported by the Danish Institute for International Studies, with the partnership of the South Sudan Law Society.

Danish Institute for International Studies

www.riftvalley.net

Rift Valley Institute
Taasisi ya Bonde Kuu
معهد الأخدود العظيم
Machadka Dooxada Rift
የስምጥ ሸለቆ የጥናት ተቋም
Instituto do Vale do Rift
东非大裂谷研究院
Institut de la Vallée du Rift

ISBN 978-1-907431-39-5