Zimbabwe-Brazil cooperation through the More Food Africa programme

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This Working Paper series emerges from the China and Brazil in African Agriculture (CBAA) programme of the Future Agricultures Consortium. This is supported by the UK Economic and Social Research Council’s ‘Rising Powers and Interdependent Futures’ programme (www.risingpowers.net). We expect 24 papers to be published during 2015, each linked to short videos presented by the lead authors.

The CBAA team is based in Brazil (University of Brasilia, Gertulio Vargas Foundation, and Universidade Federal do ABC), China (China Agricultural University, Beijing), Ethiopia (Ethiopian Agricultural Research Institute, Addis Ababa), Ghana (University of Ghana at Legon), Mozambique (Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos, Maputo), Zimbabwe (Research for Development Trust, Harare), the UK (the Institute of Development Studies, the International Institute for Environment and Development and the Overseas Development Institute).

The team includes 25 researchers coming from a range of disciplines including development studies, economics, international relations, political science, social anthropology and sociology, but all with a commitment to cross-disciplinary working. Most papers are thus the result of collaborative research, involving people from different countries and from different backgrounds. The papers are the preliminary results of this dialogue, debate, sharing and learning.

As Working Papers they are not final products, but each has been discussed in project workshops and reviewed by other team members. At this stage, we are keen to share the results so far in order to gain feedback, and also because there is massive interest in the role of Brazil and China in Africa. Much of the commentary on such engagements is inaccurate and misleading, or presented in broad-brush generalities. Our project aimed to get behind these simplistic representations and find out what was really happening on the ground, and how this is being shaped by wider political and policy processes.

The papers fall broadly into two groups, with many overlaps. The first is a set of papers looking at the political economy context in Brazil and China. We argue that historical experiences in agriculture and poverty programmes, combine with domestic political economy dynamics, involving different political, commercial and diplomatic interests, to shape development cooperation engagements in Africa. How such narratives of agriculture and development – about for example food security, appropriate technology, policy models and so on - travel to and from Africa is important in our analysis.

The second, larger set of papers focuses on case studies of development cooperation. They take a broadly-defined ‘ethnographic’ stance, looking at how such engagements unfold in detail, while setting this in an understanding of the wider political economy in the particular African settings. There are, for example, major contrasts between how Brazilian and Chinese engagements unfold in Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, dependant on historical experiences with economic reform, agricultural sector restructuring, aid commitments, as well as national political priorities and stances. These contrasts come out strikingly when reading across the papers.

The cases also highlight the diversity of engagements grouped under ‘development cooperation’ in agriculture. Some focus on state-facilitated commercial investments; others are more akin to ‘aid projects’, but often with a business element; some focus on building platforms for developing capacity through a range of training centres and programmes; while others are ‘below-the-radar’ investments in agriculture by diaspora networks in Africa. The blurring of boundaries is a common theme, as is the complex relationships between state and business interests in new configurations.

This Working Paper series is one step in our research effort and collective analysis. Work is continuing, deepening and extending the cases, but also drawing out comparative and synthetic insights from the rich material presented in this series.

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1. **Introduction**

The expanding footprint of BRICS countries in Africa, especially over the last 15 years, has remained a subject of intense public interest in academic, development and diplomatic circles. The superlative ‘win-win’ has been widely used to distinguish the cooperation of BRICS countries. They set themselves apart from the West, whose aid has been criticised for being conditional; coming with strings attached.

There is some understandable trepidation among traditional donors towards the BRICS approach, and their focus remains on China, while the other countries are considered more of a sideshow. China accounts for over half of the BRICS’ cooperation (Muggah and Thompson 2015) and is considered both less malleable and a bigger threat for its different political system, governance and economic might1.

Zimbabwe experienced intractable socio-economic development challenges from 2000 and the period 1998-2008 has been referred to mildly as one of ‘political and economic crisis’ (Tendi 2014: 1). The European Union, which had hitherto been the largest development partner for Zimbabwe, suspended development cooperation with the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) and confirmed the fallout by imposing sanctions on specified state entities and members of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). The GoZ argues that such ostracising by the West exacerbated the challenges and forestalled recovery efforts. Zimbabwe was forced to ‘Look East’ for alternative development partners, and investment by the Chinese got the warmest embrace. As Zimbabwe was actively courting investment from the East, Brazil was in its own way extending its tentacles across Africa in line with its increasing economic stature.

For Zimbabwe, agriculture has been an obvious priority sector for cooperation programmes considering its key contribution to the country’s economy and its high proportion of the country’s population that derives its livelihood from the sector. Indeed, a high proportion of cooperation programmes with traditional donors were in that sector. During the period 1998–2008, when Zimbabwe experienced an unprecedented economic slump, the agricultural sector was very much at the front and centre, both as a major casualty and cause of the meltdown. Due to liquidity challenges that have persisted since 2008, insignificant capital investment has been made in agriculture, with the result that underutilisation of farmland, especially among newly-resettled farmers, is widespread.

The GoZ has been in discussion with the Government of Brazil (GoB) for a major agricultural mechanisation cooperation programme since 2010, and the first batch of machinery and equipment2 was delivered between October 2014 and January 2015. The South American country is supplying tractors, tractor-drawn equipment and irrigation equipment under a concessionary loan agreement through the More Food Africa programme3. The process to culminate in the supply of the equipment has been intractable and is yet to fully play out. Yet negotiations have been undertaken cordially and with mutual respect. This paper documents the negotiation process to date, situating it within the broad development encounters between Brazil and Africa, and in particular that BRICS country and Zimbabwe. As the machinery and equipment itself had not yet been distributed at the time of preparing this report, inferences on the likely impact of the programme are drawn from experiences with similar programmes implemented earlier and a consideration of the economic situation and institutional capacity in the country.

The study was conducted in the Knowledge Encounters framework (Keeley and Scoones 2003; Long and van der Ploeg 1989) with information gathered from published and unpublished secondary sources as well as interviews with key informants from the two countries. The paper has to be considered as preliminary, as at the time of preparing the report only the first of three batches of the machinery and equipment had been delivered and distribution had not yet been done.

2. **BRICS as alternative development partners**

The core principles espoused in the discourse on engagement with BRICS countries include equal partnerships, mutual (or win-win) benefits, solidarity, non-conditionality, non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, as well as sharing of experiences. With these principles being a departure from the aid effectiveness guidelines (OECD 1991) that have been agreed to among the Development Assistance Committee group of countries, the uneasiness among the traditional donors that the BRICS engagement could undermine their efforts is understandable.

Gabas and Tang (2014) note that North-South cooperation and its conditionalities are tainted by the colonial legacy. Developing countries have by and large embraced the BRICS approach as it represents a departure from the donor hegemony that is associated with tied aid. The BRICS countries do not carry any colonial guilt and feel that they have a stronger affinity with developing countries that have been major recipients of development assistance from the West; Brazil, India and South Africa in particular were former colonies and bring in their experiences as major recipients of Western aid.

Carmody (2013), however, cautions that win-win globalisation and the South-South cooperation mantra disguises skewed power relations between the BRICS and developing countries, noting the high likelihood for the provider of the development assistance to act as a ‘Big Brother’. Mhandara et al. (2013) reiterate this, and posit that much as some relations between aid-dependent countries and Western donors have often been described as cases of neo-colonialism, cooperation with BRICS countries can also easily degenerate into that status.
In most development discourse, private companies are considered to give the greatest impetus to
globalisation. The increased footprints of BRICS countries have been described as globalisation of state power, as
their governments (rather than private companies) have been taking the initiative. The Brazil-Zimbabwe cooperation in agricultural mechanisation aptly illustrates this point, as negotiations have been spearheaded by governments, and the programme will be implemented by both the state and private sectors of the two countries.

A key feature distinguishing the BRICS countries’ cooperation from that of traditional donors is that aid, trade and investment are often provided as a combo, with the boundaries between each of them often blurred. Engagement with the BRICS is often of a longer term with a bias towards visible ‘hard’ sectors (e.g. infrastructure and capital equipment). Developing countries have welcomed the aid thrust, as capital and infrastructure no longer feature prominently in the aid portfolio of traditional donors who are increasingly focusing on ‘soft’ interventions (education, health, capacity building and governance) instead.

3. Brazil’s place in BRICS’ cooperation with Africa

China got a head start at cooperation with Africa, being a forerunner and having more cash for investments abroad. Gabas and Tang (2014), however, argue that Chinese engagement in sub-Saharan Africa is mired in mistrust due to insufficient transparency accompanying it, and that this could fuel and even perpetuate misunderstandings and misconceptions. Brazil, by presenting its cooperation with Africa as unique, more transparent, and based on a desire to build enduring relationships through development aid and private investment, could be capitalising on the tinge of resentment towards Chinese engagement.

3.1 Brazil’s comparative advantages and strategies

Riding on the goodwill generated by the BRICS engagement, but not trying to catch up with China, Brazil had to find its own uniqueness to use as the linchpin for cooperation with Africa. With Brazilian cooperation, social, political and cultural considerations are just as important as economic issues (Chengu 2011). Brazil is bringing in new perspectives on the benefits of modern agricultural development, and its accommodation of social movements in development cooperation has been applauded (Cabral and Oxley 2013).

Brazil is presenting itself as a development partner (rather than a business partner) familiar with the development challenges of the South, including all of Africa (Ibid), due to similar ecosystems. Beyond the win-win mantra, Brazil is sharing its successes in biomedical and health research, agriculture and food security with Africa as entry points for furthering its foreign policy. Through the innovative research work of the Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária (EMBRAPA), Brazil has become a foremost authority in tropical agriculture. With its machinery and agricultural research developed under similar conditions to Africa, the country presents its equipment as ‘tropicalized technology’. The dominant narrative presented by the country is that its cooperation is a horizontal relationship between countries sharing common problems and development challenges (Cabral and Oxley 2013; Stolte 2012).

A major feature of Brazilian cooperation, distinguishing it from traditional donors and China, is that much less disbursement of cash is involved. De Bruyn (2014) reiterates this point in discussing BICS’ involvement in African agriculture, where Brazil is presented as a source of ‘inspiration’ and China as a source of ‘financial resources’. Agriculture has the largest portfolio in its cooperation programmes with Africa, and the Latin American country presents the major thrust of its technical cooperation as being to make a positive contribution towards global development and food security through sharing knowledge and successful experiences (Farani and Arraes 2012). Among the BRICS countries, Brazil made the greatest strides in poverty reduction and increasing food security despite the country achieving lower economic growth rates than its contemporaries India and China (Oxfam 2010). With food insecurity rampant on the continent due to low agricultural production and so many of the continent’s inhabitants deriving their livelihood from agriculture, most African countries view Brazil’s successful transformation of family farms as a model that can be adapted by them.

Brazil continues to exploit the worldwide acclaim it has earned in reducing poverty and achieving food security by presenting some of its successes at home on the world stage. Of these two examples stand out:

a) The country set up the Centre of Excellence against Hunger to share its experiences with the world on how to tackle the scourge.

b) The Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), under the leadership of a Brazilian since January 2012, declared 2014 the International Year of Family Farming, where family farming was presented as the heart of the agricultural, food security and nutrition agendas. FAO organised workshops and conferences to galvanise worldwide discourse on popularising the practice. It is no coincidence that family farming is being promoted by FAO, whose current director-general Jose Graziano da Silva was directly involved in the Hunger Zero programme (discussed more fully in Section 4 below) before his appointment.

The strategy that Brazil has chosen to promote itself as a world power of note does not infringe on the interests of traditional donors, and indeed a significant portion of Brazilian cooperation is delivered under trilateral frameworks with traditional donors and/or international organisations (Farani and Arraes 2012; Cabral and...
3.2 Brazil’s economic, moral and political motivations

Brazil’s increased cooperation with Africa is not just out of benevolence or to spite the West; it wants to gain some economic presence and develop/secure markets for its manufactured goods (Muggah and Thompson 2015; Patriota and Prerri 2012; Stolte 2012). Further, as a rising power of the South now considered the sixth largest economy in the world (ECDPM 2012), the country has foreign policy ambitions. African countries supported Brazil in the leadership contest for the director-general of the United Nations’ largest agency, FAO. The highest concentration of African embassies in the Southern Hemisphere is reported to be in Brasilia (Green 2013). Brazil has been reciprocating: in May 2013, as a special guest at commemorations marking 50 years of the founding of the African Union (AU), the country announced the cancellation of US$900m of debt owed to it by Africa to ‘maintain a special relationship’, bearing in mind Africa’s strategic role in Brazil’s foreign policy (Black Global 2013). The Brazilian government’s pardoning of a significant portion of African debt was taken as an affirmation of remarks made by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2010) at the 13th Ordinary Session of the AU summit affirming the South American country’s succour towards Africa: ‘Brazil would not be what it is today without the participation of millions of Africans who helped build our country. Whosoever comes after me has the moral, political and ethical obligation to do much more’. As evidence that Africa was not indifferent to overtures from the South American powerhouse, Niyiragira (2009) notes that the invitation was extended ‘in recognition of the personal attention the Brazilian President had given to Brazil’s relationship with Africa’.

Muggah and Thompson (2015) contend that Brazil was perturbed by the subdued reception with which their overture was received. With Brazilian law prohibiting the government from providing new loans or financial assistance to indebted countries, it could be inferred that the cancellation was done not just to endear the country to Africa; it could also have been done to reinstate commercial ties with those African countries who had no capacity to clear outstanding debts. Overall, Brazil could reap benefits from the resumption of commercial links and strengthened diplomatic relations that could far surpass the debt pardoned.

Developing countries have been clamouring for reforms of the United Nations and its institutions to better represent their interests. Concomitant with its growing stature as a major economic power, Brazil has been actively canvassing for support among developing countries for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council, and its forays in Africa can also be considered as part of that grand strategy.

4. Genesis of Brazil-Zimbabwe cooperation in agriculture

A narrative widely propagated among those following Zimbabwe’s economic fortunes over the last 15 years has been that the country turned to Brazil and others in the BRICS grouping after its falling out with the West not out of choice. Indeed, the country was ostracised, with bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the West at the government level suspended and key state institutions and individuals of the ruling ZANU-PF party barred from visiting or conducting any business with the West.

The period of turmoil in Zimbabwe’s agriculture and its economy coincided with Lula da Silva’s time at the helm of Brazil (2003–2010). A hallmark of Lula da Silva’s presidency was increased cooperation with Africa within the framework of South-South cooperation. During his presidency, Lula da Silva travelled to Africa on 12 different occasions and visited 29 countries (Muggah and Thompson 2015). Albeit less aggressively, his successor President Dilma Vana Rousseff and her government have continued to affirm Brazilian ties with Africa. It is under such a framework that it can be argued that Zimbabwe and Brazil found each other, rather than Zimbabwe (or Brazil for that matter) solely taking the initiative.

Zimbabwe seized on the opportunity presented by the Brazil-Africa Dialogue on Food Security, Fight against Hunger and Rural Development (10–12 May 2010, Brasilia) to invite Brazilian investment, emphasising the vast business opportunities that were presented in the aftermath of the land reform. Based on its experiences in successfully improving productivity among its small farms through the Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) programme, Brazil devised the More Food for Africa programme as a vehicle for sharing its successes through providing agricultural machinery, training and technical support to African countries that so requested.

Zimbabwe was one of the first countries whose request for cooperation with Brazil under that programme was approved. The two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the More Food for Africa programme in 2011. Since then, work has been underway (at the technical level) by the two sides to finalise the loan agreement.

Prior to the last phase of its land reform programme (2000), Zimbabwe had earned the coveted title of ‘bread basket for Southern Africa’, as the country produced food surpluses that had a ready market among its then perpetually food-deficit neighbours. Before the Independence of South Africa in 1994, that position was of strategic significance to the region, and Zimbabwe was then in charge of the food security portfolio in the Southern Africa Development Coordination Community, the forerunner to the current Southern Africa Development Community. With Zimbabwe’s food production falling short of national consumption needs since 2000 due to a number of constraints (among them inadequate tillage and breakdown of irrigation systems),
the country hopes the More Food Africa programme will help increase production and in the process regain its earlier status.

The rest of this section discusses two other pertinent issues surrounding Brazil-Zimbabwe cooperation:

- Why Zimbabwe, of all countries in the sub-region, has hitherto not had any cooperation programme with Brazil; and
- Potential commercial benefits to Brazil through the More Food International programme with Zimbabwe.

4.1 Cooperation agreements between Brazil and Southern African countries other than Zimbabwe

As part of its strategy for asserting itself as a major global power, Brazil has been on a major diplomatic drive, setting up additional embassies in Africa and establishing links with major regional and international organisations. In Southern Africa the country’s efforts have all along skirted Zimbabwe, as cooperation programmes have been reported between Brazil and South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, Namibia, Angola and Tanzania (Stolte 2012). Tanzania and Zambia are two Southern African countries that benefited from the recent redeeming of the US$900m African debt to Brazil through cancellation and restructuring’, benefiting to the tune of US$273m and US$113.4m respectively.

Poverty reduction and its eradication have been priorities of the Brazilian government’s domestic and foreign policy since the Lula presidency, and the country achieved the Millennium Development Goals on hunger and poverty five years ahead of schedule (Ibid). Keen to share its successes in developing and implementing programmes to reduce hunger and poverty, and in the process earn a place for itself among the elite nations, Brazil has developed the innovative programme Purchase from Africa for Africa (PAA) for cooperating with poor and food insecure African countries. Mozambique and Malawi are the two Southern African countries among the five in the whole of Africa that are currently benefiting through PAA. The programme is implemented by Brazil and the host governments in partnership with FAO and the World Food Programme to promote food production among small farmers. The food excess to consumption requirements is bought by the programme for school feeding.

Brazil classifies Zimbabwe as a middle income economy and consequently the country has not been eligible for the PAA programme. The country has had to settle for the commercial financing arrangements provided through the More Food for Africa programme. In a recent statement, the affable Brazilian Ambassador to Zimbabwe is quoted as saying, ‘As a rule, Brazil does not give any support to sovereign nations and we don’t give out hand-outs either. Usually we find synergies and business opportunities where we can work with people on various projects… Zimbabwe is a rich country and does not need donations but investments’ (Kachembere 2014)

4.2 Commercial benefits to Brazil

Brazil stands to gain substantially from supplying the hardware, bearing in mind the tremendous business opportunity in selling farm machinery and equipment. Indeed, the initiative is driven by the South American country’s efforts to diversify its markets for manufactured goods (Stolte 2012).

With the displacement of whites from Zimbabwe’s commercial farms during the land reform programme, a lot of farm machinery was vandalised and whatever was spared is overdue for replacement. With almost all former large scale commercial farms subdivided, average farm sizes have become much smaller and irrigation systems have to be re-designed, presenting tremendous business opportunities. The inadequacy of farm machinery has often been cited as the major cause for late planting and less-than-full utilisation of farmland in newly-resettled areas.

It has been through the Tianze contract farming scheme that a few large scale tobacco farmers have acquired farm machinery, as local financial institutions have been hamstrung in providing medium- and long-term finance to agriculture from 2009 when the liquidity challenges set in. Interest among farmers in the Tianze farm machinery loan scheme has remained lukewarm as the repayment arrangements are considered rather unfavourable. Farmers are only paid for tobacco delivered after the entire loan has been redeemed. With the smaller farm sizes following the land reform programme and the recent softening of tobacco prices, most average-sized tobacco farms need at least two seasons to clear the tractor loan. The Brazilian farm mechanisation programme will fill the void with lower interest rates and a long repayment period.

In 2000, Zimbabwe was ranked seventh on tractor ownership in Africa with 24,000 units. Allowing for vandalism that accompanied the land reform programme and normal replacement, there is potential for Brazil to get even more business beyond the loan package. Furthermore, the GoZ technical staff who have been involved in the negotiations have given a favourable assessment of the equipment.

Part of the long term interest of Brazil in implementing the More Food for Africa programme is to exploit the business potential for its manufactured goods within the growing African market (Cabral and Oxley 2013, Economist 2012, Patriota and Prerri 2012). To more appropriately reflect its global status, the More Food for
Africa programme has since 2013 been rebranded More Food International.

As a component of its business development strategy, the Brazilian government has been actively supporting the participation of its companies at African trade fairs to promote their products. Brazil’s participation at the Zimbabwe International Trade Fair has become regular over the last few years and agricultural machinery has constituted a major component of the displays.

Up to the turn of the century, Brazil’s cooperation with developing countries was largely with Lusophone group of countries and historical and cultural/linguistic affiliations were major considerations in the country’s foreign policy. In the Southern African sub-region, Brazilian cooperation has been predominantly with Angola and Mozambique. Chichava (2014) reiterates Mozambique’s pre-eminence in Brazil’s cooperation with Africa and intimates that the South American country first tries out its cooperation meant for the continent with that Lusophone country before replication10. Zimbabwe being contiguous with Mozambique, Brazil could consider the Zimbabwe cooperation as an offshoot of its long-running programme with the eastern neighbour. The experiences from its cooperation with Mozambique can also be handy in the Zimbabwe programme. Besides, the South American country can conveniently use the same team to backstop its cooperation programmes in the two countries.

Brazil recently moved its Harare embassy from rented offices in a city centre high rise office complex to spacious stand-alone premises in an upmarket suburban area. This is in line with the general trend among diplomatic missions accredited to Zimbabwe. The development is as much a showcase of Brazil’s stature, as it gives an indication of the value the country attaches to its relationship with Zimbabwe now and in the future.

5. Towards making the cooperation programme make an impact

The cooperation programme has three components, executed simultaneously:

a) Exchange of family-farming-focused public policy experiences;

b) Technical assistance focused on strengthening extension systems; and

c) Concessional loan for the acquisition of farm machinery and equipment (Lidia Cabral pers. comm. 2014).

Significant work leading to the equipment being made available was done in the two countries from 2010, culminating in the delivery of the first of three tranches of the hardware between October 2014 and January 2015.

I now discuss the work that has been undertaken under the programme in the two countries.

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe welcomes the increased activity of BRICS on the world development stage, coming as it has when cooperation with the traditional cooperation partners was on hold. Cooperation with Brazil and China provides an alternative in the immediate period and strengthens the country’s negotiating position when re-engaging with traditional donors. Zimbabwe’s relationship with the BRICS countries assumed a greater significance, particularly with those countries with which cooperation deals were finalised when the country was under sanctions. It is speculated that such developments spurred traditional donors to collectively and individually review the restrictive measures they had imposed on an ‘errant’ Zimbabwe. As a quid pro quo, the Southern African country appears to have reciprocated by elevating its relationship with BRICS countries. With China’s influence being more pervasive, relations are stronger with that Asian country. Brazil is also getting accolades, largely for the agricultural mechanisation programme and by extension for its endorsement of Zimbabwe’s land reform programme. Zimbabwe could also be hyping its relations with the BRICS countries to lure back Western partners which had all but severed ties with the country (British Expertise 2014).

All-around funding for agriculture – capital equipment, infrastructure and seasonal inputs – has been a challenge since the country embarked on its land reform programme. As a consequence of the under-funding of agriculture, production of all commodities declined considerably from the pre-land reform period and the country has had to import a significant quantity of its food each year since then. Zimbabwe sees the impact of its cooperation programme with Brazil beyond just recapturing the much coveted tag of ‘Food Basket for Southern Africa’, as the equipment will be used on other enterprises beyond food crops.

By far the most interest in the programme is with the machinery and equipment, particularly tractors. The country breathed a sigh of relief when the first consignment of the machinery and equipment was delivered between October 2014 and January 2015. The development came after quantities of tractors and tractor-drawn equipment, knapsack sprayers and irrigation equipment that were to be supplied by Brazil under the US$98.6m agreement were specified by the GoZ. The list of beneficiaries by each type of farm asset were identified by the GoZ. Conforming to the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment regulations (2010), most of the selected agents are indigenous (black-owned) companies, much as some long-established farm machinery dealers were also included. Most of the business will be handled by Haingate Investments, an

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indigenous company involved in agricultural machinery. The principal company does not have a track record in implementing similar programmes and it remains to be seen if Haingate Investments will be able to satisfactorily manage the cooperation programme\textsuperscript{11}.

Commercial banks that will administer the loan repayments were identified and the Agricultural Bank of Zimbabwe (Agribank)\textsuperscript{12} was appointed by the GoZ as the lead banking institution to administer the facility. Vetting of prospective beneficiaries for their capacity to repay the loan was undertaken by Agribank in close liaison with the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development and Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement.

With the GoZ being the borrower and fully guaranteeing the loan agreement, other government institutions that have been involved in the negotiations include the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) and the Attorney General's office.

**Brazil**

Key institutions that have been involved in the negotiation process include the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA), Chamber of International Trade (CAMEX), Banco do Brasil, and agricultural machinery suppliers. The MDA has overall responsibility for the programme and its duties include initiating and maintaining dialogue with beneficiary countries through the country's diplomatic representation. Overall responsibility for the technical assistance and policy guidance has also been vested with the MDA. CAMEX is an inter-ministerial body overseeing international trade and is headed by the Ministry of Development, Industry and International Trade, but also includes staff from the Ministries of Finance, Planning, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs (through the Brazilian Agency for Cooperation – ABC); the Presidency; and MDA seconded to it.

In December 2013 Brazil’s government-owned development bank, Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES), opened its Africa office in Johannesburg (Green 2013), becoming the third office of the bank on foreign soil\textsuperscript{13}. The development has been interpreted as an affirmation of the country's resolve to strengthen cooperation with Africa.

Brazil’s cooperation programme is unwieldy (Cabral and Oxley 2013) and to improve coordination among the various government agencies on the More Food International programme, CAMEX in March 2013 established the Grupo Técnico Mais Alimentos Internacional working group. The GoB has shortlisted Brazilian companies that will supply the equipment, ensuring that each selected company will meet set technical standards and the equipment will not be overpriced. As negotiations at government-to-government level were underway, discussions on pricing for the equipment was undertaken directly between the GoZ and the shortlisted Brazilian companies within the ceiling set by MDA.

6. **Delays in delivering the equipment?**

In this section, the progress in negotiations and other groundwork culminating in the delivery of the first batch of agricultural equipment is discussed.

**Zimbabwe**

On 29 August 2013 the loan agreement was officially signed between the two governments in Brasilia and the first disbursement of US$38.6m was expected before the end of December 2013, with two other disbursements of US$30m each following at six-month intervals (Bonga 2013). The loan was made available through the Exporting Financing programme\textsuperscript{14} with funding coming from the More Food International programme. The letter of credit was issued to Agribank, notified and negotiated along with Banco do Brasil SA.

Among the reasons for the delays in getting the equipment delivered is the novel nature of the programme, which has made the negotiation process protracted and necessitated the amending or even enacting of enabling legislation in both countries. Further, there has not been any commercial cooperation at government-to-government level or involving private companies from the two countries; the Brazilian Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Ms Marcia Maro da Silva, confirms that this has been the first time Brazil has extended a concessionary credit facility to Zimbabwe. Corroborating the GoB’s position, the Zimbabwe Investment Centre confirmed that it is yet to register any Brazilian company to operate in the country. With the working group Grupo Técnico Mais Alimentos Internacional in place, it was expected that all legal re-alignments and technical issues at the Brazilian end would be expedited. The ordinance issued by MDA in 2013 detailing the selling conditions (accredited suppliers, the machinery selection process, post-sale conditions and warranties) was a useful milestone.

The finalisation of the programme culminating in the delivery of the equipment has indeed been arduous and protracted. The major statement by the Brazilian Ambassador to Zimbabwe, made towards the end of May 2014, was that the equipment was expected by August 2014\textsuperscript{15} – in time for the 2014/15 summer season. With more and more African countries signing up for the More Food International programme, there is some urgency for the programme to deliver bearing in mind that CAMEX approved a total of US$640m as the programme's loan book. The South American country is lately reported to have made a total commitment of US$1.6bn in lines of credit to Africa (Kachembere, 2014).

There was a palpable element of weariness over the drawn-out nature of the negotiation process among the GoZ officials who have been involved, bearing in mind the hype that has accompanied the programme through the local media.
The delay in finalising the Brazilian machinery loan contrasts sharply with the speed with which Chinese cooperation programmes are processed...China doesn’t keep us waiting for two years, China will decide today and will go ahead. The next day you sign and work starts...’

former Malawi President Joyce Banda is reported to have said (De Bruyn 2014).

Brazil

Brazil has publicly expressed its disquiet with the country’s Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment regulations that compel all foreign-owned businesses to cede 51 percent of their shareholding to local indigenous Zimbabweans. The GoB is compelled to accept whichever companies Zimbabwe nominates as the local agents to work with Brazilian companies. A preferable option would have been for the GoB to do its own independent due diligence, even just as a reassurance. Under the current framework with a possibility for a Brazilian company being paired with a Zimbabwean company with inadequate capacity, the credibility of the programme and indeed that of Brazil could be put in jeopardy. Brazil will not take comfort in the fact that Zimbabwe as the guarantor of the loan will have to pay up if farmers default, as the country is currently saddled with a US$10.7bn debt (Herald, 2013).

The concerns raised by the Brazilian Ambassador have been echoed by other foreign missions, with the Chinese government cautioning its nationals contemplating to invest in Zimbabwe to comply with the country’s indigenisation law (Brautingam 2014).

7. The More Food for Africa programme and its future in Zimbabwe

It was argued earlier that the supply of the machinery and equipment was delayed due to the novelty of the programme. The unwieldy nature of Brazil’s bureaucracy has not helped matters. Challenges arose with overwhelming requests for cooperation made by African countries at a time when Brazil was aligning the programme to conform to its laws. It has further to be realised that up to 2000, Brazil’s cooperation was largely with Lusophone countries (Cape Verde, Mozambique and Angola) and the More Food programme has seen the South American country extending itself to the whole of Africa – and lately to the world, with the re-branding to More Food International.

This section discusses some pertinent issues that have arisen with the implementation of the programme in Zimbabwe thus far and suggests areas that could warrant particular attention in future.

Perceptions on the More Food programme and its components

There are varied perceptions in the country on the basis of the programme and indeed what it could accomplish. This could very well be due to inadequate publicity that has accompanied the programme and the little impact achieved through similar programmes in the past. At the time of preparing this report, there was little evidence that the programme’s other equally important components beyond the delivery of machinery and equipment were known. The project document has only been shared at the top government level and technical staff of specific units have solely been aware of the specific components of the programme they have worked on (types and specifications of equipment and machinery, repayment capacity of applications, etc.) rather than the programme in its entirety.

Press statements on the programme released by the GoZ and the Brazilian Embassy thus far have mentioned the delivery of machinery and equipment as its only components, repeatedly emphasising solidarity as a key pillar of the cooperation. The GoZ is of the view that the programme will be used on the whole range of enterprises; Brazil on the other hand considers the programme to have a more specific focus in line with the name and objectives of the More Food International programme.

The divergences on the purpose of the programme at the level of the two governments was confirmed at the handover ceremony for the first consignment of the Brazilian machinery and equipment. Zimbabwe’s Deputy Minister of Agriculture Mr Davis Marapira who represented the GoZ and is responsible for crops, mechanisation and irrigation development, had this to say: ‘I want to thank the Brazilians for extending this credit facility to us and
we are going to use the equipment to boost our agricultural production.’

In response, the Brazilian Ambassador to Zimbabwe Marcia Maro Da Silva, in the company of her country’s senior advisor in the Ministry of Agrarian Development, Secretary of Family Farming Mr Marco Antonio Viana Leita, reiterated her country’s commitment to help Zimbabwe improve food production and ensure food security: ‘We want to support Zimbabwe boost its food production and ensure food security. So we will continue to support the country with lines of credit.’

Farmers and most technical staff see the programme as established to provide the country with affordable and durable farm machinery, completely missing out the extension component and the exchange of public policy experiences on family farming.

Past experiences with similar programmes

Parallels in design, delivery and impact have been made between the programme and similar earlier ones, particularly the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) 2004 Farm Mechanization programme and the 2007 Agricultural Mechanization programme administered by the RBZ. Under both programmes funding was sourced from China under government-to-government arrangements, and the machinery was for use by ARDA and newly-resettled farmers respectively. Allegations of cronyism in the distribution of machinery plagued the 2007 RBZ programme and continued to simmer during the time of the Inclusive Government (2009–2013) punctuated with calls for both programmes to be audited.

Table 1 shows the pattern in the distribution of the equipment under Phase 1.

Table 1: Beneficiaries by category under the 2007 RBZ Phase 1 Farm Mechanization programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beneficiary group</th>
<th>Combines</th>
<th>Tractors</th>
<th>Ploughs</th>
<th>Harrows</th>
<th>Planters</th>
<th>Sprayers</th>
<th>Vicons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Ministers</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senators/MPs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service chiefs/ Senior civil servants</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional leaders</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War vets</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top producers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Development Fund</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pamberi Investments</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maguta/Inala</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University farms</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
<td><strong>925</strong></td>
<td><strong>586</strong></td>
<td><strong>463</strong></td>
<td><strong>71</strong></td>
<td><strong>241</strong></td>
<td><strong>78</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: RBZ (2007)

Other than machinery handed over to institutions (universities, Pamberi Investments, Maguta/Inala, District Development Fund), the Farm Mechanization programme benefited largely the ruling party.

Scoones et al. (2011), however, dismiss as a ‘myth’ the widely-held assertion that under Zimbabwe’s land reform programme land was parcelled along partisan lines with ZANU-PF members being the primary beneficiaries. While some senior ruling party officials benefited, by far the majority of new settlers are ordinary people. With most of those resettled from its rank and file, the ruling party stands to benefit from the Farm Mechanisation programme, but not through any sinister scheme. The programme will simply see beneficiaries even more beholden to the Party.

The Farm Mechanization debt comprises a significant part of the US$1.3bn RBZ debt. The debt has been referred to as an albatross around the central bank’s neck as it deters financial institutions and development partners from collaborating with it. The Parliament of Zimbabwe has just been discussing the modalities for the GoZ to assume it. From a public consultation process, the overwhelming view has been that the debt should be fully recovered from beneficiaries. The Parliamentary Committee on Budget and Finance and the Minister of Finance are recommending that the debt be written off; the latter quipping, ‘let bygone be bygones’ (New Zimbabwe 2015). A number of the legislators personally benefited from the Farm Mechanization programme and there is every livelihood that the RBZ Debt Assumption Bill will pass in its current form.
From precedence, some GoZ critics even fear that through the More Food International programme, the country could be ‘flooded with unproductive tractors’ that could be either misused or underutilised. This view, though far-fetched, is in line with that of Mutenga (2014) who posits that farmers attach more sentimental value to having a tractor as a physical asset (even mostly parked) wherein it is a symbol of agricultural modernity; a contrast to its designed purpose of increasing agricultural productivity.

**Training and seasonal inputs as key components**

It is not clear if any training on the proper use and maintenance of the machinery and equipment among beneficiaries will be undertaken. Such training is particularly important as the backlog in such training at national level has continued to escalate over the years. Due to inadequate funding, the Institute of Agricultural Engineering, the country’s premium institution mandated to undertake such a task, discontinued trainings on tractor driving, ploughing and farm machinery in the late 1990s. This is particularly important for the tractor consignment that is said to be a showcase of the latest technology.

As the RBZ carried out a major mechanisation programme in 2007, it also gave out seasonal inputs (seed, fertiliser, herbicides and diesel) to the same beneficiaries but productivity did not noticeably increase. With these parallels, it is not surprising that most stakeholders are sceptical about whether the Brazilian cooperation could make any major impact on agricultural production when seasonal inputs are not even part of the package.

**Concept of family farming in Zimbabwe’s context**

The concept of family farming that is credited for most of Brazil’s improvements in economic fortunes since Lula da Silva’s presidency does not assume the same meaning in Zimbabwe. Unlike the case with Brazil, Zimbabwe does not have active social movements that the government could partner with in promoting family farming.

In the Zimbabwean context, family farming is synonymous with subsistence farming where each household has access to a limited area (typically not more than five hectares) that it manages on its own with its family labour, often with rudimentary tools and inadequate inputs; at best the household produces just enough to meet family consumption needs. Among communal farmers, most beneficiaries under the cooperation programme will be drawn from smallholder irrigation schemes where the proposed technology could be an indicator of the unenviable position that Brazil finds itself in. Once the negotiation process was started, it could not be abandoned and at some point it had to be concluded, otherwise Brazil could risk appearing to be in the perennial shadow of China.

**Appropriateness of the machinery and equipment**

Concerns have been raised on the appropriateness of the sizes of equipment to be supplied, bearing in mind the smaller farm sizes and the recent push towards reduced tillage techniques which require less tractor power. For full utilisation among the target group of beneficiaries (small farmers), some sharing of the machinery and equipment may be necessary. From past experiences, the use and management of communally-owned farm machinery can be fraught with problems (Mukwereza 2013; Rusike 1988).

Through the programme, centre-pivot irrigation systems will be installed in communal irrigation schemes. Management of smallholder irrigation schemes in Zimbabwe has always presented challenges in viability (due to small areas per farmer) and consensus (with cropping programmes and operations shared among disparate small farmers). There is every likelihood that the smallholder irrigation component of the More Food International programme could present even more formidable challenges bearing in mind the technology to be used. While it could not be established whether other cheaper irrigation systems (flood, sprinkler and drip) were ever considered, the country, being in such a vulnerable position, may not have had any choice but to accept the more expensive system.

Addressing a conference promoting locally-manufactured goods, the GoZ’s Minister of Finance acknowledged the limitations of beneficiary countries in negotiating cooperation programmes with BRICS countries: ‘The thing is, the model for China, India ... is basically to say if you are borrowing [their] money they supply the equipment and their companies will do the construction’ (Majaka 2014) Under the current package, Brazil could make significant commercial gains through the sale of machinery and equipment as well as spares.

**Brazil cooperation and its caution in contrast to China and its leverage**

The relatively long process that has culminated in the delivery of the machinery and equipment could be an indication of the unenviable position that Brazil finds itself in. Once the negotiation process was started, it could not be abandoned and at some point it had to be concluded, otherwise Brazil could risk appearing to be in the perennial shadow of China.

Cooperation programmes with China, in contrast, are concluded much faster not just because the Asian giant is more awash with cash but due to the greater leverage the Asian country has over African countries. The case where China nudged the GoZ to settle an overdue loan repayment obtained by a Zimbabwean private company, Farmers World, illustrates China’s significant leverage on the Southern African country.

Addressing a recent conference in Harare to promote procurement from local companies, the GoZ’s Minister of Finance opened up on his government’s determination
to ensure that relations with China remain on an even keel: ‘We have paid $180 million which was not in the budget just to make us look good’ (Mtomba 2014) The GoZ assumed the US$80m debt with China’s Exim Bank for equipment supplied to Farmers World and has since made a payment of about US$12m to allow the country to access more Chinese loans, although the GoZ had not guaranteed the loan.

Through most of 2014 and to date, the GoZ has been in discussions with China for a US$4bn rescue package. In the negotiations the Asian giant insisted on feasibility studies to precede the release of the funds and that appropriate safeguards be put in place to avoid loss of funds through ‘leakages’ (MG 2015). The Chinese are reportedly going to deploy their nationals to key parastatals that will implement the deals for capacity building. It is not clear if Agribank working with various departments in the Ministry of Agriculture has the capacity to satisfactorily administer the programme. Brazil’s model of relying largely on existing structures and its civil servants to implement the cooperation programme could present an additional challenge as only limited capacity building and backstopping services can be provided.

Due to its determination to build relations with more African countries and its limited leverage on Zimbabwe, Brazil could be in a dilemma; it cannot take a similar position lest it risk its gesture being considered as insincere. The best the South American country appears to have done is to put in place some safeguards for repayments (including the government guarantee) and importantly avoiding over-exposure by staggering the release of the machinery and equipment.

As that equipment arrives and the roll-out of the programme in more African countries is continued, it will be appropriate for an assessment of Brazilian cooperation in Africa to be undertaken with a view to establish useful insights that could help shape future cooperation programmes.

In defining its cooperation programme, Brazil emphasises ‘business with a legacy’ as its cornerstone. At the time when it will be appropriate to undertake an ex-post evaluation of Brazilian cooperation in Africa, it will be opportune to also assess the extent to which the South American country’s engagement would have lived up to this avowed cornerstone.

8. BRICS engagement and its impact on Zimbabwe’s relations with the EU

Zimbabwe’s cooperation with China has provided some breathing space, and its continued engagement with that Asian country and latterly with Brazil and Russia could have set off a stampede among Western countries to individually review their cooperation with Zimbabwe. In contrast to the tenuous reengagement negotiations that went on during the tenure of the Inclusive Government (2009–2013), the recent flurry of statements by ambassadors from Western European countries accredited to Zimbabwe attest to their change of heart (approaching eagerness in some instances) to normalise relations.

The French Ambassador to Zimbabwe heaped praises on the country as an ideal investment destination, confirming that the EU will resume direct cooperation with Zimbabwe from late 2014 (Sibanda 2014): ‘A literate, skilful and hard-working people, abundant natural and mineral resources, scandalously good climate, a widespread though deteriorated infrastructure network, such a peaceful and welcoming nation, such a resilient people with such foundations, how can one but envisage a bright future for Zimbabwe … the EU will resume its direct co-operation with the government of Zimbabwe, and the European Development Fund will start assisting in the implementation of ZimAsset’ (the country’s economic blueprint for 2013–2018).

The Belgian Ambassador also weighed in, saying, ‘Belgium has been at the forefront towards the lifting of sanctions, trying to normalise relations with Zimbabwe and we will continue doing so’ (Share 2014) France dispatched a business delegation to Zimbabwe towards the end of 2014; Belgium is set to do likewise in April 2015.

In an address to a forum of non-governmental organisations in Zimbabwe in 2014, the EU Ambassador gave clear signals that normalising relations with the country was imminent, noting that there was no more crisis in the country. Much to the chagrin of his hosts, he went on to refer to non-governmental organisations (that incidentally have been nurtured by the West) disparagingly as ‘anti-government organisations’ which incidentally have been nurtured by the West) disparagingly as ‘anti-government organisations’ which went on during the tenure of the Inclusive Government (2009–2013), the recent flurry of statements by ambassadors from Western European countries accredited to Zimbabwe attest to their change of heart (approaching eagerness in some instances) to normalise relations.

Zimbabwe, which was on a mutual demonetisation path with the UK for over a decade (Tendi 2014) has ironically been keen to normalise relations with its erstwhile colonial power. The UK has since 2014 been making overtures to normalise relations, starting with the appointment of Ms Catriona Laing as the Ambassador. Ms Laing has been described longingly as ‘a breath of fresh air’ (Bwoni 2014) in contrast to the inflexible stance maintained by her predecessors.

Culture and sport have long been used as part of the array of tools of diplomacy colloquially referred to as ‘soft power’. In mid-December 2014 the UK chose Harare for screening the African Premiere of the film Paddington Bear, a fitting gesture of the British government’s determination to mend relations through highlighting a cultural affinity shared between the two countries.
At the premiere ceremony, Ambassador Laing dwelt on the positives, singling out the long history shared between the two countries characterised by strong ties, common language and culture. Jonathan Moyo, Zimbabwe's Information, Media and Broadcasting Services Minister was equally conciliatory: ‘There are many other aspects of our everyday life that brings us together. If we had paid attention to some of those things maybe some of the misunderstanding we have had recently could have been dealt with differently’ (Mushakavanhu 2015).

The recent report prepared by British Expertise (2014) following an exploratory visit to Zimbabwe provides some fillip to the normalisation of relations through strengthening technical cooperation. Underlining its seriousness towards reengagement and in doing so maintain the momentum, Her Majesty’s government sent a second such mission in mid-February 2015. The UK however acknowledges the primacy of China in Zimbabwe’s cooperation, particularly for finance and infrastructure projects.

9. Conclusion

Zimbabwe was the first country to have its application for cooperation with Brazil under the More Food Africa programme approved. Through that programme, Brazil shares its experiences, expertise and technology with Africa for the latter to achieve food sovereignty. Zimbabwe’s application was made as part of efforts by the country to seek alternative development partners following the fallout with its erstwhile partners in the West.

The presidency of Lula da Silva saw Brazil increasingly extending its African footprint beyond the Lusophone countries as a deliberate strategy of securing markets for its manufactured products and to assert its position as a major world power commensurate with its increasing economic stature.

The Brazil-Africa Dialogue on Food Security, Fight against Hunger and Rural Development (May 2010) presented Zimbabwe with its first opportunity to formally engage Brazil to invest in the country’s agricultural sector. Negotiations between the two countries have been tortuous due to the novelty of the programme and it was a welcome relief for the equipment and machinery under the first phase of the programme to be delivered at the end of 2014.

With the programme negotiated and finalised while Zimbabwe was under sanctions from the West, the GoZ gives a special status to its relationship with the South American country. In public discourse, Zimbabwe maintains that the cooperation signals Brazil’s endorsement of the country’s land reform programme as well as serves as an affirmation that Brasilia is not in the orbit of the West. Brazil sees the programme as its contribution towards a more food-secure world.

Previous similar programmes have been marred by allegations of cronyism in the selection of beneficiaries as well as poor repayments on the machinery and equipment loans. That the loan is covered by a government guarantee provides no comfort as the GoZ is currently heavily in debt and is at the exploratory stages of re-establishing a relationship with the International Monetary Fund.

The drawn-out nature of the process leading up to the delivery of the first consignment of machinery and equipment contrasts sharply with the speed with which the cooperation programme with China come to fruition. Unlike China which has a long-standing political-cultural and economic cooperation programme with Zimbabwe, cooperation with Brazil is still relatively nascent, much as both countries are keen to nurture it: Brazil for economic and geo-political considerations, Zimbabwe to ease its dependency on China. Zimbabwe owes China a special gratitude for being an all-weather friend and the Asian country has not been shy to use the mature political and economic ties to its advantage – even to nudge the Southern African country to pay up overdue loans – a leverage Brazil does not have at this stage.

This report has discussed the negotiation process in the lead-up to the delivery of the first phase of agricultural machinery and equipment under the More Food International programme. For a complete assessment of the motivations and impact of Brazil-Zimbabwe cooperation through the More Food International programme, it would be necessary at the appropriate stage to establish whom the beneficiaries under the programme have been as well as whether agricultural productivity and production indeed improves. Ex-post, it would be necessary to establish if the cooperation leaves a legacy of food security as its imprint on the country.

Zimbabwe welcomes its re-engagement with the European Union, albeit amid speculation that it is spurred by the country’s burgeoning cooperation with the BRICS countries.
End Notes

1. Key insights and positions from the Brazil end were gathered by Lidia Cabral and I am indebted to her.

2. BRICS refers to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

3. Other than Russia, the other countries in the grouping are democracies following similar political and economic systems with traditional donors and can thus be more easily be persuaded to toe the line.

4. Brazil refers to the package as such rather than just as ‘farm machinery’.

5. The institution More Food Africa was created in 2010; it has since been renamed More Food International in 2013 to more closely reflect its global appeal, with Cuba joining. In this paper the two names are used interchangeably, referring to the same institution.

6. Brazil, India, China and South Africa.


8. http://allafrica.com/stories/201406041462.html; other African countries also benefitting outside Southern Africa include Ethiopia, Niger and Senegal. Another donor can also be involved; e.g. UKAid in Ethiopia.

9. http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Agriculture/Tractors for tractor ownership in all countries in 2000. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Zimbabwe is listed third after South Africa and Nigeria. Tractor ownership in Africa was led by Algeria (at 93,000 units), followed by Egypt (86,000), South Africa (72,300), Morocco (43,226), Libya (34,000), and then Nigeria (30,000). In Southern Africa, Zambia followed Zimbabwe with 6,000 units.

10. Much as the situation must have changed since 2000, the position then shows the potential market that exists for tractors in Zimbabwe.

11. In earlier versions of the More Food programme, Brazil was to perform due diligence of suggested partner companies. That clause was removed giving sole discretion on nominations to the host government.

12. Agribank is a state banking commercial institution that was set up in 1999 primarily to serve farmers.

13. BNDES had earlier established foreign offices in London and Montevideo.

14. This confirms the narrative that securing export markets is a major motivation for Brazilian engagement with Africa.

15. Statement by Brazilian Ambassador to Zimbabwe: http://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2014/05/21/brazil-grants-zim-100m-agric-loan

16. A recent statement by the Brazilian Ambassador to Zimbabwe could partly explain why the programme has stalled: http://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2014/05/21/brazil-grants-zim-100m-agric-loan

17. The ARDA Mechanisation programme was financed by the RBZ in 2004. The equipment was never fully accounted for amid allegations of misappropriation. The consignment was comprised of 224 units of farm equipment among which were 129 tractors, 15 ploughs, 15 combine harvesters and 29 harrows.

18. In 2007 Zimbabwe through its Reserve Bank implemented a USS200m agricultural mechanisation programme through which at least 3,000 tractors, 105 combine harvesters, 1,800 tractor-drawn ploughs, 500 planters, 746 chemical sprayers, 600 fertiliser sprayers, 210 hay bale, 100,000 ox-drawn ploughs, 130 harrows, 2,000 planters, 46,200 cultivators, 78,000 farm carts, 92,000 knapsack sprayers and 200,000 chains were distributed among newly-resettled indigenous (black) farmers. Loans were denominated in Zimbabwe dollars and while default rates were reported to have been high, it did not make economic sense to enforce repayments in a currency that was demonetised less than two years thereafter (Mutenga 2014).

19. Traditional leaders are Chiefs who preside over customary courts. War vets are those who participated as combatants in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. Controversy surrounds the categories Women and Youth with allegations that...
they were included to accommodate key organs of the ruling party: Women’s and Youth Leagues. War vets are a constituency of the ruling party; Chiefs have always aligned themselves with the ruling party.

Debt accelerated through a host of quasi-fiscal activities that the RBZ undertook between 2000 and 2008; the farm mechanisation component is estimated at US$200m.

A1 farms focus on smallholder production and can be either under village arrangements where some facilities (e.g. grazing, water sources, dip tanks) are shared or be self-contained units. The village variant can be based on crops or livestock. The average farm size for A1 units varies from 12ha to 70ha in farming regions of highest and lowest potential respectively. The national average A1 farm size is 37ha. A major objective of the resettlement model is to relieve pressure in over-populated communal areas with the principal target group being landless peasants (Scoones et al. 2011; MoLARR 2001).

The A2 resettlement model was created to open access to small, medium and large scale commercial farming to black indigenous farmers. Variants of the model include small scale, medium scale and large scale and farm sizes under each variant are increased on moving into lower potential farming areas. Under a fourth variant of the A2, peri-urban, farm sizes are much smaller and range from 2-50ha. A2 farms are stand-alone farms similar to the former large scale commercial farms. The average size for A2 farms is 318ha. The distinction between A1 and A2 farms based on size is, however, not that clear-cut and there is some considerable overlap between the two.

Additional information on Zimbabwe’s land reform programme is available at http://zimbabweland.net/

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