

# **A study of Brazilian Trilateral Development Cooperation in Mozambique: The case of ProSAVANA and ProALIMENTOS**

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# China and Brazil in African Agriculture

## Working Paper Series

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This Working Paper series emerges from the China and Brazil in African Agriculture (CBAA) programme of the Future Agricultures Consortium. This is supported by the UK Economic and Social Research Council's 'Rising Powers and Interdependent Futures' programme ([www.risingpowers.net](http://www.risingpowers.net)). We expect 24 papers to be published during 2015, each linked to short videos presented by the lead authors.

The CBAA team is based in Brazil (University of Brasilia and Universidade Federal do ABC), China (China Agricultural University, Beijing), Ethiopia (Ethiopian Agricultural Research Institute, Addis Ababa), Ghana (University of Ghana at Legon), Mozambique (Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos, Maputo), Zimbabwe (Research and Development Trust, Harare), the UK (the Institute of Development Studies, the International Institute for Environment and Development and the Overseas Development Institute).

The team includes 25 researchers coming from a range of disciplines including development studies, economics, international relations, political science, social anthropology and sociology, but all with a commitment to cross-disciplinary working. Most papers are thus the result of collaborative research, involving people from different countries and from different backgrounds. The papers are the preliminary results of this dialogue, debate, sharing and learning.

As Working Papers they are not final products, but each has been discussed in project workshops and reviewed by other team members. At this stage, we are keen to share the results so far in order to gain feedback, and also because there is massive interest in the role of Brazil and China in Africa. Much of the commentary on such engagements are inaccurate and misleading, or presented in broad-brush generalities. Our project aimed to get behind these simplistic representations and find out what was really happening on the ground, and how this is being shaped by wider political and policy processes.

The papers fall broadly into two groups, with many overlaps. The first is a set of papers looking at the political economy context in Brazil and China. We argue that historical experiences in agriculture and poverty programmes, combine with domestic political economy dynamics, involving different political, commercial and diplomatic interests, to shape development cooperation engagements in Africa. How such narratives of agriculture and development – about for example food security, appropriate technology, policy models and so on - travel to and from Africa is important in our analysis.

The second, larger set of papers focuses on case studies of development cooperation. They take a broadly-defined 'ethnographic' stance, looking at how such engagements unfold in detail, while setting this in an understanding of the wider political economy in the particular African settings. There are, for example, major contrasts between how Brazilian and Chinese engagements unfold in Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, dependant on historical experiences with economic reform, agricultural sector restructuring, aid commitments, as well as national political priorities and stances. These contrasts come out strikingly when reading across the papers.

The cases also highlight the diversity of engagements grouped under 'development cooperation' in agriculture. Some focus on state-facilitated commercial investments; others are more akin to 'aid projects', but often with a business element; some focus on building platforms for developing capacity through a range of training centres and programmes; while others are 'below-the-radar' investments in agriculture by diaspora networks in Africa. The blurring of boundaries is a common theme, as is the complex relationships between state and business interests in new configurations.

This Working Paper series is one step in our research effort and collective analysis. Work is continuing, deepening and extending the cases, but also drawing out comparative and synthetic insights from the rich material presented in this series.

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## Introduction

The distribution of power in the international system has dramatically changed in the twenty-first century. Emerging countries like China, India, Brazil and South Africa, called the 'new powers' (Narlikar 2010) or the 'rising states' (Alexandroff and Cooper 2010), have expanded their capacity of influence worldwide, shifting the balance of international organisations (Nye 2012; Hurrell 2007; 2006). New institutional arrangements such as multilateral platforms that support South-South cooperation, triangular cooperation and other *ad hoc* arrangements were designed by South countries in order to consolidate their participation in various spheres of the international system: trade, finance, diplomatic relations, development and so on (Abdenur and Da Fonseca 2013; McEwan and Mawdsley 2012; Woods 2008; Manning 2006).

A remarkable feature of the rise of these emerging countries has been their engagement in development assistance through South-South cooperation mechanisms and innovative aid modalities, such as Trilateral Development Cooperation (TDC)<sup>1</sup> that involves a partnership between Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors and/or multilateral agencies and emerging countries to implement a development programme in a third recipient country (UN 2012). In this context, Brazilian technical cooperation has attracted increasing attention due to the originality of its projects in areas such agriculture, health and social development as well as the expansion of its portfolio to Portuguese-speaking nations in sub-Saharan Africa. Several studies have begun to look at the Brazilian development programmes to understand the motivations behind the government's development narrative (Cabral and Shankland 2013; Menezes and Ribeiro 2011; Saraiva 2010; Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007; Soares de Lima 2005), while others intend to compare Brazilian aid to other emerging countries or DAC donors (Chichava et al. 2013; Rowlands 2008; Manning 2006).

However, TDC, which plays an important role in Brazilian development assistance, particularly in Mozambique, the leading recipient country of Brazilian technical cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa, has been neglected by most analysts, with the exception of Abdenur (2007), Abdenur and Da Fonseca (2013), Cabral and Weinstock (2010), McEwan and Mawdsley (2012), Ayllón (2013) and Fingermann (2014). In general, the limited literature around South-South cooperation and TDC highlights the motivations of the partners to set this new type of institutional arrangement and the impact of it on the architecture of international aid. The literature surrounding Brazilian South-South cooperation might be divided into three perspectives – development partner (Saraiva 2012; 2010; Amorim 2010; 2003), imperialist (Clements and Fernandes 2013; Ferrando 2013; Curado 2010; Visenti 2010) and self-interest (Cabral and Shankland 2013; Nogueira and Ollinaho 2013; Menezes and Ribeiro 2011; Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007; Soares de Lima 2005). The literature regarding TDC is however split into two antagonist perspectives:

enthusiasts and sceptics (Abdenur and Da Fonseca 2013; Ayllón 2013; McEwan and Mawdsley 2012; Stahl 2012; Cabral and Weinstock 2010; Fordelone 2009; Abdenur 2007). For enthusiasts, TDC promotes a better cost-benefit relationship, complementarity and mutual exchange of know-how, which may reshape development cooperation towards a more equalitarian relationship (Ayllón 2013; Fordelone 2009). Sceptics argue that this modality may be a strategy adopted by traditional donors, either to undermine or to influence South-South cooperation's principles and practices, and further see it as a way to sustain traditional donors' legitimacy and credibility in the new geography of international aid (Abdenur and Da Fonseca 2013; McEwan and Mawdsley 2012).

Despite the efforts of the literature to define the motivations behind South-South cooperation and TDC agreements, there is still little evidence on their impact during the implementation process. As TDC is a relatively new modality of development assistance, empirical studies remain scarce. In particular, no study has ever attempted to identify empirically the motivations, ideas, values and practices of all different actors involved during the implementation process, so there is limited evidence on its impact and value from the recipient's country perspective and whether or not it functions as an effective "partnership" (McEwan and Mawdsley 2012: 1186). In order to narrow this gap, this research considers implementation as a complex social process, which goes beyond the motivations highlighted by the official discourse once actors have their own values and interests which are directly not associated to policymakers' interests. Inspired by recent studies developed by Mosse (2005;), Long (2002; 1999) and Buckley (2013; 2011), based on the actor-oriented approach, this article argues that one must look at the ground of the implementation process to analyse whether TDC may reshape the architecture of development aid and what its impacts are on partners, particularly to emerging donors such as Brazil, and its largest recipient country, Mozambique. The method applied in this paper has combined the observant participant and document analysis techniques, in addition to fifty-nine semi-structured interviews, most of which were conducted during a fieldwork in two ongoing TDC programmes developed by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC, in the Portuguese acronym) in the agricultural sector in Mozambique: ProALIMENTOS, a partnership between the Brazilian office of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), ABC and the Ministry of Agriculture of Mozambique (MINAG); and ProSAVANA, a partnership between the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), ABC and MINAG, from March to June 2013.

First, the paper discusses Brazil's official narrative which differentiates South-South from North-South as well as emphasises TDC as a strategic tool to enhance South-South principles in the international arena. Second, it introduces the theoretical framework adopted to understand the roles of different actors during the implementation process. Then, it presents the case of ProALIMENTOS and ProSAVANA. Finally, it concludes that the results of this research indicate that there is no single

model for TDC. As for the case of ProALIMENTOS, TDC may lead to complementary gains and transfer of know-how between partners, though it has facilitated overlapping of South-South cooperation practices by North-South. While the case of ProSAVANA highlights no complementary gain, once there are internal and external challenges involving the programme, this leads to two 'bilateral' programmes.

## Brazil's Trilateral Development Cooperation Narrative

Brazilian technical cooperation presents itself as a potential alternative to traditional donors' practices and is often used as a tool of diplomatic relations (Chichava et al. 2013). According to ABC, the government's institution responsible for technical cooperation, Brazilian guiding principles based on solidarity, demand-driven action and no interference in domestic issues distinguish South-South cooperation from North donors (ABC 2013). It introduces a mutual learning process between partners that enhances the benefits of its technical cooperation programmes. In addition, Brazil's government states that its local expertise and knowledge might fit better the needs of developing countries, as they were formed in a similar social context (Ibid).


This institutional narrative regarding Brazil's South-South cooperation is also highlighted by national leaders when they talk about the Trilateral Development Cooperation programmes (Abreu 2013; Ayllón 2013). For ABC's current Director, Fernando Abreu (2013), TDC holds several advantages over South-South initiatives, as it introduces an innovative approach in the international aid architecture that goes beyond North and South divisions. Furthermore, ABC believes that TDC maintains Brazil's guiding principles of solidarity, demand-driven action and non-interference in domestic issues, despite a clear distinction in financial resource allocation, as is shown in Table 1. Actually, ABC understands TDC as a

strategic tool to strengthen its South-South narrative, once traditional donors are obliged to adopt Brazilian's guiding principles, which 'represent a progress in relation to the traditional North-South cooperation, as they promote a horizontal perspective instead of a patronizing attitude'<sup>2</sup> (Abreu 2013: 13), as well as increase the country's institutional capacity by acknowledging local experience and rejecting donor's conditions.

Thus, Abreu has recently emphasised the government's interest in expanding this modality in terms of investments as it encourages 'the best use of financial resources, human resources and infrastructure' (Abreu 2013:12). According to him, TDC has significantly increased in ABC's portfolio, despite the substantial decrease in ABC's annual budget and number of ongoing projects since Dilma Rousseff assumed the presidency in 2011 (Abreu 2013). As of September 2013, for instance, ABC has registered 37 ongoing TDC projects, which corresponded to over US\$54m. Out of the total volume of financial resources, ABC has financed 45 percent (US\$24.3m), which represents a much higher figure than the US\$8.3m recorded in bilateral cooperation in the same year (Abreu 2013).

Moreover, it is important to note that most of TDC projects are in partnership with DAC donors, even though the government claims that there is a growing interest in expansion of agreements within the United Nations agencies. Japan, which is the oldest partner in this modality, still represents the main ABC partner (23.6 percent), followed by Germany (6.2 percent), the United States (3.8 percent), Italy (3.8 percent), Spain (1.3 percent) and Switzerland (1.3 percent). The Japanese leadership in this modality is related to two features: a large number of ongoing projects involving the Third Country Training Program;<sup>3</sup> and the magnitude of ProSAVANA. The growth of partnerships with other bilateral donors is associated with historical ties built in the 60s and 70s, as well as the international community's interest in this type of aid.

Figure 1: Ongoing TDC projects (as of September 2013)



Source: Abreu (2013)

In general, ABC highlights TDC as a tool to decrease the gap between traditional donors and emerging donors, which is in line with the enthusiast's perspective, and follows the premises discussed and supported in the Paris Declaration (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (2011) (Ayllón 2013). The agency also claims that the three-way dialogue contributes to a new architecture of development cooperation, as it rejects the hypotheses brought up by sceptics, in which TDC is seen as a potential Northern instrument to undermine the South-South approach (Abdenur and Da Fonseca 2013; McEwan and Mawdsley 2012). In sum, ABC suggests that TDC might enhance South-South cooperation guiding principles in the international arena and improve aid effectiveness by promoting better practices between the partners.

## The theoretical framework

In spite of ABC's emphasising of the positive motivations behind its South-South cooperation and TDC (ABC 2013; Abreu 2013), the literature around Brazilian technical cooperation has identified that the government's engagement in this field is not purely based on altruism as some authors have advocated (Saraiva 2012; 2010; Amorim 2003). The case of ProSAVANA, a trilateral agreement between JICA and ABC in Mozambique, further studied in this research, has been called into question by several analysts who aimed at identifying why the Brazilian government has decided to invest in such a large agriculture programme in Mozambique – but without considering what the reasons behind the TDC agreement were.

For example, Nogueira and Ollinaho (2013: 15), on the one hand, affirm that ProSAVANA might not be considered a successful programme, as the government has not properly followed guiding principles expressed in its own official discourse. For them, the case of ProSAVANA shows that the limited operational capacity of ABC to support South-South principles may allow Brazilian private sector interests to take the lead over the programme. Clements and Fernandes (2013), on the other hand, state that ProSAVANA is part of former President Lula's foreign policy, which 'has strongly supported the acquisition of lands on the Latin American Continent' and aims to expand this policy to countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Clements and Fernandes 2012: 6). Meanwhile, Funada-Classen (2013a; 2013b) claims that ProSAVANA is in line with Japanese foreign policy that promotes international land grabbing to guarantee the country's food security issues. Hence, the motivations behind ProSAVANA may seem to be either self-interested (Funada-Classen 2013a; 2013b; Nogueira and Ollinaho 2013) or imperialistic (Clements and Fernandes 2013; Mello 2013).

In accordance with this perspective, Mozambican and international organised civil society groups such as *União Nacional de Camponeses* (UNAC), *Justiça Ambiental*, Livangingo and Friends of the Earth International, among

others, have published an Open Letter addressed to the Heads of State of the three involved countries, which indicates the lack of participation in the design of ProSAVANA and emphasises the controversies between the Brazilian narrative and ProSAVANA's implementation process. Like the above authors, civil society organisations argue that several foreign agribusiness companies installed in Nacala Corridor have promoted land conflict, suggesting that either these investments are associated with ProSAVANA or that land grabbing conflicts might increase when large Brazilian agribusiness investors acquire their DUAT in the area, the state-granted land use right.

This gloomy scenario around ProSAVANA that focuses on identifying the motivations behind the growth of Brazilian South-South cooperation, but does not provide any clue on the motivations, ideas and values of other actors involved during the implementation process, might provide a pale portrayal of the current architecture of development cooperation. It does not consider a more complex analysis of the context and assumes that public policy follows a linear process, in which the motivations of policymakers are the same that one might find among actors on the ground. In fact, this is related to two features. First, most studies on Brazilian technical cooperation have attempted to examine the patterns in Brazilian foreign policy through a historical perspective (Menezes and Ribeiro 2011; Saraiva 2010; Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007; Soares de Lima 2005). Second, just a few researchers have conducted extensive field research on ongoing projects, in which their goal is to move beyond the traditional public policy paradigm that tends to adopt an instrumental view of policy (Ekman and Macamo 2014; Fingermaun 2014; 2013; Cabral and Shankland 2013).

In addition, it is worth mentioning that the literature concerning TDC has a similar challenge. Despite the assumptions brought up by enthusiasts and sceptics, one may notice that there are scarce empirical studies around this topic that have identified whether this modality represents a proper shift in the architecture of international aid, building up a more equalitarian relationship between partners as well as improving aid effectiveness through a better exchange of know-how and complementarity. In fact, no research has ever attempted to look at the several aspects involving Brazilian trilateral agreements, as the limited literature on ProSAVANA, for instance, has neglected to consider the hypotheses carried by the TDC's analysts, since they have only focused on one side of the coin, either Brazil or Japan. In other words, there is no research trying to understand how the relationship between North-South and South-South might reflect on the recipient's perspective about Brazilian cooperation.

In order to fill up this gap in the literature, this paper analyses two trilateral projects in the agricultural sector in Mozambique – ProALIMENTOS and ProSAVANA – through the lens of an actor-oriented approach, which understands policy as a complex social process in which actors constantly interact in the arena (Buckley 2013; Mosse 2005; Long 2002; 1999). From this perspective,

the instrumental view of policy that neglects the agency of actors to transform social process is not sufficient to comprehend development interventions, which must be regarded as a 'battlefield of ideas' between social actors, one in which 'knowledge emerges as a product of the interaction and dialogue between specific actors' (Long and Villarreal 1998: 42). Therefore, the actor-oriented approach focuses on the micro level of analysis and calls for an extensive fieldwork to identify the ideas and values of social actors that might transform political discourse.

However, this focus on the micro level does not deny that the meso and macro levels may reflect on the relations of power and knowledge of actors during the negotiation process. To properly address these other levels, this research draws a multilevel framework that identifies not only the 'battlefield of ideas', but also involves an analysis of institutional capacity, including human and financial resources, as meso level and historical ties between actors and the political and economic context as macro level. Thus, through a comparative case study in Mozambique, I intend to discover not just how the negotiation process between those different social actors are undertaken on the ground, but also seek to answer the main question put by the TDC literature: Has TDC changed the dynamics of development cooperation?

## **Brazil in Mozambique: a new emerging donor with old partners**

Although Brazil's presence in Mozambique as a donor is quite recent, this country represents the top ABC recipient and shows that TDC is a significant trend in Brazilian technical cooperation, considering that a third of ongoing projects are run on the basis of trilateral agreements (ABC 2013). In the agricultural sector, the largest sector (19 percent) of ABC in which the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) dominates most of the portfolio of technical cooperation, this modality represents six out of eight ongoing projects, as can be seen in Table 1 (ABC 2013; Abreu 2013; Cabral and Shankland 2013; Magalhães 2008).

Out of the six TDC agreements, I have chosen two ongoing TDC projects in partnership with DAC donors: ProALIMENTOS, a partnership between ABC, USAID-Brazil and MINAG; and ProSAVANA-PI, a partnership between ABC, JICA and MINAG. The research has only focused on ProSAVANA-PI due to the fact that part of the programme involved Embrapa as in the case of ProALIMENTOS, and on the struggle to access ProSAVANA-PD and ProSAVANA-PEM. Plataforma, a partnership between ABC, USAID-Mozambique and MINAG, and the two other projects related to JICA's Third Country Training Program were excluded, as the former had already finished the main activities and the latter consisted of training activities undertaken in Brazil.

In order to understand these projects, one may need to comprehend the political relations between USAID and ABC, JICA and ABC as well as USAID and Mozambique,

JICA and Mozambique, and ABC and Mozambique. The relations between Brazil and both DAC donors, JICA and USAID, are based on longstanding partnership, although the reasons that lie behind both are quite different. USAID began to provide aid to Brazil in 1962 as a way to strengthen US geopolitical interests in the region. The agency has played an important role in several sectors, such as health, education, food security, sanitation and the environment. During the 1960s and 1970s, when Brazil's military government was politically aligned to the interests of the United States government, USAID focused on strengthening national institutions and Embrapa was 'one of the most significant institutions to receive USAID assistance' for increasing its research capabilities (USAID 2014). JICA, on other hand, officially started to give assistance to Brazil in 1976, but the Brazil-Japan relations have emerged previously due to the need to strengthen ties between these countries, as Brazil has the largest Japanese community outside Japan. Like USAID, JICA has played a relevant role in the agricultural sector, especially through Embrapa, as it has funded PRODECER (Japan-Brazil Agricultural Development Cooperation Program), which may have inspired the trilateral agreement further discussed here, ProSAVANA. However, currently both DAC donors have suppressed their financial assistance to Brazil, as they recognise the country's economic ascent and desire to provide aid to other, poorer countries. Therefore both agencies have decided to collaborate with their old recipient partner through trilateral programmes, such as ProALIMENTOS and ProSAVANA.

In regard to the political relationship with Mozambique, one must take into account the fact that USAID has built strong ties with the Mozambican government since 1984 and often appears as one of the largest bilateral donors in the country (OCDE 2013; USAID 2014), whereas the Japanese agency is a newer player in the Mozambican aid system, officially opening the Japanese Embassy in 2000 and JICA's office in 2003 (JICA 2014). Brazil-Mozambique political relationships started during Geisel's government (1974-1979), who pursued an independent foreign policy, opening the Embassy of Brazil in Mozambique in 1976, just a year after the country's independence (Saraiva 2012). Since then, Brazil-Mozambique relationships have been through many ups and downs, but in the last decade, since Lula's administration, these relations have substantially grown and ABC has significantly increased its technical cooperation programme in the country. However, ABC's cooperation still represents a much lower figure than the one provided by traditional donors like USAID and JICA.

In order to analyse the implementation process of these two TDC projects, this research was based on a mix of qualitative techniques, including observant participation, semi-structured interviews and document analysis. The observant participation and the fifty-nine semi-structured interviews were mainly conducted during the period I lived in Mozambique, from March to June 2013, while the document analysis was a continuous process carried out in the last two years. The interviews included a range of different social actors, from high-level

Table 1: ABC's Technical Cooperation Agreements in the agriculture sector in Mozambique.				
Project name		Financial resources allocated by each partner	Total Budget	Timeframe
<b>Trilateral Projects</b>				
Plataforma		USAID - Mozambique - US\$ 2,500,000	US\$ 14,688,802	50 months
		ABC - US\$ 4,208,802		
		EMBRAPA - US\$ 7,940,000		
		MINAG - US\$ 40,000		
ProALIMENTOS		USAID - Brazil - US\$ 1,102,887	US\$2,406,724	2 years
		ABC - US\$ 577,295		
		EMBRAPA - US\$519,200		
		MINAG - 300,000		
ProSAVANA	PD	JICA - US\$ 6,264,000	US\$7,723,370	24 months
		ABC - US\$ 1,159,370		
		MINAG - 300,000		
	PI	JICA - US\$ 7,317,000	US\$ 13,483,840	5 years
		ABC - US\$ 3,672,960		
		EMBRAPA - US\$ 1,356,280		
		MINAG - 1,137,600		
	PEM	not available	to be defined	6 years
	International Brazil Nut Training		not available	not available
International Vegetable Production Training		not available	not available	5 years
<b>Trilateral Projects with Multilateral Agencies</b>				
PRONAE		ABC - US\$ 537,980	US\$ 1,704,455	2 years
		FNDE - US\$ 61 400		
		PMA - US\$ 1,037,000		
		MINED - US\$ 68,075		
<b>Bilateral Projects</b>				
More food African Program		not available	US\$ 97,590,000	not available
Banco de Semetes(Native seeds Program)		not available	US\$ 363,500	3 years

Source: Based on information received from ABC (personal communication), Cooperation agreements, JICA (2013) and Nogueira and Ollinaho (2013).

policymakers to low-level technicians, involving always the three parties and the specialised institutions, as shown in Table 2. I have presented the interviewees by number in order to protect the identity of all informants (Annex I: List of Interviews) and highlighted the fact that interviews have played a more important role to comprehend the design of both projects, as well as the policymakers' motivations to adopt a TDC approach instead of a bilateral one. The observant participation, on the other hand, was key to identify the negotiation process between all different actors –researchers, technicians, policymakers and others stakeholders – during the implementation, providing useful insights to TDC literature.

## Case Study I: ProALIMENTOS

### I. Overview

ProALIMENTOS, fully named '*Projeto de Apoio Técnico aos Programas de Nutrição e Segurança Alimentar de Moçambique*', is the first trilateral agreement signed between ABC, USAID-Brazil and Mozambican Agriculture Ministry (MINAG) in 2011, after the ratification of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Brazil and United States for the Implementation of Technical Cooperation Activities in Third Countries on 3 March 2010 (MRE-SCI 2013).

**Table 2: Summary of the Interviews**

Nationality	Government Institutions					Specialized Institutions								other stakeholders	Total
	Donors			Receipts		Donors				Receipts				NGOs/ Entrepreneurs /Researchers /International Organizations	
	MRE & ABC	USAID	JICA	MINAG	Other Local Ministries	EMBRAPA		FGVProjetos	JICARS	MSU	UF	IIAM			
Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	Group*	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	Group**	Individual		
Brazilian	6	1	1			3	2	3	1		1			3	21
North - America		2								2	1				5
Japanese			1						1						2
Mozambican		1			27	1				1		10	1	6	29
Others														2	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>59</b>

\*One group consisted of three people, the other of four people; \*\* Group of three people. Source: Fieldwork

This project is not as well-known as the ProSAVANA programme and the budget allocated for the implementation, US\$2.4m, is smaller than other trilateral projects in the agricultural sector in Mozambique, as can be seen in Table 1. Yet it is worth noting that ProALIMENTOS is considered a benchmark for Brazilian TDC, as it brings to the ground specialised institutions of the three countries – the University of Florida (UF) and Michigan State University (MSU) on behalf of USAID-Brazil; Embrapa on behalf of ABC; and the Agricultural Research Institute of Mozambique (IIAM) on behalf of MINAG – and has a balanced distribution of financial resources, even though the agreement determines that USAID-Brazil is responsible for the purchase of equipment and machinery, while ABC covers the travel expenses of Embrapa and Embrapa and IIAM pay for the technical hours of their own researchers and technicians. The main project’s goal is to increase horticulture production and enhance the capacity of small local farmers located in the *cinturão verde* (green zones) around Maputo by three integrated activities: conducting socioeconomic research, strengthening local farmers’ production and providing post-harvest capacity and training.

## II. Partners in Design?

The activities of ProALIMENTOS, however, were not design by the three parties involved in the project; nor by policymakers who strongly support the initiative. In fact, the idea of this project emerged from a group of researchers from IIAM and Embrapa who were working together in another project in the same area, who then introduced it to ABC, who has negotiated the agreement with USAID-Brazil. Thus, one can say that this project has followed ABC’s principles of demand-driven action, but it has not strictly followed this premise, since its ideas emerged from a debate between IIAM and Embrapa, not including the future North-South partner in its initial discussions.


Yet for ABC’s policymakers, ProALIMENTOS represented a stimulating proposal: it would permit the expansion of Brazil’s guiding principles and practices in Mozambique, as well as facilitate the execution of a trilateral project with USAID-Brazil, who had already shown interest in collaborating in TDC through the Memorandum of Understanding in 2010 and the design of a Guidelines for TDC in 2011 (Interviewee 3, ABC). For USAID-Brazil ProALIMENTOS was easily accepted, as it symbolises an opportunity to the agency to maintain its geopolitical influence in emerging economies like Brazil by the maintenance of its local office even when it has not been providing any type of aid to the country (Interviewee 46, USAID-Brazil).

In addition, USAID-Brazil highlights that ProALIMENTOS was positively seen by the US government leaders due to its close relation to the Feed the Future initiative, which proposes to accelerate growth in the agricultural sector of 19 selected countries, including Mozambique, through the development of partnerships with ‘strategic middle income countries’, such as Brazil, South Africa and India. For interviewee 46, for instance, Brazil’s knowledge in tropical agriculture, especially within Embrapa, which is recognised as a well-organised and qualified research centre in the study of tropical seeds, has attracted attention from North American research institutions to work in this project (Interviewee 46, USAID-Brazil). Nevertheless, the North American institution selected first by USAID-Brazil, the University of Florida (after which it partnered with the University of Michigan) was not able to participate in the initial design of the project (Interviewee 21, Embrapa). This lack of participation delayed the implementation of ProALIMENTOS for one year, as the North American institutions required a new round of discussion in order to include their own interests in policy texts. As Mosse (2005: 39) affirms, ‘development policy texts, then, are both the outcome of social process of enrolment, persuasion and dispute, and contain contradictions’.

### III. Implementation: North-South meets South-South cooperation

Since I arrived at the Estação Agrária de Umbeluzi of IIAM, located in Boane next to Maputo, I noticed quite a positive environment between the partners, unlike the one I have found during my fieldwork visits to ProSAVANA's experiments. My positive perception was related to the following features: first, all researchers and technicians involved in the project spoke fluent Portuguese; second, most of them have known each other from earlier projects or have been indirectly connected to Embrapa; third, UF has involved former Embrapa researchers in the project; and fourth, a previous network of professional relations has mitigated conflicts during the implementation as they all were well aware of Embrapa's philosophy and practices, as well as of Brazilian culture (Interviewee 44; Interviewee 55). So, according to Long's (2002; 2001) assumption 'the battlefields of knowledge' could be diminished by previous network and cultural ties among social actors.

Figure 2: ProALIMENTOS' Professional Network



Source: Fieldwork

Nonetheless, these features did not completely avoid some 'battlefields of knowledge' that I have seen during my fieldwork visits. Different social actors have performed 'battles', which have emerged around competing views and approaches. The first battlefield that has deeply impacted on the implementation process was substantial differences in managerial practices between donor agencies and their local institutional capacity, USAID and ABC. While USAID gives autonomy to UF and MSU to manage financial resources and has a large staff in Mozambique to support all operations, ABC has only one person allocated in Mozambique to run a slow bureaucratic process, which requires that every financial expenditure of Embrapa gets approved by its operating intermediary – the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Brazil. Such managerial tensions have reflected on the project's activities, especially the conduct of socioeconomic research included later by UF in the policy texts to be coordinated by MSU. MSU's members have not understood the shortcomings of Brazilian South-South cooperation and decided to start this activity with IIAM's team by sending a group of scientists to the project area in April 2011, not waiting

for Embrapa's members. The result of this decision was an increase of tensions between North-South and South-South partners. Although MSU and IIAM have written a short report to involve Embrapa's researchers in the next steps of this activity, Interviewee 18 says it was not well accepted by Embrapa's researchers as they interpreted it as a top down attitude:

I guess it came off as 'hey guys, here is what we are going to do' and I didn't mean it that way, but that's how it came off. After going back and reading it again I can see how it could be interpreted in that way. So it wasn't received all that well. I think that was a mix of, you know, you have got Latino America and Tio Sam, you've got that whole thing. (Interviewee 18, MSU)

In order to avoid situations like this one, MSU and UF have decided to change their strategy and wait for ABC's approval to run the next fieldwork mission alongside Embrapa. According to interviewees 18 (MSU) and 58 (UF), this shift in strategy was positive for the implementation process as it has allowed UF and MSU to properly exchange know-how with Embrapa, particularly in tropical agriculture.

In terms of agricultural management, Embrapa and UF-MSU have adopted a similar approach in the production component. Although all institutions agreed that agricultural experiments should have been performed at IIAM's Estação Agrária de Umbeluzi before transferring the knowledge to local farmers and IIAM researchers alongside selected Mozambican students who were profoundly involved in this activity, there were competing views on agricultural management that were not easily accepted by local researchers. For example, IIAM participants, even the two of them who had studied and worked in Brazil, have not easily accepted their partners' proposal to enhance local production through a complete shift in the soil compost, which could exclude an industrial, imported soil compost called Agromix. Thus, both partners had to negotiate with IIAM to add organic compost to Agromix; at the same time, they would keep its use for the production of seedlings, as is shown in dialogue below:

**IIAM researcher:** One thing that has changed the results was the shift in soil compost for the production of seedlings. The first mission of Embrapa has identified that Agromix, industrial compost used for the production of seedlings, was too light. There was no density. So, they looked up the package and it was not included what the components were. Then, we all went to check with the local sellers, but they did not have this information as well. Thus, we concluded that we should add new components on it, so we added organic compost, organic fertilisers, like livestock manure and ashes, to prevent the spreading of diseases, NPK 12-84-12, a chemical fertiliser available here and river sand to increase porosity. After that, the production of seedlings has substantially increased and mixing these components with Agromix has decreased the

expenditure of local farmers, once a package of Agromix yields the double.

**USAID visitor:** But, why do you need Agromix?

**IIAM researcher:** Agromix is an industrial product, imported from South Africa. It is good, but we need to add some stuff to increase its nutrients.

**USAID visitor:** Have you ever tried this compost without Agromix?

**IIAM researcher:** No. It would not have the same result, but it might be worth trying.

This negotiation process shows that another battlefield has arisen from competing views during the implementation, but it also demonstrates that teamwork has been very integral to increasing agriculture production and exchanging knowledge among all actors. From this perspective, one could conclude that ProALIMENTOS has been a successful TDC project and the Brazilian TDC narrative has been able to put in place a more equalitarian relationship in terms of exchange of knowledge and distribution of power. However, this hypothesis has not been confirmed during the fieldwork. This fact does not deny good results achieved in the project, nor the real exchange of knowledge between partners, but it shows that the analysis is not as simple as black and white. Although the South-South narrative has positively influenced ProALIMENTOS, the participation of Northern partners has also impacted on the way it has been implemented. For instance, interviewees 58 (UF) and 31 (Embrapa) affirm that the participation of IIAM is not only related to this horizontal approach, but it is also influenced by an additional payment provided by Northern institutions to IIAM's researchers. Then, the same interviewees state that this practice is quite common in Mozambique, where government wages in the public sector are very low.

Nevertheless, the Brazilian government's official discourse criticises this type of practice, as it may lead to a counterproductive cycle for development. Indeed, the fact that Brazilian technical cooperation accepts this type of practice demonstrates that TDC can 'co-opt emerging donors into a depoliticized and ineffective aid system' (McEwan and Mawdsley 2012: 1185), as argued by some sceptical authors. Such practice incentivises the continuity of the development industry, called by Ferguson (2009) the 'anti-politics machine of development'. Rather than local researchers fight for better payment conditions in the public sector they tend to look for another project to maintain their financial gains or a job in well-paid international institution like USAID, promoting 'internal brain drain'. In sum, ProALIMENTOS might effectively increase the knowledge of local researchers of IIAM, but they may not be able to transfer this knowledge to local farmers after the project ends, as MINAG does not provide any type of financial incentive to IIAM and its researchers (Interviewee 12, IIAM).

With regard to the recipient's perspective, it is worth mentioning that this case study shows that although IIAM researchers have a positive view about TDC agreements as they are able to gather knowledge from both partners, they consider that Brazil's narrative is not more equalitarian than the North's narrative. Like the

**Figure 3: Municipalities of Nacala Corridor included in ProSAVANA**



Source: Master Plan ProSAVANA

Northern partners, Brazil has not included in the project's goals a strategy to transfer knowledge of seed production. In other words, Embrapa has just taught how IIAM could reproduce open-pollinated seeds, but not how they could produce their own seeds through the use of local material (Interviewee 12, IIAM; Interviewee 51, MSU). Thus, they conclude that the most important advantages of Brazil are language, common colonial historical background and cultural ties that facilitate communication between partners and accelerate negotiation during the implementation (Interviewees 5; 12; 13; 32; 35, IIAM).

## Case Study II: ProSAVANA

### I. Overview

The Triangular Cooperation Program for Agricultural Development of the African Tropical Savannah in Mozambique, usually called ProSAVANA, is a partnership between ABC, JICA and MINAG, based on the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the three governments in September 2009 and the Japan-Brazil Partnership Program<sup>4</sup> (2000). This very well-known programme is the largest project in ABC's portfolio, comprising US\$21.1m, with an estimated investment of US\$36.2m, as can be seen in Table 1.

The aim of ProSAVANA is to develop new agricultural models in Nacala Corridor, which involves 19 municipalities located in the provinces of Niassa, Zambezia and Nampula, by integrating large-scale foreign investments with small- and medium-scale local farmers. In order to achieve its main goal, the programme consists of three interconnected components: ProSAVANA-PD (March 2012 to 2014), ProSAVANA-PI (April 2011 to March 2016) and ProSAVANA-PEM (May 2013 to May 2019). At the stage of this research, I was

only able to closely interact with ProSAVANA-PI, as ProSAVANA-PD had almost finished its activities and ProSAVANA-PEM has not begun yet.

ProSAVANA-PD is the formulation of an overall strategy for the development of the agricultural sector in the Nacala Corridor, designed by FGV Projetos, contracted by ABC, with Oriental Consultants Co. Ltd., NTC International Co. Ltd. and Task Co. Ltd., hired by JICA, and MINAG. ProSAVANA-PI involves agricultural technology transfer by improving local research capacity through several activities executed by Embrapa on behalf of ABC and the Japan International Research Center for Agricultural Sciences (JICARS) on behalf of JICA, in cooperation with IIAM. ProSAVANA-PEM seeks to strengthen the quality of agricultural extension services by promoting trainings and activities with technicians of the public and private sector with the support of the Brazilian institutions *Associação Brasileira de Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural* (ASBRAER), *Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Rural* (SENAR) and the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA); the Japanese companies NTC Internacional Co., Lda., Oriental Consultants Co., Ltd. and IC-Net Ltd.; and in cooperation with the Mozambican National Directorate for Agricultural Extension (DNEA).

## II. Policy design: demand-driven?

The design of ProSAVANA has been discussed by many analysts who have attempted to understand how a programme inspired by PRODECER<sup>5</sup> would impact on the Mozambican land system (Clements and Fernandes 2013; Mello 2013). However, the comparison between policy texts of ProSAVANA and PRODECER has led to misinterpretations about the programme instead of providing useful information on its progress (Ekman and Macamo 2014). In addition, the fact that the conception of ProSAVANA emerged from conversations involving the former Brazilian President Lula and the former Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso during the G-8 Summit Meeting in L'Aquila, without the Mozambican government, has been sufficient to discredit the programme as not purely demand-driven (Nogueira and Ollinaho 2013).

Although the initial design of ProSAVANA has not, in truth, included Mozambican authorities as required by Brazilian guiding principles, it is worth highlighting that the final policy text has included local government interests, aligning ProSAVANA's goals to PEDSA, Mozambique's Strategic Plan for Agricultural Development (2010-2019). This Mozambican strategy states that the government's main goal is to rapidly accelerate production in the agricultural sector in order to improve the country's food security by associating large private sector investments with small and medium-scale farmers. Moreover, interviewee 57 from MINAG affirms that several Mozambican policymakers have participated in the policy texts debate. According to the same interviewee, many people from MINAG have visited Brazil to understand in what way PRODECER's experience could contribute to ProSAVANA's proposal.

Thus, unlike ProALIMENTOS where the main idea emerged from those who would execute the programme, ProSAVANA is a programme that has arisen from a discussion between high-level policymakers, and the programme's idea has then been introduced to low-level technocrats of the three countries. This fact has generated a completely different environment between partners during the implementation process, as can be seen in the next section. Furthermore, one must consider that ProSAVANA's policy text differs significantly from ProALIMENTOS's in terms of distribution of financial resources. In this case, ABC is responsible for purchasing the materials and equipment used by Embrapa, while JICA must purchase the supplies for the Japanese team. According to ABC's policymakers, this new scheme of

**Figure 4: Field Experiment at IIAM's Northwest Zonal Centre in the city of Lichinga**



Source: Fieldwork

TDC may strengthen Brazilian South-South cooperation's guiding principles as it might expand ABC's coordination capacity and permit the provision of financial cooperation through the construction of a Multi-Use Agricultural Laboratory in Lichinga (Interviewees 46; 56, ABC). At the same time, this agreement is important for Japanese leaders, as ProSAVANA enhances JICA's legitimacy in African countries and improves JICARS's knowledge of tropical agriculture by promoting the exchange of knowledge between North-South-South partners (Interviewee 53, JICA; Interviewee 54, JICARS).

## III. Implementation: Opposing practices and Independent projects

The case study of ProSAVANA reinforces the need to address development interventions through the lens of an actor-oriented approach as it visibly shows that the actors' values and ideas are not directly connected to policymakers' goals, even when policymakers build institutional arrangements to integrate different views, such as the creation of the Joint Technical Committee that aimed at joining researchers and technicians of Embrapa, JICARS and IIAM involved in ProSAVANA-PI.

Contrasting the environment I found in ProALIMENTOS, where specialised institutions of the three countries were working side by side, my visits to ProSAVANA-PI have revealed that two separated 'bilateral' projects were underway in the Northwest Zonal Centre of IIAM in the city of Lichinga and the Northeast Zonal Centre in the city of Nampula. Rather than Embrapa and JICARS working together to boost the exchange of knowledge between partners, they have officially established two separated field experiments and IIAM has designated

different researchers and technicians to work with each partner. For example, Figure 4 illustrates the lack of communication and integration between Embrapa and JICARS, ABC and JICA and also ABC and Embrapa, as the sign does not include either the logo of JICA or ABC.

Additionally, interviewee 16 from IIAM states that 'there is an overlap in the test of soil fertility managed by Embrapa and JICARS. Both institutions are doing the same thing instead of harmonizing the trials ... It doesn't make any sense'. Interviewee 1 from Embrapa argues, 'if ProSAVANA is a trilateral project, the Japanese and Brazilian institutions should be working together to promote a greater result to the beneficiary institution – IIAM'. Thus, from the recipients' perspective a trilateral project like ProSAVANA is not an effective arrangement. IIAM's researchers explain that ProSAVANA-PI has not provided a greater exchange of knowledge and complementarity, as one would expect. Neither has it reduced costs or improved expenditures of the partners (Interviewee 16, IIAM Nampula).

In reality, Embrapa and JICARS have not been able to exchange any type of information as each one of them had a different perspective on project management, so JICARS has not been able to take advantage of this partnership to rapidly increase its knowledge in tropical agriculture as was expected by JICA's policymakers. The lack of integration between Japan and Brazil in ProSAVANA-PI may be related to a cultural battlefield arising from different values and ideas. On one hand, Embrapa understood that JICARS was unwilling to integrate with Brazilians, as JICARS's researchers have not shared their materials and equipment when Embrapa needed, and they have also not shown up to social activities, such as a barbecue organised by Embrapa's team in Lichinga (Interviewees 1; 31, Embrapa). On the other hand, JICARS affirmed that there was a straight division of roles and activities in ProSAVANA's policy texts, which clearly indicated who was responsible for the purchase of materials and equipment of each partner. In other words, for Embrapa, JICARS as a partner should demonstrate sympathy to Brazilian colleagues and help them, despite the fact that ABC is who should officially address Embrapa's demands. Whereas for JICARS, this attitude was completely mistaken, as policy texts were very clear about the Japanese responsibilities and schedule.

Additionally, I observed another type of battle between Embrapa and IIAM. In spite of the common language and similar historical ties, IIAM's team has not participated in the field experiments as much as they have done in ProALIMENTOS. In fact, local researchers have participated more actively in Embrapa trials in Lichinga than in Nampula. Actually, in Nampula Embrapa has received a tiny share of support from IIAM's team, as most of them have chosen to collaborate with JICARS. Like many other traditional donors in Mozambique, I realised that JICARS has provided an additional financial support to IIAM's researchers and technicians, principally in Nampula where JICARS has allocated full-time permanent staff. Embrapa, on the other side, has not adopted this practice in ProSAVANA-PI in both places,

but in the city of Lichinga the Brazilian side has been able to involve IIAM's researchers more due to the following features. First, Embrapa was the only institution to assign a permanent researcher there. Second, this researcher of Embrapa was a Mozambican agronomist, who was well aware of the mechanisms of Mozambican bureaucracy. Third, as a Mozambican, the agronomist understood local needs and knew how to deal with local culture, despite the fact that IIAM's researchers constantly called into question Brazilian guiding principles by demanding financial cooperation.

Brazil is more involved in technical cooperation. That is ok, but when we try to talk about financial cooperation, Brazil is not able to give us a proper answer ... but if we want to discuss this trilateral agreement in all spheres of the programme, we need to talk about financial cooperation as well. (Interviewee 10, MINAG)

Mozambicans have put us under pressure to provide financial cooperation ... but I am from Embrapa, not ABC. I don't have the financial resources to do it. (Interviewee 31, Embrapa)

Hence, for IIAM researchers' financial cooperation through an additional payment on salary is not counterproductive, but is part of the development industry. In a highly aid dependent country like Mozambique (Castel-Branco 2011; Hanlon 2004), Brazil's guiding principles that claim for a horizontal relationship might not make a lot of sense. For Mozambican policymakers, Brazil should provide financial cooperation like any other donor if the partner wishes to be taken seriously. JICA's policymakers also emphasise this claim, as they argue that ABC's institutional constraints to providing financial cooperation may undermine the project's progress (Interviewee 53, JICA). And Embrapa's researchers state that ABC should have organised itself to be able to 'purchase the material and equipment that we need on the ground' (Interviewee 31, Embrapa), as 'the image of Brazil is at risk, it is not only the image of Embrapa or ABC' (Interviewee 1, Embrapa). So, in the case of ProSAVANA, there is a significant pressure in ABC to comply with financial cooperation, either in cash or in material, assumed in the policy texts, and the fact that ABC is unable to comply with it has directly impacted on ProSAVANA-PI.

In a general sense, the ProSAVANA-PI scenario is completely different from that of ProALIMENTOS, even though cultural ties between Brazil and Mozambique, particularly a common language, have played a relevant role in the process of negotiating arenas of knowledge and power. In truth, the ProSAVANA case shows the complexity of social relations and the need to look at actors in the field in order to understand TDC. As can be seen, the lack of horizontal relations and reciprocity between donor countries demonstrate that several premises established by TDC literature are misguided. Lastly, this paper verifies that the TDC model as a whole is compromised in the case of ProSAVANA, once the project is seen as two 'bilateral' projects.

## Conclusions

A comparison of these two case studies permits us to identify whether TDC has led to a shift in the architecture of international development cooperation. Through an analysis of the macro- and meso-factors that might reflect on the negotiation process during the implementation, this research has demonstrated that TDC is far from that which was proposed in ABC's official documents and in specific projects. By analysing the manner in which the actors relate and build relationships of power and knowledge, it becomes quite clear that TDC does not represent a break in North-South and South-South borders within the international system's structure, as there is no single model for TDC. In the case of ProALIMENTOS, for example, the network of professional relations and cultural ties between actors are factors that help in overcoming the institutional barriers erected by ABC. As such, one may see greater flexibility among counterparts in seeking a working model that includes the interests of all parties. This however ensures that North-South practices dominate South-South practices, due to the Brazilian agreement to the additional salary. This fact may indicate that which McEwan and Mawdsley (2012) call a coopting of South-South cooperation in accordance with North-South practices, which may produce a removal of politics from South-South Cooperation, leading to complete adherence to the practices of the international development industry.

As for ProSAVANA, however, project delays due to ABC's institutional weakness create a completely different scenario, marked by a complete lack of integration between parties. As such, many of the actors interviewed stated that ProSAVANA appears to be two separate projects rather than a trilateral project, in that actions do not complement each other in any way and the exchange of knowledge between field actors is limited to the bilateral sphere. Nonetheless, the lack of integration between parties led to redundancy in activities, with two different agricultural experiments. Furthermore, the lack of flexibility shown by JICA in awaiting Brazilian cooperation led many to believe that JICA's main motivation in this ProSAVANA partnership with Brazil was the possible increase in legitimacy stemming from working with a South-South partner with an excellent image among beneficiaries, even if the image has been sullied as a result of the negative repercussions that ProSAVANA has generated in local and international media.

TDC, however, does not promote only that which enthusiasts and sceptics propose. There are cases, such as that of ProALIMENTOS, in which the model allows for complementary actions and increases the exchange of knowledge (Ayllón 2013; McEwan and Mawdsley 2012; Fordelone 2009), while also leading to Northern practices dominating those of their Southern counterparts. At the same time, there are cases such as ProSAVANA, in which TDC has become a practically inefficient instrument, incapable of promoting any form of complementary activities. In political terms, this model may work to

increase the legitimacy of Northern countries in underdeveloped nations, as is the case of the relationship between JICA and ABC in ProSAVANA.

Therefore, TDC may provide gains and risks in North-South and South-South Cooperation. This depends, clearly, on how the partnership is created. In Brazil's case, one might say that the technical cooperation system must be reformed, with the creation of a legal framework, given that the country's efforts to increase credibility within the international system through three party agreements have been shown by analysis to have exactly the opposite effect, and given that a failure to comply with planned activities has a negative effect on relationships with countries both from the North and the South. For the case of DAC donors, like USAID and JICA, TDC might increase credibility in the recipient country, which could facilitate the implementation process. As well, TDC can be seen as a strategic tool adopted by DAC donors in order to strengthen ties with emerging donors like Brazil, thus keeping its capacity of influence in the international aid system.

Finally, from the recipient's perspective, both projects have shown that cultural ties between Brazil and Mozambique, particularly the language, are cited by beneficiaries as improving the learning process. It is also important to note, however, that Brazilian cooperation often relies too heavily on cultural ties during implementation – which is to say that executing Embrapa members are often unaware of the particularities of the African continent. Technicians sent on missions run by both projects, for example, note that they were never trained in local culture and many were quite surprised with women's roles in rural area. Furthermore, a comparison of both projects has demonstrated that TDC is only considered as a win-win relationship when all the three parties are well integrated and adopt similar practices to execute the project, independently of cultural ties.

## End Notes

- 1 'Trilateral' and 'Triangular' Development Cooperation are used synonymously here, although authors like Rhee (2011) claim that there is a distinction between them.
- 2 Translation of the following sentence: 'a cooperação trilateral representa um avanço em relação à tradicional cooperação Norte-Sul, ao favorecer a adoção de abordagem horizontal e menos paternalista' (Abreu 2013: 13).
- 3 The Third Country Training Program is considered the oldest trilateral agreement, signed between the ABC and JICA in 1985, which aimed at offering short-term trainings to public officials of developing countries in Brazil (JICA 2012).

- 4 The Japan-Brazil Partnership Program (JBPP) aims to enhance the Nipo-Brazilian partnership in trilateral agreements by promoting projects that go beyond the scope of TCP, which consist of trainings executed only in Brazil. The JBPP was signed on 28 March 2000, and the first project in a third recipient country started in Angola in October 2007.
- 5 PRODECER has been a large development project aimed at increasing agricultural production in the Cerrado region. The program has been implemented since 1978. For more information about this program, read Rodrigues et al. (2009).

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## Annex I List of Interviews

Interviewer	Nationality	Date	Place	Institution	Project
1	Brazilian	19 April, 2013	Lichinga, Mozambique	EMBRAPA	ProSAVANA
2	Brazilian	27 August, 2013	Brasilia, Brazil	EMBRAPA	All
3	Brazilian	26 March, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	USAID Brazil	ProAlimentos
4	Mozambican	22 April, 2013	Nampula, Mozambique	IIAM	ProSAVANA
5	Mozambican	02 April, 2013	Boane, Mozambique	IIAM	ProAlimentos
6	Mozambican	24 April, 2013	Nampula, Mozambique	Nampula Civil Society Plataform	ProSAVANA
7	Mozambican	1 June, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	Chamber of Commerce Mozambique Brazil	All
8	Brazilian	27 August, 2013	Brasilia, Brazil	ABC	All
9	Mozambican	17 May, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	LOZANE FARMS	ProSAVANA
10	Mozambican	16 May, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	IIAM	ProSAVANA
11	Mozambican	18 April, 2013	Lichinga, Mozambique	IIAM	ProSAVANA
12	Mozambican	03 April, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	IIAM	ProAlimentos
13	Mozambican	02 April, 2013	Boane, Mozambique	IIAM	ProAlimentos
14	Mozambican	18 April, 2013	Lichinga, Mozambique	EMBRAPA	ProSAVANA
15	Brazilian	03 May, 2013	Sao Paulo, Brazil	FGV Projetos	ProSAVANA
16	Mozambican	22 April, 2013	Nampula, Mozambique	IIAM	ProSAVANA
17	Mozambican	24 April, 2013	Nampula, Mozambique	MINAG	ProSAVANA
18	North - American	10 March, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	MSU	ProAlimentos
19	Brazilian	12 June, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	FNDE	ProAlimentos
20	Mozambican	23 April, 2013	Nampula, Mozambique	CEPAGRI - Nampula	ProSAVANA
21	Brazilian	13 March, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	EMBRAPA	ProAlimentos
22	Mozambican	23 April, 2013	Nampula, Mozambique	MINAG	ProSAVANA
23	Mozambican	19 April, 2013	Lichinga, Mozambique	MINAG	All
24	Brazilian	7 June, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	CCIABMFAO	All
25	Mozambican	17 April, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	FAO	All
26	Mozambican	13 June, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	MINED	All
27	Brazilian	7 July, 2013	Brasilia, Brazil	ABC	ProSAVANA
28	Brazilian	10 May, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique via SKYPE	FGV Projetos	ProSAVANA
29	Brazilian		Maputo, Mozambique	FGV Projetos	ProSAVANA
30	Mozambican	19 April, 2013	Lichinga, Mozambique	IIAM	ProSAVANA
31	Brazilian	22 April, 2013	Nampula, Mozambique	EMBRAPA	All
32	Mozambican	2 April, 2013	Boane, Mozambique	IIAM	ProAlimentos
33	Other	18 June, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	PMA	ProAlimentos
34	Mozambican	13 June, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	MINAG	All
35	Mozambican	3 April, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	IIAM	ProAlimentos
36	North - American	3 April, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	MSU	ProAlimentos
37	Brazilian	16 April, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	The Embassy Of Brazil	All
38	Mozambican	18 March, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	Politecnica University	All
39	North - American	17 April, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	USAID Mozambique	ProAlimentos
40	Brazilian	9 April, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	EMBRAPA	All
41	Brazilian	15 April, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	FIOCRUZ	All
42	Mozambican	24 April, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	MINAG	ProSAVANA
43	Brazilian	17 April, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	JICA	ProSAVANA

44	Brazilian	10 April, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique via SKYPE	UF	ProAlimentos
45	Mozambican	10 April, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	UNAC	All
46	Brazilian	8 August 2012	Brasilia, Brazil	ABC	All
47	Brazilian	12 June, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique via SKYPE	JICARS	ProSAVANA
48	North - American	16 April, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	USAID Mozambique	ProAlimentos
49	Mozambican	23 March, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	USAID Mozambique	Plataforma
50	Mozambican	23 April, 2013	Nampula, Mozambique	MINAG	ProSAVANA
51	Mozambican	25 march, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	MSU	ProAlimentos
52	Mozambican	2 April, 2013	Boane, Mozambique	IIAM	ProAlimentos
53	Japanese	21 June, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	JICA	ProSAVANA
54	Japanese	22 April, 2013	Nampula, Mozambique	JICARS	ProSAVANA
55	Other	4 April, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	Terra Viva	All
56	Brazilian	8 March 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	ABC	All
57	Mozambican	21 May, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	MINAG	All
58	North - American	23 March, 2013	Maputo, Mozambique	UF	ProAlimentos
59	Brazilian	6 de julho de 2012	Brasilia, Brazil	ABC	All

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