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Open government and transparency reform in Chile Balancing leadership, ambition and implementation capacity

Aránzazu Guillán Montero



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Abstract

Chile is a successful open government reformer. The implementing agencies have achieved the targets set in the national action plans for transparency and access to information commitments. These reforms are changing administrative practices and attitudes about transparency and access to information management, but still fall short of reaching the citizens. Chile's success responds to the institutional capacity of public agencies and to the adoption of commitments that are part of their strategic work plans. However, challenges related to contingent political factors, inter-agency coordination, and monitoring affect the action plans' potential for transforming how the state relates to its citizens. These factors also influence the limited priority that stakeholders attribute to open government processes.

Keywords: Chile; open government; transparency; access to information; OGP.

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1. Chile and the Open Government Partnership

Chile joined the Open Government Partnership (OGP) officially in September 20, 2011, as part of the second cohort of 39 countries.¹ By joining OGP, Chile aimed to deepen the change towards greater transparency started with the transition to democracy in 1990. For the administration of President Sebastián Piñera (2010-2014),² the OGP process aligned closely to their program of modernizing the public sector and improving service delivery.

The Citizens' Defense and Transparency Commission (Comisión Defensora Ciudadana y Transparencia, CDC), an advisory body of the Presidency within the General Secretariat of the Presidency (Ministerio Secretaría General de la Presidencia, SEGPRES) is the entity in charge of coordinating OGP in Chile. An OGP working group, formed in December 2011, prepared the first National Action Plan (NAP) 2012-13. Chile presented this NAP at the OGP International Conference in Brazil in April 2012. Building on the results of the OGP independent assessment and the government's self-evaluation, the government developed a second NAP (2014-16) and presented a preliminary version at the Second OGP International Conference in London in October 2013. However, a second consultation process following the election of President Michelle Bachelet and the appointment of the new administration in March 2014 led to significant changes in this NAP.

Chile is a success story from the perspective of the implementation of its OGP commitments. It has a strong implementation record. The country completed 15 of 19 commitments of the first NAP according to the IRM report 2012-2013 (Sanhueza 2014), and has completed or is close to complete several of the commitments included in the second NAP. Nonetheless, the Chilean political and institutional context presented important challenges to the design and implementation of OGP reforms. In this regards, the Chilean case contributes to understand some of the determinants of the implementation and effectiveness of OGP reforms, provides lessons for improving OGP processes and their emerging results, and contributes to identify further research and practice needs.

The next section identifies the commitments selected for the analysis. Then, section 3 focuses on the adoption of the commitments and section 4 on the emerging results of their implementation. The analysis of the implementation process is the focus of Section 5. Finally, the last section presents the main lessons drawn from the Chilean case.

1 Chile fulfilled all requirements for joining OGP and received a score of 16 points over 16 on the indicators of fiscal transparency.

2 Piñera did not belong to the Concertación coalition. His election represented the first hand-over between opposing political coalitions since the democratic transition. See Joyce (2014).

2. A focus on transparency and public information

Like most Latin American countries, Chile has embraced transparency policies as a point of departure for enhancing open government (OECD 2014) and its NAPs reflect this commitment. The first NAP had a strong emphasis on transparency and access to information (15 of 19 commitments), including the use of technology for transparency (four commitments). The second NAP continues to underscore transparency as one of its core themes. All twelve commitments are relevant to transparency, ten to accountability and nine to citizen participation. The emphasis of the commitments is on e-government (4), capacity building (3), open data (2), and public service delivery (2) (OGP dataset).³

This emphasis reflects the high level of progress on transparency and access to information in the country. Transparency has been a critical dimension of Chile's Anti-Corruption and Probity Agenda and State Modernization Agenda since the early 2000s.⁴ As a part of wider modernization efforts, transparency policies aim to bring government closer to citizens by promoting the disclosure of public information and guaranteeing citizens' access to information. Their purpose is ensuring accountability in the use of public resources and promoting spaces for citizen participation (Olavarría 2012).

Open government reforms in Chile build on the Transparency Law (Law 20.285) enacted in 2008. The law acknowledged the right of access to the information held by state bodies and ensured the protection and effective implementation of this right.⁵ While Chile was a latecomer to passing ATI legislation,⁶ it soon became one of the region's stronger performers and a model of good practice (Herrero 2015).⁷ In 2009, Chile established a transparency oversight body, the Council for Transparency (Consejo para la Transparencia, CPLT), which plays a critical role in the implementation of transparency policies.

The emphasis on transparency contrasts with limited citizen engagement and participation in Chile. At the municipal level, Chileans show the lowest level of participation in Latin America (below 5% in municipal meetings in 2012) (Morgan et al. 2012).⁸ These limitations respond to structural factors, such

3 <http://www.opengovpartnership.org/blog/abhinav-bahl/2014/11/13/so-what%E2%80%99s-those-new-ogp-action-plans-anyway-2014-edition>.

4 For example, the access to information bill was developed in the context of President Bachelet's Transparency and Probity Agenda, during her first presidential mandate. In 2006, a presidential directive required the bodies of the central administration to publish online information on personnel, procurement processes and financial transfers (Guillán 2012).

5 Cf. <http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=276363>.


6 Chile advanced access to information legislation after a 2006 decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Claude Reyes et al. vs. Chile) that sanctioned the government for refusing to provide public information to the plaintiff and for the lack of a procedure to request public information. See http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_151_esp.pdf.

7 The country scores 93 over 150 in the RTI rating. Cf. http://www.rti-rating.org/view_country?country_name=Chile.

8 Barómetro de las Américas (LAPOP). Respondents were asked if they had attended a town meeting, a municipal council meeting, or another meeting called by the local government during the last 12 months.

as high levels of inequality,⁹ and historical legacies including the horizontal integration of political and economic elites (Rovira 2009) and an authoritarian regime (1973-1990). Historically, citizens and civil society have had limited opportunities and institutional channels to voice their demands and concerns and to participate in policy-making (PNUD 2014).

Figure 1. Sequencing of National Action Plans in Chile – Selected commitments



9 Despite high levels of human development (0.82) and sustained economic growth during the last decades (annual GDP growth 4.1% in 2013), inequality is a persistent problem in Chile, which had a Gini coefficient of 0.50 in the late 2000s--the widest inequality gap of all OECD countries (OECD 2011) See for example <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/oecd-says-chile-has-widest-inequality-gap/>.

Five Chilean commitments on transparency and access to information

This study analyses five selected commitments in the area of transparency and public information. It examines the adoption and implementation of two commitments from the first NAP with follow up in the second NAP, and of three new (yet related) commitments. (See Figure and Table 1.)

The development of the Transparency Portal (commitment #2.4 in the first NAP) has continued through three related commitments under the second NAP: the expansion of the Transparency Portal (#4) and two new commitments on transparency management at the municipal level (#1) and records management (#5). The Open Data Portal (commitment #1.3 in the first NAP) has follow up in two new related commitments: the open data strategy (#2) and the national open data competition (#3). The CPLT leads the implementation of the five commitments in cooperation with other government institutions.¹⁰

Table 1. Selected commitments on transparency and access to information from Chile's NAPs

NATIONAL ACTION PLAN 2012-2013		
	1.3 Open government portal	2.4 Transparency Portal
Commitment	One-stop shop for transparency, participation and open data initiatives to facilitate citizen access and provide government institutions with common tools and standards	Consolidate information regarding the transparency obligations of public entities and municipalities on a centralized web portal
Lead Institution	SEGPRES	SEGPRES Support: CPLT
Theme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> E-government Public service delivery 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FOI E-gov Sub-national governance
Specificity	Low	Low
Potential Impact	Moderate	Moderate
Actual Completion	Completed	Completed
On Schedule	On schedule	On schedule
Starred	Yes	Yes

¹⁰ It is responsible for 5 out of 12 commitments or 42% of the second NAP.

NATIONAL ACTION PLAN 2014-2016		
Commitment	Lead Institution	Theme
<p>1. Transparency management at municipal level (new) Implementing a model of transparency management at the municipal level in order to adopt management practices that improve the quality of services provided to citizens and municipalities' enforcement of the transparency law</p>	<p>CPLT Support: SUBDERE*, Municipalities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Subnational governance • Capacity building
<p>2. Open data strategy (continued) Promote reutilization of data with a citizen focus, enhancing interaction with civil society</p>	<p>CPLT, Modernization Unit Support: SEGPRES</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Open data
<p>3. Open data contest and reuse of information with citizen focus (new) Promote the reutilization of data and public information in partnership with other actors (civil society, developers, public institutions)</p>	<p>CPLT. Support: Modernization Unit, SEGPRES</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Open data
<p>4. Transparency Portal (continued) Ensure the installation and use of the portal by all</p>	<p>CPLT Support: SEGPRES, SUBDERE</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • E-government • Capacity building
<p>5. Records management model (new) Develop a model of records management based on national and international good practices to strengthen citizens' access to information</p>	<p>CPLT. Support: CDC, SEGPRES</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Record management

Source: Author based on Chile's NAP 2012-13 and NAP 2014-16.

* Under Secretary of Regional and Administrative Development (Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Regional Administrativo).

3. Balancing priorities in the adoption of transparency and public information commitments

The consultation process for the adoption of commitments is a key step in OGP processes at the country level. The development of the first NAP challenged most actors involved in OGP due to the novelty of the process. Chile, like most countries, learned from the first consultation process and moved towards more collaborative engagement in developing the second NAP. Moreover, OGP countries have refined the criteria used to decide on the adoption of specific commitments. This learning process affects the scope and implementation of the action plans.

A government-driven first action plan

After joining OGP in September 2011, Chile had a short time to develop a coherent first NAP. The country had to draft and formally submit the plan to consultation before the end of the year. The CDC prepared the draft based on ongoing government initiatives, most of them related to electronic government and with limited citizen focus (Sanhueza 2013).¹¹ The draft went through a two-week non-binding consultation process (Dec. 23- Jan. 9), with limited publicity, and was discussed with the OGP working group, composed by five CSOs and six public institutions. Although they could be submitted electronically or through regular mail, the call resulted only in three proposals from individuals and two from CSOs (Sanhueza 2014).

Civil society organizations criticized the limited participation in the consultation process. Although two civil society proposals were incorporated into the plan¹² and the government replied to the proposals and suggestions received, critics considered that the government had failed to engage in an actual dialogue with other actors in the formulation of the NAP (Sanhueza 2014). Autonomous institutions such as the CPLT also noted the limited dialogue with other actors and the few opportunities they had to suggest and identify the proposals that would be included in the NAP. The CDC merely informed them about the contents of the draft NAP instead of actively seeking inputs.¹³

The Chilean government already prioritized the open government and the transparency portals before joining OGP. The CDC included both portals in the NAP. It already had the open government portal among the priorities. Meanwhile, the CPLT strongly supported the inclusion of the transparency portal, which had been launched in April 2013¹⁴ as a result of an agreement with SEGPRES. For the CPLT, the commitment represented an opportunity to ensure government support and resources for the portal. Civil society, which is generally supportive of the role played by the CPLT, also saw this commitment as highly relevant to strengthen citizens' right to information and transparency in Chile.¹⁵

The first consultation and the development of the 2012-13 NAP represented a learning process for all the actors involved. The shortage of time was a critical factor for not holding a wider consultation. Given

11 Interviews conducted by the author (Santiago, May 2015).

12 Regarding open data and access to information and participation in environmental issues.

13 Interview conducted by the author (Santiago, April 2014).

14 The Council had World Bank support for the development of the portal's software. A tender for the development of the portal was issued in 2012.

15 Several interviews conducted by the author (Santiago, May 2015).

the limited spaces for direct public participation in policy-making in Chile, setting those mechanisms quickly enough and changing the traditional style of policy development was a major challenge. Thus, the government drew on the pre-existing policy agenda and defined the commitments on the basis of ongoing reforms in the areas of electronic government and transparency. This strategy contributed to ensure a smooth implementation process.

The strong role played by the CDC in driving the OGP process was not always matched by its ability to effectively communicate and coordinate the efforts of different government agencies and civil society. Moreover, civil society lacked the capacity to actively engage the government continuously in processes that are demanding in terms of time and resources.

Change of government and the development of a more participative second action plan

In the development of the second NAP, the Commission addressed the limitations of the first consultation process and sought to enhance civil society participation. Developed still during the Piñera administration, the preliminary second NAP presented in London in October 2013 was the result of a wide consultation process. In collaboration with the General Comptroller Office, the CPLT and regional governments, the CDC organized participatory workshops in four Chilean regions. Citizens and community based organizations were a strong presence in these meetings (e.g., 90 citizens attended Punta Arenas' workshop).¹⁶ Furthermore, CSOs involved in open government policies participated in a consultation meeting at the national level.

The regional meetings resulted in more than 200 proposals, later reduced to 86 after the national consultation through the OGP working group. The preliminary NAP was intentionally broad. Given that the end of the Piñera administration was close, the Commission attempted to strategically use the NAP to keep in the agenda some of the open government initiatives that were under way.¹⁷ However, the new administration took a drastic approach and reduced the number of commitments included in the NAP from 86 to 12 commitments.

Following new directives issued by the OGP, which recommended using a SMART methodology and reducing the number of commitments, President Bachelet's newly constituted CDC undertook a series of consultations with the OGP working group to restructure the NAP. In addition to the OGP standards, the Commission relied on additional criteria to reduce the number of commitments. First, their alignment with the new administration's agenda. Second, the feasibility of the commitments and the clear leadership from at least one public institution for the implementation process. Finally, the Commission decided not to include commitments that required any draft bills, on the grounds that the enactment of laws is a legislative prerogative and thus the government could not commit itself to deliver results in that area.

The impact of the last criteria on the scope of the NAP was controversial. For civil society, it has reduced the transformative potential of the NAP since significant reforms require changing the legal framework in Chile.¹⁸ Moreover, they notice that the Chilean executive has strong legislative powers

16 Interview conducted by the author (Santiago, May 9, 2015).

17 Interview conducted by the author (Santiago, May 9, 2015).

18 Interviews conducted by the author (Santiago, May 5 & 8, 2015).

and the capacity to decisively influence the timing of the legislative process and to achieve a high level of legislative success (cf. Cheibub and Limongi n.d).¹⁹ In any case, the CDC points out that the mere enactment of a law does not ensure effective implementation.²⁰ Also, governmental legislative priorities change over time and particularly after a change in administration, which would affect the feasibility of commitments that involve legal changes.

Under the new administration, participation was widened by expanding the composition of the OGP working group, which also became a permanent technical committee. All public agencies responsible for the implementation of commitments are members of the working group, which also includes other public agencies and autonomous institutions such as the General Comptroller Office (Contraloría General de la República, CGR). The initial membership of five CSOs increased to include one CSO which represents community based organizations (Asociación de ONGs, ASONG). However, critics still consider the working group's membership not representative enough, since there are no sectorial organizations and only limited representation of organizations from outside the capital.²¹

There was fluid dialogue between the government and civil society in the reorganization of the NAP and the final commitments were adopted by consensus. A high rotation of personnel between the Commission and the working group, due to the change of administration, facilitated the dialogue. The same persons continued engaged in the process yet they had swapped positions. For example, the newly appointed director and part of the Commissions high-level staff came from civil society, while its former director became the CEO of a national CSO represented in the working group. Though this permanence benefitted consensus building, some potential risks arise from the situation--for example, a limited renewal of the community working on transparency and open government in the country.²²

The feedback obtained through monitoring the implementation of the first action plan and the results of the independent assessment mechanism helped improve the second NAP. The IRM Report 2012-13 revealed that the launching of the Open Government Portal faced challenges to meet the needs of the interested public services. Also, there were not clear indicators set on how many government services would use the portal and how they would do it. Moreover, only a limited number of municipalities (71 out of 345) and public entities had joined the portal. The assessment recommended setting more ambitious targets as well as making joining the portal compulsory for agencies and municipalities.

The new and complementary commitments adopted in the second NAP respond to these constraints and aim to enhance the interaction with citizens. For example, they set ambitious targets for increasing the reach of the Transparency Portal at the national and municipal levels. Moreover, the new related commitments aim to strengthen the municipalities' capacity to implement and enforce the transparency law and enhance the interaction with citizens, as well as to overcome one of the main barriers to access

19 Also, Chile has strong transparency champions in Parliament and an active Bicameral Commission on Transparency. Chile coordinates and has played a very active role in the OGP Legislative Openness working group. In this regards, focusing the NAP on executive initiatives only would be a missed opportunity to create synergies with other open government policies that could enhance the transformative character and outcomes of OGP in the country (Interview conducted by the author, Santiago, May 2015).

20 Phone interview conducted by the author (September 24, 2015).

21 Interview conducted by the author (Santiago, May 2015).

22 Some interviewees also indicate the potential risk of conflict of interests that this rotation involves, although by all accounts no real conflicts have occurred so far. Interviews conducted by the author (Santiago, May 2015).

public information at both national and municipal levels (the “information not found” response). The CPLT also proposed committing to make the legislative changes needed to recognize the portal as the state’s main transparency instrument, but this commitment was rejected due to the criteria of not including legislative changes.²³

The commitments related to transparency and public information were highly feasible. The CPLT had great interest in undertaking some commitments, and proposed 12 commitments aimed at strengthening the implementation of the transparency law. Five of these commitments were adopted (representing 42% of the NAP). Other government institutions as well as civil society approved the inclusion of a large number of commitments led by the CPLT.²⁴

A reflection of its performance, the adoption of several commitments by the CPLT helped strengthen their implementation (e.g. by securing political commitment and sufficient resources). However, concentrating a large share of the commitment in one implementing agency could also create potential risks. Hypothetically, a serious setback for the CPLT could undermine almost half of the NAP. Moreover, there are some potential attribution problems. In the Chilean institutional context, the CPLT is responsible for the effective fulfillment of the commitments--and for assuming any setbacks--, but the ultimate success in implementing the reforms will be usually claimed by the central government.²⁵

Table 2. A strong government drive in the OGP consultation processes in Chile

First consultation	Second consultation
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government driven -- led by the CDC. • Based on ongoing government initiatives. • Limited citizen focus. • Limited consultation and participation (online 2-week non-binding consultation and just 5 civil society proposals). • Five CSOs members of working group. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initial draft NAP with over 80 proposals from broad consultation process. • Following OGP guidelines, new administration issued stricter criteria for selecting NAP commitments (e.g., no draft bills). • Final NAP reduced to 12 commitments adopted by consensus. • Widened participation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Four participatory workshops (including regional level) – over 200 proposals received. • Consultation meeting with CSOs at national level. • Expanded composition of working group, including representation of community based organizations.

23 CPLT’s proposal of commitments for second NAP. On file with author.

24 Interview conducted by the author (Santiago, May 5, 2015).

25 This is a general tension within OGP reforms. Interview conducted by the author (Santiago, May 9, 2015). On attribution problems and tensions, see the last section of this case study.

Increasing participation in the adoption of OGP commitments in Chile

The consultation process for the formulation of the action plan influences how transformative and ambitious the NAP can be as well as its results. Due to time constraints, the first consultation process in Chile had limited public participation and emphasized the feasibility of commitments and mostly endorsed ongoing government initiatives. This strategy contributed to ensure the successful implementation of the commitments. Participation was wider in the second consultation process, but the change of administration and newly adopted OGP criteria contributed again to an emphasis on securing the implementation of commitments rather than on enhancing their scope and potential impact. Moreover, for some actors the decision not to include draft bills significantly undermined the transformative potential of Chile's second NAP.

While the leadership of government agencies is key for successful implementation, there is also a trade-off between ensuring effectiveness and adopting truly transformative initiatives. In combination with other contingent factors (see below), the somewhat limited ambition of the NAP might have affected public institutions' and civil society's interest and the priority they attributed to OGP processes in Chile.

4. Is OGP improving transparency in Chile? Emerging results and the uptake of reform

Are the commitments analyzed in this study transforming the way public institutions work in Chile and how they relate to citizens? A major challenge for answering this question is that a monitoring and evaluation framework of OGP commitments is still under development in Chile.²⁶ In addition, the OGP working group's monitoring role is not yet well defined and it is hindered by the limited capacity of civil society to engage in a sustained way during implementation, due to time and resource constraints.²⁷

The absence of a rigorous and systematic monitoring system was a major limitation in the implementation of the first NAP, which the working group prioritized for the second NAP. With support from the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), members of the working group (including representatives from civil society and from public institutions responsible for implementation) received training in the logical framework methodology and developed specific monitoring matrixes. However, the matrixes were not available one and a half years into the implementation of the second NAP--the working group had them under review at the time of the fieldwork for this study. For the mid-term self-evaluation report (Chile 2015b),²⁸ the working group decided not to formally adopt the matrixes although each implementing agency used its own to guide the assessment process.²⁹

Monitoring challenges are less serious for the commitments implemented by the CPLT, since the institution uses a logical framework approach to monitor all its activities since its creation. The Council internally monitors the commitments it leads and the information is integrated into its performance indicators.³⁰ However, in the absence of a common monitoring system, the information remains internal to the Council and is not integrated into a common framework that generates information to feed back into and adjust the implementation of open government commitments in Chile.

Transparency Portal

Monitoring challenges aside, the implementation of transparency and access to information commitments in Chile is producing positive results. Table 3. summarizes the progress in integrating municipalities and other public entities in the Transparency Portal. There has been significant success in expanding the reach of the portal and the related targets have been fulfilled. However, progress at the central level has been slower due to setbacks discussed in the following section. In May 2015, only 14 central administration agencies were using the portal. The number increased to 52 by July 2015, but there is no

26 This would complement the external independent assessment conducted by the IRM mechanism.

27 Interviews conducted by the author (Santiago, May 5 & 8, 2015).

28 The draft was opened to public consultation (<http://participacionciudadana.minsegres.gob.cl/consultas-ciudadanas-virtuales/consulta-p%C3%BAblica-borrador-informe-de-autoevaluaci%C3%B3n-de-medio-t%C3%A9rmino>) during the review of this study.

29 Phone interview conducted by the author (Sept. 24, 2015).

30 The indicators used by the CPLT to monitor OGP commitments are: 1) trimestral management control for the transparency portal, the municipal transparency management model, and hackathon; 2) RTA management control for records management model; 3) monthly meetings with the Executive for guidelines on the reutilization of data with a citizen focus. Personal communication with CPLT (June 3, 2015).

interoperation with the central government portal yet. Nevertheless, the number of access to information requests processed through the portal (46,636 as of July 2015) is significant,³¹ with 90% of the requests addressed to municipalities (CPLT 2015b).

Table 3. Public institutions integrated to the transparency portal (July 2015)

Type of institution	Number
Municipalities	283
Central administration agencies using the portal	52
Agencies with constitutional autonomy	2
Autonomous agencies by law	2
Total	339

Source: CPLT (July 2015)

The CPLT faces the important challenge of demonstrating to other public institutions the impact and added value of being included in the portal. As more municipalities and entities join the portal, it has become more difficult to prove the difference that inclusion makes for them. The Council is currently conducting studies for assessing the portal's impact on improving public management as well as on the quality of public services.³² Without enough available data, no clear pattern has emerged yet.

Records management

It is still early to analyze the results of the records management model, given that it is in the early stages of implementation. The development of the model is in itself a significant change. However, the potential of this commitment to change the practices of the public administration, as well as to improve the agencies' capacity to respond information requests and fulfill proactive transparency obligations, can only be assessed after the implementation of a pilot in 2015-16. The transformative potential of this initiative could reach beyond Chile, since the model has been made available to other Latin American transparency oversight bodies through the RTA network.³³

Open government data

Chile has held three open data competitions to date. The first one, in November 2014, gathered 80 developers and six public institutions that made their data available.³⁴ Participants presented 23 proposed applications, and ultimately 17 projects entered the competition. Five projects were awarded grants for further development (Chile 2015b). The event has been very successful in contributing to build a community of open data developers in Chile.³⁵ Some of the applications are already operational (e.g.,

31 Personal communication with the CPLT (June 2015).

32 Supported by the IADB under the Norwegian Transparency Trust Fund.

33 The model has been developed in collaboration with other transparency oversight bodies in the framework of the RTA access to information network led by the CPLT. See <http://mgd.redrta.org/mgd/site/edic/base/port/inicio.html>.

34 <http://abrecl.datos.gob.cl/>.

35 Interview conducted by the author – Modernization Unit (Santiago, May 6, 2015).

Infosalud has been presented to the Ministry of Health).³⁶ The Modernization Unit has facilitated the contact of the developers with government services for the use of the applications, and is currently working with CORFO (Chile's state corporation for investment and innovation) to facilitate their operationalization. The open data instruction is still under development. This norm is expected to contribute to avoid duplication in open data initiatives, and to a more effective use of open data to improve public management and citizen service.³⁷

After the launching of the Open Government Portal (www.datos.gob.cl),³⁸ the main challenges include enhancing citizen demand and making the datasets of public services effectively available. The results are still modest. 1,233 datasets had been published as of September 2015. Of the 69 services integrated, only 13 showed more than 50% advance in opening their data by July 2015. Citizen demand is still modest as well. The portal had only received 40 citizen requests at the moment of writing this study.

Impact at the municipal level

Without an impact evaluation, it is still not possible to quantify the concrete impacts of the Transparency Portal and the transparency management model at the municipal level. However, the implementation of these commitments has inspired visible changes in the attitudes and behavior of relevant actors at multiple levels.

The transparency management model was recognized by the Organization of American States (OAS) with the Inter-American award for innovation in effective public management.³⁹ The model has helped change the municipalities' attitude towards the transparency law and has strengthened enforcement. Although the enforcement of the law is still weak at the local level (56% in proactive transparency and 54.2% in access to information on average),⁴⁰ the integration into the portal has improved how effectively municipalities implement and enforce the transparency law. For example, the implementation of proactive transparency increased from 30.3% in 2012 to 56% in 2014. Also, for the 154 municipalities integrated into the portal in 2014, the percentage of responses to access to information requests was higher (84.5%) than at the central level (71.1%). (Table 4).

The municipalities have a positive perception of the model as an integrated solution for transparency management. This has helped raise the visibility of the challenges faced by the municipal in implementing the transparency law. Across all Chilean regions, 91% of the mayors would recommend the model and implement it again.⁴¹ In the assessment of the municipalities, the four components of the transparency management model with higher ratings are: formalization of roles (15.8%), internal regulation (14.9%), transparency portal (14.6%) and training of local public officials (13.7%).⁴²

36 <http://infosaludapp.cl/>.

37 Interview conducted by the author – Modernization Unit (Santiago, May 6, 2015).

38 <http://datos.gob.cl/page/view/inicio>.

39 <http://www.oas.org/es/sap/dgpe/innovacion/2014/>.

40 For example, <http://200.91.44.244/consejo-para-la-transparencia-solicita-sumariar-a-29-municipios-por-bajos-niveles-en-transparencia-activa/consejo/2015-05-25/114403.html>.

41 Evaluation of 71 mayors and 139 counterparts in local administration. Personal communication with CPLT (June 2015).

42 Ibid.

As the main positive effects of the model, the municipalities identified: clarifying and formalizing the processes for managing transparency in the municipality (99% of responses), defining the roles and specific functions of the different administrative units (97%) and strengthening the oversight capacity of municipal transparency management (94%). Moreover, 75% of the mayors believe that the implementation of the model had a positive spillover effect over others areas of the local administration such as the standardization and optimization of administrative procedures, and the digitization and management of documents and records.⁴³

Table 4. Enforcement and implementation of the transparency law at municipal level

	Among municipalities <i>not</i> in the Portal	Among municipalities <i>in</i> the Portal
Access to information requests*	26,9%	84,5%
	<i>Before joining the portal</i>	<i>After joining the Portal</i>
Proactive transparency**	52.57%	70.36%

Source: CPLT (2015c); Personal communication with CPLT (Sept. 23, 2015).

*For the 154 municipalities integrated in the Portal and 171 not in the Portal.

** Data available only for the first 96 municipalities that joined the Portal.

The implementation of these initiatives has contributed to empower the municipalities to implement transparency reforms and to redefine their role, even in cases where resources and capacities are limited. Improvements in access to information and proactive transparency among municipalities cut across levels of development and capacity. (See Figure 2).


The methodology used by the CPLT to work with municipalities is itself an important output. The Council realized the importance of understanding the local context and the actors involved in order to design interventions. Municipalities were given ownership of the initiative by involving them in the design of the transparency management model from the beginning.⁴⁴ Moreover, the CPLT and the Under Secretary for Regional and Administrative Development (Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Regional Administrativo, SUBDERE) gave recognition to local good practices in the areas of internal management and relation with citizens, which created incentives for the municipalities to enforce the law and even to go beyond their obligations to produce innovative transparency reforms.

As the body responsible for monitoring the implementation of the law at the local and central levels, the CPLT realized that sanctions should be combined with rewards to strengthen the enforcement of the law. The Council also plays a facilitator role and contributes to build institutional capacity. However, while balancing the CPLT's oversight and capacity building roles can be the best way to strengthen

43 Communication with the CPLT (September 23, 2015).

44 Interview conducted by the author (Santiago, May 5, 2015).

Figure 2. Improving transparency across Chilean municipalities*



Source: CPLT oversight processes 2013, 2014, 2015

*Data is provided for specific municipalities representative of each level of development and capacity.

transparency at the local level, at the same time it represents an ongoing strategic challenge for the institution.⁴⁵

Organizational impact on the implementing agency

The CPLT has undergone a process of organizational learning through the implementation of these commitments. The process has produced lasting structural changes in the Council. Individual projects have become institutionalized in new organizational units: a municipalities unit and a Transparency Portal unit. The latter, still in the process of being established, will combine technological roles, capacity building functions, and responsibilities regarding relations and coordination with other actors (including other web portals operated by the Chilean state).

The implementation process also represents a good example of division of responsibilities and cooperation between the executive, the autonomous oversight bodies, and local authorities. The CPLT has shown that state institutions can join forces in order to strengthen transparency and access to information. The Council has figured out improved ways to coordinate and work together with other institutional actors. In particular, the collaboration and partnership with SUBDERE for the implementation of all initiatives at the municipal level has proved remarkably effective. In this process, the Council has helped define and strengthen the role of the oversight body at the local and central levels.

45 Some believe that after building institutional capacity, the CPLT should now concentrate on its enforcement role. (Santiago, May 9, 2015). A related challenge is that the level of enforcement of sanctions is very low in Chile.

The commitments analyzed are linked to strategic actions undertaken by the CPLT and the Modernization Unit as part of their activity plans. This connection in turn has increased the sustainability of the emerging results. However, sustainability presents two further challenges. First, how to ensure the operational resources required to continue the work initiated in the first NAP and continued in the second one. For the CPLT, the inclusion of these measures into the NAPs has ensured the political support and financial resources for implementation. High level support and operational funds are necessary to ensure that the NAPs' targets are fulfilled (e.g., targets for the transparency management model in 2016), and to make all public entities and municipalities in Chile use the portal and implement the transparency management and records management models.

An even more complex challenge is fulfilling the expectations created by the implementation of the measures. Citizens and public officials would like to see a single unified portal that is the gateway to access all information in the hands of the state. Achieving this would require legal changes to make the incorporation into the portal obligatory, as well as devising an overall strategy, supported by the government and coordinated with different institutions, that aligns the different online tools that the Chilean state is developing for enhancing the interaction with citizens.

5. Strong capacity and the challenges of maintaining momentum and reaching the citizens

In contrast with other Latin American countries (OECD 2014), Chile shows a strong implementation record in open government reforms. Overall the implementation of the first NAP was very successful with 15 out of 19 commitments implemented (IRM Report 2014). The ongoing implementation of the second NAP shows a comparable track record with most of the commitments on schedule, already fulfilled or on track for being completed by the end of the implementation period.⁴⁶

A strong implementation record of transparency and public information commitments

The implementation of transparency and public information commitments in Chile is significant. The Transparency Portal fulfilled its targets under the first NAP, and the commitment was beyond 100% compliance (Sanhueza 2014, 37). The IRM reported the commitment as met given the participation of 71 municipalities in the portal and the signature of agreements to join the portal with key institutions, such as the Chilean Congress and the General Comptroller Office. However, the IRM also highlighted the challenges of broadening the participation of national public entities and of fully permeating the municipal level.

At the local level, the progress towards achieving the transparency portal's targets under the second NAP is on track, but it experienced an unexpected setback at the central level.⁴⁷ At the municipal level, the targets for 2014 and 2015 have been met and implementation is on track to fulfill the targets for 2016 (See Table 2).⁴⁸ At the central level, however, implementation depended on the inter-operation of the portal and the government's PISEE platform.⁴⁹ However, a hacking attack to the platform in early 2015 made it necessary to disconnect all the 145 agencies that were already linked to the portal. This incident slowed down the implementation process. The CPLT has now reached an agreement with SEGPRES's Modernization Unit to allow some agencies to access the portal directly (as municipalities do), while looking for a solution for the rest of the agencies during the current year. The revised target for the NAP is to connect 225 units/agencies. This number would increase incrementally, building on a pilot including 17 agencies in May 2015.⁵⁰

The commitment related to the transparency management model at the municipal level is on track to be fulfilled before July 2016. The intermediate targets for December 2014 (70% of municipalities) and

46 The first self-assessment of the Chilean government will be submitted in the coming months.

47 2014 targets: 198 (100% bodies using the access to information request system) of the central administration bodies and 226 (65%) of municipalities. 2015 targets: 126 (no access to information request system) of the central administration and 75% of municipalities. 2016 targets: 90% of municipalities. Cf. Chile Action Plan 2014-16 (12).

48 Interview conducted by the author (Santiago, May 2015) and personal communication with CPLT (June 2015).

49 The Plataforma de Interoperabilidad de Servicios del Estado (PISEE) is administered by the Modernization and e-Government Unit since 2009. It is a platform for electronically exchanging information and data between public bodies. See <http://www.modernizacion.gob.cl/es/ejes-estrategicos/modernizacion/institucionalizacion-de-la-politica-de-atencion-a-los-usuarios-de-servicios-publicos/>.

50 Interview conducted by the author (Santiago, May 2015).

2015 (80%) have already been achieved,⁵¹ and the model is currently implemented in 86.7% of the Chilean municipalities (the end target is 90%).⁵²

The records management commitment is also progressing well. Following the new technical norm of records management (issued in 2012), the CPLT has led the development of the new records management model (first intermediate target).⁵³ After the finalization of the model, the Council is currently coordinating with supporting institutions its dissemination (including training staff in the new system) and the implementation of a pilot at the municipal level in order to complete the commitment.

The implementation of open data commitments has also made good progress. The Open Government Portal was developed and launched, though it is still in beta version (<http://www.gobiernoabierto.cl/>). It provides links that citizens can use to stay informed and/or make requests, present claims and send suggestions to public services. It also provides access to Chileatiende, a related online portal of the Chilean state (www.chileatiende.cl). The IRM (2014) found that the portal's main challenges were increasing citizen demand for the data published and integrating additional public services. These seem still to be the most important challenges today (see section on results below). Finally, the open data commitments under the second NAP are on track as well.

Analyzing implementation challenges and opportunities

Several factors explain the success in the implementation of OGP's transparency and public information commitments in Chile. These factors include the context in which the reform is taking place (in particular the organizational context), the characteristics of the commitments, and the actors' incentives to engage in the implementation process. These factors have contributed to make these commitments widely accepted and highly feasible, as well as to secure the resources required for implementation. Nevertheless, some implementation challenges are also related to contextual factors (particularly the change of government), issues of inter-agency coordination, and the monitoring of open government policies.

Conducive factors

A context of coordinated efforts between different actors benefits the implementation of policy reforms (Hatch 1998). The transparency and public information commitments are not entirely new initiatives, but rather strategic actions that lie at the core of strengthening Chile's transparency and access to public information. The commitments led by the CPLT are aligned with other ongoing initiatives (both national and international) and the Council would have undertaken them independently of their inclusion in the NAP. Moreover, the CPLT has actively sought to engage and coordinate with different actors involved in the process. All the activities have been implemented under a logic of collaboration, building on

51 Personal communication with CPLT (June 2015).

52 Presentation CPLT Implementation report transparency management model, May 28, 2015. On file with author.

53 The records management system is available online at <http://mgd.redrta.org/modelo-de-gestion-de-documentos-y-administracion-de-archivos-para-la-red-de-transparencia-y-acceso-a-la-informacion/mgd/2015-01-23/093820.html>. The model was presented in Santiago in September 2014. See <http://www.consejotransparencia.cl/foro-internacional-se-reune-en-chile-con-miras-a-construir-un-modelo-de-gestion-documental-y-archivos/consejo/2014-09-29/135921.html>.

pre-existing institutional relations. This also include a “partnership” with civil society, although this collaboration has been limited to dialogue and consultation rather than co-implementation.⁵⁴

The process of adoption of the commitments is in itself an important factor. All the actors involved in open government policies in Chile perceive the commitments, which were adopted by a broad consensus, as highly desirable and strategic. They continue the transversal agreement across political elites and actors that supported the enactment of the transparency law in 2008 (Olavarría 2012, 58). The actors interested in the issue see the commitments as critical reforms for strengthening the transparency and openness of public administration, and to transform the relationship between the state and its citizens. This common assessment has created incentives for the different actors to actively support and collaborate in the implementation process.

The design of the commitments also contributed to improve the implementation process, particularly in relation to the municipal components. Initiatives that take into account the characteristics of the target population, fit their needs, and generate high levels of ownership and appropriation tend to be better implemented. The CPLT involved the municipalities in the design of the transparency management model from the beginning. It has designed the model based on their needs, building on an incremental approach involving several pilots. The implementation has relied on providing positive incentives that recognize the municipalities’ good performance.⁵⁵ Nonetheless, at the municipal level, variations in the effectiveness of implementation can be expected depending on the characteristics of different municipalities (e.g., level of capacities and resources) and on the authorities’ leadership and support.

Institutional capacity, good performance and leadership of the responsible institutions have also facilitated the implementation process. Despite financial constraints and institutional challenges (Olavarría 2012, 103), as well as persistently low levels of public awareness about its activities,⁵⁶ the CPLT has become a consolidated oversight institution with strong capacities, highly-qualified human resources, and very good performance in the fulfillment of its functions (Guillán 2012). In 2014, 85% of the citizens that interacted with the CPLT considered that the institution effectively fulfills its mission, and 73% viewed it as an efficient institution (CPLT 2015a).⁵⁷

The CPLT sees the OGP commitments as an essential part of its core strategic programs and as critical for ensuring its own performance. All the administrative levels of the organization support the implementation process. The Council’s authorities acknowledge the added value of including core CPLT’s activities in the framework of international processes, which provide strategic opportunities for ensuring operational resources and capacities and give further visibility and legitimacy to its activities --through external assessment processes. The remarkable performance of the CPLT makes the institution that leads the implementation of the OGP commitments a desirable partner for different actors both from the state and from civil society.

54 Several interviews conducted by the author (Santiago, May 2015).

55 See, for example, <http://200.91.44.244/cplt-entrega-resultados-del-modelo-de-gestion-en-transparencia-municipal-en-la-region-de-los-lagos/consejo/2015-05-29/110932.html>.

56 According to the National Transparency Survey, 87% of the sample had not heard about the CPLT in 2011 and 78% in 2014. Cf. FrontDesk (2011, 72); Estudios de Entorno (2014).

57 This positive perception is shared by stakeholders familiar with the CPLT, who positively assess the Council in terms of its prestige, the autonomy and soundness of its decisions, its relations with other public agencies, and the services provided to citizens (CPLT 2015a).

The availability of resources has facilitated the implementation of open government reforms in Chile. Cooperative relations between institutions and the inclusion of these initiatives as international commitments under the OGP has helped secure the operational resources for implementing from the government. An important instance is the collaboration between the CPLT and SUBDERE, which has been key to secure resources for the transparency management model at the municipal level (NAP 2014-16, 5).⁵⁸ For the Transparency Portal, the Council has benefited from the international commitment and the strategic importance of the portal for the public sector to secure political support and resources from the executive.

Table 5. Implementation opportunities and challenges

Opportunities	Challenges
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consensus around strategic reforms that add value to long-term transparency policies. • Cooperative relations between institutions. • Institutional capacity, good performance and effective leadership of leading institutions. • Reforms address the needs of the target groups and engage them in the implementation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Changing political context and uncertain high level support / priority given to the open government agenda. • Institutional framework with overlapping competencies on transparency. • Not clearly defined role of the OGP working group. • Civil society's capacity and resource limitations.

Implementation challenges

The political context has influenced the implementation process of open government reforms in Chile. The change of administration in early 2014 affected the adoption and implementation of the second NAP. Key actors in the new government were not sufficiently familiar with OGP, and submitting the final NAP required a wide effort of dissemination and communication about OGP processes and commitments from the Commission. Moreover, the new government was initially reluctant to support a draft NAP that they perceived as a legacy of the previous administration and not necessarily aligned with the new government's political and policy agenda. Although the implementation of commitments has progressed well, some actors perceive less political support for open government at the highest levels of government. According to these actors, government priorities would have changed towards the domestic government agenda and away from international commitments.

Recent corruption scandals in Chile have raised citizen awareness about the importance of improving transparency and government accountability (AA.VV. 2015), but they have also created institutional challenges that could affect open government reforms. In response to the crisis, in May 2015 the President appointed a Presidential Advisory Council on Anti-Corruption and undertook a wide renovation of the

58 80 million pesos.

executive, changing the authorities of key ministries, including SEGPRES.⁵⁹ This change of authorities created uncertainty regarding the support for open government reforms and the risk of eventual delays and/or new coordination challenges in the implementation process.

The Presidential Advisory Council's final report (April 2015)⁶⁰ recommended strengthening Chile's participation in OGP (and similar international initiatives) and contained specific recommendations for buttressing integrity at the municipal level and improving transparency and access to information. These recommendations can potentially contribute to prioritize the open government agenda and reinforce the commitments under implementation. For example, the report recommended giving legal status to the Transparency Portal under the administration and oversight of the CPLT, and reforming the legal framework in the area of records management (Consejo Asesor 2015, 47).

Although at the moment of writing it was still uncertain what specific actions the government would take on the basis of the recommendations, and whether reforms would be linked to ongoing initiatives (rather than being contingent ad hoc reforms in time of crisis), some positive developments have already occurred.⁶¹ Chile submitted its candidacy to the OGP Steering Committee in early June 2015 and has been selected to serve as a Steering Committee member since October 2015 (Chile 2015a). This activism can be interpreted as a political signal that indicates that open government reform may have moved up in the government's agenda. Nonetheless, challenges still remain to give traction to open government reforms in the country and to make more visible the efforts of the implementing agencies at the international level.⁶²

The uncertain role of the permanent OGP working group has been another challenge. During the implementation of the first NAP, the working group did not meet regularly to monitor the process. Setting the working group as a permanent structure was a positive step. However, the frequency of working group meetings is still irregular and its role in the implementation process has not been properly defined. Moreover, the limited capacity of civil society representatives to sustain an active role during the implementation process also constrains the ability of the working group to fulfill an effective monitoring role.⁶³

The lack of a systematic monitoring and evaluation framework to generate inputs and information for adjusting the implementation process constitutes another drawback for the OGP process in Chile. Beyond the external independent assessment, Chile is still struggling to develop a systematic monitoring system for open government commitments. (See section on results above).

The coordination between the different institutions responsible for the implementation of open government processes is often difficult. In the case of Chile, the institutional framework generates some coordination challenges given the overlapping functions and responsibilities of different agencies

59 Jorge Insunza was appointed head of SEGPRES replacing Ximena Rincón González on May 11, 2015. On June 7, 2015, he was replaced by Nicolás Eyzaguirre Guzmán as a result of corruption allegations involving Insunza's consulting firms.

60 See Consejo Asesor Presidencial Contra los Conflictos de Interés, el Tráfico de Influencias y la Corrupción (2015).

61 Interview conducted by the author (Santiago, May 2015).

62 Phone interview conducted by the author (Sept. 23, 2015).

63 Interview conducted by the author (Santiago, May 2015).

responsible or co-responsible for the implementation of OGP commitments.⁶⁴ Several agencies play a role in the areas of state modernization and open government. SEGPRES formally holds the coordinating powers and competences to lead the open government agenda. Within the SEGPRES's structure, the Commission specifically plays the coordinating role for OGP. This role seems to have been strengthened under the second NAP, in which the Commission is leading less commitments and rather playing a crucial supporting and coordinating role.

While the Commission has the technical capacity and resources to fulfill such role, how effectively it is able to coordinate and lead the agenda depends in practice on the political context, which influences whether its technical work is backed up by political support at the highest levels of SEGPRES. This support provides the Commission with the leverage to effectively coordinate government institutions across sectors--since in practice coordination problems are often solved informally through working relations among the actors. The Commission's de facto political support is currently difficult to assess given the recent changes in SEGPRES, but it seems to have fluctuated between the Piñera and the Bachelet administrations.

Despite these challenges, Chile is a strong implementer of open government policies. The commitments analyzed in this paper can significantly improve the institutional capacity of the Chilean state to be more transparent and to effectively fulfill its transparency obligations. However, they fall short of effectively buttressing the transparency and participation channels that improve accountability. There are some concerns on whether the NAPs fall short of advancing innovative solutions that can transform how the state relates to its citizens. Enhancing the linkage with citizens should be addressed through complementary measures and further OGP reforms.

64 Interview conducted by the author (Santiago, May 2015).

6. The lessons of OGP implementation in Chile

Based on the analysis presented above, we can extract several lessons from open government reforms related to transparency and public information in Chile. First, an important message is that while we should not forget about pushing for optimal solutions to open government challenges, we should also think pragmatically about what is feasible and meaningful for local actors (Boehm and Caprio 2014). Chile has been a strong implementer of OGP reforms, but there are concerns about whether the NAPs fall short of advancing solutions that are actually innovative and transformative. For example, a number of commitments involve activities that were already part of the regular work plan of the implementing agencies. However, pragmatic solutions can be critical steps in longer-term reform processes. They can help strengthen the demand for reform and, by showing results, contribute to create incentives and political support for wider governance reforms. Also, consultation processes can help modulate and align the expectations of the different actors involved in order to generate consensus for change and support implementation. Furthermore, the external evaluation of OGP reforms should also be a critical instance to help countries move in the direction of reforms that are both pragmatically feasible and potentially transformative.

Another relevant lesson relates to the attribution of open government reforms. OGP provides an opportunity for specific state agencies to strengthen their institutional stance and advance critical reforms. However, implementation success still seems to be capitalized mainly by the executives rather than by the specific institutions and agencies leading the implementation process. It would be desirable to enhance the role of other actors as co-implementers of open government reforms and to improve coordination between state institutions. Strengthening public awareness about the crucial role of implementing agencies would contribute to increase ownership of reforms, produce exemplary effects internally and internationally, and incentivize the participation and commitment of the agencies. This goal, which requires a detailed understanding of the country context, would help allocate costs, benefits and responsibilities in a more equitable way, making all the actors involved co-responsible for both successes and setbacks.

Third, the Chilean case provides relevant lessons about the role of autonomous bodies responsible for the oversight and implementation of transparency reforms. The role of autonomous bodies was not clearly defined at the outset of OGP processes, but they have claimed an active role in many countries. The CPLT has taken an active stance in the formulation and implementation of the second NAP in Chile. With strong capacities, positive recognition from civil society and public institutions, good public perception, and experience in inter-sectorial coordination, the Council can play a critical role in leading a transformative agenda. However, it is also crucial to balance this proactive role with the Council's

Box 3. Some lessons for the OGP implementation process in Chile

- ◆ Feasible commitments, though not necessarily transformative in the short-term, can be critical steps in longer-term reform processes.
- ◆ Implementing agencies leading reform efforts should receive recognition as co-implementers at the national and international levels.
- ◆ Autonomous institutions can play a central role in the implementation of commitments and should have a more clearly defined role in OGP processes at the country level.
- ◆ Countries with high institutional capacity can be strong implementers, but often present challenges for the active involvement of civil society.

oversight responsibilities, which also involve eventually sanctioning state institutions if they fail to fulfil their obligations under the transparency law.

Fourth, alignment with long-term policy priorities and the institutionalization of initiatives enhance the continuity and sustainability of open government reforms. The continuity of transparency and public information reforms in Chile relies on the inclusion in the NAPs of commitments that are long-term policy priorities, have high levels of consensus among different actors, and are part of the strategic working plans of the institution responsible for the implementation and oversight of transparency policies (namely, the CPLT). In addition, this institutional leadership and active involvement in open government reforms, with the support and coordination capacity of the Commission, has also contributed to the reform process' sustainability.

Finally, as strong institutional capacities may foster the successful implementation of OGP reforms, they may also create challenges for civil society to find the space and resources to contribute to the process, particularly when spaces for participation in policy-making are limited. Facing capacity constraints, state driven reform processes and changing political priorities, civil society may lose interest in strategically prioritizing their engagement in open government processes--even though specific CSOs may focus on initiatives that are aligned with their own agendas. Civil society needs to reflect on how to create the opportunities for a meaningful contribution to OGP reform processes that goes beyond the consultation stage. More generally, OGP should consider how to encourage governments to actively involve civil society in reform processes, and how to best support civil society in different country contexts so that it can be an actual partner in the implementation and monitoring of reforms.

OGP processes have contributed to improve the dialogue between government and civil society in Chile, but the institutionalization of this cooperation is still narrow and limited. The government and public institutions play a defining role in the development of the open government agenda. Despite a broader public consultation for the second NAP, a small number of specialized CSOs still prevails in the process of defining open government priorities. The initiatives included in the action plans are important policy priorities, but actors involved in OGP processes in the country have been unable to communicate their significance to the citizens in a way that encourages public participation.

Transparency reforms are producing significant changes in how government institutions manage information and make it available to the public in Chile, particularly at the municipal level. However, the long-term impact of these reforms is still constrained by the limits to citizen engagement and participation in Chilean policy-making. OGP processes have not yet been able to eliminate or remove those constrains.

Recent events in Chile should be seen as an opportunity to boost the open government reform agenda. Despite some challenges, a strong implementation capacity and leadership, sustained transparency reforms implemented since the early 2000s, and the emerging anti-corruption agenda of the government create the right conditions for long-term change. OGP can help align the different initiatives aimed at strengthening transparency, participation and accountability in the country. The engagement of civil society in formulating and co-executing these reforms is necessary for effectively transforming the interaction between citizens and the state in Chile.

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Annex I: List of interviews

Name	Organization
Alberto Precht	Executive Director, Chile Transparente.
Álvaro Ramírez	ILPES / CEPAL, Naciones Unidas.
Andrea Sanhueza	Consultora IRM report.
Eduardo Gonzalez Yáñez	Director of Operations, Consejo para la Transparencia.
Emilio Moya	Director of Studies, Chile Transparente.
Francisco Sánchez Lay	OGP Focal point, Comisión Defensora Ciudadana y Transparencia.
Jorge Alzamora	Chief of Division, Unidad de Modernización del Estado y Gobierno Digital. SEGPRES.
Juan Emilio Cheyre	Professor, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.
María Jaraquemada	Director of Research, Fundación Ciudadano Inteligente.
María Jose Poblete	Executive Director, Proacceso.
Natalia Carfi	Unidad de Modernización del Estado y Gobierno Digital. SEGPRES.
Nicolás Cobo	Professor, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.
Raúl Ferrada Carrasco	General Director, Consejo para la Transparencia.
Rocío Noriega	United Nations Development Program, Chile.
Sebastián Sottorff	Journalist, El Mercurio.
Silvana Fumega	Consultant.

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Chile is a successful open government reformer. The implementing agencies have achieved the targets set in the national action plans for transparency and access to information commitments. These reforms are changing administrative practices and attitudes about transparency and access to information management, but still fall short of reaching the citizens. Chile's success responds to the institutional capacity of public agencies and to the adoption of commitments that are part of their strategic work plans.

However, challenges related to contingent political factors, inter-agency coordination, and monitoring affect the action plans' potential for transforming how the state relates to its citizens. These factors also influence the limited priority that stakeholders attribute to open government processes.