WELL-BEING AND CITIZENSHIP
IN URBAN NIGERIA

JULY 2015

ANDREA RIGON
University College London

SYLVANUS DANGOJI
Ahmadu Bello University

ALEXANDRE APSAN FREDIANI
University College London

STEVE ABAH
Ahmadu Bello University

JULIAN WALKER
University College London

OLUSEGUN OGUNLEYE
University College London

URBANISATION RESEARCH NIGERIA

Prepared by
Rights and Permissions

Except expressly otherwise noted or attributed to a third party, this report is © 2014 ICF International, under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-ShareAlike CC BY-NC-SA.


Comments or enquiries related to this report should be addressed to robin.bloch@icfi.com

Cover photo: Zaria, Nigeria; Nikolaos Papachristodoulou.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................... ii  
ACRONYMS ........................................................................................................ iii  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................... iv  
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1  
EXISTING EVIDENCE ON URBAN WELL-BEING .............................................. 2  
METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................. 7  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................................ 7  
METHODS AND ANALYSIS .............................................................................. 9  
DATA CHALLENGES AND DEFINITIONS ......................................................... 10  
PROCESSES, RELATIONSHIPS AND TRENDS IN URBAN WELL-BEING .......... 12  
REALITY OUTPACING PLANNING: RAPID DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE .................. 12  
GOVERNANCE .................................................................................................. 13  
STRATIFIED CITIZENSHIP .............................................................................. 17  
WELL-BEING OUTCOMES ................................................................................. 19  
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 24  
CONCEPTUALICATION ...................................................................................... 25  
WELL-BEING IN KEY POLICY DOCUMENTS ..................................................... 25  
STAKEHOLDERS’ UNDERSTANDINGS OF WELL-BEING ..................................... 27  
ACHIEVING WELL-BEING ................................................................................ 30  
Policies and interventions .................................................................................. 30  
POLICY CONCERNS ........................................................................................ 34  
CITIZENSHIP PRACTICES ............................................................................... 37  
POLICY FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS ............................................................. 43  
CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................. 45  
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................. 47  
ANNEX 1: CITY PROFILES .............................................................................. 50  
ANNEX 2: ANONYMISED LIST OF INTERVIEWEES ......................................... 54
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank all the people who availed their precious time to this research project, and shared their perspectives and data. A special thanks to the Government of Nigeria, whose civil servants and elected officers at every tier of government have been very open in meeting with us. Many thanks to colleagues at Ahmadu Bello University, Benue State University, University of Lagos, and University of Ibadan. I would also like to thank the entire research team in Nigeria and in the UK (Steve Abah, Sylvanus Dangoji, Julian Walker, Alexandre Apsan Frediani, Olusegun Ogunleye, and Laura Hirst) and acknowledge the support of colleagues at the Bartlett Development Planning Unit. I am grateful to Sarah White and Michael Mattingly for their useful comments. Many thanks to both Dr Robin Bloch and Nikolaos Papachristodoulou at ICF International for their continuing support and coordination.

Dr Andrea Rigon, lead researcher and author
# ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABU</td>
<td>Ahmadu Bello University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Community Development Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Demographic and Health Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPU</td>
<td>Development Planning Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>gender based violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHS</td>
<td>General Household Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGAs</td>
<td>Local Government Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGA</td>
<td>Local Government Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICS</td>
<td>Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPI</td>
<td>Multidimensional Poverty Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBS</td>
<td>National Bureau of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Population Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUDP</td>
<td>National Urban Development Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCL</td>
<td>University College London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URN</td>
<td>Urbanisation Research Nigeria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Well-being is increasingly used as a criterion to measure development outcomes, in the light of the now established critique of income as a satisfactory measure (UNDP, 1990). The aim of the key development policy document in Nigeria, Nigerian Vision 20:2020, is to improve the well-being of Nigerians.

However, as well-being is an emerging and contested concept, this report explores how the well-being of urban citizens is understood specifically in Nigeria, and identifies the key issues for urban well-being as expressed by a selection of key stakeholders in Nigerian society. This is an important task in the Nigerian context, which is characterised by impressive and sustained growth rates juxtaposed alongside increasing rates of both income poverty and subjective poverty.

This study analyses the discourses and views of 45 urban stakeholders strategically positioned at different levels of Nigerian society, as well as existing literature and documents.

Based on White’s (2010) framework for the analysis of well-being and contemporary conceptualisations of citizenship, the analysis reveals three main trends affecting urban well-being: (i) rapid demographic changes that make it difficult for government to respond with adequate planning and interventions; (ii) a number of governance issues, particularly regarding power distribution, lack of city-level governance and the role of the state; (iii) the existence of stratified citizenship characterised by unequal access to services and rights based on socio-spatial discrimination and notions of indigeneity.

Electricity, congestion, housing, youth unemployment, security and health are a number of key areas which were raised during interviews in which the inadequate and unequal provision of goods and services, underpinned by these three trends, affect urban well-being.

An analysis of stakeholders’ conceptualisations of well-being showed how it is viewed in terms of basic needs to be achieved through economic growth, and how well-being is itself considered fundamental for productivity. Well-being was also understood through the broad notion of security, emphasising different dimensions beyond the material aspect.

Finally, another understanding of well-being was as ‘social order’, a problematic idea at the root of existing and proposed policies.

Policies for urban well-being present three characteristics: (i) policies are underpinned by the notion of restoring social order, with chaos and disorder (often associated with informality) seen as a cause of ill-being; (ii) the prominence of middle-class concerns and the exclusion of non-indigenes and those living in poverty; (iii) government being seen as a provider of the enabling environment and infrastructure needed for private sector actors to deliver economic growth which purportedly lead to improved well-being.

These characteristics were present in a number of policy concerns raised by stakeholders, including: decongestion policies; transport and road infrastructure; social security for unemployed; education and food...
security. A generally negative view of urbanisation emerges with a strong emphasis on stopping rural-urban migration as a way to halt urban growth. The research has highlighted a range of very important citizenship practices to deliver goods and services essential to citizens’ well-being. These practices reveal the importance of autonomous collective action in the achievement of well-being. They also show the role that income levels and other social identities such as indigeneity play in such processes. While these processes mostly focus on the delivery of goods and services, in the context of a democratic government still in transition, they also become a platform for voice and the claiming of rights.

A key problem that emerges and requires further research is the issue of the inappropriate planning taking place, which serves particular interests and further entrenches inequalities. The report encourages an open discussion on the current urban governance arrangements in Nigeria, particularly the division of roles between different tiers of government, and also on how city-level governance may enable citizenship practices that complement public interventions.

The report also questions the effectiveness of strategies for urban well-being solely focused on creating an enabling environment for investment and economic growth to address the concerns of the large majority of low-income residents.

In particular, the report indicates that policies often exclude the urban poor and non-indigenes and the removal of these discriminations is necessary for the achievement of well-being for all in Nigerian cities and towns.

Finally, the report acknowledges the importance of the state in providing or regulating the provision of a number of goods, services and infrastructure, whose provision in urban areas is still inadequate.
INTRODUCTION

Well-being is increasingly used as a criterion to measure development outcomes, in view of the now well-established critique of income as a satisfactory measure (UNDP, 1990). The aim of the key development policy document in Nigeria, Nigeria Vision 20:2020, is to improve the well-being of Nigerians.

However, as well-being is an emerging and contested concept, this report explores how the well-being of urban citizens is understood specifically in Nigeria, and identifies the key issues for urban well-being as expressed by key stakeholders. This is an important task in the Nigerian context, which is characterised by impressive and sustained growth rates at the same time as increasing rates of both income and subjective poverty.

The importance of measuring development outcomes through an understanding of well-being is consistent with the interest of the Government of Nigeria in understanding and measuring multi-dimensional poverty and with Nigerian engagement with the Multidimensional Poverty Peer Network. The introduction of the measurement of subjective poverty in Nigeria revealed that many more people than those captured by official standard statistics would consider themselves as poor.

Analysing well-being

Defining well-being is especially challenging because of the different ways in which the concept is understood in different contexts – and by different people. However, rather than being driven by a definition, researchers have focused on dimensions and descriptions (Dodge, Daly, Hufton, & Sanders, 2012). What various authors agree on is the multidimensional character of well-being and the fact that different dimensions are deeply intertwined.

One way of classifying the different dimensions of well-being is through the person-centred framework developed by Sarah White and the Well-being in Developing Countries Research Programme at the University of Bath.

The basic working definition of well-being proposed by White includes: doing well, a material dimension referring to standards of living; feeling good, the subjective perception; as well as a dimension of doing good and feeling well, incorporating the idea of living a good life which emphasises the importance of people’s relationships with others (White, 2010, p. 160).

The framework also considers three interdependent dimensions of well-being: material; relational; and subjective. The material include assets, welfare, and standards of living. The relational is further divided into the social (social relations and access to public goods) and the human (capabilities, attitudes to life, and personal relationships). The subjective comprises two elements: perceptions of one’s own position; and cultural values, ideologies, and beliefs, including the cultural roots of material welfare or standards of living (White, 2010, p. 161).
The list below in Figure 1 further elaborates the different dimensions of well-being.

**Figure 1 White’s dimensions of well-being explained**

- **The material** concerns practical welfare and standards of living.
  - Objective aspects include:
    - income, wealth, and assets
    - employment and livelihood activities
    - levels of consumption.
  - **Subjective aspects include:**
    - satisfaction with income and wealth
    - assessment of one's standard of living compared with others'
    - assessment of present standard of living compared with past.

- **The social** concerns social relations and access to public goods.
  - Objective aspects include:
    - social, political, and cultural identities
    - violence, conflict, and (in )security
    - relations with the state: law, politics, welfare
    - access to services and amenities
    - networks of support and obligation
    - environmental resources.
  - Subjective aspects include:
    - perceptions of safety, respect, and discrimination
    - (di s)satisfaction with access to services
    - assessment of treatment support given or received
    - perceptions of environmental quality.

- **The human** concerns capabilities, attitudes to life, and personal relationships.
  - Objective aspects include:
    - household structure and composition
    - education, information, and skills
    - physical health and (di s)ability
    - relations of love and care.
  - Subjective aspects include:
    - (dis)satisfaction with levels of health, information, skills, education
    - self-concept and personality
    - sense of competence, (in)capability, and scope for influence
    - trust and confidence
    - religious faith.

*Source: White 2010, p. 163. The CC license does not apply to this figure.*

**EXISTING EVIDENCE ON URBAN WELL-BEING**

Existing data on well-being in Nigerian cities is problematic and contested, making it difficult to provide a reliable picture of the situation in urban areas. This is a methodological limitation which will be discussed later in this report. However, there are a number of specific studies from which a variety of indicators can be drawn. These studies therefore provide a general, albeit limited, introduction to frame this report.
The following section outlines well-being indicators categorized according to the dimensions of White’s well-being framework, with a focus on the material and the relational dimensions. The subjective dimension of well-being is not addressed in the literature.

At a broad level, according to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) progress report, on almost all measures, poverty is more prevalent, deeper and severe in rural than in urban areas (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2013, p. 11). In most MDG indicators, the North (particularly North West and North East) is substantially worse off than the South (ibid., p. 11). However, at the same time, the incidence of urban poverty is recorded to be rising, from 35.4% in 2001 to 61.8% in 2010 (Anyanwu, 2012, p.9), and a National Bureau of Statistics report (National Population Commission (NPC) and ICF International, 2014) shows that income inequality is relatively higher in urban areas than in rural areas.

A current and comprehensive indicator of well-being (or lack thereof) is the global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), an international measure of acute poverty which captures the severe deprivations that each person faces at the same time with respect to ten indicators in three dimensions; education, health and living standards. The 2014 Global MPI (using 2011 data) revealed that 43.3% of Nigerians are multidimensionally poor, 25.3% of whom live in severe poverty (OPHI, 2014). In addition to this another 19.3% of Nigerians are vulnerable to poverty. With regards to the urban context, only 16.1% of the people are considered multidimensional poor, 6.3% of whom live in severe poverty, while 21.3% are vulnerable to poverty.

The major indicators contributing to the urban multidimensional poverty in Nigeria are the following: child mortality (any child has died in the family); nutrition (severe undernourishment of any adult or any child); school attendance (no child is attending school up to the age at which they should finish class 6); years of schooling (no household members has completed at least one year of schooling); and cooking fuel (the household cooks with dung, wood or charcoal). The MPI also shows a variation in well-being indicators that demonstrates a major regional divide in the country beyond rural and urban. For instance, while Lagos has an MPI of only 0.011, states in the North West and North East have very high MPI levels (e.g. Kebbi 0.566 and Bauchi 0.600).

Material well-being (assets, welfare, standards of living)

As noted above, income inequality appears to be increasing in cities and is relatively higher in urban areas. Whilst some reports (Deloitte, 2012; Renaissance Capital, 2012) look at the size and incomes of the Nigerian middle class, the majority of whom reside in cities, to determine that a great number of Nigerians have made the jump from poor to middle class, others (Dulani, Mattes, & Logan, 2013; Oduh, 2012; Olokeusi, 2011) contend that rising incomes do not reflect the lived experience of urban residents and that in fact the middle class has experienced increased poverty or is at risk of falling into poverty. The decline of specific manufacturing sectors and the increase in foreign imports has been held responsible by some for exacerbating urban poverty in northern parts of the country (Burgis, 2009 in Potts 2012, p.1389).
Unemployment rates in some key urban centres are as high as 50%, although this figure may not take into account rates of informal employment, which are high; according to a 2003 DFID study, in Lagos up to 70% work in the informal sector (Agunwamba et al., 2009, p. 41) and the majority of residents live at the subsistence level only (Aluko 2010, p. 69). The high cost of living in many Nigerian cities is reflected by data showing that 62.6% of urban household consumption expenditure is spent on food (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2010, p. 56). In addition, in 2006 the incidence of absolute poverty whereby households were experiencing difficulties in satisfying their food needs was just as serious in urban as in rural areas (Potts, 2012, p. 1389). These figures infer a lack of disposable income and therefore inability to build up assets for urban dwellers.

Several articles (John, Mohammed, Pinto, & Nkanta, 2007; Last, 2000; Oruwari, 2006) also point to the economic and social disenfranchisement produced by unemployment and the inability to satisfy basic needs of urban life as reasons that people turn to crime and violence.

Housing is another key requirement in the promotion of material well-being, but access to affordable, quality housing is a huge problem confronting the urban poor in Nigerian cities. Housing construction in Nigeria has not kept pace with demand and there is an estimated deficit of 16 million housing units nationwide (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2010, p. 49), resulting in high costs and inaccessibility to the majority of the population.

Lack of affordable housing for low income citizens facilitates the proliferation of informal settlements in cities. In Lagos, up to 50% of the population lives in informal settlements (Ademiyuli and Solanke 2008, in Agunwamba 2009, p. 42) across some 200 different informal settlements across the city (Gandy, 2006 in Amao, 2012, p. 73). Nationally, UN-HABITAT estimates that 70% of urban populations live in informal settlements (UN-HABITAT, in Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2013, p. 52). The density of urban housing is also a well-being issue; low income households comprise 70% of the urban population but only inhabit 30% of the land (Onukwa, 2005 in Agunwamba 2009, p. 42). Substandard quality of dwellings and a lack of sanitation services in such areas can lead to poor levels of well-being in terms of health.

Relational well-being (social relations, access to public goods)

In terms of social relations, a wide range of literature suggests that Nigeria’s widespread conflict and insecurity stem from the complex relationship of its diverse ethnicities, its historical and political legacy from colonialism and post-colonialism, the oil industry, and poverty and inequality. In addition to this, another body of literature focuses on the distinctly urban character of violence in Nigeria. One reason for this is the concentrated and readily visible inequality and poverty in Nigerian cities. Several articles (John et al., 2007, Last, 2000, Oruwari, 2006) point to the economic and social disenfranchisement produced by unemployment and the inability to satisfy basic needs of urban life as reasons that people turn to crime and violence. This trend has distinct age and gender components, with the research indicating that some uneducated youth view participation in gangs as legitimate work (Oruwari, 2006) and that young
male urban migrants feel frustrated and undignified as their poverty means they cannot marry back home (Last, 2000). Some households move to other informal settlements farther away from livelihoods and community in order to escape the violence (Oruwari, 2006).

Residents of informal settlements are often stigmatised because of the violence their neighbourhoods are known for (Amao, 2012) to the detriment of their economic and social opportunities. Increasing crime has an overarching detrimental effect on the well-being of all members of society (Nwaubani, 2013) but an overwhelmingly biased effect on the urban poor and those living in informal settlements.

There is also evidence that suggests that experiences of gender based violence (GBV) are higher in urban areas than rural, and that women in particular experience higher rates of GBV from both partners and relatives in cities (Okemgbo, Omideyi and Odimegwu, 2002 in Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2010, p.62), and when travelling to urban areas for work (Usman 2010). At the same time, data from the 2013 National Demographic and Health Survey (NPC and ICF International, 2014) shows that women in urban areas are more likely to participate in household decision making than their rural counterparts, possibly as a result of the shifts in social and cultural structures that attend increasing rates of urbanisation and female participation in the workforce (Corroon et al, 2013).

Access to public goods and services is an integral aspect of relational well-being. In urban areas, demand for such services has increased along with rates of urbanisation but quality and coverage has not increased at the same pace (Olotuah, 2002 in Lanrewaju, 2012). Sanitation is a significant well-being issue in Nigerian cities; whilst 75.6% are reported to have access to improved drinking water since 2008 (NPC and ICF International, 2014, p.12), an estimated 22% of urban dwellers lack access to adequate sanitation facilities, and up to 60% depend on shared pit latrines (Ademiluyi, 2008, p.179).

However, these figures vary greatly from state to state, from less than 10% access in Zamfara and Ogun states to 67% in Gombe state (NPC and ICF International, 2014). A lack of sanitary landfills and waste collection services is also common in many cities. These sanitation conditions create health hazards, whilst also increasing household burdens, particularly for women who tend to take responsibility for healthcare in the household. Increased household expenditure can also result from the need to access sanitation and health services privately.

In some national reports (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2010a), health is treated more as a barrier to economic progress than an intrinsic component of well-being. The literature indicates general improvements nationally in health outcomes such as infant mortality rates, maternal health, and HIV/AIDS. Whilst most data available on health does not focus specifically on urban health issues, infant and childhood mortality rates have been falling year on year since 1999, with rates consistently lower in urban than rural areas, and HIV/AIDS prevalence in urban areas is estimated to be about double that of rural areas (10.1% and 5.7% respectively) (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2013, p. 44). Urban residents have access to three times the number of doctors and twice the number of nurses and midwives than rural residents (Uneke et al. 2008 in
Agunwamba et al 2009:46). However these achievements remain problematic especially with regards to gender inequality (Agunwamba, 2009; Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2010a; Hagen-Zanker & Homes, 2012) and urban socio-spatial inequalities, which may impact on substantive access within urban populations to such services.

Nigeria has one of the lowest rates of primary school enrolment in the world, with significant gender imbalances in some regions (Agunwamba, 2009; Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2010a). Even though Nigeria is making progress with basic primary education enrolment, other studies (Oruwari, 2006; Uwaifo Oyelere, 2010) show that “returns on education” are falling, as school achievement does not guarantee employment. Urban dwellers are ostensibly more able to access education than their rural counterparts and literacy rates are higher in urban areas than rural areas for children (45% vs 19%) (Agunwamba, 2009, p.5), and for women (87% urban, 57% rural) (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2013, p.21), although there still exist marked discrepancies in school enrolment rates between sexes; gross enrolment ratios nationally have been consistently over 10% higher for boys than for girls (Hagen-Zanker and Holmes, 2012, p.6).

The above data provides a snapshot of a number of material and relational urban well-being indicators in Nigeria. It is important to note however, that whilst there are noticeable differences between rural and urban contexts, there exist equally important regional inequalities that impact on well-being, due to factors such as sub-national financial autonomy, differences in size, population, socio-economic conditions and resources, giving rise to variations in poverty and vulnerability between cities located in different states. For instance, Hagen-Zanker and Holmes (2012) quote a UNDP example of poverty rates in states of Bayelsa and Jigawa as 20% and 90% respectively.

Within this context, this report’s exploratory research is based on semi-structured interviews with key actors in various sectors and cities. The report is structured as follows.

The next section presents the theoretical framework and the methodology for the research, including an overview of research participants.

The findings and analysis section is divided into three main subsections. The first outlines the processes, relationships and trends in urban well-being emerging from the analysis of key stakeholder interviews and from supporting secondary literature. The second explores different conceptualisations of well-being in Nigeria, as expressed by the categories of stakeholder interviewed. The third analyses the processes to achieve well-being and is divided into two parts. The first part explores policies and interventions to achieve the well-being of citizens, which are either implemented by different public authorities, or proposed by research participants. The second part looks at ‘people’s practices’ – the ways in which citizens individually or collectively pursue their well-being.

Finally, policy findings and recommendations are outlined before the conclusions and implications for future research.
METHODOLOGY

This section is divided in two parts. The first introduces the theoretical framework and the second briefly presents the methodology used in this research.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The framework through which this research seeks to achieve its aims is based on the assumption that different stakeholders build their understandings of well-being drawing upon different discourses, and that these understandings are deployed to make sense of the urban context, and of the processes, relationships and trends that affect well-being.

On the basis of these understandings, different stakeholders articulate the different planned interventions needed to achieve well-being (i.e. a broad range of intentional actions to achieve well-being, including changes in the legal framework, policies, and development programmes). The research also considers advocacy activities to obtain some of these interventions. A fourth category relates to the practices that various groups engage with to achieve well-being or claim citizenship rights.

In terms of well-being, this study has adopted White’s (2010) analytical framework, which identified three main dimensions explained above. Another fundamental element of the White’s framework is how it views well-being as the outcome of the interplay between individual and collective processes. The approach developed by White understands well-being not as a state that people experience but as a process, hence the objective of this research in people’s practices to achieve well-being.

In the analysis of well-being, this report also analyses the related concept of citizenship, through a similar framework (e.g. urban context; discourses; planned interventions).

“Citizenship is about belonging to a group or community and about the rights and responsibilities associated with such membership. In addition to being about a status, that confers rights and obligations, citizenship is also a practice whereby people are able to participate in shaping their societies. It implies not only rights and responsibilities, but also interaction and influence within the community (Meer & Sever, 2004, p. 12).”

Therefore, “Citizenship as participation can be seen as representing an expression of human agency in the political arena, broadly defined; citizenship as rights enables people to act as agents (Lister, 1997, p. 228).”

Citizenship complements the understanding of well-being in two main ways. First, it contributes to identify the relevance of membership to different groups for the analysis of well-being and the scale of these memberships (local, state, national, etc.). Second, citizenship offers a lens to explore who defines the rights to well-being of different social groups. In particular, these two aspects of citizenship claims, and how they are understood in Nigeria, are further analysed through two dimensions.
Figure 2 Aspects of citizenship

Groups/scales
This dimension of citizenship relates to the relevant groupings around which claims and rights are structured. The analysis of groups may imply looking at membership beyond the national level, e.g. Islam, global business community, etc. In considering these groupings it is important to review the priority given to individual (e.g. market based) or collective (e.g. traditional group membership) claims, and how such claims are structured around diverse social identities (e.g. gender, ethnicity, class).

Defining entitlements and priorities
This dimension of citizenship relates to how claims are made and rights are understood. Specifically, are urban citizens considered active social subjects who contribute to define their rights and struggle for recognition? Or are they seen as passive subjects acquiring legal rights granted by an external authority? Secondly are citizenship rights understood in formal or substantive terms? And how does this affect well-being? Formal citizenship refers to legal rights as opposed to substantive citizenship, the de facto realisation of such rights.

“Formal membership without substantive citizenship characterizes many of the societies which have experienced recent transitions to democracy and market capitalism [...] Although in theory full access to rights depends on membership, in practice that which constitutes citizenship substantively is often independent of its formal status. In other words, formal membership in the nation-state is increasingly neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for substantive citizenship (Holston & Appadurai, 1996, p. 190).”

Following these considerations it is important to understand which groups are salient for what type of citizenship and related aspects of well-being in Nigeria. For example, some formal citizenship rights revolve around national (Nigerian) citizenship but the actual substantiation of rights is in

Source: Own elaboration.
practice dependent on group membership (e.g. indigeneity) as practised at state level.

While this research acknowledges the complexity of well-being, it mostly focuses on two issues as entry points to explore well-being and citizenship: infrastructure and services; and insecurity. These have been identified by looking at the scope of the wider URN initiative (both future research projects in Theme C and projects under the other themes) and at key concerns in existing literature. The framework is summarised in the figure below.

Figure 3 Visual representation of the theoretical framework

Source: Own elaboration.

METHODS AND ANALYSIS

A list of key stakeholder types in Nigerian cities was prepared and individuals were identified. A total of 45 semi-structured interviews were conducted. This research collected the views of policy-makers as well as policy implementers, i.e. civil servants at different tiers of government. Some 21 participants were working in Government: 6 for Local Government (LG); 8 for State Government (SG); and 7 for Federal
Of these 6 were politicians (PO) either elected (e.g. members of state assemblies, LG chairmen) or appointed (e.g. state commissioners) and 15 civil servants (CS).

These were complemented by the views of a range of 19 civil society members (CS). Ten of these 19 civil society members were classified under the broad umbrella of community (COMM), including religious leaders, leaders of ethnic groups, and members of community organisations. Three were identified as members of professional organisations (PRO), while 6 were NGO staff (NGO).

Finally, 5 participants were from research institutions (Res). 13 participants were based in Abuja (A), 23 in Lagos (L), 3 in Zaria (Z), 3 in Kaduna (K), 2 in Ibadan (I) and one in Makurdi. Many participants occupied senior positions within their organisations (e.g. permanent secretary, executive director, director, chairman, traditional king), chosen because their views were more likely to have an impact on national discourses and policies. Further URN research under the theme of Urban Well-being will consider the perspectives of the residents of a low-income neighbourhood. Research participants comprised 36 males (M) and 9 females (F), reflecting the gender imbalance at the top of selected organisations. A table in the annex presents an anonymised summary of all research participants.

Interviews were transcribed and analysed through Qualitative Data Analysis Software NVivo 10, which retrieved answers to the same questions or on the same topic classified by specific stakeholder characteristics, facilitating the identification of patterns. The use of software made it easy to compare views and triangulate information. An inductive process of analysis revealed emerging patterns and discourses amongst interviewees that are presented in the findings section. The progressive analysis of interviews revealed that the dataset had reached saturation in that additional interviews did not add new substantial issues to the analysis, confirming that the findings cover the major discourses on the topic in urban Nigeria.

DATA CHALLENGES AND DEFINITIONS

This research identifies key issues for urban well-being, and the authors have confidence in the quality of the analysis of the findings presented. However, the reliability of the quantitative data available on urban areas to support the processes and trends identified by key stakeholders has limitations. Not only are there discrepancies from different sources, but the way rural and urban areas are classified by law and by the National

---

1 Nigeria is a federal republic made up of 36 states. Each state is divided in a number of Local Government Areas (LGAs), currently 774 in Nigeria.

2 Quotes from interviews are referenced in the text. For example, (8, SG, PO, M, L) means that the quote is from Research participant No. 8 (the number allows the reader to identify other contribution from the same participants in the text), that he is working for the State Government (SG) in a political position (PO), is male and from Lagos. (11, FG, CS, F, A) Research participant No. 11 is working as a civil servant (CS) for the Federal Government (FG), is Female and based in Abuja.
Population Commission (NPC) presents several problems. These challenges add to the already complex task of producing such data in the fast-changing Nigerian urban context.

There is an overlap of public bodies providing statistics. For example, State Governments have their own statistical offices which work independently from the National Bureau of Statistics. There are often considerable differences and disputes over the statistics provided by the Federal Government and State governments, since federal funding allocations to states are linked to population.³

A major challenge in discussing urban Nigeria is the problematic definition of an urban area and therefore the difficulties in using existing statistics. Definitions are never neutral but in the case of Nigeria they become particularly political. Government and research institutions have adopted the definition of the National Planning Commission which is based on population size and the presence of local government headquarters. However, considering that some Local Government Areas (LGAs) were established under political influences (since they bring resources and employment), they may not be located in what would be considered urban according to more standard population criteria. Moreover, most data is collected at LGA level but LGAs often cover both urban and rural areas. Therefore it is not possible to simply aggregate LGA data to obtain a full picture. Furthermore, different levels of government have responsibility for land allocation depending on whether an area is declared urban as opposed to rural. Governors have the power to declare an area urban⁴ which allows them to make planning decisions autonomously from traditional leaders and Local Governments. Non-urban areas are allocated by Local Governments. Any land one kilometre on both sides of a federal highway is also considered urban for planning purposes. As a result of these issues, staff at one of the most important federal-funded research centres admitted to a lack of reliable data on the population size of cities and towns.

³ Statistical conflicts, often linked to fund allocation, appear to be stronger when states are ruled by a different political party than the one in power at the Federal level.
⁴ Section 3 of the 1978 Land Use Act
The aim of this section is to present a picture of what key stakeholders consider to be the factors affecting well-being in Nigerian cities. Of great interest are findings that do not relate to single factors but to how key stakeholders understand the intersection of multiple factors and their relationships, and how these affect urban well-being.

Three broad trends emerged during discussions about the capacity of the Nigerian state to substantively deliver the well-being priorities of citizens, as well as in terms of the ability of Nigerian citizens to make claims. These relate to rapidly changing demographic and development realities; governance issues; and stratified systems of citizenship structured, in particular, around indigeneity.

REALITY OUTPACING PLANNING: RAPID DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE

A major commonality that emerged across the majority of stakeholders interviewed, particularly civil servants at state and federal levels, is that the speed of urbanisation is outpacing the capacity of government authorities to plan adequately. The rate of urban population growth is such that infrastructure and services development is left lagging and as a result, it is becoming more and more difficult for the government to keep up with the needs of the urban population (19, Res, F, I).

Urban planning in a broad sense is considered critical to ensure well-being in cities. Its perceived failure in Nigeria was therefore seen as a major factor affecting urban well-being. Civil servants raised the issue of working in a reactive mode to situations rather than proactively planning ahead. Some civil service professionals expressed frustration with constantly tackling emergencies rather than working with a consistent long-term plan to address their causes. Whilst some planning was perceived as unrealistic in the first place, other more realistic plans were felt to be disrupted by political interference. Often politicians disregarded professionally-prepared plans responding to local needs in order to pursue their own agendas. These kind of political interferences featured heavily in relation to the disruption of planned land use and allocation (27, FG, CS, M, A). Other related factors, which are analysed further later in this report, regard the difficulties of government actors to view urbanisation as a positive phenomenon and their emphasis on the need to halt rural-urban migration. Another discourse shared by both civil society members and
civil servants concerned the difficulty of implementing existing policies for well-being due to a lack of a system of independent monitoring implementation, the funding process, and corrupt practices (12, CS, NGO, M, K).

A significant example of the speed of urbanisation and unrealistic plans reported by civil servants concerns the plans for the development of the new Nigerian capital, Abuja. The development of the city has been planned in different phases, with each phase designed for a predicted number of inhabitants. At each phase, population predictions significantly underestimated reality yet subsequent plans did not take into considerations of actual growth.

GOVERNANCE

Issues related to poor governance were seen as the main factor affecting urban well-being in Nigerian cities. This section explores particular issues related to governance as identified by key stakeholders, divided into five subsections.

Power distribution across levels of government

Political leaders and civil servants working across the three tiers of government felt that one process seriously affecting their capacity to contribute to citizens’ well-being is the inappropriate level of government exercising authority on specific issues. This was attributed to different processes. Most responsibilities and powers of each level of government are set out in the 1999 Nigerian constitution, and whilst some responsibilities appear justified in terms of maintaining national unity in a complex country, others appear to fulfil the interests of the existing political national elite (Helly, 2012). In other cases, through institutional practices some levels of government have appropriated powers and responsibilities officially belonging to another level of government (NBS, 2012). The issue is not only vertical (between Local Government, State Government, Federal Government) but also horizontal, for instance between departments in different ministries.

In the Nigerian context, relationships between government actors are characterised by competition over power and resources, making coordination difficult. This was an issue that was clearly highlighted by civil servants. These conflicts, particularly between state governments and the federal government, often intersect with party politics, and are exacerbated where federal and state governments are controlled by competing parties.

Several examples were given which clarify the connection to well-being between the governance issues arising from federal and state conflict of interests.

5 The Biafra Civil War of secession 1967-1970 has led to a further centralisation to promote national unity and prevent powerful governors to challenge the federal state.
In Nigeria, main roads come under the control of the Federal Government, which includes a number of important corridors within the city of Lagos. Civil servants gave the example of a five year delay in the implementation of a major public transport infrastructure project which required the use of a federal road, due to complex political negotiations between the Government of Lagos and the Federal Government (which are controlled by different political parties). As public transport is a critical sector for urban well-being, such delays have had a major impact. Similar delays and associated well-being impacts were encountered during plans for a better use of the railway system, which is under federal control.

Another major example highlighted was the lack of state police. Politicians at all levels emphasised the need for a state police force. Responsibility for the police lies with the federal government and states are prohibited from creating their own forces. Governors therefore do not have autonomy to develop a strategy to fully tackle the issue of security at the state level. However, Lagos state complements its federal allocation for policing with additional equipment, training, salaries, and insurance through a private-public security fund. The demand for state police is a particularly controversial issue considering the political competition between the administrations of Lagos State and central government, past threats of secession in some regions of Nigeria, and the importance of the security issue at present.

Similar issues are experienced in terms of control over electricity. The electricity sector is regulated by the Federal Government. Whilst states are not allowed to produce and sell electricity to private users, they can produce it for the government’s own use. This has led to Lagos government achieving a more stable supply for their public buildings, including hospitals, and public lighting positively affecting government productivity, health services, and security – all important factors for urban well-being.

In addition to conflicts and competition between state and federal government levels, many public institutions overlap horizontally, carrying out work in parallel and claiming power on the same issues, without coordination (13 Res, M, M). One example cited here was the difficulty of accessing information on gender-based violence. Interviewees reported that different agencies (e.g. the Office of the Public Defender, the Police, and the Ministry of Women Affairs) collect their own information but coordination between them is very limited.

One issue that interviewees felt to be connected in multiple ways to well-being is the concentration of power in the hands of State Governors, and their relationships with Local Government Areas. LGAs receive a federal funding allocation which is managed through a joint account with the state government. However the state government often exercises power over the management of these finances, effectively capturing this allocation and resulting in a relationship of patronage (UN-Habitat 2012). This seriously compromises the financial and political autonomy of LGAs, and their capacity to plan and respond to the specific needs of their citizens. For example, civil servants working in LGAs in Kaduna State argued that such governance arrangements and related bureaucratic practices make it very difficult for LGAs to implement their plans (25, LG, CS, M, Z). Political
interference, shifting priorities and Governors put pressure on LGA chairmen to shift their agendas. Often, Governors take over LGA functions in order to build political consensus. One such example is the building of access roads; Governors often hold back the LGA allocation in order to implement the building of access roads autonomously, despite the law mandating local governments to do so. This often means that governors build roads strategically to maximise political support rather than according to need.

Additionally, LGA budgets are made yearly at a local level but there is a lengthy, bureaucratic process for the budget to be approved and the funds released. In Kaduna State for example, most infrastructure projects (e.g. boreholes, road construction) cannot be implemented during the rainy season. Therefore, due to the delay in approving budgets and releasing funds, only some planned projects can be implemented and very often these are not the most important/needed (25, LG, CS, M, Z). The NBS, UNDP and UN-Habitat report on governance in Nigeria explores how many constitutional roles assigned to LGAs are taken over by higher authorities, concluding that, while there are huge differences across Nigeria, the denial of LGAs autonomy is unconstitutional (NBS, 2012, p. 130).

The problem of political leadership where power is concentrated in the hands of governors and not shared with local government was consistently raised, although some questioned the capacity of local authorities to take on responsibility, should more power be devolved to them (14, SG, CS, M, K).

**Lack of city-level governance**

In relation to the ability of urban citizens to actively pursue claims for their well-being priorities, a critical issue is that Nigeria lacks city-level governance. No city has a democratically elected city-level government. To some extent, the only exception is the city-state of Lagos as the city has expanded to cover most of the territory of the state (and actually extending beyond the state), effectively rendering the Governor of Lagos State an elected mayor of the mega-city. Another exception is Abuja and its Federal Capital Territory Administration, which does provide some city level governance, but is effectively a ministry of the federal government rather than a body that democratically represents the capital’s residents.

For all other cities, the number of uncoordinated local government bodies makes consistent city-level planning difficult, particularly in cities which are not state capitals. For example, the city of Ibadan is spread out over five LGAs, Kaduna over four (although two also cover areas outside the city) and Zaria two. As mentioned previously, these bodies often have limited power and report directly to state governors without an intermediary authority at city level.

This lack of unified governance can increase divisions in cities. For example, in Kaduna the administrative separation of the city – which reflects the religious divide – can make it more difficult to overcome sectarian conflicts between Christian and Muslims. Different LGAs may also be run by different parties making coordination even more difficult. Moreover, the areas covered by local governments also include some rural or peri-urban areas, meaning that local government departments must
plan rural as well as urban interventions. Small towns generally occupy the area of just one LGA; however, LGAs are still weak and lack autonomy from state government.

**Capacity in public officers**

Respondents from both the civil service and civil society highlighted a lack of capacity and leadership amongst some public sector workers (both elected LGA officers and civil servants) as a factor undermining the delivery of infrastructure and services needed to enhance the well-being of urban residents. Specifically, respondents expressed concern around political leaders’ lack of knowledge and awareness of urban processes, resulting in inappropriate policies. An exception was made for the Lagos Governor and his administration, whose leadership capacities were acknowledged by government and professional interviewees. A concern of civil servants and researchers was also the dearth of accurate and available data. They argued that data is the fundamental starting point to understand existing problems and plan solutions.

It was noted that the way the civil service is structured makes it difficult to attract high quality employees. This was exemplified by responses from professionals working for externally-funded public agencies who constantly emphasised that they were not civil servants and would not consider joining the civil service.

**Democracy**

There was unanimous agreement on the importance of 15 years of uninterrupted democracy and associated political stability as a precondition for enhanced well-being in cities. However, it was also recognised that Nigeria’s is still a democracy in transition. It is a country in which citizens still fear challenging authority to claim basic rights and therefore in which a truly inclusive democracy has not yet been achieved. The legacy of the years of military regimes prevails in terms of people not claiming some of their rights and accepting some levels of abuse. It was argued that confidence in the dividends of democracy and political stability has created a conducive environment for investment which led to three million tax payers in Lagos.

**Weakness of the state as regulator**

A widely shared perspective was that there are areas in which the government is still unable to perform its function as a regulator (and enforcer of such regulations) of private sector activities in a way that benefits the public and creates conducive competition (31, CS, NGO, M, L). This was attributed to a lack of an adequate legal framework but also as the result of entrenched institutional practices protecting specific private sector interests.
STRATIFIED CITIZENSHIP

Another set of processes affecting well-being relate to how citizenship rights are unequally granted. Two specific processes were identified: (i) As a basis for citizenship rights, indigeneity linked to the state of origin of a citizen (or their parents) is often more important than belonging to the Nigerian state; and (ii) socio-spatial inequalities affecting the distribution of well-being and ill-being.

Indigeneity

Being an indigene or not provides differential access to services and rights. Respondents mentioned several times that being in another Nigerian state can be worse than being abroad in this respect. This also reflects a distinction between formal and substantive citizenship rights as reflected in the quotations below:

“The law says that after five years in another state residents are supposed to have the same rights [as indigenes], but the practice is very different. It is not even possible to contest as a councillor. It is like going abroad (22, Res, M, A).”

“Nobody has been granted this citizenship or indigene ship in this very particular place once you are from outside unlike what happens maybe in America [where], after some time, you will be now called an American citizen. There is no nobody from outside Kaduna State who is not an Hausa man that is an indigene, you are not given an indigeneship certificate even though you have stayed there for so many years. [...] I mentioned one now, the indigene certificate, we don’t get the indigene certificate, and that should be the beginning because I have stayed here how many years, all my children they are still indigenes of Imo State, if you want to do something they say go to your own local government area to collect it and that is what we have been doing. (21, CS, COMM, M, Z).”

However, it is very difficult to document processes of inequality and exclusion based on indigeneity. This is a highly political issue about which clear data does not exist (National Bureau of Statistics [NBS] surveys are based on residence and do not contain data on indigeneity\(^6\)). Whilst Nigerian law and the constitution legislate against discrimination, in practice exclusion of non-indigenes varies greatly across states and socio-economic class. Despite being born in a state, people can be excluded from scholarships and other services and told to seek such requests from the LGA of their parents’ origin.

This discrimination also has implications for the capacity of people to run for political office. It is important to note that indigeneity is bestowed through patrilineal descent and therefore, the children of an indigene mother may be excluded from her indigene rights. This idea of not being

\(^6\) With the only exception of the census which actually presents other challenges with people returning to their state of origins to be counted there.
able to become part of the host community is strongly rooted in culture. The following Nigerian saying, a version of which can be found in every part of the country, illustrates the pervasiveness of this trend: “No matter how long the bush cat has stayed in the house, it is not an house cat.”

Issues of indigeneity become more salient in the context of increasing insecurity. Some states have instituted policies of compulsory registration for security reasons. This has generated feelings of discrimination in people from the north of Nigeria who feel they have been associated with the Boko Haram insurgency when in reality they have suffered most from the crisis. These policies were recently outlawed by the Federal Government.

The Lagos government has allegedly evicted some Nigerians from the state who were considered ‘idle’. A representative of an ethnic minority in Lagos expressed his concerns:

“I don’t buy that idea of sending people back to their own state like for instance me, I just told you my family has been here for one hundred and fifty years, if you ask me to go back to where I am coming from in Jigawa State, where will I start from? I am a twelfth generation here in Lagos state now where will I start from? You are telling me to go and start from scratch from nowhere. [...] I don’t believe in sending somebody out from his own country because we are all from Nigeria (26, CS, COMM, M, L).”

Two other types of discriminatory practices against non-indigenes were identified. It was argued that areas of the cities with a high presence of non-indigenes received a worse provision of public infrastructure. The issue of it being a more difficult process to access land for non-indigenes was also raised.

The concerns raised by stakeholders were also presented in an extensive report on this issue by Human Rights Watch (2006). The report states that policies initially created to protect cultural identity and autonomy have been perverted into unacceptable discrimination. For instance, many states refuse to employ non-indigenes in their state civil services, and most if not all states deny academic scholarships to non-indigenes. Moreover, state universities charge higher fees to non-indigenes. This is in addition to the barriers to political rights and access to services and infrastructure to these communities (Human Rights Watch, 2006).

“Taken as a whole, these discriminatory policies and practices effectively relegate many non-indigenes to the status of second-class citizens [...] Nigeria is home to communities of people who are discriminated against as non-indigenes even though their families have occupied their land for a century or more and no longer have any idea where their ancestors migrated from. A Nigerian who cannot prove that he is an indigene of somewhere by producing a “certificate of indigeneity” is discriminated against in every state of the federation and is barred from many opportunities at the federal level as well. [...] government policies that enhance the importance of Indigeneity have heightened intercommunal divisions because they have served to erode the very meaning and importance of national citizenship, subordinating it in many respects to Nigerians’ ethnicity and
ancestry. Indeed, in many important respects state and local governments treat their non-indigene constituents like citizens of a foreign country. (Human Rights Watch, 2006, pp. 1-2).”

**Urban informality and inequalities**

There is a general trend in the spatial inequality of distribution of well- and ill-being. In Lagos, for example, there exists immense socio-spatial inequality, with the majority of residents living in informal settlements. People living in these areas are subject to massive forced displacement and eviction without the provision of alternatives, particularly in Lagos and Abuja. Compensation and resettlement policies only cover the few who hold titles to land. These processes lead to the destruction of livelihoods. To settle in a particular slum location, people make physical, financial and psychological investments over a number of years. They also build livelihoods around their current living arrangements. Starting from scratch all over again due to eviction may dramatically affect their well-being, particularly for those already facing other challenges such as debt, poor health, and old age.

In one example given, government officials publicly denied the demolition of a settlement claiming that it was a dumping site. Residents had been relocated there by the government after the area where they originally settled had been cleared to build the national theatre. Despite having been relocated there by the government, the government not only proceeded with evictions but denied the existence of residents. Human rights organisations had to obtain satellite images of the area to demonstrate to the government that it had indeed destroyed a settlement, after refusing to listen to the protests of residents.

Another example is within the Municipality of Abuja, where in July 2014, 761 street vendors were arrested, resulting in the conviction of 674. Not only are urban policies designed for the rich but some policies directly destroy the livelihoods of the urban poor operating in the informal sector. When discrimination on the basis of indigeneity intersects with economic/socio-spatial inequality and high levels of chronic poverty in Nigeria, these two trends become extremely harmful for the well-being of many urban Nigerians.

**WELL-BEING OUTCOMES**

The three trends described above were seen as underpinning factors affecting the coordination and equitable delivery of goods and services essential for citizens’ well-being. A number of key areas in which such goods and services are inadequate to ensure the majority of citizens’ well-being were raised during interviews. These are described below.

**Electricity**

All interviews emphasised the provision of reliable electricity as a fundamental priority to ensure urban well-being, directly and indirectly. It was argued that everything depends on power, even the idea of the city itself:
“...in an urban city, it is not urban if there is no electricity, it is a forest if electricity is not functioning at all. Once electricity is poor, people have to run a generator at a higher cost. In Nigeria we assume that we pay three times higher than what we should be paying because of the absence of electricity. For example I paid a thousand naira which is about four pounds to have a haircut but if there is constant electricity I will pay half of that (42, CS, PRO, M, L).”

The lack of a reliable power supply was highlighted as a particular problem for households and businesses. The use of private generators is very costly and thus reduces available household income for other expenditures. The use of generators is also a serious health hazard: faulty generators can cause fatal fires, in addition to severe noise and air pollution from the fumes (19, Res, F, I).

One major impact on well-being caused by the poor electricity supply concerns its effects on employment. The lack of reliable electricity affects a number of professions: those thought to be most affected included carpenters, welders (who rely on quality as well as reliability), barbers and shopkeepers. Moreover, the lack of reliable provision of electricity and the consequent use of generators substantially increase the costs of products and services as well as reducing profit margins.

At a broader level, impacts such as deindustrialisation, low levels of manufacturing employment and output and loss of competitiveness in Nigeria were cited. The poor electricity supply was also mentioned as an important factor in the closure of textile, aluminium and other industries in Kaduna. Moreover, it also affects the productivity of public institutions and government offices. Interviewees had positive expectations for the upcoming privatisation process and expressed people’s willingness to pay more if this meant gaining access to a reliable supply.

**Congestion**

All stakeholders identified traffic congestion as negatively affecting the well-being of urban citizens. Congestion is a constant feature of the daily life of every inhabitant in Lagos and Abuja, affecting productivity, psychological and physical health (e.g. 23, SG, CS, F, L). It was also argued that traffic congestion disproportionately affects women with childcare responsibilities. Long commutes affect well-being through stress, tiredness, lost time and angry feelings:

> “People leave home as early as 4:30am to get to work by 8am, they leave their homes by 4:30am and get to work by 7 am and sleep in their cars till 8 am, then resume work. That is seriously reducing the quality of life and the health of such people are affected and so that is another thing I consider as very vulnerable to good living (42, CS, PRO, M, L).”

The concentration of activities in some parts of the city is thought to contribute to traffic congestion, particularly as the city continues to grow. For example, federal civil servants looked critically at the concentration of government ministries and other government agencies in the city centre of Abuja, considering it to directly affect congestion.
In Lagos, a major cause of congestion, at least in some areas, is the daily passage of over 5,000 trucks (as estimated by the Government of Lagos). These trucks contribute to air pollution and represent a security risk. Some 3,000 of these vehicles are tankers transporting oil products refined abroad and brought back into the country. The passage of most of these trucks could be avoided if Nigeria gets its refineries and pipelines working again, as well as putting its existing rail network to effective use.

Urban well-being is also affected indirectly due to reduced economic productivity caused by everyday traffic congestion. This loss of productivity was emphasised by every level of stakeholder interviewed, with senior civil servants complaining that they are unable to discipline workers for arriving late and leaving early, considering the time spent travelling to work. In one interview, a policy analyst quoted research revealing that the average urban worker in Nigeria loses two hours of productivity each day due to traffic:

“We have discovered that the productive hours of a Nigerian urban worker is about four hours in a day because he gets to work tired by 8am so basically has to unwind, relax and chill for the better part of the morning hours. So productivity actually starts at about 11am to 2pm then lunch and after lunch everybody’s mind is ‘how do I get home. So productivity again drops by 2pm because people have to see how they can beat the traffic by 2:30pm-4pm to get home by 6pm. So the actual productive hours of an urban Nigerian work are about 4-5 hours daily. In a very productive country, productivity is a minimum of 6-7 hours daily. That is two hours short in Nigeria (42, NGO, PRO, M, L).”

Traffic congestion was not only strongly identified as an important issue in large cities such as Lagos and Abuja but also in smaller cities such as Kaduna, where people interviewed felt the situation was rapidly deteriorating. Despite remaining a major issue, stakeholders interviewed acknowledged significant recent improvements in the traffic situation in Lagos and Ibadan due to major infrastructure interventions. Stakeholders recognised ambitious public transport plans in Lagos involving Bus Rapid Transit (BRT), modern monorails, metrocables and the use of waterways. However, concerns remained over the affordability of some of these interventions as well as difficulties with implementation and maintenance, demonstrated in relation to the BRT (e.g. poor training of bus operators as well as the large number of non-operating buses due to poor maintenance) (Res, F, L). Future URN research will explore how urban mobility and transit policies and practices address equity concerns.

**Housing**

The particular housing context of Nigerian cities impacts greatly on the well-being of urban citizens. Large numbers of residents live in inadequate shelter due to a housing shortage and to the unaffordability of existing housing. Stakeholders interviewed argued that the lack of a well-functioning mortgage system and very high interest rates make it difficult to buy houses, although a mortgage market is developing. Moreover, access to land and titling often requires a complex and costly process. One of the constraints related to building new homes relates to planning
standards which are considered too high to house the existing urban population. Another factor contributing to high house prices is that wealthy people increasingly use housing to store wealth, particularly due to rigid controls on exporting capital.

Rent prices are high and new tenants are often asked to pay two years rent in advance. Thereafter, rent is generally paid in advance on a yearly basis. This impacts on the amount of disposable income available to tenants. People also tend to live far from their place of work due to issues of affordability, with long commuting times affecting their well-being as described previously.

Senior civil servants complained that none of the government programmes supposedly providing affordable houses was actually affordable for civil servants on middle class incomes. Civil servants in Lagos, Kaduna and Abuja expressed that rent levels were affecting their well-being.

Youth unemployment in cities

Unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, was seen as a major factor affecting material and social dimensions of well-being. According to most interviewees youth unemployment not only affects the well-being of young people but that of society as a whole due to its connection with young people engaging in criminal activities in cities.

Security

Different types of insecurity severely undermine well-being in urban Nigeria. The effects of the insurgency were prominent in all discussions. Boko Haram was seen as part of a global phenomenon but interviewees acknowledged that Nigeria was less prepared than other countries in how to deal with this threat. The spread of the Boko Haram insurgency was specifically connected to a lack of basic needs and the failure to deliver development in those areas of the country primarily affected.

As well as being a result of underdevelopment, the insurgency was seen as impacting on future development and ultimately on the well-being of citizens. The delivery of infrastructure (e.g. road-building) in particular is impeded by the presence of the insurgency (14, SG, CS, M, K). It was also argued that such insecurity is hindering investment in the affected areas (23, LG, CS, M, L). The withdrawal of investment from the north was a cause for concern and, in the long-term, could exacerbate the North-South divide in terms of development.

The insurgency was also seen as causing two types of migration. The first flow concerns indigene people leaving the epicentre of the insurgency in the North-East to escape Boko Haram and state violence (31, Res, NGO, M, L). The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that 650,000 have already left their residences. The second flow includes non-indigene traders and other business people residing in the north of the country, who no longer feel safe and can relocate their activities to their state of origin or elsewhere (e.g. Igbo business owners in Zaria). Many interviewed in Lagos and Abuja were concerned about the further influx of people to these cities. The following quote outlines some of the trends resulting from recent insurgency:

Youth unemployment in cities

Unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, was seen as a major factor affecting material and social dimensions of well-being. According to most interviewees youth unemployment not only affects the well-being of young people but that of society as a whole due to its connection with young people engaging in criminal activities in cities.

Security

Different types of insecurity severely undermine well-being in urban Nigeria. The effects of the insurgency were prominent in all discussions. Boko Haram was seen as part of a global phenomenon but interviewees acknowledged that Nigeria was less prepared than other countries in how to deal with this threat. The spread of the Boko Haram insurgency was specifically connected to a lack of basic needs and the failure to deliver development in those areas of the country primarily affected.

As well as being a result of underdevelopment, the insurgency was seen as impacting on future development and ultimately on the well-being of citizens. The delivery of infrastructure (e.g. road-building) in particular is impeded by the presence of the insurgency (14, SG, CS, M, K). It was also argued that such insecurity is hindering investment in the affected areas (23, LG, CS, M, L). The withdrawal of investment from the north was a cause for concern and, in the long-term, could exacerbate the North-South divide in terms of development.

The insurgency was also seen as causing two types of migration. The first flow concerns indigene people leaving the epicentre of the insurgency in the North-East to escape Boko Haram and state violence (31, Res, NGO, M, L). The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that 650,000 have already left their residences. The second flow includes non-indigene traders and other business people residing in the north of the country, who no longer feel safe and can relocate their activities to their state of origin or elsewhere (e.g. Igbo business owners in Zaria). Many interviewed in Lagos and Abuja were concerned about the further influx of people to these cities. The following quote outlines some of the trends resulting from recent insurgency:
“There was a time when there was kidnapping, we were wondering from where did this kidnapping come, before you know it there were assassinations left and right, and this made many people leave this place. Now that we have this insurgency, this one has almost halted the trend of development in this place. Things are no more moving in the right direction, people are no more happy. The very people you see here their legs are out, one leg in, one leg out, they can even leave any moment from now depending on what the political climate will be and what the social climate will turn out to be tomorrow. Things are no more as they used to be” (21, CS, COMM, M, Z).

The insurgency has inevitably had a deep impact on people’s psychological well-being and in certain cities this has led to changes in behaviour. In Abuja, for example, people avoid busy places and people are scared to attend religious functions in cities such as Zaria and Kaduna.

“I think the bigger threat is the insurgency that keeps coming in and you never know when they are going to hit. It is now like guerrilla war. So it affects the psyche of people. So you start living in fear when you are not supposed to. I think these are the problems that are becoming an issue. [...] It’s just that you will start getting afraid, you won’t want to go where there is a crowd so your earlier relaxation to be within and socialise as you should has gone. Maybe we will now go back to Facebook and start doing it through Facebook (45, CS, PRO, M, A).”

Institutions such as schools have also been affected: in Abuja some schools ended the school term early after exams, schools are being fenced off, civil defence presence in schools is being negotiated, and graduation ceremonies suspended (36, FG, CS, F, A).

Insecurity is also held to have accelerated the construction of gated communities. Whilst this trend had already started before the last wave of insurgency, processes of ‘privatisation of security’ have found a new legitimacy. The creation of vigilante groups is another trend (e.g. 19, Res, F, I). Such groups are also used to support political candidates and enforce extra-judicial justice:

“what you have is an increase in the proliferation of para-security organisations like the vigilantes for certain communities just to provide extra security [...] Security has always been a top issue for Nigeria especially for urban cities. But now terrorism has added a different dimension to that because they are not something that the police force can protect you from. We are living at the threat of each other, the fear that someone coming randomly without proper checks can be a threat (42, CS, PRO, M, L).”

An important point raised was how police and army brutality increases insecurity. State security institutions often violate the rights of people and citizens feel they cannot trust any institutions (34, SG, CS, F, L). Traditional rulers avoid turning to the police and prefer to solve problems locally:

“These expressions of the security problem proceed in tandem with pronounced weaknesses in the functioning of security agencies, especially the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) [...] to the extent
that the presence of the police itself sometimes inspires insecurity (NISER, 2005, p. 1).”

The link between food security and state security was also emphasised, particularly by politicians (33, SG, CS, M, L). Failure to ensure food security in cities can lead to social unrest, undermining state security and political stability. A politician mentioned the protest related to food prices in Tunisia which initiated the Arab Spring and drew parallels with the protests that took place in Nigeria when the government attempted to remove fuel subsidies which people felt had an enormous impact on transport and food prices (17, SG, PO, M, L). An inefficient food distribution system, road networks affected by flooding, and fluctuations in fuel prices have also been identified as factors affecting food prices.

Finally, it was argued that the prominence of the issue of security in the public discourse is used to conceal other concerns and prevent the voicing of strong criticisms on other issues important to well-being such as budget monitoring on health and education.

Health

People interviewed agreed on a general trend of improved health in many cities, partly as a result of improved public health provision. Interviewees reported that these improvements were connected to commitments made under the Millennium Development Goals which were achieved with the contribution of global donors. For instance, the Global Fund has substantially increased its support to the country over the past four years, and has heavily subsidised malaria drugs.

Another important relationship raised by participants was that between infrastructure and health. In particular, a number of stakeholders emphasised the role of good drainage to improve health in cities. However, general trends for specific cities are difficult to identify as evidence provided by participants was often anecdotal.

CONCLUSION

This section identified three major trends affecting well-being and described processes affecting well-being outcomes in cities in six key areas. While predominantly referring to the material dimensions, the processes described also emphasised relational aspects around inequalities and psychological well-being as well as the importance of the subjective dimension. The next section will look at how, based on their understanding of the urban processes in Nigeria, key stakeholders conceptualise well-being.
CONCEPTUALISATION

Drawing on the discussions above, this section analyses how different stakeholders conceptualise well-being. This analysis contributes to understanding how stakeholders interpret the factors that undermine urban well-being outlined in the previous sections and prepares for the analysis of policies and interventions that are in place – as well as people’s practices to achieve well-being.

WELL-BEING IN KEY POLICY DOCUMENTS

A first step is to understand how well-being is conceptualised in Nigeria’s key policy documents. As these simply provide a starting point for an analysis of stakeholders’ conceptualisations, the report briefly looks at three documents: (1) Nigeria Vision 20:2020 (2010b) which presents the country’s goals and strategies to achieve them; (2) the National Urban Development Policy (2012), the overarching policy for urban Nigeria which focuses on the specific context of this research; and (3) the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) (2004), the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) for Nigeria.

Nigeria Vision 20:2020 (NV20:2020) is “Nigeria’s long term development goal designed to propel the country to the league of the top 20 economies of the world by 2020” (p. 2). In this document, “guaranteeing the well-being and productivity of the people” is one of the three pillars underpinning this vision. The vision identifies a set of problems preventing the achievement of well-being: “The main goal of Nigeria’s Vision 20:2020 is to improve the well-being of Nigerians. In this direction, the Vision aims to reduce the problems of hunger, poverty, poor healthcare, inadequate housing, low quality human capital, gender imbalance, low productivity and poor basic facilities by 2020” (p. 8). Well-being is seen as something to improve by reducing a set of problems. NV20:2020 is based on a discourse on the achievement of well-being through translating economic growth into “equitable social development for all citizens” (p. 2). Beyond access to a basic set of services, two key interventions are presented to allow people to achieve their ‘productivity’ and ‘well-being’, which are closely associated in the vision. These are building human capital, and improving access to credit (through micro-credit). The discourse presented in the vision does not mention structural inequalities and relationships that need to change.

The conceptualisation of well-being emerging from NV20:2020 therefore almost exclusively focuses on the material aspects of well-being with two notable exceptions in the area of relational well-being. The vision aims to “promote gender equality and empower women” and “foster a culture of recreation and entertainment for enhanced productivity.” However, these two aspects appear to be framed as instrumental to the achievement of material well-being. Moreover, from the framing of the pillar, well-being itself seems to be instrumental to productivity. It is useful to present here the objectives given in the vision to guarantee well-being and productivity of citizens (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2010, pp. 8-10):
■ Eradicate extreme hunger and poverty
■ Guarantee food security
■ Enhance access to quality/affordable healthcare
■ Provide sustainable access to potable water and basic sanitation
■ Provide accessible and affordable housing
■ Build human capacity for sustainable livelihoods and national development
  – Developing human capital
  – Acquiring education and skills
  – Generating employment and protecting jobs
  – Empowering persons with disability
■ Improve access to micro-credit
■ Promote gender equality and empower women
■ Foster a culture of recreation and entertainment for enhanced productivity.

Well-being is also part of the goal of the National Urban Development Policy, which aims to

“promote a dynamic system of urban settlements, which fosters sustainable economic growth, promotes efficient urban and regional planning and development, as well as ensures an improved standard of living and well-being of all Nigerians (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2012, p. 14).”

However, well-being is only explicitly mentioned once within the rest of the policy, where it is included in one of the objectives under a goal related to poverty reduction and social welfare: “…to enhance the capacity of urban authorities to improve the living conditions as well as the general economic well-being of the citizenry to have access to social welfare facilities” (p. 30). This objective clarifies that reference to “economic well-being” refers exclusively to the material dimension.

The NEEDS is older than the other documents but still significant as it represents the country’s commitment to external donors and presents Nigeria’s strategy to address poverty. In the report’s opening line, the document is described as “Nigeria’s plan for prosperity” (2004, p. viii). The report clarifies that:

“A primary aim of NEEDS is to create a new Nigerian citizen who values hard work and who realizes that one cannot have something for nothing. Achieving this aim may be the strongest action Nigeria can take to build a better future for its people (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2004, p. viii).”

In the chapter titled Investing in the Nigerian People it is argued that “NEEDS is about the Nigerian people—their health, education, employment, happiness, sense of fulfilment, and general well-being” (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2004, p. 28). Well-being is also mentioned in the chapter Creating a Competitive Private Sector, in a section on environmental management which reads: “NEEDS focuses on ensuring a safe and healthful environment that secures the economic and social well-being of Nigerians on a sustainable basis” (Federal Republic of Nigeria,
2004, p. 65). While there is no further elaboration of what is specifically meant by ‘well-being’, it shows an awareness that well-being has a social as well as an economic dimension. However, these references are limited in the document and found in chapters focusing on investment and private sector growth.

STAKEHOLDERS’ UNDERSTANDINGS OF WELL-BEING

Well-being as basic needs

The prevailing conceptualisation amongst stakeholders is that well-being is defined as the fulfilment of a set of basic needs. Employment (including self-employment) is seen as key to generating the income needed to meet such basic needs. The main strategy here is to pursue economic growth and the creation of jobs primarily through the development of the private sector. In this context, the role of the state therefore is to create an enabling environment for investment. This is based on a citizenship model based on ‘regimes of activation’ in which the creation of employment is considered sufficient for citizens to achieve well-being. This vision can be at odds with policies of other countries facing high rates of economic growth as well as a significant number of people living in poverty. The Indian government issues a ration card which provides a range of social security benefits, for example, while in Latin America a number of countries have introduced conditional cash transfers and other social security programmes.

Stakeholders emphasised three key, interrelated basic needs to achieve urban well-being: food, transport, and housing. Employment was also considered by some as a basic need needed to fulfil the others. In terms of food, government stakeholders placed emphasis on the importance of good quality, nutritious food, with particular reference to child nutrition and impacts on cognitive development and future opportunities:

“If you don’t have a job you cannot live well, because we do not have a social safety net. Most of the social safety net we have is still very, very minuscule. So we, government, must find a way of reducing youth unemployment, stabilising the fuel prices, reducing the volatility of food prices. So to me when a man tells you he is living well or his well-being is very, very okay he means he is having good food, his food security is guaranteed, means of transportation is ensured, and he has a job. He is either in paid employment or an entrepreneur (17, SG, PO, M, L).”

Framing well-being in terms of a set of basic needs was also thought to be useful in terms of the subjective nature of preferences and aspirations. Civil servants felt this subjectivity to be problematic for government.

7 Other presented a more comprehensive list of the essential for urban well-being that were lacking in Nigerian cities. The list included: roads, effective public transport systems, housing, electricity, safe potable water, as well as services like education and medical care.
planning, arguing that with a growing income the aspirations and scales of preference of individuals may expand and change. Moreover, well-being is “ambiguous” because “each person has their own priorities” (6, FG, CS, M, A). Government policy and planning cannot therefore keep up with people’s expanding preferences and therefore should focus on a standard set of basic needs, achievable for all.

“What you want may not be what she wants. We have individual differences. But the baseline: roof over your head; good health; that you can commute from one place to another; that you can do your business with certain inputs from government like power supply for instance; security; water supply—all those things that are the inputs that make a good life (7, FG, CS, M, A).”

Well-being as a means to achieve productivity and growth

Responses around the perceived importance of well-being for urban citizens were often connected to the productivity and thus economic growth and development of Nigeria with little or no mention of well-being in terms of rights. The only mention of well-being as a right by government stakeholders was phrased in terms of people having “a right to actually participate in some kind of economic activities” (15, SG, CS, M, L). Another example was the view taken by some stakeholders that interventions to improve citizen health were a way to maintain citizen productivity. From a civil service perspective, maintaining productivity through well-being was also important for taxation (e.g. 14 SG, CS, M, K).

The general understanding amongst stakeholders was that well-being is multi-dimensional. However, the dimensions most consistently identified and often articulated in terms of basic needs were connected with what White (2010) would consider the material dimension. Overall, the conceptualisation of well-being and how it can be achieved that emerges from key Nigerian stakeholders is consistent with New Institutional Economics\(^8\) which emphasises the role of the state in providing an enabling environment for the private sector to flourish.

Well-being as security

An alternative but consistent conceptualisation of well-being presented by stakeholders was well-being as security. In this instance, security was understood as a holistic term encompassing several processes. For instance, a participant indicated that well-being for urban citizens “would be in terms of security within the city […] security from crime, security from disasters both natural and made disasters. Good living will also be in terms of food security, the economic well-being and secure livelihood” (19, Res, F, I). This conceptualisation was very important in relation to the point often made that insecurity and uncertainty are a constant condition of urban life in Nigeria that undermines well-being, particularly psychological well-being.

\(^8\) This refers to the current agenda often framed as the post-Washington consensus, which builds on New Institutional Economics, recognising that to work effectively, the state has to provide an enabling framework.
While different dimensions of insecurity and uncertainty were mentioned, the issue of physical security linked to crime, violence and particularly the insurgency (including the many terrorist attacks on civilians) figured prominently in this conceptualisation. The impacts on everyday behaviour were emphasised; “If you don’t feel secure you are bound to stay indoors and you might not explore the opportunities that are there for you” (29, CS, NGO, F, L). In areas that had been affected by intercommunal violence based on religion, security framed as peace was considered the precondition to enjoy any other dimension of well-being: “even if you have the food and there is no peace, you can’t have rest of mind. Even though you have that good road, without peace you will not enjoy the road [...] If you have security, you have everything (30, CS, COMM, M, K).”

In this context, another interesting aspect of looking at security as well-being was the expressed need for youth employment generation policies in order to contain the perceived security threat posed by unemployed young people. An endlessly repeated expression across interviewees in all cities was that “an idle mind is the devil’s workshop.”

**Well-being as a defining feature of the city**

For some stakeholders, well-being was considered as a defining feature of the city, arguing that a city that does not deliver well-being to its residents fails to be a city. Also in the imaginary of rural dwellers the city is the place of well-being.

**Well-being as social order**

The idea of well-being as social order was prevalent amongst civil servants at State and Federal levels. The argument put forward (further explored later in the report) is that well-being is the product of following policies, masterplans, and planning standards. It is when plans are not followed (e.g. due to political interference or due to incapacity to cope with rates of urban growth), that ‘disorder’ and ‘chaos’ lead to poor well-being of urban residents. For this reason, well-being was thought to be easily achievable as long as there was the political will to ‘stick to the masterplan’. Following the same reasoning, a strong association was made between disorder and informality, explicitly emphasising the importance of converting the informal into the formal. This discourse around social order also often encompassed a particularly aesthetic view of well-being, to be achieved through the orderly implementation of plans and strongly associated with beautification and greening interventions:

“There wasn’t a deliberate process of planning, the cities are expanding organically so they grow naturally out of the expansion of businesses and population. There was not a deliberate plan by the government to expand certain areas and so proper infrastructure was not put in place to cater for this growth. A major issue for me is that this will lead to disorder and we need order. To plan and to put things in order, you will damage a lot of things especially houses because you have to displace people to properly map out places for residence, businesses or industry. So the major issue for me is the disorder in urban cities, so lack of planning is the key thing that causes this disorder (42, CS, PRO, M, L).”
ACHIEVING WELL-BEING

This section presents the processes taking in place in urban Nigeria to achieve well-being as identified by stakeholders. The first part analyses government policies and interventions to achieve well-being, while the second explores citizenship practices.

POLICIES AND INTERVENTIONS

Stakeholders’ views on policies for urban well-being are strongly linked to their understanding of the relevant urban processes and their conceptualisations of well-being. Three characteristics of policy have been identified: (1) a focus on social order; (2) the prominence of middle class concerns and exclusion of poor and non-indigenes; (3) the view of the government as enabler of (economic) development. These are followed by examples of policy concerns in which these characteristics play out.

Restoring ‘social order’: planning for whom?

A view shared amongst government stakeholders was that policies and planning for ‘social order’ are required in order to achieve well-being. This view presents a strong modernist discourse combining criteria based on aesthetics and ‘order.’ Planning was viewed in terms of restoring a social order lost during the rapid growth of cities:

“If there are no plans, the city won’t be orderly. Planning is about ensuring orderliness, cleanliness and maximizing the land resources to achieve better living (40, SG, CS, M, L).”

“I would work on the policy of social order, where we will come up with creative ways of ensuring public order such as: you cannot sell things on certain part of the road; everywhere cannot be a bus stop; you cannot build your houses anywhere you feel you want to build it—those things that lead to general order in the society (42, CS, PRO, M, L).”

These ideas were entrenched within high levels of the civil service, amongst those holding political positions as well as planning professionals. One suggested method of achieving social order was to follow the existing masterplan and planning and building regulations. This technocratic discourse emphasises that planning is an exclusively technical and neutral process that professionals have to do for people, rather than with people: “In this office we’re professional. We’re planning for people” (2, FG, CS, M, A).

Two other policy areas related to social order were raised, revealing interesting findings around who cities are understood to be planned for. The first regards the emphasis on the greening of the city, while the second addresses policies towards those living in informal settlements.

A strong emphasis in Lagos revolved around the importance of greening demonstrated by the following interview excerpts:
“Greening, I mean the tree planting and the greening is a serious prerequisite for preventive medicine. The parks and gardens allow for a good, relaxed atmosphere and a beautiful aesthetic, I mean texture of the area, all these are very impactful on the people (10, SG, PO, M, L).”

“Health starts from cleanliness... That’s why the Lagos state government in partnership with local government will say “we have to plant trees” every time. So when we plant trees it helps us in our daily activities (20, LG, PO, F, L).”

Along with this discourse of greening, cleanliness and order, a certain attitude towards informal settlements clearly emerged built on an implicit association between low-income people and disorder. Slums and their residents were seen as a source of criminality and moral vice to be eradicated rather than engaged with:

“Slums breed criminality. Crime rages in so much of the slum areas. The more you attempt to reduce the incidence of slums, the more you are reducing the incidence of crime. Prostitution and all other social moral vices do well in the slum areas (10, SG, PO, M, L).”

With increased security concerns in Nigeria, discourses of social order and public order were seen as interrelated priorities. The understanding that the primary responsibility of government is to provide for the security of property and human life, and the centrality of security for enabling foreign and national investment contributed to translate security concerns into various policies. Several stakeholders emphasised the need to introduce wide-scale use of CCTV for security. This demonstrates the use of western models of security which do not necessarily take into consideration the priorities of the majority of residents in informal settlements.

Conversations on planning standards captured an often perhaps unrealistic understanding of the situation of the majority of the urban residents. For example, a professional and former civil servant argued that Nigerians need bigger housing compared to western standards due to cultural differences, rather than considering how planning standards and regulations might need to adapt to increasing urban concentrations in order to facilitate access to housing:

“[The] standards we allow for permits, you know when you do building design, when you do planning permit, the standards, are they reflecting [...] the culture that we have because of the weather and the kind of people we have, you know there has to be a courtyard where the family sits away from where the public meets the family—unlike [the houses] where you come into the sitting room straight and there is everybody sitting, the children, everybody, visitors. In some of our cultures, women will stay separate and the children, then the father and his visitors. So again you have to give room for such interaction, and then there has to be a common space for the family to interact just on their own. The white man’s interaction space is usually his dining table. Unlike us, we, men will hardly go to the kitchen. But for them, the kitchen, the sitting room the dining area is in the same zone. But
for us here there is that variation. So yes, is one way of doing that, the standard needs to be checked (45, CS, PRO, M, A).”

This and other considerations emphasise how most planning is aimed at the middle and upper classes rather than the large majority of urban residents of lower incomes. For instance, in Lagos, several stakeholders had the vision of building the model of an African mega-city. This drew upon projects such as that of Atlantic City, i.e. building an ideal city for the upper class through reclaiming land from the sea.

One researcher expressed her critical stance towards this proposed model:

“Unfortunately the African model mega-city is built around indicators for the western world that are attractive to foreign investors and so a lot of their policies and program are very elite. And if you have a city where you have about 60 percent living on less than a dollar a day and you have an elite, the philosophy behind your government is an elite government [...] inherently you are just providing for the few who do not belong to the low income (43, Res, F, L)”

These views on policies and planning for social order can translate into specific interventions requiring the formalisation of informal practices and processes including the explicit elimination or renewal of slums, which are considered a source of insecurity. These views chime with the reality of a number of mass evictions, demolitions and street clearances currently taking place in Nigerian cities without consideration for the lives and livelihoods of residents. As mentioned above, in July 2014, Abuja’s administration arrested hundreds of street hawkers, prosecuting and convicting 674 of them, in addition to arresting 172 beggars and destitute as well as 72 minors. The deportation of non-indigenes to their state of origin due to their ‘idleness’, particularly implemented by Lagos State, is also related to this idea of social order.

Evictions and relocations

The prominence of the idea of ‘social order’ and the resulting attitudes towards informal settlements have led to a certain legitimisation of government actions to relocate people living in informal areas without engagement, in contrast to other countries where civil society organisations play an important role in negotiations around relocation. Research participants from civil society pointed out how large-scale evictions have particularly affected the livelihoods of thousands of dwellers. A strong critical argument was made that urban policies are not only designed for the wealthy but that they directly destroy the livelihoods of the urban poor.

Compensation and resettlement policies only apply to a minority of those evicted, i.e. those in possession of land titles. Civil servants strongly felt that those without land titles should not be able to claim compensation: “if you have lived for 50 years but have no documents you have illegally

occupied my [government] property, why should you get compensation?” (27, FG, CS, M, A). They also pointed out that indigenous communities as well as those with titles do get properly compensated. One NGO representative strongly argued that the way the government uses the 1978 Land Act and the Certificate of Occupancy is “antithetical to the law” because “the act was made to recognise the pre-existing situation [i.e. the situation before 1978], not to destroy the claims of all those who do not have titles’ (41, CS, NGO, M, L).

Who are policies for?

Another characteristic of policy linked to this idea of social order relates to who the targets of such policies are. This section analyses urban policies for well-being in relation to people living in poverty and non-indigenes.

Policies for urban well-being are not for the poor

A point that emerged from the multiple discussions is that policy interventions for well-being in cities are not focused on the needs and aspirations of the poor. Strong criticisms of current planning practices and policies were raised by some researchers and NGO members. For example:

“Urban planning and planners typically operate from a very technical, professional point of view. They are not really in the process of putting the people first, putting their views as a priority while designing or managing our cities, that is the last thing on their minds. They are more interested in physical aspects of cities, they are more interested in some form of compliance with codes in the urban, whether it is building codes, spatial codes. In short, regulation of the usage of the city [...] is very technical and that’s where the problem is because you find out that both the designers and managers of the cities don’t really factor into account the views of the people (41, CS, NGO, M, L).”

“We have focused on good roads, but how many people have cars? [...] Now there are subsidies on petrol. But these don’t benefit everyone. There is discussion about deleting them and using those funds for infrastructure. I would prefer to see these funds used to subsidise food (22, Res, M, A).”

Some pro-poor interventions are proposed not because of their potential to improve the lives of the poor, but rather because they are cost-effective. It was argued that some interventions which could improve the well-being of the urban poor could have economic returns, for example it would be cheaper to treat dirty water rather than any subsequent water-related diseases.

What emerges very clearly from the policies for urban well-being suggested by interviewed stakeholders is that the concerns of people living in poverty – the majority of urban dwellers – are largely overlooked.

Citizenship and indigeneity

A key process affecting the well-being of urban Nigerian is the exclusion of non-indigenes from accessing some public services and from running for elective offices (Section 4.1). This process is translated into different discourses about citizenship by different actors. A recent study (Alemika, Cheeseman, & LeBas, 2012) suggested that the attitudes of urban citizens
towards the exclusion of non-indigenes differ. While most urban citizens think that discrimination in terms of access to services is not justified and everyone should be entitled to equal state services, the large majority are in favour of the exclusion of non-indigenes from elective offices.

However, there are differences depending on the city. For instance, Aba, Ibadan and Lagos were more favourable to non-indigenes running for elective positions. Similarly, the work of Abah and Okwori (2005) demonstrates the contradictions in attitudes towards citizenship of non-indigenes and the discourses around this issue at local level. The majoritarian discourse supporting granting non-indigenes equal access to services should lead the Nigerian government to pass a non-discriminatory law that can protect the constitutional provision to secure ‘full residence rights for every citizen in all parts of the Federation.’

As objects of policy people in urban Nigeria are not treated equally. Often people living in poverty are not seen as policy targets and this approach does not seem to be strongly contested. On the other hand, there are a number of policies and practices which exclude non-indigenes but these seems to be increasingly challenged.

**Government as a provider of enabling environment and infrastructure and services**

Consistent with the conceptualisation of well-being presented so far, a third characteristic of policy is built around the view that government responsibility lies in providing the enabling environment for private activities that ultimately lead to well-being. According to stakeholders, government is not in the position to directly employ or provide basic needs for every citizen. However, government should create the enabling environment for people to achieve their well-being.

An important component of this environment is the provision of certain public goods, particularly infrastructure and services, that individuals, no matter how rich, cannot provide for themselves. Most stakeholders recognised that much infrastructure requires government provision or at least government regulation, and that no single actor can effectively provide certain types of infrastructure. These included good road networks, electricity, water supply, and public transportation.

Infrastructure was also closely linked to policies for well-being due to the close relationship made between well-being and productivity and the view that infrastructure is necessary for productivity. Public lighting was also mentioned as an infrastructure intervention effective in the reduction of crime and improvement of livelihoods through extending the business hours of small and medium enterprises with a multiplier effect on the local economy. Another component of the enabling environment highlighted is the importance of facilitating the development of the manufacturing sector by harmonising taxation between tiers of government.

**POLICY CONCERNS**

These three policy characteristics are now explored in the analysis of a number of policy concerns identified by stakeholders.
Decongestion policies

Consistent with the identification of congestion as a major factor undermining urban well-being (section 4.1), government stakeholders emphasised the importance of policies to ‘decongest’ the city. This discourse around decongestion is also associated with the unwillingness to accept urbanisation and view it as a positive phenomenon. This was confirmed by a number of senior government officials insisting that it was important to develop and invest in rural areas to stop rural-urban migration. This migration was considered as an important cause of city congestion which makes it difficult to provide infrastructure and services (19, Res, F, I; 7 FG, CS, M, A). The political discourse around stopping this migration flow was strong despite evidence pointing to the prominent role of natural growth in explaining most population growth in Sub-Saharan cities (UN-Habitat, 2006).

Underpinning this view, there is a negative perception of urbanisation and the idea that urbanisation can be controlled and stopped. “You plan the rural areas, you keep the people there happy or comfortable so that it will help you to control the urban growth in the urban areas” (14, SG, CS, M, K). The related idea is that urban well-being can be achieved with policies targeting rural areas so as to prevent further migration.

A frequent proposal to decongest cities referred to the decentralisation of centres of activities through the creation of polycentric cities to avoid high levels of daily commuting to the city centre. The main strategy underpinning this policy was the provision of services and employment where people live.

In Lagos, the transport masterplan was built upon a major idea of developing twenty centres of activities by bringing in services and good transport connections. The aim was the relocation of some top jobs to incentivise regional development and partner up with neighbouring states (15, SG, CS, M, L). In Abuja, the focus of the decentralisation process was the creation of new satellite towns ‘to make people productive where they are’ (4 FG, CS, M, A). In Abuja, many emphasised the improvement of security as a result of decongestion since terrorist attacks tend to target congested places.

Transport and road infrastructure

Providing transport both in terms of the road infrastructure and the availability of road services was considered of the utmost importance: “Transport is like this vein. It takes blood from the heart transports it to others […] supplies the entire body. Anywhere there is an access road you open up new possibilities” (14, SG, CS, M, K).

However, from the interviews the different priorities of middle class civil servants, civil society members and researchers with a concern for low-income groups clearly emerged. For instance, interventions to improve the traffic situation did not take sufficient account of loss of livelihoods and changes in price and availability of services. The ban of commercial motorbikes for urban transport was a very controversial policy. Carrying passengers on motorbikes in certain areas of Lagos and in cities such as Zaria was banned on security and health grounds arguing that motorbikes
were used for criminal activities and commercial motorbike drivers caused too many accidents. Therefore, a number of civil servants and politicians argued that this was a good policy for well-being. However, such a policy raised serious concerns amongst community leaders and researchers due to the enormous loss of jobs for young people and to the lack of cheap transport alternatives for many Nigerians. It was argued that commercial motorbikes run by young people had been incentivised and promoted by the same authorities which recently banned them. Moreover, the concern that a high number of young people would find themselves without a source of livelihood, it was argued, represented an even higher security threat than the use of commercial motorcycles.

Social security mechanisms for unemployed youth
Several stakeholders argued that an important issue was the lack of basic social protection and that there was a need for social security mechanisms for unemployed young people. However, considering unemployment and poverty rates, stakeholders acknowledged that such interventions are unrealistic. Policies to generate employment such as choosing labour intensive technology for public works and services were considered more realistic. It is important to note that the concern for youth unemployment was related to the security risk posed by young people rather than a concern for the well-being of unemployed youth. An interviewee summarised social protection interventions in this way: “A fixed token that would reduce thuggery, theft, political hooliganisms (22, Res, M, A).”

Education and vocational training
Public policies in the education and training sector were considered of the utmost importance. However, there were several concerns about the progress achieved in terms of the quality of public education. There was praise for public interventions such as skill acquisition centres that would prepare young people for a profession. However, concerns were raised on the relevance of the careers proposed which did not adapt to the changes in consumers’ demands.

Food security
Food security was mentioned as important by a number of government research participants in political positions as well as civil servants. While this is an important area for the well-being of urban citizens living in poverty, the discourse was often framed in terms of national security emphasising the importance of food security to avoid riots. Controlling price fluctuations of fuel and creating an efficient food distribution system were considered important interventions. Lagos State has embarked on a policy to incentivise food production which they also considered important in terms of employment generation of such strategy.
CITIZENSHIP PRACTICES

The function of the state as enabler of well-being in urban Nigeria is poorly performed, largely because of the three trends presented above. As a result, citizens engage in collective practices, exercising active citizenship to achieve well-being. It is important to note that the main objective of this active citizenship is the delivery of good and services to members rather than claiming rights. This section presents some of the citizenship practices adopted by individuals, households, and communities to achieve well-being as identified by key stakeholders interviewed.

Diverse groups of urban citizens necessarily have different well-being priorities. The main dimension that generates different priorities and attitudes towards policies with regards to well-being is social class in terms of income level. As an example, the banning of commercial motorbikes (see above) was well received amongst wealthy car users but was perceived as a loss of livelihood and as a cheap means of transport by low-income groups. In terms of different priorities, a civil servant argued that low-income groups seek access to free services and infrastructure while the upper class is willing to pay but demand services of good quality (14, SG, CS, M, K).

The relationship between government and citizens is a significant determinant of people’s own practices to achieve well-being. The social contract offered by politicians to citizens during political campaigns is based on the idea that once in power they will provide for every citizen’s need. The citizen is positioned as a recipient of state provision, generating frustration when expectations are unmet. When public provision does fail, services (such as electricity, security, road repairs, financial services) are either obtained privately, or through a number of different collective action processes. According to stakeholders, urban citizens feel that the provision of certain public goods would be better provided by (e.g. security), or at least regulated by (e.g. electricity) the state but are obliged to seek them elsewhere. The citizenship practices analysed below present a range of collective action at various scales.

Community Development Associations

The importance of Community Development Associations (CDAs) was consistently highlighted during discussions with key stakeholders as a practice to achieve well-being and substantive citizenship. CDAs are a collective form of organisation operating at the community level to address local problems not dealt with by government. It was suggested that CDAs act as a fourth tier of government, as a space where citizens collaborate to deliver basic interventions by pooling their own resources or engaging with government when further support is needed.

There is generally a productive relationship between CDAs and LGAs: LGAs can step in and support community efforts while CDAs ensure that

10 CDAs may be registered with federal, state, or local governments, or with none of them. They do not need government permission to operate.
decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen. This cooperation
also provides information on community needs to the government. Local
politicians also use CDAs as platforms to mobilise voters. LGA authorities
welcome collaborations with CDAs in which they share the costs of
delivery community development, effectively reducing expenses. These
organisations can provide support to the LGAs in monitoring the
implementation of projects in their areas:

“[CDAs] are actually the ones on the ground, [...] when they come
together like that, they interface [with] the government [...] you
now have a meeting with the government to say ‘we need this, we
need that, this is that area we know you can improve’. [CDAs] help
government to get to where government probably is not. So, that’s
how they help to improve their own well-being. So if there are
blocked drains, if there is flooding, other people will try to come
together and solve the problems and escalate to the level of the
government to say ‘come to this area, this place needs attention.’

Their contribution is to give eyes to see that what has been given
to be done to them is done as mandated. If you don’t do the right
thing the community will report to the local government and the
person in charge will be held responsible for whatever lapses. So
that is the job of the community, they put eyes to see that what is
to be done has been done as it should (25, LG, CS, M, Z).”

Whilst CDAs are typically rural organisations, they have expanded to urban
areas and undertake different activities and services according to the type
of neighbourhood they are based in and the socio-economic characteristics
(as social class) of residents. In middle class urban areas, these
organisations are often associated with particular gated communities.
Depending on the income and needs of a neighbourhood, CDAs may
collectively supply specific services such as electricity, security, rotating
loans, drainage maintenance and road repair.

“So the process is very personal, sometimes people come together
and form neighbourhood organisations that help achieve certain
demands of good life. Some come together and put resources
together and provide security for the neighbourhood. I live in an
estate where we provide our own electricity supply. We don’t
depend on government for our electricity supply, we guarantee
ourselves 24 hours electricity supply because that is something
that is a demand for our good lives. [...] we pay a premium on it
but it is guaranteed. [...] So the processes of achieving well-being
are more individual but gradually with the help of our democratic
system, in states like Lagos more and more people are becoming
aware of their rights as citizens and so are placing more demands
on the government for the provision of certain basic infrastructure
and amenities that will improve quality of lives (42, CS, PRO, M,
L).”

The following extract provides an overview of the range of activities
achieved through collective action in these organisations:

“We say, you are your own local government. The roads you drive
on, you have to work it through collective effort, so you find
neighbourhoods organising within itself. This part of town [...] has
a Community Development Association which is responsible for maintaining and managing services within the estate. So when the roads are bad, usually the money the committee collects are used to fix them. [...] The police are almost not in existence here but you have the private security firms which monitor the estate and provide some kind of security. [...] In the area of water, sometimes communities come together contribute money and build boreholes to gain access to decent water. They also pay money to fund the vigilantes that provide security so that people can sleep well at night. In some other communities, people contribute money to build their hospital; there might be a place called a [public] clinic but when you go in there are no drugs or other things to take care of patients. There are cases where communities contribute money to pay doctors and nurses to provide health care services. They pay teachers to teach their children. Around the country so many citizens come together and act collectively to provide things that aid well-being. They manage their solid waste, drainage, some weekends they declare labour day and the young men in the communities come together to excavate drainage to keep away floods from their communities. They also manage their education, security and all of that. When you look at it from this point of view, those actions relieve the government of their responsibilities not as if it is meant to be like that but they have failed in providing for the citizens. In the more affluent neighbourhoods you see more people coming together to act collectively on security. The people uses several associations which they have formed to help the communities, these are self-help mechanisms the citizens in different parts of the country have formed to fill the gap created by government failure to address them (41, CS, NGO, M, L).“

Each household a local government

Whilst CDAs collectively provide services at a community level, another revealing discourse articulated by several interviewees is that “every household is a local government” due to the way in which they also provide for their own services, such as water, electricity, and security, which are not usually delivered by the local government:

“Sometimes people will say that every house or every household is a local government on his own because you have your own generator because you cannot depend on public power supply which is irregular. So you spend money to run your generator whether it is run by diesel or by petrol. You have your own well or borehole, deep well for your own water supply. You have to do much more to try to secure yourself; your buildings will have burglar-proof [systems]. If you can afford it, you will employ security personnel or guard to keep watch over your house (19, Res, F, I).”

Savings groups

In a country with interest rates that easily rise above 25 percent and where people have little access to credit, savings groups and rotating funds play
an important role across different socio-economic groups. Sometimes these financial initiatives are not the only activities that these self-help groups undertake. Such groups are often also created in relation to specific identities such as place of residence, profession, religion, ethnic group, parent- and widowhood, and disability.

**Ethnic-based collective action and the role of traditional leaders**

In the context of different entitlements and discrimination based on indigeneity, collective action is strongly linked with ethnicity, particularly amongst non-indigene groups trying to promote their well-being. It is important to note that non-indigene communities have their own traditional leaders,¹¹ who are often directly involved in promoting the collective action of their members. These actions can be broadly classified into three categories:

- Direct provision of services to members
- Internal administration of the community (traditional justice administration)
- Advocacy

**Direct provision of services to members**

For example, ethnic communities can build their own hospitals and/or clinics where their members have discounted rates and traditional leaders can intervene in case a member is unable to pay.

**Internal administration of the community (traditional justice administration)**

In order to solve various conflicts within the community, members prefer to seek solutions from traditional leaders rather than turning to the police. The role of traditional authorities in ensuring local security and providing justice is very important and linked to mistrust of police:

“If someone steals my property, I just want my property back to me. If the chief proves to the person that he is wrong, the property would be returned to me. It doesn’t become evidence in the custody of the police to go to court and spend five years and at the end of the day you don’t know what happened to your property. Sometimes there are cases whereby the only thing the complainant wants is an apology to restore lost pride and this is the kind of relief they never get in the formal police sector so they go to the chief (31, CS, NGO, M, L).”

A traditional leader in Zaria explained that in over 16 years he has never referred a case to the police, always solving cases locally. He argued that most crimes reported to him have socio-economic origins. If such cases were reported to the police, the guilty party would often be subject to bribes, bail money or court fees, thereby exacerbating their situation and

¹¹ Examples are the leader of the Igbo and the one of the Yoruba in Zaria, or the leader of the Hausa in Lagos.
contributing to a vicious circle of crime. Therefore, this leader preferred to
inflict public punishments intended to cause embarrassment and prevent
such behaviour (3, CS, COMM, M, Z).

**Advocacy**

Ethnic-based collective action has an important function in terms of
advocacy and political representation as traditional leaders of non-
indigene communities represent their constituencies in different arenas.
Advocacy in these contexts is more important where the non-indigene
group is located in a particular area or dominate a specific sector of the
economy/profession, therefore having some shared interests to lobby for.
Some of these organised non-indigene groups can become very influential.

**Collective provision of private security**

The collective provision of private security is worth noting here. Whilst the
private provision of security is an indication of the state’s inability to meet
such needs, interviewees nevertheless felt that everyone should play a role
in security struggles.

Collective provision of private security takes two main forms depending on
the income levels of residents. Wealthier neighbourhoods gate their areas
and hire guards, while poorer neighbourhoods resort to self-organised
vigilante groups. However, these two forms of collective action on security
require a ‘community’ to support them. Civil servants in Abuja observed
that in their neighbourhoods no community-led initiative existed to ensure
security, which they felt was linked to the lack of an established
‘community’.

Another interesting point was the extent to which some neighbourhoods
collectively decide to limit their own freedom for security. Some gated
communities establish curfews, not allowing anyone to enter or leave the
area after a certain time, unless for an emergency:

“In consensus we decided when the gate will be closed and
opened in our community. The one to the main road is closed at
seven thirty in the evening. There is another entrance which we
close at eleven so, if you are outside after eleven, then you have to
sleep outside (32, Res, M, I).”

**Religious organisations**

An important component of citizen practices to achieve well-being is
participation in religious activities. It was pointed out that, while churches
take care of the spiritual dimension of well-being, this spirituality has a
very material aspect. Spiritual leaders primarily talk about material well-
being in their services: “They say let us pray for promotion and for jobs.
People pray for a bigger car if you have a small one. They pray for the here
and now. The paradise is secondary to the material immediate aspect”. 12
Interviewees also talked about the relationship between religious
organisations, democracy and welfare. Religious organisations are

---

12 Based on discussion held with academics at Ahmadu Bello University.
increasingly putting pressure on government when it fails to provide services. Simultaneously, both Christian and Muslim organisations are increasingly providing services, such as hospitals and education facilities, to urban citizens. Such organisations also favour the formation of mutual services for their members. While religion can be a source of division, it is also important to note that regularly attending a place of worship can build bridges across different sectors of society and ethnic groups.

13 Interviewees highlighted that this is not always the case and that in Plateau State for example, the religious divide increased the indigene/non-indigene tensions.
POLICY FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

This report has identified the perspectives of key stakeholders on main trends and key areas related to urban well-being, as well as the different conceptualisations of well-being used by stakeholders. The characteristics of policies for urban well-being as well as a number of policy concerns were analysed before a range of citizenship practices to achieve well-being were presented. The authors hope that the report may contribute to the discussion on the current discourses on urban well-being and adequate policy responses.

While it is beyond the aims of this report and the limited scope of the research to provide detailed policy recommendations, four main implications emerged from the analysis:

■ Considering the current trends in population growth in Nigerian cities and towns, it is important to question whether the current governance structure is effective to plan and manage city development in ways that enhance residents’ well-being. In particular, it is important to think about the division of roles of each tier of government and how city-level governance may enable complementary citizenship practices. This concern is not new: other research and voices in Nigeria (e.g. NBS, 2012) have made this observation but this research supports its importance.

■ This study highlighted stakeholders’ confidence in the view that well-being policies should aim to create the conditions for increased economic growth which will in itself be the main driver of improved well-being. However, the extent to which current economic growth is creating employment and contributing to the well-being of most Nigerians is questionable in the context of growing levels of poverty. Data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2012b) demonstrate that both absolute and subjective measurements of poverty indicate increasing poverty. Focusing mostly on the promotion of GDP growth and investment as a strategy for well-being can be contrasted with other countries with high levels of growth as well as a significant proportion of the population living in poverty but which are complementing their growth strategies with strong social policy measures. It would be important for Nigeria to implement strong social policy measures targeting the urban poor, which build upon the existing livelihoods of the poor rather than interventions that undermine them.

■ Some of the existing policies and interventions analysed do not target all urban citizens equally. In particular, there are two processes of discrimination which must be removed to achieve the well-being of all urban citizens: socio-spatial inequalities and discrimination of non-indigenes.
This research has revealed how the limited availability of public goods such as safety and security, as well as infrastructure and services, may affect urban well-being even in the presence of growing income levels. NBS data (2012b) shows that, in Nigeria, many more people than those captured by official standard statistics consider themselves as poor. One explanation given is that despite the availability of better incomes, the lack of adequate services and infrastructure may reduce the subjective experience of well-being. This research has demonstrated that there are a number of goods, services and infrastructure which are better provided or at least regulated by government but government performance is still lacking.
CONCLUSIONS

This study has analysed the discourses and views of forty-five urban stakeholders strategically positioned at different levels of Nigerian society as well as existing literature and policy documents. The analysis revealed three main trends affecting urban well-being:

- Rapid demographic change that makes it difficult for government to respond with adequate planning and interventions
- A number of governance issues, particularly regarding power distribution, lack of city-level governance, and the role of the state
- The existence of stratified citizenship levels characterised by unequal access to services and rights based on socio-spatial discrimination and indigeneity.

Electricity, congestion, housing, youth unemployment, security and health are a number of key areas which were raised during interviews in which the inadequate and unequal provision of goods and services, underpinned by these three trends, affect urban well-being.

Well-being tended to be conceptualised as the achievement of basic needs through economic growth. At the same time, well-being itself was considered fundamental for productivity. Well-being was also understood through the broad notion of security. A final understanding of well-being was as social order. Policies for urban well-being presented three characteristics:

- Policies are underpinned by the notion of restoring social order, with chaos and disorder seen as a cause of ill-being
- Planning and policies are not for all; in particular they discriminate against those living in poverty and non-indigenes
- Government is seen as a provider of the enabling environment and infrastructure needed for private sector actors to deliver economic growth intended to lead to improved well-being.

These characteristics were present in a number of policy concerns raised by stakeholders, including decongestion policies, transport and road infrastructure, social security for the unemployed, education and food security.

A generally negative view of urbanisation emerges from the strong emphasis on stopping rural-urban migration as a way to halt urban growth. Finally, the research has highlighted a range of very important citizenship practices to deliver goods and services essential to their well-being. These practices reveal the importance of autonomous collective action in the achievement of well-being. They also show the role that income levels and other social identities such as indigeneity play in such processes. While these processes mostly focus on the delivery of goods and services, in the context of a democratic government still in transition, they also become a platform for voice and the claiming of rights.
A number of problematic assumptions identified in this study needs to be unpacked and explored further by researching specific areas of concern. A key problem is not that insufficient planning takes place but that it is the wrong kind of planning, which serves some interests and not others, and further entrenches inequalities. As put by one research participant: “we can say after 54 years of independence in Nigeria, a lot of planning has already been done, and sadly a lot of the planning has been done wrongly” (31, CS, NGO, M, L). Another important area to explore regards the role of the state vis-à-vis autonomous citizens’ organisations in the process of achieving well-being. It is important that further research also considers the trends identified in the analysis of specific sectors, for instance, the relationship between well-being/ill-being and public transport, infrastructure, and displacement.

Future URN research under the theme of urban well-being will address many of these concerns. A research project will examine the links between mobility, poverty reduction, social inclusion and urban integration in a selection of Nigerian cities to explore how current mobility-related policies and practices address equity concerns. Another project will use urban health statistics to look at the relationships between urbanisation, infrastructure services and health issues. Another piece of research will look at how participatory well-being assessments in low-income urban neighbourhoods can potentially contribute to the establishment of supportive networks as well as generate information for enhancing the accountability of public resource allocations. It will also explore the ways in which individuals and groups articulate their dimensions of well-being, and their strategies and pathways to expand such dimensions.

A further project will investigate how low income urban residents are able to negotiate their interests in relation to urban infrastructure development in Nigeria, particularly with reference to infrastructure-induced displacement. A complementary project will investigate the hierarchical structure of Nigerian communities in terms of their experience of or exposure to crime, conflict, violence and injustice and assess how they diminish the well-being of urban populations. Finally, another piece of work will attempt to provide a better understanding of urban water poverty in Nigeria, particularly in the peripheries of large cities.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Oduh, M. O. 2012. The dynamics of poverty and income distribution: is the Nigerian middle class statistically or economically growing? *Developing Country Studies*, 2(7), 84-94.


ANNEX 1: CITY PROFILES

These short profiles provide basic information on the five cities where most stakeholders interviewed were based. It provides a background for the discussions presented in the report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CITY</th>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>ZONE</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>North Central</td>
<td>1.4 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With a population of around 1.4 million (2006 census), Kaduna is the capital of Kaduna state and one of the largest cities in northern Nigeria. The Kaduna urban area is rapidly expanding over four different local government areas. The city is marked by strong religious and ethnic diversity, although it has a significant Christian population. This diversity has been the context for recent political violence and social unrest. A small town during the pre-colonial era, Kaduna was established as an urban centre by the colonial government: colonial powers invested largely in developing Kaduna’s infrastructure (major rail and road transport routes, as well as markets) and the city became the capital of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. Kaduna also held strong commercial and trading functions. Nowadays, Kaduna acts as the administrative headquarters of Kaduna state. The city has strong transport links through state and Federal highways, and operates as a major economic node in northern Nigeria specialising in manufacturing, textile production, petroleum refining, vehicle assembling, brewing and food processing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CITY</th>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>ZONE</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zaria</td>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>North Central</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Zaria is a city also located in northern Kaduna state. The city was historically known as Zazzau and was one of the original seven Hausa city-states. With a population of 400,000 inhabitants (2006 census), Zaria is the second largest city in the state. The urban area of Zaria is composed of two LGAs. While Zaria is well connected with the rest of Nigeria through road and railway links, the city’s economy is largely based on agriculture. Zaria is considered a major distribution point for cotton, groundnuts and tobacco. Other economic activities of significance include the textile and manufacturing industries, as well as railway repairing. Furthermore, Zaria is the home of Ahmadu Bello University, Nigeria’s largest university and the second largest in Africa.
Abuja became the capital of Nigeria in 1991. The city is located in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). The FCT is divided into six Local Government Areas. According to the 2006 census, the city of Abuja had a population of 775,000 inhabitants, but it is estimated that well over 2 million people now live in the metropolitan area (Abuja is the fastest growing Nigerian city). The city mainly concentrates institutional, administrative and government functions. The headquarters of the Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS) is located in Abuja, and the city acts as the regional headquarters of OPEC. In the context of the various ethnic and religious divisions that mark Nigeria, the Federal government came up with a plan to establish a capital on neutral ground. The chosen location is symbolic: it is an illustration of neutrality and national unity. Another rationale for selecting a new site for a Federal capital emerged from the desire to decongest Lagos. Following the oil boom in the 1970s, Lagos went through a phase of rapid urban growth, making the city highly overcrowded and dysfunctional. Abuja is an entirely planned city: although its site was designated since the early 1970s, the city was mainly built in the 1980s. The city’s masterplan was elaborated by an international consortium, composed by three American firms. It defines the overall physical layout and key design elements of the city that are evident in Abuja’s current urban form. Abuja is serviced and connected by a thorough road system and the city’s urban structure is complemented by the presence of a system of satellite towns such as Idu (the major industrial site) and Dei-Dei (home of the international livestock market and the international building materials market). Abuja is known for being one of the wealthiest and most expensive cities in Africa. Many marginalised inhabitants are locating in the semi-developed edges of the city, and squatter settlements and towns have appeared rapidly in and outside the city limits.
Lagos
Lagos
South West
9-20 million

Capital of Nigeria until 1991, Lagos is a global megacity and port, and the largest urban area in sub-Saharan Africa. Located in the South-West geopolitical zone, Lagos has a complicated governance and administrative structure: Lagos refers to both a city and a state. In the 2006 census, Lagos state had a population of 9 million inhabitants although this figure has been contested by Lagos state authorities, which argue that Lagos State houses more than 20 million people. Nonetheless, Lagos is regarded as one of the fastest-growing cities in the world, and UN projections illustrate that the city will become one of the most populous urban conurbations. Within Nigeria, Lagos has a high concentration of administrative, commercial and industrial functions: as a state capital, it retains governmental powers, and exhibits much of the non-oil related economic growth in Nigeria. As an urban agglomeration, Lagos is currently expanding inland, resulting in the formation of an urban corridor linking Lagos with cities in the hinterland, notably Ibadan. Lagos is also marked by a complex governance and administration structure: there is no single administrative unit covering the entire metropolitan area. Lagos thus effectively covers various Local Government Authorities within Lagos State. The urban settlements in the mainland expand beyond the area originally comprising the territory of Lagos and include several separate towns such as Mushin, Ikeja and Agege. The 1970s oil boom transformed Lagos by fostering a huge population explosion, fast economic growth and unparalleled rural migration. In turn, this resulted in the rapid expansion of adjacent towns and settlements, which led to the emergence of today’s Greater Lagos metropolis. Lagos’ history is illustrated through the layout of the various LGAs that comprise the metropolitan area; they also reflect the conglomeration of unique cultures that give identity to the city. Nowadays, Metropolitan Lagos refers to both the islands of the former Municipality of Lagos and adjacent mainland suburbs. In effect, Metropolitan Lagos is a statistical unit but not an administrative one; for statistical recollection purposes, Metropolitan Lagos includes 16 out the 20 LGAs that compose Lagos State, it comprises 88% of the state’s total population and also contains semi-rural areas. Within Lagos’s complex governance structure, Lagos State government plays the dominant role, as it is responsible for the provision of several utilities: roads and transportation, power, water, health and education.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CITY</th>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>ZONE</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ibadan</td>
<td>Oyo</td>
<td>South West</td>
<td>1.4 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ibadan is the capital of Oyo State. The population of central Ibadan, including five LGAs, is 1,338,659 (census 2006). However, the larger metropolitan areas which includes 11 LGAs has a population of 2,550,593, making it the third largest metropolitan area in Nigeria after Lagos and Kano. At Nigerian independence, Ibadan was the largest and most populous city in the country and the third in Africa. Ibadan is located about 128 km north-east of Lagos and 345km south-west of Abuja. Its central location provides transport and economic advantages. The employment structure is led by retail trade, public administration, service and repair services and education.
### ANNEX 2: ANONYMISED LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>CS Type</th>
<th>Gov Type</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>FG</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>COMM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Zaria</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>FG</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>COMM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>FG</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>FG</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>STA</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>STA</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>FG</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Res</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Makurdi</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>STA</td>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>STA</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>LG</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>STA</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>LG</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Res</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Ibadan</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>LG</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>COMM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Zaria</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Res</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>LG</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>LG</td>
<td>Zaria</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>COMM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>COMM</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>FG</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>COMM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>COMM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Res</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Ibadan</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>STA</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>STA</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>COMM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>FG</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>COMM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>COMM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>COMM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>STA</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Res</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>LG</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Urbanisation Research Nigeria (URN) is delivering research accompanied by data collection on key themes concerning urbanisation, urban development and the provision of infrastructure. URN will produce and disseminate thorough, relevant, interesting and readable research outputs which will contribute towards the evidence base for better urbanisation strategy, urban policy, and urban programming and management in Nigeria.

URN falls within the four-year DFID-supported Urbanisation and Infrastructure Research and Evaluation Manager (UIREM) – Nigeria programme. It is implemented by a consortium led by ICF International.

This research has been funded by UK aid from the UK government; however the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.