Independent Evaluation of the Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform Programme

Theory of Change Monitoring Synthesis Report

December 2015
Overview

The purpose of this report is to assess and revise the theory of change (ToC) behind the Security Sector and Police Reform Programme (SSAPR) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), from the perspective of the programme’s beneficiaries. This report is based on the findings of longitudinal ToC monitoring, in which community members not involved in any aspect of SSAPR provided initial and follow-up data on changes in their communities related to security, along with their perspectives on the causes of these changes. Data from SSAPR local state and non-state partners were also used to contextualise these changes and highlight the potential for sustainability.

As this report is based primarily on data from community members, it does not attempt to assess the elements of SSAPR’s ToC or changes related to the institutionalisation of reform, political engagement or internal dynamics of the Congolese National Police (Police Nationale Congolaise, PNC). Each of these complex processes relies on separate actors and, often, entirely separate theories of how change happens, each of which merits further in-depth discussion.

Overall, this study finds respondents feel security in pilot sites has improved since SSAPR began, attributed overwhelmingly to the introduction of the SSAPR’s community policing (police de proximité, PdP) approach. Respondents confirmed the primary areas of change in SSAPR’s ToC – police responsiveness, community–police collaboration and community trust – have been realised. In addition, these discussions highlighted the importance of understanding objective and subjective security as separate elements of the change process, as well as the importance of understanding the importance of both security and justice institutions.

Similarly, when considering intermediate changes in SSAPR pilot sites, respondents felt overall the areas of the ToC expected to bring about change – improved police capacity, responsiveness and citizen engagement with security issues – had largely seen such change. However, respondent discussions suggested a need to revise the ToC to understand the dynamics of change in terms of police motivation to serve the public, rather than primarily in terms of accountability.

Despite the many positive changes in security respondents identified, this report also highlights the concerns of SSAPR key informants regarding the sustainability of the programme’s accomplishments. These concerns are primarily related to maintaining PdP motivation, as well as to the internal dynamics of the PNC.
Acknowledgements

The research team would like to extend its gratitude to the many individuals and groups that have made this study possible.

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We would similarly like to thank our colleagues in the Police Support Programme (PSP), Control and Coordination of the Security Sector (CCOSS) and External Accountability (EA) components of the Security Sector and Police Reform Programme (SSAPR), whose knowledge of the programme and the wider context was instrumental in developing our research approach and implementing the survey in each of the study sites.

Finally, we would also like to express our sincerest gratitude to our colleagues at the Department for International Development (DFID) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), William Evans (Governance Adviser) and Anne-Judith Ndombasi (Deputy Programme Manager), for their continued commitment and ongoing support to security sector reform in DRC.

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Introduction

Background

The Security Sector and Police Reform Programme (SSAPR) is a five-year programme funded by the UK Government's Department for International Development (DFID). SSAPR was established in 2009 to assist the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in laying the foundations for the reestablishment of rule of law by supporting the creation of accountable and service-oriented institutions able to improve safety, security and access to justice for Congolese citizens. It comprises four separate but complementary components: Support to the Police (PSP), Control and Coordination of the Security Sector (CCOSS), External Accountability (EA) and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). SSAPR is implemented in the pilot sites of Matadi, Kananga and Bukavu as well as at the national policy level. A significant focus of these efforts was the introduction of police de proximité (PdP), or the community policing approach, in all SSAPR pilot sites.

The SSAPR Theory of Change

A theory of change (ToC) describes how and why a programme is expected to have its anticipated effect. In recent years, ToCs have become increasingly prominent parts of planning and evaluation in development programmes, and are seen as ways to improve understandings of complex change processes facing development actors. In an effort to better understand the underlying logic behind SSAPR, in 2013 key programme stakeholders developed a ToC for SSAPR's interventions. This entailed an extensive consultative process led by the DFID Stabilisation Unit and involving members of the SSAPR design and implementation team. The ToC was based on SSAPR's implementation experience and the personal knowledge of the programme team. However, a decision was taken not to include programme beneficiaries in this process, as well as not to conduct primary data collection to support or verify the ToC. This was largely to ensure the ToC reflected the programme implementers’ intended programme logic, as the ToC was developed relatively late in programme implementation. This original ToC serves as the basis for this report and as a framework for the study it presents.

Study Rationale

Building on the 2013 ToC, the SSAPR M&E component developed a qualitative ToC monitoring approach to investigate the underlying logic from the perspective of SSAPR’s intended beneficiaries. This was developed based on discussions with DFID DRC with the aim of identifying lessons learnt for future iterations of this and similar programmes, as well as to support the overall SSAPR impact evaluation. Ensuring this research accounted for the often-slow pace of change and complex factors involved in the security sector was also a priority. As such, ToC monitoring adopted a longitudinal approach to examine if and how SSAPR’s interventions had contributed to change at the ToC

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outcome and impact levels in SSAPR pilot locations, from the perspective of SSAPR’s intended beneficiaries.

This document provides a synthesis of the findings from ToC monitoring, analysed in the context of the 2013 ToC. The analysis aims to test and validate some of the causal assumptions included in the 2013 ToC as well as to further refine it by identifying key changes at the impact and outcome levels highlighted by programme beneficiaries, as well as the causal processes behind these changes. This is the first document to assess how change happens from the perspectives of SSAPR’s intended beneficiaries.

After a brief presentation of the research methods this study employs, this report begins with a discussion of changes programme beneficiaries identified at the impact level of the ToC, and the key outcome-level changes that contributed to this change. The next section discusses intermediate programme-level changes associated with changes in outcomes and impacts. Following each section, revisions to the 2013 ToC are suggested based on community-level experiences of the change process. Following this, this study utilises findings from SSAPR implementers along with those from state and non-state partners to highlight potential concerns related to the sustainability of this change. The document concludes by presenting the overarching conclusions from this study and a discussion of further research needed to understand the nature of changes in SSAPR pilot sites.

**Study Objectives**

This study was designed to capture the experiences of SSAPR’s ultimate intended beneficiaries – namely, individuals living in communities in which SSAPR is operating. As such, it is not intended to represent the views of police, who are important but more immediate beneficiaries of the programme.

This ToC monitoring was designed specifically to answer the following research questions:

□ Have objective and subjective feelings of security changed? If so, what are the processes through which these changes have occurred?

□ To what extent do the assumptions and linkages connecting outputs and outcomes in SSAPR’s ToC hold true? What are the key variations?

□ What other contextual factors (at the provincial and national levels) are associated with changes in the supply and demand dynamics of security provision?

□ What implications do these changes have for programme sequencing and implementation of activities?

**Key Definitions**

For the purpose of this study, and in line with the M&E component’s ongoing evaluation of SSAPR, ‘change’ is understood to mean an observable long-term shift in behaviour, relationships, activities and actions of social actors.
This report also distinguishes the police de proximité (PdP) from the Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC, Congolese National Police). The term ‘PNC’ refers to the police force as a whole, including those trained in the community policing doctrine approach as well as the majority of cadres who were not trained in the approach in intervention sites. The PdP are considered here as a cadre of PNC officers, operating within the structure of the PNC, who have been trained in the 3P (proximité, partenariat et prévention, or proximity, partnership and prevention)/3R (résolution des problèmes, redevabilité, respect des droits de l’homme, or problem-solving, accountability and respect for human rights) principles during SSAPR. Training officers in this approach is a core element of SSAPR activities.

Although SSAPR understands the PdP primarily as a philosophy to build the capacity of the police to be more responsive to citizens, this report refers to the cadre of police specifically trained in the 3P/3R doctrine in SSAPR pilot sites.
Research Methods

Based on these research questions, the M&E component designed a longitudinal mixed-method approach using primarily qualitative methods. This framework was adapted from the outcome mapping and outcome harvesting approaches, which identify specific examples of outcome-level change and investigate the processes behind them. This approach allowed the research team to consider how SSAPR and other actors may have contributed to change, as a diverse range of actors influenced each change as part of complex, long-term processes. Here, we present an overview of the methodology. For the detailed methodology, please see the ToC Monitoring Concept Note in Annex A.

Study Setting

Research was conducted between February and September 2014 through two visits to each of the SSAPR pilot cities of Bukavu, Kananga and Matadi. An additional visit was made to the comparison city of Goma (matched with Bukavu) to gather perspectives from a location where SSAPR is not present. This provided a useful counterfactual against which the information gathered from SSAPR pilot sites could be compared. Since SSAPR was implemented in three ‘cycles’, with one commune addressed per cycle, data were collected from Cycle 1 communes to ensure research sites had experienced the maximum exposure to SSAPR interventions.

Ethical Considerations

All attempts were made to ensure this study met the highest ethical standards. Verbal and signed consent was sought from participants for data collection and processing. Participants were informed of their rights and had the right to refuse participation or stop participating at any time without penalty. Respondents were provided with drinks and snacks and a transportation allowance of US$5 per person for their participation in the study. All personal identifiers were removed from the raw data to allow for blind data entry analysis and to ensure privacy protection. Data have been stored in a secure part of the SSAPR head office in Kinshasa and will be transferred to Palladium’s London office on closure of the programme.

Sampling and Data Collection

Data were collected from two primary respondent groups. First, members of community-level groups served as a primary respondent group and, as members of the public not directly connected

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3 Additional visits have been planned for the comparison sites of Mbuji-Mai and Boma but are pending DFID’s approval of a no-cost extension.
to SSAPR, comprised the majority of SSAPR’s intended beneficiaries. These respondents were selected through two-stage sampling. First, respondent groups were selected using a maximum variation sampling approach, ensuring each sample represented a wide cross-section of views and respondents. Although this mode of selection yields a relatively small number of respondents,\(^4\) the variation in the sample allowed it to reach levels of representativeness that would otherwise require significantly larger sample sizes and thus more resource-intensive approaches.

The research team worked with community-level authorities to identify groups that had had no direct involvement with SSAPR interventions. From this list, six groups were selected at each data collection point. The purposive selection of groups was made to ensure each round covered the widest diversity of groups. A convenience sample of six to eight men and six to eight women was then selected from each selected respondent group. Eligibility criteria for participation were as follows: individuals with no direct involvement in any element of SSAPR programming who were over 18 years of age and had lived in the commune in question since 2009. Table 1 shows this breakdown.

**Table 1: Breakdown of Community-Level Respondent Groups**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members of religious groups (various)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of civil auto-defence groups</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students (tertiary)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of motards (bikers’) association</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of trade organisations(^5)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of youth associations</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total respondents</strong></td>
<td><strong>141</strong></td>
<td><strong>137</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The research team made efforts to ensure the sample of participants was as representative as possible of the diverse civil society groups represented in each community. Triangulating data from all respondent groups represented in the study further strengthened the validity of these findings.

\[^4\] Approximately 60-75 respondents per location.

\[^5\] This differed between locations from fish-seller women, to women market traders, to joiners, etc.
Second, data were also collected from **direct SSAPR partners** – politico/administrative officials and community-level partners with whom SSAPR worked directly – in order to contextualise community-level findings. These individuals were identified as being involved in SSAPR by both the programme and community members, following which a convenience sample was selected. Table 2 shows the breakdown of these respondents according to gender and title.

**TABLE 2: BREAKDOWN OF DIRECT SSAPR PARTNERS PARTICIPATING IN THE RESEARCH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police officials</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice officials</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local administrative officials</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community officials (chefs de commune, quartier, etc.)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSAPR experts (from PSP/CCOSS and EA components)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen groups (media, relevant networks and committees)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Partners</strong></td>
<td>56</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For all groups, data were collected using both quantitative and qualitative research instruments. First, respondents were given a bespoke scorecard on which they were asked to rate the likelihood (from 1 to 10) of a given event occurring in 2009. This included both positive events, such as ‘*the police make an effort to resolve my problem*’, and negative events, such as ‘*the police ask me for a bribe*’. Respondents then rated the likelihood of the same events occurring on the date of data collection. During follow-up visits, respondents were asked to rate the likelihood of the same events occurring at the date of the first round of data collection, as well as with reference to the current round of data collection.

Following this exercise, qualitative data were collected through a semi-structured questionnaire asking respondents to explain and discuss differences between the score assigned to the two instances considered in the scorecards. This collection took the form of focus group discussions (FGDs) for SSAPR community beneficiaries and key informant interviews (KIs) for SSAPR partners. Data collectors recorded responses in field notebooks in the language of choice.
Data Entry and Analysis

Qualitative and quantitative data were entered into MS Word and Excel following each round of data collection. Field staff translated raw data from field notebooks into French and transcribed them into Microsoft Word. Scorecard responses were coded into Excel. Raw qualitative data were analysed using both grounded theory\(^6\) and thematic approaches.\(^7\) Findings from these approaches were compared to identify the divergent themes that emerged. Quantitative data from scorecards were analysed in Excel to identify perceived individual- and group-level changes between 2009 and 2014. This provided an indication of overall trends and relative changes in each outcome area. The team also used triangulation techniques during qualitative analysis to ensure the findings presented here represented the predominant and most salient themes, commonly cited within interviews across a diverse range of stakeholder groups. This served to ensure the overall findings reflected the views of the majority of stakeholder groups and the specific citations included in this report were representative of these overall findings.

Study Management

This study was implemented in conjunction with the Congolese National Institute of Statistics (Institut National de la Statistique, INS). The SSAPR M&E team was responsible for research design, tool development and analysis, whereas INS researchers led the data collection. All data were transcribed in French, although INS provided researchers familiar with the local context and skilled in local languages to facilitate free expression by respondents.

Study Limitations

Five considerations exist for this study that may limit its conclusions.

The first limitation stems from the methods available for selecting individual participants. Although maximum variation sampling ensured representation of a broad range of views in the respondent population, selecting individual respondents through a convenience sample may nevertheless introduce an element of bias, as respondents may have a disproportionate interest in security owing to very positive/negative experiences, or may be unemployed (available during the day) or more socially active. Similarly, discussing sensitive topics like security in a group setting may make respondents less inclined to disclose details. Despite these potential biases, the research team is confident the variety of respondent groups sampled and their in-depth engagement with respondents helped mitigate these issues.

Second, this study is also limited in terms of understanding the relative importance of levels of exposure to SSAPR to population-level change. Although SSAPR was implemented in three cycles, data were collected only in Cycle 1 communes, which had had the greatest exposure to the

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\(^7\) This followed the logic of thematic analysis using SSAPR’s outcome areas as pre-identified themes. See, for example, Gregory, G. and Guest, S. (2012) *Applied Thematic Analysis*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
programme. As such, this study does not represent changes in communes with less exposure to SSAPR activities and may over-represent the effect of the programme overall.

Third, researchers recorded all data using field notes rather than digital recordings, as this was the most practical and cost-effective approach. Although every effort was made to document interviews as closely as possible, these notes may not fully capture all nuances of each discussion. Similarly, quotations included in this report represent the closest possible approximation to exact remarks from respondents, although they were taken directly from field notes rather than a verbatim transcript.

Fourth, the research team designed and implemented purpose-built scorecards to assess the likelihood of a certain event occurring at both the beginning and the end of the survey period. In some cases, the earlier period was five years previously and this therefore introduces an element of recall bias into responses. However, the purpose of the scorecards was more to assist the focus group respondents to recall how the security situation had been at the beginning of the period, rather than to provide quantitative estimates of changes in the security situation across the study period. The research team used landmark events to minimise recall bias as much as possible. Triangulation of findings in analysis also assisted in mitigating this limitation.

Lastly, this study purposefully seeks to explore the views of SSAPR’s intended beneficiaries on changes and change processes. As such, although these respondents are well placed to highlight the dynamics they feel are most relevant to these change processes at the community level, they do not necessarily have insight into other processes leading to these changes within the PNC, the Government of DRC or other partners.

General Considerations

This research did not seek to specifically investigate the differential experiences of SSAPR programming on men and women in pilot locations. However, all attempts were made to ensure our sample included equal proportions of male and female respondents. Analysis of the responses across male and female respondents nevertheless shows no strong differences between the responses of these groups in terms of trends, emphasis or tone. Given these similarities, the report findings do not specifically address gender dimensions, which are likely to require further investigation to fully unpack.
Research Findings

This section describes the high-level changes resulting from SSAPR as articulated by respondents. This discussion takes place against the backdrop of the 2013 ToC, which serves as both a framework for findings and a basis for revision. Based on this information, this section also identifies revisions to the 2013 ToC across all result levels. This section is based on data gathered from community-level respondents.

What impact-level changes occurred in SSAPR pilot sites between 2009 and 2014?

Perceptions of security have improved in SSAPR sites

At the highest level, SSAPR aimed to improve security for communities living in its pilot sites. Although the 2013 ToC represents this as a singular goal, its narrative understands SSAPR as contributing to both subjective security – how safe people feel – and objective security – how safe people actually are. These concepts distinguish changes in crime and security events (nature or frequency) from changes in feelings about security. This distinction can additionally be understood as the difference between freedom from danger (objective) and freedom from fear (subjective)\(^8\).

This study found perceptions of both objective and subjective security have changed positively in SSAPR sites. Focusing on objective security, one respondent in Bukavu describes this shift:

‘Today, crime has significantly reduced compared with 2009. Before, you would see between five and six crimes happen a day, including armed robbery, rape, theft and police harassment’ (Bukavu, Religious Group 1).

Respondents in Kananga described similar developments:

‘Before (in 2009), there were many crimes in our commune – armed robbery, bandits, drunkenness. Too many youths fighting on the streets of Ndesha. Many people shouting insults, not to mention violence and harassment […] Now, even though you can still see some crimes, their frequency has diminished’ (Kananga, Religious Group 1).

Other discussions centred on subjective security, highlighting the sense of worry that accompanied previous elevated crime rates. One respondent in Matadi recounts this feeling:

‘In 2009, there was a high level of crime in the commune of Nzanza, including theft, extortion and violence in the street. You couldn’t walk during the night with confidence, without worrying about bandits or the police. But today it’s the opposite – the bandits have significantly diminished and the police don’t torment us anymore. Now you can walk at night and no one will come and bother you’ (Matadi, Trade Organisation 2).

A respondent in Kananga described similar changes in subjective security:

‘Crime [happening now] is not the kind that creates fear in a community. It is typical cases that happen without serious harm’ (Kananga, Students 1).

These examples highlight the link between objective and subjective security, as reduction in crime also afforded these respondents an improved sense of safety. It should be noted that, while both male and female respondents identified significant improvements in security between 2009 and 2014, female respondents more often referenced ‘subjective’ elements. This highlights that the same contextual factors and interventions may have differing effects on how men and women experience both objective and subjective security, although further research is necessary to better understand these dynamics.

**What Changes Led to Improved Security?**

We described above how perceptions of security have improved in SSAPR sites since 2009. SSAPR’s original ToC understands the programme as contributing to this increased sense of security through three primary outcomes:

- Improved police–public–local authority cooperation;
- Improved police response to public security needs;
- Greater public trust in and support for the police.

This dynamic is illustrated in Figure 1, with the blue boxes indicating outcome-level changes, which together lead to the desired impact-level change of increased public sense of security, illustrated in red.

**Figure 1: Original ToC logic at the outcome/impact level**

Respondents in SSAPR pilot sites overwhelmingly described improvements in both forms of security between 2009 and 2014 related to changes in the police. Referring to 2009, they described the police as a significant factor behind both subjective and objective insecurity. This was manifest in arbitrary
arrests, collaboration with criminals and corruption, which contributed to both fear and physical threats to the community. One respondent in Bukavu described this situation:

‘In 2009, a person could be a victim of police harassment around five to seven times a week if they had the habit of going outside. The police and the military officers were the principle perpetrators. But now you can go out late and, even if you meet a member of the PdP, there is no longer any harassment’ (Bukavu, Students 1).

Discussions in Kananga echoed these experiences:

‘In 2009, the police used brutality and violence to intimidate the population; the population was scared and did not want to approach them. However, in 2014, there are no more arbitrary arrests or violence, everything is resolved calmly and we are not scared’ (Kananga, Youth 1).

Respondents overwhelmingly attributed this positive change to the introduction of the PdP under SSAPR. They identified occasions on which the PdP had contributed to objective security by reducing crime carried out by criminal groups, bandits, rebels and members of the military, including theft, rape, murder and robbery. One respondent in Kananga provided an example of these dynamics:

‘We noticed frequent crimes in 2009, with the presence of the shegues (armed bandits), who operated in full view of the police, who were indifferent. But, with the presence of the PdP, there is no longer complicity and indifference, like the saying “He who says nothing consents.” The PdP has arrested many shegues and has diminished their actions significantly’ (Kananga, Youth 1).

Changes at this level are a clear achievement for SSAPR. Though respondents cited some additional contextual factors as relevant to overall security, the three outcomes in the SSAPR ToC - trust, responsiveness and community-PdP collaboration – were most often cited as driving these positive changes within the police. The following section presents details of changes at the outcome level.

**Communities have Increased Trust in the Police because of the PdP**

When considering the changes that contributed to improved security, nearly all respondents described improved trust in the PdP in 2014 as compared with the PNC in 2009.

‘In 2009, the police were enemies of the population. They terrorised the population. But now in 2014, this is no longer the case. Confidence has been re-established between the population and the police, allowing them to collaborate. We now feel that the [police] station in the commune is our station’ (Matadi, Youth 1).

This change was attributed to the PdP’s positive manner of interacting with the population, willingness to carry out tasks without bribes and reduced collaboration with criminals. One

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9 These factors vary significantly across group, but tend to include the behaviour of the military and the local economy, as well as recent events such as migration, conflict and prisoner escapes.
respondent in Bukavu described how these changes had resulted in increased trust and mutual respect between communities and police:

‘The PdP are police in service of the population. They settle issues with honesty, react and without asking for bribes. They are closer to the population and listen to us […] Before 2009, going to the police could just as easily incriminate the victim [as the perpetrator]. Those police would not go to the scene of a crime without first receiving a sum of money’ (Kananga, Trade Group 2).

Other respondents describe progress brought by the PdP as a shift away from an exploitative mindset towards one committed to making their community a safer place. Although this is a slow process that is far from complete, respondents felt this shift had contributed to a reduction in police brutality, abuse and crime.

**Police responsiveness has improved as a result of the PdP**

In addition, respondents also described significant improvements in police responsiveness between 2009 and 2014, attributing it to the presence of PdP officers. Previously, respondents noted members of the PNC would often ignore crimes taking place in front of them or refuse to respond to incidents when called. One respondent in Kananga described this situation:

‘Before 2009, to get a police officer to respond to the population in case of a crime or insecurity required a lot of money. To get the police to intervene in a situation required paying the frais de motivation; if not, he dragged his feet’ (Kananga, Students 1).

Many describe the PdP as a departure from this behaviour, as, respondents argue, they are willing to work on behalf of the public without demanding bribes or other compensation. One respondent in Bukavu described this dynamic:

‘In 2009 when an issue arose, the police would come to take us and abuse us without letting us explain what had happened. Today, when problems arise, the police arrive accompanied by the chef de quartier and they listen calmly and let us explain what has occurred. We are free to express ourselves now’ (Bukavu, Youth 1).

Another respondent in Kananga confirmed these changes, noting the PdP’s improved responsiveness to the community’s needs:

‘Today in 2014, once the PdP officers are called, no matter the time of day, they intervene quickly and on time. Even without being called, they come to help once they hear someone is being threatened. With the PdP, intervention is quick, assured and without cost. PdP officers do their best to resolve problems’ (Kananga, Students 1).

Intervening in crimes was repeatedly cited as a factor in the perceived improvement in objective security, as incidents were averted in a manner clearly attributable to the PdP. This active engagement is a cornerstone of the PdP model. In addition to these changes, respondents in Matadi also consistently cited the establishment of an emergency hotline as a further symbol of improved police responsiveness (Matadi, Menuisiers1). Focus groups and key informants across SSAPR pilot sites corroborate these findings.
Collaboration between police and communities has improved through PdP

Respondents also noted improved collaboration between the police and pilot communities through involvement of PdP officers. They highlighted that, in 2009, communities were reluctant to work with the police, seeing them as drivers of insecurity rather than a solution to it. A female respondent from Matadi described the change process in terms of both police and criminal elements:

‘In 2009, the police collaborated with criminals, and we the population were considered their playground where they could come and steal whatever they wanted […] It was difficult for us to take any matters to the police because they would not find a solution to your problem. However, today these problems don’t exist anymore. The police are now at our service – the problems we take to them are dealt with impartially; they don’t collaborate with criminals anymore. Today, we’ve become the collaborators with the police by turning in the criminals that are eventually arrested’ (Matadi Trade Group 1).

Improved collaboration provides the PdP with better information, improving officers’ ability to address and prevent crime. Though seemingly distinct processes, building community trust in the PdP and improving their ability to respond were cited as measures that together aim to address the critical lack of community confidence in the PNC. These processes indicate improved subjective security was often a necessary condition in fostering the community–PdP cooperation that improved objective security (as the section below explores in further detail).

It should be noted that, while the 2013 ToC refers to police–public–local authority cooperation, community-level respondents rarely referenced the role of local authorities, highlighting instead the relevance of police and community police coordination in improving security.

A revised SSAPR ToC impact–outcome logic from the perspective of beneficiaries

The findings of this study provide further evidence that the ToC outcomes materialised and were, for the most part, instrumental in bringing about changes in both objective and subjective security, although this change occurred through different trajectories. In this respect, our research suggests the SSAPR ToC logic at the impact level is largely consistent with beneficiary experiences. The data collected from this longitudinal study can be used to validate some of the causal assumptions from the 2013 ToC and strengthen the evidence base for the underlying programme logic of how outcome and impact level change occurred.

Although the data suggest the impact–outcome logic is sound from a beneficiary perspective, based on our findings a few revisions to the ToC are necessary at the outcome–impact level to better reflect the data. The remainder of this section presents these findings.
Disaggregating objective and subjective security provides insight into change processes

Most importantly, the revised ToC separates objective and subjective security, both conceptually and in terms of programme logic.

Although the processes leading to both objective and subjective security are closely linked and self-reinforcing, they nevertheless occur on their own timescale and with different sequencing. The results of this study suggest subjective security is influenced first by improvements in trust and responsiveness. Progress in this area demonstrates the PdP contribute to rather than detract from public security. This confidence in the PdP makes individuals more likely to collaborate with the PdP, improving their ability to contribute to objective security. Both forms of security are also self-reinforcing: as objective security improves through improved collaboration, and responsiveness, subjective security also improves.

Respondents indicated that improved subjective security was often a necessary condition for fostering the community-PdP cooperation that improved objective security. Despite entrenched mistrust of the police among the community, this study shows even incremental improvements in police behaviour and responsiveness positively affected levels of trust in the PdP in a relatively short period of time. For example, many respondents cited how high-profile prosecutions by police officers had improved their trust in the PdP, even though these things are only indirectly linked.

This suggests these events may be impactful primarily because of their strong symbolic nature. It should be noted that making large gains in this manner is easiest when public expectations of the police are low. Going forward, such symbolic action will likely have a diminishing effect on subjective security as expectations of police performance are raised.

Clarifying the links between justice provision and a public sense of security

Understanding objective and subjective security as two different concepts also clarifies factors beyond SSAPR’s immediate scope that affect change. Perhaps the most significant factor is the formal justice system: respondents described security and justice provision as inherently linked, citing occasions where justice-related outcomes had improved their sense of security. For example, respondents in Matadi cited the fact that ‘bandits are arrested and sent to the prosecutor’ as a factor that improved their feelings of security (Matadi, Youth 1). This group also connected improved justice provision to improved objective security, manifest in a reduction in crime:

‘It is thanks to the work of the PdP on the ground that these evils are leaving our commune and quartier. [This also owes] to the effort of justice [sector] to track down these bandits and organise public trials’ (Matadi, Youth 1).

Despite the connections many respondents made between security and justice, they also noted that coordination and procedural links between these systems were not fully functional. Many respondents noted that, although the PdP often took initial steps to resolve an issue or identify a perpetrator, cases were often not properly handled by judiciary bodies owing to a lack of
coordination, corruption or mismanagement. This weakness, they argued, represented a limitation to the PdP’s efforts to improve security, as both objective and subjective security were often inextricably linked to the justice sector. One respondent in Matadi described this dynamic:

‘The PdP can arrest you gently, but once you are before the judicial police they charge you with exaggerated claims. It’s as if they still have the same motivation to collect money from the population’ (Matadi, Builders 1).

This observation further underscores the sentiment that the police are the beginning of an interdependent justice chain, composed of complex and often interdependent connections. This suggests the performance of justice institutions may not only reflect on the public’s perception of the PdP but also affect the PdP’s ability to promote security. As such, a justice-related outcome is proposed within a revised ToC, indicating its relevance to both security outcomes.

**A Revised ToC Logic**

Figure 2 represents a revised understanding of security and the change process, taking into account these beneficiary perspectives. The links between these interplaying elements and the justice system are displayed with broken lines, indicating the ToC has not proven or disproven this link, so it remains an assumption until it can be proven.

**FIGURE 2: REVISED OUTCOME/IMPACT LEVEL TOC, BASED ON BENEFICIARY PERSPECTIVES**

What intermediate changes occurred between 2009 and 2014 that contributed to improved police outcomes?

At the programme level, SSAPR’s 2013 ToC envisions three primary programmatic outputs as driving changes in three outcomes described above around the role of the police in improved
security: empowerment of key stakeholders, changes to police capacity and changes to police accountability. These output-level changes are understood to be the result of SSAPR’s direct engagement at the population, police and politico-administrative levels. Figure 3 illustrates this dynamic.

**FIGURE 3: ORIGINAL SSAPR 2013 ToC**

This section presents changes between 2009 and 2014 at the programmatic output level reported by study respondents. These include better PdP capacity to respond to community security needs, better citizen engagement with and understanding of security issues and improved PdP motivation to serve the public. This section also highlights elements of these changes that represent a departure from the 2013 ToC.

**The PdP has better capacity to respond to community security needs**

Respondents identified improved PdP capacity, including both skills, equipment and infrastructure, as a significant change between 2009 and 2014. Respondents repeatedly cited the police’s previous inability to respond to and address their needs as a factor reducing citizen confidence in the police and contributing to insecurity. For example, respondents described police officers in 2009: ‘In 2009,
the police were devoid of adequate equipment. For them, deployment was difficult, and sometimes a few officers were dressed in tatters’ (Kananga, Religious Group 1). Another group in Kananga described a different situation in 2014:

‘Today, things have changed – the PdP officers have motorcycles, vehicles, Motorola (for communication) that help them respond in time to the security needs of the population. Once you call them, even at midnight, they are capable of intervening. They mobilise their vehicles and come quickly’ (Kananga Students 1).

Respondents also noted, however, that inadequate facilities and small numbers of officers allocated to protect large geographical areas reduced the presence of the police and created the impression that the PNC was unable to address security issues. One respondent in Bukavu described the importance of police stations in shifting these dynamics:

‘In 2009, the work of the police was not felt at the centre of society […] the police station was very far from the people. But today, with the presence of police stations almost everywhere, the work of the police is noticeable by communities. In case of a problem people go directly to the PdP. People no longer hesitate to turn perpetrators in at the closest police station’ (Bukavu, Students 1).

In 2014, respondents noted PdP officers had better skills and capacity, allowing them to respond better to the needs of citizens. This includes responding when they are called, carrying out their professional duties and proactively engaging in crime prevention. Although many community members felt equipment was still lacking for many PdP officers, the improved buildings and mobility equipment the PdP received through SSAPR were described as being important to helping the PdP consolidate their capacity gains. One respondent in Bukavu described the importance of PdP training in building capacity:

‘There is a realisation among the PdP, they have been sensitised to behave well and to collaborate well with the population. The real factor in this change is the PdP training’ (Bukavu, Students 1).

Beyond building skills, a number of respondents also noted the increased number of PdP officers on the streets in many locations also played a role in improving security. This also ensures members of the PdP are present late at night, unlike other PNC cadres. This presence combined with PdP training has created an environment where people are comfortable walking in previously unsafe places and approaching police. As one SSAPR partner noted, ‘This presence reassures the population that they can go to the PdP in case they need to.’ The addition of officers who speak the local language was also repeatedly mentioned as positively affecting the public’s impressions of members of the PdP and their ability to respond (Kananga, Motards 1).

The PdP have improved motivation to serve the public

In addition to improving the capacity of the PdP to respond to public needs, respondents cited improved motivation for the PdP to act in the public’s interest as an important change. The original ToC refers to improved police accountability as an intermediate change. Although this study identified links from accountability to improved perceptions of the police, our research suggests the
issue is larger than just accountability and includes other related issues we have classified as ‘improved motivation’. Our research suggests accountability is important but part of a broader change around motivation. Respondents attribute this change in motivation to three primary factors: the PdP approach, improved internal accountability and reliable compensation to the police through the bancarisation system.11

First, respondents associated changes in police motivation with the training of PdP officers in the PdP approach. This training extends beyond skills and capacity-building to a reorientation of PdP members away from intimidation and towards the needs of the community. One respondent in Bukavu pinpointed this change:

‘This change is attributable to the reform efforts, specifically the PdP, as this forms part of the education for the population as well as the police – meaning specifically the PdP philosophy’ (Matadi, Trade Group 1).

This observation is consistent with SSAPR’s understanding of the PdP approach as both a philosophy and also a specific set of skills, which together create new expectations of the behaviour and performance of the police. Respondents specifically emphasised the elements of this training that covered Congolese law and human rights as having specifically shifted this motivation (Bukavu, Auto Defence 1).12 However, information gathered from PdP officers themselves is necessary to confirm that these were in fact the elements of the training that most affected PdP motivation.

In addition, respondents cited shifts in internal accountability aimed specifically at the police as altering incentives for the police, and specifically the PdP, to act in the interest of the public. These changes in internal accountability were largely linked to strengthened efforts to ensure legal consequences for police misconduct. Although our evidence does not indicate the frequency of these cases, the fact that respondents cited a few, high-profile events or trials as examples of improved accountability indicates these efforts had a strong symbolic importance. For example, all FGDs in Matadi cited the same case as an example of improved accountability.

‘In 2009 there was total impunity. But today, police officers are held accountable for their crimes and brought to justice. For example, a police officer killed someone in Quartier Baoba – he was taken to the auditoria for his crime and convicted’ (Matadi, Youth 1).

Others describing this same case cited the public nature of this trial as particularly important to building public trust in the process, as well as publicising the consequences of misdeeds. Despite being targeted at the police force at large, these processes were noted as particularly important to shifting incentives within the PdP. They indicated a reduced tolerance for impunity to members of both the police and the public. One respondent in Matadi described this process:

11 Bancarisation is the process through which police officers’ salaries are paid directly into their bank accounts. This form of payment attempts to reduce opportunities for corruption within the PNC, including opportunities for superior officers to skim off the salaries of those officers below them.

12 Overall, community-level respondents expressed a good understanding of details of the PdP training – more research is necessary to understand the ways in which communities learn about these and other technical details of SSAPR implementation.
'The PdP are now sanctioned in cases of abuse. This makes them collaborate well with the population, which makes the population want to collaborate with them' (Matadi, Trade Group 1).

Thus, this change also begins the self-reinforcing process of PdP–community cooperation, essential for changing both subjective and objective security. This verifies the ToC assumption that trust improves as police become more transparent and accountable. Similarly, respondents cited the importance of high-ranking members of the police speaking in public to support community–police collaboration as well as condemning harassment, rape and other crimes carried out by both the police and criminals. These events were cited as motivating PdP officers to work in support of the community and indicating, even if only symbolically, a shift in incentives. Respondents across all sites also cited the increased commitment by politico-administrative authorities to enforce internal accountability mechanisms as an important factor driving this change.

Additionally, respondents cited that improving the regularity of PdP salary payments, primarily through the bancarisation system, as a factor that had improved police’s motivation to serve the community. This system, respondents argued, had improved the PdP’s financial situation, reducing their dependence on bribes as a means of supporting themselves. One respondent in Bukavu described this change:

‘The reason we have noticed a change is that, before, police officers received their salaries from their bosses. This meant [superiors] only gave the officers half their salaries, but now we have the bancarisation system’ (Bukavu, Students 1).

This change, respondents argued, reduced police incentives for corruption within the PdP, making it more possible and attractive to follow PdP principles, which prohibit corrupt practices. Although respondents were clear corruption endured even within the PdP, they felt these changes had nevertheless played a significant role in shifting PdP motivation to carry out their job functions in the interest of the public.

Citizens better understand and engage with security issues

Respondents also cited improved public understanding and engagement with security issues as a significant change between 2009 and 2014. One respondent in Kananga described this situation:

‘Before 2009, people thought you needed to have an umbrella of political affiliation or obedience in order to approach local authorities to discuss security matters. Today, pastors in the churches have the courage to preach on the radio and speak to the Provincial Assembly authorities to involve them in matters concerning security of persons and their belongings’ (Kananga, Students 1).

These changes provide opportunities for the public to engage with security issues, through media coverage of both police misconduct, as well as trials and other measures of internal accountability carried out by the PNC. While more data are necessary to fully understand this relationship, this finding indicates SSAPR communities now take an interest in security issues. This evidence is strongest in Kananga, where respondents highlighted the importance of community-level engagement in the police reform process:
‘With the PdP doctrine, the change in the mentality of the population is remarkable […] workshops by non-governmental organisations and members of civil society on the PdP doctrine allowed these groups to take things into their own hands and begin advocating on behalf of the population in terms of security and justice’ (Kananga, Students 1).

Respondents noted the public was now more aware of the most appropriate place to take problems as well as which practices by police, including accepting bribes, were illegal. This was most clearly described in Kananga:

‘With the establishment of the PdP, many people now know their rights in the realm of security. That’s the reason why so many voices are being heard now demanding that the population be protected’ (Kananga, Religious Group 1).

Although respondents in Bukavu were not as vocal about this change, they nevertheless provided one example of an intervention key to supporting this change:

‘Poster campaigns helped improve public knowledge that the services of the police are free, which reinforces the connection between the police and the community. We hope these will be expanded and distributed everywhere’ (Bukavu, Religious Group 2).

Although more evidence is necessary to fully understand the varying role of the community on the police reform process, these findings indicate that, even if these processes are often slow, they nevertheless have played a role in supporting the development of the PdP. Although respondents did not feel the PNC was ‘directly answerable’ to the population on security matters as highlighted in the ToC, this level of public engagement was reported nevertheless to motivate police to work in the interest of the public, as well as to motivate PNC authorities to remain invested in reform efforts.

A revised SSAPR ToC output logic based on beneficiary perspectives

The previous section provided evidence from beneficiary perspectives that validates the linkages between changes in the main programme outputs and outcomes included in the original ToC. Our findings have also identified a number or revisions to the original ToC. These begin with clarifying the roles of the PdP vis-à-vis the PNC, followed by an acknowledgement of the potential impact of the police on the security reform process. The issue of motivation within the police reform process, along with its relationship to accountability, is also considered.

The PdP function – and are understood by the public – as separate from the PNC

Consistent with broader programme approaches, the 2013 ToC does not distinguish the PdP from the PNC. The PdP is intended as a philosophy or approach that extends throughout the PNC cadres in each SSAPR site. However, in reality, respondents described the PdP as distinct from the broader PNC. Often, this was based first on both physical as well as behavioural differences between the PdP and the wider PNC, as described by respondents in Matadi:
‘The PdP are identified by the [yellow] elements on their uniforms that mention the police de proximité. Additionally, they are the officers that do not demand money in order to resolve a problem’ (Matadi, Religious Group 1).

These same respondents further described this distinction:

‘Women know well how to identify which police officers belong to the PdP and which don’t. The PdP are identified by the yellow part of their uniform, which mentions the PdP. Also, their uniforms are cleaner than those not in the PdP’ (Matadi, Religious Groups 1).

Furthermore, respondents also described the PdP in direct contrast to the PNC. For example, ‘the PdP’, one respondent noted, ‘is a police force that enforces the rights of the population, and the non-PdP detract from this progress’ (Kananga, Trade Group 1). Another respondent in Kananga spoke similarly, noting that, ‘The PdP carry out their duties for free, whereas the non-PdP demand makolo or a bribe for every request’ (Kananga, Students 1).

Given that the ToC understands SSAPR as working to improve the PNC as a whole, this distinction complicates reform efforts. In some cases, respondents noted that the PdP had set a positive example to non-PdP cadres by encouraging them to act fairly and intervene in crimes, which had improved the performance of those in the PNC. However, all respondent groups also noted that non-PdP cadres continued to act in a manner contrary to the 3P/3R principles, particularly by perpetrating harassment. This behaviour reportedly strained the relationship between the two groups. One respondent in Kananga described this dynamic:

‘[Non-PdP units] are in permanent conflict with the PdP who are in disagreement with their behaviour. This attitude of the non-PdP units undermines the confidence that the PdP have managed to gain from the population’ (Kananga, KII Round 2).

Respondents attributed this ‘conflict’ to the introduction of the PdP’s 3P/3R approach, aimed at reducing corruption, violence and collusion with criminals. This change, respondents argued, threatened the primary source of income and power for many members of the PNC, and reduced the progress of reform.

Although full-scale reform of the PNC is beyond the scope of SSAPR, this tension nevertheless detracts from the ability of the PdP to positively influence the PNC. Fully grappling with the process of institutionalisation of the PdP approach will be essential to the ultimate sustainability of reform efforts, but revising the ToC to honestly represent the current distinction between the PNC and the PdP will allow for a better understanding of the processes intended to link these bodies and mainstream both training and approaches throughout the institution more widely.

**Understanding the PNC as detracting from security**

Beyond highlighting the differences between the PdP and non-PdP, respondents also clearly highlighted the often-deleterious impact of the non-PdP on both objective and subjective security. When referring to 2009, respondents in every site overwhelmingly described police not as simply unskilled but also as ‘enemies’ of the people. In Goma, a location without PdP presence, one respondent described this dynamic clearly: ‘We wonder if the police are here to make us more secure or less secure’ (Goma, Students 1). This statement underscores the public perception of the PNC’s
active role in contributing to insecurity, which is distinct from a simple failure to promote security. As the 2013 ToC does not account for the distinction between the PdP and the PNC, it also fails to consider the often-negative impact of the PNC on objective and subjective security, and thus how SSAPR could mitigate this. Highlighting the positive and negative impact of the broader PNC on reform efforts provides a more realistic understanding of the role of the PNC from the perspective of community members.

**Motivation is a key factor driving changes in police behaviour**

The 2013 ToC highlights ‘accountability’ as a core outcome area in the police reform process. The 2013 ToC describes this in a largely technical manner, situating accountability in terms of ‘mechanisms to address public needs, external demand, discipline and abuse of power’. However, beneficiaries largely attribute improvements in police behaviour to changes in police *motivation to serve the public*, under which internal accountability plays an important but not determinant role. Similarly, although the 2013 ToC highlights external accountability as part of separate empowerment processes, this study indicates that citizen-level accountability processes play a smaller, though complementary, role in improving police motivation to serve the public.

In addition to refining these elements of the ToC, this study also identifies that community-level respondents understand **low salaries to be a critical factor affecting PdP motivation** to serve the public. Many respondents noted PNC salaries were often too low to cover even basic needs, which drove officers, they argued, to corruption. One respondent in Kananga described this dynamic:

‘*It is an issue of low salaries. Some recruits are inducted but have not yet been paid. In order to live they let themselves engage in begging and harassment. When all matters are settled, they act corruptly rather than righteously. When you pay a bribe, you assist them rather than them assisting you*’ (Kananga, Students 2).

This was not addressed in the 2013 ToC. Although it appears to make assumptions related to the will for change at all levels, the 2013 ToC does not specifically address salary or other factors affecting PdP motivation. In practice, while SSAPR provided a stipend to PdP trainees, its failure to address the issue of PNC payment overall is cited as causing members of the PdP to again rely on corrupt practices once they return to the standard PNC pay scale. One respondent described how gradually adherence to PdP principles had declined, noting that, *‘In the beginning, the PdP collaborated well with the population, but they now have a tendency to also ask for a small bribe before they resolve a problem’* (Bukavu, Students 2). These stipends may have further complicated these dynamics by raising trainee expectations and providing a false incentive to those participating in the training.

Although less far-reaching than the corrupt practices of non-PdP units, the fact that some PdP members have reverted to old practices suggests incentives to act in the interest of the population are not maintained at current levels of compensation. Some respondents also argued that low salaries were responsible for the desertion of many officers from the PdP and often the PNC. This

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13 SSAPR implementers note that the issue of salaries was however raised in ToCs from 2011 and 2012.
not only represents a risk to programme sustainability but also suggests a specific threat to maintaining a strong PdP presence in communities. As such, salaries have been added to the revised ToC as a central factor affecting PdP motivation.

A revised SSAPR theory of change

Figure 4 represents our revised understanding of security and the change process in SSAPR intervention sites, taking into account beneficiary perspectives gathered during this study.

**Figure 4: Full revised SSAPR ToC**
Concerns for Sustainability

The above discussion highlighted a number of positive changes related to security and police performance in SSAPR pilot sites, as articulated by community respondents. Despite the strength of these achievements and the conviction with which they were discussed among both community groups and SSAPR partners, SSAPR partners and key informants nevertheless expressed concern for their sustainability. This section presents the concerns of these partners in an effort to contextualise and allow for a better understanding of the factors affecting the future trajectory of change. These factors first cover the motivation of the PdP, refer second to the internal dynamics of the PNC and lastly reflect the instability of security in SSAPR sites and the PdP’s role in these contexts.

First, regarding motivation, SSAPR partners, staff and politico-administrative actors across all pilot sites officials overwhelmingly cited the issue of low salaries as the biggest threat to sustaining SSAPR’s achievements. An informant in Matadi highlighted this issue, citing that the PdP were paid only around US$51 a month, an amount insufficient to cover daily expenses. They detailed the impact of this small amount on SSAPR’s progress:

‘This change will not be sustainable, because the social situation of police officers still leaves something to be desired. This did not improve as part of the dynamics of reform. The work conditions of the PdP improved, but their salary is still mediocre’ (Matadi, KII2).

In all sites, key informants linked this issue to corruption, noting, ‘[the PdP] are not paid. So they have the tendency to demand bribes just to find something to eat’ (Bukavu, KII2). An official in Kananga echoed this sentiment with an anecdote highlighting corruption in the force:

‘Say two police officers (one PdP and one non-PdP) live on the same piece of land. The family of the non-PdP officer eats every day, has clothes to wear, etc. But the PdP officer doesn’t have anything at the end of the day! What’s the consequence? The PdP is discouraged! The PdP officers will begin to ask themselves, “Can we eat the PdP philosophy?”’ (Kananga, KII2).

Echoing the views of many community-level respondents, key informants drew a direct connection between low salaries and enduring corruption within the PNC. While the complex dynamics behind corruption and decision-making among PdP officers merits further investigation, these informants consistently expressed concern that on low salaries PdP officers would lose their motivation to adhere to the PdP philosophy of non-corruption.

Key informants also raised the connection between low salaries and concerns about retention rates within the PdP, noting how low salaries might increase the likelihood that PdP officers would leave the force (Kananga, KII2). The threat that high levels of desertion may undermine positive gains is even more serious when coupled with concerns about the low ratio of police to population. Informants in both Bukavu and Kananga raised this as a major obstacle to maintaining security. A key informant in Bukavu noted how, despite improvements, the PdP remained understaffed:

‘Even though we recommend one police officer for every 350 residents, we have 35 police officers for 150,000 people – that’s one officer for every 4,286 inhabitants!’ (Bukavu, KII2).
As such, reducing the number of PdP not only would represent a lost investment for SSAPR but also may further reduce the ability of the police to maintain a strong presence within communities.

Second, a number of key informants cited internal factors within the PNC as further risks to the sustainability of SSAPR’s achievements. First is the inevitability that internal transfers within the PNC will affect the likelihood that the PdP approach will be sustained in its current form.

‘There are now new generals within the PNC, which will definitely have a negative impact on the sustainability of the accomplishments of the programme, in the sense that those who have been trained will find themselves in other provinces that have not yet begun the reform process. Similarly, SSAPR pilot provinces will see new authorities coming who haven’t been trained […] this presents risks to the sustainability of the programme, and will put a chill on “police–population” relations’ (Bukavu, KII2).

At the practical level, key informants also expressed concern that the PdP philosophy had not yet been sufficiently mainstreamed within the wider PNC. This was most clearly manifest in the continued negative impact of non-PdP officers on the PdP trained cadres. A key informant in Kananga described this dynamic:

‘Superior officers in the PNC that have not had police reform training are an obstacle to the success of reforms and, by the same account, the sustainability of its accomplishments’ (Kananga, KII2).

Relying on direct training to integrate the PdP approach into the PNC suggests it is not yet an engrained philosophy, and sustainability may suffer in the absence of SSAPR support. This is supported by the negative experience of many community respondents with non-PdP officers, who were often cited as having a deleterious impact on the work of the PdP.

With these concerns in mind, it should be noted that community-level respondents and key informants also highlighted the limited ability of the PdP to contribute to objective and subjective security, given the fragility of many SSAPR pilot areas. In many cases, these weaknesses were related to specific security events, including a mass prison break in Bukavu and the arrival of kuluna\(^{14}\) gangs in Matadi. Although combatting these security threats is outside the immediate mandate of the PdP, a number of respondents cited the PdP’s inability to deal with them as a limit to their sustainability. One respondent in Matadi described this issue:

‘In 2014, we’ve observed a resurgence in insecurity, especially at night in certain unlit corners. This violence is carried out by the reappearance of the phenomenon of kulunas. Kulunas are armed and the PdP cannot deter them because they are unarmed’ (Matadi, Trade Groups 2).

This indicates that any security incident has the potential to negatively reflect on the PdP and reduce public confidence in the force, even though many of the most severe incidents are likely to be outside

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\(^{14}\) Local motorcycle gangs
of their mandate. Although these expectations for the PdP may be unrealistic, they may nevertheless threaten the sustainability of the PdP in its current state.
Conclusions and Areas for Further Research

Conclusions

This study presents the findings of original research developed to assess the 2013 ToC from the perspectives of the programme’s intended beneficiaries. This in-depth, longitudinal investigation revealed that SSAPR considerably improved perceptions of both objective and subjective security in SSAPR pilot sites. This progress was largely attributed to the PdP, which improved police responsiveness, community trust in the police and community–police collaboration.

Even within the context of this significant achievement, it is important to remember SSAPR was implemented in some of the most unstable and insecure cities in DRC. Although respondents described SSAPR’s pilot sites as more secure in 2014 than in 2009, changes and perspectives on change are inherently relative. Sustaining and improving security in these sites remains a challenge for residents as well as the organisations that continue to work there. With an eye on ongoing challenges, this study has also highlighted a number of important revisions to the 2013 ToC. These include:

- Disaggregating the processes supporting subjective and objective security;
- Clarifying the role of the PdP vis-à-vis the wider PNC, as well as efforts to mainstream the PdP philosophy more widely;
- Highlighting the potential negative impact of non-PdP members of the PNC on objective and subjective security;
- Situating motivation as a key factor driving change, supported by internal and external accountability as well as compensation;
- Substantiating the link between justice provision and security.

There was a sense among respondents that police and security services were a significant cause of insecurity across all research sites. Many descriptions of the PNC in 2009 paint a picture of a service plagued by criminality, abuse of power and systematic violations of human rights. The image painted by respondents today is different and undoubtedly very much improved, although poor behaviour, criminality and harassment still occur. This validates the PNC as a point of intervention in impacting community perceptions of safety and security but suggests sustaining such change in the long term will require an examination of the structural causes of poor police behaviour in addition to the many risks both internal and external to the PNC.

It is hoped identifying these areas for revision can improve programming that seeks to support community-based police reform efforts in DRC and beyond.

Areas for Further Research

As community policing approaches become increasingly central to international development and stabilisation programmes, the findings from this research will also be important to those developing
ToCs and designing programmes for community policing programmes in other post-conflict contexts. To further this evidence base, this exercise has also identified four primary evidence gaps related to the SSAPR ToC.

First, these findings could be complemented by a similar study conducted with the PNC and PdP. This would provide police perspectives on the drivers of change and serve as the basis for a police-driven ToC. This investigation would be particularly useful to explore the dynamics behind police motivation.

Second, an assessment of capacity-building and other supply-side activities is necessary to specifically identify drivers of police behaviour change and elements that are not effective. This would also help clarify police perspectives on reform, levels of ownership and future prospects for sustainability.

Third, given the overall similarities between the responses of male and female respondents, a specific examination of SSAPR’s differential impacts (or lack thereof) on men and women would be useful to add texture to these findings.

Fourth, the numerous concerns for the sustainability of SSAPR’s achievements highlight the need for an in-depth assessment of the future prospects for police reform from both a political and a management point of view within the PNC.

Lastly, although this study has identified promising indicative findings related to the role of citizen empowerment in police reform, more research is necessary to better understand how and at what stage this demand-side function most meaningfully affects the reform process.
Annex A: SSAPR Theory of Change Monitoring Concept Note
Introduction

Background

The Security Sector and Police Reform Programme (SSAPR) is a five-year programme funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID). Established in 2009, SSAPR is intended to assist the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in laying the foundations for the re-establishment of the rule of law by supporting the creation of accountable and service-oriented security and justice institutions that are able to improve safety, security and access to justice for Congolese citizens. To achieve this goal, SSAPR aims to promote accountability through support to the police reform process, as well as to improve the capacity of communities to cooperate with police and demand effective policing through four complementary projects: the Police Support Programme (PSP), Control and Coordination of Security Sector (CCOSS), External Accountability (EA) and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). These SSAPR initiatives involve stakeholders from all aspects of public administration, police and civil society, including the Ministry of the Interior, Security, Decentralisation and Customary Affairs (Ministère de l'Intérieur, Sécurité, Décentralisation et Affaires Coutumières, MISDAC), the Congolese National Police (Police Nationale Congolaise, PNC) the General Inspection Audit, the Secretariat of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Parliament, civil society, the media, magistrates and Congolese researchers. SSAPR is implemented in pilot sites of Matadi, Kananga and Bukavu as well as at the national policy level.

Motivation

In 2013, a comprehensive theory of change (ToC) was developed to describe SSAPR logic and implementation experience. This document is intended to be updated and tested throughout implementation based on lessons learnt through service delivery. Although SSAPR components have compiled a strong base of programmatic data documenting activities and outputs according to the ToC, this is not sufficient to meaningfully update and validate the overall ToC. More evidence is needed concerning changes at outcome and impact levels as well as the longitudinal aspects of change in order to investigate the functional logic of SSAPR’s ToC and to test its key supporting assumptions.

Filling this evidence gap is particularly critical in SSAPR’s final year of implementation, as these data will support ongoing lesson learning, the final impact evaluation and project completion report and the design of SSAPR’s follow-on programme. As community policing approaches become increasingly central to international development and stabilisation programmes, the findings from this research will also be important to those developing ToCs and designing programmes for community policing programmes in other post-conflict contexts.

To address this evidence gap, SSAPR’s M&E component has designed an operational research study to assess, document and learn from SSAPR’s ToC. This exercise will examine if and how SSAPR’s interventions have contributed to change at the outcome level, with the overall goal of assessing the causal logic behind security-related change in SSAPR pilot locations. This should be understood as a descriptive exercise designed to identify strategic lessons rather than one to
establish SSAPR’s direct connection to such changes, as the final impact evaluation will address questions of causality.

Research questions

Overarching questions will focus on the dynamics influencing change in security in SSAPR pilot sites:

- Have objective and subjective feelings of security changed? What are the processes by which these changes have occurred?
- To what extent do the assumptions and linkages connecting outputs and outcomes in SSAPR’s ToC hold? What have been the key variations?
- What other contextual factors (at the provincial and national levels) are associated with changes in the supply and demand dynamics of security provision?
- What implications do these changes have for programme sequencing and implementation of activities?

These overarching questions will be operationalised through specific research questions beginning from each of SSAPR’s ToC outcome areas:

1. How have public levels of trust and support for the police changed?
   - How has SSAPR contributed to this change?
   - What other contextual factors played a role?
2. How have the dynamics of public–police–local authority cooperation changed?
   - How has SSAPR contributed to this change?
   - What other contextual factors played a role?
3. How have the dynamics of police response to crime and interaction in the community changed?
   - How has SSAPR contributed to this change?
   - What other contextual factors played a role?

For the purposes of this exercise, the word ‘change’ is understood as an observable shift in behaviour, relationships, activities and actions of social actors.

Methodology

Approach

Answering these questions requires in-depth engagement with SSAPR’s intended beneficiaries, partners and staff. This level of engagement combined with the long-term nature of the changes described in the research questions is best suited to qualitative methods that allow participants to reflect on change processes both retrospectively and prospectively. In addition, as opposed to development outcomes in sectors such as health or education, which can be objectively measured according to quantitative indicators, changes in security and justice involve both objective and subjective outcomes, many of which are best explored qualitatively.

Given these priorities, the research team proposes a longitudinal mixed-method approach to answer the above research questions, based primarily on qualitative methods, specifically focus group discussions (FGDs) and key informant interviews (KIs). The proposed research framework is adapted from the outcome mapping and outcome harvesting approaches, which identify specific
examples of outcome-level change and investigate the processes behind them. This approach will allow the research team to consider how SSAPR and other actors may have contributed to change, as a wide range of actors may influence each example. As such, this approach is also particularly well suited to programmes like SSAPR that seek to change relationships and behaviour through complex, likely long-term processes.

This research design will follow a flexible approach well suited to investigating the function and logic of a ToC according to both programme dynamics and relevant contextual factors. This approach uses a maximum variation sampling method to ensure respondents represent a broad cross-section of populations. Although this mode of selection will yield a relatively small number of respondents, the variation in the sample will allow it to reach levels of representativeness that would otherwise require significantly larger sample sizes and thus more resource-intensive approaches. Triangulating data from the three respondent groups represented in the study will further strengthen the validity of these findings.

To operationalise this approach, reflection scorecards will be used to both gather information and facilitate qualitative data collection. As we plan to revisit as many of the same respondents as possible over time, this tool will allow for a longitudinal exploration of change processes within and between individuals. Data collected using this tool will highlight changes in trends between 2009 and early and late 2014, and will facilitate a comparison of these trends between and among respondent groups.

Research sites

The study will be implemented in SSAPR’s three pilot sites. In each site, research will take place in the commune that participated in Cycle 1 of community policing (police de proximité, PdP) training – and thus that with the longest history of SSAPR interaction. The research team will revisit each research site once every three to six months with the aim of returning to the same respondents to discuss changes over time. If deemed useful, the research team may also visit communes involved in more recent PdP cycles as a point of comparison.

To provide further points of comparison for SSAPR’s endline evaluation, this research approach may be implemented in the three comparison sites identified in the programme’s baseline (Boma, Mbuji-Mai and Goma).

Sampling strategy

We have identified three primary levels of respondents to meet research objectives:

1. Community-level respondents (no direct connection to SSAPR);

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16 Approximately 60-75 respondents are expected per location.
2. Partners (politico-administrative or police bodies with whom SSAPR works directly, as well as community-level partners);
3. SSAPR field staff from PSP/CCOSS and EA (those directly implementing SSAPR activities).

The above list highlights the primary actors relevant to SSAPR: its intended beneficiaries, its implementers and its partners who both support implementation and are expected to benefit from it. For each category, respondents will be purposively selected through two-stage sampling. First, respondent groups will be selected based on a convenience sample drawn through a maximum variation sampling approach, detailed for each category below. This approach will ensure each sample represents a wide cross-section of views and respondents. Following this, a convenience sample of individuals will be selected from each respondent group to participate in data collection activities.

All individuals selected to participate in KIIs or FGDs must also be aged 18+ years and have lived in the commune in question since 2009.

**Community level**

At the community level, the first stage of sampling will be based on the divisions provided in Table 1 below. These categories were developed based on conversations with SSAPR staff and experts and together encompass a wide range of experiences of Congolese public life. Research teams will select the categories by considering which categories are 1) most relevant to each location and 2) least likely to have a direct connection with SSAPR programming.

Table 1: Community-level stakeholder and respondent groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Respondent group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victims/survivors</td>
<td>Community-level services for victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medical care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups active in security and justice</td>
<td>Advocate groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neighbourhood self-defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human rights groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>Trade, employment or cooperative groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Media or journalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local non-governmental organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social/cultural</td>
<td>Religious groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>University students</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Once the three categories have been identified in each location, the research team will also select one respondent group from each category. This will again be limited to groups with no connection to SSAPR programming, as well as to groups that are available at the time of research.

A convenience sample of six to eight men and six to eight women will be selected from each of the three selected respondent groups.\textsuperscript{17} Table 2 below illustrates one potential outcome of this selection process:

Table 2: Example illustration of community-level participant selection process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected category</th>
<th>Selected respondent group</th>
<th>FGD participant selection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil society</strong></td>
<td>Employment co-operative</td>
<td>6-8 men from selected employment cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6-8 women from selected employment cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social cultural</strong></td>
<td>Church group</td>
<td>6-8 men from selected church group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Youth</strong></td>
<td>Sport club</td>
<td>6-8 men from selected sport club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6-8 women from selected sport club</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Where group membership is gender-specific, comparable men’s and women’s groups will be selected and respondents identified through this same approach. Where lists of group members are available, respondents will first be selected randomly from each list, then contacted to ensure eligibility. Only individuals and respondent groups with no previous link or formal interaction with SSAPR partners or activities will be included in the sample.

\textsuperscript{17} Community-level respondents will be selected by the M&E team officer in conjunction with supervisors from the National Institute of Statistics (Institut National de la Statistique, INS) (see ‘Research staff’ section for further discussion of this relationship).
SSAPR direct partners

SSAPR direct partners will also be identified through a maximum variation sampling approach, based on the categories detailed in Table 3 below.

Table 3: SSAPR direct partners – category and individual/groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>INDIVIDUAL/GROUPS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMMUNITY-LEVEL BODIES</td>
<td>Members of forums de quartier*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Members of RRSSJ*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Journalists from the MARS project*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEGAL</td>
<td>Provincial Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public prosecutor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL GOVERNMENT</td>
<td>Governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MISDAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Town mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Town magistrate (all 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chefs de quartier (all)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chefs d’avenue (all)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLICE</td>
<td>Provincial Commissariat – high commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special Police for the Protection of Women and Children – principal commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commissioners of all the three unités (Nzanza, Mvuzi, Matadi)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Indicates respondent groups best suited to FGDs rather than KIIs.

As these categories include SSAPR’s primary partners, at least one individuals/group from each category should be selected. Between five and 10 individual respondents will then be selected based on a convenience sample of members categories. In cases where groups rather than individuals are being used, a convenience of group members will also be conducted to select six to eight participants who will then participate in an FGD.

In comparison sites not selected for SSAPR programming, respondents from similar categories to those outlined above will be selected.
SSAPR staff

At least one member of PSP, CCOSS and EA field staff each will also be interviewed in each location. These three groups will constitute the maximum variation allowed in the sample, with between one and three respondents selected from each based on convenience. All efforts will be made to accommodate the schedules of SSAPR staff and not to disrupt day-to-day activities.

This respondent group will only provide data on SSAPR project locations.

Data collection procedures and instruments

Data collection will be carried out through FGDs and KIIIs using a scorecard method to guide discussion.

Reflection scorecards

Instruments

All discussions will begin by using a reflection scorecard in order to facilitate reflection and stimulate conversation. This scorecard will provide 15 example events derived from the ToC and ask respondents to rate the likelihood each event happening first in 2009, followed by the likelihood of the same event happening in 2014 on a scale from one to 10.

An example scorecard is provided in Figure 1 below,

Figure 1: Examples from reflection scorecard

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Je suis témoigne d’infraction dans la rue (sans violence)</th>
<th>1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Je dénonce une infraction à la police</td>
<td>1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le policier fait un effort pour régler mon problème</td>
<td>1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Procedures

After having distributed one scorecard to each respondent, in each session research supervisors will read each scorecard example to respondents as a group, while respondents complete their answer on their own. Prior to completing the scorecards, respondents will be given an anchor event to help them recall 2009 – this will be an event of local significance that occurred in that year, as identified by INS supervisors and SSAPR staff (i.e. an election, local celebration, etc.). Additionally, key respondents will also be given a frame of reference for the likelihood of different ratings (1 = never, e.g. snow in Kinshasa; 10 = definitely, e.g. the sun will rise tomorrow).
Respondents will keep the completed scorecards throughout the FGD so that they may reference their own scores in the discussion. At the end of the discussion, the research supervisor will collect the completed scorecards to serve as a data source.

All reflection scorecards and interview guides were pilot tested in Bukavu and have since been adapted based on this testing.

## Discussions

### Instruments

Reflection scorecards also serve as a useful entry point for FGDs and KII s, which serve as the main form of qualitative data collection. KII s will be conducted with individuals in leadership or decision-making positions, whereas FGDs of six to eight respondents will be conducted with community groups and SSAPR partners whose perspective together would be more informative than any individual respondent.  

These discussions will be based on topic guides and follow the logic of the reflection score card to cover the following areas of discussion:

- Crime and violence;
- Police–community relations;
- Police effectiveness and responsiveness;
- Harassment and corruption;
- Accountability;
- PdP.

See Annex 2 for FGD and KII topic guides.

### Procedures

For each of the above areas, respondents will be asked to explain their scorecard responses, provide examples demonstrating these changes and discuss their thoughts on the causes on these changes. In addition to explaining their own answers, SSAPR partners and staff will also be asked to reflect on examples of change cited by the community respondents and provide their views on the key drivers of change behind each example. KII s are expected to last one hour, whereas FGDs are expected to last two hours.

Data from KII s and FGDs will be collected in the form of written notes. One note-taker will be assigned to each FGD to ensure notes capture discussions as closely as possible. All data collection will be conducted in French, although supervisors and note takes will also be skilled in local languages to facilitate comprehension and discussion.

### Limitations

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18 Indicated with an * in Table 2.
Despite the strength of the proposed approach, like all research studies this approach carries a number of limitations. One limitation stems from the methods available to select individual participants. Although maximum variation sampling will ensure a broad range of views are represented in the respondent population, selecting individual respondents through a convenience sample does introduce an element of bias, as participants may participate who have disproportionate interest in security owing to highly positive/negative experiences, are disproportionately unemployed (available during the day), are disproportionately socially active or have disproportionately high education levels (skilled French speakers). Collecting data from the same population over time may also introduce a social desirability bias, as respondents may feel inclined to exaggerate stories of change based on what they believe the researcher wants to hear. Despite these potential biases, the research team feels in-depth engagement with these respondents can help mitigate and/or contextualise some of these biases, as can engaging with a wide variety of respondent groups.

Additionally, one risk to this approach is the potential difficulty in locating and returning to the same respondents for follow-up visits. Although the team will collect contact details and confirm each respondent’s willingness to participate in the future, in practice respondents may be too difficult to locate, unavailable or unwilling to participate in future rounds. This issue is not anticipated on a large scale, and thus is not expected to substantially detract from the research approach or findings.

**Ethics**

The research team will ensure all respondents participate voluntarily and obtain informed consent prior to engaging in the study. Informed consent will be demonstrated through signed consent forms, which will be housed securely in the SSAPR office in Kinshasa. In cases where respondents are only able to provide verbal consent, including illiterate respondents or those hesitant to sign their name, the research supervisor will testify written consent.

All research will be conducted by trained data collectors with significant experience collecting data in each pilot location. Field training for all research supervisors and note-takers will also cover research ethics standards and consent procedures. The research team will maintain a constant review of all ethics procedures and update DFID on any changes in research approach with ethical implications. If necessary, the research teams submit all research protocol for institutional review board (IRB) review. The research team has access to an internal IRB through GRM Futures Group as well as a US-based IRB where appropriate. To the researcher team’s knowledge, there are currently no relevant IRBs/ethics boards in DRC.

Every effort will be made to maintain the anonymity of respondents during both data collection and analysis. Original documents with corresponding contact information and responses will be kept in a secure area in the SSAPR Kinshasa office. During the analysis phase, responses will be entered into a database using a unique identifier to separate individual respondents from their answers. All data will be kept in this database accessible only to core research team members.
**Data management and analysis**

Qualitative data from FGDs and KIIs will be analysed quantitatively and qualitatively. This analysis will be conducted after each round of data collection and will be carried out in a number of phases:

- Database creation and entry – the research team will create an Excel-based database for the entry of all quantitative scorecard responses, along with unique identifiers for each respondent. Contact information will be linked to unique identifiers to allow respondents to be contacted in the future, though stored separately from results to maintain respondent anonymity.

- Quantitative scorecard analysis – for each question, responses will be averaged and changes compared between 2009 and 2014 by individual respondent. This provides an indication of overall trends and relative changes in specific outcome areas across respondent groups, sites, gender, etc.

- Qualitative analysis – data collection will yield a large amount of raw qualitative data from FGDs and KIIs. This will be analysed using two methods:
  - Grounded theory-based approach\(^\text{19}\) – common words, phrases or sentiments will be coded to identify overarching themes and key issues in the text. This will allow the analysis to start from a blank state without a preconceived framework.
  - SSAPR theme-based approach – raw data will also be assessed using the global framework of SSAPR’s outcome areas, with a sub-framework of linkages between output and outcome areas.\(^\text{20}\)

The overall themes and findings of these two approaches will be compared to identify any divergent findings or themes that may emerge.

**Research staff**

This research will be led by the M&E component Technical Manager (Danielle STEIN) and implemented largely by the In-Country Coordinator (Olivier MUMBERE), with technical oversight and quality assurance from the component Project Director (Andrew KOLEROS).

Mr. MUMBERE will supervise data collection in each site, which will be carried out in partnership with local supervisors and note-takers from INS. The M&E component has a longstanding collaboration with INS supervisors in Kinshasa and in each pilot city, and will work with two research supervisors and two note-takers of proven research knowledge, skill and ethical standards. INS representatives will aid Mr. MUMBERE to collect quantitative data (reflection scorecards) and

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qualitative data (FGDs and KII s). Analysis of data collected along with production of project reports will be led by Ms. STEIN.

All efforts will be made to promote high retention levels within the core research team as well as among INS supervisors. In the event that an INS supervisor is unable to participate in all rounds of research, the core team will work closely with INS directors to select a supervisor of comparable skill level from the given location.

**Deliverables and dissemination**

- Three to four lessons learnt briefings – one to two page documents describing SSAPR-specific outcomes or outputs identified across pilot sites along with specific evidence demonstrating its occurrence and anchoring it in SSAPR’s overall ToC;

- Overall ToC assessment – document of up to five pages identifying strategic-level findings for each outcome area in the ToC.

Data from this research will also support the development of a number of M&E outputs during the remainder of the programme:

- M&E contribution to quarterly reports;

- Support to production and analysis of overall impact evaluation.

External dissemination will come in the final year of SSAPR during the M&E component’s focus on data use for decision-making. It is expected that, once refined, the methodology used for this activity will also be presented to the Police Reform Monitoring Committee (Comité de Suivi de la Réforme de la Police, CSRP) and in other DRC-based M&E circles as a form of capacity-building and practice-sharing.

**Timeline**

The above forms of data collection are envisioned to occur in a routine manner, on either a quarterly or a six-monthly basis. Based on value-for-money considerations, the frequency of visits will be determined following the completion of a first round of data collection in Bukavu, Kanaga and Matadi. These visits will be conducted following the below schedule:

- February 2014 – pilot, Bukavu;

- March 2014 – analysis of Bukavu pilot;

- April 2014 – data collection, Kananga; analysis of Kananga data collection;

- May 2013 – data collection, Matadi.
Each period of data collection is estimated to require 10 days. Future follow-up visits as well as visits to non-SSAPR sites will be scheduled following the initial round outlined above.

**Estimated costs**

Based on a pilot exercise conducted in Bukavu, each round of data collection is estimated to cost (per site):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example Bukavu costs</th>
<th>US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transit (flight, go pass)</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily expenses for M&amp;E charge</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local transit (chauffeur, gas)</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INS supervisors and note-takers</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGD materials, compensation for respondents (transit, snacks)</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,780</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gas and chauffeur prices should be expected to be higher for Matadi, although Matadi will not incur flight costs.
Annex B: Purpose-built Community Scorecard
L’objectif de cette conversation est de mieux comprendre votre opinion sur les changements qui sont intervenus durant les 5 dernières années dans le domaine de la sécurité. On va commencer par considérer la situation il y a 5 ans (à l’époque où l’approche PdP avait commencé) dans le premier tableau (1) et en suite on passera au deuxième tableau (2) qui revient sur la situation actuelle. Après avoir rempli ces tableaux, on va discuter sur les réponses du groupe dans son ensemble dans une petite conversation intime.

On peut concevoir les réponses de niveau ‘1’ comme quelque chose d’invraisemblable, comme par exemple parler avec Obama. Dans ce sens, les réponses de niveau ‘10’ suggèrent quelque chose d’évident, comme voir le soleil pendant la journée.

1) Quelle était la probabilité de ces événements en mars 2014 (l’époque où l’approche PdP a commencé) ?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 = Invraisemblable; 10 = Exactement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Je vois (ou écoute) une histoire impliquant la police ou infraction grave dans les nouvelles/TV/radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Je suis témoin d’une infraction dans la rue (sans violence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Je vois la violence dans la rue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Je suis victime d’une violence ou d’une tracasserie de la part de la police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Je dénonce une infraction à la police</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Je vais droit à la police lorsque je suis témoin (ou victime) d’une infraction

Le policier fait un effort pour régler mon problème

Le policier (de la police de proximité) fait un effort pour résoudre mon problème

Le policier (en général) demande un pourboire

Le policier de proximité demande un pourboire

Le policier (en général) commet des abus ou des violences ou viole les règles

Le policier de proximité commet des abus ou des violences ou viole les règles

Les policiers qui commettent des abus sont comptables pour leurs actions

Les policiers (de la police de proximité) qui commettent des abus sont rendus comptables pour leurs actions

Une église de la place exige de discuter des questions sécuritaires graves avec l’autorité locale (gouverneur de province, bourgmestre ou maire)

Une organisation locale de la société civile publie dans un journal une lettre exigeant l’amélioration des conditions sécuritaires

La police (en général) est assez bien équipée pour répondre aux demandes de sécurité de la population

La PdP est assez bien équipée pour répondre aux demandes de sécurité de la population

2) Quelle est la probabilité de ces événements maintenant à juillet 2014 ?

1 = Invraisemblable; 10 = Exactement

I) Je vois une histoire impliquant la police ou infraction grave dans les nouvelles/TV/radio

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Événement</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7a)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7b)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8a)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>Le policier (de la police de proximité) fait un effort pour résoudre mon problème</td>
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<td>Le policier de proximité demande un pourboire</td>
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<td>Le policier (en général) commet des abus ou des violences ou viole les règles</td>
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<td>Les policiers (de la police de proximité) qui commettent des abus sont rendus comptables pour leurs actions</td>
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<td>Une église de la place exige de discuter des questions sécuritaires graves avec l’autorité locale (gouverneur de province, bourgmestre ou maire)</td>
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<td>Une organisation locale de la société civile publie dans un journal une lettre exigeant l’amélioration des conditions sécuritaires</td>
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<td>La police (en général) est assez bien équipée pour répondre aux demandes de sécurité de la population</td>
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<td>La PdP est assez bien équipée pour répondre aux demandes de sécurité de la population</td>
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Annex C: Semi-structured Questionnaire
Guide de discussion en focus groupes

Bukavu – phase de collecte 2

Pour les communautés non-SSAPR

Questions générales :

A. Depuis la visite de notre collègue le mois d’avril, quels sont les grands changements qui sont passés à Bukavu ? Premièrement laisse cette question ouverte et suivre n’importe quelle réponse pour apprendre les détails, etc.

B. A préciser :
   a. Changements politiques
   b. Changements dans le domaine de la sécurité

C. Est-ce ces changements ont changé la situation de sécurité ? Comment, dans quelle mesure, etc. ?

D. En février, il y avait un événement politique ou la police a dispersé un rassemblement politique violent – est-ce que cette événement a changé :
   a. La situation de sécurité ?
   b. La perception de la police dans la communauté ?

Quand mon collègue est venu en mars 2014, on a déjà mentionné quelques changements qui avaient passée entre 2009 et mars 2014. On voulait discuter ces changements un peu plus, et aussi considérer les changements qui sont passés entre mars et maintenant.

Changements dans les domaines clefs : l’objectif ici est de comprendre un peu plus les différences intervenues entre mars et maintenant comme suggéré dans les cartes de score et illustré par des exemples spécifiques (soit bons ou mauvais) soutenus par des événements concrets. On se concerne surtout avec les changements entre mars et maintenant.

a. Infraction (questions de référence 2-3)
   1. Qui a une opinion à soumettre au débat concernant les différences entre mars et aujourd’hui en rapport avec l’infraction et la violence ?
   2. Combien de fois pourriez-vous voir une infraction se commettre et quel type d’infraction ? Donnez des exemples concrets d’événements qui se sont réalisés dans les communautés.
   3. Quelles sont les choses qui ont changé pour vous amener à revoir votre score ?
   4. Est-ce que la police de proximité y est pour quelque chose ? (Sinon, quels sont les vrais moteurs des changements observés dans vos communautés ?)

b. Collaboration avec les communautés (questions de référence 5-6)
   1. Qui a une opinion concernant les différences intervenues entre mars et maintenant pour le travail de la police – allez-vous vers la police si vous avez des problèmes ou dénoncez-vous les personnes coupables de crimes à la police ?
   2. Combien de fois cela s’est produit ? Veuillez donner des exemples concrets.
   3. Qu’est-ce qui a changé pour vous amener à changer votre score ?
   4. Est-ce que la police de proximité y est pour quelque chose ? (Sinon, quels sont les vrais facteurs de changement dans vos communautés ?)
c. Réactivité de la police (questions de référence 7a/b)
   1. Qui a une opinion sur les différences intervenues entre mars et aujourd'hui concernant la réactivité de la police – est-ce que la police est intéressée à répondre aux besoins sécuritaires de la communauté ?
   2. Pouvez-vous donner des exemples concrets sur les services de la police qui vous ont satisfait ou est-ce que la police semble avoir amélioré sur base des conseils reçus dans la communauté? Est-ce que la police s’est efforcée de résoudre des problèmes concrets dans la communauté ?
   3. Quelles sont les choses qui ont changé pour vous amener à modifier votre score ?
   4. Est-ce que la police de proximité y a été pour quelque chose? (Sinon, quels sont les vrais facteurs de changement dans la communauté ?)

d. Tracasseries (questions de référence 4; 8a/b)
   1. Qui a une opinion sur les tracasseries et les abus de la police entre mars et maintenant ?
   2. Combien de fois pourriez-vous être victime de tracasseries ou d’abus de la police ? Qu’est ce qui se passait concrètement ? Donnez des exemples concrets.
   3. Que dites-vous concernant les pratiques liées aux pourboires ? Donnez des exemples concrets.
   4. Quelles sont les choses qui ont changé pour vous amener à modifier votre score ? Est-ce que la police de proximité y est pour quelque chose ? Veuillez donner des exemples concrets d’événements qui sont intervenus.

e. Redevabilité (questions de référence 10a/b)
   1. Qui a une opinion sur les différences entre mars et aujourd’hui concernant la redevabilité de la police ?
   2. Pensez-vous que la police est aujourd’hui plus redevable de ses actions ? Pourquoi ?
   3. Quelles sont les choses qui ont changé pour vous résoudre à revoir votre score ?
   4. Est-ce que la police de proximité y est pour quelque chose ? Veuillez donner des exemples sur les événements qui sont intervenus.

f. Equipement police (questions de référence 13a/b)
   1. Qui a une opinion sur les différences entre mars et aujourd’hui concernant l’équipement de la police ?
   2. Pensez-vous que la police est aujourd’hui mieux équipée ? Pourquoi ?
   3. Quelles sont les choses (dans l’équipement) qui ont changé pour vous amener à revoir votre score?
   4. Est-ce que la doctrine de la police de proximité y est pour quelque chose ? Veuillez donner des exemples sur les événements qui sont intervenus.

g. Exigences sécuritaires des organisations locales vis-à-vis de l’autorité civile locale (questions de référence 1-12)
   1. Qui a une opinion sur les différences entre mars et aujourd’hui concernant le niveau d'exigences des organisations locales ?
2. Pensez-vous que les organisations sont plus exigeantes aujourd'hui vis-à-vis de l’autorité locale en matières sécuritaires ? Pourquoi ?
3. Quelles sont les choses qui ont changé pour vous amener à revoir votre score ?
4. Est-ce que la doctrine de police de proximité y est pour quelque chose ? Veuillez donner des exemples sur les événements qui sont intervenu