



# Independent Evaluation of the Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform Programme

Final Evaluation Report

December 2015



# Independent Evaluation of the Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform Programme (SSAPR)

## Evaluation Final Report

**December 2015**

**Core Evaluation Team Members:**

Andrew Koleros, and Danielle Stein

**Wider Evaluation Team:**

Coralie Blunier, Olivia Kaye, Jonathan Kaminski and John Mayne

This evaluation final report has been produced as part of the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) component of the Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform Programme (SSAPR). The SSAPR M&E Component was commissioned by the UK Department of International Development (DFID) to provide an independent evaluation function to the larger programme.

This report has been produced by Palladium with in-country data collection partner The Institute National Institute of Statistics (*Institut National de la Statistique, INS*). This report reflects the independent assessment of the evaluation team. The authors do not declare any conflicts of interest.

**Suggested Citation:**

Koleros, A. & Stein, D. (2015). *Independent Evaluation of the Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform Programme: Final Evaluation Report*. London: Palladium.

# Acknowledgements

The research team would like to extend its gratitude to the many individuals and groups that have made this evaluation possible.

First and foremost, we would like to thank the many entities whose support was essential to the implementation of this study, including the Ministry of the Interior, Security, Decentralisation and Customary Affairs (Ministère de l'Intérieur, Sécurité, Décentralisation et Affaires Coutumières, MISDAC) and the Police Nationale Congolaise (Congolese National Police, PNC).

We would similarly like to thank our colleagues in the Police Support Programme (PSP), Control and Coordination of the Security Sector (CCOSS) and External Accountability (EA) components of the Security Sector and Police Reform Programme (SSAPR), whose knowledge of the programme and the wider context was instrumental in developing our evaluation approach and implementing research studies in each of the study sites.

Finally, we would also like to express our sincerest gratitude to our colleagues at the Department for International Development (DFID) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), specifically William Evans (Governance Adviser) and Anne-Judith Ndombasi (Deputy Programme Manager), for their continued commitment and ongoing support to security sector reform in DRC.

This evaluation would similarly not have been possible without the excellent coordination and support of researchers from the National Institute of Statistics (Institut National de la Statistique, INS) in both Kinshasa and SSAPR pilot cities.

Most of all, we would like to thank all community members in Matadi, Kananga, Bukavu and Goma for their willingness to participate in this evaluation, their generosity with their time and their candid responses on the sensitive issue of security.

# Executive summary

## Introduction to the programme

The Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform (SSAPR) programme was a five-year programme funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID). Established in 2009, SSAPR intended to assist the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in laying the foundations for the reestablishment of the rule of law by supporting the creation of accountable and service-oriented security and justice institutions able to improve safety, security and access to justice for Congolese citizens.

The programme was designed as four separate but complementary components to achieve these goals: the Police Support Project (PSP), Control and Coordination of the Security Sector (CCOSS), External Accountability (EA) and Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E). All components were managed independently; each was designed to target different Congolese actors and to empower them to work together to improve the public sense of security in the programme's three pilot cities (Bukavu, Kananga and Matadi) as well as at the national policy level.

SSAPR was intended to run until December 2015 as a pilot programme in the three pilot cities, with a proposed follow-on five-year programme to be implemented based on lessons learnt from the pilot. Owing to mitigating circumstances, DFID suspended SSAPR in November 2015, terminated it in February 2015 and subsequently cancelled plans for a follow-on programme.

## Evaluation context and methodology

At the end of the programme implementation period, the SSAPR impact evaluation responds to the dual objectives of demonstrating accountability while also promoting learning. Thus, questions central to the impact evaluation are around whether the programme was implemented as planned and whether implementation led to desired results. Beyond the need for accountability within SSAPR itself, and as community policing approaches become increasingly central to international development and stabilisation programmes, it was recognised that the findings from a final impact evaluation of SSAPR would be important to those designing community policing programmes.

In order to respond to these dual objectives, we employed a quasi-experimental evaluation design approach nested within an overarching theory-based evaluation design approach. For the quasi-experimental design approach, quantitative data were collected through two cross-sectional representative household sample surveys in SSAPR pilot and comparison sites using a structured questionnaire in 2010 at baseline and in 2014 at endline. Samples were then analysed through a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach to produce quantitative estimates of change over time attributable to the programme.

For the theory-based evaluation design approach, we employed contribution analysis (CA) as an analytical approach to guide causal inference analysis. This involved analysing and interpreting findings from both the quantitative analysis described above and other data sources according to the programme theory of change (ToC) to identify contributory causes to results and support causal claims. This combination of theory-based and experimental approaches sought to answer if and to what extent SSAPR interventions have contributed to


changes in security in SSAPR pilot cities as well as how and why SSAPR has (or has not) contributed to change (and under what conditions).

## Evaluation findings

The final product of this approach was a series of comprehensive narratives, or impact stories, presenting the evidence from various sources in support of causal and contributory claims. These are presented as ‘nested ToCs’ within the larger programme ToC in Figure 1 below.

The remainder of this Executive Summary presents a high-level summary of the four main impact stories produced by the evaluation:

- 🕒 Police Support Project impact story;
- 🕒 Community engagement impact story;
- 🕒 Local politico-administrative authority impact story;
- 🕒 Overview ToC impact story.



**FIGURE 1. SSAPR OVERVIEW TOC INCLUDING NESTED TOCS FOR TARGET GROUPS**

It concludes with a final section on conclusions from the evaluation as well as implications for the design and implementation of future programmes in both DRC and other developing country contexts.

## Police officers exposed to SSAPR have positively changed their practice as a result of SSAPR intervention

The PSP component of the programme aimed to improve police practice to better serve the public and respond to community needs by training the police and providing infrastructure and equipment support. SSAPR reached a sufficient number of police officers with police support interventions in favour of the community policing model, or *police de proximité* (PdP), including intensive training and coaching for over 1,500 officers. For some police officers, this was the first training they received.

Several gender-targeted activities were also conducted, initially in support of victims of gender-based violence (GBV). Police stations were provided with infrastructure and equipment to support the police in dealing with female victims and cases of GBV. The programme also incorporated training into the PdP approach on how to effectively deal with cases of GBV. Additional gender mainstreaming and gender equity activities began relatively late in the programme. This included integrating gender focal points into PNC operations and developing strategies to mainstream gender issues across the organisation.

Community members also reported improvements in police practice over time in SSAPR pilot sites, specifically among PdP-trained officers. Quantitative analysis indicates that positive interactions with a PdP officer were highly correlated with improved perceptions of security. Community members in SSAPR pilot sites also reported seeing more frequent patrols over the life of the programme. To support these changes, the programme supported the media and civil society to establish external accountability mechanisms in SSAPR pilot sites to hold the police to account for their behaviour.

The volume of evidence gathered during this evaluation suggests these changes were credibly the result of SSAPR activities. Participation in the PSP-supported training programme improved the capacity of the police and their practices, although work here may be beginning to slip, with declining police motivation and a reduction in activity within external accountability mechanisms. The evidence is more mixed on the degree to which changes in equipment and infrastructure supported by the programme led to changes in police practice, although it seems to have had an effect on the community's perceptions of the police's capacity. Supplementary analysis also did not find evidence of any compelling external factors likely to have strongly influenced these changes, strengthening the certainty of our findings.

## Communities in SSAPR pilot sites have positively changed their practice around community engagement as a result of SSAPR

The evaluation found community engagement activities organised through community group actors – namely, CSOs and the media – were successful in reaching a large proportion of the population with education and awareness-raising activities. Evaluation findings indicate changes in CSO and media practice were effective in providing opportunities for engagement with the police, through *forums de quartier* (FQs) and other community engagement events.

This led to changes in community practice regarding their engagement with the police. More than one-third of respondents in household surveys in SSAPR intervention sites reported

having participated in an FQ or alternative community forum. Qualitative data gathered during this evaluation suggest both the police and community members attended these fora.

Given the large reach of these activities, and as no other security-related education or awareness campaigns occurred in SSAPR sites during the implementation period, it is reasonable to conclude that exposure to SSAPR-initiated activities led to this change in community capacity. As community engagement activities were ongoing and able to sustain a high degree of interest and positive engagement from pilot communities over a number of years, the evaluation team concluded that changes in community capacity and practice with regard to the police were indeed the result of exposure to SSAPR community engagement activities. Analysis also did not find any compelling evidence of external factors that could have strongly influenced these changes, strengthening the certainty of our findings.

This sustained change in community practice, however, is predicated on other actors, such as CSOs, the media and local politico-administrative authorities continuing to provide engagement opportunities for community members to use their improved capacity to better engage with the police. Although these opportunities existed over the life of the programme, they were all funded, and in some cases coordinated, by SSAPR. Emerging evidence indicates some of these activities may decline in the absence of funding from the intervention.

## Local authorities in SSAPR intervention sites have engaged better with communities following SSAPR support

Recognising the importance of collaboration between all actors, SSAPR undertook a diverse range of activities designed to create an enabling framework for security sector reform among local politico-administrative structures in SSAPR pilot sites. Politico-administrative officials, or *autorités politico-administratives* (APA), were trained on a number of topics, with training designed to improve their knowledge of key issues surrounding security sector reform (SSR) and to equip them with the skills and tools necessary to fulfil their crucial oversight role.

Available data suggest these trainings were of high quality and strategic relevance in building the capacity of APA to play a larger part in SSR. The APA interviewed during the evaluation acknowledged that the training allowed them to fully rise to their roles as coordinators of the security sector at the neighbourhood level. Importantly, the training also aimed to influence APA attitudes towards the police.

APA reported being extremely pleased with the extent to which community fora had improved the level of collaboration between all members of the population and how they had been employed to confront security problems. They mentioned participating in a number of measures and recommendations that had been formulated during the FQs in order to respond to community security needs.

The evaluation team collected sufficient and credible evidence to support a causal claim that SSAPR activities with APA, particularly the organisation of community fora and training for APA, led to changes in their capacity and subsequently changes to their practice regarding local security concerns. Supplementary analysis also did not find compelling evidence of any external factors likely to have strongly influenced these changes, strengthening the certainty of our findings. However, community engagement opportunities, particularly FQs, seem to have been an important intervention related to APA's ability to translate their improved

capacity into improved practice. Early evidence indicates that, without SSAPR funding, the magnitude or frequency of these engagement opportunities may decline.

## Impact story for overview ToC impact

The overview ToC for SSAPR articulates the high-level impact pathway: it states that changes in practice among the programme's primary target groups – the police, local authorities and communities – leads to greater collaboration among these groups with regard to local security concerns. This improved collaboration among all actors in turn leads to greater public trust in the police and reduced crime. Greater trust in the police and reduction in crime lead over time to an increased public sense of security.

There is strong evidence that 'improved police/public/local authority collaboration' has occurred in SSAPR intervention sites. One of the biggest programme successes in terms of improved collaboration was the creation of community fora such as FQs. Qualitative data collected in SSAPR intervention sites indicate that, as communities engaged more with the police and came to support the PdP, people were more willing to collaborate with the police. Although this represents a significant improvement, survey results indicate that community members in SSAPR's intervention sites are still not fully satisfied with the level of collaboration.

It is reasonable to conclude the various mechanisms SSAPR supported have promoted a more participatory approach between the PNC, local authorities and communities to addressing security issues. The evaluation team also gathered supporting qualitative information from local security actors to describe the nature of this change, from police to local authority representatives to civil society members to community members themselves. Survey respondents in 2014 reported strong feelings of confidence in the police and PdP-trained officers, in particular in their communities. Although seemingly distinct processes, ToC monitoring data show the feedback loops and inter-dynamics at play, as building public trust in the police and improved police practice further improved community-police collaboration by improving confidence in the PNC.

There is mixed evidence to support reduced crime levels. Data on levels of crime among survey respondents between 2010 and 2014 in SSAPR intervention and pilot sites indicate that changes in levels of misdemeanour crimes were not statistically significant. This was true when disaggregating data for both men and women. However, the change in the prevalence of serious crimes was statistically significant, indicating a detectable reduction in serious crime in SSAPR intervention sites as compared with comparison sites over time. This was true when disaggregating for both men and women.

The evaluation also gathered data on the 'increased sense of security' among citizens in SSAPR pilot sites, reinforced by quantitative and qualitative findings. This significant increase in perceptions of security was identified across all three SSAPR intervention sites, with respondents reporting feeling substantially safer and more secure than those populations sampled at baseline. In terms of gender-disaggregated results, there was not strong evidence that women experienced differential changes in capacity or community practice. According to our multidimensional indices, men were more likely to experience an improved sense of public security than women, although this does not detract from the positive changes experienced by both sexes in pilot sites.



# Conclusions on the short- and long-term impact of SSAPR and implications for future police reform programmes

## Impact of the overall SSAPR intervention

Findings from quantitative analysis indicate that overall the programme was sufficient in improving the public's sense of security in intervention sites over time. Additionally, heterogeneity analysis indicated that, although men's sense of security improved slightly higher than that of women, both experienced statistically significant improvements compared with in comparison sites. Moreover, poor and marginalised groups particularly benefited from SSAPR's contribution to an increased sense of security.<sup>1</sup> Although this was not an explicit target population of the programme, this is still an interesting finding.

Although results indicate SSAPR was sufficient to improve the public's sense of security, results are more mixed when looking at the larger situation of safety and security. Overall, incidence of crime in both SSAPR pilot sites and comparison sites increased over the intervention period. When comparing incidence rates between SSAPR sites, the relative magnitude of change was lower in intervention sites, although still an increase. When looking at crime prevalence disaggregated by type of crime, we found statistically significant results in the reduction of serious crimes in intervention sites compared with comparison sites, a positive result. Encouragingly, this result was statistically significant for both men and women.

At the same time, analysis indicated there were no statistically significant changes in the prevalence of misdemeanour crimes in SSAPR intervention sites compared with comparison sites over time. This was true for both men and women. What is striking is this finding is in stark contrast with the perceptions of community members: qualitative evidence suggests security is perceived to have improved. Qualitative evidence from different community groups also shows communities say they now experience less crime because of improved police practice and community engagement activities such as the FQs.

This discrepancy between perceptions of changes in crime levels and actual changes as reported from a representative household survey highlight the complicated relationship between objective security (actually being free from crime) and subjective security (feeling safe from crime). This suggests reality and perceptions are often out of sync, and perhaps perceptions of change may occur in advance of actual change, calling into question whether SSAPR targeted the 'right' level of impact from the outset.

## The relative effectiveness of SSAPR component parts

The evaluation concluded that the *overall* SSAPR intervention positively improved perceptions of security in SSAPR intervention sites. Furthermore, the evaluation examined the relative effectiveness of specific programme components. Given SSAPR's focus on improving security through police reform, one focus of our analysis investigated the links between changes in perceptions of security and changes in police practice. When applying regression analysis, the following factors were all strongly correlated with a positive change in a sense of public

---

<sup>1</sup> This analysis was based on asset wealth indicators.

security: being exposed to SSAPR, positive experiences with police officers trained in the PdP approach and knowledge of the PdP approach.

This means that not only did people in intervention sites have more positive perceptions of public security than those in comparison sites, but also, even among those in intervention sites, the more exposure respondents had to SSAPR police support activities, the more positive their perceptions of public security. Positive perceptions of improved security were also more associated with positive improvements to police behaviour than changes in physical infrastructure. This has implications for programme scale-up and design.

The establishment of FQs should be considered one of the largest successes of the programme in fostering collaboration between the police, communities and local authorities. Nearly all interviews with all stakeholder groups mentioned their importance in improving police–community collaboration. Quantitative data suggest they had a strong reach as well, with nearly one-third of community members reporting participating in at least one FQ, which is a remarkable statistic. SSAPR quarterly reports also state a surprisingly strong involvement of women (especially in Bukavu), suggesting these fora are inclusive, which is a positive sign that the security concerns of women are being represented.

## The long-term sustainability of SSAPR

SSAPR programme reports and annual reviews consistently highlighted the evident risks of the sustainability of the overall intervention. From a top-down sustainability perspective, although some achievements have been made to establish a legal framework for police reform through new laws and decrees, the programme rightly identified lack of political engagement on the part of national Congolese counterparts as the biggest risk to this long-term sustainability. Despite some clear progress, there is little evidence to support long-term implementation or enforcement without continued external support and political engagement.

When considering the bottom-up perspective, the programme clearly achieved short-term results corresponding to the desired impact, although there is already some emerging evidence of declines in programme achievements that are necessary links in the causal chain for these positive results to be sustained. For instance, one of the most important changes was the improved police practice stimulated by the PdP training. Equally, the biggest risk to sustaining this change is the declining motivation for PdP-trained police to continue this improved practice.

Both PdP and non-PdP members of the PNC cited salaries as the biggest factor associated with declining police practice. When discussing these issues, community members often linked corruption to the poor salaries of police. If the issue of salaries is not addressed for these police officers, there seems little prospect that they will continue good police practice and the abandonment of corrupt practices. Although the larger police reform process in DRC has attempted to address this to some degree through the *bancarisation* system, the fact that the police more reliably receive their salaries is not a replacement for poor salaries and other equipment and material support they need to remain motivated to continue good practice.

Second, some evidence suggests the continuation of demand-side activities necessary to support these positive changes in the long term is also in question. Specifically, evidence suggests a decline in some of the important external accountability mechanisms supported through the programme. Although FQs are mentioned above as a success of the programme, local authorities interviewed as part of this evaluation indicated a reluctance to continue

organising them without funds, although this was not the case across the board. Similarly, the media reported a decline in security-related journalism since SSAPR stopped paying for media spots. Equally, it is unclear the degree to which civil society will remain engaged with communities around local security concerns when opportunities for training or funding provided by SSAPR are no longer there.

Beyond these concerns, there are some indications that local-level institutional reforms may allow some elements of the reform process to continue. Most promising are examples of budget shifts aimed at covering future police trainings and other reforms in SSAPR pilot sites. But, without a supported police and the commitment of police superiors in the process, this will be a challenge to maintain.

## Overall conclusions on sustainability

Overall, the evaluation identified many positive achievements and lessons to be learnt from SSAPR that would support the scale-up or implementation of police reform programmes in DRC as well as the design of police reform programmes in other contexts. Nonetheless, the results of this evaluation put into question the extent to which these short-term changes will continue. Although this evaluation suggests some interventions may be maintained while others risk declining or fully stopping, at present there is little evidence to determine which achievements of the programme will continue in the long term. As SSAPR was designed as an overall intervention, this raises questions as to whether the short-term changes achieved in the programme period will be maintained if some aspects of the programme intervention are adopted and others not.

The programme did not manage to balance the long-term ambition of delivering sustainable change for communities within SSAPR intervention sites, with the short-term intention to deliver a 'proof of concept' that police practice and community perceptions could be improved through a high-value external intervention. With the £58 million budget over the five years and a heavy level of external support leveraged by the programme, there is strong evidence that police practice improved in the short term, and this was largely associated with positive changes to public perceptions of security.

However, even just after the end of the programme, there are already signs of backsliding and a return to old practices. This raises questions as to whether SSAPR invested too little in concerns of sustainability for the benefit of implementing an impressive programme with a demonstration effect of what is achievable. The fact that this balance was not achieved – and perhaps the programme was not designed to achieve it – means that, despite demonstrating a positive impact in the short term, SSAPR's long-term impact on the lives of Congolese citizens remains unclear.

This needs to be interpreted in the context of two important factors, however. First, the overall programme logic and ToC for the programme were not fully articulated until 2013, over halfway through implementation. This meant the programme did not state its short- and long-term goals until quite late in the implementation period, and thus there was little time to work collaboratively together to achieve these results.

Second, it is important to recognise that, owing to mitigating circumstances, DFID suspended the programme in November 2014 and terminated it in February 2015, approximately one year earlier than its intended closure, and subsequently cancelled plans for a follow-on five-year programme to build on the successes and lessons learnt from the first five years of

implementation. The final year of the programme was intended to focus on issues of sustainability, consolidating the results achieved and working collaboratively with national partners to institutionalise the results to the extent possible. The early termination of the programme resulted in an absence of these critical activities, which undoubtedly would have begun to address some of the sustainability questions raised by this evaluation.

As SSAPR was originally intended to be a pilot, with at least one subsequent programme to follow, it is understandable that a focus on the short-term ‘proof of concept’ aspects of achieving results – particularly to national counterparts – may have received more focus and prioritisation than activities aiming to contribute to long-term sustainability results. Had this been designed from the onset as a stand-alone five-year programme, DFID and implementers may have approached some of its activities differently from the outset.

## Implications for the scale-up of SSAPR and other police reform programmes

- ❶ The buy-in of national counterparts is vital in the process. Without their clear commitment, there is little prospect of long-term change. This requires a more active political engagement from the part of not only programme implementers but also donors and other political stakeholders who carry more weight than programme staff.
- ❷ SSAPR proved that police training and community engagement can work in the short term. The question is how to change incentives in a community to sustain these changes in the long term, for instance planning for the long-term changes in practice among key actors such as the media and civil society to continue when funding for their interventions ceases.
- ❸ Without fully understanding and addressing the multifaceted constraints to behaviour change among key actors, it is unlikely that changes will be sustained. For instance, although the programme addressed issues around the capability of the police, it was not able to address issues of their poor compensation, which impacts on their behaviour around corrupt practices.
- ❹ Some of the least costly activities were the most impactful. The FQs, which required just some support for community mobilisation, provided one of the most important contributions to impact. Infrastructure support, on the hand, a relatively costly intervention, seemed to improve people’s perceptions of the police’s ability to respond but was not correlated with actual changes in police performance.
- ❺ There are questions as to whether a costly intervention such as SSAPR should have been more ambitious in its intended goal, holding itself to account for more than a change in perceptions and rather to an actual change in security in terms of reductions of actual crime.

# Contents

Acknowledgements .....	2
Executive summary .....	3
Introduction to the programme .....	3
Evaluation findings .....	4
Police officers exposed to SSAPR have positively changed their practice as a result of SSAPR intervention .....	5
Communities in SSAPR pilot sites have positively changed their practice around community engagement as a result of SSAPR .....	5
Local authorities in SSAPR intervention sites have engaged better with communities following SSAPR support .....	6
Impact story for overview ToC impact .....	7
Conclusions on the short- and long-term impact of SSAPR and implications for future police reform programmes .....	8
Implications for the scale-up of SSAPR and other police reform programmes .....	11
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES .....	15
List of tables .....	15
List of figures .....	15
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS .....	16
Key Definitions .....	19
1. Introduction to SSAPR .....	23
1.1. SSAPR theory of change and programme logframe .....	24
1.2. Rationale for SSAPR impact evaluation .....	25
2. Methods .....	28
2.1. Evaluation design approach .....	28
2.2. Detailed methods for quasi-experimental DiD approach .....	31
2.3. Detailed methods for Contribution Analysis as the theory-based analytical approach .....	35
2.4. Construction of impact stories .....	40
2.5. Evaluation design considerations and limitations .....	43
3. Police impact: police officers exposed to SSAPR have positively changed their practice as a result of SSAPR intervention; however, some evidence suggests risks to the sustainability of this change in the long term .....	47
3.1. Evidence that SSAPR's interventions with the police improved their capacity .....	48
3.2. Evidence that changes to police capacity led to changes in police practice .....	51
3.3. Overall causal claim: SSAPR interventions led to positive changes in police capacity in SSAPR intervention sites .....	56
4. Community impact: communities in SSAPR pilot sites have positively changed their practice around engagement with the police as a result of the SSAPR intervention, although these changes are unlikely to be sustained after the life of the programme .....	58
4.1. Evidence that SSAPR interventions improved community capacity .....	59
4.2. Evidence that changes in capacity led to changes in practice .....	61
4.3. Overall causal claim: SSAPR interventions led to positive changes in community practice regarding the police .....	63
5. Local authority impact: local authorities in SSAPR intervention sites have engaged better with communities since SSAPR support .....	66

5.1.	Evidence that SSAPR interventions improved local authority capacity.....	66
5.2.	Evidence that changes in capacity led to changes in practice .....	68
5.3.	Overall causal claim: exposure to SSAPR intervention built the capacity of local authorities, leading to a change in their practice regarding engagement with local security concerns .....	70
6.	Impact story for the overview ToC .....	72
6.1.	Evidence that change in practice among all actors led to improved collaboration and a greater sense of trust in the police .....	72
6.2.	Evidence that change in practice among the police led to reduced crime .....	76
6.3.	Evidence that change in target groups' collaboration and changes to trust in the police led to changes in public sense of security .....	79
7.	Conclusions on the short- and long-term impact of SSAPR and implications for future police reform programmes .....	84
7.1.	Conclusions on the impact of the overall SSAPR intervention .....	84
7.2.	The relative effectiveness of SSAPR component parts.....	86
7.3.	The long-term sustainability of SSAPR .....	87
7.4.	Implications for the scale-up of SSAPR and other police reform programmes .....	91
	List of figures .....	93
	List of tables .....	94
	Annex A: Methodology on sampling and analytical approach .....	95
	Data description and sampling.....	95
	Impact evaluation design and analytical methods .....	95
	Outcome indicators and dimensions of change .....	98
	Organisation and interpretation of the results .....	101
	Annex B: Evidence supporting impact stories.....	104
	Organisation of annexes .....	104
	Police Support Programme impact annex .....	105
	Assumptions linking activities to improved police capacity.....	112
	Changes in police practice .....	113
	Assumptions around changes to police practice .....	122
	Variations on the narrative .....	124
	Community engagement impact annex .....	127
	Community sufficiently reached .....	127
	Evidence that causal link assumptions between activities and reaching the public were realised .....	129
	Changes in community capacity .....	131
	Assumptions from changes in reach to changes in capacity .....	133
	Changes in community behaviour.....	135
	Assumptions from changes in capacity to changes in behaviour .....	138
	Variations to the narrative .....	139
	Politico-administrative authorities impact annex .....	141
	SSAPR training was effective in reaching local APA.....	141
	Variations on the narrative .....	145
	Overview ToC impact story annex .....	146
	Changes in direct benefits and improved wellbeing .....	146

A change in practice among community members contributed to changes in public–police collaboration in SSAPR pilot sites .....	148
Impact measured through a multidimensional index .....	156
Assumptions around changes in community practice leading to improved collaboration and reduced crime .....	157
Assumptions of changes in police practice leading to reduced crime .....	159
Assumptions of changes to public trust in the police and reduced crime leading to an increased public sense of security .....	160
Variations to the narrative .....	163
Civil society impact annex.....	166
The evaluation team gathered substantial evidence that capacity-building activities were conducted as planned, reaching a large and diverse number of CSOs able to represent community concerns.....	166
SSAPR activities with CSOs increased opportunities for the police and the public to engage on security concerns.....	167
There is weak evidence on the effectiveness of CSO–community engagement activities leading to a change in police practice through improved external accountability measures .....	169
No strong evidence that changes in CSO practice will be sustained, outside of some isolated cases.....	172
Variations to the narrative .....	173
Media impact annex .....	174
Journalists were effectively reached by SSAPR with high-quality training and other support services.....	174
SSAPR interventions caused this increase in CSO performance .....	176
Improved media practice was effective in reaching community members with information to build their knowledge and awareness of police reforms.....	177
Improved media practice was effective in establishing an external accountability measure to hold police to account.....	178
Despite this progress, there is weak evidence on the sustainability of this change in media practice and thus its long-term effectiveness in establishing a strong external accountability function .....	180
Variations on the narrative .....	181
Parliamentarian impact annex.....	182
SSAPR was effective in reaching parliamentarians with high-quality and relevant training on security and justice concerns .....	182
SSAPR-led training was effective in improving the knowledge, competencies and attitudes of the Provincial Assemblies.....	183
Some laws in favour of consolidation of the reform and/or related to security were enacted and voted at the Provincial Assembly.....	185
Variations on the narrative .....	186

# LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

## List of tables

Table 1. SSAPR logframe results mapped to the ToC .....	25
Table 2. Evaluation city pairs: intervention and comparison sites .....	29
Table 3. Respondents in supplemental data collection, by group and gender .....	39
Table 4. Percentage of population in SSAPR intervention sites in 2014 who have positive attitudes about the PNC and PdP .....	49
Table 5. Perceptions of changes in police performance over time, by site and by year .....	51
Table 6. Percentage of respondents reporting the PNC as the primary institution responsible for maintaining the peace in their neighbourhood, by type of site and year .....	60
Table 7. Percentage of survey respondents reporting participating in SSAPR community engagement activities over the life of the programme in SSAPR intervention sites .....	62
Table 8. Percentage of KAP respondents reporting appreciation of the current level of collaboration between the police and communities, by research site .....	73
Table 9. DiD change in survey respondents reporting being a victim of crime in the past three years between 2010 and 2014, by research site and sex .....	77

## List of figures

Figure 1. Original SSAPR ToC, August 2013 .....	24
Figure 2. SSAPR evaluative theory of change.....	36
Figure 3. SSAPR overview ToC including nested ToCs for target groups .....	41
Figure 4. PSP ToC .....	47
Figure 5. KAP survey respondents reporting frequency of seeing police patrols in their neighbourhood, by site and by survey year .....	52
Figure 6. DiD impact of SSAPR disaggregated by cycle .....	55
Figure 7. Community engagement ToC.....	58
Figure 8. Local authorities ToC.....	66
Figure 9. Overview ToC .....	72
Figure 10. Percentage of respondents reporting changes in community–public collaboration over the past three years, by site and survey year.....	73
Figure 11. Reported confidence levels in PdP by 2014 KAP survey respondents in SSAPR intervention sites .....	74
Figure 12. Changes in perceptions and experiences with crime at the city level over time in SSAPR intervention and comparison sites .....	79



## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

---

<b>AFI</b>	<i>Alkire Foster KAP Index</i>
<b>APA</b>	<i>Autorités Politico-Administratives (Political and Administrative Authorities)</i>
<b>ATT</b>	<i>Average Treatment Effect on the Treated</i>
<b>C3C</b>	<i>Command Centre Control and Coordination</i>
<b>CA</b>	<i>Contribution Analysis</i>
<b>CAR</b>	<i>Capability, Accountability and Responsiveness</i>
<b>CCOSS</b>	<i>Coordination et Contrôle des Services de Sécurité (Coordination and Control of Security Services)</i>
<b>CLSP</b>	<i>Comite Locale de Sécurité et Police (Local Security and Police Committee)</i>
<b>CSO</b>	<i>Civil Society Organisation</i>
<b>DAC</b>	<i>Development Assistance Committee</i>
<b>DAI</b>	<i>Development Alternatives International</i>
<b>DFID</b>	<i>Department for International Development</i>
<b>DiD</b>	<i>Difference-in-Difference</i>
<b>DRC</b>	<i>Democratic Republic of the Congo</i>

---

---

<b>DYCOM</b>	<i>Dynamique Communautaire</i>
<b>EA</b>	<i>External Accountability</i>
<b>EDG</b>	<i>Effective Development Group</i>
<b>ETD</b>	<i>Entité Territoriale Décentralisée (Decentralised Territorial Entity)</i>
<b>FGD</b>	<i>Focus Group Discussion</i>
<b>FQ</b>	<i>Forum de Quartier</i>
<b>GBV</b>	<i>Gender-Based Violence</i>
<b>ICAI</b>	<i>Independent Commission for Aid Impact</i>
<b>IE</b>	<i>Impact Evaluation</i>
<b>IG</b>	<i>Inspecteur Général (General Inspector)</i>
<b>IGA</b>	<i>Inspection Générale de l'Administration (General Inspection Audit)</i>
<b>ISSAT</b>	<i>International Security Sector Advisory Team</i>
<b>KAP</b>	<i>Knowledge, Attitudes and Perceptions</i>
<b>KII</b>	<i>Key Informant Interview</i>
<b>M&amp;E</b>	<i>Monitoring and Evaluation</i>
<b>MIS</b>	<i>Ministry of Interior and Security</i>

---

<b>NGO</b>	<i>Non-Governmental Organisation</i>
<b>OECD</b>	<i>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</i>
<b>OPJ</b>	<i>Officier de Police Judiciaire (Judicial Police Officer)</i>
<b>PdP</b>	<i>Police de Proximité (Community Police)</i>
<b>PNC</b>	<i>Police Nationale Congolaise (Congoles National Police)</i>
<b>PRSP</b>	<i>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</i>
<b>PSP</b>	<i>Police Support Project</i>
<b>PWC</b>	<i>PricewaterhouseCoopers</i>
<b>PSM</b>	<i>Propensity-to-Score Matching</i>
<b>RARE</b>	<i>Rapid Assessment, Response and Evaluation</i>
<b>RENADHOC</b>	<i>Réseau National des Organisations des Droits de l'Homme (National Network of Human Rights Organisations)</i>
<b>RRSSJ</b>	<i>Réseau pour la Réforme du Secteur de Sécurité et de Justice (National Network on Security Sector Reform and Justice)</i>
<b>SSAPR</b>	<i>Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform</i>
<b>SSR</b>	<i>Security Sector Reform</i>
<b>TOC</b>	<i>Theory of Change</i>

## Key Definitions

<b>Term</b>	<b>Definition</b>	<b>Source</b>
Accountability	An obligation or willingness to take responsibility or to account for one's actions according to principles of transparency.	'SSR in a nutshell: Manual for Introductory Training in Security Sector Reform' (2012) DCAF/ISSAT
Capacity	The ability of an individual/organisation to perform assigned duties effectively. This includes human capacity (individual ability), physical capacity (having the right equipment) and institutional capacity (systems and organisational structures in place).	'SSR in a nutshell: Manual for Introductory Training in Security Sector Reform' (2012) DCAF/ISSAT
Civil Society	The political space between an individual and government. Civil society can help define a country's security needs and policies, ensure oversight of public institutions and at times provide security and justice services to segments of the population.	'SSR in a nutshell: Manual for Introductory Training in Security Sector Reform' (2012) DCAF/ISSAT,
Civil Society Organisations (CSO)	A non-state organisation composed of uncoerced participants with shared interests, values and purposes, such as ethnic, cultural, political, or religious beliefs. CSOs may include non-governmental organisations, faith groups, think tanks etc.	'SSR in a nutshell: Manual for Introductory Training in Security Sector Reform' (2012) DCAF/ISSAT,
Collaboration and Cooperation	A willingness to work together in a mutually beneficial way, such as by sharing ideas and working with a range of stakeholders to develop positive solutions for all involved.	Authors' definition. At times in this report we use these terms interchangeably.
Community Policing	A partnership between the police and the community to define crime-related problems, set priorities, determine root causes and implement solutions to reduce or eliminate the problem.	'SSR in a nutshell: Manual for Introductory Training in Security Sector Reform' (2012) DCAF/ISSAT,
Components	This refers to the four aspects of the SSAPR intervention: PSP, CCOSS, EA, and M&E. Each of these entails projects or activities	Authors' definition.
Crime (general)	A violation of state law, resulting from an external human act, positive or negative, socially reprehensible, which is not justified by the exercise of a right which is punishable by law.	Definition used in the SSAPR 2013 RARE study and agreed upon with programme stakeholders
Crime (major)	Major crimes are those that threaten the life or serious harm the victim. They include but are not limited to: violence by armed groups; armed robbery; attempted	Definition used in the SSAPR 2013 RARE study and agreed upon with programme stakeholders

	murder; violence by security forces and sexual aggression (including rape).	
Crime (misdemeanour)	Minor crimes that are illegal but do not threaten the life of the victim. They include but are not limited to: theft; harassment; aggression; injury and assault; burglary; fraud/corruption; domestic violence; unarmed robbery; police brutality; theft of a vehicle and religious-based violence.	Definition used in the SSAPR 2013 RARE study and agreed upon with programme stakeholders
Empowerment	Refers to people's (increased) ability, through the development of resources, assets, capabilities and transformed institutions, to make choices and decisions regarding their development.	Voice, Empowerment and Accountability Topic Guide, GSDRC
Local Authorities	Refers to administrative officials within the local community. This include but is not limited to the Mayor; Bourgmestre; Chefs des Quartiers and Chefs des Rues.	Authors' definition based on SSAPR programme documents.
Objective Security	Refers to how safe people actually are from crime within their community.	Authors' definition based on SSAPR 2013 ToC document
Ownership	The extent to which responsibility is being taken for something, such as the institutionalisation of reforms.	Authors' definition based on SSAPR 2013 ToC document
PdP Officers	Members of the Congolese National Police who have been trained in the <i>Police de Proximité</i> approach in SSAPR pilot sites	Authors' definition based on SSAPR 2013 ToC document
<i>Police de Proximité</i> Approach	A philosophy of police reform focussing on improving accountability, capacity and transparency within a chosen cadre of the Congolese National Police.	Authors' definition based on SSAPR programme documents.
Police Reform	A process aimed to improve the accountability, capacity and responsiveness of police forces, based on a combination of technical skill development and promoting values of human rights and rule of law. These processes often posit a link between effective and responsive security provision and poverty reduction, political stability and social development.	'SSR in a nutshell: Manual for Introductory Training in Security Sector Reform' (2012) DCAF/ISSAT,
Programme	This report uses the term programme to refer to the SSAPR intervention as a whole, which is comprised of four components	Authors' definition based on SSAPR programme documents.
Public Sense of Security	An individual's sense of security – the extent to which an individual feels safe as a whole.	Authors' definition based on SSAPR 2013 ToC document. This report often refers to 'public sense of security' which is a Logframe indicator. However this should be interpreted at an individual level

		and not a community as a whole.
Results	The measurable output, outcome or impact (intended or unintended, positive or negative) of a development intervention.	IFAD Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Concepts and Terms,
Security Sector Reform	A nationally-owned process aimed at ensuring that security and justice providers deliver effective and efficient security and justice services that meet the people's needs, and where security and justice providers are accountable to the state and its people operating within a framework of good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights.	Police Reform' (2009) DCAF/ISSAT Background note.
Security Related KAP	The knowledge, attitudes and perceptions that people have relating to their own security, including their experience with crime and security and justice-related institutions.	Authors' definition. The term is further defined in <b>Box 2</b> on page 34.
Subjective Security	Refers to how safe people feel they are from crime within their community, regardless of actual crime levels.	Authors' definition based on SSAPR 2013 ToC document
Sustainability	A characteristic or a condition where the needs of today's generation can be met without leading to declines in the future wellbeing of generations or populations.	'SSR in a nutshell: Manual for Introductory Training in Security Sector Reform' (2012) DCAF/ISSAT,

# Section 1

## Introduction

01

# 1. Introduction to SSAPR

The Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform (SSAPR) programme in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was a five-year £59 million programme funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) from January 2010 through May 2015. SSAPR intended to assist the Government of DRC in laying the foundations for the re-establishment of the rule of law by supporting the creation of accountable and service-oriented security and justice institutions that are able to improve safety, security and access to justice for Congolese citizens. SSAPR aimed to promote accountability through support to the police reform process, as well as to improve the capacity of communities to cooperate with police and demand effective policing.

SSAPR comprised four components. All components were managed independently; each was designed to target different Congolese actors and empower them to work together to improve the public sense of security in the programme's three pilot provinces (Bas Congo, Western Kasai and South Kivu) as well as at the national policy level. Activities involved stakeholders from all aspects of public administration, police and civil society, including the Ministry of Interior and Security (MIS), the Congolese National Police (Police Nationale Congolaise, PNC), the General Inspection Audit (Inspection Générale de l'Administration, IGA), the Secretariat of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), Parliament, civil society and the media, plus magistrates and Congolese researchers.

Each component is briefly described below:

1. Project Support to the Police (PSP) aimed to support the national police reform process and capacity-building for the PNC. It focused on implementing a community policing approach (*la police de proximité*, or PdP) in the three pilot cities. The PSP component was implemented by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC).
2. Control and Coordination of Security Sector (CCOSS) supported cross-government coordination; accountability; and internal oversight of security sector institutions (both national and provincial levels). Support aimed to strengthen the capacity of these institutions to monitor and evaluate service delivery in the security and justice sectors and address the issue of financial sustainability of the police reform process by assessing the future budgetary needs of the PNC. The CCOSS component was implemented by PWC.
3. External Accountability (EA) aimed to strengthen civilian participation, oversight and control mechanisms. It also provided support for state institutions like Parliament, the Security and Justice Commissions, civil society, the media, academic institutions and policy or research think tanks based in DRC. The EA component was implemented by Development Alternatives International (DAI).
4. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) aimed to support the monitoring of programme implementation and the evaluation of programme performance against expected programme results. This included the consolidation of quarterly and annual reporting for the programme, the delivery of surveys, assessments and other data collection activities to monitor progress and leading on other aspects of M&E. The component also developed lessons learning reports. The M&E component was implemented by Palladium, operating under the name the Effective Development Group (EDG).



SSAPR was intended to run until December 2015 as a pilot in the three pilot cities mentioned above, with an intended follow-on five-year programme to be implemented based on lessons learnt from the pilot. Owing to mitigating circumstances, DFID suspended the programme in November 2015 and terminated it in February 2015, cancelling plans for a subsequent follow-on programme.

## 1.1. SSAPR theory of change and programme logframe

In an effort to better understand the underlying logic behind SSAPR, in 2013 key programme stakeholders drafted a theory of change (ToC) for SSAPR's interventions (Figure 2), well after the mid-point of programme implementation. This ToC was developed through an extensive consultative process led by the DFID Stabilisation Unit involving members of the SSAPR design and implementation team. It was based on SSAPR's implementation experience and the personal knowledge of the programme team. However, a decision was taken not to include programme beneficiaries in this process, as well as not to conduct primary data collection to support or verify the theory. This was largely to ensure the ToC reflected the programme implementers' intended programme logic, as the ToC was developed relatively late in programme implementation.

The ToC was built around the well-known Capability, Accountability and Responsiveness (CAR) model of understanding governance.<sup>2</sup> This was deemed to be a useful framework by the programme, as it emphasised that the programme was interested not only in strengthening the operational effectiveness of the police but also actually in improving police performance by looking at all aspects of police governance. It also based the ToC around a democratic policing model rather than a law enforcement approach.




FIGURE 2. ORIGINAL SSAPR ToC, AUGUST 2013

<sup>2</sup> Moore, M. and Teskey, G. (2006) 'The CAR Framework: Capability, Accountability, Responsiveness. What Do These Mean, Individually and Collectively?' Discussion Note for DFID Governance and Conflict Advisers. <http://www2.ids.ac.uk/gdr/cfs/pdfs/CARframeworkDRCweb.pdf> [accessed August 2015].

The ToC also explained the programme within larger security sector reform (SSR) occurring in DRC, and as a support to the nationally led police reform process underway, as opposed to it being an independent police reform programme itself. This is important, as it situated the programme as part of larger processes that were dependent on other processes occurring as well, including reforms to the justice sector.

In terms of results measurement, the programme logframe was developed at the beginning of the programme and included one Goal statement: *Improved safety, security and rule of law for Congolese citizens*; one Purpose statement: *Develop the capacity and accountability of a Congolese police that is increasingly responsive to the needs of local communities*; and seven Programme-level Outputs, with indicators designed to track changes at each level over time. The impacts and the outcomes in the ToC did not follow the same framing as the programme logframe; however, ToC results can be broadly mapped to the logframe’s Goal and Purpose statements. Table 1 presents how programme logframe results map to the ToC.

<b>Result level</b>	<b>Programme logframe</b>	<b>SSAPR ToC result</b>
<b>Goal/impact</b>	Improved safety, security and rule of law for Congolese citizens	Improved public sense of security
<b>Purpose/ outcome</b>	Develop the capacity and accountability of a Congolese police that is increasingly responsive to the needs of local communities	Improved police responsiveness to public security needs
		Improved police–public–local authority cooperation
		Greater public trust in and support for the police

**TABLE 1. SSAPR LOGFRAME RESULTS MAPPED TO THE TOC**

## 1.2. Rationale for SSAPR impact evaluation

The programme logframe served as the basis for the programme’s M&E framework, with the PSP, CCOSS and EA components responsible for reporting against programmatic outputs on a quarterly and annual basis. The Goal and Purpose indicators were measured by the M&E component through population-based surveys at programme baseline (2010) and endline (2014) and through other thematic research studies conducted throughout the life of the programme. Although this was important to understand overall programme performance against stated goals, the M&E system was not designed to provide rigorous and robust evidence on the overall impact of SSAPR, as this would be achieved through an impact evaluation of the programme.

Impact evaluations of large-scale development programmes have become increasingly dominant in recent years. According to a 2012 DFID Working Paper on impact evaluation methods,

Impact Evaluation (IE) aims to demonstrate that development programmes lead to development results, that the intervention *as cause* has *an effect*. Accountability for expenditure and development results is central to IE, but at the same time as policy makers often wish to replicate, generalise and scale up, they also need to accumulate lessons for the future.<sup>3</sup>

The rationale for the SSAPR impact evaluation follows these dual objectives to estimate the effect of the intervention while also promoting learning. First, SSAPR was a £59 million programme implemented over five years and, as such, it is important for DFID to understand whether the programme achieved its intended results and the return on its investment. Thus, questions central to the impact evaluation are whether the programme was implemented as planned and whether implementation led to desired results.

Beyond the need for accountability within SSAPR itself, as community policing approaches are becoming increasingly central to international development and stabilisation programmes, it was recognised that the findings from a final impact evaluation of SSAPR would be important to those designing community policing, both in DRC and in other post-conflict contexts. Effective and accurate evaluations of SSR programmes are notoriously difficult to conduct, with good examples scarce as a result. As noted by Gronewald and Peake (2004), compared with other spheres of international assistance, SSR programmes have so far been less rigorously and less effectively monitored, and evaluations have been less frequent and less informative.<sup>4</sup> There are many potential explanations for this, notably that actors may be unfamiliar with or have vastly different understandings of SSR; that all SSR programmes are highly politically sensitive (this is especially true in SSAPR's case); and, most importantly, that SSR is a complex process influenced by an assortment of context-specific actors.

As such, the SSAPR impact evaluation attempted to answer the following questions for policy makers, programme planners and other stakeholders:

- ❶ Did SSAPR interventions contribute to changes in PNC capacity and accountability, stakeholder empowerment and ownership and sustainability over the intervention period? How did these changes occur?
- ❷ Did these changes contribute to more effective policing? How did this occur?
- ❸ Did more effective policing contribute to improved security for Congolese citizens?
- ❹ What were the key factors that contributed to these changes?

---

<sup>3</sup> Stern, E., Stame, N., Mayne, J., Forss, K., Davies, R. and Befani, B. (2012) 'Broadening the Range of Designs and Methods for Impact Evaluations'. Working Paper 38). London: DFID.

<sup>4</sup> Gronewald, H. and Peake, G. (2014) 'Police Reform through Community-Based Policing: Philosophy and Guidelines for Implementation'. New York and London: International Peace Academy and Saferworld.  
[http://www.seesac.org/sasp2/english/publications/1/Police\\_Firearms/6\\_Police-Reform.pdf](http://www.seesac.org/sasp2/english/publications/1/Police_Firearms/6_Police-Reform.pdf)

**Section 2**  
Methods

02

## 2. Methods

### 2.1. Evaluation design approach

In order to answer the above research questions, we employed a quasi-experimental design nested within an overarching theory-based evaluation design approach. For the quasi-experimental design approach, quantitative data were collected through two cross-sectional representative household sample surveys in SSAPR pilot and comparison sites using a structured questionnaire in 2010 at baseline and in 2014 at programme endline. Samples were then analysed through a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach to produce quantitative estimates of change over time.

For the theory-based evaluation design approach, we employed contribution analysis as an analytical approach to guide causal inference analysis. This involved analysing and interpreting findings from both the quantitative analysis described above and from other data sources according to the programme ToC to estimate programme attribution and/or contribution and to substantiate causal claims.

The remainder of this section provides the rationale for this combination of theory-based and experimental approaches.

A focus on attribution and causality is the hallmark of impact evaluation. This often involves employing experimental design approaches that assess changes that can be attributed to a particular project, programme or policy; and identifying the causal relationship between that project, programme or policy and the outcomes of interest. These design approaches require strict rules for enrolling participants or beneficiaries in a programme, and the creation of exposure and comparison groups in order to estimate a valid counterfactual to outcomes in a given population with and without exposure to a programme, respectively, which are representative and generalisable. Experimental design approaches require randomised assignment to exposure and control groups and are considered the 'gold standard' in evaluation designs, as randomisation generates comparability between the exposure and comparison groups in observed and unobserved characteristics, with low risk of bias.<sup>5</sup>

However real-world evaluations often do not allow for randomisation in enrolment because of several circumstances, including feasibility, ethical concerns and resource constraints. This is the case for the SSAPR intervention, as the three pilot cities for the programme – Bukavu, Kananga and Matadi – were not selected at random but purposively selected by the programme based on a series of programmatic criteria, particularly the security situation in these sites. Thus, by definition, a selection bias exists in that these sites were chosen because they exhibited relatively a poor security situation compared with other sites in the country.

As such, a pure experimental design approach was not an option for the SSAPR impact evaluation. In the absence of randomisation, a range of variant designs on the experimental design approach, or quasi-experimental design approaches, exist that attempt to imitate randomised assignment when it is not feasible. Some of these variant designs are particularly

---

<sup>5</sup> Rossi, P.H, Freeman, H.E. and Lipsey, M.W. (1999) *Evaluation: A Systematic Approach* (6th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

appropriate in situations such as that of SSAPR, in which the programme assignment rules are less clear. The DiD method is one commonly used design in this case.

An impact evaluation using a DiD design allows for the comparison of patterns of changes within intervention sites (having been ‘recipients’ of the programme) with their comparison counterparts, provided they had comparable baseline levels and within-site distribution of baseline outcomes.<sup>6</sup> In the case of SSAPR, improvement on some of the key programme outcomes – particularly around the attitudes and perceptions of security – could then be seen as programme-driven (i.e. the programme had a detectable causal impact) if the matched comparison sites at baseline did not experience the same patterns of growth. The difference across changes (DiD) of comparisons and intervention sites could be then identified as the real programme impact.

We thus selected a DiD design approach based on city-level matching. Each of the three intervention cities was matched with a comparison city to serve as its counterfactual. Cities were matched in 2010 based on a range of factors using available data, including relative population size, ethnicity, conflict level, region, language, recent historical trends and geographical proximity. Table 2 presents the matched sites. All comparison sites are located in the same province as their matched pilot city. Both Matadi and Boma and Bukavu and Goma are two to three hours’ drive apart. Difficult road conditions mean travel between Kananga and Mbuji-Mai takes significantly longer.

**TABLE 2. EVALUATION CITY PAIRS: INTERVENTION AND COMPARISON SITES**

SSAPR intervention pilot site	Evaluation matched comparison site
Bukavu	Goma
Kananga	Mbuji-Mai
Matadi	Boma

Section 2.2.3 presents a more detailed discussion on the matching process. **Box 1** presents the implications of the matching process for the interpretation of evaluation results.

<sup>6</sup> Gertler, P.J., Martinez, S., Premand, P. et al. (2011) *Impact Evaluation in Practice*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

---

## Box 1. IMPLICATIONS OF DiD IN CITY PAIRS FOR INTERPRETING EVALUATION RESULTS

DiD designs compare the changes in outcomes over time between a population that is enrolled in a programme (the treatment group) and a population that is not (the comparison group). It is important to note that the counterfactual being estimated here is the change in outcomes for the comparison group. The treatment and comparison groups do not necessarily need to have the same pre-intervention conditions. But for DiD to be valid, the comparison group must accurately represent the change in outcomes that would have been experienced by the treatment group in the absence of treatment.

Although evaluation results presented in this report often show that, over time, the situation has improved on key indicators in SSAPR sites, for many of these indicators they started off from a lower position at baseline. The most meaningful comparison is thus the DiD –patterns of change between SSAPR pilot sites and comparison sites over time. It is less useful to compare the 2014 situation in pilot sites to the 2014 situation in comparison sites, as for many indicators the 2014 situation could be showing that, although there was an improvement over time, the pilot sites had only just 'caught up' to the comparison sites, or sometimes had not yet reached the same level. The situation in intervention sites might be better off than it was in 2010 on some indicators, but this should not be interpreted as it now being 'better off' compared with the comparison sites.

Nonetheless, the evaluation results presented here sometime report figures in pilot and comparison sites in 2014 specifically to provide a broader picture of the situation. For example, although there may have been an increase in the proportion of the population who trust the police in pilot sites over time compared with in comparison sites, still less than half of the population in 2014 reported they would actually go to the police in the case of a crime, with a lower percentage in pilot sites reporting this compared with in the comparison sites. Thus, although there has been an improvement over time, it is also important to remember that the situation is still far from ideal for the population living in these intervention sites, and in some cases still worse off than in the matched comparison sites. The evaluation report attempts to balance both of these important trends in results presentation.

---

Although the DiD design was deemed the best available approach to estimate programme impact attributable to the programme, quasi-experimental design approaches are particularly appropriate when only one causal factor is under investigation. Most programmes, however, including SSAPR, do not work in isolation and are not an independent cause in themselves, as many different interventions and factors can contribute to changes in outcomes. In the case of SSAPR, many factors have an impact on an individual's perception of security, beyond the performance of the police.

As such, the DiD design approach alone lacks the explanatory power to answer the 'hows' and 'whys' of programme effectiveness, which is central to policy learning. The notion of

‘contributory causes’ recognises effects can be produced by several causes at the same time, where no independent cause may be either necessary or sufficient for impact. Based on the complexity of a programme and the possible contributions of other potential ‘causes’ for effects, it is often most reasonable to look at the programme as an intervention that is part of a causal package and a contributory cause, rather than as being necessary and sufficient to produce the effect independently.

In these cases, theory-based design approaches provide a more appropriate framework for causal inference. Theory-based design approaches are dependent on the use of a ToC to demonstrate the relations between ‘causes’ and ‘effects’ and are process-oriented – that is, regarding the programme as a conjunction of causes that follow a causal pathway that leads to intended outcomes. Thus, theory-based evaluation design approaches provide an opportunity to test a programme’s theory through the links in the causal chain and explain how and why change happened.

Given the complicated nature of the SSAPR intervention, we opted to combine the DiD quasi-experimental design approach described above with a theory-based approach to improve the certainty of evaluation findings and the causal claims that could be made through the evaluation. The following sections provide the detailed methods for both the quasi-experimental design approach and the theory-based design approach.

## 2.2. Detailed methods for quasi-experimental DiD approach

### 2.2.1. Sampling approach

Sampling followed a stratified sampling approach, wherein the choice of individuals was quasi-random according to strata quota corrected by sampling weights in analysis. As explained above, intervention and comparison cities were matched in 2010 based on a range of factors. For the 2010 survey, a representative but not proportional stratified sample of 8,800 individuals was drawn across these six research sites within randomly selected communes, within which a random sample of ‘clusters’ (avenues, neighborhoods or villages), parcels<sup>7</sup> and then households were selected with equal population quotas and numbers of clusters depending on district size.

To the extent possible, all of the sites selected at baseline were revisited in 2014. When sites could not be located, the evaluation team randomly selected a replacement site. The evaluation team then randomly selected five households per cluster in intervention sites, and 10 households in the comparison sites. This sampling approach maximised the likelihood of matching and capturing comparable population samples over time. We sampled 8,250 individuals: 2,750 individuals in intervention sites and 5,500 in comparison sites, as the analytical approach required more controls than exposed individuals. The evaluation team ensured equal numbers of men and women were sampled.

---

<sup>7</sup> A parcel is defined here as an enclosed or semi-enclosed courtyard or space with one or more households within it.



## 2.2.2. Data collection and entry

Within each selected site, respondents were selected at random. The evaluation team used a rapid parcel listing of each selected cluster on arrival. Following this, the enumerator randomly selected a household. On arriving at the selected household, the enumerator first screened potential participants for eligibility. The respondent was then randomly selected from all eligible participants within that household. The only exclusion criterion was that the respondent had to (i) be over 18 years of age, (ii) not live in the same household as somebody working for an institution responsible for ensuring public security and justice<sup>8</sup> and (iii) have lived in the commune in question since 2010.

Data were collected using a quantitative questionnaire. In order to maximise comparability between the 2010 and 2014 datasets, the 2010 questionnaire was used with an additional section added to assess respondents' exposure to SSAPR interventions.

The evaluation team created a standard data entry template using CSPro for data entry. Data were double blind entered by data entry agents, with supervisors reviewing both versions. Any discrepancies between the two versions were reconciled against the original questionnaires to ensure the data were of the highest quality possible. Data were then imported into STATA for analysis. The research protocol for sampling and data collection, including all data collection instruments, is available on request.

## 2.2.3. Data analysis

This section provides an overview of the analytical approach used in this study. A more detailed methodology of our analytical approach is provided in **Annex A**.

Because the selection of programme intervention sites was predetermined and not random at baseline, the measurement of impacts through DiD approaches can be fraught with estimation biases because of both observable and unobservable differences between individuals selected and those not selected/eligible for the programme. The intervention sites might have been selected because they had more likelihood than the other provinces or cities of reacting to SSAPR with improved outcomes, while being roughly similar at baseline. This is likely to be the case since SSAPR was implemented in a non-random manner. For this reason, we proposed the use of matching techniques to correct for the observable characteristics between the exposure and comparison individuals that may have caused the observed changes in the outcomes.

We employed propensity-to-score matching (PSM) to accomplish this, pooling all individuals from the entire sample according to baseline and/or endline characteristics and deriving a sub-sample of 'matched' individuals based on a common support statistical range of comparable baseline and/or endline observable characteristics. DiD estimates were then directly derived from the matched sample (and then compared with average estimates from the whole sample to detect any possible selection bias) so as to obtain the average treatment on the treated effect (ATT) according to the outcome variables of interest.

Specifically, a probit regression was performed on the whole sample of all individuals on the probability of any individual being a recipient of the programme at baseline and/or endline. Propensity scores were then derived for both intervention and comparison individuals on a

---

<sup>8</sup> This was a deviation from the sampling design of 2010, but analytic methods were used to control for this effect at baseline and should correct for any deviations in analysis.

common support area of propensities; non-comparable individuals were then excluded from the matched sample. Intervention and comparison observations were defined and their outcomes (in difference for DiD approaches) were then compared; statistical difference significance tests were performed on each. To improve standard error calculations from survey data, ATT calculations were used together with a bootstrapping of observations (rerunning calculations for hundreds of rounds through numerical resampling). Standard regression techniques were then performed on the matched sample, controlling for other characteristics and looking at interactions between treatment effects and some baseline characteristics of interest to the analysis.

Data analysis followed a DiD approach, estimating the difference between key measures of interest among individuals living in SSAPR intervention and comparison sites in 2010 and 2014, in order to estimate the overall level of change in knowledge, attitudes and perceptions (KAP) around community-level security concerns. This analysis provided information on the extent to which communities where SSAPR was implemented experienced improved outcomes over time compared with comparison sites.

The specific analytical methods used consisted of the following:

- Descriptive DiD estimates across intervention and comparison sites, and over time, from the two repeated cross-sectional samples wherein individuals were assigned a sampling weight that mapped out their likelihood of being sampled onto the number of people in the population they were representing;<sup>9</sup>
- DiD estimates on the matched samples by round of data collection wherein matching was done through a PSM approach that excluded from the sample individuals who were not comparable;
- DiD estimates on the matched samples both by and across rounds of data collection where PSM was done both across intervention and comparison groups and over the two rounds of data collection; and
- Regression-based DiD estimates on the matched samples both by and across rounds of data collection, controlling for observable characteristics using PSM at the time the individuals were interviewed.

We then used heterogeneity analyses to look at the outputs of three sets of regressions:

- Regressions between outcome estimates and an asset index (asset-based wealth measure), gender and education levels in order to determine differential impacts;
- Regressions between outcome estimates and exposure variables (that described individuals' knowledge and experience of the various programme components in the intervention sites) in order to identify the components of the programme correlated with observed outcomes; and
- Regressions between outcome estimates and the cycle of police training in intervention sites, in order to make inferences about the relative performance of the different implementation phases of the programme across and by intervention sites.

---

<sup>9</sup> This was required because of the representative but non-proportional sampling methodology used during the 2010 quantitative baseline survey.

---

**Box 2. APPROACH TO A COMPREHENSIVE MEASURE OF KAP THROUGH THE USE OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL INDICES**

In order to provide a fuller picture of changes in SSAPR intervention sites over time, our analysis included 29 variables related to different aspects of security as an aggregate estimate of the overall impact of the programme to complement other findings. The 29 variables chosen included the programme logframe Goal and Purpose indicators and ranged from experiences with criminality and judicial matters, to perceptions of the accountability of security services, to knowledge and attitudes towards security service and justice providers. Variables were analysed together using three multidimensional indices adapted from the Alkire Foster multidimensional poverty approach in order to determine a single measures of impact for comparison purposes.

Within this multidimensional approach, ‘impact’ was defined as follows:

The proportion of targeted households demonstrating less exposure to criminality and more resilience to security issues through better security and justice institutional capacities and reactivity, individual abilities, knowledge, attitudes and perceptions, within a better security and justice environment

The first index, the **Base KAP Index**, provides an overall measure of the degree to which an individual experiences improved security and justice outcomes (‘improved KAP’) across all 29 variables. A threshold was determined for each variable in order to determine whether an individual was considered as having the desired characteristic (faring well) or not (not faring well). Thus, a higher score on this index suggests an individual possessing increasingly improved security-related KAP.

The second index, the **Alkire Foster KAP Index (AFI)**,<sup>10</sup> is adapted from a method developed by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative for measuring multidimensional poverty, estimating the depth and intensity of security-related KAP changes over time. To accomplish this, an individual was defined as having improved security-related KAP if overall they met the cut-off in at least two-thirds of these 29 variables. Thus, improvements according to the AFI relate to an individual attaining an overall level of improved KAP in a more binary manner.

Lastly, the **Global Impact Indicator** uses performance measures from the AFI to assess the level of changes in security-related KAP in SSAPR intervention sites relative to the security-related KAP levels of the comparison group at baseline. Thus, improvements according to this indicator show an individual’s security-related KAP relative to a comparison group.

Together, these three indices provide a robust snapshot of the overall impact of the programme. The results of this analysis according to these three indices are included within the impact stories presented in the results section.

---

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.ophi.org.uk/research/multidimensional-poverty/how-to-apply-alkire-foster/>

## 2.3. Detailed methods for Contribution Analysis as the theory-based analytical approach

We employed Contribution Analysis (CA) as our primary analytical approach to guide causal inference analysis. CA is an approach to impact evaluation developed by John Mayne (2001, 2008, 2011) that aims to compare an intervention's postulated ToC against collected evidence in order to come to robust conclusions about the contribution a programme has made to observed outcomes.

Originally designed as a pragmatic approach for assessing causal dynamics in complex settings, CA's original inspiration was as a tool for cases in which multiple factors may have influenced the outcome. CA can reduce uncertainty about the contribution of a given intervention to observed results by understanding why the observed results have occurred (or why expected results have not). Further, it can highlight the roles played by the intervention and other internal and external factors.

Best practice in CA follows a six-step process to construct an 'impact story'. These steps build evidence necessary to demonstrate a programme's contribution to change whilst weighing up the relative importance of other factors in this change. The remainder of this section provides the detailed methodology for how we applied CA to this evaluation by step in the CA process.

### 2.3.1. CA Steps 1 & 2: constructing a ToC model

The first two steps for a CA are as follows:

1. **Set out the attribution problem to be addressed:** This includes determining the specific evaluation questions to be addressed and identifying the expected change in a situation and the expected role of the programme in bringing about this change.
2. **Develop a detailed ToC and results chain for the programme:** This describes how the programme is expected to achieve change and identifies possible external factors that may account for observed changes.

Based on the results identified in the programme logframe and ToC described in Section 1.1, at the outset of the evaluation we conducted an evaluability assessment of the programme's current ToC (Figure 2) according to the criteria Davies poses for this process to determine its suitability for evaluative purposes using CA.<sup>11</sup> The assessment found elements of the ToC as articulated were not evaluable and thus a process was required to revise the ToC as developed by the programme to identify more evaluable linkages between results.

To achieve this, we applied as an overall framework for this work the 'ToC model with nested ToCs for multifaceted sufficient interventions' proposed by Mayne.<sup>12</sup> In this model, activities and results are depicted according to different levels within a programme impact pathway as a sequence of results leading from programme-level activities to the long-term intended impact of the programme on the identified target population. These include the following levels: **activities** undertaken by the programme; **goods and services** produced as direct outputs of these activities; the **reach** of these activities on the intended target groups and the target group's reaction; **changes in capacity** (knowledge, attitudes, skills, etc.) of those reached by the programme's goods and services; the **behavioural changes**, or changes in practice, that

<sup>11</sup> Davies, R. (2012) 'Criteria for Assessing the Evaluability of a Theory of Change'. 5 April. <http://mande.co.uk/blog/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Evaluability-of-TOC-criteria3.pdf>

<sup>12</sup> Mayne J. (forthcoming) 'Useful Theory of Change Models'.


occur among a target group reached; the **direct benefits**, or improvements, in the state of individual beneficiaries; and the **wellbeing changes**, or the longer-term improvements, in the overall lives of individuals.

The ToC model also included external influences, events and conditions unrelated to the intervention that could contribute to realisation of the intended result, as well as the positive or negative unintended effects that occur as a result of the programme’s activities and results.

Lastly, and importantly, the ToC model included assumptions about the causal links in the impact pathway: the salient events and conditions that have to occur for each link in the causal pathway to work as expected. Within the model, the arrows between boxes represent expected ‘causal links’ (i.e. that changes in police knowledge and skills lead to changes in police practice), while the ‘causal link assumptions’ explain how and why the causal link is expected to work.

The main results and causal link assumptions included in the 2013 ToC and main results for the programme logframe were all incorporated into the evaluable ToC models and validated with programme stakeholders.

Figure 3 presents a high-level overview of the SSAPR ToC as a result of this process: impact pathway and key assumptions required for this impact pathway to hold true (i.e. for SSAPR component activities to cause an increased public sense of security).



**FIGURE 3. SSAPR EVALUATIVE THEORY OF CHANGE**

## 2.3.2. CA Step 3: gathering existing evidence

This step uses existing secondary data and collects primary data to assess the logic of the links in the ToC to identify what evidence already exists and where stronger evidence is required. Evidence to be gathered should include observed results, assumptions about the ToC and other influencing factors.

In addition to using the results of the quantitative data analysed through a DiD approach as explained in detail above in Section 2.2, in order to complete this step we gathered existing possible data relevant to the ToCs. This included a number of data sources produced by the programme components, including programme monitoring data, quantitative survey data and qualitative research studies. Many of the research studies used as secondary sources were research reports conducted by the M&E component of the programme over the life of the project. The remainder of this section provides a short description of the main secondary data sources used as part of this evaluation, particularly the M&E component studies used.

### Programme monitoring data

We gathered all available programme monitoring data from the programme components, including quarterly and annual reports and other thematic reports around specific interventions. After an initial review, the programme was requested to provide additional data sources as well, which were highlighted in the initial reports. In total, the evaluation team reviewed and analysed over 100 independent data sources from the programme's routine monitoring system.

### ToC monitoring

ToC monitoring is a longitudinal research approach designed for SSAPR by the M&E component, spanning 2014 to spring 2015. Adapted from the outcome mapping approach, which identifies specific examples of outcome-level change and investigates the processes behind them, during ToC monitoring we gathered data using retrospective scorecards and through focus group discussions (FGDs) through repeated visits to SSAPR intervention and comparison sites. This approach allowed the research team to consider how SSAPR and other actors may have contributed to change, as a diverse range of actors influenced each change as part of complex, long-term processes. This exercise included a total of 278 community-level respondents, including 141 men and 137 women across the three SSAPR intervention sites and Goma as a control site.

### Research into the link between the security and justice sectors in DRC (RARE) study

The Rapid Assessment, Response and Evaluation (RARE) study was conducted in 2013 and aimed to explore the link between the security and justice sectors in DRC from both the supply and the demand side. This involved a structured survey of 2,423 victims of crime using a time/location sampling method and structured interviews with 50 SSAPR-trained police officers in the three SSAPR implementation sites, both of which were complemented by FGDs and key informant interviews (KIIs).

### The state of gender in the Congolese police

This study, often referred to as 'the Gender Study', was conducted between 2013 and 2014 and aimed to assess the state of gender mainstreaming as part of the process of reform in the PNC. The research team used a mixed-methods approach to data collection and analysis to reach two main respondent groups: female and male members of the PNC and politico-

administrative key informants. Methods included a structured survey of a random sample of 513 members of the PNC (295 men and 218 female), along with in-depth career history interviews with 32 of these female respondents. Researchers further interviewed provincial and national PNC officials.

### 2.3.3. CA Step 4: assemble and assess impact stories

This step involves drafting impact stories for specific target groups that express why it is reasonable to assume that the actions of the programme have contributed to the observed outcomes. The stories are then assembled and assessed critically by considering the following questions:

- ❑ Which are the strong and weak links in the ToC?
- ❑ How credible is the story as a whole?
- ❑ Do stakeholders agree?
- ❑ Where are the main weaknesses?

The evaluation team developed initial drafts of multiple impact stories according to the ToC, which it presented to programme stakeholders in March and April 2015. We included the following target groups within the three SSAPR intervention sites: the community, the PNC, local politico-administrative authorities (*autorités politico-administratives*, APA) at the SSAPR site level, media and civil society.

Results from this initial stakeholder consultation assisted us in identifying data gaps that could be filled both by programme monitoring data and additional primary data collection, and the identification of other important ToCs that were important to include in the evaluation, such as for national and provincial parliamentarians.

### 2.3.4. CA Step 5: seek out additional evidence

This step seeks to fill evidence gaps in the impact stories identified in the critical assessment carried out in Step 4. This means identifying and collecting evidence to fill gaps or strengthen weak evidence that make the impact story less credible. This includes evidence about what results have occurred, how reasonable the key assumptions were and what role external influences and other contributing factors have played.

Based on initial stakeholder consultations held in March and April 2015, the evaluation team sought to fill any evidence gaps through additional primary data collection exercises. The major evidence gaps identified were around the potential contribution of other external or influencing factors on study results.

These largely took the form of FGDs and KIs with representatives of groups not previously targeted for in-depth qualitative research exploring SSAPR initiatives and performance. Table 6 presents the respondents from each group included in this exercise.

<b>Respondent group</b>	<b>Men</b>	<b>Women</b>
Community groups <sup>13</sup>	100+ <sup>14</sup>	100+
PdP	67	5
Non-PdP	24	0
Media	15	9
Civil society organisations (CSOs)	15	9
APA	15	7
Parliament members	17	8

**TABLE 3. RESPONDENTS IN SUPPLEMENTAL DATA COLLECTION, BY GROUP AND GENDER**

### 2.3.5. CA Step 6: revise and strengthen impact stories

In this step, impact stories are revised based on new evidence collected in Step 5. This approach is most successful when done iteratively. Revised stories here can be returned to Step 4 to build a more substantive and credible story based on further analysis.

Using CA, reasonable contribution causal claims can be made if the following four conditions are met: (i) the ToC logic is plausible; (ii) activities were implemented as envisaged in the ToC; (iii) the ToC is supported/confirmed by evidence on observed results and underlying assumptions; and (iv) other influencing factors have been assessed for contribution to results.

Based on the results of CA Step 5, we analysed data from this round of data collection to incorporate it into the impact stories developed in Step 4; the outcome was a revised and final set of impact stories. Data analysis here focused on identifying the contribution of other influencing factors gathered during Step 5 of the process.

The findings from this last step of the CA were shared with programme stakeholders in June 2015. Both internal and external stakeholders, including independent quality assurance reviewers with backgrounds in evaluation methods and security and justice programmes in developing country settings, provided a subsequent round of comments. The results of these reviews are the impact stories presented in the remainder of this report.

<sup>13</sup> Community groups visited here were the same groups used as part of the ToC monitoring exercise, described in Section 2.3.2.

<sup>14</sup> The evaluation team conducted over 30 FGDs with community groups in the three pilot sites; exact numbers of participants were not available at the time of writing.



## 2.4. Construction of impact stories

The final product of this analytical approach was a series of comprehensive narratives, or impact stories, presenting the multi-source evidence that supports causal and contributory claims. Through this approach, a separate impact story was developed to investigate SSAPR's impact on changes in behaviour and practice for each primary target group mentioned in the methods section under CA Step 4. We also developed an impact story around the overall ToC to investigate the impact of the programme on perceptions of public security.


### 2.4.1. Overview SSAPR ToC with nested actor-based ToCs

Figure 4 presents the overview ToC for the programme, demonstrating how the actor-based ToCs (and impact stories) for the individual target groups are situated within the overall impact pathway.

Following the impact logic from bottom up, the overview ToC begins with three nested ToCs. Each of these corresponds to one of the **three primary SSAPR target groups**: (i) the police (PNC), (ii) the community and (iii) local APA. These nested ToCs articulate at a high level the overarching logic of how the programme envisioned SSAPR activities targeting each group would cause a positive change in security practices in their communities.

If a change in practice occurs within these primary actor groups, the **overview ToC** posits that these would result in improved collaboration among all actors. This improved collaboration then would lead to a reduction in overall crime within communities and greater trust in the police as a security provider. This greater trust in the police together with a reduced incidence of crime leads to an increased sense of public safety for the Congolese people.

As Figure 4 illustrates there are certain key assumptions that need to hold true for these impact pathways to occur. The key assumptions included in the figure are around the ability and motivation for these key actors to change practice and an improvement in internal and external accountability measures to hold actors to account (thereby sustaining the change in practice). As such, the programme worked with **secondary actors** critical to these assumptions being met: CSOs, the media and parliamentarians within Provincial Assemblies.



**FIGURE 4. SSAPR OVERVIEW TOC INCLUDING NESTED TOCs FOR TARGET GROUPS**

## 2.4.2. Approach to causal claims within CA and impact stories

For each of the main target groups (police, community groups, APA), SSAPR undertook a number of specific activities. The use of the nested ToC models thus provided the structure for compiling impact stories for different programme target groups. It was a useful way of understanding causality and causal claims in complicated programmes such as SSAPR, with multiple component activities working with multiple target populations to bring about long-term and sustained change in the population at large. In such cases, programme activities alone may not be sufficient to cause higher-level changes in the impact pathway. For the causal links in the pathway to be realised, other events and conditions (support factors) are also needed; these are the causal link assumptions.

The expectation is that the specific programme activities along with the needed support factors comprise a causal package that is sufficient to bring about the causal changes. It is further expected that the support factors alone are not sufficient to realise the change – that is, that the programme activities are an essential part of the causal package. Then, the specific programme activities together with the causal link assumptions comprise a causal package sufficient to contribute to the change in results. In this case, we can conclude that the programme activities are a contributory cause to the observed changes.

For some of the causal link assumptions, SSAPR efforts are undertaken to maximise the likelihood of the link(s) coming about. We describe this in more detail within the impact stories for the different target groups presented later in this report. For example, in the community ToC, the activities to enhance police capacity were to ensure key assumptions, such as having opportunities to engage with the police and the need to see actual changes in perceived security, were met. A comprehensive intervention such as SSAPR would not want to leave such key events and conditions to chance and would actively ensure their realisation to ensure the impact pathway occurs. Thus, in the impact story on changes to community behaviours

around security, causal link assumptions within the impact pathway reflect the need to engage with the police and justice systems.

In demonstrating that the programme's intervention was a necessary part of this sufficient causal package, (i.e. that realisation of the support factors alone would not be sufficient to make a contribution to the intended result), one can make claims that the intervention was a contributory cause of the results. The use of the term 'contribution' rather than 'causation' recognises that other external factors may be at play that contribute to the intended results as well.

As part of the SSAPR evaluation, the evaluation team did not find any significant other factors that might have had a strong influence on observed changes. To identify potential other influences, we used the 'human security' framework to organise our investigation. Human security works with the idea of components of human security: infrastructure, education enrolment rates, access to health services, economic growth and access to potable water. Using these components as guidance, we systematically analysed existing available secondary data in order to determine any possible changes in these components that occurred over the programme implementation period, as these might have externally influenced the higher-level changes expected in the overview ToC.

Analysis here focused on identifying whether developments in these components were different in intervention sites and comparison sites over time. We also took into account key events in each site (e.g. major occurrences such as the building of a new road or installation of new city electric lights) that might have influenced observed changes. This included an assessment of development projects started or stopped in the intervention and comparison sites over time.

The evaluation team also collected primary data from a range of diverse community groups in SSAPR intervention sites to understand what factors of the human security framework community members identified as likely to have change the public's sense of security in their community. We also asked about the degree to which these factors had changed in SSAPR intervention sites over time. We did not find compelling evidence to suggest any of these external factors contributed significantly to changes in the public's sense of security during the SSAPR implementation period. However, it is important to point out that respondents frequently mentioned a number of points that could contribute to better safety, such as changes to infrastructure (e.g. having well-lit roads) and access to potable water (e.g. women are less at risk of being victims of crime if they do not have to spend lengthy periods fetching water away from home). Nevertheless, no significant changes in these components were noted over the SSAPR implementation period.

The evaluation team thus concluded that any changes observed in the intervention sites were indeed the result of the SSAPR intervention. There is no other credible explanation. For ease of reading and to avoid repetition, external factors are not explicitly addressed within each impact story. However, we only claim causality within impact stories when we found substantial evidence that the programme's intended results had indeed been observed, substantiated by our DiD quantitative analysis, and that this meant causal link assumptions were realised.

## 2.5. Evaluation design considerations and limitations

- As the selection of SSAPR sites was predetermined and not random at baseline, measurement of impacts through our analytical approach can be fraught with estimation biases. To address this, quasi-experimental two-level matching techniques and repeated DiD estimates were employed.
- Study site selection entails further limitations in terms of the representativeness of the findings of both surveys. As the pilot and comparison sites are located in the same province, the findings should not be understood to be representative of cities not sampled, or of DRC as a whole. Findings are only broadly representative of populations sampled in each of the six study sites.
- The close geographical proximity of some matched intervention and comparison sites suggests some SSAPR programme effects may spill over to comparison sites, underestimating the impact of SSAPR's interventions. To reduce this limitation, exposure questions were included in questionnaires administered in both intervention and comparison sites and outliers subsequently eliminated from analysis.
- Owing to financial and time constraints, it was not feasible to revisit some of the more isolated villages sampled in the 2010 KAP. Therefore, results may be less representative of populations living in isolated/rural villages.
- Biases exist around sampling procedures owing to difficulties in obtaining accurate population statistics disaggregated below the city level.
- There are also risks in using quantitative measures alone to assess changes in subjective concepts such as perceptions of police and security, as some SSAPR interventions aim to improve PNC capacity, potentially raising expectations of the population with regard to security and PNC performance. As such, it is possible that PNC performance may objectively improve, but that respondents may subjectively perceive this performance as poor relative to new expectations. To mitigate this, we employed recall and exposure questions to understand changing attitudes and perceptions of police performance.
- The sensitive nature of questions asked in this study also introduces possible response bias for some individuals, as respondents may be unwilling to discuss sensitive issues, especially those pertaining to being victims of crime (in particular crimes of a sexual nature). This is especially applicable for male enumerators surveying female respondents, as some subjects are sensitive or difficult to discuss across genders. Enumerators worked in pairs of one woman and one man, alternating male and female respondents. Therefore, roughly 25% of the time male enumerators were interviewing female respondents. Reluctance to discuss experience with crime, particularly crimes with a gender-based or sexual element with a male enumerator, may result in such crimes being underreported in the data.
- An additional limitation is a potential unwillingness to discuss sensitive matters out of fear of reprisal for recounting incidents of harassment, abuse or mistreatment at the hands of the police. Respondents, both male and female, may have underreported their experience with crime, especially crimes of a serious nature.

- ❶ As with all household surveys, both the 2010 and the 2014 KAP relied on potential respondents being home during the day. Enumerators reported difficulties finding men in the sampled households as they were often at work during the day. Where possible, enumerators would schedule a time to return to interview the randomly selected individual if they were unavailable at that time. However, in some instances this was not possible, and the enumerator would proceed to the next household. In such instances, there may be a very slight bias towards older/less mobile or unemployed people, specifically among males, as they are more likely to work outside the home. Therefore, the dataset may be slightly less representative of professional/employed men and women.
- ❷ The evaluation team decided to exclude those living in the same household as someone working for an institution responsible for public security and justice, as they would theoretically have a higher level of safety and security-related KAP. However, this exclusion was not made at baseline and this thus creates inconsistencies between the 2010 and 2014 datasets. If anything, this would understate the true impact of SSAPR. Although this was controlled for in the analysis to the extent possible, it is a limitation on the external validity of these results.
- ❸ As the programme was terminated earlier than intended, the evaluation period was thus also condensed. As such, there was limited time available to fully conduct the CA methodology as planned. For instance, it was envisioned that Step 5 would be an iterative process, whereby stories would be revised and additional data gathered for at least two rounds. Instead, it was limited to just one round, limiting the strength of the causal inference analysis findings.
- ❹ CA works best with close collaboration with programme implementers and other stakeholders. By the time the evaluation team was ready to provide findings from the first round of impact stories to the programme, programme operations were already beginning to wind down and there were fewer programme staff available to feed into the revision process, which undoubtedly would have strengthened and contextualised further the impact stories. As a result, the assumptions included in the ToCs, which are a critical component of the causal inference analysis, tended to be the most salient themes as identified by the evaluation team, and some critical assumptions might have been overlooked or not thoroughly investigated. The evaluation attempted to address this to some extent by identifying where there were not enough data to support any causal claims.
- ❺ One major limitation of the causal inference analysis through CA was the focus on SSAPR pilot sites over comparison sites in conducting primary qualitative data collection. This is particularly the case in the analysis of external and other influencing factors that might have contributed to change over the programme period. Although secondary analysis suggested that no salient factors or other major development programmes were implemented in the comparison sites that might have reasonably influenced change over time, the lack of primary data collection in comparison sites to confirm this is a limitation to our analysis.

## 2.5.1. Impact stories for main target groups and the overall ToC impact

Sections 3-5 of this report present the impact stories for each of the three primary target groups. Each impact story begins with a more detailed ToC for each target group, articulating the impact pathway leading from cause to effect and indicating the results and assumptions at each level of the pathway. The remainder of the story presents evidence gathered during the evaluation following the ToC logic. Annexes B-D of this report present the detailed evidence at each level.

The impact story in Section 6 of this report follows the same structure as for the primary target groups, beginning with a detailed ToC for the overview ToC pathway, followed by the evidence gathered at each level to support that the change occurred and substantiate causal claims. Annex E presents the detailed evidence at each level.

The nested ToCs for each of the secondary target groups articulate how the programme envisioned SSAPR activities targeting each group would cause a change in their practice, which contributed to changes in the accountability measures and the willingness and motivation of the three primary target groups to change. Results that support/refute these assumptions are thus embedded within the other ToCs. Annexes F-H of this report present the detailed evidence for each secondary actor ToC.

## 2.5.2. Strength of evidence assessments within TOCs

As mentioned above, each impact story begins with a diagrammatic nested TOC outlining the main impact pathway and causal assumptions. Within these diagrams we have used different colours to represent the strength of available evidence to support that each change occurred or causal link assumption was realised:

- 🟢 **GREEN** indicates evidence available confirming a change occurred or an assumption was fully realised;
- 🟡 **AMBER** indicates mixed evidence for/against a change occurring or an assumption being realised;
- 🔴 **RED** indicates evidence available disproving a change or that an assumption was not realised; and
- 🔵 **BLUE** indicates that no/little evidence is available thus no conclusions can be drawn.

## 2.5.3. Sustainability aspects of nested ToCs within impact stories

The ToC diagrams at the beginning of each story also include an assessment of sustainability at the assumption level. The sustainability of short-term changes instigated by the programme is a critical assumption in each of the actor-based ToCs. As such, an assessment of emerging evidence around the change in policy and institutional reform caused by the programme is embedded within each impact story.

For each level of assumption within the impact stories, a sustainability consideration is included. Evidence is analysed and presented on the degree to which the change occurred during the programme implementing period, and the degree to which emerging evidence suggests this change will be sustained after the implementation period ends.

## Section 3

### Police Impact

03

### 3. Police impact: police officers exposed to SSAPR have positively changed their practice as a result of SSAPR intervention; however, some evidence suggests risks to the sustainability of this change in the long term

The PSP component of the programme aimed to improve the police’s ability to serve the public by training officers and providing infrastructure and equipment. This was expected to fill a practical gap that had previously been a barrier to the police’s ability to respond to community needs. This improvement in police capacity was then thought to improve police practice in terms of their ability to respond to public security needs and their overall behaviour and performance.

Figure 5. presents the nested ToC for this impact story. Annex B presents the detailed evidence for each level of the ToC’s impact pathway and causal assumptions. The remainder of this section presents the impact story compiled based on evaluation findings.




FIGURE 5. PSP ToC



## 3.1. Evidence that SSAPR's interventions with the police improved their capacity

This section presents evidence on the extent to which the SSAPR intervention (the cause) led to police capacity (the effect) over the implementation period and analyses the strength of the evidence available to support causal claims.

### 3.1.1. Evidence the cause occurred: training, infrastructure and equipment were provided as expected

One of the major programmatic activities involved training police officers in the three intervention sites on the PdP approach. Programme records show that a total of 1,549 officers were trained in the PdP approach in Cycles 1 and 2, along with 55 PdP trainers and nine coaches.<sup>15</sup> Coaches were trained in each city to support implementation of the PdP approach after the conclusion of the training. In Bukavu, respondents noted that all trainees were selected to participate in PdP training by their superiors, whereas respondents in other locations were both selected by their superiors and volunteered.

Additionally, SSAPR constructed physical infrastructure and provided equipment to the PNC in pilot sites, including 23 new district police posts, commissariats and sub-commissariats across all Cycle 1 and 2 communes. The programme also provided 10 vehicles, 100 motorbikes and 109 radios, along with one garage in each pilot city and trained mechanics.

A system to directly deposit salaries of the police into their bank accounts, as opposed to police superiors receiving salaries and individually distributing them each month at their direction, called the '*bancarisation* system' was also supported by the programme so police consistently and reliably received their salaries each month. Programme reports outline how SSAPR provided support to strengthen the capacity of the inspector general (*inspecteur général*, IG), including the development of an internal and external complaints mechanism.

In terms of gender-targeted activities, the programme conducted several activities to support this. Support for victims of gender-based violence (GBV) were implemented from the beginning of the programme. Police stations constructed and supported by the programme were provided with infrastructure and equipment to support the police in dealing with female victims and cases of GBV. The programme also incorporated training into the PdP approach on how to effectively deal with cases of GBV. Additional gender mainstreaming and gender equity activities began relatively late in the programme. This included integrating gender focal points into PNC operations and developing strategies to mainstream gender issues across the organisation.

---

<sup>15</sup> This training in the 'PdP approach' included the principles of proximity, partnership, prevention, resolution of problems, accountability and respect for human rights, along with investigation, gender sensitivity and other technical skills.

### 3.1.2. Evidence the effect occurred: police capacity in SSAPR pilot sites positively changed

In terms of improved capacity, community respondents in household surveys rated the positive attitudes and responsiveness of the PdP as better than that of the PNC over time. Table 4 below illustrates this.

**TABLE 4. PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION IN SSAPR INTERVENTION SITES IN 2014 WHO HAVE POSITIVE ATTITUDES ABOUT THE PNC AND PdP**

<b>Percentage of respondents who agreed with the following statement</b>	<b>PNC</b>	<b>PdP</b>
Police have an attitude of assistance to the population (in the streets)	54.4	69.1
Police respond rapidly to demands for assistance	43.6	59.1

Similar findings were echoed across all groups participating in ToC monitoring as well as by the International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), which conducted two independent reviews of SSAPR, in 2013 and 2014, further substantiating the claim that communities have observed and appreciated changes in police capacity.

One member of a focus group described this change:

*Today the police are well equipped. They have modes of transport, communication and clean uniforms, they've acquired presentable buildings and sufficient equipment (Kananga I, FGD, local non-governmental organisation, NGO).*

PNC officers' views on the PdP varied by site. While respondents in Matadi and Kananga were positive about the PdP behaviour it had brought about, officers in Bukavu were more critical, noting that the selection of training participants was focused on those exhibiting poor capacity already as opposed to selecting those who were high performing within the police.

### 3.1.3. Evidence on the extent to which causal assumptions were met

Following the ToC logic, a number of assumptions are necessary in order to draw a causal claim that programme activities led to improved police capacity. Programme documents demonstrate that funds were used to procure infrastructure and equipment, which were maintained during the period of the programme. Qualitative data gathered from PdP trainees confirms the assumptions that PdP trainees were willing to listen and learn, that they were amenable to new thinking about police practice and that there was no significant attrition prior to training.

### 3.1.4. Evidence supporting a causal link: participation in SSAPR-led training increased police skills and improved attitudes among officers trained in the PdP approach

Evidence suggests changes in capacity were largely attributable to SSAPR training activities. In FGDs, PdP officers noted that they felt the PdP training programme had improved their knowledge and skills. Furthermore, 63% of PdP officers interviewed for the 2013 RARE study attributed positive feelings about the PdP approach to the fact that they *'improved their knowledge of the PdP approach'*. PdP trainees largely defined the 'PdP approach' as one that fosters *'collaboration between communities and police'* and supports *'police that are in service of the population'*. This definition is consistent with the definition of the PdP provided in training materials.

During FGDs, communities also confirmed the importance of the PdP training in providing new skills to the police, noting, *'here is a realisation among the PdP, they have been sensitised to behave well and to collaborate well with the population. The real factor in this change is the PdP training.'*

PdP and non-PdP officers also mentioned that the training encouraged officers to work according to PdP principles and improve their attitude. This indicates that the benefit of PdP training may have also had a wider impact than on the direct PdP trainees alone. It should be noted that this could be explained partially by the lack of training available to the PNC otherwise.

Some evidence from both the ISSAT review and ToC monitoring suggests new infrastructure also had a positive impact on the motivation of PNC officers, as well as on their practical ability to do their job. In FGDs, community respondents also said an increase in the number of police posts had improved their perceptions of police capacity. One respondent in Bukavu described the importance of the new police stations in shifting these dynamics, noting the importance of increased numbers of police posts in encouraging community members to approach the police. The *bancaisation* system in particular was thought to have increased police morale and reduced reliance on corruption by lower-level officers by increasing the regularity of their salary payments.

### 3.1.5. Causal claim: SSAPR interventions led to positive changes in police capacity in SSAPR intervention sites

In summary, evidence available to the evaluation team suggests exposure to the SSAPR intervention indeed led to changes in the capacity of the officers trained in the PdP approach by the programme. Among the different interventions, training seems to have had the greatest impact in terms of capacity changes. Qualitatively, police officers highlighted the importance of this training in contributing to capacity improvements. Community members also highlighted that SSAPR activities had contributed to improved police capacity, strengthening the ability of the police to respond to community needs.

The evidence gathered throughout the evaluation, however, suggests these changes in capacity were largely limited to the officers trained by the programme and did not lead to changes in the overall capacity of the PNC in general in the pilot sites. The existence of new

infrastructure and equipment seems to have improved the community’s perceptions of the police’s ability to respond. Police officers themselves also mentioned this in qualitative interviews.

## 3.2. Evidence that changes to police capacity led to changes in police practice

Following the ToC logic, improvements in police capacity were expected to lead to improved police practice. Claims around improvements in police capacity (the cause) are documented in Section 3.1 above. This section thus presents evidence supporting that changes to police practice (the effect) occurred over the implementation period and the strength of evidence to support causal claims.

### 3.2.1. Evidence the effect occurred: police practice improved in SSAPR pilot sites

Data from the DiD quantitative analysis revealed that individuals living in SSAPR pilot communities were 60% more satisfied with police performance in 2014 than the comparison population at baseline. Changes in the perceptions of police performance have also improved over time among survey respondents in SSAPR pilot sites compared with those in comparison sites (Table 5).

**TABLE 5. PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGES IN POLICE PERFORMANCE OVER TIME, BY SITE AND BY YEAR**


Perception of change in police performance over past three years				
Perceived change	Pilot		Comparison	
	2010 (N=4,397)	2014 (N=2,689)	2010 (N=4,394)	2014 (N=5,496)
Improved	20.2	51.6	46.9	13.5
Stayed the same	38.9	31.7	18.1	36.0
Worsened	36.2	12.6	33.5	50.0

When asked how this change in police performance had manifested, the top three responses were as follows: police arrest criminals; police harass the population less than before; and police listen to community concerns.

This change is the result of a combination of contributory factors, such as improved experience with the police, opportunities for engagement on security issues and improved collaboration between the community and police. Findings from the ToC monitoring describe this change:

*In 2009 the police collaborated with criminals and we, the population were considered their playground where they could come and steal whatever they wanted [...] it was difficult for us to take any matters to the police because they would not find a solution to your problem. However, today these problems don't exist anymore. The police are now at our service – the problems we take to them are dealt with impartially; they don't collaborate with criminals anymore. Today we've become the collaborators with the police by turning in the criminals who are eventually arrested (Matadi Trade Group 1).*

Survey findings suggest a higher proportion of community members in intervention sites also reported seeing police patrols in their neighbourhoods as compared with those in non-intervention sites over time. This included a nearly 20% decrease in the proportion of respondents in pilot sites reporting that they 'never see police patrols' (Figure 6).



**FIGURE 6. KAP SURVEY RESPONDENTS REPORTING FREQUENCY OF SEEING POLICE PATROLS IN THEIR NEIGHBOURHOOD, BY SITE AND BY SURVEY YEAR**

Although community perceptions of the police were largely consistent across locations, some key differences in these data include community perceptions of police collaboration, which improved by nearly two-thirds in Bukavu (65%), as compared with 48% in Kananga and 23% in Matadi. Similarly, community perceptions of police performance at the city level increased in Bukavu by 77%, compared with 68% in Kananga and 28% in Matadi.

The evaluation gathered mixed evidence, however, to support changes in the practice of police officers regarding gender mainstreaming. The 2014 Gender Study found female officers who were generally positive about gender sensitisation efforts had improved their own understanding of and confidence in their role in the PNC. However, they were critical of changes in male officers, noting *'what [the male PNC officers] teach us is different than what [male officers] do themselves. This sensitisation hasn't changed anything for how they deal [with] female police.'* These discrepancies highlight the differences between policy and reality and underscore the importance of tracking policy change and sensitisation through to the implementation level.

### 3.2.2. Evidence on the extent to which causal assumptions were met

Following the ToC logic, a number of assumptions are necessary in order to draw a causal claim that changes in police capacity have led to improved police practice. First, internal accountability functions needed to be strengthened within the PNC, specifically in terms of reforms to the IG. While we were unable to collect substantial evidence around changes to

internal accountability mechanisms, the data we did collect suggested this has not fully occurred. There is some evidence the IG is beginning to occupy an oversight function, with several sources referring to an audit of the PNC payroll, resulting in the identification of payroll discrepancies and the subsequent payment of salaries to 1,200 police officers. However, there are considerable ongoing challenges to the effective functioning of the IG in the long term – namely, poor capacity, a lack of political will and the absence of any enforcement powers.

Perhaps the most sustainable reforms going forward are those affecting the legal and structural environment of the PNC. These include establishment of the *Loi Organique* within the PNC and the creation of gender focal point positions as well as the establishment of a specific unit to deal with women's issues within the PNC. The establishment of dedicated budget lines to support the quality and efficiency of police activities in all pilot cities is an isolated but encouraging indication.

Next, an external accountability mechanism through increased engagement with CSOs and the media was needed to hold the police to account for their actions and support continued positive police practice. The EA component of SSAPR implemented a number of interventions designed to establish citizen-led functions as an external mechanism to hold the police to account. As part of this, it trained 37 journalists in the three pilot sites and Kinshasa with the aim of bringing security issues into public debates and better informing citizens, raising awareness on security issues and reporting on the implementation of police reform. The component also trained 1,282 individuals representing a diverse range of more than 150 CSOs to increase their knowledge of local security issues and specific tools designed to assist local community members to hold the police to account.<sup>16</sup> Additionally, EA supported 28 community forums designed to support collaboration between police, the community and politico-administrative officials. EA also worked with Provincial Assemblies to link them more closely to the police reform process. Parliament members in all pilot cities participated in security control activities as well as security monitoring missions.

Evidence gathered from FGDs with police officers suggests the external accountability measures supported improvements in police practice during the SSAPR implementation period. For example, PNC officers mentioned that they were motivated to change their behaviour in part because of pressure from the media and CSOs, and this included a reduction in the risk of arbitrary or brutal arrests. These respondents also noted that the work of CSOs had also improved their collaboration with communities, reinforced by the high level of community participation in *forums de quartier* (FQs) and other community fora.

Evidence gathered during the evaluation, however, calls into question the extent to which these activities will be sustained in the absence of SSAPR funding. For example, interviews indicated that media reports and investigations had decreased in the absence of SSAPR support, as some media institutions have replaced security reports with other reports that bring in advertising money. Similarly, new activities implemented by CSOs were funded by SSAPR and coordinated by a network heavily supported by the programme. Although there is no clear evidence at this stage as to which activities are likely to continue, there is a risk that those developed by SSAPR may be supplanted when a new donor comes along.

PNC reform was also effectively integrated in the mission statements of some Provincial Assemblies as part of building an external accountability mechanism. As both representatives of the population and actors of the reform, members of the Provincial Assemblies confirmed

---

<sup>16</sup> These include scorecards, suggestion boxes and various forms of action research.

they were now involved in looking for solutions to the problems related to insecurity in their cities/provinces. Members of the provincial parliament Participated in activities to control the police's actions. They also take part in other monitoring missions on security. In the three pilot cities, Parliament members participate in security control activities as well as other security monitoring missions. Provincial Assemblies have also developed some initiatives to guarantee the continuation of the work that has already been initiated. Some laws in favour of the consolidation of the reform and/or related to security have been enacted and voted on. In all three pilot cities, a budget line has been approved, given the increase of the budget allocated to the security sector, with the aim of improving the quality and efficiency of the police's activities. In Matadi, the Provincial Assembly has voted on a law relating to the creation of a budget line dedicated to the parliamentary control of activities in the sector of security and justice.

Lastly, there are assumptions that, for police capacity to translate effectively into improved police practice, a visibly supportive police leadership was required, and there needed to be internal police motivation to change corrupt practices in favour of the population. In terms of police leadership, FGDs with police indicated this did occur during the SSAPR implementation period, with superiors who were part of SSAPR or who received PdP training tending to support the reform process. Although the evaluation team was not able to collect substantial evidence around the long-term sustainability of this, data from interviews with various stakeholders suggest this might not hold true in the future. Police reported that many of their superiors trained by SSAPR were no longer in place and had been transferred to other sites. This was confirmed in interviews with civil society and through media reports, both reporting that superior officers had been reassigned to different posts and that, with new superior officers who had not been part of the PdP approach, willingness to support some of the PdP programme initiatives had declined. For instance, journalists who took part in the SSAPR training programme reported that it was difficult now – compared with after the training – to access higher officials in the PdP.

Lastly, there is evidence suggesting the internal motivation of the police to change corrupt practices was not fully achieved during the SSAPR implementation period and risks further declining in the future. When asked about the police's motivation to change their corrupt practices, programme implementers in the PSP component stated that the sense of pride PdP officers felt from helping their communities was a strong enough motivator for them to change their practices. Although reducing corrupt practices reduces officers' income overall, there was an assumption that the reward was the symbolic benefit of serving the public and being respected as a result of improved practices.

Quantitative analysis, however, found no significant change between 2010 and 2014 in the proportion of the population who perceived the PNC to be corrupt, although fewer people in SSAPR intervention sites reported paying bribes to a member of the police in the past 12 months compared with those in the comparison sites. In Kananga and Bukavu, community respondents increasingly considered the police corrupt, despite a higher proportion of people indicating that they had not paid a bribe to the police. This contradiction may indicate a public acceptance of bribery and its perceived disconnect from police performance. This is consistent with findings from similar research in other contexts.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup> See, for example, Gutmann, J., Padovano, F. and Voigt, S. (forthcoming) 'Perception vs. Experience: How to Explain Differences in Corruption Measures Using Microdata?'

Interviews with PdP-trained officers indicated that concerns around salaries and poor socioeconomic conditions had caused improvements in police practice to slip. Although officers in all sites said they were interested in participating in future PdP training, those in Matadi said this with the clear caveat that they would only be able to participate if their salaries and other socioeconomic conditions improved. Although *bancarisation* had helped stabilise PNC salaries, it had not raised their official salaries or provided other benefits to officers.


### 3.2.3. Evidence supporting a causal link: changes to police capacity and external accountability mechanisms led to changes in police performance

There is evidence that changes to police capacity led to changes in police practice. Police officers in SSAPR intervention sites largely attributed improvements in practice to their improved capacity to do their job well, supported through the PdP training. Qualitative data from the ToC monitoring show communities attributed improvements in police practice to improvements in police capacity.

There is less evidence that infrastructure played a critical role in positive changes among community members. The PSP was rolled out in three cycles, by commune. The first-round communes (Cycle 1) received the full PSP intervention, including training, equipment and physical infrastructure support (a total of 15 police buildings were constructed). Cycle 2 communes did not receive the full intervention to the same degree, with a limited training package and less equipment and infrastructure supported (a total of eight police buildings were constructed). The last round of implementation (Cycle 3) occurred relatively late in the programme, and communes received limited training and no support for equipment or physical infrastructure.

Data from the DiD analysis indicate that individuals living in Cycle 1 communes consistently experienced the highest levels of improvement in KAP, while KAP improved for individuals in Cycle 3 communes slightly more than for individuals in Cycle 2 communes (

Figure 7).<sup>18</sup> The major difference between these two rounds of programme implementation was the degree of equipment and infrastructure support provided. This suggests that, although equipment and infrastructure certainly had an impact in terms of changes to the perceptions of police capacity and performance, it may not have translated into a detectable difference in police practice.



**FIGURE 7. DID IMPACT OF SSAPR DISAGGREGATED BY CYCLE**

<sup>18</sup> For a detailed explanation of KAP measurement, see Box 2.



### 3.3. Overall causal claim: SSAPR interventions led to positive changes in police capacity in SSAPR intervention sites

In summary, the volume of evidence gathered during this evaluation suggests improved capacity of the police led to changed perceptions of community members on the performance of the police: respondents reported seeing improvements in police practice over time in SSAPR intervention sites. Regression analysis conducted as part of the quantitative analysis also indicated that positive interactions with police were highly correlated with improved perceptions of security among community members in SSAPR intervention sites.

The evidence also suggests these changes were credibly the result of SSAPR activities. There is clear evidence that participation in the PSP-supported training programme improved the capacity of the police and their practice, although this may be beginning to slip with declining police motivation and changes to internal and external accountability mechanisms.

The evidence is more mixed on the degree to which changes in equipment and infrastructure supported by the programme led to changes in police practice, although it certainly had an effect on the community's perceptions of the police's capacity. Supplementary analysis also did not find evidence of any compelling external factors like to have strongly influenced these changes, strengthening the certainty of our findings.


**Section 4**  
Community Impact

04

#### 4. Community impact: communities in SSAPR pilot sites have positively changed their practice around engagement with the police as a result of the SSAPR intervention, although these changes are unlikely to be sustained after the life of the programme

SSAPR outputs on community engagement were focused on improving communities' knowledge and awareness of security issues in order to build their capacity to better engage with the police. The programme primarily targeted CSOs and the media to raise their knowledge and awareness through mass sensitisation and public education campaigns and provide the community with opportunities to engage through community forums. Sufficiently reaching the community via CSO and media activities was intended to increase their capacity in terms of better knowledge about their rights and the police reform process overall, as well as their attitudes regarding the police. This change in capacity was meant to improve their practice regarding the police in terms of their interest in, engagement with and support for the police.

Figure 8 presents the nested ToC for this impact story. Annex C presents the detailed evidence for each level of the ToC's impact pathway and causal assumptions. The remainder of this section presents the impact story compiled based on evaluation findings.



**FIGURE 8. COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT TOC**

## 4.1. Evidence that SSAPR interventions improved community capacity

This section presents evidence on the extent to which the SSAPR intervention (the cause) led to community capacity (the effect) over the implementation period and to analyse the strength of the evidence available for causal claims.

### 4.1.1. Evidence the cause occurred: SSAPR interventions reached a significant and reasonably representative number of community members

The programme implemented a number of sensitisation events and mass media activities aimed at reaching people in the community. This involved capacity-building with different community groups, including CSOs and the media to provide these services. Quantitative analysis indicates that nearly one-third of respondents in SSAPR pilot sites reported being reached through a sensitisation event over the life of the programme. A higher proportion reported seeing or hearing SSAPR-related mass media messages, such as on billboards or the radio. Quantitative analysis indicates SSAPR interventions reached women equally.

SSAPR community engagement activities also provided sufficient opportunities through community fora. This included the establishment of FQs and ‘dynamic community forums’ (*dynamiques communautaires*, DYCOMs) as different opportunities to bring together public, police and local authorities to discuss community-level security concerns. By the third year of the programme, FQs were in operation in all nine pilot communes across the three pilot cities. Participants in community fora described how women were often more represented than men and felt comfortable voicing their security concerns. Interviews with local authorities and civil society representatives confirmed women were strongly active participants in FQs.

### 4.1.2. Evidence the effect occurred: positive changes to community capacity

Evaluation findings indicate that a number of changes in community capacity occurred over the life of the programme. These changes relate to improved knowledge and awareness of rights and security issues. Quantitative analysis indicates that, compared with in 2010, individuals in SSAPR pilot sites had improved knowledge on the roles of different security institutions over time. Nearly 85% of survey respondents reported having heard of the PdP in their community. Among them, 93% correctly identified their primary role as ‘protection of citizens and their possessions’, compared with less than 1% of respondents reporting both ‘protecting authorities and their goods’ and ‘protecting the borders of the country’.

Table 6 presents data around the proportion of the population who reported the police as the primary institution responsible for protecting the population, among a list of eight other security providers (including the army, UN security agencies, local private security groups and local and traditional authorities). This trend is important for two reasons. First, it presents an over 10% increase in the proportion of the population in pilot sites who see the police as the primary institution responsible for maintaining the peace. In addition, the shift in the proportion of the population who now see the PdP as the primary institution responsible is an important finding for the programme. FGD respondents also described how ‘many people now know their rights

in the realm of security' (Kananga, Religious Group1) as a marked change since the situation in 2009.

**TABLE 6. PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS REPORTING THE PNC AS THE PRIMARY INSTITUTION RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING THE PEACE IN THEIR NEIGHBOURHOOD, BY TYPE OF SITE AND YEAR**

Year	Pilot sites (N=4,384)		Comparison sites (N=4,393)	
	2010	2014	2010	2014
PNC	43.1	31.4	57.1	52.8
PdP	-	23.2	-	-
PNC and/or PdP	43.1	54.6	57.1	52.8

#### 4.1.3. Evidence on the extent to which causal assumptions were largely met

Following the ToC logic, a number of assumptions are necessary in order to draw a causal claim that programme activities led to changes in community capacity. First, a reasonably representative and significant proportion of the population needed to be reached and willing to learn. Data presented above indicate SSAPR community engagement activities reached a sufficient and representative portion of the community. Quantitative analysis and ToC monitoring data support these claims, as more than half of the population in SSAPR intervention sites heard about the programme through different mass media interventions and nearly one-third of the population participated in a community forum. This strong participation in SSAPR activities also suggests there was a reasonable level of inquisitiveness and a willingness to engage with security actors to discuss issues of local security.

In addition, formal and informal discussions needed to occur so community members have an opportunity to use this raised awareness. Data collected from internal project monitoring verifies that formal discussions took place involving community members, APA and the police through the mechanisms established by the programme. Qualitative data from ToC monitoring as well as external reviews support this claim. Indeed, this was one of the most remarked-on themes in the qualitative research.

Lastly, the population needed to observe positive changes to police practice, through the media reporting on good stories and other mechanisms. Community members reported observing reduced police harassment and improved police attitudes over time in SSAPR pilot sites. The results of the quantitative analysis suggest the single factor with the strongest correlation with improved KAP of the police came from positive interactions with the police.

#### 4.1.4. Evidence supporting a causal link: exposure to SSAPR interventions led to changes in community capacity

Evaluation findings support claims that reaching the public through community education and awareness sessions led to changes in capacity during the programme implementation period. Overall, the various community engagement activities (FQs, DYCOMs, community sensitisation events) established by the EA component have been successful in providing opportunities to bring together the different actors within the communities and empowering the general public to be more involved in their community's security. Qualitative data from FGDs with different community groups support the finding that community fora have created a unique and valuable opportunity for communities to engage with key local actors. Previously, in 2009, there was no engagement between these groups; respondents indicated that the public viewed the police as key drivers of insecurity rather than as a force that could improve their wellbeing. Now, respondents reported, open dialogue between stakeholder groups in the community are viewed as necessary and beneficial.

#### 4.1.5. Causal claim: SSAPR interventions led to changes in community capacity

In summary, the evaluation found community engagement activities organised through community group actors – namely, CSOs and the media – were successful in reaching a large proportion of the population with education and awareness-raising activities. These changes were effective in improving the community's knowledge and awareness of security concerns. Evaluation findings also indicate changes in CSO and media practices were effective in providing communities with opportunities for engagement with the police, including through FQs and other community engagement events. As no other security-related education or awareness education campaigns occurred in SSAPR sites during the implementation period, it is reasonable to conclude that exposure to SSAPR-initiated activities led to this change in community capacity.

### 4.2. Evidence that changes in capacity led to changes in practice

SSAPR community engagement activities sought to empower SSAPR pilot communities to work with APA and the police in providing responsive and accountable policing services. Following the ToC logic, improvements in community capacity were expected to lead to improved community practice. Claims around improvements in community capacity (the cause) are documented in the above section. This section thus presents evidence to show changes to community practice (the effect) emerged over the implementation period and analyse the strength of evidence supporting causal claims.

#### 4.2.1. Evidence the effect occurred: community behaviour regarding the police has changed

Community members pointed to more positive interactions with the police in SSAPR pilot sites over time. One of the more clearly observed changes is increased interest in security matters demonstrated by community members. Quantitative analysis estimated changes in community practice (Table 7) from a representative sample of the population of the three SSAPR

intervention sites. Results show, for instance, that nearly 30% of respondents participated in an FQ, demonstrating good uptake of SSAPR community engagement activities in intervention sites. At the same time, evaluation findings indicate that some activities, such as the community scorecards, reached a relatively low proportion of the population.

**TABLE 7. PERCENTAGE OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS REPORTING PARTICIPATING IN SSAPR COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITIES OVER THE LIFE OF THE PROGRAMME IN SSAPR INTERVENTION SITES**

<b>Participated in an FQ or other community forum activity</b>	<b>29.7%</b>
Participated in a public forum discussing the security situation	12.1%
Participated in an event using community scorecards	1.2%
Participated in joint activities with the police	6.4%

ToC monitoring data reveal how the opportunity to engage through community forums (etc.) has established a culture in which the community is increasingly interested in community security issues and active in advocating for its improvement.

*With the PdP doctrine, the change in the mentality of the population is remarkable [...] workshops by NGOs and members of civil society on the PdP doctrine allowed these groups to take things into their own hands and begin advocating on behalf of the population in terms of security and justice (Kananga, Students 1).*

#### 4.2.2. Evidence on the extent to which causal assumptions were met

Evaluation findings suggest assumptions around changes in community capacity leading to change in practice have been mostly realised. One key assumption here is that communities observed changes in police performance and changes in crime. The PSP impact story above reports on the positive observations of community members around improved police performance. However, as emerging evidence suggests, if police performance declines, then this assumption will no longer hold in the long term. Equally, the ToC overview impact story provides mixed evidence on observations of reduced crime levels in SSAPR intervention sites compared with in comparison sites.

Next, the community needed to be provided with opportunities to engage with the police. The evaluation collected strong evidence in support of opportunities existing for engagement with the police. This directly relates to activities of CSOs supported by SSAPR and local authorities trained by SSAPR in the organisation of community fora for engagement, particularly FQs. The most recent round of quarterly reports from the programme components note reasonably strong and autonomous bodies are in operation across the pilot cities. Indeed, routine internal monitoring is reporting that local actors are maintaining FQs in Cycle 1 and 2 communities without SSAPR support.

Lastly, the media needed to be free to report. The evaluation team was not able to collect enough evidence around this assumption through the limited qualitative interviews held with media representatives, and thus this assumption does not have sufficient data for conclusions.

### 4.2.3. Evidence supporting a causal link: changes in community capacity led to changes in community practice regarding the police

Some evidence gathered during the evaluation supports the assumption that changes in community capacity led to changes in practice. Indeed, ISSAT noted that community participation in FQs had been so successful that community members were using them as a space in which to raise other issues facing their wellbeing:

*Results exceed expectations in this area; populations with forum de quartier are using this mechanism to bring other issues to their local representatives (i.e. health, justice concerns). This underscores the need to understand these types of dynamics and seek ways to maximise synergies with other DFID DRC programmes that use this type of bottom-up accountability mechanisms in other sectors (ISSAT Annual Review, 2013).*

However, the evaluation also found evidence suggesting this currently observable change in community practice may not be sustainable after the programme ends. Interviews with the media, for instance, indicated that media awareness-raising activities had declined with the closure of programme funding. Given that CSO activities were also SSAPR-funded, it is unlikely that CSOs will continue their activities. Furthermore, in interviews with local authorities such as village and neighbourhood chiefs, who are largely responsible for convoking community members to community fora, many reported that, in order for these activities to continue, they needed paper and photocopying abilities so they could advertise meetings and offer coffee and tea to participants. In addition, they needed to be able to provide incentives (such as coffee) for the police to be willing to perform patrols after dark. At present, they report not being in a position to provide adequate incentives.

### 4.3. Overall causal claim: SSAPR interventions led to positive changes in community practice regarding the police

The evaluation concluded that community capacity changes regarding knowledge and awareness of local security concerns occurred and were quite credibly the result of SSAPR efforts. This led to changes in community practice regarding engagement with the police. A large number of community fora were also organised to provide opportunities to engage with the police and local actors around local security concerns; these appear to have been very successful. For instance, more than one-third of respondents in household surveys in SSAPR intervention sites reported having participated in an FQ or other community forum. Qualitative data from this evaluation suggest both the police and communities attended these fora.

Given that these activities were ongoing and able to sustain a high degree of interest and positive engagement from pilot communities over a number of years, the evaluation team concluded that the changes in community capacity and practice with regard to the police were



indeed the result of exposure to SSAPR community engagement activities. Analysis also did not find any compelling evidence of external factors that could have strongly influenced these changes, which strengthens the certainty of our findings.

This change in community practice, however, is predicated on other actors, such as CSOs, the media and APA, to provide engagement opportunities for community members to use their improved capacity to better engage with the police (the desired change in community practice). Although these opportunities existed over the life of the programme, they were all funded, and in some cases coordinated, by SSAPR.

# Section 5


## Local Authority Impact

05

## 5. Local authority impact: local authorities in SSAPR intervention sites have engaged better with communities since SSAPR support

Recognising the importance of collaboration between all actors, SSAPR undertook a diverse range of activities designed to create an enabling framework for security sector reform among APA structures in SSAPR pilot sites. Local authorities in SSAPR intervention sites were targeted with training activities aimed at building their capacity in terms of better knowledge and attitudes regarding the police reform process and improved skills in collaboration and dialogue. This improved capacity was intended to lead to changes in their practice regarding the police, including increased interest in, support for and engagement with them.

Figure 9 presents the nested ToC for this impact story. Annex D presents the detailed evidence for each level of the ToC's impact pathway and causal assumptions. The remainder of this section presents the impact story compiled based on evaluation findings.



**FIGURE 9. LOCAL AUTHORITIES TOC**

## 5.1. Evidence that SSAPR interventions improved local authority capacity

This section presents evidence on the extent to which the SSAPR intervention (the cause) led to local authority capacity (the effect) over the implementation period and analyses the strength of evidence available to support causal claims.

### 5.1.1. Evidence the cause occurred: SSAPR interventions targeted local authorities with training and other capacity-building interventions

The CCOSS component of the programme conducted many capacity-building activities in order to support institutionalisation of the PdP approach. APA, including mayors, *bourgemestres*, the Prosecutor's Office and heads of neighbourhoods, were supported through trainings, workshops and awareness-raising events to improve public–police–local authority collaboration on local security concerns. Trainings covered a number of topics to improve knowledge of key issues surrounding SSR and to equip them with the skills and tools necessary to fulfil their crucial oversight role. Magistrates also received training by SSAPR in order to better conduct oversight missions. They were trained on human rights (in order to verify the conditions of detention), on the oversight of judicial police officers (*officiers de police judiciaire*, OPJs) and on the use of the appropriate tools to improve their jobs. Available data suggest training was of high quality and relevant to the specific capacity APAs need to play a larger part in SSR.

### 5.1.2. Evidence the effect occurred: positive changes to local authority capacity to manage local security concerns exists

During qualitative interviews with APAs conducted as part of the evaluation, these actors discussed how, as a result of their improved understanding of the laws around SSR and the concept of human security, they had increased their capacity and learned to work with other actors. For example, they reported better collaboration with OPJs to understand the different offences under civil and criminal law. One participant remarked:

*We gained knowledge on bribes that allow us now to help the population to deal with it (APA, Kananga).*

Improved attitudes towards the police also seemed to be consistent across groups involved in SSAPR and a necessary change before different groups are willing to work with the police. A chef de quartier in Bukavu explained this change:

*Being part of the APAs, we have often been victim of arbitrary arrests committed by members of the PNC. Now, thanks to the training, we collaborate better with the PNC because we both know what is each other's' work (APA, Bukavu).*

### 5.1.3. Evidence on the extent to which causal assumptions were largely met

Following the ToC logic, a number of assumptions are necessary in order to draw a causal claim between exposure to the SSAPR intervention and changes to APA capacity. First, APA trained by the programme reported that SSAPR trainings targeting APA were of high quality and relevant to their local context. Training numbers suggested these activities reached a significant number. Interviews also confirmed a high willingness to gain these new skills and knowledge among APAs.

### 5.1.4. Evidence supporting a causal link: exposure to SSAPR interventions led to changes in local authority capacity

The APAs interviewed in this evaluation acknowledged that the training had allowed them to fully rise to their roles as coordinators of the security sector at the neighbourhood level. Importantly, the training also aimed to influence APA's attitudes towards the police. Indeed, participants in FGDs stated that, prior to the training, they were unaware of the extent to which security concerns plagued the community and impacted community members' lives. However, APAs reported that, since training, they had become deeply involved in both identifying security issues and working together to find solutions. This activity now takes place on a regular basis and invitations to attend have been extended to all community members. A chef de quartier in Matadi described this change:

*Before the training, security services were the only ones responsible for security issues. Today, all the members of the community are involved in these issues. In the security sector there is more to deal with than just criminality or theft problems. There are other security-related issues like water, electricity or sanitation, conditions that are factors of insecurity.*

### 5.1.5. Causal claim: participation in SSAPR's capacity-building events resulted in improved local authority capacity

In summary, the evidence presented here provides a credible case that SSAPR reached a reasonably representative number of APAs with high-quality and strategically relevant training around engagement on local security concerns. This has reportedly improved their capacity to engage in local security matters. APAs did not report any other training or capacity-building received during the SSAPR implementation period, thus it is reasonable to conclude the SSAPR intervention led to these changes in capacity.

## 5.2. Evidence that changes in capacity led to changes in practice

Following the ToC logic, improvements in APA capacity were expected to lead to improved practice regarding interest in and engagement on local security concerns. Claims around improvements in APA capacity (the cause) are documented in the above section. This section thus presents evidence supporting the claim that changes to APA practice (the effect) occurred

over the implementation period and analyses the strength of the evidence available to support causal claims.

### 5.2.1. Evidence the effect occurred: local authority practices regarding local security concerns has changed

APAs interviewed during the evaluation confirmed they now had discussions with police about security issues on a daily basis. Problems affecting either the PNC or the population are discussed daily between chefs de quartier and the commandant of the local commissariat/sub-commissariat. This procedure was described by an official in Kananga,

*Every morning the chef de quartier makes a report on the security situation to the police station/sub-station.*

In addition, the APAs asserted that, as a result of the FQs, the relationships between the police and other security sector actors had improved to a point where they worked collaboratively and problems were resolved together. Although men and women both reported changes in practice, female officials reported that they were not always in a position to conduct the same activities as their male counterparts.

### 5.2.2. Evidence on the extent to which causal assumptions were met

Following the ToC logic, a number of assumptions are necessary in order to draw a causal claim between improved APA capacity and changes to APA practice regarding local security concerns. First, the development of local security plans was a step envisioned to allow APAs to act on their new knowledge and skills. The evaluation team was not able to gather any of these plans during the evaluation period, programme stakeholders said local security plans had been developed in programme sites. In some interviews, APAs alluded to a number of measures and recommendations that had been formulated during the FQs in order to respond to community security needs and included in local security plans.

Next, APAs needed adequate and continued financial support to sustain activities. Evidence suggests this materialised during the programme period, but the continuation of this is under question. APAs reported that financial support was provided for community engagement activities at the onset of the programme, including office materials and refreshments for participants in meetings. However, now a lack of financial investment exists to allow them to continue their activities in the FQs.

Lastly, APAs needed opportunities to engage with the police in order to change their practice around local security concerns. APAs interviewed as part of this evaluation were pleased with the increased involvement of different stakeholders in the management of security issues at the neighbourhood level. The officials discussed how members of the PNC at the commissariat level were increasingly sensitive and reactive to the security needs of the communities raised at FQs. However, as above, the continuation of these activities without programme funding is unclear.

Chefs de quartier in some sites also reported being often ignored by members of the PNC. In one incident, following the arrest of one of the members of the community, the chefs de quartiers were not kept informed of the situation and thus were not aware whether he had been referred to a higher legal authority or had been released after paying a fine.

### 5.2.3. Evidence supporting a causal link: changes in local authority capacity led to changes in local authority practice regarding local security concerns

There was substantial evidence gathered linking changes in APA capacity to changes in practice. In Bukavu, for example, programme reports indicate that all 20 neighbourhoods have held FQs. This has resulted in improved mechanisms to discuss and resolve local problems. Programme reports indicate that some results of this process go beyond typical security concerns, including installing public toilets in one neighbourhood, improvements to water access and electricity and the construction of a bridge and other administrative offices. In Matadi, one of the APAs declared,

*The FQ are like a parliament at the local level where the population can express its concerns and where solutions and strategies are found together.*

### 5.3. Overall causal claim: exposure to SSAPR intervention built the capacity of local authorities, leading to a change in their practice regarding engagement with local security concerns

The evaluation team collected sufficient and credible evidence to support a causal claim that SSAPR activities with APAs, particularly the organisation of community fora and training for APAs, led to changes in their capacity and subsequently to changes to their practice regarding local security concerns. Supplementary analysis also did not find evidence of any compelling external factors likely to have strongly influenced these changes, strengthening the certainty of our findings.

However, the existence of community engagement opportunities, particularly FQs, seemed to be an important intervention related to APA's ability to translate their improved capacity into improved practice. Early evidence indicates that, without SSAPR funding, the magnitude or frequency of these engagement opportunities may decline.

## Section 6

### Impact Story for the Overall ToC

06



## 6. Impact story for the overview ToC

The overview ToC for SSAPR articulates the high-level impact pathway: it states that changes in practice among the programme’s primary target groups – the police, APA and communities – leads to greater collaboration among these groups with regard to local security concerns. This improved collaboration among all actors in turn leads to a greater public trust in the police and reduced crime. Greater trust in the police and reduction in crime lead over time to an increased public sense of security.

Figure 10 presents the nested ToC for this impact story. Annex E presents the detailed evidence for each level of the ToC’s impact pathway and causal assumptions. The remainder of this section presents the impact story compiled based on evaluation findings.





FIGURE 10. OVERVIEW TOC

### 6.1. Evidence that change in practice among all actors led to improved collaboration and a greater sense of trust in the police

The three previous impact stories for the police, APA and communities provide overall evaluation findings on the extent to which each group has changed practice regarding engagement with local security concerns (the cause). This section thus presents evidence on the extent to which greater collaboration, increased trust in the police and a reduction of crime (the effects) have led over the implementation period to an increased public sense of security (impact) and analyses the strength of evidence available to support causal claims.

### 6.1.1. Evidence the effect occurred: improved collaboration among all actors and a greater public trust in the police

There is strong evidence improved police–public–local authority collaboration has occurred in SSAPR intervention sites. Quantitative analysis indicates nearly 25% more survey respondents in SSAPR intervention sites reported an improvement in police–public collaboration. This is a stark comparison with a nearly 20% increase in respondents in comparison communities reporting collaboration had worsened (Figure 11).



**FIGURE 11. PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS REPORTING CHANGES IN COMMUNITY–PUBLIC COLLABORATION OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS, BY SITE AND SURVEY YEAR**

ToC monitoring also indicates that police–public collaboration has increased significantly. Respondents noted that, in 2009, communities were reluctant to work with the police, seeing them as drivers of insecurity rather than as a solution to it.

Although this represents a significant improvement, survey results also indicate that community members in SSAPR’s intervention sites are not fully satisfied with the level of collaboration. Data presented in Table 8 below indicate that just over one-third of community members in SSAPR sites are satisfied with the current level of collaboration, compared with more than half of respondents in comparison sites.

**TABLE 8. PERCENTAGE OF KAP RESPONDENTS REPORTING APPRECIATION OF THE CURRENT LEVEL OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE POLICE AND COMMUNITIES, BY RESEARCH SITE**

	Intervention (N=4,384)	Comparison (N=4,393)
Good	35.0	52.7
Bad	62.5	46.6
Don’t know	2.5	0.7


These results should be interpreted carefully. For instance, they may mean that, although the level of collaboration has improved in SSAPR sites, they are just now reaching an ‘acceptable

level' from a low base, and as such community members in SSAPR pilot sites are now enjoying the same level of appreciation as those in comparison sites. In addition, an improving security situation in SSAPR sites may also serve to raise community expectations about what 'effective collaboration' looks like.

As documented in the local authority ToC, APA were also more active and engaged in community fora and commented in interviews on the strong engagement of the police in these activities. They also referred to a police station in Kananga being built as an initiative of FQ members with the aim of reinforcing the police presence at quartier level and the organisation of evening patrols in Bukavu in order to flush out criminals taking refuge in abandoned buildings.

Through funding for oversight missions, the programme reported that magistrates were able to assess the work of the OPJs and report issues to their superiors. Thus, if OPJs were found not to respect the legal procedures, they could be sanctioned. The oversight missions conducted by prosecutors trained by SSAPR were therefore a means of pressuring the OPJs to improve their work and behaviour. Evidence from KIIs confirmed the oversight missions had a positive impact on the OPJs' work.

Evidence also suggests there has been a substantial improvement in public levels of trust in and support for the police. Individuals in SSAPR pilot sites reported strong confidence in the police and PdP-trained officers, in particular in their communities. When asked what their strongest feelings were in thinking about the PdP, nearly half of the sample said 'having confidence in the PdP'. Only 6% of respondents reported 'fear' as their strongest sentiment (Figure 12). ToC monitoring data further strengthens these findings, as respondents overwhelmingly noted that their trust had increased in the police since 2009 and the introduction of PdP.



**FIGURE 12. REPORTED CONFIDENCE LEVELS IN PDP BY 2014 KAP SURVEY RESPONDENTS IN SSAPR INTERVENTION SITES**

### 6.1.2. Evidence on the extent to which causal assumptions were largely met

Following the ToC logic, a number of assumptions are necessary in order to draw a causal claim between changes in practice among targeted groups and increased collaboration with and greater trust in the police. First, changes to internal and external police accountability mechanisms needed to occur to support actors in maintaining these new practices. There is mixed evidence to confirm that changes to internal police accountability have occurred in SSAPR intervention sites. The evidence for this assumption is presented in the PSP impact story in Section 3.2.2.

Next, the ToC posits that, in order for these changes in collaboration and trust to be maintained, there needed to be continued observation of positive changes in the police and reductions in crime among community members. The evaluation gathered some emerging evidence suggesting some of these activities may decline in the future in the absence of programme funding. The evidence for both of these assumptions is presented in the PSP impact story in Section 3.2.2.

### 6.1.3. Evidence supporting a causal link: change in community practice led to improved collaboration among actors and a greater public trust in the police

Of the evidence collected over the life of the programme, a constant theme was how SSAPR had created a space for dialogue and collaboration between the public, the police and local authorities in order to combat drivers of local insecurity. One of the biggest programme successes in terms of improved collaboration was the creation of community fora such as FQs. As discussed in the community engagement ToC in more detail, FQs were effective in providing positive opportunities for improved collaboration between the public, the police and local authorities. KAP survey data indicate that over a third of community members reported having participated in a community forum over the life of the programme. FGDs with police and APA both confirmed the importance of these fora for bringing communities together to discuss local security concerns.

This positive dynamic was noted by ISSAT in their independent annual review of the programme in 2013, which stated:

*These forums have created an opportunity for the PNC, the 'bourgemestre' (the commune-level of local municipal administration), civil society and community members to openly discuss local security matters, identify security issues and jointly suggest solutions/actions. It should also be noted that some degree of ownership was observed in Matadi and Kananga, where provisional CLSP [Comites Locale de Sécurité et Police, or Local Security and Police Committees] have been organized by the 'bourgemestres' using their own initiative, without the support of the program (Annual Review, 2013).*

According to the programme's 2014 Annual Review,

*The demand for and participation in FQs has increased and it is highly encouraging that FQs held in cycles 1 and 2 are being maintained by local actors without SSAPR support, showing strong local ownership of the initiative and the resulting sustainability of the forums. FQs also organized in commune of cycle 3 are proving to be very effective in offering the population a framework within which to express its perception of daily security issues.*

#### 6.1.4. Causal claim: a change in practice among actors resulting from SSAPR interventions has led to improved community collaboration and a greater sense of trust in the police

In summary, the evidence provides a credible case that SSAPR interventions led to improved community collaboration among actors and a greater sense of trust in the police. As communities began to support the PdP, people were more willing to collaborate with the police. Similarly, as police practice improved – that is, they became more responsive to community needs – members of the public demonstrated greater trust in them and were also more likely to engage with them. External reviewers also remarked on this positive change in police behaviour. ISSAT cites ‘universal agreement among interviewees that relationships between the police and the public had improved substantially in areas where PdP is being implemented’.

Some evidence suggests community fora such as FQs have continued after SSAPR funding ending, but many stakeholders interviewed during the evaluation suggested that, without continued funding for these activities and for media support, a reduction in activities might occur.

## 6.2. Evidence that change in practice among the police led to reduced crime

This section presents evidence on the extent to which changes in police practice (the cause) led to a reduction in crime in SSAPR intervention sites (the effect) over the implementation period and analyses the strength of the evidence available for causal claims.

### 6.2.1. Evidence the effect occurred: crime was reduced

There is mixed evidence to support observations about reduced crime levels.<sup>19</sup> Survey results indicate there was no statistically significant difference in changes in experiences of crime among survey respondents between 2010 and 2014 in SSAPR intervention and pilot sites (Table 9). This was true when disaggregating data for both men and women.

However, when looking at serious crimes, the change in experiences with crime in SSAPR intervention sites between 2010 and 2014 was statistically significant, indicating there was a detectable reduction in serious crime in SSAPR intervention sites as compared with comparison sites over time for both men and women. Importantly, there was no statistical significance when testing across sex for both groups, suggesting men and women were not differently affected. This data are consistent with crime rates reported in the M&E component’s RARE study in 2013.

---

<sup>19</sup> A detailed definition of ‘crime’ as used in this evaluation is provided in the Section **Error! Reference source not found.** on page vi.

**TABLE 9. DID CHANGE IN SURVEY RESPONDENTS REPORTING BEING A VICTIM OF CRIME IN THE PAST THREE YEARS BETWEEN 2010 AND 2014, BY RESEARCH SITE AND SEX**

	All respondents	Male respondents	Female respondents
<b>Misdemeanour crime</b>	0.007* (0.004)	0.009 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)
$R^2$	0.008	0.010	0.007
<b>Serious crime</b>	0.018*** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.007)	0.018*** (0.006)
$R^2$	0.014	0.018	0.011

Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance reported at \* <0.1, \*\* <0.05, \*\*\* <0.01.

## 6.2.2. Evidence on the extent to which causal assumptions were largely met

Following the Toc logic, a number of assumptions are necessary in order to draw a causal claim between changes in police practice and a reduction in crime. First, there is an assumption that no police scandals occurred that affected public perceptions of the PdP. The evaluation team was not able to gather evidence on any major scandals occurring over the implementation period in SSAPR pilot sites. Rather, a number of scandals have occurred affecting the broader PNC, including Operation Likofi in Kinshasa and the police opening fire on demonstrators at a political rally in Bukavu. ToC monitoring data suggest these events have an important symbolic effect on the population, and one incident such as the one described here in Bukavu can significantly detract from positive progress being made.

Next, the changes to police practice needed to be visible in order to lead to a reduction in crime. There is strong evidence that changes in PdP practice were visible. This evidence stems from data collected through quantitative analysis presented earlier in this story and ToC monitoring, where people in all sites reported experiencing significant changes in PdP behaviour towards the public, responsiveness and performance in their duties. However, data presented in the police impact story suggest that, without the sustainability of reforms within the police, these changes may not continue to occur in the future.

Last, there are assumptions relating to the formal justice system, specifically that courts dealt effectively with criminals. The evaluation team gathered data indicating that this assumption has largely not been met. The RARE study found low levels of public confidence in the ability of the justice system to hold criminals accountable. Among victims surveyed who took their case to the police, only 3.6% also went to the prosecutor. Although this would normally come

following referral by the police, only 1.3% of individuals who took their case to the prosecutor were referred by anyone, and only 0.4% were referred by the police.

This indicates that, at the time data were collected in June 2013, coordination and referral between links in the justice chain were largely absent. Despite this, quantitative analysis indicates that, compared with comparison sites, 13.5% more people in SSAPR pilot sites in 2014 were satisfied with their experiences of the formal justice system. However, this improvement from baseline should not be interpreted as an effective system overall. Others have documented the importance of including both justice and security issues in police reform.<sup>20</sup>

### 6.2.3. Evidence supporting a causal link: changes in police practice led to reductions in crime

Data gathered during the evaluation shows there was no reduction in misdemeanour crime during the programme period. Further, data suggest the police are still associated with crimes in SSAPR pilot and comparison sites. Among victims of crime identified in household surveys, community members were asked if a security institution was involved or implicated in the crime. The data indicate an alarmingly high proportion of community members associating crimes with the police. Respondents in Kananga consistently reported higher rates of police involvement in crimes compared with in other research sites. For instance, nearly 80% of male respondents in Kananga associated the police with harassment, compared with 83% of male respondents in the matched city of Mbuji-Mai. However, these results are not consistent with qualitative data obtained from the ToC monitoring activities. Community-level respondent groups identified a reduction in crime as a major factor influencing their perceptions of the police:

*Today, crime has significantly reduced compared with 2009. Before, you would see between five and six crimes per day, including armed robbery, rape, theft and police harassment (Bukavu, Religious Group 1).*

### 6.2.4. Causal claim: changes in police practice did not lead to reductions in crime.

In summary, the evidence presented here provides a credible case that, though changes in police practice occurred, this did not lead to overall reductions in the majority of crimes people experience – that is, misdemeanour crimes, although rates of serious crime did decrease. This is supported by little or conflicting evidence around the major assumptions in the ToC logic, in that courts are not effectively dealing with criminals and some evidence of police scandals that occurred during the programme period could have had a negative effect. Although there was a positive reduction in serious crime for both men and women in SSAPR pilot sites, the evidence gathered by the evaluation team suggests improved police practice contributed to these changes, but does not support the assumption that it was caused by changes in police practice alone in intervention sites.

---

<sup>20</sup> Desai, D., Isser, D. and Woolcock, M. (2010) 'Rethinking Justice Reform in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: The Capacity of Development Agencies and Lessons from Liberia and Afghanistan'. Washington, DC: World Bank.


## 6.3. Evidence that change in target groups' collaboration and changes to trust in the police led to changes in public sense of security

This section presents evidence on the extent to which changes in a public sense of security (the effect) occurred over the implementation period and analyses the strength of evidence for causal claims.

### 6.3.1. Evidence the effect occurred: increased public sense of security

There is strong evidence of an increased public sense of security in SSAPR pilot sites, reinforced by quantitative and qualitative data, across all three SSAPR intervention sites, with respondents reporting feeling substantially more secure in 2014 than populations sampled at baseline in 2010.

Figure 13 displays changes in perceptions around feeling safe against theft and attack at the city level over time in SSAPR intervention and comparison sites. The net changes indicate that individuals living in SSAPR intervention sites now feel more secure in their communities than those living in comparison sites in 2010.



**FIGURE 13. CHANGES IN PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCES WITH CRIME AT THE CITY LEVEL OVER TIME IN SSAPR INTERVENTION AND COMPARISON SITES**


These findings were supported by data collected through ToC monitoring. This study found perceptions of security had changed positively in SSAPR sites. Although this represents a significant improvement from the situation in 2009 in SSAPR intervention sites, it is also important to observe current perceptions of public security. In our quantitative surveys, less than half of respondents in SSAPR pilot sites reported feeling secure in their communities, compared with more than 55% of those in comparison sites in 2014.

This statistic requires further interpretation. It is necessary to recall that the SSAPR intervention sites were purposively chosen for to their 'insecurity' relative to other cities in the country, thus the need for a programme (see **Box 1**). Although the evaluation attempted to match the city pairs on as many observable characteristics as possible, the security situation in the comparison sites on average was better than those in intervention sites at baseline. So, while the trajectory of change in intervention sites may have gone up over time at a higher or faster rate than in comparison sites, we cannot interpret from this that the pilot sites in absolute terms are 'more secure' in 2014 compared with comparison sites. In some cases, as the above shows, although things are better now in intervention sites than in 2010, this does not necessarily mean the situation is better in intervention sites compared with comparison sites in 2014. Thus, as the data above suggest, although things have improved in intervention sites,



the majority of community members in the SSAPR pilot sites still feel insecure in their communities. This is an important finding to consider.

In terms of gender-disaggregated results, multidimensional indices indicate men were more likely to experience improved overall KAP than women, although this does not detract from the positive changes in overall KAP experienced by both sexes in pilot sites. Figure 14 shows the relative change in improved KAP for both men and women in SSAPR intervention sites compared with respondents in comparison sites over time. Men experienced slightly higher changes in improved KAP across all three indices, although women also experienced significant improvements in KAP that should not be overlooked or underestimated.<sup>21</sup>



**FIGURE 14. DID IMPACT OF SSAPR INTERVENTIONS OVERALL DISAGGREGATED BY SEX**

### 6.3.2. Evidence on the extent to which causal assumptions were largely met

Following the ToC logic, a number of assumptions are necessary in order to draw a causal claim between changes in collaboration among actors and trust in the police and an increased public sense of security. First, there needed to be no backsliding, so improvements achieved initially were maintained and continued. The evaluation was not able to gather any data that suggested backsliding had occurred during the programme implementation period. However, there is early evidence from different sources that some of the gains the programme made are starting to decline. ToC monitoring data collected between spring and autumn 2014 indicates that, in a number of cases, adherence to PdP principles and other changes in behaviour among PdP-trained officers had begun to decline.

Interviews with local authorities confirmed this. The APA interviewed as part of this evaluation believed the spirit of collaboration had faded over time. They cite the example in which one official declared:

*With time, there has been less collaboration and more disrespect of the rules coming from the PDPs. The police are coming back to their old practices because of its lack of motivation and/or supervision coming from hierarchical supervisors who have not been trained on the PdP. We can see the PDPs often receive orders that are going against the 10 golden rules.*

This point was importantly reinforced when conducting interviews with the police themselves. While some PdP officers said they enjoyed the training opportunities and status involved in being part of the PdP, the majority cited salaries and poor socioeconomic conditions as being a concern and a factor that could lead them to leave the PdP. Many respondents in the

<sup>21</sup> For a more detailed explanation of KAP, please see Box 2.

qualitative research also highlighted that, in some cases, positive improvements in police practice had slipped backward because of poor salaries and the low socioeconomic status of the police.

Another critical assumption is that institutional changes occurred to allow any positive changes to continue. The programme from the outset recognised the risks to the sustainability of the programme. Through the CCOSS component, it aimed to institutionalise the police reform process at the national and provincial levels by working with relevant political actors. At the national level, trainings were conducted with key security actors to strengthen their ability to incorporate police reform activities into their current mandates. At the provincial level, capacity-building activities were conducted with several stakeholders. This included authorities within the governor's office, the provincial delegation of MISDAC, the Provincial Security Council and the provincial delegation of the General Inspectorate of the PNC in SSAPR pilot sites.

The programme was able to work with national counterparts to improve the policing legal framework during the SSAPR intervention period. For instance, in 2012 the National Assembly, with support from SSAPR, approved the Organic Law of the PNC and a decree on the creation of local and provincial-level security committees to coordinate public-police collaboration efforts at these levels. The SSAPR 2013 Annual Review reports that a significant number of major laws and decrees relating to the security and justice sectors were passed on topics from the statutes of police agents to the organisation and functioning of local security councils.

The programme acknowledged challenges with the institutionalisation of reforms, and that this process required strong political commitment. Although there was a general willingness among political actors to support police reform, this was not matched with firm commitments or actions in a timely manner, largely because the police are closely linked to the current regime. By the end of 2014, the programme reported the need for extensive and broader legislation to implement internal security and police reform, with political engagement and advocacy at the highest political level a key concern.

Despite progress, there remain serious questions about the sustainability of the programme, and of the reform process in general, without external support. The SSAPR team provided considerable support to these activities. Ideally, these should have been nationally driven. That they were not demonstrated that relevant Congolese counterparts came to these activities with limited buy-in and interest in follow-on.

Some evidence of ownership of reforms at the local level has also been recorded. For instance, the provincial commissariat in Matadi began a number of initiatives to support the reform process, including providing petrol and motorbikes to local police stations, engaging more proactively with communities and providing financial support to cover running costs at local commissariats. Equally, the programme reports that the provincial minister in Bukavu expressed his wish to extend PdP activities beyond the pilot provinces to all territories in the area, as the provincial government saw successes related to SSAPR interventions. However, these are more plausibly isolated cases of particularly engaged community members rather than indications of a long-term systemic change.

### 6.3.3. Overall causal claim: exposure to SSAPR interventions led to an increased sense of security

It is reasonable to conclude that the various mechanisms SSAPR supported have promoted a more participatory approach between the PNC, local authorities and local communities to address security issues. The evaluation team also gathered supporting qualitative information from local security actors – police, APA, civil society members and community members – to describe the nature of this change. Respondents in quantitative surveys reported strong feelings of confidence in the police and PdP-trained officers, in particular in their communities. Through seemingly distinct processes, ToC monitoring data show the feedback loops and inter-dynamics at play, as building public trust in the police and improved police practice further improved community–police collaboration by improving community confidence in the PNC. Early evidence from numerous interviews with different stakeholders suggests, however, there may be some backsliding in these changes over time.

This led to an increased sense of security among citizens in SSAPR pilot sites. Supplementary analysis also did not find evidence of any compelling external factors likely to have strongly influenced these changes, strengthening the certainty of our findings. However, this increased sense of security is not associated with reductions in levels of misdemeanour crime, suggesting that, despite an increased sense of security, community members may not be safer from these types of crime as a result of programme implementation.

## Section 7

Conclusions on the short- and long-term impact of SSAPR and implications for future police reform programmes

07

## 7. Conclusions on the short- and long-term impact of SSAPR and implications for future police reform programmes

### 7.1. Conclusions on the impact of the overall SSAPR intervention

#### 7.1.1. Results suggest SSAPR was both sufficient and equitable in achieving SSAPR's intended impact level change of 'improved sense of public security'

Findings from the quantitative analysis indicate that, overall, the programme was sufficient in improving the public's sense of security in the intervention sites over time. Additionally, heterogeneity analysis indicated that, although men's sense of security improved slightly more than women's, both experienced statistically significant improvements compared with in comparison sites. Moreover, poor and marginalised groups particularly benefited from SSAPR's contribution to an increased sense of security.<sup>22</sup> This was not an explicit target population of the programme, but this is still an interesting finding. A heterogeneity analysis of survey data indicates that, in 2010, poorer respondents reported a lower sense of security than their wealthier counterparts; by 2014 they had caught up in SSAPR intervention sites but not in comparison sites.

#### 7.1.2. An analysis of objective versus subjective security raises concerns as to the true impact of SSAPR

Although results indicate SSAPR was sufficient in improving the public's sense of security, results are more mixed considering the larger situation of security. For instance, while there have been improvements in subjective security (perceptions of security) over time, results on changes in the actual prevalence of crime –objective security – are mixed.

On disaggregating crime prevalence by type of crime, we found statistically significant results in terms of a reduction in serious crimes in intervention sites compared with comparison sites over the SSAPR period, a positive result. Encouragingly, this result was statistically significant for both men and women.

At the same time, analysis indicated no statistically significant changes in the prevalence of misdemeanour crimes in SSAPR intervention sites compared with comparison sites over time. This was true for both men and women. What is striking is that this finding is in stark contrast with the perceptions of community members: qualitative evidence suggests security is perceived to have improved. Qualitative evidence from different community groups also shows communities say they now experience less crime because of improved police practice and community engagement activities such as the FQs.

This discrepancy in SSAPR pilot sites between perceptions of changes and actual changes as reported in a representative household survey highlights the complicated relationship

---

<sup>22</sup> This analysis was based on asset wealth indicators.

between objective security (actually being free from crime) and subjective security (feeling safe from crime). This suggests reality and perceptions are often out of sync, and perceptions of change may occur in advance of actual change.

At the programme's conclusion, prevalence of serious crime had reduced from baseline levels yet that of misdemeanour crime had not. Nearly 80% of respondents in SSAPR intervention sites reported having been the victim of a misdemeanour crime in the previous three years (compared with about 87% in comparison sites), whereas only about 10% of respondents reported having been the victim of serious crime in 2014 in SSAPR intervention sites (compared with about 16% in comparison sites). Community members in both intervention and comparison sites in 2014 also continued to speak about the police's complicity in crime.

This is an important trend to consider. The majority of community members had experienced misdemeanour crimes. These include theft, robbery, harassment and assault, and are presumably the types of crimes that would be effectively prevented through improved police practice towards the community and better public-police collaboration, as they represent the majority of crimes and thus the types of crimes more likely raised through community forums. At the same time, the police are patrolling more than they were, community members are engaging with the police and many events in the SSAPR pilot sites have raised awareness about police reforms. All of these undoubtedly contributed to improved perceptions of positive changes in security, despite the fact that this change is not mirrored in actual security improvements across the board.

In the context of these mixed achievements, assessing the overall success of SSAPR and its interventions quickly becomes a more nuanced exercise. This calls into question whether the intended impact of the programme, to improve subjective security in terms of feeling safe from crime, was the 'right' goal at the impact level of the programme. It is for precisely these reasons that the 2008 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Handbook on Security Sector Reform does not prescribe a list of standard indicators.<sup>23</sup> Instead, SSR evaluators recommend using a range of context-specific indicators to measure changes in security within a target population. DFID itself recommends a mixture of qualitative indicators to measure perceptions and quantitative measures to capture objective changes. DFID's 2010 Briefing Note 'Working Effectively in Conflict-Affected and Fragile Situations' acknowledges that, in fragile states, both sets of indicators have limitations: data shortages can make quantitative measures unreliable; there may be high levels of misinformation; and subjective assessments may over-represent more extreme opinions. Cross-referencing perceptions with quantitative data may therefore provide the most robust results of programme impact.<sup>24,25,26</sup>

---

<sup>23</sup> Available at [http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/the-oecd-dac-handbook-on-security-system-reform/section-10-monitoring-and-evaluation\\_9789264027862-13-en;jsessionid=45ss0p6na8gps.x-oecd-live-02](http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/the-oecd-dac-handbook-on-security-system-reform/section-10-monitoring-and-evaluation_9789264027862-13-en;jsessionid=45ss0p6na8gps.x-oecd-live-02)

<sup>24</sup> Available at [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/67695/building-peaceful-states-1.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67695/building-peaceful-states-1.pdf)

<sup>25</sup> <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/programs/criminaljustice/research-publications/measuring-the-performance-of-criminal-justice-systems/indicators-in-development-safety-and-justice/project-overview/approaches/short-guide-to-country-led-indicator-development-in-justice-and-safety>

<sup>26</sup> DFID (2010).

## 7.2. The relative effectiveness of SSAPR component parts

The evaluation concluded that the *overall* SSAPR intervention positively improved perceptions of security in SSAPR intervention sites. Further, the evaluation examined the relative effectiveness of specific programme components.

### 7.2.1. Police training in the PdP approach represented the most important contribution to programme impact compared with other police interventions

Given SSAPR's focus on improving security through police reform, one focus of our analysis related to investigating the links between changes in perceptions of security and changes in police practice. When applying regression analysis, the following factors were all strongly correlated with a positive change in an individual's sense of security: being exposed to SSAPR, positive experiences with police officers trained in the PdP approach and knowledge of the PdP approach. Each was correlated with a marginal improvement.

This means the more exposure respondents had to SSAPR police support activities, the more positive their perceptions of security were, as compared with respondents who were not or less exposed to the programme, even within SSAPR intervention sites. This trend also held true when analysis was carried out by SSAPR intervention commune, further highlighting the importance of PdP trainings in contributing to positive programme impact. Respondents living in communes that did not benefit from the construction of physical infrastructure demonstrated similar outcomes to those who lived in communes that did. Results from regression analysis presented above – which showed correlations between positive interactions with police officers and improvements in public perceptions of security – support this finding.

That we could not identify a clear association suggests perceptions of improved security were more linked to improvements in police behaviour than to changes in physical infrastructure. In sum, this means infrastructure support was not a necessary condition for change. This has important implications for programme scale-up and other police reform programmes.

### 7.2.2. Forums de quartier and citizen forums made an important contribution to programme impact

The establishment of FQs is a success of the programme: these fostered collaboration between the police, communities and local authorities. Nearly all interviewees from different stakeholder groups mentioned the importance of FQs and other citizen forums in improving police–community collaboration. Quantitative analysis suggests a similar finding: nearly one-third of community members reported having participated in at least one FQ or citizen forum. This is a remarkable figure.

Internal programme monitoring shows that, by the final year of the programme, 28 FQs had been held across all three pilot cities. SSAPR quarterly reports also show surprisingly strong involvement of women (especially in Bukavu), suggesting these fora are inclusive, which is a positive sign that the security concerns of women are being represented.

This is a significant finding in itself; it supports the conclusion that, in SSAPR intervention sites, the programme initiated positive changes. At the same time, some local authorities reported there had been a decline in incidence of FQs because of a lack of funding, which is needed for administrative tasks and simple hospitality for participants. Other authorities reported that the police or local authorities themselves had taken on the financial support, recognising the importance of these community fora.

Although these financial struggles are understandable following the end of a programme, it is unclear whether these important events could have occurred with less external funding, including for tea and coffee, invitations and other operational costs. It is unclear whether these provisions were necessary to implement the activities, or if they have now unnecessarily raised expectations. It is nonetheless encouraging that some communities have taken on this financial burden themselves, recognising the importance of these activities in improving police–public collaboration.

### 7.3. The long-term sustainability of SSAPR

SSAPR programme reports and annual reviews consistently highlighted the evident risks regarding the sustainability of the overall intervention, often mentioning the challenges of ‘top-down’ sustainability, which requires institutionalisation of reforms at the national and provincial levels. Further, it is questioned whether ‘bottom-up’ successes at the SSAPR pilot city level can be made sustainable. The remainder of this section explores the sustainability of the SSAPR intervention from both perspectives.

#### 7.3.1. Top-down sustainability of the police reform process: evidence for the institutionalisation and scale-up of the programme

The programme rightly identified lack of political engagement of national counterparts as the biggest risk to this programme’s sustainability. Although some achievements have been made in establishing a legal framework for police reform through new laws and decrees, top-down sustainability is a challenge

Regarding institutionalisation of the reform process and of an enabling legal framework, the programme did achieve some important results. These included support to the National Assembly, which approved the Organic Law of the PNC and a decree on the creation of local and provincial-level security committees to coordinate public–police collaboration efforts at the local and provincial levels.

Looking at these changes from the bottom up, they clearly represent progress – yet there is little evidence to support their implementation or enforcement without continued external support and political engagement. Data gathered during the evaluation suggest the programme drove most of these achievements, and that overall it struggled to gain stakeholder buy-in. Given the other development priorities in DRC and the political sensitivities involved in this type of programme, it is important to mention that, through political engagement by both programme implementers and DFID, senior stakeholder buy-in was gained in many cases during the programme period. Nonetheless, without ratification of passed laws and enforcement of decrees, change will not be genuine or sustained. National counterparts seem to have taken little ownership of the programme’s aims and show limited ability or willingness



to drive the change process. Similar research in African contexts has written on the importance of political will to impact local change.<sup>27,28,29</sup>

### 7.3.2. Bottom-up sustainability – evidence for the continuation of impacts achieved at the local level

The programme clearly achieved short-term results corresponding to the desired impact, although there is already some emerging evidence of declines in programme achievements that are necessary links in the causal chain for these positive results to be sustained.

As mentioned above, one of the most important changes was improved police practice stimulated by the PdP training. This intervention intended not only to create better-skilled police but also to improve community attitudes towards the police, particularly regarding corrupt practices. On the other hand, the biggest risk to sustaining this change is the declining motivation for PdP-trained police to continue improved practices. In order to create sustainable change, the ToC posits that police are motivated to continue good police practice if they see the community is proud of its good police; it is assumed such pride overpowers incentives for corruption. Further, it was assumed the establishment of internal and external accountability functions in SSAPR sites pressure the police into continuing good practice. Evidence suggests these assumptions held in the short term, but the situation was beginning to decline by the end of the programme.

First, in interviews with both PdP and non-PdP members of the PNC, respondents cited low salaries as the biggest factor associated with declining police practice, suggesting the departure from corrupt practices is not a comparable compensation with the rewards of a positive perception in the community. When discussing these issues, community members often linked corruption to the poor salaries of police. In some ways, it seemed communities were accepting of corrupt practices, implicitly acknowledging that low wages and lack of support present a challenge to the police.

If the issue of salaries is not addressed for these police officers, there seems little prospect that they will continue good police practices and abandon corrupt practices. Although the larger police reform process in DRC has attempted to address this to some degree through the *bancarisation* system, the fact that the police more reliably receive their salaries does not compensate for not having a sufficient salary to remain motivated to continue good practice. This has been well documented in similar contexts.<sup>30</sup>

Second, some evidence suggests the continuation of demand-side activities necessary to support these positive changes in the long term is also in question. Specifically, evidence suggests a decline in some of the important external accountability mechanisms supported through the programme. Although FQs are mentioned above as a success of the programme, some local authorities interviewed as part of this evaluation indicated a reluctance to continue organising them without funds to support them, although this was not the case across the board. This is consistent with findings from similar contexts within Africa, indicating the

---

<sup>27</sup> Baker, B. (2003) 'Policing and the Rule of Law in Mozambique'. *Policing and Society* 13(2): 139-158.

<sup>28</sup> [http://www.academia.edu/2315685/The\\_challenge\\_of\\_local\\_ownership\\_of\\_SSR\\_From\\_donor\\_rhetoric\\_to\\_practice](http://www.academia.edu/2315685/The_challenge_of_local_ownership_of_SSR_From_donor_rhetoric_to_practice)

<sup>29</sup> [http://www.academia.edu/2315531/Obstacles\\_to\\_security\\_sector\\_reform\\_in\\_new\\_democracies](http://www.academia.edu/2315531/Obstacles_to_security_sector_reform_in_new_democracies)

<sup>30</sup> Baker, B. (2009) 'Resource Constraint and Policy in Liberia's Post-Conflict Policing'. *Police Practice and Research* iFirst: 1-13.

importance of community forums as well as challenges with their sustainability.<sup>31</sup> The programme could have learned from studying these similar cases.

Similarly, interviews with journalists indicated a decline in security-related journalism since SSAPR stopped paying for media spots. Equally, it is unclear whether CSOs will remain engaged with communities on local security concerns and continue to routinely educate the population and raise awareness of police reforms when opportunities for training or funding provided by SSAPR are no longer present.

These opportunities for collaboration provided by community-level engagement were key to the success of the programme, and linked to positive perceptions among community members of the police as a security service provider and of their own sense of security. As perceptions of insecurity are directly linked to observations of and experiences with crime, there is a risk improvements in SSAPR sites could decline.

Beyond these concerns, there are some indications that local-level institutional reforms may allow some elements of the reform process to continue. Most promising are examples of budgets shifted towards future police trainings and other reforms in SSAPR pilot sites. The provincial commissariat in Matadi has begun a number of initiatives as part of the reform process, including providing petrol and motorbikes to local police stations, engaging more proactively with communities and providing financial support to cover running costs at local commissariats. Equally, the programme reports that the provincial minister in Bukavu has expressed a wish to extend PdP activities beyond the pilot provinces to all territories in the area, given the success of SSAPR interventions that have been noted by the provincial government.

The fact that all stakeholders interviewed repeatedly highlighted only the above few examples raises concerns that these may be two isolated cases of particularly dynamic groups/individuals and not indicative or representative of wider changes in the sustainability of the intervention. Nevertheless, future iterations of this programme could benefit from examining them further and from seeking out additional examples, if these exist.

### 7.3.3. Overall conclusions on sustainability in the context of programme delivery and an early programme closure

The results of this evaluation put into question the extent to which the short-term changes the programme has brought will continue in the future. Although this evaluation suggests some interventions may be maintained while others risk declining or stopping completely, at present there is little evidence to determine which achievements of the programme will continue in the long term. Nonetheless, as SSAPR was designed as an overall intervention, this therefore raises questions as to whether the short-term changes achieved in the programme period will be maintained if stakeholders adopt some aspects of the programme intervention and not others.

The programme did not manage to balance the long-term ambition of delivering sustainable change for communities within SSAPR intervention sites with the short-term intention to deliver a 'proof of concept' that police practice and community perceptions could be improved through a high-value external intervention. With a £58 million budget over five years and a heavy level of external support leveraged by the programme, there is strong evidence that police practice

---

<sup>31</sup> Baker, B. (2007) 'Community Policing in Freetown, Sierra Leone: Foreign Import or Local Solution?' *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 2(1): 23-42.

and community engagement improved in the short term, and this brought about improvements in individuals' perceptions of security.

However, even just after the end of the programme, there are early signs of backsliding and a return to old practices. This raises questions as to whether SSAPR invested too little in concerns of sustainability for the benefit of implementing an impressive programme with a demonstration effect of what is achievable. This tension applies to both the police reform process and community engagement, as has been written about previously.<sup>32</sup> The fact that this balance was not achieved – and perhaps the programme was not designed to achieve it – means that, despite demonstrating a positive impact in the short term, SSAPR's long-term impact on the lives of Congolese citizens remains unclear.

This needs to be interpreted in the context of two important factors. First, the overall programme logic and ToC for the programme were not fully articulated until 2013, over halfway through programme implementation. This meant the programme did not state its short- and long-term goals until quite late in the implementation period, and thus provided little time to work collaboratively to achieve these results. At that time, the programme considered the ToC an internal tool that at some point should be used to promote local ownership by external stakeholders. There is little evidence of this occurring during the programme period. This lack of ownership and buy-in among key national and local stakeholders could to some extent explain early indications of programme successes declining. This has been well documented in similar settings, as referenced earlier in this report.

Second, it is important to recognise that, owing to mitigating circumstances, DFID suspended the programme in November 2014 and terminated it in February 2015, approximately one year earlier than intended, and subsequently cancelled plans for a follow-on five-year programme to build on the successes and lessons learnt from the first five years of implementation. Interviews with DFID and programme staff indicated that the final year of the programme was intended to focus on issues of sustainability, consolidating results achieved and working collaboratively with national partners to institutionalise the achievements to the extent possible. Early termination of the programme meant these critical activities did not take place, leaving just time for asset recovery and the consolidation of lessons learnt, which undoubtedly would have begun to address some of the sustainability questions this evaluation raises.

Further, it is important to remember SSAPR was originally intended to be a pilot programme, with at least one subsequent five-year programme to follow, if not several. As such, it is understandable that a focus on the short-term 'proof of concept' aspects of achieving results – particularly to national counterparts – may have received more focus and prioritisation than activities aiming to contribute to long-term sustainability results. Had this been designed from the onset as a stand-alone five-year programme, it is reasonable to assume DFID and programme implementers would have approached some of its activities differently from the outset.

Nonetheless, there were many positive achievements and lessons to be learnt from SSAPR that would support the scaling-up or implementation of further police reform programmes in DRC as well as the design of police reform programmes in other contexts.

---

<sup>32</sup> ICAI (Independent Commission for Aid Impact) (2015) 'DFID's Approach to Delivering Sustainable Impact'. Report 45. London: ICAI.

## 7.4. Implications for the scale-up of SSAPR and other police reform programmes

- Importance of buy-in of national counterparts in the process. Without the clear commitment of these actors, there is little prospect of long-term change. This requires more active political engagement by programme implementers, donors and other political stakeholders who carry more weight than programme staff.
- SSAPR proved police training and community engagement can work in the short term. The question is how to change incentives in a community to sustain these changes in the long term. This means planning is necessary to identify how long-term changes in practice among actors such as the media and civil society can continue when external funding ceases.
- Without a full understanding of and respond to the multifaceted constraints to behaviour change among key actors, it is unlikely changes will be sustained. For instance, although the programme addressed issues around the capability of the police, it was not able address issues of their poor compensation, which impacts their behaviours around corrupt practices.
- Some of the least costly activities were the most impactful. The FQ, which required just some support for community mobilisation, provided one of the most important contributions to impact. Infrastructure support, on the other hand, which was a relatively costly intervention, seemed to improve people's perceptions of the police's ability to respond but was not correlated with actual changes in police performance.
- There are questions as to whether a costly intervention such as SSAPR should have been more ambitious in its intended goal, holding itself to account for more than a change in perceptions to include an actual change in security in terms of reductions of actual crime.

# Section 8

## Annexes

08

## List of figures

Figure 15: Breakdown of dimension weightings .....	99
Figure 16. Nested ToC for Police Support Programme .....	105
Figure 17. KAP survey respondents reporting frequency of police patrols in their neighbourhood, by site and by survey year .....	114
Figure 18. Respondents' explanations of what is responsible for positive change in the police .....	115
Figure 19. Perceptions on changes to the level of performance of the PNC over past 3 years .....	119
Figure 20. DiD impact of SSAPR disaggregated by cycle .....	120
Figure 21. KAP survey respondents reporting perceptions to changes in police corruption .....	120
Figure 22: Relationship between perceived corruption and non-payment of bribes in previous 12 months.....	121
Figure 23. Nested ToC for SSAPR communities .....	127
Figure 24. Nested ToC for APA .....	141
Figure 25. Overview SSAPR ToC.....	146
Figure 26. Percentage of respondents reporting changes in community–public collaboration over the past three years, by site and survey year .....	147
Figure 27. Proportion of 2014 KAP respondents in SSAPR intervention sites reporting feelings of confidence in PdP .....	151
Figure 28. Proportion of misdemeanour and serious crime among all victims of crime in the past 12 months, by type of crime and sex of respondent .....	153
Figure 29. Changes in perceptions and experiences with crime at the city level over time in SSAPR intervention and comparison sites .....	155
Figure 30. Change in overall safety, security and justice KAP in SSAPR intervention sites and comparison sites over time and the overall level of change (DiD), across three indices.....	157
Figure 31. Percentage of police officers in SSAPR pilot sites reporting satisfaction with the PdP approach just after the PdP training and one year after .....	161
Figure 32. Difference-in-difference impact of SSAPR interventions overall disaggregated by gender .....	164
Figure 33. Change in overall safety, security and justice KAP across six research sites over time and overall level of change (DiD) across three indices.....	165

## List of tables

Table 10: Overview of characteristics, cut-offs and weightings indicators by dimension .....	102
Table 11. Number of police trained disaggregated by cycle and SSAPR pilot site .....	106
Table 12.: Content of PDP training .....	106
Table 13. SSAPR construction by location .....	108
Table 14. SSAPR equipment provided for each province .....	109
Table 14: Percentage of population in SSPAR intervention sites in 2014 who have positive attitudes about the PNC and the PdP .....	115
Table 16. Percentage of respondents reporting satisfaction with the performance of the PNC in their neighbourhood and city.....	116
Table 17. Percentage of respondents reporting top five reasons for dissatisfaction with the police ..	116
Table 18. Percentage of respondents who agree with the following statements about the police, by type of research site .....	117
Table 19. Community groups participating in evaluation activities reporting on SSAPR effectiveness in their communities .....	131
Table 20. Percentage of respondents reporting that the principal role of the police is to protect people and their property, by type of site and demographic characteristic .....	132
Table 22. Percentage of respondents reporting that the principal role of the police is to protect people and their property, by type of site and demographic characteristic .....	133
Table 23. Percentage of KAP respondents reporting appreciation of the current level of collaboration between the police and communities, by research site .....	149
Table 22. Percentage of KAP respondents reporting types of crimes for which they would go to the police, by type of crime and by research site .....	151
Table 25. Percentage of survey respondents reporting being a victim of misdemeanour or serious crime in the past three years, by time, research site and by sex of respondent.....	153
Table 26. Percentage of survey respondents reporting the police being implicated in theft, harassment or assault, by research site and sex of respondent .....	154
Table 27. Percentage of survey respondents reporting feeling safe in their community, by research site and sex .....	156
Table 26. Number of people trained disaggregated, by type of training and city .....	183

# Annex A: Methodology on sampling and analytical approach

## Data description and sampling

The data comprised two cross-sectional samples of individuals interviewed in the six intervention and comparison sites in 2010 at baseline and in 2014 after four years of SSAPR implementation. While the sample sizes were sufficiently large for a representative sampling of those cities' populations, it was necessary to calculate sampling weights so as to be able to reweight individual observations within the two samples. Information on 2010 and 2014 district-level population and sampling allocation rules as well as on household sizes enabled us to derive 2010 and 2014 district-level sampling weights and correct for household size (individuals sampled who belonged to larger households were assigned a bigger sampling weight) to derive individual weights. Cross-sectional weights were rescaled to derive panel weights so as to enable comparisons between 2010 and 2014. The reweighting of the sample was necessary to obtain representative statistics about the directions and outcomes of changes having occurred over the four years' time frame.

Sampling and survey protocols followed a stratified approach wherein the choice of individuals was quasi-random according to strata quota where effects were corrected by the sampling weights above described. The major assumption around this approach is that the size of clusters is relatively homogeneous within districts (since a similar allocation was given to each cluster and we did not have any cluster-level population information).

The data gathered included 8,800 individuals in 2010 and 8,200 in 2014. While the sampling allocation was even between intervention and comparison sites in 2010, it was revisited in 2014 for impact evaluation purposes. Two-thirds of the total sample size of 2014 was allocated to the comparison sites because individuals might be increasingly difficult to compare with their counterparts having potentially experienced benefits from the SSAPR implementation, and we needed to have many more comparison observations in order to derive a consistent counterfactual. For baseline, the even allocation had no significant influence, since the sites were quite reasonably well chosen and paired for having plausible counterfactuals. Notwithstanding, the analytical methods described below are meant to correct for any significant differences at baseline between intervention and comparison sample populations, as well as those at endline, which may explain differences in the main outcome indicators that exposure to SSAPR implementation has not caused.

## Impact evaluation design and analytical methods

Availability of baseline and endline data enabled a DiD impact evaluation design through which we could assess both after-and-before and between control and pilot changes in the outcome variables of interest. An impact evaluation using a DiD design allows for the comparison of patterns of changes within intervention sites (having been 'recipients' of the project) with their comparison counterparts, provided they had comparable baseline levels and within-city distribution of baseline outcomes. Improvement in some of the perception and attitudes indicators could then be seen as project-driven (i.e. the project had a detectable causal impact) if and only if comparison sites at baseline did not experience the same patterns of growth. The difference across changes (difference in difference) of comparisons and intervention sites could be then identified as the real programme impact.



Because the selection of programme intervention sites was predetermined and not random at baseline, the measurement of impacts through DiD approaches can be fraught with estimation biases, because of both observable and unobservable differences between individuals selected and those not selected/eligible for the programme. The intervention sites might have been selected because they had more likelihood of reacting to SSAPR with improved outcomes than the other provinces or cities while roughly similar at baseline. This is likely to be the case since SSAPR was implemented in a non-random manner. For that reason, we proposed the use of matching techniques to correct for the observable characteristics between the exposure and comparison individuals that may have caused the observed changes in the outcomes.

We employed PSM to accomplish this, pooling all individuals from the entire sample according to baseline and/or endline characteristics and deriving a sub-sample of 'matched' individuals based on a common support statistical range of comparable baseline and/or endline observable characteristics. DiD estimates were then directly derived from the matched sample (and then compared with average estimates from the whole sample to detect any possible selection bias) so as to obtain the ATT according to the outcome variables of interest.

Specifically, a probit regression was performed on the whole sample of all individuals on the probability of any individual being a recipient of the programme at baseline and/or endline. Propensity scores were then derived for both intervention and comparison individuals on a common support area of propensities; non-comparable individuals were then excluded from the matched sample. Intervention and comparison observations were defined and their outcomes (in difference for DiD approaches) were then compared; statistical difference significance tests were performed on each. To improve standard error calculations from survey data, ATT calculations were used together with a bootstrapping of observations (rerunning calculations for hundreds of rounds through numerical resampling). Standard regression techniques were then performed on the matched sample, controlling for other characteristics and looking at interactions between treatment effects and some baseline characteristics of interest to the analysis.

The last issue to address was the possibility of spillover effects (or what is called contamination in the impact evaluation literature) between intervention and comparison sites. In the case of positive spillovers (e.g. a reduction in criminality in the comparison sites driven by reallocation of some police employees with strengthened capacities from the intervention sites, or through migration of people with new practices in terms of use of security and justice services, with social influence and so on), the total positive impacts would have been underestimated since, without spillovers, the difference in the outcome indicators between intervention and comparison sites would have been larger. The inverse is also true. For that reason, it is preferable that comparison sites not be too close geographically and culturally close to intervention sites, which is not always the case. Some precautions were taken to mitigate this impact. For instance, new migrants were excluded from the sample at endline. In addition, a positive contamination of intervention sites to comparison sites would mean the impact results should be taken as conservative and at the low end of the range of impacts in terms of magnitude of impacts. This is consistent with a cautious approach.

Given practical constraints (lack of re-contact information, available budget and so on), the 2010 households and individuals were not re-interviewed in 2015, which rules out the use of panel data and the possibility of tracking individuals over time. This generated some limitations

for causal analysis. Hence, the impact evaluation relied on two repeated cross-sections of two different samples. This resulted in several consequences:

- DiD approaches were not available at the individual level, but some basic DiD at the aggregate city or communal level was pursued – however, differences in observable characteristics between comparison and intervention individuals at each phase as well as across survey rounds needed to be corrected for.
- Single difference estimations at endline were pursued with available matching and selection correction techniques, but were also applied at baseline, with single differences later reconciled to derive a pseudo DiD estimate.
- 2014 individuals were matched with their 2010 counterparts by city to make sure we compared like with like – that is, the sample of matched 2014 individuals had similar observable characteristics to those in 2010 (at least for time-invariant characteristics). This required a double-matching approach: restricting the two separate 2010 and 2014 samples to those individuals with good matches between comparison and intervention sites. And then, within this restricted sample (which excluded outliers or parts of the population for which an impact estimate was meaningless because no corresponding population could be found), we excluded individuals that could not be compared over time.

The analytical methods used in this impact evaluation design consisted of the following analytical techniques:

- Descriptive DiD estimates across intervention and comparison sites, and over time, from the two repeated cross-sectional samples;
- DiD estimates on the matched samples by round of data collection;
- DiD estimates on the matched samples both by and across rounds of data collection; and
- Regression-based DiD estimates on the matched samples both by and across rounds of data collection, controlling for observable characteristics used in the PSM approach at the time the individuals were interviewed.

Further heterogeneity analyses looked at the outputs of three sets of regressions:

- Regressions wherein the DiD estimate interacted with an asset index (asset-based wealth measure), gender and education levels to determine differential impacts by these characteristics;
- Regressions wherein the DiD estimate interacted with exposure variables (that described individuals' knowledge and experience of the various programme components in the intervention sites) to identify the components of the programme correlated with observed impacts in terms of KAP; and
- Regressions wherein the DiD estimate interacted with the cycle of police training in intervention sites, to make inferences about the relative performance of the different implementation phases of the programme across and by intervention sites.

## Outcome indicators and dimensions of change

We measured the effectiveness of SSAPR in the delivery of improved safety, security and rule of law using a multidimensional index following the Alkire Foster methodology used for multidimensional poverty. Following this method, a binary cut-off was defined for each characteristic considered salient for the measurement of improved security and justice from the KAP indicators collected in both rounds of surveys. A household was considered to be 'faring well' in relation to the characteristic if it was above this cut-off (and considered 'not faring well' if below). Weighted indices, described further below, were then developed from these binary indicators. These indices were then used as continuous outcome measures in statistical analysis.

Alternatively, binary outcome variables were created by defining cut-off points for the index, with '1' specified for households that had surpassed this threshold and '0' for those below it. For the SSAPR overall outcome indicator, the binary cut-off point was defined as follows:


- The proportion of targeted households demonstrating less exposure to criminality and more resilience to safety and security issues through better security and justice institutional capacities and reactivity, individual abilities, knowledge, attitudes and perceptions, within a better security and justice environment.

The term 'greater ability' appears in the wording of the indicator because of how it is computed in practice. Specifically, a household was allocated '1' if it was above the median of the comparison group (taken from the intervention sites) in relation to the AFI and '0' if otherwise. Thus, households demonstrating 'greater ability' were those above the typical household of the comparison group in relation to this index. This core outcome indicator is therefore a relative one, whereas the AFI is an absolute performance indicator related to KAP characteristics.

The characteristics that inform the AFI fall within the following categories:

- Experience with criminality (as a victim and a witness);
- Perception of criminality and insecurity incidence (fears and protection);
- Performance, knowledge and use of security services;
- Accountability of security services;
- Experience with judicial matters;
- Performance, knowledge and use of judicial services.

Those dimensions comprised 29 specific characteristics as detailed in Appendix 1. Following the Alkire Foster method, binary cut-offs were defined for each of the characteristics. A household was coded as being 'non-deprived' if it could be considered as faring reasonably well in relation to the characteristic in question. The particular cut-offs used for each characteristic are presented in the annexes. There was inevitably a degree of arbitrariness in defining such cut-offs. However, the results include some alternative measures, which act as a check on the robustness of the results obtained from applying the cut-offs. Thus, individual indicator-level results are also presented in analysis. Each of the dimensions presented above was then weighted in order to calculate the overall criminality and justice effectiveness measures.



**Figure 15: Breakdown of dimension weightings**

Figure 15 shows dimensions were not weighted equally. Given the importance of security matters within SSAPR, we weighted the security components of the programme at twice the level of justice (65% vs.35%). The institutional performance dimension was weighted equally for security and justice, with similar weights to overall criminality experiences. Perception of criminality was given a 10% weight, as it already relates to and complements the criminality experience component; 15% was given to the accountability component since it also relates to and complements the institutional performance indicator.

The overall performance indicator is the proportion of characteristics the individual scored positively on. A household was defined as having a positive KAP behaviour and experience if *overall* it met the cut-off in at least two-thirds of these characteristics. A performance index was created that takes a value of 1 if the household reached this benchmark for overall KAP; otherwise, it was equal to the proportion of characteristics the household scored positively on.

The last indicator is the KAP global indicator for SSAPR effectiveness, based on whether each individual was doing better in terms of overall KAP than a typical individual in the same area (by city pairs), which is a relative performance measure and is derived by comparing each individual's KAP performance index with the median of the comparison group. In particular, the global indicator takes the value of 1 if the KAP index is greater than the median of the comparison group, and 0 otherwise. In summary, the three key measures of overall programme effectiveness were as follows:

- ④ The base KAP index: the proportion of characteristics for which an individual reached the cut-off for positive KAP behaviour and experience;
- ④ The Alkire Foster KAP index: whether the individual reached the cut-off in at least two-thirds of the characteristics, and otherwise equal to the proportion of characteristics for which they do reach the cut-off; and

- The global KAP indicator, based on whether the AF KAP index is greater than the median of the comparison group or not for each individual.

The last important analytical issue was to ensure the baseline sample was adequate for impact evaluation purposes, and especially that it allowed for PSM techniques.

We derived a matched sample at baseline based on observable characteristics (household composition, education, wealth defined by the asset index and so on), and investigated whether the outcome variables detailed above and the key overall performance KAP indicators were still significantly different. If this were the case, this suggests that, even when controlling for systematic observable differences at baseline between comparison and intervention sites, the outcome indicators were different owing to unobservable exogenous differences in the security and justice environments. Those differences at baseline should then be appropriately accounted for in the DiD approach for the impact evaluation work.

The set of observables retained for the analysis comprised the following variables: household size, number of men, women and children, ethnicity, sex of the respondent, education, parental link with the household head, familial status, orphanhood/immigrant, whether there is any familial relationship with one member working in one of the five security and justice institutions (including courts and justice) and the wealth asset index.

The probit analysis showed individuals interviewed in the intervention sites belonged to households with significantly more women and were a little bit older than in the comparison sites. They were also more likely to come from the major ethnic group represented in the sample (Bantous), had received less basic education (but same number and proportion among those having received secondary and above), were less likely to be household heads (but larger households), were more likely to be orphans and were more likely to have someone in their household currently working in the PNC (but less likely than interviewees in the comparison sites to have family involved in courts and other justice institutions).

These baseline differences were accounted for to derive propensity scores of selection in the comparison versus the intervention sites based on these observable characteristics. The balancing property was satisfied, which indicated good matching performance. Out of the 8,763 individuals for whom we had the available data needed for the probit estimation, we ended up with 8,755 individuals. On this basis, we concluded that the original sample was ideally chosen across all cities and that both comparison and intervention populations were comparable for the purpose of impact evaluation. We verified this by looking at the ATT calculations for the global indicator earlier defined and calculated at baseline accounting for sampling weights. The bootstrapped average treatment effect based on the matched sample and the kernel matching technique gave us a value of -6.5%.

Having a negative difference at baseline that resists matching techniques indicates that SSAPR was implemented in cities with probably more security and justice concerns than the chosen counterfactual ones, no matter how their choice was rationalised. In this instance, only a DiD approach would be able to net out this initial difference for rigorous impact evaluation of SSAPR over time. Therefore, the differences at endline would underestimate the SSAPR causal effects on KAP performance.

## Organisation and interpretation of the results

The overall analysis provided the following results:

- Differences at baseline and endline and DiD for each single outcome characteristic across the whole treatment and control groups and by city pair, and likewise for the three multi-dimensional performance indicators;
- The same performed on the matched sample and subsamples only when PSM is only performed by survey round;
- The same performed on the matched sample when PSM is performed by survey round and then across the two waves (on the pooled data);
- Regression outputs to identify the impact of SSAPR for the main three indicators on the matched sample when matching is done as above on the pooled sample;
- The main DiD regression coefficients for each single characteristic;
- The heterogeneity regressions wherein the DiD impact is also interacted along the wealth, gender and education dimension to look at differential impacts according to population characteristics;
- The project component decomposition regressions, wherein the DiD difference impact is interacted with individual exposure variables one by one and all taken together;
- The cycle decomposition regressions where the DiD impact is differentiated across the three different waves of the project having taken place in different communes at different points in time within each pilot city.

As we used only two repeated cross-sections in a pooled data regression framework, we had to control for baseline indicator levels as well as individuals' performance over time. The causal impact is therefore identified as the regression coefficient of the interacted term between endline and treatment dummies. For interaction terms relevant for the heterogeneity analyses, one needed to further interact the two baseline and control dummies with the variable along which the heterogeneity analysis is performed for additional controls. The interaction between endline and treatment dummies gave an unconditional causal impact, while the three-way interaction terms between endline and treatment dummies together with the heterogeneous variable of interest gave the marginal additional and conditional impact. When performed according to the asset index, for instance, one can see that the poorest individuals experienced a higher magnitude of the impact compared with richer counterparts (but they were starting from lower KAP indicator levels), since the unconditional impact was higher than in the base regressions whereas the conditional impact was negatively correlated with wealth.

**Table 10: Overview of characteristics, cut-offs and weightings indicators by dimension**

Dimension	Characteristic	Cut-off: an individual is non-deprived if ...	Weight of each characteristic
Experience with criminality	Victim	Not victim of any murder, burglary, theft of an important asset (livestock, harvest, vehicle), sexual harassment, any violent aggression in the street or public (excludes domestic violence), imprisonment and excision	14.00%
	Witness	Not witness of more than one of the above	6.00%
Perception of criminality and insecurity incidence	Fears	Number of feared issues is less than or equal to 3 (out of 18 possible)	4.00%
	Feeling safe against theft and attack	Answer is yes	1.50%
	Reasons for feeling unsafe	Unrelated to security services or feeling safe	1.50%
	Feeling safe against theft and attack city	Answer is yes	1.50%
	Reasons for feeling unsafe	Unrelated to security services or feeling safe	1.50%
	Knowledge	Knowledge of at least 3 official institutions out of 4	2.00%
Performance, knowledge and use of security services	Knowledge of police district	Main institution responsible for security-keeping at district level is PNC	1.00%
	Knowledge of police city	Main institution responsible for security-keeping at city level is PNC	1.00%
	Feeling <i>vis-à-vis</i> security institution	Positive feeling in at least 3 out of the 4 institutions (and knowledge)	2.00%
	Knowledge of institutional roles	Knowledge of official roles of at least 3 out of the 4 institutions	2.00%
	Recourse to institutions	Use of public security services in all 4 hypothetical cases (violence and rape)	3.00%
	Experience and appreciation	More positive appreciation than negatives or no use of any institution	3.00%
	Performance district	Self-perceived performance of PNC at district level is at least quite satisfactory	1.50%

<b>Dimension</b>	<b>Characteristic</b>	<b>Cut-off: an individual is non-deprived if ...</b>	<b>Weight of each characteristic</b>
	Performance city	Self-perceived performance of PNC at city level is at least quite satisfactory	1.50%
	Time to go to police post station	Existence in the district and less than one hour by walking	3.00%
	Frequency of police patrols	Sees police patrols sometimes or often	3.00%
	Cooperation of PNC and local communities	Self-perceived cooperation is deemed as good	3.00%
Accountability of security services	Illegal payments and bribes	Has not paid any bribe to any policemen over the past 12 months	3.00%
	Corruption of police	Self-perceived integrity or clueless	3.00%
	Call centre	Existence or availability of a police call centre that is reachable	3.00%
	Knowledge	Knowledge of judges and other public justice officers	5.00%
	Feeling	Positive feeling (respect, confidence)	5.00%
Performance, knowledge and use of justice services	Performance of formal justice institutions	Rather or very satisfied with the formal judicial system	5.00%
	Performance of informal justice institutions	Rather or very satisfied with the informal judicial system	5.00%
	Willingness to use judicial institutions	Yes when needed	5.00%
Experience with judicial matters	Exposure to judicial institutions	Yes over the past 3 years within the household	5.00%
	Satisfaction with experience and outcomes	Not applicable or not unsatisfied	5.00%



# Annex B: Evidence supporting impact stories

## Organisation of annexes

### Organisation of impact story annexes

Each impact story begins with a diagram of a more detailed ToC for the target group. As explained above this, describes the sequence of key activities and results, the causal links between results and the causal link assumptions at each level.





After the diagram, we present the overall results of data analysis, indicating to what degree evidence suggests the results occurred and the causal link assumptions were realised. This is followed by an assessment of the strength of evidence as to whether this causal package was likely sufficient to cause the observed result, or whether claims can be made that the causal package indeed caused the result.

A final section includes an assessment of the evidence on the degree to which these changes might be sustained after the programme ends based on evidence around changes to policy and institutional reforms.

The impact stories are drafted in narrative format to improve readability among different stakeholder groups and summarise the main conclusions and evidence within each story. The evaluation, however, drew on a number of data sources, as described in the methodology section above. As a result, we have included an annex for each impact story, which presents the body of evidence drawn from within each impact story for readers interested in a more comprehensive assessment of the impact for each ToC impact story.

### Strength of evidence assessments within ToCs

Each impact story begins with a diagrammatic nested ToC outlining the main impact pathway from the SSAPR intervention to improved wellbeing for the population. Within these diagrams, we use different colours to represent the strength of available evidence on whether each change occurred or causal link assumption was realised:


-  **GREEN** indicates evidence available confirming a change occurred or an assumption was fully realised;
-  **RED** indicates evidence available disproving a change or that an assumption was not realised;
-  **AMBER** indicates weak evidence for/against a change occurring or an assumption being realised;
-  **BLUE** indicates that no/little evidence is available thus no conclusions can be drawn.

### Sustainability aspects of nested ToCs within impact stories

The ToC diagrams at the beginning of each story also include an assessment of sustainability at the assumption level. The sustainability of short-term changes instigated by the programme is a critical assumption in each of the actor-based ToCs. As such, an assessment of emerging evidence around the change in policy and institutional reform caused by the programme is embedded within each impact story.

For each level of assumption within the impact stories, we include a sustainability consideration. Evidence is analysed and presented on the degree to which the change occurred during the programme implementing period, and the degree to which emerging evidence suggests this change will be sustained after the implementation period ends.

## Police Support Programme impact annex



**Figure 16. Nested ToC for Police Support Programme**

This annex presents the detailed evidence linking SSAPR interventions to changes in police capacity and practice in pilot sites. Prior to the beginning of the programme, communities in SSAPR pilot sites viewed the police as not only ineffective but also key drivers of local insecurity. SSAPR’s supply-side interventions aimed to address these issues by improving police capacity to respond to public needs.

### SSAPR training and equipment was provided as planned

**There is strong evidence SSAPR training was implemented as planned.** The programme identified barriers as lack of police capacity, including both lack of/poor police training and lack of physical infrastructure and equipment. Police motivation was not specifically addressed in the training curriculum or programme materials at this time.

Police training was structured around the 3P/3R principles<sup>33</sup> translated as proximity, partnership, prevention, problem-solving, accountability and respect for human rights. Despite being provided to only a specific cadre of PdP trainees, these principles are understood as

<sup>33</sup> The PdP approach diverges from traditional community policing models in that it goes beyond operational, tactical level interventions and emphasises crime prevention. In the PdP philosophy, responsibility for crime prevention falls to both the police and the communities in which they serve.

relevant to *all aspects* of policing, including day-to-day engagement with the public and investigation of serious crimes.

Cycle 1 PdP began in 2012, with Cycles 2 and 3 implemented in the following two years. Training was delivered through SSAPR staff as well as SSAPR-trained PdP trainers, 55 of whom were trained as part of SSAPR. Table 2 illustrates the number of trainees in each cycle.

Table 11. Number of police trained disaggregated by cycle and SSAPR pilot site

	<b>Matadi</b>	<b>Kananga</b>	<b>Bukavu</b>
<b>Cycle 1</b>	272	274	220
<b>Cycle 2</b>	262	298	245
<b>Cycle 3</b>	235	298	245
<b>Total</b>	769	870	710

According to PdP officers, PdP training covered a range of topics. The table below highlights these areas of content, as outlined by PdP officers.

Table 12.: Content of PDP training

<b>Basic training</b>	<b>On-the-job training</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• L'approche PdP</li> <li>• Les notions sur le droit (droit pénal, droit spécial, droit et protection d'enfance droit humanitaire international ...)</li> <li>• Les renseignements généraux</li> <li>• La psychologie du commandement</li> <li>• L'éthique et la déontologie policière</li> <li>• Les techniques de gestion des masses</li> <li>• Les techniques d'enquête criminelle</li> <li>• La rédaction des procès-verbaux</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Des recyclages sur les notions de PdP et des droits humains</li> <li>• La formation sur les droits de l'enfant</li> <li>• La formation sur la violence basée sur le genre</li> <li>• La formation en Informatique</li> <li>• Formation sur les techniques de gestion des élections</li> </ul>

In FGDs, PdP officers recounted that they joined PdP training through a number of different avenues. Across communes, these officers most commonly mentioned that they were selected to take the test and ultimately join the training by their superiors. In Bukavu, respondents noted that officers with higher intellectual levels and better behaviour were selected. Respondents in Kananga mentioned that they opted to join the PdP out of interest in the training opportunity. However, PdP officers in Matadi said they had less choice regarding their participation in the PdP. One officer in Matadi commune described this:

*C'était une obligation. Nous étions dans des unités de la PNC, on nous obligé d'intégrer la PdP, si tu refuses on bloque ton salaire. Moi par exemple, on menaçait de me déloger du camp mais j'ai accepté d'aller en formation pour sauvegarder mon logement. Au début, lors de la 1ère promotion, on se basait sur le niveau d'études ; mais après ils ont pris tout le monde, même les zoulous [un terme local pour désigner les bandits de la rue].*

To support the implementation of PdP training in day-to-day police work, SSAPR also trained a small number of coaches per province, plus two trained on SGBV. Coaches were first identified by their superiors for competency testing; those who passed the test were then trained as coaches, from whom a smaller group was selected to become coaches. In Bukavu, 90 officers were selected for testing, 45 for training and 13 as coaches. In each of Kananga and Matadi, nine people were selected as coaches. Coaches participating in KIIs described their work as aimed largely at supporting PdP officers to implement the PdP approach, including PDP principles, operations administration, sexual and gender-based violence, etc., and was implemented in the form of mentoring/accompaniment.

Programme reporting indicates that coaches visited commissariats (*ciats*) and sub-commissariats (*sous-ciats*) regularly. In Bukavu, coaches made 90 visits to *ciats* and 340 visits to *sous-ciats* between January and June 2014. Coaches across locations confirmed had visited *ciats* and *sous-ciats* multiple times a week. In interviews, coaches recounted that all trained coaches were still in their roles, but were sometimes asked to do other work in the PNC, particularly training, which takes them away from coaching full time.

**There is strong evidence that equipment was provided as planned. Similarly, there is strong evidence that construction was carried out in Cycle 1 and 2 communes as planned, but did not occur as planned in Cycle 3.** The other major focus of SSAPR's supply-side activities was investment in physical infrastructure and equipment to improve police capacity to respond to public needs.

The majority of this investment focused on constructing and equipping new police buildings at the district, *ciat* and *sous-ciat* levels. After a series of unexpected delays, construction of police stations commenced in 2010 in Cycle 1 communes, extending to Cycle 2 communes in later years. Owing to delays, no construction was carried out in Cycle 3 communes.

Table 13 shows the number and type of building completed in each location.

**Table 13. SSAPR construction by location**

	Matadi			Kananga			Bukavu		
	Distri ct	Cia t	Sous- ciat	Distri ct	Cia t	Sous- ciat	Distri ct	Cia t	Sous- ciat
<b>Cycle 1</b>	0	1	3	1	1	4	1	1	3
<b>Cycle 2</b>	1	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	3
<b>Cycle 3</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>

Locations of new buildings were selected to ensure maximum convenience and accessibility for their communities, with areas without any posts prioritised. Independent reviewers were impressed with the quality of the buildings, describing them as *'modern, smart and spacious [...] that often stand in stark contrast to their surroundings (and other government buildings)'* (ISSAT, 2013).

SSAPR united a diverse range of local, provincial and national representatives to ensure C3C (command centre control and coordination) unit was operational. Internal project monitoring suggests the C3C is functioning well, with the head of C3C increasingly showing leadership and taking responsibility for the centre with technical assistance from SSAPR no longer required.

SSAPR also provided equipment to address additional barriers that prevent police from responding efficiently to public security needs, including a lack of transportation and communications equipment. The programme procured 10 police vehicles and 100 motorbikes to allow police to respond quicker to public demands and patrol larger areas within the SSAPR pilot communities. SSAPR also aimed to help the PdP overcome lack of funds to pay for petrol by paying fuel costs for the first few months of the programme, during which time measures were put in place to ensure police posts budgeted for these in the future. As of late 2014, internal project monitoring reported that police in certain communes were no longer dependent on SSAPR for vehicle operating costs.<sup>34</sup>

In addition to construction and equipment procurement, three provincial garages were built (one in each pilot city) to house the newly procured police vehicles (10 vehicles and 100 motorbikes). By the third year of the programme, these garages were fully equipped and operational, with a mechanic in each to ensure the equipment was properly maintained. Provincial garages submit fleet management reports to the Kinshasa based *chef de garage* on a monthly basis.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>34</sup> SSAPR has been working at the national and provincial levels of government to improve budgeting for *ciat* operating costs

<sup>35</sup> PSP/CCOSS (2013) 'Quarterly Report'. Logframe Indicator 3.2.

Table 14. SSAPR equipment provided for each province

SSAPR cycle	Radios	Mobile base	Fixed base
Cycle 1	69	8	5
Cycle 2	40	8	5
Cycle 3	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	109	16	10

The programme provided handheld radios and support to transmissions systems that enable police to communicate and coordinate responses between different *ciats*. The new *ciats* and *sous-ciats* were all equipped with furniture, computers, typewriters and stationery procured by the programme.

Discussions with community members confirm that these materials were provided and the important purpose they serve. One group described this change,

*Today the police are well equipped. They have modes of transport, communication and clean uniforms, they've acquired presentable buildings and sufficient equipment (FGD, MINASE, Kananga I).*

As such, evidence is strong that PdP training, construction and equipment provision largely occurred as planned.

## SSAPR was effective in improving police capacity through PdP training

**Available evidence suggests the skills of PdP officers improved as a result of PdP training.** Although test results for PdP officers before and after training were not available to the evaluation team, in FGDs PdP officers universally spoke positively of the PdP training, noting it had improved their knowledge and skills. One PdP officer in Bukavu described this, saying, *'Cette formation a renforcé ma capacité intellectuelle et professionnelle. Avant quand j'étais dans la PNC je ne savais pas beaucoup de choses, je posais des actes par ignorance.'* Similarly, PdP officers in Kananga also mentioned the importance of this training.

*La formation nous a été beaucoup plus intéressante. Nous venions des différents horizons. Nous avons été fixes ensemble sur les choses à faire. Nous avons beaucoup amélioré nos connaissances dans beaucoup de domaines.*

Results gathered from PdP officers as part of the RARE study confirm this, as 62.9% of PdP officers who felt positively about the PdP approach attributed these positive feelings to the fact that they 'improved their knowledge of the PdP approach'.

Communities also confirmed the importance of the PdP training in providing new skills to the police. One student in Bukavu describes this, noting, *'There is a realisation among the PdP,*

*they have been sensitised to behave well and to collaborate well with the population. The real factor in this change is the PdP training.'*

Understanding the factors driving the success of this training also requires assessing the training these officers would have received in the absence of PdP training. One PdP officer in Matadi reflected on this contrast, noting,

*Oui cette formation était très utile parce que nous avons appris beaucoup des choses ; pour certains c'était même la 1ère fois de se retrouver dans un centre de formation ; en tant que policier.*

This contrast also applied to the training currently available to non-PdP officers. In FGDs, non-PdP officers noted their training varied substantially: in some cases, they receive initial training with little follow-up, while in other cases they did not receive any training at all. One non-PdP officer in Kananga described this:

*Nous n'avons pas eu la chance de bénéficier des formations car nous n'avions pas de numéros Matricule. Ceux qui ont bénéficié des formations de renforcement des capacités (y compris la PdP) sont ceux qui avaient déjà leurs numéros matricule.*

Despite this contrast, PdP and non-PdP officers also mentioned that the improvements brought about by the PdP training had encouraged some other members of the PNC to also work according to PdP principles. One non-PdP officer described this change:

*Vers les années 2009, avant la mise en œuvre du Processus PdP ; les arrestations se faisaient avec répression mais actuellement, en observant les méthodes d'action de la PdP, nous commençons à changer nous aussi. Nous sommes une même police, nous ne pouvons pas marcher à contre-courant de la réforme.*

However, despite this positive indication, more evidence is necessary to confirm significant impacts of the PdP training on the skills of non-PdP officers.

**The evidence is largely strong that providing equipment to police allowed them to be more responsive.** Members of the PdP commonly mentioned the positive impact of this equipment in interviews, including one officer in Matadi, who noted that,

*Les équipements qui nous ont été dotés par le Programme SSAPR, ont été d'une grande utilité surtout dans l'amélioration de la qualité de notre travail.*

Community members described the improved buildings and mobility equipment the PdP had received through SSAPR as integral to helping the PdP consolidate their capacity gains. When discussing the difference between 2009 and 2014, respondents described how previously

*La police de 2009 n'était pas bien équipée elle vivait dans des mauvaises et déplorables conditions qui étaient à la base de leur état fragile, mais actuellement grâce à la réforme de la police (PdP), elle est dotée du matériel roulant, motos, véhicules, habillement etc. Le meilleur constat est l'augmentation des bureaux du sous commissariat uniquement pour la police de proximité. En suite la population peut constater de cas de vente de tenues chez d'autres policiers et leur meilleur équipement c'est la forme comme à la PdP (Kananga I, FGD, Motards).*

This assertion was widely supported across SSAPR pilot sites and diverse focus groups.

*Aujourd'hui la PdP est bien équipée. Elle possède des moyens de transport, de communication, des tenues qui les rendent propres, ils ont acquis des bâtiments présentables, le mobilier suffisant. Les choses qui ont changé sont : les bâtiments présentables, les moyens de transport (véhicules et motos), les moyens de communication (phonies, téléphones, etc.), les ordinateurs, les tenues, etc. (FGD, MINASE, Kananga I).*

Indeed, the improved police facilities and equipment were widely remarked on, in particular in reference to improved responsiveness:

*Today, things have changed – the PdP officers have motorcycles, vehicles, Motorola (for communication) that help them respond in time to the security needs of the population. Once you call them, even at midnight, they are capable of intervening. They mobilise their vehicles and come quickly (Kananga, Students 1).*

A recent ISSAT review suggests these positive changes extended beyond what would typically be associated with the construction of physical infrastructure, noting that,

*Internally they (the buildings) offer police officers positive working conditions and are a source of pride, while externally they also stand as a symbol to a state that is both more present and more benign.<sup>36</sup>*

In addition, to their symbolic value, establishing more police posts has improved community perceptions of police responsiveness. One respondent in Bukavu described the importance of increasing the number of police stations in shifting these dynamics,

*En 2009 le travail de la police ne se faisait pas sentir au sein de la société. En cas de problème et de dénonciation on fréquentait moins voire rarement la police. Le Poste de la police était très éloigné de la population. Mais aujourd'hui avec la présence des postes de la police presque partout, le travail de la police est perceptible par les communautés. En cas de problème on va directement à la PdP. On hésite plus à aller dénoncer le coupable de crimes au poste de la police plus proche (Bukavu, Students 1).*

The ISSAT reviewers also commented how increased demand for police posts had become a proxy indicator of improved trust between the public and police:

*It (the positive change) is best demonstrated by the fact that in some communes the public is now complaining that there are still not enough officers or sous-commissariats, and demanding that certain areas at the very least receive a police post – views that would have been rarely heard 4-5 years ago.<sup>37</sup>*

Despite the positive impact of police equipment and buildings described by police and members of the community, in FGDs both PdP and non-PdP officers commonly cited lack of sufficient equipment as an ongoing challenge to their ability to carry out their job functions.

As such, it may be reasonable to conclude that the need for logistics and other equipment within the PNC is higher in SSAPR intervention sites is higher than the programme could respond to, although further research would be necessary to verify this.

---

<sup>36</sup> ISSAT (2013) Annual Review.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.



**There is strong evidence to confirm police have improved ability to collaborate with members of the community.** Community-level respondents repeatedly recounted examples of improved collaboration between PdP officers and pilot communities. They highlighted that, in 2009, communities were reluctant to work with the police, seeing them as drivers of insecurity rather than a solution to it. A female respondent from Matadi described the change process in terms of both police and criminal elements:

*In 2009, the police collaborated with criminals, and we the population were considered their playground where they could come and steal whatever they wanted [...] It was difficult for us to take any matters to the police because they would not find a solution to your problem. However, today these problems don't exist anymore. The police are now at our service – the problems we take to them are dealt with impartially; they don't collaborate with criminals anymore. (Matadi, Trade Group 1).*

Improved collaboration provides the PdP with better information, improving officers' ability to address and prevent crime. Although seemingly distinct processes, building community trust in the PdP and improving their ability to respond were cited as measures that together aim to address the critical lack of community confidence in the PNC.

Similarly, the KAP study revealed individuals in SSAPR pilot sites were 45.7% more satisfied with police–public cooperation than the comparison populations at baseline.

This change was also observed by the CSRP, who noted,

*Le rapprochement entre les policiers et les habitants dans les communes pilotes a dissipé l'antagonisme qui a longtemps caractérisé leurs rapports avant l'expérimentation.<sup>38</sup>*

It should be noted that, while the 2013 ToC refers to police–public–local authority cooperation, community-level respondents rarely referenced the role of local authorities, highlighting instead the relevance of police and community–police coordination in improving security.

## Assumptions linking activities to improved police capacity

The police ToC suggests addressing critical areas of weaknesses through training, equipment and construction provision will improve overall police capacity and ability to respond. The research team identified the following assumptions essential for validating the logical connection and this overall causal package. The remainder of this section discusses these assumptions and presents evidence on how they were met.

### The police are willing to listen and learn

Available evidence partially confirms this assumption. The fact that a number of police in Kananga and Matadi opted to join the PdP based on their interest in training suggests these officers would have been willing to listen and learn. This fact is similarly reinforced in some locations where PdP training was reportedly oversubscribed. However in Matadi, police

---

<sup>38</sup> CSRP '3eme Rapport Global de Suivi et Evaluation de l'Expérimentation de la Police de Proximité'.

officers faced consequences if they did not join the PdP when asked to; this suggests the willingness of these officers to learn from this training may have been lower.

## Funds were used to acquire necessary infrastructure and equipment

The research team is satisfied that funds allocated to the programme by DFID were used to acquire infrastructure and equipment. Internal programme documents provide sufficient proof that funds were used as planned. However, a full assessment of programme accounting would be necessary to confirm this, which is beyond the scope of this evaluation.

## Some form of adequate compensation seen for likely reduced income from bribes

There is weak evidence that adequate compensation was given to PdP officers for reduced income from bribes. PdP officers confirm they received salaries similar to those of members of other PNC cadres. While these cadres had become accustomed to supplementing this small salary with bribes and other income from the community, the PdP were explicitly expected not to carry out any such harassment. This income loss was not highlighted as a specific concern in programme design or implementation documents.

In FGDs, a number of PdP officers noted this loss of income was a significant factor driving other officers to leave the PdP and join other ranks of the PNC. One PdP officer in Kananga described this consideration:

*Pour beaucoup d'entre eux, dès qu'il y a une opportunité qui se présente, ils abandonnent la PdP. 'peut-être ailleurs, nous pouvons avoir quelque chose pour nourrir nos famille' disent-ils.*

PdP members in Bukavu confirm this point, saying that those who deserted 'ont intégré d'autres unités de la PNC pour gagner l'argent'.

Despite this lack of compensation, a few officers suggested duty and increased respect from the community for participating in the PdP did provide a small form of compensation for PdP officers. One respondent described this dynamic; *'Moi par contre, ce qui m'intéresse, c'est la vision moderne de la PdP qui me motive de rester ; je suis le produit de la PdP, je ne peux pas partir.'* Though positive, this was often a minority view, with other officers commonly noting, *'compte tenu des conditions sociales très précaires dans lesquelles nous vivons, dès la 1ère occasion si je trouve une ouverture je vais ailleurs'.*

As such, the available evidence suggests this assumption is largely not satisfied.


## There is no significant attrition of participants

Although FGDs indicated attrition of PdP trainees posed a concern for the programme, the evidence suggests this attrition occurred following the PdP training. The decision to attend the PdP training, respondents noted, was driven by the hope both that the PdP would provide them new opportunities and that they would earn more money as a result. As such, this assumption can be validated.

## Changes in police practice

**Evidence from the community suggests police practice has improved as expected in the ToC in terms of performance, behaviour and responsiveness.** These improvements in skills and capacity meant police were better able to respond to security needs of citizens as they arise. This includes both responding when they are called while carrying out their professional duties and engaging proactively with communities in crime prevention activities.

Figure 17 indicates that a higher proportion of community members in intervention sites reported seeing police patrols in their neighbourhoods as compared with non-intervention sites in 2014 as compared with 2010. This included nearly a 20% decrease in the proportion of respondents reporting they ‘never see police patrols’.




**Figure 17. KAP survey respondents reporting frequency of police patrols in their neighbourhood, by site and by survey year**

When asked how this change in police performance had manifested, the top three responses were as follows:

- 🔄 Police arrest criminals.
- 🔄 Police harass the population less than before.
- 🔄 Police listen to community concerns.

Respondents in the KAP survey were also asked to describe what explains these positive changes.

The figure below presents these results.



**Figure 18. Respondents' explanations of what is responsible for positive change in the police**

The KAP survey findings also show 42.8% more individuals in SSAPR intervention sites reported police performance in their city as satisfactory or higher, as compared with individuals in comparison sites. This proportion grew to 58.3% more individuals in SSAPR sites than in comparison sites when considering police performance at the commune level. This improvement is particularly significant as these figures represent the greatest area of difference between treatment and control sites over time across all result areas investigated in the KAP. Table 15 shows public attitudes towards the PNC when considering members of the PNC in general alongside the PdP in particular.

**Table 15: Percentage of population in SSPAR intervention sites in 2014 who have positive attitudes about the PNC and the PdP**

% of respondents who agreed with the following statements	PNC	PdP
Police have an attitude of assistance to the population (in the streets)	54.4	69.1
Police respond rapidly to demands for assistance?	43.6	59.1

**When getting into detailed data from the KAP, however, the evidence is more mixed.** Table 16 reports data from the endline KAP survey on perceived satisfaction with police services in their neighbourhood and city. Interestingly, community members in SSAPR intervention sites reported less satisfaction overall than respondents in control groups; however, the overall change in satisfaction from baseline to endline in intervention sites has increased.

**Table 16. Percentage of respondents reporting satisfaction with the performance of the PNC in their neighbourhood and city**

	Pilot sites (N=4,384)		Comparison sites (N=4,393)	
	Neighbourhood	City	Neighbourhood	City
Satisfied	33.2	33.7	49.6	50.9
Not satisfied	60.3	62.4	46.8	47.2
Don't know	6.5	4	3.6	1.9

Table 17 presents the percentage of respondents among those reporting being not satisfied with the police according to the top five reasons for dissatisfaction. The data overwhelmingly indicate that those who are not satisfied with the police attribute this to them not being paid well. This may be linked to poor behaviours among the police, which promote dissatisfaction among community members.

**Table 17. Percentage of respondents reporting top five reasons for dissatisfaction with the police**

Reasons for levels of non-satisfaction with the police	%
Too few police officers	20.0
Police are not well trained	42.5
Police officers are not well paid	89.6
Police have insufficient vehicles and infrastructure	32.6
Police are not well educated	25.1

Among those reporting being satisfied with the police, **proved image** in the community.

**Table 18** presents the percentage of respondents according to the top five reasons for their satisfaction. The data indicate those who are satisfied with the police attribute this to their improved image in the community.

**Table 18. Percentage of respondents who agree with the following statements about the police, by type of research site**

	Treatment (N=4,384)	Control (N=4,393)
Police respond rapidly to demands for assistance	41.3	57.4
Police exhibit a positive attitude towards helping community members	53.1	67.2
Police vehicles are in a good state	55.8	43.4
Police have effective communication mechanisms	51.7	49.2
Police are viewed positively in the community	72.9	71.1

Qualitative evidence gathered at the population level further substantiates these improvements in responsiveness.

*Today in 2014, once the PdP officers are called, no matter the time of day, they intervene quickly and on time. Even without being called, they come to help once they hear someone is being threatened. With the PdP, intervention is quick, assured and without cost. PdP officers do their best to resolve problems (Kananga, Students 1).*

Similar findings were echoed across all groups participating in ToC monitoring, further substantiating that the community had observed and appreciated changes in police practice. This progress was also noted by external project reviews:

*The Police continues to adapt its working methods according to the six fundamental principles of the police de proximité [...] and in terms of working more closely with the public. Trained officers use peaceful methods, inform and advise the public.<sup>39</sup>*

Police officials and local leaders who participated in our research attributed these changes specifically to the PdP training.

**There is strong evidence gathered at the population level that police and specifically PdP behaviour has improved.** The strongest evidence in this regard was gathered from the population. The KAP survey revealed respondents in SSAPR pilot sites were 58.3% more satisfied with the performance of the police than comparison populations were at baseline. Respondents explained this change was based on the PdP’s positive manner of interacting with the community, willingness to carry out tasks without bribes and reduced collaboration with criminals. One respondent in Bukavu described how these changes had resulted in increased trust and mutual respect between communities and police:

<sup>39</sup> Review team translation. The original reads ‘la police continue à adapter sa manière de travailler conformément aux six principes fondamentaux de la police de proximité ... et de se rapprocher de la population. Les policiers formés emploient des méthodes pacifiques, informent et conseillent la population’ (CSRP, p.4).

*The PdP are police in service of the population. They settle issues with honesty, react and without asking for bribes. They are closer to the population and listen to us [...] Before 2009, going to the police could just as easily incriminate the victim [as the perpetrator]. Those police would not go to the scene of a crime without first receiving a sum of money. (Kananga, Trade Group 2).*

Other respondents described this improvement as a shift away from an exploitative mind-set towards one committed to making their community a safer place, as well as a reduction in police brutality, abuse and crime. Population-level feedback on changes brought about by the PdP was nearly universally positive, summarised as follows:

*En 2014, l'amélioration de la conscience de la police grâce aux formations reçues ainsi que les nouvelles conditions de travail de la PdP ont redus la police plus actives pour le mieux des intérêts de la population. Les policiers répondent promptement et efficacement aux demandes de la population.*

Another focus group respondent stated how the PdP training had changed the mentality of the police to be more focused on serving the community:

*Aujourd'hui nous observons la réactivité de la police bien qu'elle doit encore s'améliorer. La police s'efforce petit à petit à répondre aux besoins de sécurité de la communauté par l'application de la formation reçue. Cependant certaines unités de la police ont défaillies. Par exemple, la police donne les numéros d'urgence qu'on peut appeler en cas de besoin ou de nécessité et un jour, à Nguba, on avait appelé le numéro que la police avait communiqué, le policier qui avait l'appareil était en break, il nous avait communiqué un autre numéro que nous avons appelé et nous étions très satisfaits (FGD, students, Bukavu II).*

External reviews from both CSR and ISSAT also remarked on this positive change in police behaviour. ISSAT provides more detail, saying,

*There was universal agreement among interviewees that relationships between the police and the public had improved substantially in areas where PdP is being implemented [...] most interviewees also emphasised that relationships between the police and local authorities had improved (though there are some difficulties). This was attributed both to formal mechanisms for these three-way interactions such as the Forums de Quartier, but also to more general improvements in the way the Police acted, leading the public to respond with greater trust and to be more ready to interact with the Police.<sup>40</sup>*

Similarly, the CSR reviews noted how police trained in the PdP approach interacted positively with the community using peaceful means:


*Trained officers have understood that the PdP approach is suitable for implementing the Police's mission to protect people's security and property, and that their behaviour (knowledge, skills, actions) meets public expectations. They state that they are proud to work in this new manner.<sup>41</sup>*

---

<sup>40</sup> ISSAT (2013).

<sup>41</sup> Review team translation. The original reads: "les policiers formés ont pris conscience que l'approche police de proximité convient à l'exercice de la mission de la police de sécurisation des personnes et de leurs biens et

The KAP survey provides further insight into the nature of this change from the perspective of the population as evidenced in the graph below.



**Figure 19. Perceptions on changes to the level of performance of the PNC over past 3 years**

**Analysis of KAP data by programme cycle also support this claim.** The PSP component of the programme was rolled out in three cycles. Thus respondents living in Cycle 1 communes were exposed to PdP-trained officers for the longer period of time. Analysis of changes in positive community perceptions regarding the police ('improved KAP') through three different multidimensional indices<sup>42</sup> by cycle provides insights into the effect of different levels of exposure to PSP interventions. officers on the PdP approach.





Figure 20 displays these results. Importantly, infrastructure and equipment were available only for Cycle 1 and Cycle 2 communes. During Cycle 3, the PSP component only conducted trainings of police officers on the PdP approach.

qu'ainsi leurs comportements (connaissances, aptitudes, pratiques) répondent aux attentes de la population. Ils déclarent être fiers de travailler suivant ce nouveau mode. (CSRP, p. 11)

<sup>42</sup> See SSAPR Endline KAP Study Report for a detailed explanation of multidimensional indices.






**Figure 20. DiD impact of SSAPR disaggregated by cycle**

Unexpectedly, this analysis shows that individuals in Cycle 1 communes experienced the highest levels of KAP improvement across intervention sites over time, as they had the longest exposure to the programme. This result was consistent across all three indices.


However, across all three indices, individuals in Cycle 3 communes experienced slightly higher levels of KAP improvement over time than individuals in Cycle 2 communes. This is particularly notable as only PdP training was carried out in Cycle 3 communes, unlike Cycle 2 communes, which received both training and new infrastructure. These results suggest infrastructure improvement was not as important as the changes in police behaviour brought about through training.

**There is mixed evidence linking changes in police corruption with positive changes in police practice over the SSAPR intervention period.** Findings from the KAP survey suggest community perceptions that the police are corrupt did not change significantly over the course of the SSAPR implementation period, with perceptions in intervention sites of corruption consistently higher than in comparison sites. At the same time, a slightly higher percentage of respondents in SSAPR intervention sites reported reduced police corruption over time, as compared with fewer respondents reporting reduced corruption in comparison sites. Figure 21 presents the results of these indicators.



**Figure 21. KAP survey respondents reporting perceptions to changes in police corruption**

Further analysis confirms this observation. For instance, in sites where more individuals had not paid a bribe in the previous 12 months in 2014 as compared with 2010<sup>43</sup> there was not necessarily a positive trend in perceived improvements in corrupt practices among the police. This may be a finding in itself, indicating the deeply rooted acceptance of bribery within these six research sites and its perceived disconnect with either overall corruption or perceptions of police performance. Figure 22 presents these indicators disaggregated by city pair. DiD shows the difference in changes between each comparison site between 2014 and 2010.<sup>44</sup>



**Figure 22: Relationship between perceived corruption and non-payment of bribes in previous 12 months**

The above figure demonstrates respondents in Kananga experienced the greatest improvement in public perceptions of corruption. In Bukavu, most positive change occurred related to not paying bribes within the last 12 months.

Overall, however, the KAP study found 5.9% more people in SSAPR intervention sites as compared with non-intervention sites had not paid a bribe to a member of the police in the past 12 months. Qualitative data collected through ToC monitoring highlight a similar level of improvement:

*The PdP are police in service of the population. They settle issues with honesty, react and without asking for bribes. They are closer to the population and listen to us [...] Before 2009, going to the police could just as easily incriminate the victim [as the perpetrator]. Those police would not go to the scene of a crime without first receiving a sum of money (Kananga, Trade Group 2).*

In discussions, many respondents also highlighted that, in some cases, positive improvements in police practice have slipped backward owing to poor salaries and the low socioeconomic status of the police, increasing the likelihood of corrupt behaviour.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>43</sup> This was the case in Mbuji-Mai and Matadi.

<sup>44</sup> City pairs refer to the matched control design used as part of the KAP endline study. Each of the three pilot sites, Matadi, Kananga and Bukavu, was matched with a comparison site – Boma, Mbuji-Maye and Goma, respectively. See Endline KAP report for a more detailed explanation of study design.

<sup>45</sup> These factors are addressed in the sustainability section of this report as part of the overview ToC impact story.

## Assumptions around changes to police practice

### Rewards seen as compensating for power and income loss

Available evidence only partially substantiates this assumption. On the positive side, a number of PdP officers specifically cited the opportunity to receive training as an important element keeping them in the PdP. One officer described this :

*Le fait que les PdP disposent davantage d'opportunités pour les formations en renforcement des capacités (informatique, droit de l'homme, OPJ, violence basée sur le genre) nous encourage à rester au sein du corps de la PdP.*

Additionally, other members of the PdP cited their interest in 'serving their country' and applying their new knowledge of working with the community as attractive reasons for remaining in the PdP. This sentiment was particularly noticeable in Kadutu commune of Bukavu. Similarly, PdP officers, unlike members of the broader PNC, commonly described themselves with a sense of pride, noting they had better skills and interacted more effectively with the population. This pride and membership in the PdP may constitute a further reward for PdP officers.

However, in FGDs across all sites, PdP officers repeatedly highlighted their poor socioeconomic situation, particularly compared with other elements of the PNC, as a challenge to remaining in the PdP and a reason they would leave in the future. This suggests that, to many officers, changes in skills and membership in the PdP are not enough to compensate for their poor socioeconomic situation.

### New infrastructure and equipment managed/maintained

Available evidence indicates this assumption can be only partially confirmed. According to KAP survey respondents in SSAPR intervention sites in our 2014 survey, 62% of community-level respondents agreed PNC police vehicles were in a good state; 71% agreed PdP police vehicles were in good state.

However, other officers noted vehicles provided by SSAPR were no longer available to them. One officer in Bukavu described this problem stemming from a lack of maintenance:

*Le véhicule et les motos nous ont beaucoup aidées dans des patrouilles quand SSAPR nous approvisionnait en carburant. Mais depuis qu'il y a eu coupure d'appui, les réservoirs sont rouillés et tout est en panne.*

Another PDP officer in Kananga noted their superior officers now used their vehicles:

*Les engins roulants fournis par le SSAPR (motos et véhicules etc.) nous facilitaient la mobilité pour des interventions rapides. Mais, fort malheureusement, ils ont été par la hiérarchie réorientés à d'autres fins.*

Maintenance records necessary to further confirm this were not available to the evaluation team.

## Police leadership visibly supportive and senior police officials speaking out

Available evidence suggests that, while some members of the police leadership are supportive of reform efforts, the majority are not. Overall, among PdP respondents, superiors in Bukavu were most supportive, followed by those in Kananga and Matadi. One PdP officer in Matadi noted that some superior officers seemed to actively be working against the reform efforts:

*Ils cherchent plutôt à faire disparaître la PdP en déplaçant certains de nos éléments vers d'autres unités et ville ; Ils favorisent davantage les non Pdp [...] Egalement notre commandant a été arrêté pendant plusieurs jour au cachot, justement par ce qu'il est PdP, et que selon la hiérarchie ne pouvait pas commander le commissariat de Nzanza.*

An officer in a different commune in Matadi described a similar sentiment:

*Les autorités ne soutiennent pas la PdP, elles nous utilisent seulement dans les missions où n'y a pas d'argent ; mais là où il y a l'argent elles disent. « Britannique aboyi bolia » c.à.d. « la Coopération britannique nous a interdit de vous utiliser à d'autres missions.*

Although officers in some locations were more supportive than those in others, PdP officers consistently said those who had received PdP training were generally supportive and those who had not were not. One officer in Bukavu described this:

*Les plus favorables sont ceux qui comprennent et les moins favorables sont ceux qui ne comprennent pas.*

Based on this observation, another officer in Bukavu expressed concern that this support would change now that his superiors trained in the PdP approach had been transferred:

*De plus, les chefs qui avaient été sensibilisés pour la PdP sont partis. Nous avons quelques nouveaux chefs qui ne comprennent pas trop notre travail et notre rôle au sein de la PNC. Nos chefs considèrent aussi que nous n'avons pas reçu une bonne partie de la formation utile pour un policier qui doit faire face aux criminels et voleurs à mains armées. Notamment la formation en manipulation d'arme à feu.*

As such, the available evidence does not verify this assumption.

## No significant dropout from the PdP

Evidence gathered from FGDs and ToC monitoring does not validate this assumption, suggesting instead that a number of PdP trained officers have left both the PdP and the PNC. Although respondents did not provide figures related to desertion, all groups knew of PdP officers who had left the PdP following PdP training. Similarly, members of the PdP who participated in FGDs mentioned that many planned to leave once a better opportunity arose. One officer in Matadi noted that, for many of them,

*Dès qu'il y a une opportunité qui se présente, il laisse la PdP, peut être ailleurs, nous pouvons avoir quelque chose pour nourrir nos familles.*

Human resources information or other data showing actual numbers of PdP officers and retention rates were not available to the evaluation team to further confirm these findings.

## Strengthened internal accountability (*bancarisation* and IG)

Evidence from community respondents suggests *bancarisation*<sup>46</sup> provided police officers greater financial stability, making them less dependent on bribes as a means of supporting themselves and their families. One respondent in Bukavu described the improvements:

*The reason we have noticed a change is that, before, police officers received their salaries from their bosses. This meant [superiors] only gave the officers half their salaries, but now we have the bancarisation system (Bukavu, Students 1).*

Respondents also cited how the *bancarisation* system had increased the PdP's motivation to collaborate and respond to public security needs, with one respondent stating,

*En 2009, la police ne collaborait avec la population alors qu'aujourd'hui c'est une police de collaboration. La police est aujourd'hui régulièrement payée grâce à la bancarisation. L'impunité n'existe plus (Kananga, FGD, Etudiantes).*

Community-level respondents also suggested *bancarisation* had a positive effect on police officers that have not been trained in the PdP approach:

*Aujourd'hui la police est un peu bien payé, il y a régularité de la paie et aussi la bancarisation a résolu beaucoup des problèmes. Oui la PDP y a été pour quelque chose car en cas de tracasserie au de demande de pourboire elle est prêtée à intervenir [...] Par exemple : le policier ou les militaires ne tracassent plus la population en présence de la PDP. Les mamans peuvent sortir des fêtes même aux environs de 23 heures, si elle rencontre la PDP, elle les accompagne jusqu'à la maison sans les tracasser. Il faut aussi dire que les autorités se sont impliquées totalement pour réduire le cas de tracasserie (Bukavu I, FGD, Femmes).*

The institutionalisation of *bancarisation* was aimed at supporting a broader culture of internal accountability within the PNC. This also extended to capacity-building efforts aimed at the IG.

## Strengthened external accountability

However, there is weak evidence to support claims of sustainability of these important external accountability mechanisms, as the programme funded many of these activities and, as funding declined, so did the activity. These themes are further explored in the primary target group **ToC for APA**, and the secondary target group **ToCs for civil society, the media and parliamentarians**.

## Variations on the narrative

### Impacts through a gender lens

**In terms of gender mainstreaming in the police, the programme conducted several activities to support this, but relatively late in the programme.** In 2014, the PNC expressed an interest in incorporating gender considerations into its global reform strategy, notably following the vote on the law concerning gender parity in DRC. SSAPR supported a

---

<sup>46</sup> *Bancarisation* is the process through which police officers' salaries are paid directly into their bank accounts. This form of payment attempts to reduce opportunities for corruption within the PNC, including the opportunities for superior officers to skim off the salaries of those officers below them.

national workshop at the Commissaire General (CG) to support the development of the attributions, responsibilities and functioning of the police department in the fight against sexual and gender-based violence and the protection of minors and to define the roles of the national and provincial focal points.

This workshop resulted in a commitment from the PNC to integrate gender focal points into its operations and develop gender strategies to better mainstream gender aspects. For instance, the IG named two gender focal points to assist in catalysing this work. SSAPR also reportedly supported the development of gender training modules in collaboration with the Ministry of Gender, Family Affairs and Children to be delivered to the IG.

The M&E component conducted a study looking at the degree to which gender has been mainstreamed into the PNC. This provided useful and actionable results for the PNC. Female respondents were generally positive about the gender sensitisation efforts carried out by SSAP, the UN Mission in DRC and NGOs.

Given the negative perceptions of the women PNC among both their families and communities that women reported – that is, that they are prostitutes, at the whim of their superiors or unable to get another job – this sensitisation may be more useful for transforming women’s own views of their role in the PNC. In fact, some female respondents were particularly critical of the impact of this sensitisation on men. As one female officer in Kananga noted, *‘what they teach us is different than what they do themselves. This sensitisation hasn’t changed anything for how they deal [with] female police.’*

The study also found policy makers and PNC officers of both genders were positive about the state of current gender mainstreaming efforts. As evidence of this progress, key informants cited institutional progress including the Organic Law, the creation of gender focal point positions and the establishment of a specific unit to deal with women’s issues within the PNC. In addition to these policy accomplishments, key informants also referenced progress made on gender sensitisation within the PNC. On this topic, the study showed that, of PdP-trained police, 85.8% of men and 93.1% of women either fully or partially supported the integration of women in the PNC. Additionally, a larger proportion of PdP-trained men (92%) knew women were legally entitled to equal representation in DRC’s public institutions (as compared with 86.8%).

PdP training did not seem to have a significant impact on awareness of or support for women’s protection and representation. For example, 84.1% of male PdP respondents supported women’s legal protection against sexual harassment in the PNC, as compared with 96.7% of male non-PdP respondents.

However, against this backdrop of progress, many women reported often being compelled to oblige their male colleagues sexually in order to be promoted. Similarly, male respondents almost universally supported equal representation for women in the PNC and other public institutions, yet this study suggests women face significant barriers to gaining promotion and equal job duties. These discrepancies highlight the differences between policy and reality and underscore the importance of tracking policy change and sensitisation through to the implementation level.

**In terms of gender-based violence, the programme reported incorporating training into the PdP approach on how to effectively deal with cases.** Police stations constructed and supported by the programme were also provided with infrastructure and equipment to support the police in this practice.

## Geographic variations

Overall, the responses of officers not trained in the PdP approach were similar across the three pilot sites. However, on a few issues the emphasis of these respondents did vary. For example, although respondents in all sites knew officers who had participated in the PdP training, respondents in Kananga immediately noted that many of these officers had since deserted the force, joined other units or moved. Officers in Bukavu were perhaps the most negative about the PdP. While respondents in other sites were positive about PdP behaviour, in officers in Bukavu were more critical:

*La formation était très bonne mais le comportement de ces gens sur terrain est déplorable. Ils avaient mal procédé en formant des gens issus des groupes armés et des civils au lieu de récupérer des gens au sein de la PNC.*

In addition, although officers in all sites were positive about their interest in participating in the PdP training in the future, those in Matadi said this with the clear caveat that they would be able to participate only if their salaries and overall socioeconomic condition improved.

Overall, responses from PdP-trained officers were very similar across all locations. Beyond basic PdP training, respondents mentioned that other trainings varied by location, and included training on sexual violence in Matadi, child protection and rights in Kananga and computer-based tools in Bukavu. In Bukavu, respondents said they were all selected to participate in PdP trainings, whereas respondents in other locations were both selected and volunteered. Lastly, in discussing the future of police reform in their area, officers in Kananga were the most optimistic, noting that *'Nous espérons que la réforme va se poursuivre et toucher toutes les unités. Dans ces conditions, nous espérons un lendemain meilleur.'*

Community-level perceptions of the police also were largely consistent across locations. Some key differences in this data include community perceptions of police cooperation, which improved in all locations but by 65.24% in Bukavu as compared with 48.36% in Kananga and 23.43% in Matadi. Similarly, community perceptions of police performance at the city level increased in Bukavu by 77.0%, as compared with 67.53% in Kananga and 27.84% in Matadi. Changes in both these areas occurred between 2010 and 2014, and reflect comparison between SSAPR intervention communities and their matched comparison.

# Community engagement impact annex




Figure 23. Nested ToC for SSAPR communities

## Community sufficiently reached

The SSAPR EA component undertook a number of activities intended to improve community knowledge and awareness of local safety and security issues and to provide opportunities for community members to be more active in demanding improved responsiveness and quality service provision from the police.

Community engagement activities were focused mainly around raising public awareness of their rights as citizens and the police reform process through large-scale sensitisation events, and providing communities with opportunities to engage with the police and to voice concerns about issues impinging on their sense of safety and security within their communities through community fora. The programme also aimed to implement several activities aimed at building the capacity and ability of communities to better hold the police to account and demand quality security services through work with civil society.

The programme ToC designed in 2013 posited that these activities would occur by building the capacity of community groups (CSOs, the media and parliamentarians) to create an environment in which communities are able to hold the police to account and demand improved policing. This included building the capacity of CSOs to use approaches such as community scorecards and community fora as means to articulate local security needs; the establishment of FQs and community DYCOMs as a means to bring together the public, the police and APA; and capacity-building with CSOs to conduct general awareness-raising through sensitisation events in the community.



## Awareness-raising activities were held

**One of the largest and most far-reaching activities to do with community awareness has been the mass sensitisation campaigns carried out by SSAPR.** The aim was to remove the taboo associated with community security issues and to get communities talking about what impinged on their safety, while also improving knowledge of security service provision. This campaign included a mass door-to-door community sensitisation campaign, with events involving religious leaders and groups and women's and youth associations across all three pilot cities, at which DYCOM members presented on local security issues and educated attendees on their fundamental rights.

In addition, activities were targeted towards those who may not ordinarily be active in community groups – DYCOMs launched an aggressive awareness-raising programme involving TV and radio slots, the erection of billboards (saying no to police corruption), distribution of stickers and community outreach activities. The programme also targeted schoolchildren with awareness-raising activities, training 7,264 students in civic education. In addition, 50 female police officers and members of CSOs were trained on police reform issues. Overall, ISSAT in its 2013 report was able to verify six advocacy campaigns, 18 forums and three workshops had been successfully organised.

Other activities included the production and broadcasting of TV slots and magazine articles on the social conditions of the police; a TV report on insecurity; a radio report on the *kaluna* facing the police; and production and broadcasting of Forum Sécurité, a 45-minute show on transactional fines, with the prosecutor of Kananga, the PNC commissioner and RRSSJ representatives; plus a show about the C3C covering a visit from the commissioner-general of the PNC to the C3C headquarters, televised on national TV.

Mass sensitisation and community education activities conducted by SSAPR were described as a foundation stone in changing community capacity to hold the police to account. The ISSAT 2013 annual review noted these activities had empowered communities to be engaged in security issues and to demand improved and accountable police services:

*As several interviewees highlighted, sensitisation (awareness raising and training) initiatives have been crucial to the successful delivery of the PdP approach. This has prepared the ground for a mutual shift in attitudes and behaviours by empowering communities to raise security concerns and to ask tough questions of the PNC and local authorities on security matters. Again, this is a major change which should not be under-estimated .*

At the simplest level, these interventions prepared the public in SSAPR pilot communities to engage with the police and empowered them by increasing community capacity to take responsibility as actors in determining their own security.

## Community engagement activities were held

**Evaluation findings suggest community engagement activities were implemented as planned, with sufficient reach within SSAPR pilot communities.** For instance, quarterly reports from SSAPR programme implementers describe the use of community scorecards to assess the performance of police in three pilot provinces. Through the community scorecards, communities identified the main security issues facing them on a day-to-day basis: illegal fines, strength of police and police communication.

**By the third year of the programme, FQs were in operation in all nine pilot communes across the three pilot cities.** FQs were launched in the same order as the PdP training cycles as complementary demand-side activities to prepare communities to engage with the graduates of PdP training. Internal programme monitoring from the components says that, by the final year of the programme (Q2, 2014), 28 FQs had been held across all three pilot cities, with strong representation of women. Quarterly reports further state that FQs have been launched in all pilot communes.

As these initiatives were launched in conjunction with the PdP training, results in Cycle 1 and 2 communes are stronger than those in Cycle 3. However, results are encouraging: there has been a positive level of interest and involvement from a diverse range of community members and CSOs. SSAPR quarterly reports show surprisingly strong representation of women in FQs (especially in Bukavu), which is a positive sign that the security concerns of women are being represented. Another positive result is the police are reportedly increasingly attending these meetings and engaging with communities to discuss local security issues.

There is strong evidence these forums were successful in bringing together groups (communities, local politico-administrative bodies and the police) initially distrustful of each other. The CSRP third M&E report describes how these fora created a positive opportunity for groups that had not previously worked together to unite around local security issues:

*Les FQ permettent à la population de s'asseoir et de s'exprimer librement sur leurs besoins de sécurité à cote d'autres parties prenantes (police, représentants de la Société Civile, des commerçants, des Jeunes, des Femmes, des confessions religieuses et chefs des rues, etc.). Ces instances resserrent les liens entre la police, la population et les autorités politico administratives et judiciaires autour des questions qui englobent la sécurité humaine.*

ISSAT's independent external reviewers also commented on this dynamic, noting the changed dynamic brought about by community engagement initiatives:

*Mechanisms such as forums de quartiers and community score cards offer opportunities for the public to ask questions of the police and to comment and discuss police performance.*

## Evidence that causal link assumptions between activities and reaching the public were realised

As part of the community TOC, several assumptions were identified that would need to be realised for the intervention to act as part of a sufficient causal package linking programme activities to the production of direct programme outputs (goods and services) to effective public and community reach and reaction:

- That a significant portion of the public needed to be reached by activities, goods and services;
- That community groups reached were reasonably representative of the public; and
- That the public was willing to listen to ideas around public-police engagement and thought the ideas were reasonable.

The evidence collected as part of this evaluation suggests these causal link assumptions were realised. The remainder of this section presents the evidence in support of this claim.

## Significant portion of the public reached

**First, SSAPR activities reached a significant proportion of the public.** The 2014 KAP survey asked a representative sample of the population in each of the three pilot sites which SSAPR interventions they had been exposed to. As these figures are representative, the evaluation team is confident the percentage of citizens exposed to these interventions in SSAPR pilot sites is sufficient to satisfy the causal link. However, the KAP results suggest a disconnect exists between the success of the programme's activities and knowledge of the project itself. Only about 9% of respondents said they had heard of SSAPR and only 3.5% said they were aware of the '3P/3R' approach. However, when asked to identify which domain the approach was used in, over 90% correctly identified it as an approach to police reform.

Furthermore, 28.6% of respondents said they had been directly involved in SSAPR's interventions. This figure refers to those who have attended one or more community engagement or public sensitisation or education events. Therefore, it is safe to assume the number of people indirectly exposed to SSAPR's interventions (through billboards, stories in the media) is much higher. Indeed, 47% of respondents said they had been exposed to sensitisation events, with the highest frequencies reportedly associated with having seen a billboard and heard a message on the radio, followed by those who had seen a story or sensitisation message on TV.

## Community groups reached reasonably representative

**The community groups SSAPR reached were reasonably representative of the overall communities in the three pilot sites.** The ToC monitoring used a maximum variation sampling approach in order to reach a diverse range of respondent groups. The evaluation team took great care to identify citizens who had had no direct link to SSAPR interventions (i.e. who had not attended community forums or sensitisation events) in order to understand how SSAPR had affected citizens not engaged in community security issues. To do this, the evaluation team worked with community-level authorities to identify and list groups that had had no direct involvement with SSAPR interventions. From this list, a purposive selection of groups was made to ensure each round covered the widest diversity of groups (Table 19).

**Table 19. Community groups participating in evaluation activities reporting on SSAPR effectiveness in their communities**

Community group	Male	Female	Total
Members of religious groups (various)	47	46	93
Members of civil self-defence groups	16	13	29
Students (tertiary)	40	39	79
Members of <i>motard</i> (biker) associations	24	0	24
Members of trade organisations	6	31	37
Members of youth associations	8	8	16
<b>Total respondents</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>137</b>	<b>278</b>

Although this mode yields a relatively small number of respondents, the variation in the sample allowed it to reach levels of representativeness that would otherwise require significantly larger sample sizes. The data the evaluation team collected are from a combination of representative quantitative household surveys and purposive qualitative surveys. These data were triangulated with secondary data from internal programme monitoring and external reviews. Thus the evaluation team can be reasonably confident that the community groups reached were reasonably representative.

## Willingness to listen; ideas seem reasonable

**The public exhibited a willingness to listen and engage and believed ideas seemed reasonable.** As previously stated, the level of community engagement over the life of the programme was significantly higher than had been anticipated. No financial incentives were provided to encourage participation, therefore it is reasonable to assume the high level of community engagement was real. Based on this level of engagement as well as the fact that this was sustained over a number of years, the evaluation team can reasonably conclude that the public exhibited a willingness to listen and engage, and that ideas were reasonable to a level sufficient to satisfy assumptions on the reach and reaction of the programme.

## Changes in community capacity

Programme data and evaluation research suggest a number of changes in community capacity occurred over the life of the programme. These changes relate to improved knowledge and awareness of rights and security issues, improved ability to collaborate effectively with the PdP and other security actors and more positive interactions *vis-à-vis* the police.

## Better knowledge about rights, how to report poor police service

Quantitative data collected at the city level found individuals in SSAPR pilot sites had 13.5% better knowledge on the roles of different security institutions in 2014 than they had in 2010. Table 2021 presents data on the proportion of the population reporting the primary role of the police as protecting the population and their property. This statistic was slightly lower overall for community members in intervention sites compared with comparison sites; however, an extremely high percentage in both types of sites suggests the population in all six research sites possessed a good knowledge about the role of the police.

**Table 2021. Percentage of respondents reporting that the principal role of the police is to protect people and their property, by type of site and demographic characteristic**

Category	Disaggregation	Intervention	Control
Sex	Male	94.9	97.1
	Female	86.9	89.5
Age group	Under 25 years	89.4	89.6
	25-39 years	92.4	94.0
	40-65 years	91.2	95.7
	65+ years	88.0	93.9
Wealth index	Poor	89.6	90.7
	Middle range	92.1	93.9
	Rich	91.4	95.3
Level of instruction	No education	74.5	89.7
	Primary school	87.6	88.4
	Secondary school	92.3	94.1
	University	96.7	98.8

Table 22 presents data for this same question disaggregated by city pair, indicating a similar statistic.

**Table 22. Percentage of respondents reporting that the principal role of the police is to protect people and their property, by type of site and demographic characteristic**

	Treatment sites			Control sites		
	Matadi	Kananga	Bukavu	Boma	Mbuji-Maye	Goma
Total	89.2	92.1	89.8	93.3	92.7	93.7

Similarly, focus group respondents described how ‘many people now know their rights in the realm of security’ (Kananga, Religious Group 1).

## More positive attitudes about the police

**There is mixed evidence that community members in SSAPR intervention sites have a positive attitude regarding the police overall, although this has improved since baseline.** Having a positive attitude about the police is a precondition for a change in the level of engagement with the police: if you do not have a positive attitude of the police you are likely not motivated to work with them, which is a critical causal step in the ToC.

Thus, in conjunction with data on this improved knowledge and capacity to collaborate with the police, we gathered evidence on community attitudes regarding the police. Individuals in SSAPR pilot sites appear to have developed a much more positive view of the police. Results from the KAP survey show individuals in SSAPR pilot sites have 38.7% more positive feelings towards security institutions (as a whole) in 2014 than the same population in 2010.

## Improved skills in collaboration/dialogue

The evaluation was not able to collect adequate data to either confirm or refute this assumption, although community activities led by CSOs such as community scorecards do suggest improved skills in collaboration. These activities gave communities the opportunities to express their safety and security concerns and collaborate better with the police and local authorities. The high participation of community members in these activities supports the assertion that this assumption was met.

## Assumptions from changes in reach to changes in capacity

The evaluation team collected sufficient evidence that improvements in community capacity have occurred in the manner posited in the community ToC. The team is moderately confident that these changes occurred as a result of the causal of package of activities, goods and services combined with the realisation of assumptions but will need to collect further data to verify this completely. Evidence that these assumptions have occurred is presented below.

## Formal and informal discussions occurred

### **Formal and informal discussions occurred among community members and the police.**

Evidence suggests the bringing of security issues to the fore through widespread discussions and debates within communities and neighbourhoods reinforced the capacity changes brought about through formal engagement efforts with community groups.

Data collected from internal project monitoring verifies that formal and informal discussions took place involving community members, local politico-administrative leaders and the police through the mechanisms established by the programme. Qualitative data from ToC monitoring as well as external reviews corroborate this assumption. Indeed, this was one of the most remarked-on themes in the qualitative research.

## Observations about reduced police harassment and improved police attitudes

### **Community members had observed less police harassment and improved police attitudes over time in SSAPR pilot sites.**

The results of the endline KAP survey suggest the single factor with the strongest correlation to improved KAP of the police came from a positive interaction with the police. As the KAP was a quantitative dataset representative at the city level, it does not provide information about the nature of positive interactions and what these may look like. The media also reported an increased number of stories of both positive and negative police performance, which supports an increase in observations.

## Media see good stories

**There was an increase in media reporting on these positive changes.** As noted in the ToC above, a number of interventions were designed to build the knowledge and capacity of the media to be more active in security issues. There is some programme evidence to suggest these interventions were successful in increasing the number of stories on security issues featured in the media. Internal programme monitoring reports describe how the media are increasingly engaged in reporting on security issues, including a magazine article on the social conditions of the police, a TV report on issues of insecurity and a radio piece on the *kalunas*.<sup>47</sup> The 2013 ISSAT annual review states that significant progress has been made in terms of improving the quality and quantity of media reporting on security issues:

*Significant progress has also been made during 2013 with regard to the frequency and quality of control/monitoring activities undertaken by local CSOs and media. Better informed communities and media actors are increasingly engaging with policing actors. By offering them the opportunity to exercise some control over State authorities, there are early indications that it has led to building trust and confidence in what used to be seen as a predatory security service.*

ISSAT points to the involvement of the media in improvements in community capacity. The reviewers note how various community actors are increasingly active and involved in discussing security issues, referring specifically to the role of journalists:

---

<sup>47</sup> EA Component (2014) QR2.

*Civil society and the media in the three pilot towns have started to hold the PNC, other security actors and local authorities accountable for community security issues [...] Journalists trained by the SSAPR have been more willing to report on security issues, and investigative journalism has already led to changes in a number of cases, such as prison conditions in Bas-Congo. There is, however, very little evidence that potentially serious human rights abuses by the Police have yet been addressed through these channels.*

## Changes in community behaviour

The ToC presented above in Figure 23 posits that changes in community capacity (as described in the section above) work as part of a sufficient causal package of activities to contribute to changes in community behaviour. This section presents evidence of changes to community behaviour occurring and discusses the degree to which causal link assumptions were realised and the causal claims that can be made based on existing evidence. Changes in behaviour were looked at according to four dimensions:

- 🕒 Increased interest in security matters;
- 🕒 Increased media coverage of policing and trials;
- 🕒 Engagement with police;
- 🕒 Greater support for police.

There appears to be sufficient evidence a change in community behaviour occurred in SSAPR intervention sites over the life of the programme as a result of the causal package, which comprised a change in community capacity combined with positive changes in police behaviour and improved opportunities for communities to engage with the police. We discuss this change in community behaviour below.

### Increased interest in security matters

**Community members demonstrated an increased interest in security matters over time.**

Data suggest there has been a marked increase in interest in security matters at the community level. This theory is supported by a plethora of qualitative data from the ToC monitoring, as well as anecdotal evidence from project reporting and external evaluations.

On community behaviour change, one of the more clearly observed changes relates to community members demonstrating an increased interest in security matters. ToC monitoring reveals how the EA component establishing, supporting and reinforcing opportunities to engage through the various community engagement groups (FQs, DYCOMs, community sensitisation events) were successful in bringing together different actors within communities and empowering the general public to be more involved in their community's security. One respondent describes this change:

*With the PdP doctrine, the change in the mentality of the population is remarkable [...] workshops by NGOs and members of the civil society on the PdP doctrine allowed these groups to take things into their own hands and begin advocating on behalf of the population in terms of security and justice (Kananga, Students 1).*



Capacity-building and financial/technical support provided by SSAPR seem to have contributed to the creation of well-organised and accountable bodies, capable of sustaining interest in security matters beyond the life of the programme. ISSAT observed in 2013,

*The DFID Annual Review field visit to Kananga in Feb 2014 found a general sense of well-organised and empowered communities increasingly eager to express their needs and question the quality of services provided to hold the police accountable.*

Indeed, ISSAT further commented that community engagement mechanisms had been so successful that community members were using them as a forum in which to raise other issues facing their wellbeing:

*Results exceed expectations in this area; populations with forum de quartier are using this mechanism to bring other issues to their local representatives (i.e. health, justice concerns). This underscores the need to understand these types of dynamics and seek ways to maximise synergies with other DFID DRC programmes that use this type of bottom-up accountability mechanisms in other sectors.*

## Increased media coverage of policing and trials

**There was increased media coverage of policing and trials during the SSAPR intervention period.** The evaluation team found high-profile prosecutions of police had a large impact in terms of changing their perceptions of the police. A number of ToC monitoring respondents said such prosecutions had improved their trust in the police, despite the fact that links between the security and justice sectors are weak. It is not in doubt these prosecutions helped change negative perceptions of the police. This is substantiated by the increased role the media played in reporting positive and negative issues around police reform and police practice, as well as the high percentage of the population reached by messages through TV and radio.

## Engagement with the police

**Community members demonstrated increased engagement with the police.** Another success of the empowerment activities was the creation of more opportunities for the public to engage with the newly reformed members of the PdP. This successfully created space for the public to discuss security concerns with a diverse range of local security actors, who would not previously have been in contact.

Indeed, the CSR third M&E report discusses how this positive dynamic of collaboration between key security actors has been cemented into the fabric of these communities, and that, through the CLSP, a diverse range of actors are now working together to address the communities' security concerns:

*Par ailleurs, la collaboration entre les parties prenantes (population, police, société civile, autorités politico administratives et judiciaires) dans la quotidienneté est cimentée par le partenariat à travers les forums de quartiers et les conseils locaux pour la sécurité de proximité (CLSP). Ces conseils sont installés et fonctionnels dans toutes les communes de trois communes.*

Over the life of the programme, a constant theme was how SSAPR had created a space for dialogue and collaboration between the public, the police and local authorities in order to combat drivers of local insecurity. ISSAT noted this positive dynamic in its independent annual review of the programme in 2013:

*These forums have created an opportunity for the PNC, the 'bourgemestre' (the commune-level of local municipal administration), civil society and community members to openly discuss local security matters, identify security issues and jointly suggest solutions/actions. It should also be noted that some degree of ownership was observed in Matadi and Kananga, where provisional CLSP have been organized by the 'bourgemestres' using their own initiative, without the support of the program.*

Data collected in the course of this evaluation suggest the contributory factors in these improved perceptions are twofold. Regression analysis of the KAP data reveals that, controlling for all other factors, a positive interaction with the police is the single factor most strongly correlated with improved KAP relating to the police. Indeed, there is a great deal of evidence to support the assertion that police behaviour has improved significantly (this is discussed in more detail in the police ToC). However, qualitative data from ISSAT provide a more nuanced explanation of how changes in police behaviour and improved community capacity were both factors driving improved collaboration between the police and communities.

*There is little doubt that PdP officers have put the principle of partnership into practice. This is most clearly demonstrated in the regular forums de quartier and more recently the CLSPs, which have embedded the idea of working together both with the public and with local authorities to address security problems; in some areas, local leaders (mayors and bourgemestres) have begun to organise forums de quartier without the SSAPR's assistance, demonstrating the value they attach to this mechanism. Other tools such as the suggestion boxes supported by local parliamentarians and provincial civil society networks also promote the idea of public-police partnership. All of this has had a positive impact on police-public relationships.*

## Greater support for the police

**Communities in SSAPR sites demonstrated greater support for the police.** There is strong evidence that individuals in SSAPR pilot communities are increasingly supportive of the police, viewing them as partners where they had previously viewed them as corrupt and responsible for feelings of insecurity. The KAP study revealed that SSAPR pilot communities were 59.8% more satisfied with police performance in 2014 than the comparison population at baseline. This change is the result of a combination of contributory factors – improved experience with the police, opportunities for engagement on security issues and improved collaboration between the two. Data from the ToC monitoring describes this change:

*In 2009 the police collaborated with criminals and we, the population, were considered their playground where they could come and steal whatever they wanted [...] it was difficult for us to take any matters to the police because they would not find a solution to your problem. However, today these problems don't exist anymore. The police are now at our service – the problems we take to*

*them are dealt with impartially; they don't collaborate with criminals anymore. Today we've become the collaborators with the police by turning in the criminals that are eventually arrested (Matadi Trade Group 1).*

The ISSAT review team further describe how increased opportunities for positive collaboration between communities, local authorities and the police have led to improved perceptions of and ultimately increased public support for the police.

*There are numerous examples of improved interaction between civil society and the PNC in the program's pilot provinces. People are able to speak of their experience with the PNC and their security concerns without fear of repercussions. Furthermore, the forums de quartier are now taking responsibility for key decision-making functions, thus ensuring that responses to security concerns are appropriate for the local context.*

## Assumptions from changes in capacity to changes in behaviour

Evidence presented above suggests a number of significant changes to community behaviour and practice occurred among individuals in the SSAPR pilot. The ToC posits several causal link assumptions that would need to be realised in order to make causal claims that changes in public and community capacity contributed to changes in community behaviour and practice.

In order for this to be a sufficient causal package, it is necessary that observations about reduced police harassment and improved police attitudes are made, observations about reduced crime levels are made among community members, community members have adequate opportunities for engagement with the police and the media are free to report.

### Observations about reduced crime levels

There is mixed evidence to support observations about reduced crime levels. This evidence is fully reported in the ToC overview impact story.

### Opportunities for engagement with the police

The evaluation collected strong evidence in support of opportunities existing for engagement with the police. This relates directly to activities of CSOs supported by SSAPR and local authorities trained by SSAPR in the organisation of community fora for engagement, particularly FQs.

The most recent round of quarterly reports from the programme components describes reasonably strong and autonomous bodies in operation across the pilot cities. Indeed, routine internal monitoring is reporting that FQs in Cycle 1 and 2 communities are being maintained by local actors without SSAPR support.

Programme quarterly reports also describe how volunteer members of FQs are preparing to work with diverse stakeholders to undertake a formal security mapping/diagnosis activities to be used to influence future programming/community initiatives to improve safety and security.

However, interviews with local authorities called into question the sustainability of these activities, as local authorities stated in focus groups conducted as part of this evaluation that, in the absence of SSAPR funding, it was unclear whether these activities would continue.

## Media free to report

There is some evidence the media is free to report on security issues. Interviews with programme staff suggested stories in the media about police reforms were well received and viewed positively. Other data suggest the media felt they had relatively good access to police superiors at the beginning of the programme, although this is perceived to have declined as funding for media interventions subsidised by the programme has ceased.

## Variations to the narrative

### Impacts through a gender lens

In terms of gender-disaggregated results for general community members, there was no strong evidence that women were disproportionately reached by SSAPR interventions or experienced differential changes in capacity or community practice.

In terms of reach, analysis indicates that women were equally reached by SSAPR interventions. There is limited evidence on the extent to which CSO activities had differential impacts on men and women. Focus groups with CSO representatives described how they had gone to great lengths to ensure the voices of women were heard. For instance, community groups interviewed as part of the ToC monitoring interviewed equal numbers of men and women's groups (except for those within male-dominated professions such as the association of motorbike drivers), with no clear differences detected.

Indeed, participants described how women were often more represented than men in community fora and felt comfortable voicing their security concerns. In addition, representatives from Matadi described how different groups had been involved in different activities, with women more likely to be involved in activities discussing their risk of sexual violence at night and when collecting water.

In fact, programme reports show women were actively involved in the FQs and formulating recommendations that have subsequently been implemented by the PNC and local authorities (e.g. refuse bins in the communes, police officers accompanying women to get water). Qualitative interviews with local authorities and civil society representatives confirmed women were strongly active participants in FQs.

Women represented a very small number of the journalists trained. When asked if personal characteristics could be an obstacle in their work, journalists in Matadi spontaneously mentioned that being a woman made it harder to conduct interviews. This factor was nonetheless not mentioned in other cities. One journalist trained by SSAPR became the president of the Journalism for Security and Justice association and received a prize from the NGO Journalists for Human Rights.

In terms of impacts, an analysis of gender-disaggregated data shows no significant impact difference between men and women in terms of changes in capacity and practice.

## Geographic variations

Overall, no major differences were detected in terms of reach and impact when analysing results that were geographically disaggregated, although the analysis identified some differences across programme sites. For instance, a non-significant result between SSAPR pilot and comparison sites at the city level around 'knowledge of the PNC as the main provider for security' is easier to interpret when looking between matched city pairs, as the change in knowledge at the city level was statistically significant for the Bas-Congo city pairs and the Kasai Occidental city pairs, whereas the city pairs of Bukavu and Goma experienced the opposite trend, with more respondents in Goma (comparison site) having improved knowledge over time compared with respondents in the intervention sites of Bukavu.

This may be an indication that increased police presence and donor intervention in Goma over time (because of the declining security situation) has skewed overall results. Indeed, the difference between self-perceived collaboration with the police and sightings of police patrols was also most evident in Goma, where, despite a large increase in sightings of police patrols, the population felt collaboration between the police and the community was worse than it was at baseline in 2010. This is an interesting finding around perceived police effectiveness in Goma and has several possible interpretations. For instance, it could be associated with an increase of police because of the decline in security, whereby more police in an insecure environment could actually lead to a greater sense of insecurity if their methods are draconian.

## Politico-administrative authorities impact annex




Figure 24. Nested ToC for APA

## SSAPR training was effective in reaching local APA

SSAPR undertook a diverse range of activities designed to create an enabling framework for SSR among APA structures in SSAPR pilot sites. APA officials were trained on a number of topics, designed to improve their knowledge of key issues surrounding SSR and to equip them with the skills and tools necessary to fulfil their crucial oversight role. The trainings explored the following issues:

- 🕒 The PdP doctrine, including its mission and ‘golden rules’;
- 🕒 Legal and political frameworks surrounding SSR;
- 🕒 The concept of human security;
- 🕒 The role politico-administrative officials can play in making the police more accountable;
- 🕒 How police–population proximity can lead to greater cooperation between security actors (including the communities);
- 🕒 The role of administrative authorities in security sector management and in the functioning of FQs and CPLS.

Trained officials included authority members at the province level, within the mayor’s office; officials at the commune level (*bourgmestres*), *chefs de quartier* and lastly *chefs d’avenue*. Although no specific numbers were reported regarding the number of officials trained at the different levels, evidence shows all *chefs de quartier* were trained and sensitised in the context of SSAPR. A total of 56 people have thus been trained, including 17 in Matadi, 26 in Kananga and 13 in Bukavu.

## SSAPR training of APA was effective in improving knowledge, skills and attitudes

**Available data suggest these trainings were of high quality and of strategic importance in building the capacity of APA to play a larger part in SSR.** The trainings were significant for two reasons: (i) they improved the level of knowledge officials had about SSR and their understanding of their role in it; and (ii) they transferred the skills necessary to be able to fulfil this crucial oversight role.

Indeed, participants in FGDs conducted as part of this evaluation stated that, prior to the training, they were unaware of the extent to which security concerns plagued the community and impacted community members' lives. Nor were they aware of the possibility of assembling community fora to bring together members of the police, CSOs, the media and community representatives in order to discuss preventative security measures. Previously, discussions about community security had been extremely rare; even when they were held, they were attended only by senior bureaucratic figures (*chefs de cellule, chefs d'avenue*, etc.).

**The APA acknowledged that the training had allowed them to fully rise to their roles as coordinators of the security sector at the neighbourhood level.** APA described this change:

*Ces formations nous ont permis de réunir régulièrement (FQ) les membres de la communauté pour parler et régler les problèmes qui se posent dans la communauté etc.*

*Nous coordonnons le travail fait ensemble avec la PNC, des chefs d'avenue, les organisations de la société civile, les médias, les représentants des écoles et des Centres de santé. Alors que dans le temps (c.-à-d., avant la formation), un chef de quartier ne pouvait que s'occuper du travail de l'Etat-civil (administration).*

APA reported that, since training, they had also become deeply involved in both identifying security issues and working together to find solutions. Cooperation now takes place on a regular basis and invitations to attend are extended to all community members. A *chef de quartier* in Matadi described this change:

*Avant la formation, les problèmes sécuritaires étaient l'apanage des seuls services de sécurité. Tandis qu'aujourd'hui c'est une affaire de tous les membres de la communauté. De plus, au niveau du secteur de sécurité, on ne traite pas seulement les problèmes de vol et ou de criminalité. Mais aussi d'autres questions liées à la sécurité de la communauté, notamment, des facteurs liés à l'insécurité comme l'eau é, l'électricité, l'insalubrité du milieu etc.*

**Importantly, the training also aimed to influence APA's attitudes towards the police.** Improved attitudes *vis-à-vis* the police seemed to be consistent across groups involved in SSAPR. In the case of politico-administrative officials, they changed from a mentality of victimisation at the hands of the PNC to seeing how they could work together with the PNC in a collaborative way. A *chef de quartier* in Bukavu explained this change:

*Entant qu'APA de base, nous étions souvent victimes des arrestations arbitraires de la part de la PNC. Mais pour le moment, et grâce à la formation, nous avons une bonne collaboration, car chacun connaît le travail de son partenaire avec qui nous collaborons*

In responding to a question about what motivated APA to participate in SSAPR's trainings (and other interventions that address security sector reform), an APA in Kananga said:

*Nous avons eu besoin de renforcer nos compétences pour pouvoir prendre en main la coordination de la gestion du secteur sécurité au sein de nos quartiers.*

The APA appeared to be more interested in understanding the basis of the separation of powers between themselves and the security providers (the police) in ensuring security, and how this could be improved. One politico-administrative official in Bukavu stated:

*Il y avait un désordre généralisé dans la gestion de la sécurité. On ne pouvait pas comprendre et différencier le rôle d'un policier, d'un militaire, etc. On avait donc besoin de comprendre le rôle et les attributions de chaque service et/ou institution.*

## SSAPR training with APA led to improved public–police engagement through FQs

APA reported being extremely pleased with the extent to which neighbourhood forums (FQs) had improved levels of collaboration between all members of the population and how they had been employed to confront/solve security problems. In FGDs, APA reported being satisfied that this appeared to have had a positive impact on the security situation at the quartier level. In Matadi, one of the APAs declared,

*Les FQ sont une forme de « Parlement local » au niveau des quartiers à travers lequel la population exprime ses préoccupations, et où on trouve ensembles des solutions et des stratégies pour les mettre en œuvre.*

When speaking of FQs as an effective instrument for security coordination at the quartier level, APA acknowledged they had helped bring crime levels down in SSAPR quartiers. The statement below describes this change:

*La sécurité est améliorée parce que l'implication de tous dans les FQ permet d'obtenir les informations sur les malfaiteurs*

For example, in Matadi, the police arrived to dismantle a network of petty criminals and drug users thanks to a tip-off from the community at an FQ.

*Avant les FQ, on pouvait voler, violer [...] sans que les coupables ne soient dénoncés. Mais actuellement, grâce au FQ, ces genres de problèmes ont trouvés solutions. Les coupables sont poursuivis et répondent de leurs actes.*

*La police qui était considérée comme un ennemi de la population et actuellement acceptée grâce aux forums de quartiers.*

The officials interviewed as part of this evaluation were also pleased with the increased involvement of different stakeholders in the management of security issues at the quartier level. They discussed how members of the PNC at the commissariat level were increasingly sensitive and reactive to the security needs of communities raised at FQ. Furthermore, they confirmed that they now held discussions with the police about security issues on a daily basis. Problems affecting either the PNC or the population are discussed daily between *chefs de quartier* and the commandant of the local commissariat/sub-commissariat. This dynamic was described by an official in Kananga :



*Chaque matin, le chef quartier fait un rapport de la situation sécuritaire au commissariat/sous-commissariat.*

In addition, officials asserted that, as a result of the FQ, the relationships between the police and other security sector actors had improved to a point where they worked collaboratively and, consequentially, problems were resolved together. The improved level of engagement of the PNC is also clear from its involvement in the fight against drivers of insecurity. In Matadi, members of the FQ affirmed that,

*The police join in on community initiatives to combat insecurity.*

Officials also referred to how CSO engagement with community fora (both DYCOMs and FQs) had helped improve the security situation at the quartier level. The *chef de quartier* cited the following example;

*In the quartier of Lukonga in Kananga, members of the CSOs informed me of the presence of thieves within the neighbourhood. I called the PdP and, when they came, the thieves were driven out of our quartier.*

In interviews, officials confirmed that the media had shown an interest in covering the activities of the FQ, as well as other activities organised by DYCOMs. Unfortunately, though, they mentioned how 'the media asked \$10 for their services'.

## **There is some evidence these changes will not be sustainable after the programme ends, particularly in maintaining FQs**


In spite of the positive evidence provided above, politico-administrative officials believed the spirit of collaboration had faded over time. They cited an example:


*Avec l'évolution des choses, il y a un recule dans la collaboration et le respect des consignes de la part des PdP. Car la police est en train de revenir sur ces anciennes pratiques suite au manque de motivation et/ ou au manque d'encadrement par leur actuelle hiérarchie non formée sur la PdP. On sent qu'ils reçoivent souvent de leurs hiérarchies des ordres qui pèchent contre les 10 règles d'Or.*

According to the officials interviewed, other challenges threaten the sustainability of security sector reforms. Most importantly, there is a lack of financial investment to allow officials to be able to continue their activities in the FQs. APA reported that, in order for these activities to continue, they needed paper and photocopying abilities to advertise meetings and money to offer coffee and tea to participants. In addition, they needed to be able to provide incentives (such as coffee) for police willing to perform patrols after dark. At present, the *chefs de quartier* are not in a position to be able to provide adequate incentives.

There is insufficient evidence to confirm whether local security plans have been developed. The evaluation team was not able to locate any documents concerning security plans at the neighbourhood level. Nevertheless, while talking about security plans, politico-administrative officials alluded to a number of measures and recommendations that had been formulated during the FQs in order to respond to community security needs.

Politico-administrative officials referred to the following examples:

-  In Kananga, a police station was built as an initiative of FQ members with the aim of reinforcing the presence police presence at quartier level.

 In Bukavu, the FQs organised evening police patrols in order to flush out criminals taking refuge in abandoned buildings.

As a result of SSAPR support, the provincial minister for security and decentralisation of Sud-Kivu has established a suite of software in order to manage security data. This tool is not yet up and running, as the province lacks the technical capacity to use it, but, if capacity is developed, it could be an invaluable tool in fighting drivers of insecurity within the province.

It is hoped this software will help with reporting on sensitive issues within the communes. It will also be used to present the different types of insecurity in a way that allows local security councils to identify current issues and refine their strategies to eradicate them.

## Variations on the narrative

### Impacts through a gender lens

There is little evidence that women APA were less able to fulfil their role and collaborate with other stakeholders because of their gender. At the same time, female officials reported they were not always in a position to conduct the same activities as their male counterparts. They reported, for instance, that they were less likely to perform certain kinds of activities, such as joint night patrols carried out by *chefs de quartier* and the police. Women who are *chefs de quartier* are usually not allowed by their husbands to patrol at night with other men. They also mentioned that they did not feel physically capable of dealing with criminals.

### Geographic variations

Some geographic variations were found between the politico-administrative authorities in the different cities. In Matadi, one of the authorities' activities was to take care of the sanitation situation at the quartier level. The APA said they organised sanitation activities and carried out cleaning work. Authorities in Bukavu and Kananga did not seem to be involved in sanitation actions at all.

Furthermore, whereas in Matadi and Kananga the APA were positive about DYCOM activities, which seemed to be an efficient way for them to collaborate with CSOs, the APA in Bukavu were not involved at all in DYCOM activities led by CSOs. Additionally, APA in Bukavu insisted that, following the arrests of criminals, the police do not keep the *chefs de quartier* informed of the situation. They thus do not know if criminals are released, what sanctions they receive and/or which higher legal authority they are referred too. Although this is possibly also an issue in the other cities, it was only spontaneously brought up in in Bukavu.

# Overview ToC impact story annex





Figure 25. Overview SSAPR ToC

## Changes in direct benefits and improved wellbeing

The overview TOC for SSAPR articulates how the impact pathway from changes in practice among the programme’s primary target groups – the police, local authorities and communities – leads to a greater public trust in the police and reduced crime. This reduction in crime and greater trust in the police can be considered the ‘direct benefits’ of the programme, using the terminology adopted in this report around an evaluable ToC model. These changes in the direct benefits will lead over time to increased wellbeing for the population. In the case of SSAPR, this translates to an increased public sense of security.

### There was improved police–public–local authority collaboration in SSAPR intervention sites

**There is strong evidence of ‘improved police–public–local authority collaboration’ in SSAPR intervention sites, although evidence suggests community expectations around collaboration may not be fully met.** Quantitatively, analysis of KAP data indicates a nearly 25% increase in respondents in SSAPR intervention sites reporting an improvement in police–public collaboration, compared with a nearly 20% increase in those reporting worsened collaboration in SSAPR comparison communities (Figure 26).



**Figure 26. Percentage of respondents reporting changes in community–public collaboration over the past three years, by site and survey year**

TOC monitoring also indicates that police–public collaboration has increased significantly. Respondents noted that, in 2009, communities were reluctant to work with the police, seeing them as drivers of insecurity rather than a solution to it. A female respondent from Matadi described the change process in terms of both police and criminal elements:

*In 2009, the police collaborated with criminals, and we the population were considered their playground where they could come and steal whatever they wanted [...] It was difficult for us to take any matters to the police because they would not find a solution to your problem. However, today these problems don't exist anymore. The police are now at our service – the problems we take to them are dealt with impartially; they don't collaborate with criminals anymore. Today we've become the collaborators with the police by turning in the criminals that are eventually arrested (Matadi Trade Group 1).*

The change highlighted above reinforces data from respondents in all SSAPR intervention sites. These findings suggest 6% more people in SSAPR pilot sites in 2014 would seek the services of the police in cases of violence and rape committed by either a member of the community or someone external to their community, as compared with those in control sites.

It should be noted that the importance of police–public–local authority cooperation was most prominently discussed in previous annual reviews and ISSAT reviews. Respondents in the ToC monitoring rarely referenced the role of local authorities, highlighting instead the relevance of police and community–police collaboration in improving security.

**One of the biggest programme successes in terms of improved collaboration was the creation of community fora such as FQs.** As discussed in the community engagement ToC in more detail, FQs were effective in providing positive opportunities for improved collaboration between the public, the police and local authorities. KAP survey data indicate that over a third of community members reported having participated in an FQ over the life of the programme. Focus groups with police and local authorities both confirmed the importance of these fora in bringing communities together to discuss local security concerns.

According to the programme's 2014 Annual Review,

*The demand for and participation in FQs has increased and it is highly encouraging that FQs held in cycles 1 and 2 are being maintained by local actors without SSAPR support, showing strong local ownership of the initiative and the resulting sustainability of the forums. FQs also organized in commune of cycle 3 are proving to be very effective in offering the population a framework within which to express its perception of daily security issues.*

**DYCOMs were another initiative implemented to create community dynamics to enhance the sustainability of police–public cooperation activities.** As noted by ISSAT in 2013, DYCOMs, which bring together state and non-state actors (members of the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies, civil society actors, magistrates, the media, researchers and community representatives) *'are beginning to effectively work together on community security issues'*. The major positive outcome of this activity, according to ISSAT's review, is that,

*Significantly, members of the provincial parliament have for the first time been fulfilling their oversight role in collaboration with local CSOs when undertaking joint field visits to monitor the implementation of newly adopted pieces of legislation related to police check-points.*

Internal programme reports from the components also explain how SSAPR provided capacity-building sessions on the DYCOM approach, training a total of 1,517 DYCOM members across all three provinces.<sup>48</sup> DYCOM members in Kananga organised community forums for parents and students on security issues.<sup>49</sup>

## A change in practice among community members contributed to changes in public–police collaboration in SSAPR pilot sites

Qualitative data collected in SSAPR intervention sites indicate that, as communities engage more with the police and come to support the PdP, people are more willing to collaborate with the police. This collaboration provides the PdP with better information, improving officers' ability to address and prevent crime. Similarly, as police practice improves – that is, police are more responsive, effective and accountable – members of the public have greater trust in them and are also more likely to engage with them. The 2014 CSRP report describes these dynamics;

*The community, members of civil society and authorities are all reassured by the presence of trained police who are open to dialogue and accessible in the face of demands from the population.*<sup>50</sup>

External reviewers (ISSAT) also remarked on this positive change in police behaviour, citing *'universal agreement among interviewees that relationships between the police and the public had improved substantially in areas where PdP is being implemented'*.

---

<sup>48</sup> EA Component (2014) QR2.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Translated from original : *La population, les membres de la société civile et les autorités se sentent rassurés en présence des policiers formés, ouverts au dialogue et accessibles face aux sollicitations de la population.*"

The 2013 ISSAT review further detailed the importance of improved community capacity and police practice in driving community–police collaboration, noting FQs and CLSPs had helped ‘embed the idea of working together both with the public and with local authorities to address security problems’. The report noted these innovations ‘promote the idea of public-police partnership’ and ‘had a positive impact on police-public relationships’.

Although this represents a significant improvement, survey also results indicate that community members in SSAPR’s intervention sites are not fully satisfied with the level of collaboration. Data presented in Table 23 indicate that just over a third of community members in SSAPR sites are satisfied with the current level of collaboration, compared with over half of respondents in comparison sites.

**Table 23. Percentage of KAP respondents reporting appreciation of the current level of collaboration between the police and communities, by research site**

Perceived police–community collaboration	Intervention (N=4,384)	Comparison (N=4,393)
Good	35	52.7
Bad	62.5	46.6
Don’t know	2.5	0.7

These results should be interpreted carefully. For instance, this may mean that, though the level of collaboration has improved in SSAPR sites, it is just now reaching an ‘acceptable level’ from a low base, and as such community members in SSAPR pilot sites are now enjoying the same level of appreciation as those in comparison sites. In addition, an improving security situation in SSAPR sites may also serve to raise community expectations about what ‘effective collaboration’ looks like.

Respondents said people were now more aware of the most appropriate place to take problems as well as which police practices, including accepting bribes, were illegal. This was most clearly described in Kananga:

*With the establishment of the PdP, many people now know their rights in the realm of security. That’s the reason why so many voices are being heard now demanding that the population be protected (Kananga, Religious Group 1).*

Although respondents in Bukavu were not as vocal about this change, they nevertheless provided one example of an intervention key to supporting this change:

*Poster campaigns helped improve public knowledge that the services of the police are free, which reinforces the connection between the police and the community. We hope these will be expanded and distributed everywhere (Bukavu, Religious Group 2).*

Even though more evidence is necessary to fully understand the varying role of the community in the police reform process, these findings indicate that, although processes are often slow, they nevertheless played a role in supporting the development of the PdP. Respondents did

not feel the PNC was 'directly answerable' to the population on security matters, as highlighted in the ToC monitoring, but nevertheless said this level of public engagement motivated the police to work in the interests of the public, as well as motivating PNC authorities to remain invested in reform efforts.

## Greater public trust in and support for the police

It is reasonable to conclude that *'the various mechanisms supported by SSAPR have promoted a more participatory approach between the PNC, local authorities and local communities to address security issues'*.<sup>51</sup> ISSAT found plausible evidence there had been a substantial improvement in public levels of trust in and support for the police. The review team used the following quotes from local security actors to describe the nature of this change. It is interesting to note that this covers a wide range of actors, all of whom describe the same change.

*Before, if you met a police officer at night, it was like coming face-to-face with a snake. Now people feel that the police are there for them 24/7, and that's thanks to the PdP (senior local authority representative).*

*We're no longer seen as the enemy (senior police commander).*

*The programme has changed the mentality of the police. Now they really are close to us (de proximité) (community representative).*


*One day, we found a bandit in the church and he injured my son. The police caught the guy. The first thing that really struck me was that I didn't have to pay a penny (religious representative).*

*The authorities often come to us if they need information on security issues. Every week, in fact (civil society representative).*

Survey respondents in the 2014 KAP reported strong feelings of confidence in the police and PdP-trained officers, in particular in their communities. When asked what their strongest feelings were in thinking about the PdP, nearly half of the sample responded having confidence in the PdP. Similarly, only 6% of respondents reported 'fear' as their strongest sentiment in thinking about the PdP (Figure 27).

---

<sup>51</sup> ISSAT/SU (2013) Annual Review.



**Figure 27. Proportion of 2014 KAP respondents in SSAPR intervention sites reporting feelings of confidence in PdP**

TOC monitoring data further strengthen these findings, as respondents overwhelmingly noted that their trust in the police had increased since 2009 and the introduction of PdP. For example, one member of a youth organisation in Matadi noted,

*In 2009, the police were enemies of the population. They terrorised the population. But now in 2014, this is no longer the case. Confidence has been re-established between the population and the police, allowing them to collaborate. We now feel that the [police] station in the commune is our station (Matadi, Youth 1).*

It should be noted that this change was attributed to the PdP's positive manner of interacting with the population, willingness to carry out tasks without bribes and reduced collaboration with criminals.

Although this represents an improvement over time, it is important to mention that individuals in comparison sites had similar levels of trust in the police, with no significant differences in community members in either research site reporting whether they would go to the police if they were the victim of four common crimes (Table 24).

**Table 24. Percentage of KAP respondents reporting types of crimes for which they would go to the police, by type of crime and by research site**

	Intervention (N=3,607)	Comparison (N=3,738)
Harassment	70.1	70
Abuse	71.8	71.4
Theft	85.1	85.2
Violent attack	82.3	85.1



**Through a seemingly distinct processes, TOC monitoring data show the feedback loops and inter-dynamics at play, as building public trust in the police and improved police practice further improved community–police collaboration by improving community confidence in the PNC.** These processes indicate that improving feelings of security is often a necessary condition for fostering community–police cooperation.

The CSRP third M&E report similarly remarked on the change in the police’s attitudes towards the community and willingness to cooperate with them. The following excerpt describes how the mutual animosity that previously existed between police and communities had disappeared, paving the way for cooperation between former enemies:

*Le rapprochement entre les policiers et les habitants dans les communes pilotes a dissipé l’antagonisme qui a longtemps caractérisé leurs rapports avant l’expérimentation.*

Respondents also noted improved collaboration between the police and pilot communities through involvement of the PdP officers. They highlighted that, in 2009, communities were reluctant to work with the police, seeing them as drivers of insecurity rather than a solution to it.

## **Prevalence of serious crime has reduced in SSAPR pilot sites compared with intervention sites, although no change has occurred in terms of misdemeanour crimes**


There is mixed evidence to support observations on reduced crime levels. The evaluation team analysed changes in levels of crime among survey respondents between 2010 and 2014 in SSAPR intervention and pilot sites (Table 25). Data indicate that changes in levels of misdemeanour crimes were not statistically significant. This was true when disaggregating data for both men and women.

However, when running the same analysis for serious crimes, the change in SSAPR intervention sites between 2010 and 2014 was statistically significant, indicating a detectable reduction in serious crime in SSAPR intervention sites as compared with SSAPR comparison sites over time. This was true when disaggregating for both men and women, with each group exhibiting a statistically significant change over time from baseline in intervention sites. Importantly, there was no statistical significance when testing across sex for both groups, suggesting men and women were not disproportionately affected.

**Table 25. Percentage of survey respondents reporting being a victim of misdemeanour or serious crime in the past three years, by time, research site and by sex of respondent**

	Misdemeanour crime		Serious crime	
	2010	2014	2010	2014
<b>Intervention sites</b>				
<b>All respondents</b>	<b>81.26%</b>	<b>78.81%</b>	<b>20.18%</b>	<b>9.69%</b>
Male	83.71%	79.50%	22.96%	11.06%
Female	78.47%	78.04%	17%	8.19%
<b>Comparison sites</b>				
<b>All respondents</b>	<b>86.51%</b>	<b>86.96%</b>	<b>19.39%</b>	<b>16.12%</b>
Male	88.64%	88.02%	23.67%	19%
Female	84.22%	85.84%	14.78%	13.07%

These data are consistent with crime rates reported in the M&E component’s RARE study in 2013, using a representative sample of victims of crime in the three SSAPR pilot sites (Figure 14). Among all victims, about 83% of crimes reported by men and 89% of crimes reported by women were misdemeanour crimes.



**Figure 28. Proportion of misdemeanour and serious crime among all victims of crime in the past 12 months, by type of crime and sex of respondent**

Among victims of crime in the 2014 KAP survey, community members were asked if a security institution was involved or implicated in the crime. Table 26 presents the data for three common crimes cited in the study, showing an alarmingly high proportion of community members associating crimes with the police. Respondents in Kananga consistently reported higher rates of police involvement in crimes compared with in other research sites. For

instance, nearly 80% of male respondents in Kananga associated the police with harassment, compared with 83% of male respondents in the matched city of Mbuji-Mai.

**Table 26. Percentage of survey respondents reporting the police being implicated in theft, harassment or assault, by research site and sex of respondent**

	Theft		Harassment		Assault	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
<b>Intervention</b>						
Kananga	46.8	38.1	79	71.7	64.4	60.8
Matadi	26.2	24.1	48.3	38.5	22.1	21.8
Bukavu	12.3	6.5	50.1	46.7	47.6	48.3
<b>Comparison</b>						
Mbuji-Mayi	45.3	41.4	82.7	77.2	49.2	44.5
Boma	0.9	3.6	35.9	15.1	2.7	5.3
Goma	13.5	10.4	40.4	32.8	42	40.8

However, these results are inconsistent with qualitative data obtained from the ToC monitoring activities. Community-level respondent groups identified a reduction in crime as a major factor influencing their perceptions of the police, as described below:

*Today, crime has significantly reduced compared with 2009. Before, you would see between five and six crimes per day, including armed robbery, rape, theft and police harassment (Bukavu, Religious Group 1).*

A similar dynamic was noted in Kananga:


*Before [in 2009], there were many crimes in our commune – armed robbery, bandits and drunkenness. Too many youths fighting on the streets of Ndesha [...] Now, even though you can still see some crimes, their frequency has diminished (Kananga, Religious Group 1).*

This disconnect in SSAPR pilot sites between qualitative observations of changes in crime and actual changes in crime as reported from a representative household survey highlight the complicated relationship between objective security – actually being free from crime – and subjective security – feeling safe from crime. This is discussed further below.

## Increased public sense of security

**At the level of ‘wellbeing’, there is strong evidence that positive changes have occurred.** In the context of SSAPR, these changes relate primarily to an ‘increased public sense of security’ and are reinforced by data from both the KAP survey and the ToC monitoring.

Figure 29 displays changes in perceptions of and experiences with crime at the city level over time in SSAPR intervention and comparison sites alongside the level of change in the proportion of individuals reporting not having experienced a crime in the past 12 months. The net changes indicate that individuals living in SSAPR intervention sites now feel safer in their communities than those living in comparison sites in 2010. Individuals in intervention sites reported positive changes in their feelings of safety at roughly the same magnitude as the decrease in feelings of safety reported among individuals living in comparison sites.



**Figure 29. Changes in perceptions and experiences with crime at the city level over time in SSAPR intervention and comparison sites**

This significant increase in perceptions of safety was identified across all three SSAPR intervention sites, with respondents reporting feeling substantially safer and more secure than those populations sampled at baseline. The converse is true for all three SSAPR comparison sites, with respondents in all three comparison cities reporting feeling a great deal less safe and secure in their commune and city than respondents surveyed at baseline.

These findings were further confirmed in data collected through the ToC monitoring. This study found perceptions of security had positively changed in SSAPR sites, highlighting the sense of worry that accompanied previous elevated crime rates. One respondent in Matadi recounted this feeling:

*In 2009, there was a high level of crime in the commune of Nanza, including theft, extortion and violence in the street. You couldn't walk during the night with confidence, without worrying about bandits or the police. But today it's the opposite – the bandits have significantly diminished and the police don't torment us anymore. Now you can walk at night and no one will come and bother you (Matadi, Trade Organisation 2).*

Though this represents a significant improvement from the situation in 2009 in SSAPR intervention sites, it is also important to observe current perceptions of public security. Table

27 presents data from the 2014 KAP survey indicating that under half of the population in SSAPR pilot sites feel safe in their communities, compared with over 55% of community members in comparison sites.

**Table 27. Percentage of survey respondents reporting feeling safe in their community, by research site and sex**

	Intervention	Comparison
Male	43.10%	54.10%
Female	47.50%	57.60%
<b>Total</b>	<b>45.30%</b>	<b>55.80%</b>


These data suggest that, although things have improved, the majority of community members in the SSAPR pilot sites still feel unsafe in their communities.

## Impact measured through a multidimensional index

In order to provide a fuller picture of changes in SSAPR intervention sites over time, our analysis included 29 variables related to different aspects of safety and security as an aggregate estimate of the overall impact of the programme to complement other findings. The 29 variables chosen included the programme logframe Goal and Purpose indicators and ranged from experiences with criminality and judicial matters, to perceptions of the accountability of security services, to knowledge of and attitudes towards security service and justice providers. Results were then organised according to three multidimensional indices.

More details on this approach are available in the SSAPR KAP Endline Report. Headline findings on the overall impact of SSAPR according to these multidimensional indices are presented here. Controlling for all other factors in analysis,<sup>52</sup> results indicate that individuals living in SSAPR intervention sites in 2014 had improved overall knowledge, attitudes and perceptions around public safety compared with those in comparison sites over time. Indeed, on 22 of the 29 variables included in our indices, there was a significant positive improvement associated with living in an SSAPR intervention site in 2014 compared with living in comparison sites in 2010. All three intervention sites were grouped together, as were all three comparison sites, to convey the overall change in KAP across the SSAPR pilot and comparison sites.

<sup>52</sup> Comparing the differences in the differences between intervention and comparison sites over time and correcting for differences between sites and individuals' observable characteristics by survey round and by data collection round.



**Figure 30. Change in overall safety, security and justice KAP in SSAPR intervention sites and comparison sites over time and the overall level of change (DiD), across three indices**

## Assumptions around changes in community practice leading to improved collaboration and reduced crime

The ToC posits that, for changes in practice among the primary SSAPR target groups to lead to improved public–police collaboration and greater public trust in the police, some conditions need to be met. Namely,

- ❑ An internal accountability mechanism exists that holds the police to account.
- ❑ There are continued observations of positive police performance being made so communities are aware.
- ❑ There are continued observations about changes to reduction in crime.
- ❑ There are external accountability mechanisms to hold the police to account
- ❑ The media continues to raise awareness as well as serving as an external accountability mechanism.

### Evidence of internal police accountability

There is some evidence to confirm ‘changes to internal police accountability’ have occurred in SSAPR intervention sites. Internal accountability encompasses both support for police reforms from superior officers and a functional IG function in the police that identifies and punishes poor police behaviour.

**In terms of support from superiors, there is weak evidence this exists in a consistent manner.** FGDs with police indicated that only police superiors who had received SSAPR training on the PdP approach tended to support the reform process. This was confirmed in interviews with civil society and the media, with both reporting that, as superior officers have been reassigned to different posts and new superior officers have come in who were not part of the PdP approach, there has been a decline in their willingness to support some programme initiatives. For instance, the journalists who took part in the SSAPR training programme reported that it was now difficult to access higher officials in the PdP compared with after the training.

**Evidence on the extent to which the establishment of an internal IG within the PNC has been successful is inconclusive.** Anecdotal evidence suggests these efforts have largely been successful, with internal programme reports stating how SSAPR provided considerable support ‘to strengthen the capacity of the IG at both strategic and operational levels’ and was instrumental in developing a complaints mechanism available to both internal and external stakeholders. The complaints call centre is now operational and receiving calls, although the vast majority of complaints appear to be coming from within the PNC rather than from the public at large.

Collaboration between the IG and other justice services like the *parquet* has significantly improved and can be seen through missions of control of the OPJs that they organise together.

*The collaboration between the IG and other services of justice (parquet) is perfect. We organise missions of monitoring/control of the OPJ, notably on the regularity of files under investigations or on the regularity of prisoners (KII, provincial inspector, Bukavu).*

There is some evidence the IG is beginning to occupy an oversight function, with several sources referring to an audit of the PNC payroll that resulted in the identification of payroll discrepancies and the subsequent payment of salaries to 1,200 police officers. Additionally, the ISSAT annual review (2013) refers to an instance in Kasai-Occidental in which high-ranking police officials were arrested following the detection of fraud in the payment of police salaries.

A discussion with the procurer revealed that collaboration between security and justice actors and the prosecutor’s office had increased since the SSAPR intervention. The different activities of the magistrates built trust and collaboration among all different actors of the justice and security system.

However, there are considerable ongoing challenges to the effective functioning of the IG in the long term –namely, poor capacity, a lack of political will and the absence of any enforcement powers. Evidence suggests that, despite the considerable level of technical assistance provided, capacity remains limited. For instance, the military auditor complained files received from the IG were poorly prepared and had not followed procedure, meaning it was unable to prosecute. In addition, there are ongoing issues surrounding the lack of political will to make the police more accountable, as well as the limited policy and legal framework. These issues are compounded by a lack of understanding on the role of the IG at the community level. As a result, there are serious concerns that the IG cannot be sustained without the technical and financial support of the programme.

Outside of the fight against corruption within the PNC, little evidence exists of an internal mechanism that identifies and punishes bad police behaviour. Respondents participating in ToC monitoring cited a few cases in which senior police officers were held to account as important events that had improved their perception of the PNC. However, the evaluation could not gather any evidence of a systematic function being established and functional.

## Continued observations about police performance and reduced crime levels through functional external accountability mechanisms

The ToC posits that, for these changes in collaboration and trust to be maintained, there need to be continued observations of positive changes in the police and reductions in crime among community members. This will allow community members to maintain these levels of collaboration and trust over time, leading to continued reductions in crime. The evaluation gathered mixed results on whether these assumptions are being met.

Although CSOs were able to play their role as external accountability mechanisms in SSAPR pilot communities during the intervention period, particularly around opportunities for public–police engagement, evidence of the sustainability of these changes is weak. The new activities CSOs implemented were fully funded by the programme and coordinated by a network heavily supported by SSAPR.

Some anecdotal evidence exists of CSOs continuing some activities, but it is unclear the degree to which community sensitisation events and other community fora organised by the programme will continue to occur in the absence of programme funding, as the majority of CSOs active in the programme represented hired staff of CSOs implementing donor-funded activities.

## Continued media coverage

There is also evidence that media reports and investigations have decreased in number since the end of the engagement with SSAPR. Without continued funding from SSAPR, directors of media institutions have opted to replace security reports with other reports that bring in advertising money. Furthermore, journalists are still facing reticence from the authorities when they want to investigate sensitive security topics.

## Assumptions of changes in police practice leading to reduced crime

### No major police scandals

Regarding the first assumption, there is no evidence that ‘no police scandals have occurred that affected public perceptions’ of the PdP. However, a number of scandals have occurred affecting the broader PNC, including Operation Likofi in Kinshasa and police opening fire on demonstrators at a political rally in Bukavu. ToC monitoring data suggest these events have an important symbolic effect on the population and one incident, such as the one in Bukavu, can significantly detract from positive progress being made.

### Changes are visible

More positively, there is strong evidence that ‘changes in PdP practice are visible’. This evidence stems from data collected through the KAP presented earlier in this story and ToC monitoring, whereby people in all sites reported experiencing significant changes in PdP behaviour towards the public, responsiveness and performance of their duties. Further data



on police scandals will be collected as part of the remainder of the evaluation period to confirm this assumption.

## Courts deal effectively with criminals

Assumptions relating to the formal justice system, specifically, that 'courts deal effectively with criminals', is currently weak. The RARE study found low levels of public confidence in the ability of the justice system to hold criminals accountable. Among the population of victims surveyed who had taken their case to the police, only 3.6% also went to the prosecutor. Although visiting the prosecutor would normally happen following referral from the police, only 1.3% of individuals who took their case to the prosecutor were referred by anyone, and only 0.4% were referred by the police.

This indicates that, at the time this data were collected in June 2013, coordination and referral between links in the justice chain were largely absent. Despite this, data collected through the KAP study show 13.52% more people in SSAPR pilot sites than in control sites in 2014 were satisfied with their experiences of the formal justice system. However, this improvement on the baseline should not be interpreted as representing an effective system overall.

## Assumptions of changes to public trust in the police and reduced crime leading to an increased public sense of security

### No backsliding

**There is strong evidence from different sources accessed throughout the evaluation that, without a strong sustainability function in place, many of the gains the programme made are starting to decline.** ToC monitoring data collected between spring and autumn 2014 indicate that, in a number of cases, adherence to PdP principles and other changes in behaviour among PdP-trained officers had begun to decline.

This was confirmed in interviews with local authorities. Politico-administrative officials interviewed as part of this evaluation believed the spirit of collaboration had faded over time:

*Avec l'évolution des choses, il y a un recule dans la collaboration et le respect des consignes de la part des PdP. Car la police est en train de revenir sur ces anciennes pratiques suite au manque de motivation et/ou au manque d'encadrement par leur actuelle hiérarchie non formée sur la PdP. On sent qu'ils reçoivent souvent de leurs hiérarchies des ordres qui pèchent contre les 10 règles d'Or.*


In Matadi, parliamentarians reported similar challenges, related to the non-application by members of the PNC of the recommendations formulated by the parliamentarians:

*The principal actors of this reform are the PNC. Nonetheless their members are poorly paid. This results in less efficiency in our actions.*

This point was importantly reinforced when conducting interviews with the police themselves. While some PdP officers said they enjoyed the training opportunities and status involved in being part of the PdP, the majority cited salaries and poor socioeconomic conditions as a

concern and a factor that could lead them to leave the PdP. Many respondents in the qualitative research also highlighted that in some cases positive improvements in police practice had slipped backward because of poor salaries and the low socioeconomic status of the police.

Indeed, data from the RARE study conducted by the M&E component in 2013 looking at police motivation over time indicated that, among the approximately 70% of police officers trained in the PdP approach during the Cycle 1 training who reported being positive just after the training and no longer positive about the PdP approach one year later, nearly 90% of them attributed this negative change in their views of the approach to issues of salary and compensation (Figure 31).



**Figure 31. Percentage of police officers in SSAPR pilot sites reporting satisfaction with the PdP approach just after the PdP training and one year after**

FGD discussions with PNC officers also reported some dropout from the PdP: all groups of respondents reported knowing some individuals who had dropped out of the PdP after training.

## Institutional changes

The programme from the outset recognised the risks to sustainability and thus through the CCROSS component aimed to institutionalise the police reform process at the national and provincial levels by working with concerned political actors.

**At the national level, trainings were conducted with key security actors to strengthen their ability to incorporate police reform activities within their current mandates.** For instance, trainings were conducted for the National Secretariat of the CSRP to improve their M&E functions. Trainings were conducted for MISDAC to improve their role of security sector coordination. For example, trainings were conducted on police reform and security governance for various departments in the ministry to inform them of progress on police reforms and build their capacity to better plan for SSR. This included trainings for the national-level police IG.

**At the provincial level, capacity-building activities were conducted with several stakeholders.** This included authorities within the Governor’s Office, the provincial delegation of MISDAC, the Provincial Security Council and the provincial delegation of the IG in SSAPR pilot sites. They including trainings and workshops to inform on progress on police reform

process and their roles within this. These SSAPR-sponsored events were successful in getting different actors to engage in the reform process and become more aware of the principles of the PdP approach.

**There is strong evidence the programme was able to work with national counterparts to improve the policing legal framework during the SSAPR intervention period.** In terms of successes in the institutionalisation of the reform process and a policing legal framework, in 2012 the National Assembly, with support from SSAPR, approved the Organic Law of the PNC and a decree on the creation of local and provincial-level security committees to coordinate public–police collaboration efforts. Importantly, the law describes the role and responsibilities of administrative authorities in the functioning of the police.

The SSAPR 2013 Annual Review reports that a significant number of major laws and decrees relating to the security and justice sectors were passed:

- A law on the statute of the police agent;
- A decree on the organisation and functioning of the High Council of the PNC;
- A decree on the organisation and functioning of CLSPs;
- A decree on the merging of the judicial police with the national bureau of Interpol within the PNC;
- A decree on the code of deontology of police officers in the PNC;
- A decree on the organisation and functioning of the management of police training.

Alongside this, the PNC and the government adopted a five-year police reform plan. At the end of 2013, this was backed by a *loi de programmation*, which outlined steps and budgets required to implement the plan.

The programme reports that MISDAC has also demonstrated increased involvement in internal security and police reform, through a number of recent ministerial decrees, based on lessons learnt from the SSAPR pilot provinces. This includes a decree on the creation of an inter-ministerial commission responsible for the implementation of territorial reform, a decree establishing a commission for finance management reform and a decree on the creation of a technical unit to support the realisation of PNC reform. MISDAC also reportedly improved budgeting and financial management capabilities by launching a programme designed to reform resource management in MISDAC and the PNC and establishing zero-based budgeting.

Throughout 2014, the programme reported the passing of a number of policies and decrees in favour of a policing legal framework. According to the most recent Annual Review, with SSAPR support, MISDAC drafted decrees on the organisation and functioning of police territorial units and provincial commissariats. This legislation will be essential for embedding the structure of a reformed police force throughout DRC.

**The programme acknowledged challenges with the institutionalisation of reforms and that this process required strong political engagement.** Although there was a general willingness among political actors with regard to police reform, this was not met with firm commitments or actions in a timely manner, largely as the police are closely linked to the current political regime. This type of political engagement goes beyond what could or should be expected of a programme implementer and requires a higher level of engagement;

however, note that DFID did not become an active stakeholder in this process until 2013, when it put together a political engagement strategy for the programme.

At the end of 2014, the programme reported a need for extensive and broader legislation and implementation in terms of internal security and police reform, with political engagement and advocacy at the highest political level a key concern. The programme also reported that budgeting and financial sustainability of MISDAC and the PNC was one of the most important barriers to internal security and police reform.


**Despite progress, there remain serious questions about the sustainability of the programme, and of the reform process in general, without external support.** The SSAPR team provided considerable support to organise and facilitate committee meetings and other support activities, which should have been nationally driven and demonstrated weak buy-in and follow-through from the relevant Congolese counterparts. This raises questions about ownership and the ability to drive the change process.

The programme also reported some evidence of the sustainability of reforms at the local level. For instance, the provincial commissariat in Matadi began a number of initiatives in favour of the reform process, including providing petrol and motorbikes to local police stations, engaging more proactively with communities and providing financial support to cover running costs at local commissariats. Equally, the provincial minister in Bukavu had expressed a wish to extend PdP activities beyond the pilot provinces to all territories in the area, given the success of SSAPR interventions as been noted by the provincial government.

## Variations to the narrative

### Impacts through a gender lens

In terms of gender-disaggregated results, there was not strong evidence that women experienced differential changes in capacity or community practice. According to our multidimensional indices, men were more likely to experience improved overall KAP than women, although this does not detract from the positive changes in overall KAP experienced by both sexes in pilot sites. Figure 32 shows the relative change in improved KAP for both men and women in SSAPR intervention sites compared with respondents in comparison sites over time. Men experienced slightly higher changes in improved KAP across all three indices, although women also experienced significant improvements in KAP that should not be overlooked or diminished.




**Figure 32. Difference-in-difference impact of SSAPR interventions overall disaggregated by gender**

Both men and women experienced statistically significant changes in the reduction of serious crime, although no significant changes in misdemeanour crimes were detected. There were also no statistically significant differences between prevalence of different types of crime for men and women. Other gender-disaggregated data do not indicate any major differences as to women’s differential impact.

### Geographic variations

Looking at geographically disaggregated results on overall improvements in safety and security-related KAP at the city pair level brings up some interesting findings. For instance, in the intervention site of Matadi, there was an increase of about 3% in respondents reporting ‘not having been a victim of crime in the previous 12 months’, which is a positive trend. In the matched comparison city of Boma, a negative change of over 20% was estimated over time among those experiencing crime. Thus, although the net change suggests citizens in Matadi reported improved experiences with crime over time by nearly 24%, the net change in Matadi is more an effect of the relative increased experience with crime in Boma rather than the actual decrease in experience with crime in Matadi. Conversely, the Kasai-Occidental pair saw the opposite result, with respondents in the intervention site of Kananga reporting more experiences with crime over time compared with respondents in the comparison site of Mbuji-Mai.

Figure 33 displays the comparative changes in KAP across all six research sites over time using all three indices used in our analysis. Results here indicate that overall scoring across the three indices varies quite substantially, although all three comparison cities decreased in overall KAP by roughly the same amount on the Global Impact Indicator (around 10% for all cities).



**Figure 33. Change in overall safety, security and justice KAP across six research sites over time and overall level of change (DiD) across three indices**

The Bas-Congo paired cities of Matadi (intervention) and Boma (comparison) recorded the most comparable changes across all three indices used in this analysis, with the AFI and Global Impact Indicator demonstrating nearly identical scores. As each index places a different weighting on the 29 variables, this similarity between indices suggests respondents in Matadi demonstrated improved KAP not only in comparison with similar respondents in the comparison city of Boma (as measured by the Global Impact Indicator) but also overall across a high number of the different variables of knowledge, attitudes, perceptions and experiences with security and justice institutions over time. However, again, the relatively higher levels of negative change in Boma over time compared with the relatively lower levels of positive change in Matadi over time suggest overall KAP performance in Boma has negatively changed at a higher rate than KAP performance has improved in Matadi.

The Kasai-Occidental paired cities of Kananga (intervention) and Mbuji-Mai (comparison) had the lowest DiD change on two out of the three indices used in this analysis (Base KAP and the AFI), with a relatively higher change reported on the Global Impact Indicator. This suggests that, although respondents in Kananga demonstrated improved KAP when compared with respondents in Mbuji-Maye over time, overall Kananga and Mbuji-May experienced the lowest levels of absolute change in KAP performance and in the number of non-deprived characteristics across the three intervention and comparison sites, respectively.

Within the paired cities of Bukavu (intervention) and Goma (comparison), Bukavu had the largest increases in KAP performance on two out of the three indices (Base KAP and the AFI). Goma saw the largest decrease in overall KAP performance on the same two indices. In contrast with the other two city pairs, the large DiD difference changes in this city pair are driven by improved KAP performance in Bukavu over time, compared with a relatively lower negative change in Goma. This suggests that, in terms of both individual characteristics and overall performance, respondents in Bukavu experienced the highest improvements in KAP performance compared with the other intervention sites.

## Civil society impact annex

SSAPR activities led to changes in CSO practice that provided opportunities for public–police engagement but were less effective in establishing external accountability measures; claims for the sustainability of changes are weak.

SSAPR’s EA component worked with a diverse range of CSOs to increase their knowledge of local security issues and build their capacity to engage communities to take an active role in police reform issues. At the same time, CSO capacity to monitor, advocate and lobby on behalf of security issues was developed to allow CSOs to assume an oversight function and create additional pressure for accountability within the police.

The majority of activities related to CSOs focused on providing training to these groups to increase their understanding of the politico-legal landscape surrounding police reform as well as equipping them with tools designed to allow them to play an active role in holding the police to account.

**The evaluation team gathered substantial evidence that capacity-building activities were conducted as planned, reaching a large and diverse number of CSOs able to represent community concerns**

**There is strong evidence that SSAPR components provided high-quality and relevant training to CSOs in the three pilot sites as planned.** A total of 1,282 individuals were trained by SSAPR and its partners over the course of the programme. Individuals trained were representatives of 152 CSOs, ranging from local chapters of international NGOs (such as Search for Common Ground), administrative bodies (such as the PNC itself, the RRSSJ – a network that oversees CSOs in SSAPR pilot sites) and grassroots community groups (such as schools, women’s collectives and community fora).<sup>53</sup>

Training activities largely took the form of knowledge/sensitisation activities intending to build knowledge on police reform and introduce tools CSOs could use to play a more active role in advocating for improved policing. Issues covered but were not limited to police reform (issues and legal/policy); sexual violence; gender mainstreaming within the PNC; and explaining the role of the IG in improving accountability within the PNC. Primary data collected from FGDs with CSO representatives who attended these training also showed people were trained on the content of laws related to security and justice sector reform, as well as the history of the PNC. Participants described the importance of this knowledge, saying it provided a background for understanding the political landscape of SSR.

This training was complemented by the development of and training on tools to allow CSOs to play a more active oversight role in the police reform process. Specifically, these tools aimed to equip CSOs with the ability to advocate for police reform and monitor the performance of security actors through citizen oversight missions conducted by representatives of CSOs and the public. We refer to these missions as *contrôles citoyens* as there is no clear English equivalent.

---

<sup>53</sup> Complete list of CSO partners that EA worked with (2010-2014), provided by DAI.

**Evidence suggests a diverse range of CSOs were reached and CSOs reached were able to represent a wide range of views, specifically those of women and marginalised communities.** CSOs worked closely with the DYCOM structure (all members of community) and found women were often represented and more vocal than men. In addition, CSOs performed women's only outreach activities with female members of the police and military to ensure women's voices were adequately represented.

The evaluation team also gathered evidence that the CSOs connected to SSAPR understood public security needs and were able to communicate the needs of the community to these actors. The programme/CSOs made a concerted effort to make themselves accessible to marginalised communities by using anonymous suggestion boxes and community scorecards while also playing a very active role in community fora.

Additionally, in FGDs, CSO members explained they attended these trainings out of an interest in improving their capacity:

*C'était une nouvelle approche dans le cadre de sécurité car nous étions ignorants et la sécurité était longtemps resté un domaine réservé à certaines personnes seulement.*

These respondents also highlighted their interest in understanding how CSOs could improve the security situation as an additional motivation for attending these:

*L'insécurité était un phénomène grandissant dans notre ville/ province. On avait besoin d'être en contact avec ces services sécuritaires pour contribuer aussi à notre sécurité... Nous étions donc intéressés à comprendre dans quelle mesure les OSC peuvent s'impliquer et, surtout, comprendre ce que cette implication peut apporter dans le domaine sécuritaire.*

The fact that CSOs interviewed commonly cited an enhanced ability to carry out their work as a result of this training suggests these trainings were of good quality and met the needs of these groups.

## SSAPR activities with CSOs increased opportunities for the police and the public to engage on security concerns

**SSAPR training led to increased CSO knowledge and skills in facilitating community engagement around SSR.** In a focus group run by the evaluation team, representatives of CSOs who had participated in SSAPR-led training described how it had improved their knowledge of the laws and context surrounding security and justice sector reform in DRC. Focus group participants described how the sessions had improved their knowledge and capacity to advocate for change.

*Nous avons eu l'historique de la police en RDC dans ses étapes d'évolutions jusqu'à ce stade où on devrait s'impliquer pour aider cette police à remplir sa mission. Nous avons eu les informations sur les missions de la police et les devoirs de la population dans le domaine sécuritaire (FGD, Kananga CSOs).*

In one focus group in Bukavu, participants described how the training had equipped them with a new understanding of the roles and obligations of the police, while other discussions referred to the importance of their new practical skills in engaging with communities to discuss security issues.



*Dans le temps, il y avait une distance entre la Police et la population qu'elle était censé protéger. Un climat de méfiance. Mais, grâce à cette formation, nous avons mis en pratique ces méthodes de sensibilisation de porte à porte, la participation aux Forum des quartiers, la communication du numéro vert [...] pour faire comprendre à la population qu'elle doit collaborer avec la police pour sa sécurité. (FGD, Bukavu CSOs)*

*Nous avons été outillés sur les lois applicables en matière de la réforme du secteur de sécurité et de justice [...] concernant la méthodologie, nous avons eu des techniques de sensibilisation (FGD, Matadi CSOs).*

**SSAPR trainings also led to a change in CSO attitudes regarding the police.** Focus groups with CSOs discussed how this training had altered their previous conceptions about the police. In addition to understanding the challenges of police reform from a legal and policy perspective, CSOs changed their attitudes, coming to understand the socioeconomic challenges of the police adhering to the PdP philosophy:

*Avant la formation, on avait une perception négative de la police. Nous vivions très séparés de la Police. Chaque partie évitait l'autre. La police était notre ennemi. Des personnes pour menacer et inquiéter constamment la population (FGD, Kananga CSOs).*

CSO representatives noted how the training had contributed to a positive reconciliation between police and communities, where these groups were once at odds with each other.

*Après la formation, il y a eu rapprochement et cohabitation avec la police, nous sommes éveillés car nous connaissons notre rôle dans la gestion du secteur de sécurité (FGD, Kananga CSOs).*

As a result of training, CSOs are now aware of their role/responsibility as key actors in the police reform process.

*Nous exigeons des comptes à la PNC et aux autres secteurs de sécurité et de justice ; avec les boîtes à suggestions et les cartes de score, nous évaluons les prestations des policiers, nous savons organiser le dialogue social ; Pour recourir aux services de sécurité et/ ou de justice, on sait à qui s'adresser (FGD, Kananga CSOs).*

**Changes in CSO capacity led to a change in practice, in terms of increased community sensitisation around police reform.** There is significant evidence of CSO involvement in 'sensitising' and improving the knowledge of those in SSAPR pilot communities on issues surrounding security sector reform.

*Dans le temps, il y avait une distance entre la Police et la population qu'elle était censé protéger. Un climat de méfiance. Mais, grâce à cette formation, nous avons mis en pratique ces méthodes de sensibilisation de porte à porte, la participation aux Forum des quartiers, la communication du numéro vert [...] pour faire comprendre à la population qu'elle doit collaborer avec la police pour sa sécurité.*

Once the public had engaged in this debate, CSOs were able to run mass sensitisation campaigns to pass on their improved knowledge to the public. The KAP survey found that 32.91% of the population had attended a public sensitisation event.

**Changes in CSO practice also provided more opportunities for public–police engagement.** While no evidence exists on the level of engagement between CSOs and communities prior to training, the KAP survey revealed that 32.91% of people had been involved in public sensitisation campaigns, 29.73% had participated in an FQ and 12.10% had participated in a public forum to discuss the security situation. In addition, a further 6.43% had participated in joint activities with the police. However, only 1.18% had filled in a scorecard and 1.35% had used the suggestion boxes to share advice and complaints. Despite this low participation in scorecards and suggestion boxes, CSO representatives cited these as important tools at their disposal.

*Les cartes de scores et les boîtes à suggestions nous ont permis de connaître les besoins de la population en matière de sécurité et de justice, de comprendre leurs avis et préoccupations et d'influencer positivement le comportement des policiers (FGD, CSOs Bukavu).*

CSOs noted that they had also been increasingly involved in the FQs. These community fora bring together a diverse range of community stakeholders to discuss local security issues and have been a major success of the overall programme. CSOs have been employing the aforementioned engagement tools to ensure all voices are represented at the FQs. In addition, this mechanism allows CSOs to escalate issues to the relevant authorities present at the FQs. Magistrates from the *parquet* also participate in FQs and follow up on the concerns expressed by the population during their OPJ monitoring missions.

## There is weak evidence on the effectiveness of CSO–community engagement activities leading to a change in police practice through improved external accountability measures

**SSAPR training activities led to improved CSO capacity to hold security actors to account.** CSOs reported having been equipped with crucial knowledge as well as the monitoring and advocacy skills necessary to enable them to provide an oversight function of public service delivery. During FGDs with CSOs conducted as part of this evaluation, when asked the question ‘What knowledge and competencies do you have as a result of the training?’ respondents (specifically those from Bukavu) detailed how the training had equipped them with the tools needed to conduct *contrôle citoyen* monitoring missions. Respondents referred to an example of how CSOs had used advocacy techniques learnt from the trainings to develop and implement a regulatory framework that has successfully removed barriers to reform.

However, as CSO capacity was not assessed prior to training, no quantitative assessment exists to confirm this change.

**There is mixed evidence on the degree to which police and other security actors were willing to engage with the population.** There is some evidence the police have been engaging with CSOs to better understand the security needs of the population. A number of focus groups highlighted this :

*De fois pour certains questions délicates, la police fait appel aux OSC pour une consultation/un conseil utile.*

Another group also highlighted these positive changes:

*De fois, les membres de la PdP viennent à nous, pour dénoncer les ordres illégaux (qui pèchent contre la déontologie PdP) données par la hiérarchie.*

However, other groups highlighted their difficulties gaining access to the police,

*Beaucoup d'autres acteurs du secteur de sécurité ne comprennent pas encore cette nouvelle approche. Car la réforme n'a concerné qu'une partie de la PNC. Cela fait que certaines personnes ne nous facilitent pas la tâche et ne collaborent pas. (FGD, CSOs, Matadi).*

**There is mixed evidence on the effectiveness of CSO activities to improve external accountability measures better holding the police to account for their behaviour.** The evaluation team attempted to collect evidence to support assumptions that change in CSO actions to hold the police to account led to improved police behaviour. The team found mixed evidence on the police changing their behaviour and becoming more accountable to citizens as a result of the *contrôle citoyen* missions and other lobbying and advocacy.

Focus group participants from CSOs referred to the example of how CSOs, working with the security and justice network of CSOs (RRSSJ), had employed lobbying and advocacy tools gained to initiate the adoption of the law establishing relations on the use of firearms by officers and other people in charge of public demonstrations, although further information on these activities could not be found in other programme reports.

Further anecdotal evidence across the three pilot sites in the 2013 independent review of the programme (undertaken by ISSAT) suggests CSOs, the RRSSJ and the media worked together to 'take actions to hold the PNC, other security actors and local authorities accountable for issues related to community security'. The ISSAT review describes how the RRSSJ and its member organisations had been active at both national and provincial levels during the previous year:

*This collaborative process demonstrates that linkages have started to be developed between internal and external accountability mechanisms.*

However, ISSAT notes in the same annual review,

*There is very little evidence that would demonstrate that potential serious abuses by police against people, including human rights violations, have been addressed through these channels. RRSSJ monitoring activities mainly focused on the implementation of PdP, and partly on defence reform. No monitoring of serious human rights abuses were reported to the review team, except indirectly through the work of the Réseau National des Organisations des Droits de l'Homme (RENADOHC). As a point in case, the RRSSJ did not take any initiatives to document the police operations against youth gangs in Kinshasa (kulunas) which took place during the review team's visit in DRC. This is despite multiple reports and allegations from different sources of abuses by the Police.*

Primary data collected through focus groups with the police (both PdP and non-PdP) as part of this evaluation reveal some evidence to suggest that the PdP feels more accountable to citizens. Furthermore, comparisons between the PdP and non-PdP focus groups would suggest these changes are correlated with improved collaboration and more frequent

interactions with CSOs and the communities. Across all three sites, members of the PdP interviewed referenced the improved collaboration as a key factor in this change.

*Oui, nous sommes toujours avec la population et les OSCs; c'est une bonne chose car, elle permet la communication en matière de sécurité entre police-population (FGD, PdP, Matadi).*

Participants in all three sites said how community fora had given them a channel for discussing security issues. In Kananga, this was described by the participants as '*des grandes occasions pour nous d'interagir avec les groupes communautaires (media, OSC, APA, représentants des enseignants et des médecins, etc.)*'.

Members of the PdP who participated in FGDs described how this collaboration was brought about by the establishment of open communication streams between the three groups and how this benefited each of them:

*Elle [la population] facilite la tâche aux policiers de bien faire leur travail; elle permet à la population de dénoncer les malfaiteurs et ce dans les FQ ou CLSP, permet un dialogue franc entre police-population ; ceci influe sur la façon de faire notre travail car, elle nous a permis de comprendre que la population n'est pas notre ennemi mais plutôt un partenaire auprès de qui on tire des informations sur certains abus commis au sein de la communauté (FGD, PdP, Matadi).*

A great deal of this change appears to be improved collaboration and proximity to CSOs and populations. There is evidence that the activities of the CSOs directly influenced the behaviour of police:

*Q. Est-ce que cela influence/affecte d'une manière ou d'une autre votre comportement en tant que Policier PdP ?*

*A. Bien sûr. Si la population identifie le malfaiteur, pour intervenir, les policiers passent par le chef de quartier avant d'entrer dans le quartier ou auprès d'autres cadres de base (FGD, PdP, Bukavu).*

Furthermore, the PdP in Kananga described how this dynamic had forced the PdP to be more accountable for their behaviour, describing the community groups as a *garde-fou* and comparing them to a mirror in which they could see whether they were dirty (corrupt) or clean (accountable and responsive to citizens). When asked to expand, the participant replied,

*Ce partenariat nous donne matière à réflexion sur la conduite à adopter (ce qu'il faut faire et ce qu'il faut éviter) ;*

*Les principes de transparence et de redevabilité sont appliqués à cette occasion ;*

*Ce partenariat nous met dans les conditions de respecter nos principes ;*

*Il nous permet aussi de revoir nos méthodes d'intervention si les premières ont échouées ou se sont révélées inefficaces ;*

*En un mot, le partenariat nous permet d'améliorer notre travail.*

Unexpectedly, non-PdP officers interviewed described how, despite not having any formal interaction with CSOs, they had forced them (the non-PdP) to change their behaviour.

*Nous n'avons pas de contact formel avec les OSC. Impact : leur présence affecte notre comportement dans la mesure où, nous sommes obligés de nous conformer à la loi pour éviter les critiques et d'être accusé à la hiérarchie.*

## No strong evidence that changes in CSO practice will be sustained, outside of some isolated cases

A key assumption for this success of the CSO component of the programme was that CSO representatives would change their practice moving forward around local community concerns. In order for this to be achieved, several assumptions would need to be met – namely, that CSO members would remain active in the sector, that activities would be well coordinated across the civil society and that CSOs would have the financial resources to maintain these activities. The evaluation team did not find sufficient evidence that these assumptions were met, calling into question the sustainability of these changes to CSO practice and thus their effectiveness in creating future opportunities for community engagement with the police.

**Evidence suggests trained civil society members are unlikely to remain active on security issues.** The fact that the evaluation team was able to organise focus groups of those who had participated in CSO training and were still working for CSOs is a positive indication of initial sustainability. However, most of these individuals were paid in large part by SSAPR funding. As such, without SSAPR funding, it is unclear whether these activities will continue.

**The evaluation team also does not have sufficient evidence to comment on the quality of coordination provided by local network of civil society actors in security and justice.** Evidence suggests this coordination was put in place and financially supported by the programme, rather than as a result of community need or being community-led. This calls into the question the long-term sustainability of these activities once the programme has ended.

**It is unclear whether CSOs trained by SSAPR have sufficient resources (both financial and human) to fully utilise this capacity.** The general consensus from FGDs appeared to be that financial support to CSOs had decreased during the life of the programme. This mentality was summarised by a participant in Matadi, who noted,

*C'est difficile car il n'y a pas de partenaires pour nous appuyer. On grignote quelque fois sur les fonds alloués à d'autres projets ou on tire dans nos réserves s'il y en a.*

This notion was widely held. When asked 'Do you have sufficient resources to be able to continue to carry out your activities once the programme has concluded?' respondents replied

*Non, parce que nos bailleurs de fonds actuels ne sont pas encore intéressés par la réforme.*

Complaints about decreasing financial support appear to be consistent with programme reports. The ISSAT Annual Review of 2013 described how EA had decreased financial support to RRSSJ (and its members) by 50%.

Despite these reports of a lack of funding, some CSOs appear to be implementing activities without continued funding so it is difficult to tell whether there is merit to these claims. Some FGD participants, for example, mentioned lobbying activities they had conducted with the

provincial parliament; others noted how these efforts had resulted in the allocation of an additional CFA 500,000,000 to support the PdP.

## Variations to the narrative

### Impacts through a gender lens

There is limited evidence of the extent to which CSO activities had differential impacts on men and women. Focus groups with CSO representatives described how they had gone to great lengths to ensure the voices of women were heard. Indeed, participants described how women were often more represented than men in community fora and felt comfortable voicing their security concerns. In addition, representatives from Matadi described how different groups had been involved in different activities, with women more likely to be involved in activities discussing their risk of sexual violence at night and when collecting water. However, this evidence is largely anecdotal as quantitative data on differential impacts of CSO activities on communities are limited.

### Geographic variations

There are some minor variations in responses to CSO activities across the three pilot sites, although overall these activities appear to have been well received across all sites. Any variations are more to do with responses to differences in security situations rather than any major difference in the implementation of CSO activities across sites. Motivation for participating in the training and activities appears to be the same across sites, with CSO representatives noting that it was a new approach to security, and something they believed could improve security within their communities.

In the same vein, all focus groups reported facing some resistance and interference from different members of the communities when trying to implement door-to-door sensitisation campaigns. Similarly, representatives from CSOs across all three sites stated concerns over the funding of activities following the closure of the programme. It seems as though SSAPR provided financial support to implementing all CSO activities across the three sites. Indeed, all representatives referred to the same mechanisms for engaging the community (scorecards, suggestion boxes, community fora) and all stated that they had not thought of these mechanisms prior to their engagement with SSAPR.

In terms of who has attended activities, there were a few minor variations in the responses. In Matadi, representatives referenced how young people were more interested in collaboration activities with the PdP (such as football games) whereas women were more likely to be involved in discussions of issues in which they are disproportionately affected, such as requesting night patrols and better lighting to combat sexual violence.

## Media impact annex

Journalists trained by the programme changed practice in the short term, creating an effective mechanism to reach communities and hold the police to account, although little evidence exists to support the sustainability of these changes.

### Journalists were effectively reached by SSAPR with high-quality training and other support services

#### **Journalists received high-quality theoretical and practical training from SSAPR.**

Between 2011 and 2012, a total of 37 journalists were trained (14 in Kinshasa, eight in Kananga, eight in Matadi and seven in Bukavu) by SSAPR's EA component, including four women journalists. These journalists all had one to four years of prior work experience in written media, radio or television. The training aimed to improve their ability to bring security issues into public debates and better inform citizens, raise awareness on security issues and monitor implementation of the police reform process in the SSAPR pilot sites.

The training covered various topics related to security reform, including the PdP and parliamentary control and oversight of security sector issues. Journalists were trained on their role in the reform as well as the legal and operational framework they would be working in. Evidence gathered from FGDs and programme reports indicates the training also addressed the work of civil society and the mechanisms introduced in the context of SSAPR (community scorecards, FQs, etc.). Some key concepts around accountability of the police or freedom of expression were also addressed and new terminology related to the security sector and reform process was presented.

Programme reports indicate the training not only was theoretical but also illustrated key media reporting techniques and communication skills in order to allow journalists to produce quality media productions. It gave journalists new techniques, tools and skills for data collection, analysis and diffusion of information pertaining to security issues in order to better inform citizens. Among others, the participants learnt how to conduct interviews and investigations and how to diversify their sources of information. The following excerpt from a FGD with trained journalists supports this claim:

*La conciliation entre la théorie et la pratique était une très importante étape pour moi. Et, tous les moyens étaient mis à notre disposition: enregistreur numérique pour la prise de son sur terrain, transport et crédit de communication par téléphone; puis l'étape démontage de nos reportages.*

Exercises, discussions and role-playing games enabled the journalists to practice these new skills and knowledge. They were also able to put the theory into practice by going on the field to realise short-term productions alone or in pairs. The types and topics of these productions are discussed later. Programme reports as well as FGDs indicated that trainees were satisfied with the quality of the training, saying it provided a deeper knowledge of the security sector and the appropriate reporting techniques to address any issues.

*Ma plus grande découverte, c'est «le triangle informationnel » ou ce que vous avez appelé la règle des 3 sources. Je me rends compte que cette règle peut nous épargner beaucoup d'incidents. Souvent, nous nous crédibilisons en nous limitant à une seule source ou à plusieurs sources d'une même tendance (journalist CCTV/Ralik, workshop evaluation form).*

Journalists exhibited a strong willingness to participate in the trainings. Evidence from FGDs indicates that there were two major reasons why journalists undertook the training. Some journalists reportedly signed up based on their motivation to learn and specialise in analysis and reporting on security issues. Their desire to be security specialists was at the heart of their desire to participate.

*Moi personnellement, j'ai participé à cette formation pour me spécialiser dans cette thématique de sécurité et justice. Je pouvais parler de ces sujets pour informer la situation sur des évènements majeurs d'insécurité. Mais de manière non professionnelle (Chaine de Radio privée) (FGD, journalistes, Matadi).*

Others were sent by their media organisation. Some directors saw a need to have some of their people specialise on these topics, including those from Radio Catholique in Bukavu and other private media organisations.

**Journalists also received the necessary equipment to be able to produce their media reports.** Evidence in programme reports shows some equipment, like electronic recorders, was given to the trained journalists. Transport and communication credit were offered at the same time to enable journalists to conduct their investigations.

Additionally, some kits were given to the media organisation partners of SSAPR. Media organisations like Maendeleo, Radio Star, Nenola Uzima, Le Souverain, JPDDH, RTGVL and RTNK received kits including recorders, laptops installed with numeric editing programmes and cameras.

*Tous les moyens étaient mis à notre disposition: enregistreur numérique pour la prise de son sur terrain, transport et crédit de communication par téléphone; puis l'étape de montage de nos reportages (RDD journalist).*

**Training provided journalists with greater knowledge on reform and security issues.** FGDs with journalists as well as quarterly reports were helpful in understanding what the journalists learnt personally and professionally by taking part in the training. The journalists gained knowledge about the reform and important security and justice stakeholders.

Journalists seemed to have found more use in the practical parts of the training. Indeed, when asked during the FGDs what they had learnt from the training, their answers pinpointed more the techniques and practical aspects of the training.

*Nous avons appris comment traiter les informations liées aux domaines de sécurité et de justice. Ces différentes techniques apprises nous ont permis de nous mettre à l'abri des éventuelles menaces ou représailles de la part des personnes qui se sentent incriminées dans nos reportages (FGD, journalistes, Matadi).*

**Journalists trained by SSAPR also acquired the required technical skills to deal with justice and security issues.** The FGDs in the three pilot cities enabled the evaluation team to identify specific skills the journalists gained from the training. In Bukavu, the journalists said they had acquired new competencies in communication means and techniques, in editing, in the use of terminologies, in dispute settlement mechanisms and in the analysis of information. The journalists also said they felt freer to talk about these issues now they knew how to treat them in a professional way. In Kananga, journalists found the training was relevant in terms of knowing how to collect, analyse and spread information regarding security issues in sensitive cases like murders or misappropriation of money.



EA reported in quarterly reports that the journalists had made progress in using the media techniques and tools they had learnt during their training to increase the quality of their productions. Their capacity to analyse and report on issues pertaining to security had also improved. After the training, journalists were reportedly better able to interact with key actors of PNC reform they were not able to reach before, including the police, local authorities, members of the National Assembly and civil society. Discussions with key informants in the field as well as programme reports mentioned that the trained journalists were recognised as specialists on security and justice issues in their respective cities as well as nationally.

## SSAPR interventions caused this increase in CSO performance

**Key assumptions around the effectiveness of SSAPR training leading to improved media practice regarding the police have been met.** The media ToC posits that a change in capacity via training is not enough to ensure journalists will change their practice. The evaluation team thus identified additional conditions including independence of the media and a willingness to integrate the topics of justice and security in daily reports as necessary to be met in order for this change in capacity to lead to a change in media practice.

Although there is no strong evidence that the media are politically independent enough for the journalists to be able to do their work freely, informal discussions with key informants from the EA component highlighted that the general view on security issues had changed since the project began. Journalists have produced reports that have been diffused at the national level and the reactions have been mostly positive. In discussions with officers who participated in the PdP programme and with trained journalists, it was highlighted that the police were willing to cooperate more with the media today, which leads to a more favourable and transparent environment for the journalists. Although the evidence is not strong around the total independence of the media, the evaluation team gathered sufficient evidence that there were no major political obstacles preventing them from doing their job.

The ISSAT Annual Review (2013) also indicates that, as part of efforts to ensure the sustainability of the programme, almost all media organisations partnering with the programme had created a space in their programming to integrate topics pertaining to security and justice.<sup>54</sup>

*In term of aid coordination, EA has developed working collaboration with certain organizations providing support to journalists and media in DRC including Interviews, FEI and JED (ISSAT). This collaboration includes the sharing of productions realized by the group of journalists supported by the programme to be aired through community radios. Such initiative allowed to inform and discuss PdP at the community level.*

---

<sup>54</sup> These media organisations were BNTV, HTV and RTK in Matadi, FN FM, RDD, Canal 13 and CMB in Kananga and Radio Star in Bukavu. In Kinshasa, Congo Web programmed a show on community policing. Journalists from Tele 50, RTCE and RTG are producing the second show of “Forum Sécurité”.

## Improved media practice was effective in reaching community members with information to build their knowledge and awareness of police reforms

**The population was sensitised on the security-related topics covered with journalists during the training, particularly on police reforms.** Following the trainings, some shows were produced and broadcasted by the journalists in their home organisations on a weekly basis in the three pilot cities. These media productions had the aim of informing the population about services offered by the PNC and its activities. In Kananga, these shows were “Echos de la Police” and “La Police et Nous” on radio Canal 13. Additionally, there was a radio transmission “Bonjour Kongo Central” on air every morning to cover different topics related to the security.

Media professionals also reportedly integrated the theme of gender in their shows, articles and debates on the subject of the security sector and the police. Two media productions on issues related to gender were produced on the following topics: resurgence of cases of rape in Matadi and the contribution of women police agents in the process of community policing. Other media reports were produced on the level of knowledge of citizens regarding the police reform, as well as on parliamentary control regarding the application of laws relating to the police reform. Topics like sexual and domestic violence, gender discrimination, the CLSP, collaboration between the police and the population, the construction of new commissariats, the DYCOM and the FQs were also covered.

**Journalists also reported information relating to CSOs’ activities and tools to communities.** RRSSJ as well as the group of trained journalists through EA’s media strategy took many actions to follow on the implementation of the activities of CSOs and to inform citizens about the tools and mechanisms made available to them by CSOs. FGDs showed that the media covered all the CSO activities, including the *contrôles citoyens*, the opening of the suggestions boxes and the FQs.

*Chaque fois qu’il y a Forums de quartiers, les journalistes viennent pour couvrir l’activité. Ils sont avec nous dans la plupart de nos activités à l’occasion desquelles nous interagissons avec la population (FGD, CSOs, Matadi).*

CSOs also reported in FGDs that the media helped them become more recognised as real mediators between the police and population.

There is strong evidence that the training provided journalists with key technical and collaboration skills:

*Il était très difficile pour nous de contacter une autorité politico-administrative, de la sécurité et/ ou de la justice. Nous ne savions pas comment les aborder pour parler justice et sécurité. Mais pour le moment cela devient chose facile grâce à la formation reçue (FGD, journalists, Matadi).*

**The media contributed positively to changes in the community’s practice towards the police.** Evaluation findings from the KAP survey indicated that a number of changes in community capacity occurred over the life of the programme. Quantitative data collected for the KAP study found individuals in SSAPR pilot sites had better knowledge on the roles of different security institutions in 2014 than they had in 2010. Data suggest the media allowed

the population to extend its knowledge on the reform and on security issues and also encouraged the population to change its perceptions of and behaviour towards the police.

*Le commandants de Commissariats nous disent que la demande des services de la PNC par la population a sensiblement augmenté grâce à nos émissions (FGD, journalists, Kananga).*

In FGDs with the police, they reported that demand for PNC services had increased considerably since the media trainings. The police recognised the importance of the media in spreading the word about their range of services. The population was more inclined to call them and collaborate with the authorities. The community is reportedly now more trustful towards the police and more aware of the protection they can offer thanks to the change in media practice.

## Improved media practice was effective in establishing an external accountability measure to hold police to account

Some evidence supports the claim that the media are holding the police to account. According to FGDs held in 2014 in Bukavu with a student group, there has been a change in the behaviour of the police in that they now feel accountable for their actions. According to the students, the media are playing a strong role in making the police more accountable through their pressure and vigilance.

*Oui, on avait peur de mal se comporter, car on risquait d'être dénoncé par le media. Et cela à influencer sur notre façon de faire ou de travailler. Par exemple, une des chaines avait dénoncé le comportement de policiers fumeurs de chanvre avec image, cela nous a fait peur, et nous a conduit a ne plus fumer. Egalement pour un policier qui avait tué quelqu'un (FGD, PdP, Mvuzi).*

Journalists also covered some isolated events and what followed showed the police are more accountable. In Bukavu, for example, a colonel was punished for hitting a cameraman and a policeman was jailed for raping a young girl, right after the media talked about these events.

Nonetheless, evidence suggests it is not only through denouncing poor behaviour that the media are influencing the work of the police. The media are also an incentive for the police to perform better, because they reward their good behaviour as well.

*Quand le policier est coupable, les médias en parlent pour qu'il change de comportement et par contre s'il fait un bon travail, les médias en parlent aussi pour l'encourager (FGD, PdP, Matadi).*

In FGDs, journalists mentioned that the PNC was asking journalists on a regular basis to report on the arrests or the investigations the PNC was undertaking.

**The qualitative discussions with members of both the PdP and the PNC generated evidence that the pressure of the media had influenced their behaviour.** Police reported being aware their behaviour could be denounced in the media and thus tried to respect the principles instituted with SSAPR. Members of the PdP said media coverage on security issues should continue in order to keep the police behaving well.

*Le fait que les médias parlent de nous, de notre travail et/ou de nos abus constitue un moyen pour nous de rendre compte (FGD, police, Ndesha).*

PNC officers insisted that the media's denouncing role enabled them to 'rectify their mistakes'. According to them, it is necessary and helpful to have an external and neutral point of view on their activities. Additionally, since the media also covers the good practices of the police, police are encouraged to behave well if they want to be presented in the media as 'heroes' and receive recognition in their community.

*Par nos reportages, on a observé une amélioration d'une part des relations entre la police et la population et d'autre part de comportement de police et population (FGD, journalists, Bukavu).*

Discussions with the police showed this influenced their behaviour. According to both PdP-trained officers and the PNC in general, there was reportedly less violence and harassment and the police tried not to ask for bribes anymore, on account of being scared of public denouncement. The PNC furthermore said there were fewer arbitrary or brutal arrests, since the police knew they could be exposed publically in the media. Additionally, the KAP study showed pilot communities were more satisfied with police performance in 2014 than the comparison population at baseline.

*Ils influencent aussi notre comportement. Car, en parlant (par exemple) du non-respect des règles de la PdP par un de nos membres, nous nous sentons de plus en plus redevables (FGD, PNC, Kadutu).*

*Quand on intervient sur terrain on ne peut plus faire des arrestations arbitraire, brutale et inhumaine ou même ravir les biens d'autrui parce qu'on a peur diffusé sur les médias et par après être poursuivi (FGD, PNC, Ibanda).*

*La population doit être informée sur notre nouveau mode opératoire. Ce qui va attirer leur confiance en nous. Par la PdP, la police a changé sa manière de faire au sein de la population: plus de brutalité ni de dénigrement. Moins encore de tracasseries lors des arrestations. C'est la police qui vit avec la population (FGD, PDP, Katoka).*

**Although journalists have gained a certain notoriety, they still have some issues accessing authorities.** The training conferred a certain legitimacy on the journalists. They are seen as specialists in their area of work and the heads of the security section in their own media organisations ('security desks'). Some personalities even come voluntarily to them to ask for interviews or investigations.

*Moi par exemple, beaucoup croit que je suis un OPJ, on me salut avec tout le respect. C'est grâce à la formation que nous avons acquis cette notoriété.*

The joint efforts of the 37 journalists have spread wider than just the local or provincial level. They have gained respect at the national level from certain authorities and organisations. Some have received awards of merit at the national level.

*Grâce à la formation, j'ai gagné un prix national concernant le journalisme sur la bonne Gouvernance. J'ai eu un prix le reportage concernant les tracasseries de la Police de Circulation Routière (FGD, journalists).*

A journalist trained in Bukavu received a prize from the NGO Journalists for Human Rights for her film report on the PdP. Another received the prize 'Lucien Tshimpumpu' for his film report supporting the emergence of professional communal radios.<sup>55</sup>

Nonetheless, although journalists have gained notoriety and the authorities are more inclined to collaborate with them, they are still facing some resistance when they look for information on sensitive topics.

*Pour mener des enquêtes, nous avons des résistances surtout lorsqu'il s'agit d'un sujet sensible comme le meurtre. [...] Dans ces genres de situation, souvent si vous voulez rencontrer le commandant CIAT, il vous renvoi à son supérieur (le commissaire urbain). Il est donc difficile dans ces conditions d'accéder à l'information (FGD, journalistes, Matadi).*

Another issue the journalists mentioned was the constant change and rotation of authorities at the provincial level. New authorities that work for the PNC and who have not been briefed on the reform are not always very open to collaborate with journalists.

## Despite this progress, there is weak evidence on the sustainability of this change in media practice and thus its long-term effectiveness in establishing a strong external accountability function

**In terms of the sustainability of these changes, journalists said the directors of private media organisations would not hesitate to replace these productions for some that are more profitable, since SSAPR is not paying for the time slots of these shows anymore.** Some events covered by the media show security issues are now commonly discussed. Some qualitative evidence shows the directors of media houses gave space and time slots to the journalists to continue their productions on security issues even after the programme finished. But the major body of evidence shows that, although media houses are favourable to diffusing journalists' work, lack of financial support is an issue.

*Nos chefs ont été aussi suffisamment sensibilisés. Ils sont quelque peu flexibles. Evidemment, les émissions sur la sécurité n'ont plus assez d'espace comme par le passé avec l'appui de SSAPR. Ils sont de fois remplacés par d'autres émissions payantes. Mais, nous essayons de prévoir un temps pour ça (FGD, journalistes, Bukavu).*

Some evidence in the programme reports as well as that from the FGDs indicates that the trained journalists had taken initiatives to produce and disseminate reports pertaining to security without SSAPR financial support. In the FGDs, journalists said they tried to integrate the topics of security and to sensitise citizens in their own programme within their radio organisation.

Journalists organised themselves in associations in order to continue their collaboration after the training. Productions realised on a voluntary basis show the personal interests and the motivation the journalists have to drive social change.

*Nous utilisons nos propres moyens ou le moyen de nos maisons (radios, TV...), Nous le faisons par passion. Nous avons réussi à intégrer la sécurité et la justice*

---

<sup>55</sup> MARSS (2013) Report to DAI.

*dans les grilles de Programmes de nos maisons de presse (FGD, journalists, Bukavu).*

Nonetheless, journalists complained about their restricted means since SSAPR had stopped financing time slots in media organisations for the journalists to use to broadcast their shows. Journalists said the number, time and quality of their shows had decreased since the project stopped financing their activities. For example, they are not always in a position to pay the fuel to conduct investigations (FGD, journalists, Kananga).

*C'est avec les moyens de bord que nous fonctionnons. En fait, le sujet est intéressant, nous allons continuer à produire même si les fréquences seront réduites. La production a un cout. Mais, nous faisons déjà les reportages de groupe avec nos faibles moyens (FGD, journalists, Matadi).*

The FGDs with the different stakeholders showed that even the security and justice authorities and CSOs noticed media reports and investigations had decreased. This is strong evidence that, although the journalists are willing to continue their activities, the lack of financial means is a problem.

*Il y avait des émissions, notamment « Echos de la Police » animée par le Cmdt Kumuamba et François Muamba. Mais actuellement, faute de moyens, ces émissions ont cessé (FGD, PdP, Katoka).*

## Variations on the narrative

### Impacts through a gender lens

Women represent a very small number among the journalists trained and there is little to show the extent to which journalists' gender influences their work. When asked whether personal characteristics could be an obstacle in their work, journalists in Matadi spontaneously said being a woman made it harder to conduct interviews. This factor was not mentioned in other cities.

Furthermore, one journalist trained in the context of SSAP, has demonstrated that women can fulfil well their role of journalist and become as notorious as their male counterparts. She became president of Journalism for Security and Justice and has received a prize from the NGO Journalists for Human Rights.

## Parliamentarian impact annex

SSAPR activities with parliamentarians built the capacity to engage more effectively with security actors, although there is limited evidence of their effectiveness in holding police to account; evidence suggests weak support for a claim to the sustainability of these changes.

### SSAPR was effective in reaching parliamentarians with high-quality and relevant training on security and justice concerns

It is largely understood that application of the PDP doctrine implies the engagement of all security and justice actors. Each stakeholder should know the principles of the reform in order to ensure it is properly implemented. In this context, training for the parliamentarians on the different topics related to the reform was organised by the EA component. Training included topics such as the reform, parliamentary control, control of prisons and detention sites, elaboration of the parliamentary agenda, CLSP missions and functioning, budgetary control and archiving technics.

FGDs with members of Provincial Assemblies revealed the training was high quality and in line with the missions of Parliament, including fundamental functions such as (i) representation of the population; (ii) audit of the state's services (including justice and security); and (iii) preparation/vote of the edicts (local/provincial laws). It additionally responded to the needs of the Provincial Assemblies to reinforce their capacities.

*Il faut dire qu'au moment où nous avons été élus députés, nous n'étions pas tout de suite outillé en compétences nécessaires pour réaliser les taches qui nous attendent (FGD, provincial deputies, Matadi).*

In Kananga, an administrative employee at the archive service admitted the training was useful, especially in an institution like the Parliament, where the archives are part of the historical and intellectual heritage.

With the aim of guaranteeing the transfer of competencies to the next members elected, the training was not limited to the members of the Parliament, who have a limited mandate. The training was extended to the permanent technical staff. This was intended to allow the permanent employees to become trainers/coaches for the new elected members in the three commissions: the Defence and Security Commission; the Political, Administrative and Judiciary Commission; and the Economic and Financial Affairs Commission.

Table 28 presents the number of people trained in the Provincial Assemblies by category (deputy/administrative and technical staff).

Table 28. Number of people trained disaggregated, by type of training and city

	Bukavu		Matadi		Kananga		Total	
Themes	ATS	PR	ATS	PR	ATS	PR	ATS	PR

Training on the PDP doctrine	14	33	21	25	7	46	43	104
Control of prisons and detentions sites	0	0	28	25	4	48	32	73
Elaboration of the parliamentary agenda	0	0	15	25	4	17	19	42
Organisation, missions and functioning of the CLSP	31	19	33	15	18	45	82	79
Training on budgetary control	16	33	28	25	0	54	44	112

**The EA component has also given the Provincial Assemblies institutional support, including logistical and financial support, to allow them to fulfil their control missions.** In Kananga in particular, SSAPR financed the rental of two offices for the Economic and Financial Affairs Commission and the Political, Administrative and Judiciary Commission of the provincial Parliament in Kasai-Occidental in Kananga. Members of the Provincial Assemblies confirmed this support had had a beneficial effect. Indeed, without financial means and material, members of the Provincial Assemblies who have been trained would not have been in a position to put their knowledge into practice.

## SSAPR-led training was effective in improving the knowledge, competencies and attitudes of the Provincial Assemblies

In theory, members of the Parliament were already familiar with their missions. Nonetheless, they were not showing enthusiasm for fulfilling them in practice. Members of the Provincial Assemblies acknowledged that, before the training, they had never considered conducting missions of control within security and justice institutions. Now, thanks to the different trainings (on the reform, on the parliamentary control of the security sector and on the control of the detention settings), they understood the need for the Provincial Assembly to hold to account the security institutions in their reach.

In Kananga, FGD participants admitted their attitude towards and practices related to activities in the security sector had improved:

*Before the training, there was a certain kind of ignorance/negligence to conduct the number of tasks that we were assigned. We didn't dare to raise these issues. To us, the PNC and the army were distinct services that we could not have access to. But today we know that they have to report to the provincial Parliament and to the population. The missions of parliamentary control are currently being planned and realised within the security services.*

This same employee, who is now an archives technician, recognised that the knowledge he could develop thanks to the training created other kinds of need. Other elements were identified as essential to delivering a quality service; although these needs have not yet been



satisfied, it is important to mention that it was only after the training that those needs could be identified and expressed by the corresponding service.

Those trained on the control techniques of the decentralised territorial entities (*entités territoriales décentralisées*, ETD) acknowledged that the training had allowed them to improve their knowledge on ETD control missions. The techniques learnt and the tools at their disposal enabled them to successfully complete this task. Additionally, they affirmed that the training had fostered their knowledge on data collection techniques related to the needs of the population. They had learnt how to convert needs into advocacy themes within the PNC, justice services, town councils and provincial governments.

Members of the Provincial Assemblies said the training on adequate techniques to elaborate laws (logistics) had reinforced their capacity in terms of reviewing laws. A member of the Provincial Assembly declared, *'It is not enough to be elected by the population to master the notions of laws preparation and reviews. One needs to learn this. And this training was off a great important for that matter.'*

**PNC reform has been integrated effectively in the mission statements of the Provincial Assembly (institutionalisation).** As both representatives of the population and actors of the reform, members of the Provincial Assemblies confirmed they were now involved in looking for solutions to problems related to insecurity in their cities/provinces. The best way to succeed in this enterprise is to integrate the activities of the reform into their parliamentary agendas.

In Matadi, respondents confirmed that, before the training, some topics were not taken into account on parliamentary agendas, such as control of some state institutions, most notably security institutions like the PNC and the custom services. Nowadays, these themes are integrated. Many activities that were not part of the agenda before are currently being implemented. For example, the Provincial Assembly has implemented a 'parliamentary day' to discuss security issues with the population.

*Every Wednesday we invite civil society to come and talk about topics like violations at different levels (FGD, members of the Provincial Assembly, Matadi).*

In Bukavu, members of the Provincial Assembly confirmed they had integrated some activities into their agendas, like parliamentary days and workshops on the consolidation of the capacity of members. This was not the case prior to the training. In Kananga, FGD participants acknowledged that, prior to the training, no parliamentary control was organised to audit security services. Nowadays, a parliamentary control mission enquires about management of the equipment given to the PNC and the army.

## Some laws in favour of consolidation of the reform and/or related to security were enacted and voted at the Provincial Assembly

In Matadi, the Provincial Assembly has put in place an initiative to get rid of noise (groups in front of churches, bars) that was disturbing people living in the neighbourhood.

In Bukavu, the Provincial Assembly has elaborated and voted on an edict (local law) about the interdiction of mob justice. This edict is respected by the population and has been a great success. Thieves and other criminals arrested by the population are now directly brought to the police to answer for their actions.

The Provincial Assemblies of the three pilot cities have voted on a budget line, given the increase in budget allocated to the security sector, with the aim of improving the quality and efficiency of the police's activities.

**Monitoring missions, advocacy and restitution of security have been organised.** Members of the Provincial Assembly in the three pilot cities participate in activities to control the police's actions. They also participate in security control activities as well as other security monitoring missions. Control missions have been organised on detention sites also. In Matadi, the different state services have organised a control mission to address skirmishes on the border with Bas-Congo.

In Bukavu, the Provincial Assembly has organised several missions of parliamentary control regarding customs services in order to assess the application of a presidential decree relating to services offered at border crossings.

**Some initiatives have been developed by the provincial assemblies to guarantee the continuation of the work that has already been initiated.** In Matadi, the Provincial Assembly has voted in a law relating to the creation of a budget line dedicated to parliamentary control activities in the security and justice sector. Members interviewed by the evaluation team said they counted on the budget of the provincial government to finance their activities. Indeed, in the context of the consolidation and decentralisation, a withholding of 40% of the funds gathered by the provinces is being considered. If this measure is applied, members think they will not have enough financial means to continue their activities.

**Despite some improvement in the level of engagement and collaboration with other stakeholders, in some specific contexts (e.g. parliamentary control), the level of collaboration for some actors is still not optimal.** In Bukavu, members of the Provincial Assembly recognised they confronted challenges regarding collaboration in the context of the mission to control the provincial executive and other services.

*Nous faisons face aux résistances de la part des certaines personnes/institutions visées pour le contrôle. Le contrôle parlementaire étant conçu par ces dernières comme une menace, une attaque. Dans ces conditions, les concernées préparent ainsi « une contre-attaque ». Cela témoigne à suffisance la méconnaissance des missions des uns et des autres.*

In Matadi, the challenges mentioned were related to the non-application by PNC officers of the recommendations formulated by parliamentarians.

*“The principal actors of this reform are the PNC. Nonetheless their members are poorly paid. This results in less efficiency in our actions.”*

## Variations on the narrative

### Impacts through a gender lens

Women represent only a small proportion of parliamentarians (8.4% of the members of the national Parliament), which means the training was given mostly to men. Because of a lack of evidence, then, no gender variation could be identified among parliamentarians.