

Helpdesk Research Report

CSOs holding governments to account

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Question

What is the range of interventions that CSOs currently deliver to help people in developing countries hold governments and others to account and influence decisions that affect poor people's lives?

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1. Overview

This rapid review illustrates the range of interventions that Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are currently undertaking to increase government accountability. It summarises the interventions of over 30 different CSOs, operating in different sectors and across a range of contexts.

Range of interventions

There is no single classification or agreed terminology for describing different types of CSO interventions. Nevertheless, a number of broad distinctions are made in the literature. One distinction is between activities that are cooperative and operate *through* government systems (e.g. engaging in formal consultative processes), and those that are more confrontational and operate *outside* of them (e.g. protest, petitions) (Sundet, 2011). Another distinction is made between open and closed approaches to influencing government. In open approaches, CSOs may seek to galvanise broad-based public opinion, for example through the mass media, to pressure for change. In closed approaches, they might instead lobby individual personal contacts and influential political actors behind the scenes. A similar distinction can be made between interventions targeted at the individual or collective-level. Whereas some CSOs focus on accountability for individuals (e.g. using freedom of information to redress individual grievances), others opt for community-based approaches (e.g. local monitoring committees).

In practice, CSOs are likely to be undertaking several types of interventions simultaneously, and categories are overlapping. In the table provided in section two of this report, the main types of interventions are organised into the following categories:

- **Legal mechanisms:** Freedom of Information (FOI) law is used for tracking public expenditure, highlighting corruption, and exposing mismanagement or inefficiencies in public services. Some CSOs encourage and enable individuals to make their own FOI requests, such as 5th Pillar in India, which runs walk-in clinics and an anti-corruption helpline. In Argentina, the Civil Association for Equality and Justice (ACIJ) runs a Centre for Community Legal Support, which offers free legal counsel and representation in cases where public services have not been delivered.
- **Media campaigns:** CSOs use a range of different media to communicate information about the performance of government in an accessible and entertaining format, and to bring government actors into dialogue with citizens. For example, the Tanzanian CSO HakiElimu uses humorous TV and radio spots to highlight problems with education delivery. Community radio is sometimes seen as a way to give ordinary citizens a chance to engage in local accountability whilst avoiding the cultural impediments or political economy dynamics that might otherwise exclude them (Tembo, 2012). In Malawi, for example, citizens can raise concerns through CSO-organised 'radio-listening clubs', and their concerns are then addressed on air by duty bearers.
- **Public hearings/social audits:** Social audits are used to increase citizen participation in development programmes and stimulate demand for better quality public services. In India, for example, the CSO Parivartan organises public hearings in resettlement colonies which mobilise residents into demanding better completion of public works.
- **Citizen report cards:** Report cards are household surveys that collect quantitative data on citizen's views of the performance of public services. This information is then used by CSOs and journalists to highlight weaknesses and demand improvements. A well-known example is the Citizen Report Card run by the Public Affairs Centre (PAC) in Bangalore.
- **Community scorecards:** Scorecards are qualitative tools that are used for local-level monitoring and performance evaluation of specific services. They usually involve bringing communities and government officials together in a collective forum to discuss the findings of the scorecard.
- **Community monitoring:** Community groups monitor many aspects of local development – for example, whether roads are built to standard, or textbooks arrive in villages. Monitoring groups/committees can either be created in collaboration with government, or independently. Collaborative monitoring often begins with the signing of a MoU with the responsible government body or secretariat. An example is the Social Enterprise Development (SEND-Ghana) Foundation's monitoring of the Ghana School Feeding Programme (GSFP).
- **Research and advocacy:** Research and surveys are used to collect information that can then be used to highlight deficiencies in policies and advocate for positive change. PRATHAM, for example, produces the Annual Status of Education Reports (ASER), which aim to increase public awareness of the quality of education in India. In other cases, research and advocacy have been instrumental in pressing for greater budget transparency – for example in the case of Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Econômicas (Ibase), in Brazil.
- **Open data:** Some CSOs use online portals and SMS messaging to make national budget information more accessible for ordinary citizens, and useable by journalists and pressure

groups. An example is Twaeweza's Kenya Data Visualisation Dashboard. Others index and archive data on corruption for journalists – for example, Mars Group Kenya.

- **Crowdsourcing:** CSOs use web or mobile phones to crowdsource citizen inputs, aggregate them, and channel concerns and observations directly to authorities for redress. In Tanzania, for example, the organisation Huduma runs an online portal that enables people to report problems with public services in their district by text, e-mail or Twitter. Reports are sent to the responsible government or private party and compiled on a 'dashboard'. Crowdsourcing has also been used to encourage the development of mobile apps that can support citizen accountability (e.g. The Fair Play Alliance). Several CSOs also use online petitions.
- **Coalition-building:** CSOs work together and form coalitions to build momentum and increase pressure on government. An example of this is Réseau Gouvernance Economique et Démocratie (REGED) in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which brought together 300 CSOs to press for open budget data.

The examples included in this rapid review are not exhaustive, but they illustrate that CSOs deploy a wide variety of different media to gather information from citizens which they can then use to press for accountability. These include online interactive portals, SMS messaging, radio phone-ins, face-to-face meetings, surveys and crowdsourcing techniques. Likewise, they indicate CSOs are using a range of strategies and tactics to engage with local and national government - from informal networking, to formal engagement in parliamentary committees, to high-profile meetings with leading political figures, to collaborating directly in government-led programmes (as formally-contracted monitoring agencies).

In practice, choice of intervention is likely to depend on political context. In the case of the DFID-funded Supporting Transparency, Accountability, and Electoral Process in Pakistan (STAEP), for example, constituency relations groups pursued different strategies to hold actors to account, depending on the local political context. They approached officials directly to resolve complaints in some cases, politicians in others, and used local, non-state influential people as intermediaries to engage power-holders on their behalf in other cases (Kirk, 2014). Preferred routes to accountability were dependent on where the power lay in constituencies, and technical tools such as community scorecards were not always appropriate or feasible, due to limited capacity (ibid).

Scale and impact

The types of interventions highlighted in this report range from small-scale local radio campaigns (e.g. Masindi District Education Network (MADEN), to national grassroots coalitions that attract a wide support base (e.g. HakiElimu). In some cases, scaling up has been achieved through partnership with international donors, or with governments. For example, Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government (CCAGG) expanded from small-scale operations in a remote rural area to national-level monitoring following grants from the World Bank. Large-scale surveys (e.g. citizen report cards) and complex websites are typically organised by larger NGOs (or coalitions of them), but they often aim to gather data that can be used by smaller CSOs at local level.

Rigorous evidence on the impact of CSO accountability interventions remains somewhat limited. Much of the evaluation and case study evidence included here comes from donor-funded professional NGOs that operate at national-level, rather than smaller-scale, community-based organisations. There is also selection bias leading to cases of 'success' being better documented than cases of failure.

In spite of the limitations, the examples included in this report provide evidence that CSO interventions have had the following types of impacts:

- **Changes in government policy:** For example, in Mexico, the CSO FUNDAR monitored the distribution of farm subsidies, highlighting that most of the subsidies were going to large scale agro-business, rather than small-scale farmers as the government had initially claimed. This helped usher reforms to ensure small-scale producers were the beneficiaries in the future (FUNDAR, 2012). In India, the CSO Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) successfully lobbied for social audits to become part of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) (Grandvionnet, 2015).
- **Increased transparency:** In DRC, a coalition of 300 CSOs - Réseau Gouvernance Economique et Démocratie (REGED) - produced a citizens budget and successfully pressured for more budget data to be published (Schouten and Monamoto, 2013). In Brazil, another large-scale coalition convened by the Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Econômicas (Ibase) didn't always agree on tactics, but were nevertheless effective in improving the financing and transparency of a large publicly-owned bank (Spink, 2013).
- **Improved education, health and livelihoods outcomes:** For example, one rigorous impact evaluation showed that community scorecards increased teacher effort in the Anantapur district in India (Galab, 2013). In Ghana, the Social Enterprise Development (SEND-Ghana) Foundation's monitoring of the child feeding programme kick-started the machinery of government into action, making it perform the functions it is mandated to (Dogbe & Kwabena-Adade, 2012). SEND-Ghana is credited with ensuring 80% of school food came from local farmers, as well as improvements in school infrastructure, better staff training, lower pupil-teacher ratios and more textbooks (ibid). Research by the Urban Resource Centre in Karachi helped prevent the construction of an expressway that would have uprooted 100,000 people and caused immense environmental damage (UNDP, 2013). A coalition of religious groups, health professionals and CSOs - the Social Justice Coalition - successfully advocated for changes in policies governing sanitation in Cape Town, with important health implications (Overy, 2013).
- **Expose and reduce local-level corruption:** There is evidence that better CSO monitoring of school-level expenditure was associated with reduced leakage in Indonesia (Westhorpe, 2014). Community groups are sometimes best placed to identify whether projects (e.g. roads, infrastructure) that have been reported as 'completed' are in fact completed - as in the case of the CCAGG (IBP, 2011). In one social audit process convened by Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) in Rajasthan, Rs. 20 million of programme funds were recovered (Singh, 2010). Monitoring of the Health Department of the Eastern Cape by the Public Service Accountability Monitor (PSAM) helped reduce the discrepancy between budgets and actual expenditures from R1.9 billion in 2009-10 to R0.8 billion in 2011-12 (Fölscher and Kruger, 2013, p. 40).

2. Table of CSO interventions

| Organisation | Intervention | Scale & impact |
|---|---|---|
| LEGAL MECHANISMS | | |
| FUNDAR <i>Coyoacán, Mexico</i> http://fundar.org.mx/english/#.U82Zbai2264 | Uses FOI requests to gather data, produce reports, and track distribution of farm subsidies. Built an accessible online platform to enable farmers to track subsidies themselves. | Exposed subsidies were not being given to small-scale farmers, as per government policy, but instead to large agro-businesses. Findings received extensive national media coverage. As a result, some government officials were removed or forced to return funds they have received, and reforms were implemented to ensure subsidies were only given to small-scale producers in the future (FUNDAR, 2012). |
| 5th Pillar <i>Chennai, India</i> http://www.5thpillar.org/ | Uses the Right to Information (RTI) Act to tackle corruption and take up individual disputes over delays or misappropriation of public services. Citizens can apply online via the right to information portal. Runs a RTI walk-in clinic and anti-corruption helpline for corruption complaints. | National campaigns aim to seek accountability in the working of everyday public authority and force government departments to handle individual complaints properly (no independent evaluation data). |
| Gurpo Faro <i>Granda Centeno, Ecuador</i> http://www.grupofaro.org/ | Uses FOI to gather budget data and track distribution of oil revenues. | Information gathered showed that oil revenues targeted privileged groups (e.g. army, private universities). A new constitution was enacted which eliminated such ear-marked expenditures (FUNDAR, 2012). |
| Civil Association for Equality and Justice (ACIJ) <i>Buenos Aires, Argentina</i> http://acij.org.ar/acij/2012/en/ | Convenes civil society input into national audit planning processes. Uses online petitions. A community legal action programme offers free legal counsel and representation in collective cases. | Argentina's General Audit Office (AGN) has incorporated feedback from ACIJ into the national audit plan (Cornejo, 2013). |
| MEDIA CAMPAIGNS | | |
| Social Justice Coalition (SJC) <i>Cape Town, South Africa</i> http://www.sjc.org.za/ | Collects data on the problem of sanitation and works with technical experts to identify workable solutions to present to the government. Ran media and advocacy campaign on small media, TV and print media in local languages (booklets, fact sheets, posters). Formed a coalition of religious groups, health professionals and CSOs. Submitted a petition. | The campaign compelled the Cape Town city government to introduce several measures to improve access to basic sanitation in the city's informal settlements – including a janitorial service involving regular maintenance of thousands of flush toilets and standpipes in Cape Town's informal settlements. This provided 500 jobs for Cape Town's unemployed (Overy, 2013). |

| Organisation | Intervention | Scale & impact |
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| HakiElimu <i>Tanzania</i> http://www.hakielimu.org/ | Mass communication through public forums, as well as through print, radio, and TV. Also mobilised a countrywide grassroots coalition of over 30,000 'Friends of Education'. Research forms the basis of its television and radio "spots" (short broadcasts that highlight a problem area in education governance or delivery). | Credited with multiple changes in government policy, including, government withdrawal of an unpopular crash course for teachers, increased funding for teacher housing in the 2011 budget, and expedited disbursement of the secondary school grant (Carlitz and McGee, 2013). In 2011, a group of MPs established an education caucus and asked HakiElimu to help manage the secretariat. |
| Dzimwe Community Radio Station <i>Monkey Bay, Malawi</i> <i>(no website)</i> | Records messages raising questions and concerns of local radio listening clubs taking them to appropriate experts or policy makers, who then respond to the concerns. The community's questions and concerns and the duty bearers' responses are then broadcasted together in one radio programme. | In one broadcast, some community members questioned the rationale behind deploying only two police officers to an area covering more than 10,000 square kilometres with a population of 30,000 people. In response, the Government of Malawi increased the number of police officers in the area to six (Manda, 2015). |
| Masindi District Education Network (MADEN) <i>Masindi, Uganda</i> <i>(part of the DFID-funded Mwananchi Programme)</i> http://www.mwananchi-africa.org/ | Uses a radio phone-in programme, iraka ryomuntu wa burikiro (the voice of the common man), to give duty-bearers an opportunity to respond to issues of concern to the community. | Recordings of citizens speaking about issues affecting them are used to generate discussion (Tembo, 2012). |
| PUBLIC HEARING/SOCIAL AUDITS | | |
| Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) <i>Rajasthan, India</i> http://www.mkssindia.org/ | Pioneered 'jan sunwais' (public meetings) where available information from official expenditure records is read out to villagers, and local people are invited to provide testimony relating to discrepancies in this official information and actual payments received. | Successfully lobbied for social audits to become part of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) (Grandvionnet, 2015). The audits were an important tool in building social awareness which resulted in a greater demand for work leading to increased size of the programme. The process also exposed corruption in the implementation of the programme and a total amount of Rs 20 million of programme funds was recovered (Singh, 2010). MKSS works across 22 districts in India and held 1,100 public meetings in 2012-2013 (Grandvionnet, 2015, p. 98). |

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| Masindi District Education Network (MADEN) <i>Masindi, Uganda</i> <i>(part of the DFID-funded Mwananchi Programme)</i> http://www.mwananchi-africa.org/ | Uses 'suggestion boxes' to mobilise children's voices for discussions and lobbying with local education institutions and the Ministry of Education. | Gave voiceless children the opportunity to express their concerns directly (Tembo, 2012). |
| Parivartan <i>Maharashtra, India</i> http://www.parivartan.org.in/index.html | Organised public hearings in two resettlement colonies to assess whether contracts awarded had actually been provided. | Of 68 contracts discussed, 64 were found to have irregular appropriations. This initiative helped mobilise the residents of these camps and led to more open reporting of public works and their progress. Local area committees were formed in the settlements, with residents monitoring civil works and demanding redress. Local contractors and some local officials opposed it, but the public hearing resulted in contractors more carefully completing works (UNDP, 2013). |
| CITIZEN REPORT CARDS | | |
| Public Affairs Center (PAC) <i>Bangalore, India</i> http://www.pacindia.org/ | Trains NGOs to conduct participatory surveys that provide quantitative feedback on user perceptions on quality, adequacy and efficiency. | Pioneered report cards, which gave CSOs the information they needed to hold public agencies responsible for their actions (no recent evaluation data). |
| COMMUNITY SCORECARDS | | |
| Vidya Chaitanyam Project (VCP) <i>Andhra Pradesh, India</i> http://www.educationinnovations.org/program/vidya-chaitanyam-project | Uses a simple score card for monitoring school quality, capacity building and training of self-help groups. Operates 60 village organisations (VOs), in seven regions of Anantapur district. | One evaluation compared the impact on 16 randomly selected schools in two intervention areas, with 16 schools from one control area. Showed mobilisation of parents to attend SMC meetings, strengthening of SMCs. Also highlighted improved teacher effort. Specifically, teachers attending more regularly/on time, improved pedagogy, and better quality of meals (Galab, 2013). |
| COMMUNITY MONITORING | | |
| G-Watch <i>Philippines</i> https://gwatchdeped.wordpress.com/textbook-count/ | CSOs sign MoUs with the government to undertake 'textbook counts' to ensure the right quantity and quality of textbooks are bought and delivered. | Reportedly lowered the cost of textbooks, ensured faster delivery, and better quality of textbooks (G-Watch website). |

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| <p>Social Enterprise Development (SEND-Ghana) Foundation <i>Sakumono, Ghana</i> http://www.sendwestafrica.org/</p> | <p>Monitored the performance of the Ghana School Feeding Programme (GSFP), a government programme that integrates social protection interventions, engaging with 50 district assemblies, 50 focal civil society organisations (CSOs), and 50 district highly indebted poor countries (HIPC)/citizens monitoring committees (DCMC) in seven regions across the country. Also sent monitoring information via text.</p> | <p>After the release of SEND’s first monitoring report, the government changed the leadership of the GSFP and established a Review Committee to investigate problems that had been uncovered. The government also co-hosted a National Policy Dialogue on the GSFP with SEND. At the district level, GSFP implementing structures that had previously been inactive started to meet regularly and perform proper monitoring. Their monitoring resulted in real changes, such as the use of a water tanker to bring clean water to schools and a decision to purchase 80 per cent of the food for GSFP from local farmers. More districts also began allocating budgets for GSFP instead of relying only on the national government (Dogbe & Kwabena-Adade, 2012).</p> |
| <p>Supporting Transparency, Accountability, and Electoral Process in Pakistan (STAEP) <i>Pakistan (DFID-funded)</i></p> | <p>Constituency relations groups (CRGs) were trained to raise demands with state officials and politicians.</p> | <p>No data on how many demands were met, but considered a successful case, operating in a difficult environment (Kirk, 2014). Trained and supported 200 volunteer CRGs.</p> |
| <p>ACCESS <i>Indonesia</i> (supported by DFAT) <i>(no website)</i></p> | <p>Trained selected civil society organisations (CSO) to monitor the use of school operational funds. In addition, they established structures for privately reporting complaints and developed a citizen’s charter outlining rights and responsibilities of teachers and parents. Community representatives were directly elected to user groups.</p> | <p>Evaluation found a lower incidence of charging illegal fees, and reduced leakage, after community monitoring was put in place. Allegations of misuse of funds in certain villages reportedly had the effect of reducing misuse in other villages (Westhorpe, 2014). There was also a significant improvement in the level of understanding among parents of their role and rights (ibid).</p> |
| <p>Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government (CCAGG) <i>Abra, Phillipines</i> http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Profile-of-CCAGG-Philippines-2011.pdf</p> | <p>Citizen audits verify whether infrastructure contracts are fulfilled. These are then verified by civil engineers and turned into evidence-based reports that disclose potential corruption.</p> | <p>Signed a MoU with the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) of the Government of the Phillipines, the conditional cash transfer programme (i-PANTAWID). Recognising its contribution, the National Commission of Audit contracted CCAGG to conduct participatory audits (IBP, 2011).</p> |

| Organisation | Intervention | Scale & impact |
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| RESEARCH AND ADVOCACY | | |
| Public Service Accountability Monitor (PSAM) <i>Eastern Cape, South Africa</i> http://www.psam.org.za/ | Research papers, media engagement, and submissions to the legislature. | Found 'blame and shame' tactics to be ineffective, therefore, changed to a positive engagement strategy. PSAM attracted national attention, which helped to usher improvements in planning and budgeting in the Eastern Cape Health Department. The department reduced the discrepancy between budgets and actual expenditures from R1.9 billion in 2009-10 to R0.8 billion in 2011-12 (Fölscher and Kruger, 2013, p. 40). |
| Pratham <i>New Delhi, India</i> http://www.pratham.org/ | Produces Annual Status of Education Reports (ASER), the largest non-governmental household survey in India. | Works in 21 of 29 Indian states. Credited with an important role in increasing public awareness of education quality, although no improvement in test scores (Deverajan, 2011). |
| Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection <i>Zambia</i> http://www.jctr.org.zm/ | Surveys living costs in Lusaka and other Zambian towns. The Jesuit Centre has been collecting data on living costs since the early 1990s. | Research has illustrated the deficiencies in the official definition of poverty and in the monetary amounts set as poverty lines. Highlighted a significant under-provision in the allowance for non-food needs (UNDP, 2013). |
| Urban Resource Centre <i>Karachi</i> http://www.urckarachi.org/home.htm | Reviews all proposed major urban development projects from the point of view of low-income communities and interest groups and makes their assessments widely available, through quarterly reports, monographs and a monthly publication called 'Facts and Figures'. | Helped develop more interaction between low-income, informal communities, NGOs, private (formal and informal) sector interest groups, academic institutions and government agencies (UNDP, 2013). Has changed government policies, for example, stopped the construction of an expressway that would have uprooted 100,000 people and caused immense environmental damage in Karachi. The centre's proposal for the extension of the Karachi circular railway into Orangi and other areas of Karachi was accepted (ibid). |
| OPEN DATA | | |
| Social Development Network (SODNET) <i>Nairobi, Kenya</i> http://www.socialwatch.org/nod/e/653 | Provides an online portal and SMS inquiry system whereby citizens can access national and ministry-level budget information. | Breaks down government budgets, processes the complex raw material and transforms the data into information that citizens can more easily understand and use (UNDP, 2013). |

| Organisation | Intervention | Scale & impact |
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| Mars Group Kenya <i>Nairobi, Kenya</i> http://transparency.globalvoicesonline.org/project/mars-group-kenya | Indexes and archives data on corruption for use by journalists. | This group was reportedly critical in raising awareness about an unjustified increase in remuneration in Kenya's ninth parliament in 2007, which was confirmed by an independent parliamentary investigation. They are also an important part of the Kenyan civil society initiative that has been helping to expose extrajudicial assassinations by the Kenyan police since 2007. ¹ |
| Twaweza <i>East Africa</i> http://twaweza.org/go/kenya-budget-dashboard-launched | Kenya Data Visualisation Dashboard | The Budget Portal provides a facility that enables the public to access and engage with budget information. The Dashboard is used as a monitoring tool by ordinary citizens ² . |
| The Fair Play Alliance <i>Slovakia</i> http://www.fair-play.sk/ | A citizen watchdog organisation that produces large databases and communication campaigns for citizens, journalists and governments. Operates an 'open politics' database where politicians are encouraged to fill out a more comprehensive personal disclosure form than the one required by the federal election commission. | Campaigns have raised collective consciousness of political processes (e.g. judicial nomination). A future project of the Alliance called 'Labs' aims to facilitate citizen journalism by providing a forum for citizens to work together to raise awareness about stories and to allow them to investigate information on their own by using technology (Fung, Gilman & Shkabatur, 2010). |
| CROWDSOURCING | | |
| Cidade Democrática <i>Brazil</i> http://www.cidadedemocratica.org.br/ | Receives information from mass users – mainly city residents and clients of public services – and from NGOs targeting a particular problem in their urban environment. | Useful to NGOs with the capacity to use the information as a strategic mobilisation tool. As many individual users lack the civic capacity to participate effectively, Cidade Democrática invests efforts and resources in civic education (Fung, Gilman & Shkabatur, 2010). |

¹ See: <http://transparency.globalvoicesonline.org/project/mars-group-kenya>

² <http://twaweza.org/go/kenya-budget-dashboard-launched>

| Organisation | Intervention | Scale & impact |
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| Huduma (based on Ushahidi) <i>Nairobi, Kenya</i> http://web.archive.org/web/2011120170239/http://huduma.info/main | Created a website called ‘Huduma’ (Swahili for ‘service’), which enables people to submit reports on the performance of services in their district by text, e-mail or twitter. These are places on a ‘dashboard’, and aggregated on an Ushahidi-style map that visualises all the reports in the system. | Helps CSOs and journalists gather information for advocacy, and enables communities to directly contribute to monitoring government effectiveness in delivering services (UNDP, 2013). |
| COALITION-BUILDING | | |
| Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Econômicas (Ibase) <i>Rio, Brazil</i> http://www.ibase.br/en/ | Created the BNDES Platform – a coalition of 25 civil society organisations monitoring the work of <i>Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social</i> (BNDES) - a private company that is publicly owned. The platform issued a 20-page policy document that was widely distributed and formally met with the president of BNDES. | The BDNES president agreed to make public information about the 50 largest private project loans in each of the main work areas and to introduce clauses in the bank’s contracts on slave labour, and racial and gender discrimination (Spink, 2013). |
| Réseau Gouvernance Economique et Démocratie (REGED) <i>Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)</i> http://www.gndem.org/ropi | Formed an open budget secretariat of more than 300 civil society organisations to produce a ‘citizen’s budget’. Conducted research for Open Budget Survey 2008 and 2010. Convened workshops and demanded formal meetings with the Minister of Finance. | Improved the openness and public availability of government budget information. The government began publishing more information. REGED began participating in meetings related to Ministry of Finance reform processes. By the end of September 2010, the government had made public the budget summary, a Citizens Budget, the Enacted Budget, and In-Year Reports (Schouten and Monamoto, 2013). |

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