



## Helpdesk Research Report

# Lessons learned for national state entities for recovery and reconstruction

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27.08.2015

## Question

*What is the evidence on national state entities responsible for recovery and reconstruction programmes after natural disasters, in particular earthquakes?*

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## 1. Overview

This brief review examines the evidence on lessons learned for national state entities overseeing recovery and reconstruction following earthquakes and other natural disasters. The focus is on recommendations for state structure, governance, and programme management for physical reconstruction and livelihoods programmes in early and longer-term disaster responses.

There is a substantial body of literature examining the impact of and recovery from natural disasters. Country post-disaster recovery experiences are subjected to multiple evaluations by various international humanitarian networks and organisations, and academic experts. Within this work, some attention is paid to the lessons learned from the activities of national entities charged with disaster response. Much of the

research is undertaken as individual qualitative country case studies; there have also been some recent cross-country comparative analyses of lessons learned.

Based on this larger literature, this report provides a brief overview of some of the evidence. Many of the evaluations available could not be considered in the time allowed. Therefore this summary of lessons learned is illustrative, not conclusive. This report does, however, draw heavily on international agreements and good practice guides that are based on comprehensive research. Two key resources are the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (United Nations 2015) and guidelines for developing national disaster recovery frameworks by the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) in collaboration with the World Bank, European Union (EU) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (GFDRR 2015a)<sup>1</sup>.

Key indicative lessons learned for national state entities from the literature reviewed include:

### Structure

- Develop **national recovery frameworks in advance of disasters** to establish the policies, institutional arrangements, and financing mechanisms for recovery.
- Appoint a **lead agency** to facilitate a speedy and coordinated response. A built-in end date to a new agency can mitigate against duplicating mandates at various levels of government. Other recommendations are: have a **clear legal mandate** clarifying institutional roles and responsibilities; appoint an **experienced politically aware leader** backed by the highest levels of political leadership; **align all funds with national recovery priorities**; and **hire in capacity** from other state and non-state, national and international, stakeholders.
- **Integrate the immediate humanitarian action** into the government-coordinated recovery phase.
- Fully engage **all state institutions** at national and local levels, with a clear articulation of responsibilities.
- Institutionalise an **empowering and inclusive participatory approach**, and **decentralised implementation**.
- Clarify the **roles of international agencies** from the outset.

### Policy

- Adopt policy principles of **build back better, converting adversity into opportunity and pro-poor recovery**.
- **Support gender equality and mainstream gender-sensitive approaches**.

### Governance

- Develop a **national recovery vision and strategic and programmatic framework**, using the post-disaster needs assessment as the key reference point.
- Set up **government-led coordination mechanisms** within and across sectors at each level of policy-making, planning and implementation, and **continuously consult and communicate** with national and international stakeholders.

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<sup>1</sup> These guidelines are based on good practices compiled from (a) nine countries' disaster recovery experiences and (b) collaboration with the international advisory and technical working groups formed to develop the guide (GFDRR 2015a).

- Set up **flexible national public finance management systems** to maximize the impact of resources and encourage international confidence in the recovery plan. Multi-donor trust funds can coordinate and manage risk and create a forum for policy dialogue and aid coordination.
- Set up **pre-arranged and fast-tracking procurement systems** to facilitate the speedy purchase of goods and services
- Retain **accountability and transparency safeguards**, with clarity on how and when exemptions apply. Set up a **financial monitoring and evaluation system**, and an **audit system**. Use **social media tools and knowledge-sharing platforms** to strengthen the government's transparency.

#### Programme management

- **Simplify standard implementation procedures.**
- **Develop reconstruction standards** ahead of implementation and compliance monitoring teams.
- **Develop effective monitoring and evaluation systems**, including establishing a dedicated monitoring body and indicators as early as possible.

The report also includes an annex of two illustrative case studies (the Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias – BRR<sup>2</sup>, and the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission - IHRC). These were chosen as recent examples of post-earthquake national recovery programmes that have been analysed for lessons learned on the state response. Due to time constraints, this is not an extensive list. These case studies reflect the above lessons learned, providing specific in-country examples.

## 2. Structure

### Pre-disaster preparation

While states have a longstanding legal right and responsibility to prepare for and respond to humanitarian crises in their territories<sup>3</sup>, some have played limited roles in coordinating national and international natural disaster response (Zyck and Krebs 2015: 5). Many poorer states have made only modest investments in institutions and capacities to take on this responsibility (ibid.). The United Nations and other multilateral organisations continue to advocate for strengthening national disaster risk governance, set out as one of the goals of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, adopted at the Third UN World Conference in March 2015. **Developing national recovery frameworks in advance of disasters** that establish the policies, institutional arrangements, and financing mechanisms for recovery is recommended to “avoid the post-disaster political pressures, financial constraints, knowledge gaps, or confusion of responsibilities that so often impedes the recovery process” (GFDRR 2015b: 12).

### Institutional arrangements

The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) (2015a: 27-28) identifies three common options for **state recovery institutions**:

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<sup>2</sup>

<sup>3</sup> UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r182.htm>

- **Strengthen and coordinate existing sectoral line ministries** to lead the reconstruction by sector. Possible difficulties include lack of sufficient staff experience to coordinate recovery effectively.
- **Create a new institution to manage recovery.** Advantages include: the agency's autonomy; the clear line of responsibilities; effective internal and external communication; and capacity to handle complicated financial and monitoring and evaluation arrangements. Potential disadvantages include the lead agency's lack of authority to achieve results, and the line ministries' potential institutional resentment due to compromised authority and duplicated mandates at various levels of government. Start-up will incur high administrative costs and may struggle to meet urgent planning and implementation demands.
- Strengthening existing government structures through the **creation of a temporary agency** with a built-in end-date. According to the GFDRR, this hybrid model is increasingly being used by governments, and combines the advantages of the above options while offsetting their risks. When existing government agencies cannot coordinate and implement an intensive and urgent recovery programme as well as their routine services, this hybrid option ensures relatively speedy deliver of reconstruction deliverables, consolidation of recovery into one overseeing agency, and a single point of coordination of national and international stakeholders. One drawback is that, as the recovery transitions to development and the temporary agency's mandate expires, its accumulated capacity, knowledge, and experience may be lost.

The Executing Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (BRR) of Aceh–Nias 2005–2009 advises that the decision to appoint an existing local or central government agency or to establish a new coordinating entity depends on a number of variables (BRR 2009: 12). These include the scale of the disaster, the capabilities and capacities of government agencies in the affected areas, and the ambitions of the national government. If a new agency is appropriate, the BRR advises other governments to recognize that there are steep learning curves to overcome (BRR 2009: 13). For smaller scale disasters with less damage to local government infrastructure, an existing local government entity could utilize local networks and local knowledge in planning and executing reconstruction initiatives (ibid.).

Whatever the structure, experience from the Aceh and Haiti disaster response shows **swift start-up** is needed. As a result of the policy and coordinating vacuum in Aceh for much of the first year, NGOs started reconstruction before the lead agency was established and then continued their activities regardless of the new organisation (da Silva 2010: 30).

Other lessons learned from past recovery experiences include: (GFDRR 2015a)

- Institutionalising a **clear legal mandate** which clearly codifies functions of the implementing institutions, funding mechanisms, and establishing an end-date for the institution. It should clarify institutional roles and responsibilities, such as which agency will reconstruct which asset.
- Legislating for the early involvement of agencies that will have eventual responsibility for reconstructed assets (such as schools and livelihood policies); responsibility for assets that cut across local governments' jurisdictional boundaries (e.g. highways, water, and irrigation systems); and private assets.
- Appointing an experienced and informed **leader**. Political ability is essential to overcome resistance from line ministries and organisational divisions among donors, international and national nongovernmental organizations, and local and federal governments. A leader's credibility, through guarantees of transparency and accountability for all stakeholders including donors, is

important for raising resources. Lastly, backing from the highest levels of political leadership is critical.

- Ensuring that **all funds are aligned with national recovery priorities**, whether or not the funds are channelled on or off the national budgetary system.
- **Hiring in expertise** from other sources such as line departments, humanitarian response agencies, the domestic and international private sectors, civil society, and international agencies. The benefits can include:
  - Strengthening capacity when governments cannot meet the increased professional and technical requirements for recovery.
  - From experts from relief organisations: aiding continuity between the immediate humanitarian response and subsequent state response; bringing in global good practices; institutional knowledge; community relationships and goodwill.
  - When long-term staffing includes people from successor agencies, facilitating the eventual handover.

## Integrating humanitarian action and recovery

It is important to integrating the knowledge and work of humanitarian action into the state led early recovery phase, recommends GFDRR (2015a: 25-26). Integrating the humanitarian and recovery phases, and institutionalising a national-led response, can however be particularly challenging when, as in the case of Haiti, the emergency response clusters created parallel structures that left government disempowered (Patrick 2011: 9). In addition, there can be a disconnect between state bodies responsible for emergency assistance, and those responsible for reconstruction or housing (expert comment). For example in the Philippines, the overlap between these two functions affects policy and resource allocation, impacting on local level implementation (ibid.).

## Responsibilities across state and society

One of the guiding principles of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction is that “disaster risk reduction and management requires the **full engagement of all State institutions** of an executive and legislative nature at **national and local levels** and a **clear articulation of responsibilities across public and private stakeholders**, including business and academia, to ensure mutual outreach, partnership, complementarity in roles and accountability and follow-up” (United Nations 2015: 13).

The Sendai Framework also calls for an **all-of-society approach** (United Nations 2015). Lessons learned highlight that the principal resource available for recovery are the affected people themselves and their local knowledge and expertise, including people usually marginalised within their own communities, and local actors such as national NGOs, community-based organisations, the private sector and others (Zyck and Krebs 2015; GFDRR 2015a: 34).

Structuring the national response for a **tiered decentralised implementation**,<sup>4</sup> with programme implementation taking place at the local level closest to the affected communities and individuals, has

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<sup>4</sup> GFDRR (2015a: 36) provides the example of the tiered coordination and implementation structure created by the lead reconstruction agency, Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) after the Pakistan’s 2005 Earthquake.

“been proven to speed up recovery and is more likely to correspond to the needs of the affected communities”, according to GFDRR (2015a: 36; 45).

Local authorities and local communities can be empowered to reduce disaster risk, through resources, incentives and decision-making responsibilities” (United Nations 2015: 13). An analysis of four case studies<sup>5</sup> finds that the strengthening of sub-national institutions, such as provincial, district, and community disaster management committees, has been one of the most important factors contributing to ensuring local ownership of and effectiveness in the disaster management cycle (Harkey 2014: 7). Challenges in extending capacity and initiative to the local level include ensuring appropriate administrative, funding, and human resources (ibid.).

Analysing the experience of 17 countries, UNDP advises caution in decentralising DRR decision making, such as when local level governance is marked by patronage politics and/or institutionalized exclusion of certain groups, or when very low capacity means certain DRR roles may simply overburden local governments (UNDP 2015: x). A “measured approach, working only with higher layers of sub-national government (provinces or federal states) and increasing capacity at these levels to support lower level governments within their jurisdictions”, can be advantageous (ibid.). The UNDP report also points out some “promising examples of peer mechanisms and support to horizontal cooperation between districts or municipalities (centred on shared risks, for instance)” (ibid.).

## International partners

It is noteworthy that successive accords<sup>6</sup> and guidelines<sup>7</sup> set out international humanitarian actors’ commitment to strengthening the capacity of states to respond to humanitarian crises, and their commitment to work with national and local actors. Yet international humanitarian organisations continue to underutilise and ignore national state structures (Zyck and Krebs 2015; and see the Haiti case study in the Annex). In their review, Ramalingam et al (2013: 4) find that “Major evaluations of numerous high profile humanitarian crises – most notably that of the Indian Ocean tsunami – have identified insufficient investment in, and commitment to, such partnerships as the biggest hindrance to effective performance” (Ramalingam et al 2013: 4; also see Telford et al 2006: 18-19 – the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition’s Synthesis Report). GFDRR (2015a: 37) recommends that by **clarifying from the outset the role of international agencies and development partners**, the government can then establish clear guidelines on their roles, responsibilities, and mandates.

## 3. Policy principles

Three crucial policies linked to successful disaster recovery experiences are: **build back better, converting adversity into opportunity, and pro-poor recovery** (GFDRR 2015a: 13). Policymakers and practitioners have different interpretations of these concerns, in particular on what build back better should include or not. A minimum definition is that build back better signifies policy commitment to improving the resilience of critical infrastructure (GFDRR 2015a: 13). One example where disaster risk reduction considerations

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<sup>5</sup> El Salvador, Mozambique, the Philippines, Indonesia.

<sup>6</sup> Such as the 2003 Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative; and further elaborated in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action (Fan 2013).

<sup>7</sup> Such as the guidelines for the domestic facilitation and regulation of international disaster relief and initial recovery assistance adopted by the 30th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (Zyck and Krebs 2015).

have been successfully incorporated in the design and implementation of disaster recovery programmes, is following the 2005 Pakistan earthquake with improvements in the educational sector and health care provision (ibid.: 69).

The Sendai Framework calls for an approach that facilitates **empowerment and inclusive, accessible and non discriminatory participation**, paying special attention to people disproportionately affected by disasters, especially the poorest (United Nations 2015: 13). It also recommends a **gender, age, disability and cultural perspective** to be integrated in all policies and practices, and that women and youth leadership should be promoted (ibid.).

There are valuable lessons for national reconstruction entities on the strategies and actions required to **support gender equality, women's empowerment, and mainstreaming gender sensitive approaches** in reconstruction efforts. Both men and women are vulnerable to disaster impacts, but gender inequalities create distinct disparities and a particular burden on women in post-disaster scenarios (MDF-JFR Secretariat 2012: 22). The Secretariat of the Multi Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias (MDF) and the Java Reconstruction Fund (JRF) set out in detail key learning on this. Their recommendations include (among others) making gender equality a fully integrated objective of reconstruction strategies; developing sector-wide and theme-based gender analysis as early as possible after a disaster; institutionalising gender in operational procedures, supervision and support systems; strengthening operational gender expertise; and providing funding for special programs with gender focus to complement regular reconstruction projects (MDF-JRF Secretariat 2012: 24-27).

In terms of policy on the **type of assistance** that the state can consider for post-disaster response, where affordable, GFDRR recommends facilitating **people-focused recovery** by reconstructing private assets through direct subsidies, or through other enabling policy measures, where appropriate (GFDRR 2015: 12). The GFDRR Knowledge Note on earthquake reconstruction finds that direct cash grants and public works programmes are common interventions to protect the most vulnerable in the short term while reviving economic activity for the longer term (GFDRR 2011: 75). Da Silva's analysis of lessons from Aceh for post-disaster shelter recommends combining different methods of assistance to create specific programmes tailored to the needs of the affected communities and individual households (da Silva 2010: 14).

## 4. Governance systems and processes

### Strategy and planning

The national lead agency has a key role to play in setting out the government's recovery vision, guiding principles, policies, and programme framework. GFDRR (2015a: 11-24) recommendations include:

- The **recovery vision** should convey the government's priorities, which it can then use to build a consensus around. It should:
  - Make clear (a) prioritized goals for overall reconstruction and recovery, (b) policy standards, (c) timeframe for implementation, (d) identification of stakeholders, (e) strategic priorities by sector and geographic area, and (f) functional responsibilities for recovery programme managers.
  - Relate to the country's broader development context and its growth and poverty reduction programs, and incorporate resilience.

- Promote norms for non-discriminatory and equitable asset disbursement among individuals and communities.
- Promote recovery of the lives and livelihoods in disaster-affected communities, as well as infrastructure reconstruction (which in the past has tended to dominate).
- The **strategic and programmatic framework** is the central planning tool and oversight mechanism for implementing the recovery vision and policy goals, targets and priorities. It should facilitate consistent application of policy principles across sectors; prioritisation within and across sectors; central monitoring and evaluation of the recovery, enabling strategic adjustments.
- The **post-disaster needs assessment** (PDNA) or similar initial assessment provides basis for the development of the national recovery framework, and is an important reference for the development of sector-specific recovery plans.

## Government coordination

It is the role of the lead agency to establish and oversee the coordination mechanisms for coherent policy application and effective implementation at local levels. The Sendai Framework for disaster risk reduction and the GFDRR guidelines for national disaster frameworks advise setting up coordination mechanisms within and across sectors and with relevant stakeholders at each level of policy-making, planning, and implementation (United Nations 2015; GFDRR 2015a). Lessons learned from disaster responses include the importance of continuous consultation and communication with all donors, recovery partners, and affected communities, to develop consensus, set and manage expectations, and resolve conflicts expectations (GFDRR 2015a: 49-50; BRR 2009: x). Early and continuous involvement in setting strategic principles, design parameters and standards by a **broad cross-section of state and society stakeholders** can also act as a necessary check on potential unilateral actions by the lead agency (GFDRR 2015a: 29). Stakeholders can include sector ministries and departments, regional and local governments, nongovernmental organizations, community members, and private sector partners (ibid.).

Examples of specific coordination mechanisms include (GFDRR 2015a: 49-50):

- **“Task Force/Empowered Committee.** Consisting of senior politicians, administrators, and professional experts, the task force can be set up at a high level in the government to develop a recovery policy/program.
- **Donor Coordination.** Coordination can be accomplished by the lead agency assigning a donor lead responsibility for specific sectors or projects.
- **NGOs’ Coordination Committee.** The government can set up the committee at the subnational level to assist the NGOs with their participation in the recovery program. In this forum, NGOs meet the government officials and resolve all the programme issues. The committee also provides NGOs with the necessary support and authorization to implement.
- **Local Level Project Management Committee.** This committee can consist of local government officials, NGOs, and representatives of affected communities.”

Looking specifically at how the state response can involve local actors, the literature highlights various options, from appointing respected civil society leaders to serve on policy and coordination mechanisms to NGOs playing formal roles in ensuring community participation and managing implementation (GFDRR 2015: 34; BRR 2009: 18). GFDRR (2015a: 34) cites the experience of Yemen after the tropical storm in 2008



as a successful case study of engaging communities and using local labour in the reconstruction programme.

## Resource flow systems and rules

Lessons learned for **public finance management systems** for state disaster response include: (GFDRR 2015a: 44-45)

- A need for government and donor flexibility because, while core fiduciary principles apply, recovery financing is fundamentally different from regular development financing.
- Use of national budget systems and other public financial management (PFM) systems to maximize the impact of domestic and external resources.
- Rapid, comprehensive financial planning and structures to manage external resources, with the highest political involvement, to encourage international confidence in the recovery plan.
- A programmatic approach to coordinate funding sources and mitigate against duplicating efforts.
- Setting up systems that allocate and disburse funding or cash to (a) subnational entities; and/or (b) Nongovernmental organizations, communities, households, and individuals.
- Allocating resources through a budgetary process.

Post-disaster recovery experience has shown that establishing a **multi-donor trust fund** (MDTF) can be an important means to coordinate and manage risk and information, by creating a channel for funds and a forum for policy dialogue and aid coordination between donors and the government (GFDRR 2015a: 46). In Aceh, the MDTF also helped provide much needed “fungible funds” which helped close several sectoral and spatial gaps in the second recovery phase (GFDRR 2011: 12). The typical model sees the national government overseeing initiating, planning and implementing the MDTF expenditures; a steering committee of government, donor, and civil society stakeholders endorsing fund allocation; and a trustee (such as Asian Development Bank, UNDP or the World Bank) ensuring that monies are spent in accordance with objectives and measurable outputs, using transparent procedures (GFDRR 2015a: 46).

Several types of **procurement systems** will facilitate the speedy purchase of goods and services during disaster response. These include: (GFDRR 2015a: 53-54)

- Pre-arranged procurement that pre-establishes a list of qualified contractors expedites issuing contracts and evaluating tender responses.
- Fast-tracking procurement with simplified, agreed tender and purchasing processes can quickly get goods and services where needed. Pre-determining a single source for the purchase of specific goods and services can further speed up procurement.

BRR (2009: 22) found that, while accelerating public-sector administrative and decision-making processes for an urgent response was necessary, it was important to retain **important accountability and transparency safeguards**, and to be clear about how and when exemptions apply. A common requirement of donor funding is that the recipient government must provide evidence of strong financial tracking and reporting mechanisms (GFDRR 2015a: 37). Recommendations on institutionalising state accountability and transparency for disaster reconstruction and recovery include: (GFDRR 2015a: 47; 56)

- Setting up a **financial monitoring and evaluation system** to track recovery aid early is very important. The system should capture aid flows at sector and project level, and include multiple streams of funding (including public sources, donor funds (on and off budget), private sector contributions, and NGO sources). The system needs to produce timely and comprehensive estimates of: funds allocated and spent; recovery progress; economic and social impacts.
- Instituting an **audit system**. This needs to encompass public auditing of procurement and disbursements, carrying out a technical audit of the works carried out, and conducting a social audit of the benefits delivered. Often, as part of the accountability process, it is beneficial for the government to have an independent third party auditor.
- Using **social media tools and knowledge-sharing platforms** to strengthen government transparency of recovery efforts for all stakeholders, and most importantly, the general public. There are examples of transparency initiatives using new technologies in the Philippines response to Typhoon Yolanda in 2013.

## 5. Programme management<sup>8</sup>

Guidelines on programme management for national disaster recovery include: (GFDRR 2015a: 50-53)

- **Simplify standard implementation procedures** (project approval and procurement, reporting, and staffing procedures) as required to reduce bureaucratic demands and meet urgent needs.
- **Develop reconstruction standards** ahead of implementation. After an earthquake, the reconstruction must conform to appropriate seismic safety, quality, technological, and environmental standards. Reconstruction standards also could ensure that first consideration is given to local resourcing of materials and technical expertise. To ensure compliance, construction monitoring teams could be established by the lead agency to monitor technical aspects of both the inputs and outputs of reconstruction.
- **Effective M&E systems** enable progress of recovery to be assessed; ensure compliance with sectoral recovery policies and strategies; and provide early warning for corrective action. Good practice includes establishing a dedicated monitoring body and indicators as early as possible, and involving state auditors and leaders from affected communities in defining appropriate indicators.

An analysis of aid effectiveness in post-disaster Aceh emphasises the importance of having **robust information systems** in place from the start of the reconstruction process to ensure effective coordination: from the initial assessment of damage and losses through to the establishment of community needs and the ongoing tracking and monitoring of expenditures from reconstruction players (Masyrafas and McKeon 2008: 40). Masyrafas and McKeon find that a simple, largely manual financial tracking system worked best in the Aceh context: “Albeit more labour intensive, systems based on manual data collection, using a simple and clear methodology, and managed by a small and dedicated team of analysts, seem to be most effective at providing much needed output at low cost in a post-disaster environment” (2008: 40). They also report that the Indonesian government’s use of a mandatory mechanism to track NGO project information was critical to the success of the overall reconstruction effort.

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<sup>8</sup> Due to the time limitations of this review, this section is a very brief summary of key points and a resource list of useful documents.

## Additional resources for programme management

### Resources on multi-donor trust fund management in national post-disaster responses

Scanteam/Norway (2007). *Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds*. Final Report. Commissioned by the World Bank, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) in cooperation with Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and UK Department for International Development (DFID). [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLICUS/Resources/388758-1094226297907/MDTF\\_FinalReport.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLICUS/Resources/388758-1094226297907/MDTF_FinalReport.pdf)

United Nations (2013). *Financing development together. The role of pooled financing mechanisms in enhancing development effectiveness*. United Nations, United Nations Development Group and United Nations Development Programme. <http://mptf.undp.org/overview/funds/why>

### Resources on cash transfer management in national post-disaster responses

Cross, T. & Johnston, A. (2011). *Cash transfer programming in urban emergencies*. A toolkit for practitioners. Oxford: Cash Learning Partnership. <http://www.alnap.org/resource/7056>

Harvey, P. & Bailey, S. (2011). *Cash transfer programming in emergencies*. Good Practice Review. Humanitarian Practice Network. London: Overseas Development Institute. <http://www.odihpn.org/hpn-resources/good-practice-reviews/cash-transfer-programming-in-emergencies>

International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (2007). *Guidelines for cash transfer programming*. Geneva: ICRC and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. <https://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/disasters/guidelines/guidelines-cash-en.pdf>

MeryCorps (no date). *Cash transfer programming toolkit*. [http://www.fsnnetwork.org/sites/default/files/mercy\\_corps\\_cash\\_transfer\\_programming\\_toolkit\\_part\\_1.pdf](http://www.fsnnetwork.org/sites/default/files/mercy_corps_cash_transfer_programming_toolkit_part_1.pdf)

### Resources on financial tracking in post-disaster responses

McKeon, J. (2008). World Bank: Tracking Re-construction Funds in Indonesia after the 2004 Earthquake and Tsunami, in Amin & Goldstein (Eds.) *Data Against Disasters: Establishing Effective Systems for Relief, Recovery, and Reconstruction*. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPOVERTY/Resources/335642-1130251872237/9780821374528.pdf>

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- GFDRR (2011). *Earthquake reconstruction*. GFDRR Knowledge Notes. Washington D.C.: World Bank/GFDRR. <http://reliefweb.int/report/world/gfdr-rr-knowledge-notes-earthquake-reconstruction>
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- Ramalingam, B., Gray, B. & Cerruti, G. (2013). *Missed opportunities: the case for strengthening national and local partnership-based humanitarian responses*. ActionAid, CAFOD, Christian Aid, Oxfam GB and Tearfund. <http://www.alnap.org/resource/8890>
- da Silva, J. (2010). *Lessons from Aceh. Key considerations in post-disaster reconstruction*. Practical Action Publishing. <http://www.alnap.org/resource/6481>
- United Nations (2015). *Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030*. [http://www.preventionweb.net/files/43291\\_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf](http://www.preventionweb.net/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf)
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- Zyck, S.A. & Krebs, H.B. (2015). *Localising humanitarianism: improving effectiveness through inclusive action*. Humanitarian Policy Group. London: Overseas Development Institute. <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9720.pdf>

## Key websites

<http://www.alnap.org/>

<https://www.gfdr.org/recoveryframework>

<http://www.preventionweb.net/english/>

<http://reliefweb.int/>

<http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/policy/thematic-areas/evaluations-of-humanitarian-response/reports>

## 7. Annex: Case studies

### 1. Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias

To coordinate the response to the 2004 earthquake and tsunami, the Indonesian government set up the Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh (BRR<sup>9</sup>), which was adjusted to include Nias following the 2005 earthquake (BRR 2009). The Indonesian government established a new agency because local government capacity had been debilitated by the tsunami, and the decades of secessionist insurgency in Aceh made it difficult for an existing central government agency to operate effectively there (BRR 2009: 12-13). It coordinated the activities of around 900 international funding and implementing organizations and Acehese provincial and Indonesian national agencies (BRR 2009).

#### *State structure*

Some of the key strengths of the BRR approach identified in the literature reviewed include

- A **four-year mandate** was important for maintaining urgency and enforcing a handover strategy to the existing administration, ensuring that it did not unnecessarily usurp the economic and social development responsibilities of local government agencies (BRR 2009: 14) (GFDRR 2015: 28).
- Being at **ministerial level** – with equal standing with line ministries – under the President’s direct authority with formal parliamentary endorsement, was important for establishing its’ authority both with domestic ministries as well as large international donors (BRR 2009: 14).
- The deliberate selection of an individual with a **high reputation for accountability** – and his leadership and personal vision (Fan 2013: 6).
- The BRR used the language of **build back better** to describe its mission from the outset. In some areas recovery programmes became part of efforts to transform social and political relationships (for example attention to policy for squatters, the landless, widows and orphans). (Fan 2013: 9)
- In 2006, BRR established six regional offices and transitioned from sector-based to **region-based management**, a decentralised structure that “supported capacity building of local government, in preparation for eventual handover” (da Silva 2010: 30).

Criticisms of the BRR approach in the literature reviewed include:

- The separation of tsunami reconstruction and post-conflict recovery support to other areas created **issues of inequity**, perhaps intrinsically undermining the attempts to build back better (Fan 2013: 8).

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<sup>9</sup> Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR).

- BRR's mandate was extended by the Indonesian government to rebuilding activities in order to speed up reconstruction. da Silva (2010: 30) finds that this led, however, to a **conflict of interest** as BRR's overall mandate was to coordinate reconstruction, and it placed BRR in competition with implementing agencies for local contractors, labour and materials.
- When the BRR ended in 2009, Guarnacci (2012) finds that there was **no handover in accountability** for any mistakes made.

## **Governance**

Some strengths identified in the literature reviewed:

- The BRR **spearheaded governance innovations**, many of which have been replicated at national level for development purposes (Fan 2013: 7):
  - An autonomous anti-corruption unit, the first of its kind in Indonesia.
  - An Integrated Team to function as a one-stop-shop service to expedite the processing of the various documents required for the reconstruction operation.
  - A deliberately flexible management model to ensure speedy delivery and the ability to respond to a quickly changing environment.
- Coordination and transparency were aided by the mandatory 'concept note approval' and the publicly accessible Recovery Aceh Nias database (Masyrafah and McKeon 2008: 26).
- The Multi Donor Fund<sup>10</sup> (MDF) enabled donors to coordinate funds, mitigate transaction costs and create a dialogue forum for government, donors and some key funding NGOs (Masyrafah and McKeon 2008: 23). According to a systematic review by Barakat et al (2011: 44), the MDF was aligned with national government reconstruction priorities, and promoted local ownership of fund activities and projects. However, overall, the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition finds that "many efforts and capacities of locals and nationals were marginalised by an overwhelming flood of well-funded international agencies" (Telford et al 2006: 19).

Key criticisms in the literature reviewed include:

- There was a tension between BRR's **desire for a high degree of flexibility** and executive authority to respond to an 'undefined' problem, and the donors' requirements for institutional checks and balances, and emphasis on predictable systems (Fan 2013: 6).
- Planning was hampered by **limited consultations and limited assessment of reconstruction needs** (Guarnacci 2012). As a result key issues – including constraints related to land, availability of materials and buildings skills – were only evident after construction started (da Silva 2010: 45).
- Building guidance **lacked reference to international standards**, and there was a lack of enforcement – and technical and human resources within BRR – to ensure houses built (including by BRR) complied with national guidelines (da Silva 2009). Assessment of the seismic risk and the opportunity to build back better, reducing vulnerability to earthquakes, was overlooked by many agencies, including BRR (da Silva 2010: 45). Moreover, da Silva (2009) finds that the BRR response

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<sup>10</sup> The MDF pooled US\$655 million in contributions (nearly ten percent of the overall reconstruction funds) from 15 donors, the World Bank as trustee. The MDF was governed by a Steering Committee comprised of donors, representatives of national and provincial government, and civil society representatives <http://www.multidonorfund.org/about.php>

was characterised by a **one-size fits all policy** with a focus on the physical construction of houses rather than a broader recovery response (such as being sensitive to the way that the process of rebuilding can lead to economic activity).

- Fan (2013: 10) concludes that while the **massive amounts of funding** available at once created opportunities to go beyond standard life-saving response, it “also subjected agencies to intensive pressure to spend large amounts of money quickly, providing the time neither for deeper analysis nor for longer-term programme implementation and exit strategies that might have ensured a higher level of sustainability”.

### **Programme management resources**

Overall programme management –

- Progress and final reports: (<http://www.multidonorfund.org/about.php>)

Cash transfer –

- Adams, L. (2007). *Learning from cash responses to the tsunami*. Humanitarian Policy Group. ODI: London. <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/4860.pdf>
- Doocy, S., Gabriel, M., Collins, M., Robinson, C. & Stevenson, P. (2006). Implementing cash for work programmes in post-tsunami Aceh: experiences and lessons learned. *Disasters* 30(3): 277–296. [http://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/center-for-refugee-and-disaster-response/publications\\_tools/publications/\\_pdf/Aceh\\_CFW.pdf](http://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/center-for-refugee-and-disaster-response/publications_tools/publications/_pdf/Aceh_CFW.pdf)

Multi-donor trust fund –

- Recovery Assistance Policy – defines the assistance policy of the MDF in providing rules and guidance for prioritizing relevant assistance/ funding criteria) [http://www.multidonorfund.org/doc/pdf/20060300\\_policy\\_recovery\\_assistance.pdf](http://www.multidonorfund.org/doc/pdf/20060300_policy_recovery_assistance.pdf)
- Operations Manual – forms the main reference as to the structure and organization of MDF, its processes and operational procedures. [http://www.multidonorfund.org/doc/pdf/2010\\_09\\_30\\_MDF\\_OpsManual.pdf](http://www.multidonorfund.org/doc/pdf/2010_09_30_MDF_OpsManual.pdf)
- Final report of the Multi Donor Fund (2012), prepared by the Secretariat of the Multi Donor Fund. [http://www.multidonorfund.org/doc/pdf/MDF\\_report\\_vol\\_01\\_ENG.pdf](http://www.multidonorfund.org/doc/pdf/MDF_report_vol_01_ENG.pdf)
- MDF-JFR Secretariat (2012). *The Multi Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias: A Framework for Reconstruction through Effective Partnerships*. MDF-JRF Working Paper Series: Lessons Learned from Post-Disaster Reconstruction in Indonesia. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/17631/839030NWP0Box382108B00PULBIC00no5.pdf?sequence=1>

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Barakat, S., Rzeszut, K. and Martin, N. (2011). *What is the track record of multi donor trust funds in improving aid effectiveness? An assessment of the available evidence*. Systematic Review. London: EPPI-Centre, Social Science Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London.

BRR (2009). *10 Management Lessons for Host Governments Coordinating Post-disaster Reconstruction By the Executing Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (BRR) of Aceh–Nias 2005–2009*.

<http://www.recoveryplatform.org/assets/publication/BRR%2010%20Management%20Lessons%20for%20Host%20Governments.pdf>

Fan, L. (2013). *Disaster as opportunity? Building back better in Aceh, Myanmar and Haiti*. London: Overseas Development Institute. <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8693.pdf>

Guarnacci, U. (2012). Governance for sustainable reconstruction after disasters: Lessons from Nias, Indonesia. *Environmental Development*, 2, 73-85.

Masyrafah, H. & McKeon, J. (2008). *Post-tsunami aid effectiveness in Aceh. Proliferation and coordination in reconstruction*. Wolfensohn Center for Development. Brookings Institution. [http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2008/11/aceh%20aid%20masyrafah/11\\_aceh\\_aid\\_masyrafah.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2008/11/aceh%20aid%20masyrafah/11_aceh_aid_masyrafah.pdf)

da Silva, J. (2010). *Lessons from Aceh. Key considerations in post-disaster reconstruction*. Practical Action Publishing. <http://www.alnap.org/resource/6481>

Telford, J., Cosgrave, J. & Houghton, R. (2006). *Joint Evaluation of the international response to the Indian Ocean tsunami: Synthesis Report*. Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, London. <http://www.alnap.org/resource/3535>

### **Other resources**

For all outputs from the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition see: <http://www.alnap.org/TEC>

For lists of other evaluation and lesson learned resources on the response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004:

<http://www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/publications/tags/index.php/pw:asiatsunami2004/indian%20Ocean%20Tsunami%202004/>

## **2. Interim Haiti Recovery Commission**

### **State structure**

“At the time of the disaster, there was no agency within the government with the mandate to lead disaster recovery and reconstruction. The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) was launched and co-chaired by Prime Minister Bellerive and UN Special Envoy Clinton. With a mandate of 18 months, it was intended to be a high-level forum for donor coordination as well as an action-oriented mechanism carried out by its board members. The Haiti Reconstruction Fund was initially designed to complement the IHRC, but with a longer lifespan and mission. Similar to IHRC, it is governed in partnership between the government and the international community” (GFDRR 2014: 3).

Emerging lessons identified by the literature review include:

- “Authority within the IHRC was shared between the Haitian government and its international donors. As a result, the IHCR was never regarded by the government as a Haitian institution: it was



not invested in or, worse, was undermined by the Haitian government from the start” (Fan 2013: 21).

- There was poor coordination between the international community and the Haitian government, and none with lower tiers of Haitian national and local government (finds Patrick 2011: 5 – an OECD DAC quick guide that distils lessons learned from evaluations on the response to the Haitian 2010 earthquake). The international community’s assumption of “weakness in Haitian government and civil society capacity should have highlighted, not negated, the need to work through and empower government to promote long term recovery” (Patrick 2011: 5).

## **Governance**

Emerging lessons identified by the literature reviewed include:

- There were major delays in establishing the IHRC; insufficient management experience and authority among key personnel; board members did not supervise its performance closely enough and were not able to hold it accountable for delivering on work plans (Fan 2013: 21).
- The emergency response clusters created parallel structures to technical ministries leaving government disempowered, and the clusters unable to benefit from the line ministries contextual knowledge and cultural understanding (Patrick 2011: 9).
- Haitians were largely excluded from response planning and delivery, with English as the working language and meetings held frequently with security levels difficult to access for most Haitians (Patrick 2011; Fan 2013: 22). As a result “a large proportion of the Haitian public “felt doubly marginalised – by the Haitian state and by the international community” (Fan 2013: 22).
- There were multiple action and plans and strategies for recovery by multiple government agencies and international organisations. While these shared some common elements (e.g. similar guiding principles and the focus on building back better), they tended to lack budgets and timelines, and there was no programmatic or holistic approach. In the end, locally-led efforts typically were carried out independently of the national-level efforts of government ministries and their partners (GFDRR 2014: 4, 5).

## **Programme management resources**

Haiti Reconstruction Fund

- **Operations manual.** Revised 2012:  
<http://www.haitireconstructionfund.org/sites/haitireconstructionfund.org/files/documents/HRF%20Operations%20Manual%20-%20revised%20July2012.pdf>
- **Governance document.** Revised 2012:  
<http://www.haitireconstructionfund.org/sites/haitireconstructionfund.org/files/documents/HRF%20Governance%20Document%20-%20revised%20July2012.pdf>

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Fan, L. (2013). *Disaster as opportunity? Building back better in Aceh, Myanmar and Haiti*. London: Overseas Development Institute. <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8693.pdf>

GFDRR (2014). *Haiti earthquake 2010. Recovery from a Mega Disaster*. Recovery Framework Case Study. GFDRR, UNDP and EU.  
[https://www.gfdr.org/sites/default/files/publication/Haiti\\_August\\_2014\\_Summary.pdf](https://www.gfdr.org/sites/default/files/publication/Haiti_August_2014_Summary.pdf)

Patrick, J. (2011). *Haiti Earthquake Response Emerging Evaluation Lessons*. Evaluation Insights. OECD DAC. <http://www.oecd.org/countries/haiti/50313700.pdf>

### **Other resources**

For lists of other evaluation and lesson learned resources on the response to the Haiti 2010 earthquake:

- Patrick (2011). *Haiti Earthquake Response Emerging Evaluation Lessons*. Evaluation Insights. OECD DAC. <http://www.oecd.org/countries/haiti/50313700.pdf>
- <http://www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/publications/tags/index.php/pw:htiearthquake2010/Haiti%20earthquake%202010/>

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### **Suggested citation**

Carter, B. (2015). *Lessons learned for national state entities for recovery and reconstruction*. (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1254). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

### **About this report**

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