

## Recommendation(s) Status: Signal passed at danger on approach to Wootton Bassett Junction, Wiltshire, 7 March 2015




This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into eight categories:

### Key to Recommendation Status

<b>Implemented:</b>	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
<b>Implemented by alternative means:</b>	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
<b>Implementation ongoing:</b>	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
<b>Insufficient response:</b>	The end implementer has failed to provide a response; or has provided a response that does not adequately satisfy ORR that sufficient action is being taken to properly consider and address a recommendation.
<b>Progressing:</b>	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
<b>Non-implementation:</b>	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
<b>Other Public Body or Authority</b>	The recommendation is also addressed to another public body or authority.
<b>Awaiting response:</b>	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

1            07/03/2015    08/2016  
Signal passed at danger on approach to  
Wootton Bassett Junction, Wilts  
Status: Implemented

The intent of this recommendation is that the risk of overrun by trains operated by steam traction on Network Rail managed infrastructure is reduced as far as is reasonably practicable.

RSSB, working in conjunction with operators of steam traction and Network Rail, and in accordance with normal industry processes, should undertake a review of the current standards, policies, procedures and risk assessment tools intended to assess, prevent and mitigate the risk associated with overruns on Network Rail managed infrastructure.

This review should consider if these arrangements adequately control the risk of overrun associated with the movement of trains formed of steam locomotives and/or preserved vehicles. It should specifically consider:

the extent to which existing railway group standards and associated guidance adequately mitigate the risk of operating such trains;

if there are features of steam locomotives and preserved vehicles which may potentially increase the likelihood or magnitude of overruns (such as reduced forward visibility or braking systems not designed to meet modern standards of performance) or which may potentially make the consequences of an overrun worse (such as vehicles not being designed to meet modern standards of crashworthiness);

the compatibility of braking performance of steam-hauled trains and/or preserved vehicles with signal spacing on lines where signals are more closely spaced (eg lines where different maximum permitted speeds apply to passenger and freight trains);

how the train crew of steam locomotives interact with the controls and visual and audible indications of the Automatic Warning System and the Train Protection and Warning System; if the minimum crewing level for steam movements specified within GO/RT 3440 Issue 2 remains appropriate; and

if steam movements are adequately accounted for within existing tools intended to assess the risk of overruns (such as SORAT).

Companies operating steam locomotives and/or preserved vehicles on Network Rail managed infrastructure and Network Rail should implement any measures identified by this review as being required to adequately control the risk from overrun (paragraphs 256a, 256b, 257a, 257b, 257c, 258 and 280).

ORR has reported that RSSB has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on ORR's report to RAIB)
<p>2            07/03/2015    08/2016</p> <p>Signal passed at danger on approach to Wootton Bassett Junction, Wilts</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The intent of this recommendation is that an external party reviews the implementation of changes to West Coast Railways' safety management system following this incident in order to ensure that they have been effective. The review should also consider the company's safety culture.</p> <p>West Coast Railways should make arrangements for a review of its safety management system and safety culture to be undertaken by an external independent party whose suitability has been agreed with the Office of Rail and Road. The review should consider if the changes made following the SPAD of 7 March 2015 have been implemented and if they have improved the capability of West Coast Railways to control risk and the prevailing safety culture within the company. This review should specifically examine;</p> <p>governance, policy and leadership;</p> <p>control and communication and how this is organised;</p> <p>the co-operation and competence of employees;</p> <p>the planning and implementation of risk controls and how this is managed; and</p> <p>monitoring, review and auditing of compliance to the safety management system and how this is managed.</p> <p>West Coast Railways should make any changes identified as necessary (paragraphs 257a, 257b, 257c and 260).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that West Coast Railways has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>3            07/03/2015    08/2016</p> <p>Signal passed at danger on approach to Wootton Bassett Junction, Wilts</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The intent of this recommendation is that West Coast Railways implements arrangements for the acquisition and retention of route knowledge by drivers which are in line with industry best practice. It is also intended to ensure that West Coast Railways observes the requirements of mandatory standards with respect to identifying signals and signs which may be difficult to see from steam locomotives.</p> <p>West Coast Railways should review the arrangements by which drivers that it employs acquire and retain route knowledge. This review should take into account whether these arrangements meet with the requirements of RIS 3702 Issue 2 'Route Knowledge for Drivers, Train Managers, Guards and Driver Managers'.</p> <p>West Coast Railways should also consider how proposed routes</p>	<p>ORR has reported that West Coast Railways has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>

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### Safety Recommendation

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RAIB)

for steam operations are assessed in order to identify signals and lineside signs which may be difficult to see from a steam locomotive cab and how drivers of West Coast Railways operated steam trains are to be provided with additional competent assistance in sighting any signals or lineside signs falling within this category. This should be done with regard to the requirements of GO/RT 3440 Issue 2 'Steam Locomotive Operation'.

West Coast Railways should make any changes identified as necessary (paragraph 261).

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4            07/03/2015    08/2016  
Signal passed at danger on approach to  
Wootton Bassett Junction, Wilts  
Status: Implemented

The intent of this recommendation is that West Coast Railways implements arrangements for the maintenance of On Train Data Recorders which ensure that this equipment can meet the requirements of the relevant mandatory standards.

West Coast Railways should review the arrangements by which On Train Data Recorders fitted to trains that it operates are maintained. This review should specifically ensure that such recorders are maintained in a way which means that they are capable of supporting the key objectives for data recording as laid down in GM/RT 2472 Issue 2 'Requirements for Data Recorders on Trains'. These include:

the use of systematic safety monitoring as a means of preventing incidents and accidents;

the identification of driver, train and infrastructure performance in the period leading up to and (if appropriate) immediately after an incident or accident; and

the recording of information relating to the performance of both the locomotive / traction unit and the person driving.

West Coast Railways should make any changes identified as necessary (paragraph 263).

ORR has reported that West Coast Railways has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

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5            07/03/2015    08/2016  
Signal passed at danger on approach to  
Wootton Bassett Junction, Wilts  
Status: Implemented

The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that emergency and temporary speed restrictions are designed and implemented in a way which results in clear and correct information being provided to train drivers.

Network Rail, in association with any contractors who carry out such work, should review how the design and implementation of emergency and temporary speed restrictions is managed by the Swindon Maintenance Delivery Unit and how this resulted in the

ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

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errors identified in this report. This review should consider:

the information, instruction and training given to designers of TSRs;

the procurement process for designs, including the circulation list for information and designs provided to Network Rail;

the process for conversion of ESRs to TSRs, including the criteria for deciding whether an ESR design is modified, or if a new design must be used; and

the process for implementing ESRs and TSRs, including the checking of designs and the action to be taken if conditions on the ground do not match the design.

Network Rail should also determine whether any of the issues identified may apply to other maintenance delivery units and take action as necessary to make any changes required (paragraph 256b).