Recommendation(s) Status: Collision between a train and a tractor at Oakwood Farm User Worked Crossing, Knaresborough

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into eight categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.	
Implemented by alternative	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during	
means:	the investigation.	
I man la man and attion and making an	World and the sistent of the recommendation has been appeared and in its the presence of being delivered	
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.	
Insufficient response:	The end implementer has failed to provide a response; or has provided a response that does not adequately satisfy ORR that sufficient action is being taken to properly consider and address a recommendation.	
Progressing:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.	
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.	
Closed - carry forward:	ORR intends to take no further action as it has been superseded by another recommendation.	
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Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.	

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Recommendation Status Report



Report Title	Collision between a train and a tractor at Oakwood Farm User Worked Crossing, Knaresborough		
Report Number	07/2016		
Date of Incident 14/05/2015			

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
07/2016/01	Implemented	None		ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it
			The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk to users of	has completed actions taken in
			Oakwood Farm UWC.	response to this
			Network Rail should:	recommendation.
			Network Rail Should:	ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware
			a) undertake a comprehensive review of the safety of the crossing at	that the information provided
			Oakwood Farm UWC in the light of the findings in this report, its own	becomes inaccurate.
			hazard reviews, human factors advice, and suggestions from the	
			authorised user, in order to minimise the risk to users; and	
			b) implement any improvements identified in part a) above at Oakwood	
			Farm UWC in liaison with the authorised user.	
07/2016/02	Implemented	White		ORR has reported that Network
				Rail has reported that it has
			The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk to users of other POGO equipped crossings.	completed actions taken in response to this
				recommendation. ORR proposes
			Network Rail should develop and implement a programme for a timely	to take no further action unless
			review of the safety of other user worked crossings it has fitted with	they become aware that the
			POGO equipment and those it intends to fit in the future. The review	information provided becomes
			should include particular consideration of the following:	inaccurate.
			a) the design standard for crossings fitted with POGO equipment	

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			(paragraph 77); b) the ways in which users in different types of vehicles operate the crossing gates, including the function of the gate operating buttons (paragraph 74); c) the clarity of instructions to enable unfamiliar users to use the crossings safely and to minimise reliance on the briefing of all visitors by authorised users (which is not always practicable) (paragraph 94); d) improving the conspicuity of the MSLs (eg using two MSLs on each side of the crossing, the use of larger 'road traffic light' style red and green lights, flashing red MSLs, or wig wag lights) and the number and clarity of the signs, to minimise confusion and distraction (paragraph 64); and e) whether the opening of the gates should be disabled unless the MSLs are displaying green lights (paragraphs 41 and 61). This review should draw on the findings from recent relevant research (eg RSSB's research into signs at private level crossings (T983) and human factors advice). Any measures for safety improvements at such crossings should then be implemented at higher risk locations and incorporated into the standards	
07/2016/02	Implemented	None	for future designs.	OPP has reported that
07/2016/03	Implemented	None	The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk from the introduction of infrastructure equipment onto the railway network. Network Rail should review the robustness of its processes for accepting new equipment and technology onto the railway, including particular	ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware
			consideration of the following:	that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

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a) definition and adherence to an appropriate level of safety assurance;
b) the early involvement of human factors expertise, where appropriate, throughout the product's introduction;
c) the risk assessment processes applied to the new equipment itself and the infrastructure into which it is to be integrated;
d) definition and monitoring of trials, implementation of any resulting improvements, and the roll-out of the product to other locations;
e) maintenance of a hazard record for the life-cycle of the product; and
f) a process for undertaking regular audits to check the implementation of its product introduction processes and correcting any identified shortcomings (paragraph 116b).
It should then, where appropriate, produce a time bound plan for the amendment of the standard.