Recommendation(s) Status: Uncontrolled evacuation of a train at Holland Park station

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:


Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.	
Implemented by alternative	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB	
means:	during the investigation.	
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being	
	delivered.	
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is	
	in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.	

Non-implementation: Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be ta	ken.
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Awaiting response: Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:





The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
125/08/201316/2014Uncontrolled evacuation of a train at Holland Park stationStatus: Implemented	The purpose of this recommendation is to promote a design review of the passenger emergency alarm system on 1992 tube stock and the adoption of ergonomics best practice in an improved design. London Underground Limited should carry out an ergonomics assessment of the driver interface with the passenger emergency alarm system on 1992 tube stock. This assessment should include the functioning of the talkback system and the compatibility between the controls and the display. Taking account of guidelines on alarm handling and prioritisation (such as the, 'Good Practice Guide for the design of alarms and alerts' (T326), RSSB, 2008), London Underground Limited should then take appropriate action to present critical information to the train operator in a way that supports decisions and actions so that they can deal appropriately with the emergency situation (paragraph 129).	ORR has reported that London Underground Ltd has carried out a review in response to this recommendation and proposes no further action. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the infiormation provided becomes inaccurate. Training and review done. There is no hardware change.
	Relevant outcomes of this ergonomic assessment should also be applied to other stock as appropriate.	
2 25/08/2013 16/2014 Uncontrolled evacuation of a train at Holland Park station Status: Implemented	The purpose of this recommendation is to improve the ability of train operators to handle multiple passenger emergency alarms and other 'out of course' events on 1992 tube stock. London Underground Limited should review the rules, procedures and training applying to the handling of emergency situations on 1992 tube stock where multiple passenger emergency alarms have been activated and/or where only part of the train is stopped in a station. This review should include an assessment of the ways in which train operators can best manage a situation and adequacy of existing training arrangements. Particular attention should be paid to helping operators make appropriate and timely announcements and the safe management of doors in such circumstances. Any necessary changes to existing arrangements should then be implemented and staff briefed and trained as appropriate (paragraph 126b).	A.ORR has reported that London Underground Ltd has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
	stock as appropriate.	

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
3 25/08/2013 16/2014 Uncontrolled evacuation of a train at Holland Park station Status: Implemented	The purpose of this recommendation is to ensure that train operators remain in communication with line controllers when they are required to leave the cab to go back into the train. London Underground Limited should put procedures in place to require train operators to carry their hand-held radio when going back into the train, for example, to investigate the activation of a passenger emergency alarm, so that they can communicate with the line controller in a timely manner (paragraph 126c).	ORR has reported that London Underground Ltd has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
4 25/08/2013 16/2014 Uncontrolled evacuation of a train at Holland Park station Status: Implemented	The purpose of this recommendation is to make sure that line controllers are enabled to take appropriate and timely action when dealing with potential safety critical faults and conditions on trains. London Underground Limited should: a. review the procedure applying to line controllers for dealing with reports of faults on trains, particularly reports relating to smoke or burning, and improve as necessary, in order that line controllers are provided with a clear process to assist timely decision-making and response; and b. establish a protocol to manage the shift changeover between controllers, so that there is no loss of time or continuity in dealing with an incident (paragraph 128).	ORR has reported that London Underground Ltd has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate
5 25/08/2013 16/2014 Uncontrolled evacuation of a train at Holland Park station Status: Implemented	The purpose of this recommendation is to ensure that London Underground Limited's staff are able to respond appropriately to incidents on trains in platforms. London Underground Limited should review the required competencies and training for dealing with out-of-course events on trains in platforms. This should include consideration of how best to prepare station staff, train operators and line controllers to respond to such events in a rapid, coordinated and coherent manner, to protect the safety of passengers and station users (paragraphs 126b, 126c, 126d and 128).	ORR has reported that London Underground Ltd has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendationORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
6 25/08/2013 16/2014 Uncontrolled evacuation of a train at Holland Park station Status: Implemented	The purpose of this recommendation is to draw attention to the need for the prompt and accurate reporting of incidents. London Underground Limited should devise a time bound programme to reinforce, by briefing and further training if necessary, its procedures on the reporting and investigation of incidents in which there are no reported injuries but which could	ORR has reported that London Underground Ltd has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

Safety Recommendation

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)

have led to more serious consequences. This should include the need for the early debriefing of staff involved and, where appropriate, the withdrawal of any trains from service for inspection and testing, to permit such incidents to be properly investigated (paragraph 130).