Recommendation(s) Status: Train driver receiving a severe electric shock at Sutton Weaver, Cheshire, 23 September 2014

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into eight categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.	
Implemented by alternative means:	ted by alternative The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIE during the investigation.	
Implementation ongoing:	ongoing: Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.	
Insufficient response:	The end implementer has failed to provide a response; or has provided a response that does not adequately satisfy ORR that sufficient action is being taken to properly consider and address a recommendation.	
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Progressing:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.	
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.	
Other Public Body or Authority	The recommendation is also addressed to another public body or authority.	
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.	

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:



The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.



The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status		Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on ORR's report to RAIB)
1 23/09/2014 07/2015 `Train driver receiving a severe electric shock at Sutton Weaver Status: Implemented		The intent of this recommendation is to minimise the occurrence of broken auxiliary wires on Mk 1 compound catenary OLE to reduce the potential for people to receive electric shocks. Network Rail should revise its work instructions so that inspection staff are aware of what to look for, including possible fatigue damage precursors as found during the metallurgical examinations of this investigation, and during the inspections Network Rail has already carried out (paragraph 99a). It should produce a plan for the extension of its current detailed examinations of auxiliary wires close to, and within, protective sleeves to identify and rectify broken and damaged wire strands and protective sleeves on all of its Mk 1 compound catenary. Following this, its routine inspections should include this	ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
2 `Train driver at Sutton We Status: Imple		additional examination. The intent of this recommendation is to minimise the risk to train crew following an incident involving the OLE. RSSB should review Module AC of the Rule Book (GE/RT8000/AC) and appropriately clarify the actions that train crew should take if they are required to leave their train in situations where the OLE is electrically live, and may possibly be damaged (paragraph 101b).	ORR has reported that RSSB has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

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