

## Recommendation(s) Status: Accident to a track worker near Redhill, 24 June 2014




This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into eight categories:

### Key to Recommendation Status

<b>Implemented:</b>	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
<b>Implemented by alternative means:</b>	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
<b>Implementation ongoing:</b>	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
<b>Insufficient response:</b>	The end implementer has failed to provide a response; or has provided a response that does not adequately satisfy ORR that sufficient action is being taken to properly consider and address a recommendation.
<b>Progressing:</b>	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
<b>Non-implementation:</b>	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
<b>Other Public Body or Authority</b>	The recommendation is also addressed to another public body or authority.
<b>Awaiting response:</b>	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on ORR's report to RAIB)
<p>1            24/06/2014    06/2015</p> <p>Accident to a track worker near Redhill</p> <p>Status: In-progress</p>	<p>The intent of this recommendation is that all locations which are used as positions of safety should be suitable for that purpose, to minimise the risk when staff need to clear the line for the passage of trains.</p> <p>Network Rail should:</p> <p>Review each section of line where work while trains are running is authorised, and assess the availability and suitability of the locations that are required to be used as a position of safety. Where these are found to be inadequate, Network Rail should prohibit work while trains are running.</p> <p>Ensure that staff responsible for establishing a safe system of work on site are explicitly prompted to consider potential hazards that might call into question the suitability of the position(s) of safety throughout the site (such as the number of people required to use it/them, and whether the ground is reasonably level, in good condition underfoot and free of obstructions) before permitting work to commence (paragraphs 115b, 115c).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has outlined the actions to be taken in response to the recommendation. ORR is seeking further information.</p>
<p>2            24/06/2014    06/2015</p> <p>Accident to a track worker near Redhill</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The intent of this recommendation is that a consistent and appropriate level of first aid cover is provided for people working on the track.</p> <p>Network Rail should review its policy on first aid provision, as defined in company standard NR/L2/OHS/00110, and the way in which this policy is implemented, so that a consistent and appropriate level of first aid cover is provided for people working on or near the line, taking into account the nature of the work and the environment in which it takes place (paragraph 117b).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>3            24/06/2014    06/2015</p> <p>Accident to a track worker near Redhill</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The intent of this recommendation is that there should be a defined and suitable method to address the risk that, after a train has passed a work site, the work group might return to the track while their lookout is still unsighted by that train, and that COSS/SWL and lookouts should be given appropriate training.</p> <p>Network Rail should review the training of Controllers of Site Safety (or Safe Work Leaders) (COSS/SWL) and lookouts relating to setting up work under lookout protection. This review should cover the way which the lookout(s) and the COSS/SWL interact to confirm that it is safe for the work group to go on or near the line (particularly after a train has passed), and should include the definition of suitable methods by which lookouts may</p>	<p>This recommendation was concerned with a situation where a distant lookout, standing in the down side cess, had his view of any approaching up train obscured by a passing down train. It was not concerned with a situation where the distant and site lookouts had lost sight contact with each other. The briefing material seems to focus on this latter situation, rather than the situation described in the first sentence. The briefing specifically excludes 'unofficial' handsignals (which were in use at Redhill) and so in the circumstances described, the only option would presumably be for the distant lookout to wave his chequered flag until his view has been restored. This also needs to be emphasised in training material, ie how a distant/intermediate lookout is to convey to the site lookout or COSS/SWL that their</p>

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positively indicate to each other and to the COSS/SWL that the lookout(s) are unsighted and that work may not resume (paragraph 117a).

**Summary of current status (based on ORR's report to RAIB)**

view is blocked (the rule book refers to them telling the COSS/SWL that their view is blocked, but not how they should do it, which may be difficult if they are hundreds of metres away). \$B