

Recommendation Status Report: Train struck and damaged by equipment cabinet door in Watford Tunnel

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of the recommendation(s), as reported to us, are described by the following categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Open (replaces Progressing and Implementation On-going)	Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing.
Closed (replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non-implementation)	ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken.
Insufficient response:	The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is insufficient evidence to support no action being taken.
Superseded:	The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concern over the way that an organisation has responded to a recommendation are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Recommendation Status Report



Report Title	Train struck and damaged by equipment cabinet door in Watford Tunnel
Report Number	12/2015
Date of Incident	26/10/2014

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
12/2015/03	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is for Siemens to arrange for an independent review of the way in which it manages the risk to safety critical staff working on infrastructure projects.</p> <p>Siemens UK should commission an independent review of the implementation of those aspects of its safety management system relating to the welfare of safety critical staff working on infrastructure projects, including its arrangements for managing fatigue, and take action as appropriate to rectify any deficiencies found (paragraphs 95a(iv) and 97).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Siemens has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
12/2015/04	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is for Network Rail to reduce the risk arising from equipment that has the potential to foul the gauge.</p> <p>Network Rail should establish a policy and guidance on managing the risk from lineside equipment that can foul the gauge, with specific consideration of the siting of equipment in areas of limited clearance and, for example, the use of refuges in tunnels for that purpose (paragraph 95b).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
12/2015/05	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is for Henry Williams Ltd to conduct a review of its railway industry products to assure itself that it has current, appropriate and complete certification.</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Henry Williams Ltd has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation.</p>

Recommendation Status Report



			Henry Williams Ltd, in conjunction with Network Rail as necessary, should review its current range of railway products to ensure that it has full details of the certification associated with each item, and take action as appropriate to rectify any deficiencies found (paragraph 96b).	ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
12/2015/06	Closed - IA	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is for Network Rail to take action to reduce the risk of equipment being installed without contractors being aware of existing limitations on, or conditions of, its use.</p> <p>Network Rail should, in consultation with its suppliers, make improvements to its systems for product acceptance to ensure that all relevant information associated with those products, such as risk assessments, is accessible to potential users. The exercise should consider including a facility to enable each user to include information on its own application of the product that may be beneficial to future users (paragraph 96b).</p>	ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
12/2015/01	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is for Network Rail to eliminate by design, or mitigate, the risk from lineside cabinets fouling the gauge.</p> <p>Network Rail should mandate a requirement in its company standards for a design of cabinet that removes by design the risk of an open door infringing the gauge where the cabinet needs to be located in an area of limited clearance. Where this is not practicable, the design of cabinet should alert staff to an unsecured door (paragraph 95a(i)).</p>	ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
12/2015/02	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is for Network Rail to make explicit its processes for handing back a work site to reduce the risk arising from the railway not being safe and clear for the passage of trains.</p> <p>Network Rail should implement a means to meet the rule book requirement for the designated person (Engineering Supervisor or Safe Work Leader) to confirm to the PICOP that the railway is safe and clear for</p>	ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the

Recommendation Status Report



			the passage of trains when that designated person is not present on site (paragraph 95a(iii)).	information provided becomes inaccurate.
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