

Recommendation(s) Status: Derailment of a freight train at Stoke Lane Level Crossing, near Nottingham

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into eight categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
Insufficient response:	The end implementer has failed to provide a response; or has provided a response that does not adequately satisfy ORR that sufficient action is being taken to properly consider and address a recommendation.
Progressing:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
Closed - carry forward:	ORR intends to take no further action as it has been superseded by another recommendation.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Recommendation Status Report



Report Title	Derailment of a freight train at Stoke Lane Level Crossing, near Nottingham
Report Number	02/2015
Date of Incident	27/08/2013

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
02/2015/01	Implemented	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is that the HSE, as the investigatory and regulatory authority for the construction of UTXs, disseminates the key learning points from this accident to the UK tunnelling industry. It is intended that the tunnelling companies then review their methods of working and make any necessary changes to prevent similar future accidents or incidents.</p> <p>The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) should:</p> <p>a) disseminate the key lessons from this accident (paragraph 109 refers), to UK organisations representing tunnelling companies (eg The Pipejacking Association, British Tunnelling Society, UK Society for Trenchless Tunnelling), and request them to further disseminate the learning points to their members, so that individual companies can review and improve their working practices as necessary.</p> <p>b) assess the need to carry out monitoring checks at UTX construction sites, as part of its audit programmes, to verify that the procedures being followed on site are in line with industry good practice and lessons learned from this investigation (paragraph 104a).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
02/2015/02	Implemented	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is that there is one consistently applied Network Rail standard for UTXs, applicable to both outside parties and Network Rail, so that in future there is clarity about Network Rail's complete requirements and expectations and the checks its</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further</p>

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			<p>engineers should undertake. Network Rail should review how its current processes related to the construction and approval of UTX works are being applied, and consider the most effective way of merging its national standard and local route guidance documents into a unified set of requirements for UTXs. These requirements should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) include improvements to cover lessons learned from this accident as detailed at paragraph 109, and be included in a process of periodic review to check that they remain up to date; b) list the main sources of risk to its infrastructure from the construction of UTXs (eg ground settlement, heave or voiding) and how it expects those risks to be mitigated; c) provide clarity on roles and responsibilities within Network Rail, and its expectations of outside parties, particularly with respect to assessing and managing risk and communication for matters affecting safety of the railway; and d) seek to use a risk based approach which leads users to additional control measures for higher risk UTXs, such as those at level crossings. Once developed, the requirements should be the subject of appropriate briefing and training to relevant Network Rail staff and made available to outside parties installing UTXs. Compliance with the requirements should also be subject to a system of periodic internal audit (paragraphs 105a, 105c and 106). 	<p>action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
02/2015/03	Implemented	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is that Network Rail's asset protection engineers have sufficient knowledge about UTXs, and the time to properly assess and manage the associated risks to its infrastructure.</p> <p>Network Rail should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) review the working knowledge of its asset protection engineers with respect to UTXs and where necessary provide appropriate training, which should include information on types of UTX, methods of construction, best practice, failure modes, seeking specialist assistance; and 	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>

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			b) review the resourcing in its asset protection teams to check that engineers have sufficient time allocated to carry out their duties and access to specialist technical assistance when required, and where necessary, make any appropriate changes (paragraph 105b).	
02/2015/04	Implemented	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is that Network Rail has a procedure for monitoring settlement in the vicinity of UTXs and other civil engineering works adjacent to its infrastructure, which can be relied upon to accurately measure ground movements that could adversely affect the safety of the line.</p> <p>Network Rail should:</p> <p>a) review the suitability and action limits of its standard for the monitoring of track movement over or adjacent to civil engineering works, including UTXs. This should take into account calculated predictions of settlement, rates of movement and the potential for the movements to be masked by existing structures, and not rely upon inappropriate track maintenance standards; and</p> <p>b) make any necessary changes to its procedures and brief these out to relevant staff (paragraph 105d).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>