## Recommendation(s) Status: Fatal accident involving a track worker near Newark North Gate station, 22 January 2014

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into eight categories:

## **Key to Recommendation Status**

All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.		
The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.		
Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.		
The end implementer has failed to provide a response; or has provided a response that does not adequately satisfy ORR that sufficient action is being taken to properly consider and address a recommendation.		
The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.		
Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.		
The recommendation is also addressed to another public body or authority.		
Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.		

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:



The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.



The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Rep Inv Title / Current S	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on ORR's report to RAIB)
	The intent of this recommendation is that Network Rail improves work site safety discipline and vigilance, especially for teams doing cyclical or repetitive tasks with which they are familiar.  Network Rail should:  a) systematically brief and where appropriate rebrief its COSS/Safe Work Leaders that they must be on site at all times, even when working with experienced staff, and that they must provide a full site based safety briefing once the safe system of work has been verified by them as being appropriate for the conditions at the time of the work;  b) rebrief its lookouts about not leaving the position of safety until the COSS has given permission;  c) actively monitor the degree to which work site discipline is being maintained, and take appropriate corrective action if any issues are found; and  d) investigate how best to maintain vigilance and safety discipline for cyclical and repetitive tasks and implement any practicable measures into its working procedures (paragraph 87).	ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
	The intent of this recommendation is to improve the implementation of Network Rail's procedures for planning safe systems of work, so that the hierarchy of risk is used in the intended way.  Network Rail should:  a) introduce sufficient managerial supervision and audit checking to confirm that the standards governing the safety of track workers are being correctly implemented by its delivery units in the planning of safe systems of work (SSOW), particularly in those areas where staff regularly work on lines that are still open to traffic.  b) take steps to strengthen any weaknesses it finds, including the re-training of staff involved in planning safe systems of work (paragraph 89).	ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

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