

Recommendation(s) Status: Passenger train collision with trolley at Bridgeway UWC

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

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| Implemented: | All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed. |
| Implemented by alternative means: | The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation. |
| Implementation ongoing: | Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered. |
| In-progress: | The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this. |
| Non-implementation: | Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken. |
| Awaiting response: | Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation. |

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

**Number/ Date/ Report No/
Inv Title / Current Status**

Safety Recommendation

**Summary of current status (based on latest report
from the relevant safety authority or public body)**

1 16/01/2014 25/2014

Passenger train collision with trolley at
Bridgeway UWC

Status: Implementation ongoing

The intent of this recommendation is to minimise the potential for the SSOWP paperwork to mislead its users into blocking the wrong line when opting to take only one of two parallel line blockages.

Network Rail should, as part of its planning and delivering safe work project, take account of the arrangements and associated wording for parallel line blockages in the new permit packs to ensure that:

a. presentation of the SSOWP documentation is simple and clear with regard to parallel line blockages, particularly in terms of allowing users to identify which line the work is to take place on; and

b. designations of 'working' and 'parallel' blockages are verified during production of the SSOWP as referring respectively to the line on which the work is to take place and the adjacent line(s) (paragraph 95b).

ORR has reported that Network Rail has outlined the actions to be taken in response to the recommendation. ORR will continue to monitor implementation of this recommendation.

2 16/01/2014 25/2014

Passenger train collision with trolley at
Bridgeway UWC

Status: Implemented



The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk associated with late notice planning of work and planning to deadlines, which can affect decision-making on site due to the availability of information and perceived pressures of work.

Network Rail should review work planning practices and processes at Shrewsbury Maintenance Delivery Unit and optimise the distribution of information for both planners and track workers to carry out their jobs effectively (paragraph 96). This review should consider:

a. workload and resourcing to enable more strategic and proactive approaches to work planning;

b. information available to the planner and the COSS in producing and checking SSOWP documentation, including details of the work to be undertaken; and

c. local practices and assumptions about planning parallel line blockages with respect to national procedures and processes, particularly concerning the designation of 'working' lines and the inferred level of protection on the part of the planner and the COSS.

Network Rail should also determine whether such issues are applicable at other maintenance delivery units and take action as necessary to address any problems identified.

ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate. The last paragraph of the recommendation has not been done. RAIB remain concerned that the applicability to other maintenance delivery units of safety issues (raised in this recommendation) have not been determined or acted upon. \$w

**Number/ Date/ Report No/
Inv Title / Current Status**

3 16/01/2014 25/2014

Passenger train collision with trolley at
Bridgeway UWC

Status: Implemented



Safety Recommendation

The intent of this recommendation is to strengthen Network Rail's competence management processes for staff in particular circumstances where potential shortfalls in their competence or knowledge might otherwise go unchecked.

Network Rail should, as part of its review of Assessment in The Line:

- a. clarify the management arrangements for seconded staff so that it is clear which part of the organisation is responsible for each element of an individual's competence and knowledge; and
- b. revise its criteria for refresher training following periods of extended absence, particularly where significant changes to work patterns, practices or infrastructure arrangements have occurred during the absence (paragraph 97a).

**Summary of current status (based on latest report
from the relevant safety authority or public body)**

ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate. The first part of the recommendation asked Network Rail to clarify the management arrangements for seconded staff so that it is clear which part of the organisation is responsible for each element of an individual's competence and knowledge. Network Rail's response has been to mandate that Line Managers are accountable for identifying each individual within their teams for whom they take responsibility in terms of initial and ongoing training, assessment and development activities (including seconded staff). Unfortunately, it fails to establish a key principle in this area by making it clear whether it is the manager receiving the seconded person or the manager providing the seconded person who should be accountable. This would have been far simpler than leaving it to Line Managers to determine who is accountable. With the wording as proposed it would be possible for both managers to deem themselves not accountable for the seconded person, leading to exactly the circumstances that applied at Bridgeway. \$b