

## Recommendation(s) Status: Derailment at Primrose Hill/Camden Road West Junction, 15 October 2013




This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into eight categories:

### Key to Recommendation Status

<b>Implemented:</b>	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
<b>Implemented by alternative means:</b>	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
<b>Implementation ongoing:</b>	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
<b>Insufficient response:</b>	The end implementer has failed to provide a response; or has provided a response that does not adequately satisfy ORR that sufficient action is being taken to properly consider and address a recommendation.
<b>Progressing:</b>	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
<b>Non-implementation:</b>	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
<b>Other Public Body or Authority</b>	The recommendation is also addressed to another public body or authority.
<b>Awaiting response:</b>	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on ORR's report to RAIB)
<p>1            15/10/2013    21/2014</p> <p>Derailment at Primrose Hill/Camden Road West Junction</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the probability of track geometry defects remaining undetected in the event that operation of a track geometry measurement train does not take place as scheduled.</p> <p>Network Rail should provide specific guidance to managers with responsibility for track maintenance on the action to be taken to confirm that track quality remains acceptable should a planned run of a track geometry measurement train over a section of line be cancelled (paragraph 128a). This should include the criteria for whether it is necessary to conduct additional track geometry measurements, as well as the timescales for any such measurements to be completed.</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has outlined the actions to be taken in response to the recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate. In order to consider this recommendation to have been addressed, further action (which has already been proposed) is required. \$W</p>
<p>2            15/10/2013    21/2014</p> <p>Derailment at Primrose Hill/Camden Road West Junction</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The intent of this recommendation is for the key stakeholders in the railway industry to work together to assess the risk from asymmetric loading and to identify and adopt reasonably practicable control measures to mitigate that risk.</p> <p>Freightliner and Network Rail should jointly request that RSSB:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) researches the factors that may increase the probability of derailment when container wagons are asymmetrically loaded, and in particular: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. sensitivity to combinations of longitudinal and lateral offsets in loads that can reasonably be encountered in service;</li> <li>ii. the predicted performance of wagons with high torsional stiffness along their length (using the FEA type as an example); and</li> <li>iii. the effect of multiple twist faults, track twist over distances other than 3 metres (as commonly specified and measured by Network Rail) and lateral track irregularities.</li> </ul> </li> <li>b) updates and amends as necessary the risk assessment contained within the RSSB and Transport Research Laboratory joint report ('Potential risks to road and rail transport associated with asymmetric loading of containers'); this should take into account the results from the research referred to in a) and additional evidence presented in this investigation report; and</li> <li>c) works with industry stakeholders to use the outputs of a) and b) to identify, evaluate and promote adoption of any additional reasonably practicable mitigations<sup>46</sup> capable of reducing the</li> </ul>	<p>ORR has reported that Freightliner and Network Rail has outlined the actions to be taken in response to the recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate. Although some positive steps have been taken, (ie the establishment of the cross-industry working group) the findings of the group have not yet been delivered or fully considered. \$B</p>

**Number/ Date/ Report No/  
Inv Title / Current Status**

**Safety Recommendation**

**Summary of current status (based on ORR's report to  
RAIB)**

risk from asymmetric loading of wagons (paragraphs 128c,  
130a, 130b and 131b).

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3            15/10/2013    21/2014  
Derailment at Primrose Hill/Camden Road  
West Junction  
Status: Implemented

The intent of this recommendation is to clarify the requirements  
for the design and acceptance of freight wagons, taking account  
of the possibility of asymmetric loading.

RSSB should amend Railway Group Standard 'Resistance of  
Railway Vehicles to Derailment and Roll-Over', GM/RT2141 to  
refer specifically to asymmetric loading, including possible  
combinations of longitudinal and lateral load imbalance  
(paragraph 131a).

ORR has reported that RSSB has reported that it  
has completed actions taken in response to this  
recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further  
action unless they become aware that the  
information provided becomes inaccurate.