

Report Title	Near-miss at Llandovery level crossing, Carmarthenshire		
Report Number	11/2014		
Date of Incident	06/06/2013		

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
11/2014/01	Implemented	None	The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk created by having no formal method of work where traincrew have duties to perform, such as token exchange, level crossing operation and train dispatch at unstaffed stations.	ORR has reported that Arriva Trains Wales has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR
			Arriva Trains Wales should identify all locations where traincrew carry out operational activities such as token exchange and level crossing operation in addition to train dispatch, and develop risk assessed methods of work for each location. The methods of work should be briefed, and trained to all traincrew, incorporated in the performance monitoring systems and be subject to periodic review (paragraphs 106a, 106b and 108a).	proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
11/2014/02	Implemented	None	The intent of this recommendation is to improve the arrangements at stations in respect of the positioning of equipment and signage used by traincrew.	ORR has confirmed that ATW has completed the review of risk assessments and these have been
			Arriva Trains Wales should lead a review of the positioning of platform equipment and signage used by traincrew at unmanned stations and, where practicable, arrange with Network Rail for improvements to be made. This should include (paragraphs 106a and 106b):	verified by relevant senior managers. The methods of work are briefed, and trained to all train crew, incorporated in the performance monitoring systems,
			a. identification of the optimum stopping position for trains to enable the best achievable view of signals, stop boards and indicators; and	through ATW routine train crew briefing system. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they
			b. an assessment of the positioning of control equipment operated by traincrew (such as level crossing controls).	become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
11/2014/03	Implemented	None	The intent of this recommendation is for infrastructure upgrade and improvement projects to include explicit consideration of all reasonable opportunities to improve	ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has



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			safety at those locations where work is taking place.	completed actions taken in
				response to this
			Network Rail should make improvements to its processes for the design of new and	recommendation.
			altered signalling, to require the active consideration of reasonable opportunities to	ORR proposes to take no further
			make improvements (for example, the types of measures indicated in NB 130	action unless they become aware
			(paragraph 75)) to the control of risk beyond the immediate scope of the proposed	that the information provided
			works, including identifying where operator errors, individual or collective, could lead	becomes inaccurate.
			to unsafe conditions (paragraph 106c).	
11/2014/04	Implemented	None	The intent of this recommendation is for ATW to review and improve its operational	Although the research proposal
			risk management arrangements.	from ATW to undertake some
				ground-breaking work into
			Arriva Trains Wales should conduct a review of its operational risk management	fatigue is not complete yet, the
			arrangements in the light of the findings from this investigation, and make	proposal appears to address the
			improvements in accordance with the findings of the review (paragraphs 106a, 106b,	concerns expressed previously
			108a and 108b). The scope of the review should include:	about what was to be done in
				response to the fatigue elements
			a. the process for assessing risk associated with station duties on all lines over which its	of recommendation 4, as it
			traincrews operate (eg the application of route risk assessments);	represents a thorough approach
				to fatigue assessment and the
			b. a prioritised plan for the assessment of dispatch risk at unmanned platforms;	factors that drive a propensity to
				fatigue.
			c. a prioritised plan to formulate, brief and train dispatch plans to traincrew;	
			,	
			d. the effectiveness of its methods for checking compliance with its policies and	
			procedures (eg the application of remote booking-on spot checks, out-of-hours checks,	
			and remote monitoring of the use of safety-critical equipment (including the use of	
			OTDR data));	
			e. the guidance issued by ORR and RSSB about fatigue management, in particular sleep	
			risk assessments when booking-on duty, and a culture of trust and openness in fatigue	
			management; and	
			management, and	
			f. the need for a revision of its training practices and materials for drivers, conductors	
			and controllers to explain the rationale that underpins the rules and to emphasise the	
1			and controllers to explain the rationale that underpins the rules and to emphasise the	<b> </b>



			benefits of compliance (as well as describing the rules and the consequences of non-compliance).	
11/2014/05	Implemented by alternative means	None	The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk of error at traincrew operated level crossings by providing positive indications of the status of those crossings.  Network Rail should review the current arrangements for providing an indication to the train driver of the status of the crossing at Llandovery. This should include consideration of the practicability of providing an active indication when the crossing is still open to road traffic (eg a flashing red light). This review should then be extended to other traincrew operated level crossings of a similar design (paragraphs 106a, 106b and 107).	ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation by provision of TPWS at the crossing, rather than a flashing red light. This provides a higher level of protection. ORR notes that Network Rail will need to consider provision of TPWS at other traincrew-operated crossings. ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed the actions taken (by alternative means) in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
11/2014/06	Implemented	None	The intent of this recommendation is to control the risk created by traincrew continuing to operate trains in service where there is evidence that their actions contributed to a serious operational incident.	ORR has reported that Arriva Trains Wales has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR
			Arriva Trains Wales should review and improve the training and guidance given to its duty control managers on the steps to be taken when traincrew are involved in a	proposes to take no further
			serious operating incident where their actions directly contributed to it (paragraph	action unless they become aware that the information provided
			109).	becomes inaccurate.
11/2014/01	Implemented	None	The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk created by having no formal method of work where traincrew have duties to perform, such as token exchange,	ORR has reported that Arriva Trains Wales has reported that it



			level crossing operation and train dispatch at unstaffed stations.  Arriva Trains Wales should identify all locations where traincrew carry out operational activities such as token exchange and level crossing operation in addition to train dispatch, and develop risk assessed methods of work for each location. The methods of work should be briefed, and trained to all traincrew, incorporated in the performance monitoring systems and be subject to periodic review (paragraphs 106a, 106b and 108a).	has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
11/2014/02	Implemented	None	The intent of this recommendation is to improve the arrangements at stations in respect of the positioning of equipment and signage used by traincrew.  Arriva Trains Wales should lead a review of the positioning of platform equipment and signage used by traincrew at unmanned stations and, where practicable, arrange with Network Rail for improvements to be made. This should include (paragraphs 106a and 106b):	ORR has confirmed that ATW has completed the review of risk assessments and these have been verified by relevant senior managers. The methods of work are briefed, and trained to all train crew, incorporated in the performance monitoring systems,
			a. identification of the optimum stopping position for trains to enable the best achievable view of signals, stop boards and indicators; and	through ATW routine train crew briefing system. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they
			b. an assessment of the positioning of control equipment operated by traincrew (such as level crossing controls).	become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.