

Recommendation(s) Status: Near-miss at Llandoverly level crossing

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
1 06/06/2013 11/2014 Near-miss at Llandoverly level crossing Status: Implemented	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk created by having no formal method of work where traincrew have duties to perform, such as token exchange, level crossing operation and train dispatch at unstaffed stations.</p> <p>Arriva Trains Wales should identify all locations where traincrew carry out operational activities such as token exchange and level crossing operation in addition to train dispatch, and develop risk assessed methods of work for each location. The methods of work should be briefed, and trained to all traincrew, incorporated in the performance monitoring systems and be subject to periodic review (paragraphs 106a, 106b and 108a).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Arriva Trains Wales has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
2 06/06/2013 11/2014 Near-miss at Llandoverly level crossing Status: Implemented	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to improve the arrangements at stations in respect of the positioning of equipment and signage used by traincrew.</p> <p>Arriva Trains Wales should lead a review of the positioning of platform equipment and signage used by traincrew at unmanned stations and, where practicable, arrange with Network Rail for improvements to be made. This should include (paragraphs 106a and 106b):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. identification of the optimum stopping position for trains to enable the best achievable view of signals, stop boards and indicators; and b. an assessment of the positioning of control equipment operated by traincrew (such as level crossing controls). 	<p>ORR has confirmed that ATW has completed the review of risk assessments and these have been verified by relevant senior managers. The methods of work are briefed, and trained to all train crew, incorporated in the performance monitoring systems, through ATW routine train crew briefing system. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
3 06/06/2013 11/2014 Near-miss at Llandoverly level crossing Status: Implementation ongoing	<p>The intent of this recommendation is for infrastructure upgrade and improvement projects to include explicit consideration of all reasonable opportunities to improve safety at those locations where work is taking place.</p> <p>Network Rail should make improvements to its processes for the design of new and altered signalling, to require the active consideration of reasonable opportunities to make improvements (for example, the types of measures indicated in NB 130 (paragraph 75)) to the control of risk beyond the immediate scope of the proposed works, including identifying where operator errors, individual or collective, could lead to unsafe conditions (paragraph 106c).</p>	<p>Orr has reported that Network Rail has outlined the actions to be taken in response to the recommendation. ORR will continue to monitor implementation of this recommendation. Update 31/10/15.</p>

**Number/ Date/ Report No/
Inv Title / Current Status**

4 06/06/2013 11/2014

Near-miss at Llandoverly level crossing

Status: Implemented



Safety Recommendation

The intent of this recommendation is for ATW to review and improve its operational risk management arrangements.

Arriva Trains Wales should conduct a review of its operational risk management arrangements in the light of the findings from this investigation, and make improvements in accordance with the findings of the review (paragraphs 106a, 106b, 108a and 108b). The scope of the review should include:

- a. the process for assessing risk associated with station duties on all lines over which its traincrews operate (eg the application of route risk assessments);
- b. a prioritised plan for the assessment of dispatch risk at unmanned platforms;
- c. a prioritised plan to formulate, brief and train dispatch plans to traincrew;
- d. the effectiveness of its methods for checking compliance with its policies and procedures (eg the application of remote booking-on spot checks, out-of-hours checks, and remote monitoring of the use of safety-critical equipment (including the use of OTDR data));
- e. the guidance issued by ORR and RSSB about fatigue management, in particular sleep risk assessments when booking-on duty, and a culture of trust and openness in fatigue management; and
- f. the need for a revision of its training practices and materials for drivers, conductors and controllers to explain the rationale that underpins the rules and to emphasise the benefits of compliance (as well as describing the rules and the consequences of non-compliance).

Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)

ORR reports that ATW has taken a series of actions to address this recommendation. This includes a review of all route risk assessments, revised monitor requirements for checking depots (covering management checks processes), guidance to its staff for coping with fatigue and a review of its training practices and materials. The RAIB is concerned to understand the outcome of the work undertaken by the ATW fatigue management working group and has sought further information from the ORR. \$b

5 06/06/2013 11/2014

Near-miss at Llandoverly level crossing

Status: Implementation ongoing

The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk of error at traincrew operated level crossings by providing positive indications of the status of those crossings.

Network Rail should review the current arrangements for providing an indication to the train driver of the status of the crossing at Llandoverly. This should include consideration of the practicability of providing an active indication when the crossing is still open to road traffic (eg a flashing red light). This review should then be extended to other traincrew operated level crossings of a similar design (paragraphs 106a, 106b and 107).

ORR has reported that Network Rail has outlined the actions to be taken in response to the recommendation. ORR will continue to monitor implementation of this recommendation. Update 31/08/16.

**Number/ Date/ Report No/
Inv Title / Current Status**

6 06/06/2013 11/2014

Near-miss at Llandoverly level crossing

Status: Implemented

Safety Recommendation

The intent of this recommendation is to control the risk created by traincrew continuing to operate trains in service where there is evidence that their actions contributed to a serious operational incident.

Arriva Trains Wales should review and improve the training and guidance given to its duty control managers on the steps to be taken when traincrew are involved in a serious operating incident where their actions directly contributed to it (paragraph 109).

**Summary of current status (based on latest report
from the relevant safety authority or public body)**

ORR has reported that Arriva Trains Wales has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.