

Recommendation Status Report: Dangerous occurrence involving an engineering train at Blatchbridge Junction, near Frome

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of the recommendation(s), as reported to us, are described by the following categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Open (replaces Progressing and Implementation On-going)	Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing.
Closed (replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non-implementation)	ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken.
Insufficient response:	The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is insufficient evidence to support no action being taken.
Superseded:	The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concern over the way that an organisation has responded to a recommendation are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Recommendation Status Report



Report Title	Dangerous occurrence involving an engineering train at Blatchbridge Junction, near Frome
Report Number	15/2013
Date of Incident	19/03/2012

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
15/2013/06	Closed - IA	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is for Matisa to consider all working modes of a machine when designing component mounting arrangements.</p> <p>Matisa (UK) Ltd should modify its processes for designing on-track machines so that it includes the assessment of all modes of operation when designing component mounting arrangements. This includes the mounting arrangements on machines that can operate in a defined 'working mode' (ie at slow-speed) as well as travelling at higher speeds (ie being hauled) (paragraphs 112a and 114).</p>	ORR has reported that other recommendations have resulted in vehicle owners/maintainers carrying out their own reviews of the relevant issues covered by this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
15/2013/07	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk of the P3 cab of P95 machines outside the United Kingdom detaching due to fastening failure.</p> <p>Matisa (UK) Ltd should communicate the findings from this report to operators and maintainers of P95 machines outside the United Kingdom with advice on necessary measures to reduce the likelihood of the P3 cab becoming detached and falling onto the track due to the failure of the fastening system (paragraphs 112a, 112b, 112c, 113c, 113b and 114).</p>	Matisa (UK) Ltd has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
15/2013/01	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk of items of attached equipment falling from on-track machines onto the track.</p> <p>Network Rail should arrange for the maintainers and operators of its on-track machines to carry out a review of those machines and identify items</p>	ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes

Recommendation Status Report



			<p>of attached equipment that have the potential to be a threat to safety should the securing systems fail. For each item identified, the following steps should be taken:</p> <p>a) improve the design and/or maintenance arrangements to decrease the likelihood of the securing system failing; or fit secondary retention systems to prevent attached equipment falling onto the track should the securing system fail;</p> <p>b) consider the use of movement ‘tell tales’ to help identify bolts that are becoming loose; and</p> <p>c) describe the action that should be taken if attached equipment has been subjected to unusual loadings (such as impact or derailment forces) that may have affected the security of the fastening arrangements (for example, an assessment of the integrity of the fastening arrangements by a competent person) (paragraphs 112b, 112c, 113a, 113b and 114).</p>	<p>to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
15/2013/02	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk of staff misunderstanding the activities that need to be undertaken while maintaining on-track machines.</p> <p>Taking into account the output from implementing recommendation 1, Network Rail, in consultation with the maintainers and operators of its on-track machines, should review and improve the maintenance instructions for each machine. As a minimum, the review should include consideration of:</p> <p>a) the clarity of the description of activities to be performed and the sufficiency of the technical detail included;</p> <p>b) the provision of key information such as torque settings at those points within maintenance instructions where the maintainer is required to use them;</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>

Recommendation Status Report



			<p>c) the clarity with which technical terms are described; and</p> <p>d) mandating checks to confirm that maintenance technicians are referring to maintenance instructions and that, where prescribed in the manufacturers maintenance instructions, the correct torque values are being used (paragraphs 112c and 114).</p>	
15/2013/03	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to extend the scope of recommendations 1 and 2 to include all on-track machines that may operate on Network Rail infrastructure.</p> <p>Network Rail should implement a process to require that the owners of all on-track machines that operate on its infrastructure implement measures consistent with the intent of Recommendations 1, 2 and 5 (paragraphs 112b, 112c, 113a, 113b and 114).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
15/2013/04	Closed - IA	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is for Matisa to provide clear instructions so that the necessary maintenance tasks are carried out.</p> <p>Matisa (UK) Ltd should, in consultation with its customers, improve the clarity of the maintenance instructions for its on-track machines. As a minimum, the following improvements should be made:</p> <p>a) describe maintenance activities with sufficient technical detail;</p> <p>b) define the meaning of key terms that are otherwise open to interpretation such as 'check the integrity';</p> <p>c) identify which fastenings could pose a risk to safety should they fail;</p> <p>d) include key values, such as torque settings, at those points within maintenance instructions where the maintainer is required to use them; and</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed the actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate..</p>

Recommendation Status Report



			e) describe the action that should be taken if attached equipment has been subjected to unusual loadings (such as impact or derailment forces) that may have affected the security of the fastening arrangements (for example, an assessment of the integrity of the fastening arrangements by a competent person) (paragraphs 112c, 113a, 113b and 114).	
15/2013/05	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to promote the early identification of corrosion on the bolts/fastenings of high-risk equipment so that corrective action can be taken.</p> <p>Network Rail, in consultation with the maintainers of its on-track machines, and taking into account the output from implementing recommendation 1, should enhance the inspection arrangements for its on-track machines by including a periodic cycle of visual inspections of high-risk fastenings (dismantling the mounting arrangement if necessary) to detect the presence of corrosion. Where corrosion of a bolt/fastening is identified, the source of the corrosion should be found and eliminated where possible. Where this is not possible, the relevant maintenance instructions should be enhanced to include the requirement for more frequent replacement of affected bolts/fastenings (paragraphs 112b and 112c).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>