




Recommendation(s) Status: Derailment of a freight train at Shrewsbury station, 7 July 2012

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following.

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on ORR's report to RAIB)
<p>1 07/07/2012 08/2013</p> <p>Derailment of a freight train at Shrewsbury station</p> <p>Status: Implementation ongoing</p>	<p>The purpose of this recommendation is for Network Rail to ensure that the risk-based approach to inspection of points to reduce the risk of derailment, as intended by TRK/053 and as mandated by TRK/001, is correctly implemented by all of its maintenance delivery units.</p> <p>Network Rail should identify the maintenance delivery units which have not correctly adopted the risk-based approach to inspection of points intended by TRK/053 and mandated by TRK/001. It should then re-brief these maintenance delivery units on the requirement in TRK/001 and undertake follow up compliance monitoring activities to confirm that each maintenance delivery unit has adopted an appropriate regime, that all points have been the subject of a risk assessment and that all high-risk points are the subject of regular periodic TRK/053 detailed inspections (paragraph 84a).</p>	<p>Network Rail has reported to ORR that it is briefing the requirements of the current standard, clarifying the need to identify the risk category of switches, and mandating the maintenance of a register of high risk switches. ORR are seeking further information. TD December 2014.</p>
<p>2 07/07/2012 08/2013</p> <p>Derailment of a freight train at Shrewsbury station</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The purpose of this recommendation is to ensure that Network Rail's update of TRK/053 in response to Recommendation 2 of the RAIB report (18/2012) regarding the Princes Street Gardens' derailment also includes the findings of this investigation that have not already been addressed by other actions. Network Rail should rewrite TRK/053, its supporting Track Engineering Form and associated training and competence assessment material to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • remove inconsistency between them (eg TRK/053 and TEF/3029) (paragraph 85b); • align the competence requirements for supervisors in TRK/053 and TRK/001 and define how supervisors must gain and retain this competence in areas where all detailed inspections are undertaken by others (paragraph 84b.iii); • make clear that a routine measurement (currently using a TGP8 gauge) to identify wear is mandatory (paragraph 84b.iii); and • mandate that the routine measurement should be repeated for points in both normal and reverse positions (paragraph 84b.ii). 	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>3 07/07/2012 08/2013</p> <p>Derailment of a freight train at Shrewsbury station</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The purpose of this recommendation is for Network Rail to consider whether it needs to mandate the removal and re-application of the grease during supervisor's visual inspections of points.</p> <p>Network Rail should determine if it is possible for supervisors to properly and reliably identify wear and damage and to use the TGP8 gauge without removing the grease and accumulated</p>	<p>Network Rail have reported to ORR that this recommendation, including the requirement to remove grease before undertaking switch inspections, has been addressed as part of its fundamental review of its application for the standard for switch inspections. Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>

**Number/ Date/ Report No/
Inv Title / Current Status**

Safety Recommendation

**Summary of current status (based on ORR's report to
RAIB)**

residue. Network Rail should also consider the risks associated with removing and re-applying the grease against the risks associated with a lack of detection of wear or damage. Depending on the outcome of this study, Network Rail should incorporate the findings into a future rewrite of TRK/053 (paragraphs 84b.i and 84b.iv).

4 07/07/2012 08/2013

Derailment of a freight train at Shrewsbury station

Status: Implemented

The purpose of this recommendation is to ensure that Freightliner assesses the risks of continued operation when deficiencies in its maintenance practices have been identified.

Freightliner should confirm that, where disparities are identified between working practices and the requirements of the maintenance instructions, it has arrangements in place to ensure that risks are adequately managed in the interim until the discrepancy is resolved (paragraph 85c).

Freightliner has reported to the ORR that a review of the procedure on managing change has been carried out and that they are confident that, when applied, the procedure will ensure that the risks associated with any identified deficiency in maintenance practices will be adequately assessed and managed.