Recommendation(s) Status: Dangerous occurrence involving track workers near Roydon station

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:


Key to Recommendation Status

| Implemented: | All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed. | |
|-----------------------------------|--|--|
| | | |
| Implemented by alternative means: | The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation. | |
| | | |
| Implementation ongoing: | Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered. | |
| | | |
| In-progress: | The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this. | |

| Non-implementation: Regula | ation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken. |
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| Awaiting response: | Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the | |
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| | recommendation. | |

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:





The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

| Number/ Date/ Report No Inv Title / Current Status | b/ | Safety Recommendation | Summary of current status (based on ORR's report to RAIB) |
|--|----|---|--|
| 1 16/07/2012 Dangerous occurrence inv near Roydon station Status: Implemented | | The intent of this recommendation is to improve the means by which controllers of site safety assess both the required and available sighting distance at sites of work. Network Rail should review, and then improve as appropriate, the methods by which controllers of site safety assess both the required and the available sighting distance when at sites of work. The review should include: • Ithe accuracy, availability and presentation of information concerning the available sighting distances at sites of work (particularly in those areas where sighting is limited, or too short to permit a sufficient warning from one or more lookouts); • Identification of recommended methods of assessing sighting distance when on site (including the use of special equipment); and • Ithe adequacy of existing training and assessments of competence related to the assessment of sighting (paragraph 93a). | ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate. The RAIB is concerned that the response does not address the first bullet of the recommendation. However, NR/ORR are content that the first bullet should be addressed in another way. The RAIB considers that the Planning and Delivering Safe work programme will help with the implementation of bullet 1. Bullets 2 and 3 have been implemented. Insufficient concern for a triangle. |
| 2 16/07/2012 Dangerous occurrence invinear Roydon station Status: Implemented | | The intent of this recommendation is to improve the planning of work on lines that are still open to traffic ('Red Zone working') such that the controller of site safety is provided with an adequate safe system of work pack. Network Rail should review, and then improve as appropriate, the methods by which planners assess the suitability of 'Red Zone working' when selecting an appropriate safe system of work. The review should include: I the availability and presentation of information on sighting distances and warning times; I an assessment of when and how the available information is generally used by planners and any barriers to its use; I the means by which planners are informed of locations at which multiple lookouts or special equipment are needed in order to provide sufficient warning; and I the means by which planners are informed of locations at which it is impossible for lookout(s) to provide sufficient warning without the use of special equipment. (paragraph 93c) | ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate. \$W |