## Recommendation(s) Status: Derailment at Bletchley Junction, Bletchley

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

## Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.	
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.	
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.	
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.	

Non-implementation: Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be t	ken.
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# Awaiting response: Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following.





The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

umber/ Date/ Report No/	
Inv Title / Current Status	

1 03/02/2012 24/2012 Derailment at Bletchley Junction, Bletchley Status: Implemented	The intention of this recommendation is that Virgin Trains' drivers have sufficient competence in route knowledge and that this knowledge is regularly reinforced by practical application. Virgin Trains should review, and amend as necessary, its route knowledge training and assessment process so that the risk from drivers exceeding permissible speeds at diverging junctions is adequately controlled. The review should consider the need to reinforce the knowledge by driving over the routes concerned, cab simulation, video based scenario training, or other suitable techniques, and the required frequency of each (paragraph 115a(i)). Note that the principle applied by this recommendation may apply to other train operators.	Virgin Trains has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
2 03/02/2012 24/2012 Derailment at Bletchley Junction, Bletchley Status: Implemented	<ul> <li>The intention of this recommendation is that, at potentially high risk diverging junctions, such as those where the approach speed is 60 mph (96 km/h) or greater and requiring a reduction in speed of a third or more, the risk from a train overspeeding on a diverging route following the clearance of the junction signal under approach control conditions is reduced. Different or additional mitigation may be justified depending on the level of risk identified; this may include replacement by position light junction indicators; replacement of junction indicator by one in modern equivalent form; alteration to signalling controls etc.</li> <li>Network Rail, in conjunction with train operators, should assess the risk from overspeeding at potentially high risk diverging junctions with approach control following the clearance of the junction signal. As a minimum, the scope should include consideration of:</li> <li>I junction signals fitted with standard alphanumeric route indicators; and</li> <li>I the type of traction using the junction and its ability to accelerate following the clearance of the junction signal from red.</li> <li>The outcome of the risk assessments should be used to determine whether different/additional mitigation is required (paragraph 115a(iii))</li> </ul>	ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

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Derailment at Bletchley Junction, Bletchley

Status: Implemented

#### **Safety Recommendation**

The intention of this recommendation is to clarify the safety significance of the Weekly Operating Notice with respect to the information that drivers need to know and the best way to present and distribute this information.

Network Rail, in conjunction with train operating companies, should review and where necessary modify the Weekly Operating Notice to identify the information that drivers need to assure safety and how this content is presented so that it can be readily assimilated (paragraph 116a).

# Summary of current status (based on ORR's report to RAIB)

Network Rail has carried out a review in response to this recommendation and proposes no further action. Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

RAIB notes that Network Rail does not intend to revise the weekly operating notice at this stage. However, it is encouraged that the industry has identified the introduction of electronic publications as a future opportunity to consider format change in collaboration with industry partners.