

## Recommendation(s) Status: Safety incident between Dock Junction and Kentish Town

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

### Key to Recommendation Status

<b>Implemented:</b>	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
<b>Implemented by alternative means:</b>	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
<b>Implementation ongoing:</b>	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
<b>In-progress:</b>	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
<b>Non-implementation:</b>	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
<b>Awaiting response:</b>	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

1            26/05/2011    07/2012  
Safety incident between Dock Junction and  
Kentish Town  
Status: Implemented

The intent of this recommendation is to improve the way in which incidents involving stranded trains are currently handled across the network with a view to implementing good practice and with the objective of train operators reviewing existing protocols, or jointly developing and agreeing with Network Rail new protocols, that can be applied to the management of all such events.

Train operating companies and Network Rail routes over which they operate, should review existing protocols, or jointly develop a new protocol, for stranded trains in accordance with the contents of ATOC / Network Rail Good Practice Guide GPD SP01 'Meeting the needs of passengers when trains are stranded'. The protocols should also consider:

I the key findings from this investigation;

I the different arrangements in place for the interface between Network Rail and train operators' control functions;

I the different approaches to managing incidents and good practice applied in different parts of the main-line and other railway networks;

I the need to identify who will take the lead role in managing the incident and how key decisions will be recorded and shared between the affected organisations;

I the need to provide on site support to the traincrew of such trains in managing passengers' needs;

I the need to provide technical support to the train crew of stranded trains, with a particular focus on means of communicating and the need for coordinating the technical and operational response to such incidents;

I the need to recognise when minor operational occurrences have the potential to develop into major incidents unless decisions are taken in a timely and decisive manner;

I the views of passenger interest groups and emergency services: and

I the positive and negative role that can be played by social networking sites in the management of such incidents

Train operating companies and Network Rail have reported that they have taken actions in response to this recommendation. Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

**Number/ Date/ Report No/  
Inv Title / Current Status**

**Safety Recommendation**

**Summary of current status (based on latest report from  
the relevant safety authority or public body)**

2            26/05/2011    07/2012  
Safety incident between Dock Junction and  
Kentish Town  
Status: Implemented

The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that First Capital Connect safety related processes in relation to emergency preparedness are managed effectively.

First Capital Connect should carry out a review of its management processes referred to in this report to examine why it did not identify and address deficiencies in emergency preparedness prior to the incident. The lessons learnt from this review should lead to changes in management systems to provide confidence that all such deficiencies will be identified in the future (paragraphs 190h, 192a, 192c, 192f and 196f).

First Capital Connect has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

3            26/05/2011    07/2012  
Safety incident between Dock Junction and  
Kentish Town  
Status: Implemented

The intent of this recommendation is for safety related lessons learnt during Significant Performance Incident Reviews and other incident review processes to be effectively tracked, implemented and shared with other railway operators, as appropriate.

Network Rail and the train operators should amend their processes so that safety lessons identified during Significant Performance Incident Reviews and other incident review processes can be effectively monitored through to closure, and actions taken as appropriate. The process should also include a mechanism for advising other railway operators of safety lessons that may be relevant to them (paragraph 192e).

ORR has informed the RAIB that most Train Operating Companies have reported the process they have in place to ensure that safety related lessons are identified from Significant Performance Incident Reviews. The RAIB is concerned the process should also include a mechanism for advising other railway operators of safety lessons. ORR advise that this is done by means of the industry's Safety Management Information System, operational safety meetings and notices.